PART I.

The days are gone by when, for dynastical ends, small armies of

professional soldiers went to war to conquer a city, or a province, and

then sought winter quarters or made peace. The wars of the present day

call whole nations to arms; there is scarcely a family that has not had

to bewail lost ones. The entire financial resources of the State are

appropriated to military purposes, and the seasons of the year have no

influence on the unceasing progress of hostilities. As long as nations

exist distinct one from the other there will be quarrels that can only

be settled by force of arms; but, in the interests of humanity, it is to

be hoped that wars will become the less frequent, as they become the

more terrible.

Generally speaking, it is no longer the ambition of monarchs which

endangers peace; but the impulses of a nation, its dissatisfaction with

its internal conditions, the strife of parties and the intrigues of

their leaders. A declaration of war, so serious in its consequences, is

more easily carried by a large assembly, of which no one of the members

bears the sole responsibility, than by a single individual, however

lofty his position; and a peace-loving sovereign is less rare than a

parliament composed of wise men. The great wars of recent times have

been declared against the wish and will of the reigning powers.

Now-a-days the Bourse possesses so great influence that it is able to

have armies called into the field merely to protect its interests.

Mexico and Egypt have had European armies of occupation inflicted upon

them simply to satisfy the demands of the _haute finance_. To-day the

question is not so much whether a nation is strong enough to make war,

as whether its Government is powerful enough to prevent war. For

example, united Germany has hitherto used her strength only to maintain

European peace; while the weakness of a neighbouring Government

continues to involve the gravest risk of war.

It was, indeed, from such a condition of relations that the war of

1870--71 originated. A Napoleon on the throne of France was bound to

justify his pretensions by political and military successes. Only

temporarily was the French nation contented by the victories of its arms

in remote fields of war; the triumphs of the Prussian armies excited

jealousy, they were regarded as arrogant, as a challenge; and the French

demanded revenge for Sadowa. The liberal spirit of the epoch set itself

against the autocratic Government of the Emperor; he was forced to make

concessions, his internal authority was weakened, and one day the nation

was informed by its representatives that it desired war with Germany.

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.

The wars carried on by France beyond seas, essentially on behalf of

financial interests, had consumed immense sums and had undermined the

discipline of the army. Her army was by no means in thorough

preparedness for a great war, but, in the temper of the nation, the

Spanish succession question furnished an opportune pretext on which to

go to war. The French Reserves were called out on July 15th, and, as if

the opportunity for a rupture was on no account to be let slip, only

four days later the French declaration of war was presented at Berlin.

One Division of the French Army was ordered to the Spanish frontier as a

corps of observation; only such troops as were absolutely necessary were

left in Algiers and in Civita Vecchia; Paris and Lyons were sufficiently

garrisoned. The entire remainder of the army: 332 battalions, 220

squadrons, 924 guns, in all about 300,000 men, formed the Army of the

Rhine, which, divided into eight Corps, was, at any rate in the first

instance, to be under the sole direction of a central head. The Emperor

himself was the fitting person to undertake this weighty duty, pending

whose arrival Marshal Bazaine was to command the gathering forces.

It is very probable that the French reckoned on the old dissensions of

the German races. Not that they dared to look forward to the South

Germans as allies, but they hoped to paralyze their offensive by an

early victory, perhaps even to win them over to their side. It was true

that Prussia by herself was still a mighty antagonist, and that her

armed forces were of superior strength; but peradventure this advantage

might be counterbalanced by rapidity of action.

The French plan of campaign was indeed based on the delivery of sudden

unexpected attacks. The powerful fleet of war-ships and transports was

to be utilized to land a considerable force in Northern Prussia, which

should there engage a part of the Prussian troops, while the main body

of the German army, it was assumed, would await the first French attack

behind the strong defensive line of the Rhine. A French force was to

cross the Rhine promptly, at and below Strasburg, thus avoiding the

great German fortresses; its function being, at the very outset of the

campaign, to cut off the South-German army charged with the defence of

the Black Forest, and prevent it from effecting a junction with the

North Germans. In the execution of this plan it was imperative that

the main body of the French army should be massed in Alsace. Railway

accommodation, however, was so inadequate that in the first instance it

was only possible to transport 100,000 men to Strasburg; 150,000 had to

leave the railway at Metz, and remain there till they could be moved

forward. Fifty thousand men in the Chalons camp were intended to serve

as supports, and 115 battalions were destined for field service as soon

as the National Guard should relieve them in the interior. The various

Corps were distributed as follows:--

Imperial Guard, General Bourbaki--Nancy.

Ist Corps, Marshal MacMahon--Strasburg.

IInd Corps, General Frossard--St. Avold.

IIIrd Corps, Marshal Bazaine--Metz.

IVth Corps, General Ladmirault--Thionville.

Vth Corps, General Failly--Bitsch.

VIth Corps, Marshal Canrobert--Chalons.

VIIth Corps, General Felix Douay--Belfort.

Thus while there were but two Corps in Alsace, there were five on the

Moselle; and, so early as the day of the declaration of war, one of the

latter, the IInd Corps, had been pushed forward close to the German

frontier, about St. Avold and Forbach. General Frossard, its commander,

was, however, under strict injunctions to commit himself to no serious

undertaking.

The regiments had been hurried away from their peace stations before the

arrival of their complement of men, and without waiting for their

equipments. Meanwhile the called-out reservists accumulated in the

depots, overflowed the railway stations and choked the traffic. Their

transmission to their destinations was at a standstill, for it was often

unknown at the depots where the regiments to which the reservists were

to be sent were for the time encamped. When at length they joined they

were destitute of the most necessary articles of equipment. The Corps

and Divisions lacked trains, hospitals and nearly the whole of the

_personnel_ of their administration. No magazines had been established

in advance, and the troops were to depend on the stores in the

fortresses. These were in a neglected state, for in the assured

expectation that the armies would be almost immediately launched into

the enemy's country they had received little attention. It was of a

piece with this that the French Staff-officers had been provided with

maps of Germany, but not of their own country. The Ministry of War in

Paris was overwhelmed with claims, protestations, and expostulations,

till finally it was left to the troops to help themselves as best they

could. "_On se debrouillera_," was the hope of the authorities.

When the Emperor arrived at Metz eight days after the declaration of

war, the forces were not yet up to their strength, and even the precise

whereabouts of whole bodies of troops was for the time unknown. He

ordered the advance of the army, but his Marshals protested that its

internal plight was so unsatisfactory as to make this impossible for the

time. The general conviction was gradually impressing itself on the

French, that instead of continuing to aim at invasion of the enemy's

country, their exertions would have to be confined to the defence of

their own territory. A strong German army was reported to be assembling

between Mayence and Coblentz; and instead of reinforcements being sent

forward from Metz to Strasburg, much heavier ones would have to be

ordered from the Rhine to the Saar. The determination to invade South

Germany was already abandoned; the fleet sailed, but without carrying a

force to be landed on the north German coast.

Germany had been surprised by the declaration of war, but she was not

unprepared. That was a possibility which had been foreseen.

After the withdrawal of Austria from the German connection, Prussia had

taken upon itself the sole leadership, and had gradually formed closer

relations with the South-German States. The idea of national

unification had been revived, and found an echo in the patriotic

sentiments of the entire people.

The mobilization machinery of the North-German army had been elaborated

from year to year, in accord with the changing conditions, by the

combined exertions of the War Ministry and the General Staff. Every

branch of the administration throughout the country had been kept

informed of all it needed to know in this relation. The Berlin

authorities had also come to a confidential understanding with the

Chiefs of the General Staffs of the South-German States on all important

points. The principle was established that Prussian assistance was not

to be reckoned on for the defence of any particular point, such as the

Black Forest; and that South Germany would be best protected by an

offensive movement into Alsace from the middle Rhine, to be effectively

supported by a large army massed there. That the Governments of Bavaria,

Wuertemberg, Baden and Hesse, to all appearance uncovering their own

territories, were ready to place their contingents under the command of

King William, proved their entire confidence in the Prussian leadership.

This understanding enabled the preparations which it entailed to be

proceeded with. The train and march tables were worked out for each body

of troops, with the most minute directions as to the respective

starting-points, the day and hour of departure, the duration of the

journey, the refreshment stations, and points of detrainment. In the

locality of concentration cantonments were assigned to each Corps and

Division, and magazines were established with due regard to the most

convenient sites; and thus, when the stroke of war inevitably impended,

there was required only the Royal signature to start the whole mighty

movement in its smooth, swift course. Nothing needed to be changed in

the directions originally given; it sufficed to follow the plans

previously thought out and prepared.

The aggregated mobile forces were formed into three separate Armies, on

the basis of an elaborate tabular statement drawn up by the Chief of the

Prussian General Staff.

The Ist Army, under the command of General von Steinmetz, consisted of,

in the first instance, only the VIIth and VIIIth Corps, with one

Division of cavalry; 60,000 men all told. It was ordered to assemble at

Wittlich and form the right wing.

The IInd Army, under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, consisted

of the IIIrd, IVth, Xth, and Guard Corps, with two Divisions of cavalry.

Assembling in the vicinity of Homburg and Neunkirchen, it was to form

the centre, with a strength of 134,000 men.

The IIIrd Army, under the command of the Crown Prince of Prussia,

consisted of the Vth and XIth Prussian, and the Ist and IInd Bavarian

Corps, the Wuertemberg and Baden Field Divisions, with one Division of

cavalry. Its approximate strength was 130,000 men; it was to constitute

the left wing, and to concentrate about Landau and Rastatt.

The IXth Corps, consisting of the 18th and the Hesse Divisions, was

along with the XIIth Royal Saxon Corps to form a reserve of 60,000 men

in front of Mayence, for the reinforcement of the IInd Army to a

strength of 194,000 men.

The three Armies numbered together 384,000 men.

There still remained the Ist, IInd, and VIth Corps, numbering 100,000

men; but they were not at first included, as railway transport for them

was not available for three weeks to come. The 17th Division and certain

bodies of Landwehr troops were detailed to defend the coasts.

It is apparent that numerically the German armies were considerably

superior to the French. Inclusive of the garrisons and reserves about

one million of men and over 200,000 horses were on the ration list.

On the night of July 16th the Royal order for mobilization was issued,

and when his Majesty arrived in Mayence fourteen days later, he found

300,000 men assembled on the Rhine and beyond.

The plan of campaign submitted by the Chief of the General Staff, and

accepted by the King, proves that officer to have had his eye fixed,

from the first, upon the capture of the enemy's capital, the possession

of which is of more importance in France than in other countries. On the

way thither the hostile forces were to be driven as persistently as

possible back from the fertile southern provinces into the more confined

background to the north. But beyond everything the plan of campaign was

based on the resolve to attack the enemy at once, wherever found, and

keep the German forces always so compact that this could be done with

the advantage of superior numbers. The specific dispositions for the

accomplishment of those objects were left to be adopted on the spot; the

advance to the frontier was alone pre-arranged in every detail.

It is a delusion to imagine that a plan of campaign can be laid down far

ahead and fulfilled with exactitude. The first collision with the enemy

creates a new situation in accordance with its result. Some things

intended will have become impracticable; others, which originally seemed

impossible, become feasible. All that the leader of an army can do is to

form a correct estimate of the circumstances, to decide for the best for

the moment, and carry out his purpose unflinchingly.

The advance of the French troops to the frontier, while as yet

imperfectly mobilized, which was an extremely hazardous measure in

itself, was evidently with the intent of utilizing the temporary

advantage of having a superior force at immediate disposition by taking

at unawares the German armies in the act of developing their

advance-movements. But, notwithstanding, the German commanders did not

deviate from their purpose of promptly effecting this first advance in

front of the Rhine. The railway transport of the Corps of the IInd and

IIIrd Armies, however, ended at the Rhine; thence the troops marched on

foot into the cantonments prepared on the left bank of the river. They

moved in echelon, advancing only so many at a time as would make room

for the body in rear, in the first instance to the line

Bingen-Duerkheim-Landau. The farther advance towards the frontier was not

to be undertaken until the Divisions and Corps were all assembled, and

provided with the necessary trains; and then they were to march forward

in a state of readiness to confront the enemy at any moment.

The massing of the Ist Army appeared to be less threatened, because its

route was protected by neutral territory, and was covered by the

garrisons of Treves, Saarlouis and Saarbruecken, the German outposts on

the Saar.

The Ist Army, 50,000 strong, was concentrated at Wadern, in the first

days of August. The IInd Army, which meanwhile had been increased to a

strength of 194,000 men, had pushed forward its cantonments to

Alsenz-Guennstadt, at the farther base of the Haardt Mountains, a

position which had been thoroughly inspected by an officer of the

General Staff, and where the troops might confidently await an attack.

The 5th and 6th cavalry Divisions were reconnoitring the country in

front. The IIIrd Army was still assembling on both banks of the Rhine.

The French so far had made no serious attempt at Saarbruecken;

Lieutenant-Colonel Pestel, with one battalion and three squadrons, was

able successfully to withstand their petty attacks. It had meanwhile

been observed that the hostile forces were moving farther to the right,

towards Forbach and Bitsch. This seemed to indicate that the two French

Corps known to be about Belfort and Strasburg, might purpose crossing

the Rhine and marching through the Black Forest. It seemed therefore all

the more important that the IIIrd Army should be set in motion as early

as possible, for one thing to protect the right bank of the Upper Rhine

by an advance on the left; for another, to cover the left flank of the

IInd Army during its advance.

A telegraphic order to that effect was despatched on the evening of July

30th, but the Head-quarters of the IIIrd Army wished to wait for the

arrival of the VIth Corps and of the trains. Whereupon, regardless of

this delay, the IInd Army was put in march towards the Saar, where the

French were beginning to be active.

The time had gone by when they might have taken advantage of their

over-hasty mobilization; the inefficient condition of the troops had

paralyzed every attempt at activity. France had been long waiting for

the news of a victory, and something had to be done to appease public

impatience. So, in order to do something, it was resolved (as is usual

in such circumstances) to undertake a reconnoissance in force, and, it

may be added, with the usual result.

On August 2nd three entire Army Corps were set in motion against three

battalions, four squadrons, and one battery in Saarbruecken. The Emperor

himself and the Prince Imperial shared in the enterprise. The IIIrd

Corps advanced on Voelklingen, the Vth through Saargemuend, the IInd on

Saarbruecken.

Saarbruecken was evacuated after a gallant defence and repeated

counter-strokes, but the French did not press across the Saar;

convinced, possibly, that they had wasted their strength in a stroke in

the air, and had nowhere gained any insight into the dispositions of the

enemy.

The French military chiefs now hesitated for a long while between

conflicting resolutions. Orders were given and recalled on the strength

of mere rumours. The left wing was reinforced because 40,000 Prussians

were supposed to have marched through Treves, the Guard received

contradictory orders, and the bare apparition of a small German force

about Loerrach in the Black Forest occasioned the order that the VIIth

Corps must remain in Alsace. Thus the French forces were straggled over

the wide area between the Nied and the Upper Rhine, while the Germans

were advancing in compact masses towards the Saar.

This scattered state of their forces finally induced the French leaders

to divide them into two separate Armies. Marshal MacMahon took command,

but only provisionally, of the Ist, VIIth, and Vth Corps, of which the

latter had therefore to draw in to him from Bitsch. The other Corps

remained under Marshal Bazaine, with the exception of the Imperial

Guard, the command of which the Emperor reserved to himself.

It had now become a pressing necessity to protect the left wing of the

advancing IInd German Army against the French forces in Alsace, and the

IIIrd Army was therefore ordered to cross the frontier on August 4th,

without waiting any longer for its trains. The Ist Army, forming the

right wing, was in complete readiness near Wadern and Losheim, three or

four days' march nearer to the Saar than the IInd Army in the centre. It

received the order to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Tholey and

there halt for the present. For one thing, this army, the weakest of the

three, could not be exposed single-handed to an encounter with the

enemy's main force; and for another, it was available to serve as an

offensive flank in case the IInd Army should meet the enemy on emerging

from the forest zone of the Palatinate.

In the execution of this order, the Ist Army had so extended its

cantonments southward that they trenched on the line of march of the

IInd Army, and it had to evacuate the quarters about Ottweiler in favour

of the latter. This involved a difficulty, as all the villages to the

north were full, and as room had also to be found for the Ist Corps, now

advancing by Birkenfeld. General von Steinmetz therefore decided to

march his whole army in the direction of Saarlouis and Saarbruecken. The

IInd Army, on August 4th, stood assembled ready for action, and received

orders to deploy on the farther side of the forest zone of

Kaiserslautern.

COMBAT OF WEISSENBURG.

(August 4th.)

On this day the Corps of the IIIrd Army, consisting of 128 battalions,

102 squadrons, and 80 batteries, which had been assembled in bivouac

behind the Klingsbach, crossed the French frontier, marching on a broad

front to reach the Lauter between Weissenburg and Lauterburg. This

stream affords an exceptionally strong defensive position, but on August

4th only one weak Division and a cavalry brigade of the Ist French Corps

covered this point, the main body of that Corps being still on the march

towards the Palatinate.

Early in the morning the Bavarians forming the right wing encountered a

lively resistance before the walls of Weissenburg, which were too strong

to be stormed. But very soon after the two Prussian Corps crossed the

Lauter lower down. General von Bose led forward the XIth Corps (which he

commanded) with intent to turn the French right flank on the Geisberg,

while General von Kirchbach, with the Vth Corps (which he commanded)

advanced against the enemy's front. Thirty field-guns were meanwhile

massed against the railway station of Weissenburg. It and subsequently

the town were taken, after a bloody struggle.

So early as ten o'clock General Douay had ordered a retreat, which was

seriously threatened by the movement against the Geisburg; and the

chateau of that name, a very defensible building, was most obstinately

defended to enable the French to retire. The Grenadiers of the King's

Regiment No. 7 in vain assailed it by storm, suffering heavy loss; nor

did its defenders surrender until, with the greatest difficulty,

artillery had been dragged up on to the height.

The French Division, which had been attacked by three German Corps,

effected a retreat after an obstinate struggle, though in great

disorder, having suffered much loss. Its gallant Commander had been

killed. The Germans had to bewail a proportionately considerable loss;

their casualties were 91 officers and 1460 men. General von Kirchbach

had been wounded while fighting in the foremost rank.

The 4th Division of cavalry had met with much delay in the course of a

nineteen miles' march by the crossing of the columns of infantry. It did

not reach the scene of combat, and all touch of the enemy, now retiring

to the westward, was lost.

Uncertain as to the direction whence fresh hostile forces might be

approaching, the IIIrd Army advanced on the 5th of August by diverging

roads in the direction of Hagenau and Reichshofen; yet not so far apart

but that it should be possible for the Corps to reconcentrate in one

short march. The Crown Prince intended to allow his troops a rest on the

following day, so as to have them fresh for a renewed attack as soon as

the situation was made clear.

But already, that same evening, the Bavarians on the right flank and the

Vth Corps in the front had a sharp encounter with the enemy, who showed

behind the Sauer in considerable strength. It was to be assumed that

Marshal MacMahon had brought up the VIIth Corps from Strasburg, but it

remained a question whether he intended to join Marshal Bazaine by way

of Bitsch, or whether, having secured his line of retreat thither, he

meant to accept battle at Woerth. Yet again there was the possibility

that he might himself initiate the offensive. The Crown Prince, to make

sure in any case of a preponderance of force, determined to concentrate

his army in the neighbourhood of Sulz on August 6th. The IInd Bavarian

Corps received separate instructions to watch the road from Bitsch with

one Division; the other Division was to strike the hostile attack in

flank on the western bank of the Sauer, in the event of artillery fire

about Woerth being heard.

Marshal MacMahon was endeavouring with all his might to concentrate his

three Corps, and he really had the intention to make an immediate attack

on his invading foe. A Division of the VIIth Corps, which had but just

been sent to Muelhausen to strengthen the defence of Alsace, was at once

recalled to Hagenau, and early on the 6th formed the right wing of the

strong position which the Ist Corps had taken up behind the Sauer, and

in front of Froeschwiller, Elsasshausen, and Eberbach. On the left,

Lespart's Division of the Vth Corps was expected from Bitsch, of which

the other Divisions were only now on march from Saargemuend by way of

Rohrbach. Meanwhile Ducrot's Division formed a refused flank on the

French left.

Neither the German nor the French leaders expected the collision before

the following day, but when, as in this case, the adversaries are in so

close proximity, the conflict may break out at any moment, even against

the wish of the higher commanders.

BATTLE OF WOeRTH.

(August 6th.)

After a good deal of skirmishing between the respective outposts during

the night, the Commander of the 20th German Brigade[1] thought it

expedient to seize a passage over the Sauer, which flowed just in his

front and constituted a serious obstacle. The bridge leading to Woerth

had been destroyed, but the sharp-shooters waded through the river, and

at seven o'clock pressed into the town, which the French had left

unoccupied.

Soon enough they realized that before them was a numerous enemy in a

strong position.

The broad meadows of the Sauer all lie within effective range of the

commanding slopes on the right bank; and the long-ranging chassepot fire

could not but tell heavily. On the French side of the river the terrain

was dotted with vineyards and hop-gardens, which afforded great

advantages for defensive purposes.

The combat which had begun at Woerth was broken off after lasting half an

hour, but the artillery of both sides had taken part in it, and the

sound of cannon-fire had been the signal prescribed to Hartmann's IInd

Bavarian Corps, acting on which it now advanced from Langensulzbach, and

was soon engaged in a brisk fight with the left flank of the French. The

latter on their side had advanced on their right to the attack of

Gunstett, where they came in contact with the advancing XIth Prussian

Corps.

The din of battle, rolling from the north and south alike, was heard by

the Vth Corps in its position opposite to Woerth; and it seemed

imperative that it should engage with vigour the enemy's centre in order

to hinder him from throwing himself with all his strength on one or

other of the German flanks.

The artillery was brought up, and by ten o'clock 108 guns were in action

on the eastern slope of the Sauer valley.

Some infantry detachments waded breast-high through the river, but this

dashing attempt, undertaken in inadequate strength, miscarried, and it

was only by strenuous efforts that a foothold was maintained on the

other side.

The Crown Prince sent orders that nothing was to be undertaken that

would bring on a battle on that day. But by this time the Vth Corps was

so seriously engaged that the fight could not be broken off without

obvious disadvantage. General von Kirchbach therefore determined to

continue the contest on his own responsibility.

The frontal attack was an undertaking of great difficulty, and could

scarcely succeed unless with the co-operation of another on the flank.

But at this juncture the Bavarians, who, in position as they were on the

right, could have afforded this co-operation, obeyed the breaking off

command, which had also reached them in the course of the fighting, and

withdrew to Langensulzbach. There was, however, the XIth Corps in

position on the left, eager to strike in. It seized the Albrechts-haeuser

farm, and pressed forward into the Niederwald.

In front of Woerth the battle hung, consisting of a succession of attacks

renewed again and again on either side; each assailant in turn getting

worsted, in consequence of the nature of the country. By degrees,

however, the collective battalions, and finally the artillery of the Vth

Corps, were brought over to the west bank of the Sauer; while the XIth

Corps had already won there a firm point of support for further advance.

Just then, near Morsbronn, notwithstanding the evident unfavourable

nature of the ground, two Cuirassier and one Lancer regiments of

Michel's brigade hurled themselves with reckless daring on a body of

German infantry taken in the act of wheeling to the right. But the 32nd

Regiment, far from seeking cover, received in open order the charging

mass of over 1000 horse with a steady fire which did great execution.

The Cuirassiers especially suffered immense loss. Only a few horsemen

broke through the firing line and gained the open ground; many were

taken prisoners in the village, the remainder rode in wild gallop as

far as Walburg. There they encountered the Prussian 13th Hussars,

suffered further loss, and disappeared from the field.

It is true that the infantry of the French right wing succeeded in

driving back the foremost detachments of the Germans about

Albrechts-haeuser farm, but the further advance of the former was

shattered by the fire of newly-unmasked artillery.

When finally the last battalions had crossed the Sauer, the XIth Corps

made its way through the Niederwald, fighting its way step by step. The

northern edge of the forest was reached by 2.30, and there a junction

was formed with the left flank of the Vth Corps. The burning village of

Elsasshausen was carried by storm, and the little copse south of

Froeschwiller was also won after a gallant defence.

Thus crowded together in a limited space, the French army was in a

situation of imminent danger. Its left flank, it is true, still held out

against the renewed attack of the Bavarians, who had re-entered the

action, but its front and right flank were terribly hard pressed, and

even its retreat was seriously threatened. Marshal MacMahon therefore

tried to obtain a breathing space by a heavy counter-stroke to the

south. The weak German detachments standing to the east of Elsasshausen,

thrown into confusion by the vehement attack, were in part driven back

into the Niederwald, but were quickly rallied and brought up again. Here

the French cavalry strove once more to change the fortunes of the day.

Bonnemain's Division, notwithstanding the unfavourable nature of the

ground, threw itself on the dishevelled front of the enemy, suffered

terrible losses, and was shattered without having been able effectively

to charge home.

The Wuertembergers now came up from the south, and the Bavarians from the

north. General von Bose, though twice wounded, led what of his troops

he could collect to the storm of the burning Froeschwiller, the enemy's

last stronghold. The artillery moved up within case-shot range, and thus

cleared the road for the infantry which was pushing forward from all

sides. After maintaining to the utmost a resolute and gallant resistance

until five o'clock, the French retreated in great disorder towards

Reichshofen and Niederbronn.

At the Falkenstein stream, Lespart's Division, just arrived on the

field, made a short stand, but these fresh troops offered only brief

resistance, and were swept away in the general rout.

This victory of the IIIrd Army had been dearly paid for with the loss of

489 officers and 10,000 men. The loss on the French side is not exactly

known, but of prisoners alone they left 200 officers and 9000 men, and

in the German hands there remained 33 guns and 2000 horses.

The disintegration of the French army must have been so complete as to

throw it altogether out of hand. Only one brigade of Lespart's Division

took the road by Bitsch to join the French main army at St. Avold; all

the rest of the army, following an infectious impulse, rolled

unhaltingly in a south-western direction towards Saverne.

As in the Head-quarter of the IIIrd Army it had not been intended to

fight on August 6th, the 4th Division of cavalry had not left its

quarters in the rear, and was therefore not available to take up the

pursuit; it did not reach Gunstett until nine o'clock in the evening.

But, in order to be at hand at any rate for the next day, Prince Albert

marched his command on during the night as far as Eberbach; after three

hours' rest he started again, and after covering thirty-six miles,[2]

came up in the evening with the rearguard of the enemy near Steinberg,

at the foot of the Vosges. Without infantry it would have been

impossible for the Division to push farther, but the sight of it gave

the enemy a fresh impulse of flight. The Ist Corps stampeded again in

the night and reached Saarburg, where it joined the Vth Corps. Thus the

French had a start of twenty-three and a half miles, and continued their

retreat on Luneville, unmolested by the Germans.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] General Walther von Montbary. It is Molkte's custom throughout this

work, except in regard to his prime aversion, Prince Frederick Charles,

to refrain from naming an officer whom by implication he is censuring,

but this is simply a _nuance_, since he specifies the culprit's military

position.

[2] Throughout the miles are English miles.

BATTLE OF SPICHEREN.

(August 6th.)

Let us now turn to the events which occurred, on this same 6th of

August, in another part of the theatre of war.

The IInd Army, its southern (left) flank covered by the IIIrd Army, had

been moving to the westward, while the Corps it still lacked were being

brought up by railway. Its leading Corps, having traversed unmolested

the long defiles of the forest-belt of Kaiserslautern, reached on the

5th the line Neunkirchen-Zweibruecken. The cavalry, scouting into French

territory, reported that the enemy was retreating. Everything seemed to

indicate that the French would await the attack of the Germans in a

strong defensive position. The nearest position of the kind that offered

was that on the farther bank of the Moselle, of which Metz protected one

flank, Thionville the other. It was decided that if the French were

found in that position, the Ist Army should hold the enemy in front,

while the IInd made a circuit south of Metz, and so the enemy be forced

either to retire or to fight. In case of disaster the IInd Army was to

fall back on the IIIrd, now advancing over the Vosges.

The protrusion to the south-westward[3] of the Ist Army towards the

Saar, which had not been intended by the supreme Command, had brought

its left wing in upon the line of march laid down for the IInd, and

detachments of the two armies had to cross each other at Saarbruecken on

the 6th. Thus there was indeed no lack of strength at that point; but as

a battle on that day was neither expected nor probable, the synchronous

arrival of troops had not been pre-arranged, and so detachments could

only come up by quite unprescribed routes and arrive one after the other

at different hours.

The 14th Division of the VIIth Corps was the first to reach Saarbruecken,

towards noon on the 6th.

General Frossard, considering his position there very hazardous, had

left the night before, without waiting for permission, and had fallen

back with the IInd Corps on Spicheren, where it had entrenched itself.

The IIIrd, IVth, and Vth Corps were behind, at distances of from nine to

nineteen miles, and the Imperial Guard was about twenty-three miles

rearward. The Emperor, therefore, had it in his power to collect five

Corps for a battle in the vicinity of Cocheren, or, on the other hand,

to support Frossard with at least four Divisions, if that General were

confident that his position was strong enough to hold.

The range of heights which upheaves itself immediately behind

Saarbruecken is capable of affording a serious obstacle to a hostile

passage of the Saar. It was known that the French had evacuated those

heights, but General von Kameke thought it prudent to seize them at

once, in order to secure the debouche of the columns following him.

When, in the forenoon, two squadrons of the 5th Cavalry Division showed

themselves on the drill-ground on the ridge above the farther bank, they

were greeted with a hot fire from the Spicheren heights. But as it

seemed highly probable, from the previous behaviour of the French, that

the force seen there was only the rear-guard of the retiring enemy,

General von Kameke (commanding 14th Infantry Division) ordered an

immediate attack, since he had the promise of reinforcements. General

von Zastrow (commanding VIIth Corps), as soon as he recognized that the

14th Division had involved itself in a serious engagement, allowed the

13th to go forward. General von Alvensleben (its commander) also ordered

up to Saarbruecken all the available troops of the IIIrd Corps, and with

equal promptitude General von Goeben (commanding VIIIth Corps) hurried

thither the entire 16th Division. Generals von Doering (commanding 9th

Infantry Brigade) and von Barnekow (commanding 16th Infantry Division),

belonging respectively to these two Corps (IIIrd and VIIIth), had

besides already struck forward from Tudweiler and Fischbach in the

direction of the cannon-thunder, even before receiving orders to that

effect.

The position occupied by the French was one of exceptional advantage. In

the centre projected the Red Hill (der Rothe Berg), a precipitous and

almost inaccessible cliff; and the steep slopes on either side were

densely wooded. On the left the massive buildings of the Stiering-Wendel

ironworks furnished a separate defensive position.

Had the strength of the enemy been fully known the attack would

certainly have been delayed until the whole of the 14th Division had

arrived. As a matter of fact, at the beginning of the fight, about noon,

only von Francois' Brigade (27th) had come up, and this force, in the

effort to facilitate an attack on the naturally strong position held by

the enemy's front, assailed in the first instance both his flanks.

At first it succeeded in making progress. On the left the 39th Regiment

drove the swarms of hostile skirmishers out of the wood of Gifert, but

then became exposed to the bitter fire of a French battalion lining the

farther side of a deep hollow. On the right flank its 3rd Battalion,

together with the 74th Regiment, seized the wood of Stiering. But the

enemy's superior strength soon displayed itself in violent

counter-attacks, and when Von Woyna's[4] Brigade (28th) reached the

field it had to furnish reinforcements to both flanks. Thus, at an early

stage, intermingling of battalions and companies began, which increased

with every subsequent rush, and made the control of the combat a matter

of extraordinary difficulty. Added to this was the circumstance that

three Commanding Generals in succession came up to the scene of the

conflict, and one after the other took the chief control.

At about one o'clock, simultaneously with the flanks, the Fusilier

Battalion of the 74th Regiment pushed forward in front, under a severe

fire across the open ground towards the Red Hill, and, under such

trivial cover as offered, established itself at the foot of the cliff.

When at about three o'clock the Prussian artillery compelled the foe to

move his guns farther up the hill, the Fusiliers, with General von

Francois at their head, began to climb the cliff. The French Chasseurs,

evidently taken by surprise, were driven from the most advanced

entrenchments with clubbed rifles and at the point of the bayonet. The

9th company of the 39th Regiment followed close, and the gallant

General, charging farther forward along with it, fell pierced by five

bullets. Nothing daunted, the small body of Fusiliers made good its grip

of the narrow spur of the cliff.

Nevertheless, a crisis was imminent. The 14th Division was extended over

a distance of about three and a half miles, its left wing had been

repulsed by greatly superior forces in the wood of Gifert, its right

wing was hard pressed at Stiering. But now, at four o'clock, the heads

of the 5th and 16th Divisions simultaneously struck in, shortly after

their batteries, which had been sent on ahead, had come into action.

The left wing, strongly reinforced, now again pressed forward. General

von Barnekow[5] led trusty succours up on to the Red Hill, where the

Fusiliers had almost entirely exhausted their ammunition, and drove the

French out from all their entrenchments. As the result of a fierce

struggle the Germans also succeeded in taking possession of the western

part of the wood of Gifert. The right wing with sharp fighting had

pressed on to Alt Stiering and was approaching the enemy's line of

retreat, the Forbach highway. General Frossard had, however, recognized

the danger threatened at this point, and reinforced his left wing to the

strength of a Division and a half. This force advanced to the attack at

five o'clock. On the German side there was no formed force to oppose to

it, so all the previously gained advantages were lost.

If the 13th Division[6] had here struck in with a resolute attack, the

battle would have ended. This Division after, indeed, a march of nearly

nineteen miles had reached Puttlingen at one o'clock, where it was

little more than four miles distant from Stiering. When the fighting

about Saarbruecken was heard it is true that at four p.m. the advanced

guard moved forward to Rossel. It would seem that the roar of the cannon

was not audible in that wooded region; the impression was that the

combat was over, and the Division bivouacked at Voelkingen, which place

had been previously named as the end of its march by the Corps Commander

at a time when he was, of course, unable to foresee the change in the

situation.

The French offensive movement had meanwhile been brought to a stand by

the seven batteries in position on the Folster height; the infantry then

succeeded in making fresh progress, under the personal leadership of

General von Zastrow.

The nature of the ground entirely prohibited the twenty-nine squadrons

of cavalry which had arrived from all directions and were drawn up out

of the range of fire, from taking part in the action. The Hussars tried

in vain to ride up the Red Hill, but in spite of incredible

difficulties Major von Lyncker finally gained the summit with eight

guns, amid the loud cheering of the hard-pressed infantry. The guns, as

each one came up, at once came into action against three French

batteries; but quite half of the gunners were shot down by sheltered

French tirailleurs, at a range of about 800 paces. A small strip of

ground in front was indeed won, but the narrow space allowed of no

deployment against the wide front of the enemy.

But effective assistance was coming from the right. General von Goeben

had despatched all the battalions of the 16th Division not yet engaged,

in the decisive direction toward Stiering. While one part of these

troops made a frontal attack on the village, the rest climbed from the

high-road up the defiles of the Spicheren woods, in a hand-to-hand

encounter drove the French from the saddle leading to the Red Hill, and

pushed them farther and farther back towards the Forbach height.

Even as late as seven o'clock on the French right wing Laveaucoupet's

Division, supported by part of Bataille's, advanced to the attack and

once more penetrated into the oft-contested Gifert wood, but the danger

threatening the French left wing from the Spicheren wood paralyzed this

effort. By nightfall the French were falling back over the whole

plateau.

At nine o'clock, when their "Retreat" call was sounding from the

heights, General von Schwerin (commanding 10th Infantry Brigade) made

sure of night quarters by occupying Stiering, where resistance was only

quelled, at many points, after a hand-to-hand fight. The advanced guard

of the 13th Division advanced on Forbach, but did not occupy it, having

allowed itself to be hoodwinked by some French Dragoons in possession.

Apart from this, General Frossard had abandoned the line of retreat by

the so seriously threatened Forbach-St. Avold road, and fell back with

all his three divisions on Oetingen. The darkness, and the impossibility

of handling large bodies of cavalry in such a country, saved him from

further pursuit.

General von Steinmetz ordered the reorganization of the dislocated

bodies of troops that same night. Some of them had marched more than

twenty-eight miles; two batteries, arriving from Koenigsberg by rail, had

immediately set out for the battle-field. But it remains that the

Germans at no time of the day attained the numerical strength of the

enemy in this engagement, which had been begun with insufficient forces.

Only thirteen batteries could be brought into action in the limited

space, and the cavalry remained excluded from all participation. It was

only natural, under the circumstances, that the losses of the assailants

were greater than those of the defence. The Prussians lost 4871, the

French 4078 men. The fact was significant that a considerable number of

unwounded French prisoners were taken in this early action.

In strong contrast to the comradeship and mutual helpfulness displayed

by the Prussian Generals, and the eagerness of their troops to hurry

into the fight, was the strange vacillation of the Divisions in General

Frossard's rear; of which three, indeed, were sent forward to his

support, but only two came up, and that when the fight was already

ended.

It has been vehemently asserted that the battle of Spicheren was fought

in an ill-judged locality, and that it interfered with more important

plans. It certainly had not been anticipated. But, generally speaking, a

tactical victory rarely fails to fit in with a strategic design. Success

in battle has always been thankfully accepted, and turned to account. By

the battle of Spicheren the IInd French Corps was prevented from

withdrawing unharmed; touch of the enemy's main force was obtained, and

to the supreme Direction of the armies was afforded a basis for further

resolutions.

FOOTNOTES:

[3] South-eastward.

[4] There were two Major-Generals of this name, both commanding

Brigades; one the 28th, VIIth Corps, the other 39th, Xth Corps.

[5] Commanding 16th Division, VIIIth Corps.

[6] Commanded by General Gluemen.

RIGHT WHEEL OF THE GERMAN ARMY.

Marshal MacMahon in his retreat had taken a direction which entirely

severed his touch with Marshal Bazaine.

As he was not pursued, he could have used the Luneville-Metz railway to

effect his union with the French main army; for up to the 9th it was

still open. But rumour had it that the Prussians had already appeared in

Pont a Mousson, and the state of his troops did not permit him thus

early to risk another engagement.

His Ist Corps, therefore, marched southwards on Neufchateau, whence

Chalons could be reached by railway. The Vth Corps was being shifted to

and fro by contradictory orders from the Emperor's head-quarters. First

it was to proceed to Nancy, then to take an opposite direction towards

Langres. On arriving at Charmes it was ordered to Toul, but from

Chaumont it was finally directed to proceed to Chalons. General Trochu

had there located the newly-formed XIIth Corps, and behind this

gathering point the VIIth Corps also managed to get away from Alsace and

reach Rheims by rail by way of Bar sur Aube and Paris.

Thus by August 22nd a Reserve Army was formed, consisting of four Corps

and two Cavalry Divisions, under the command of Marshal MacMahon, who,

however, at a distance, as he was, of about 120 miles, was unable to

render timely assistance to Marshal Bazaine, who stood directly in the

line of the advancing enemy.

When the news of the double disaster of August 6th reached the Imperial

Head-quarter, the first impression there was that it would be necessary

to retreat immediately on Chalons with Bazaine's army; and the VIth

Corps, a portion of which was already being transported thence to Metz,

was ordered to retrace its steps. But this resolution was presently

retracted. The Emperor had not merely to consider the foreign enemy,

but public opinion within his own realm. The sacrifice of entire

provinces at the very beginning of a war which had been undertaken with

such high anticipations, would have provoked the unbounded indignation

of the French people. There were still 200,000 men who could be brought

together in front of the Moselle, supported by a large fortress, and

though the enemy would still have the superiority in numbers, his army

was holding a line nearly sixty miles long. It had yet to cross the

Moselle, and this would necessitate a dislocation which might create a

weakness at the critical moment.

In the IIIrd German Army the disorderly condition of the defeated enemy

was not known, nor even the direction of his retreat. It was expected

that MacMahon's Army would be found rallied on the farther side of the

Vosges for renewed resistance; and as it was impossible to cross the

mountains except in detached columns, the German advance was very

cautious, and by short marches only. Though the distance between

Reichshofen and the Saar is not more than about twenty-eight miles in a

straight line, that river was only reached in five days. Nothing was

seen of the enemy, except in the fortified places, small indeed, but too

strong to be taken by storm, which command the highways in the

mountains. Bitsch had to be avoided by a fatiguing circuit, Lichtenberg

was captured by surprise, Luetzelstein had been abandoned by its

garrison, the investment of Pfalzburg was handed over to the approaching

VIth Corps, and Marsal capitulated after a short resistance.

The German left wing had no enemy before it, and could be brought into

closer connection with the centre. To bring the three armies abreast of

each other a wheel to the right was requisite. The advance of the Ist

and IInd Armies had, however, to be delayed, as the IIIrd did not reach

the Saar until August 12th. The whole movement was so arranged that the

IIIrd Army was to use the roads by Saarunion and Dieuze, and to

southward; the IInd those by St. Avold and Nomeny and to southward; the

Ist those by Saarlouis and Les Etangs, the last also taking the

direction of Metz.

The cavalry Divisions which were reconnoitring far to the front,

reported the enemy as retreating all along the line. They ranged close

up to Metz, and across the Moselle both above and below the place,

forcing the detachments of Canrobert's Corps, which had again been

ordered up from Chalons, to return thither. All their information

indicated that very large masses were encamped in front of Metz. From

this it might equally be inferred that the enemy intended to retreat

further, or, with his whole force concentrated, to strike hard at the

right wing of the German Army, at the moment when the impending crossing

of the Moselle should make its severance from the left wing unavoidable.

The chief Head-quarter restricted itself in ordinary course to issuing

general directions, the execution of which was left in detail to the

army commanders; but in this instance it was deemed necessary in the

momentary circumstances to regulate the movements of each separate corps

by specific orders. On August 11th the Head-quarter of his Majesty was

therefore transferred to St. Avold, in the front line, and midway

between the Ist and IInd Armies, so as, by being in the immediate

vicinity, to be able to exercise timely authority to either hand. The

three Corps of the Ist Army advanced towards the German Nied on August

12th, only to find that the French had evacuated that position. Three

Corps of the IInd Army on the left of the Ist also moved forward in

prolongation of the same front by Faulquemont and Morhange, while two

others followed.

On the next day the IInd Army reached the Seille, without encountering

the enemy, and occupied Pont a Mousson with infantry.

The strangely inactive attitude of the French made it seem quite

probable that they might not make any stand in front of Metz, a

probability strengthened by the reports of the German cavalry, which was

scouting as far as Toul and on to the Verdun road. But there always

loomed the possibility that the enemy would throw himself with 200

battalions on the Ist Army, now in his immediate front. The two Corps

forming the right wing of the IInd Army were therefore ordered to halt

for the present, a little to the south of Metz, ready to deliver a

shattering blow on the flank of any such attack. If the enemy preferred

to assail these Corps, then would devolve on the Ist Army on its part

the prompt assumption of the offensive.

Meanwhile the other Corps of the IInd Army were pursuing the march

towards the Moselle farther to the southward; if the enemy should attack

them with superior forces after they had crossed the river, it would be

possible for them, in case of need, to fall back on the IIIrd Army.

So much caution was not universally deemed essential; it was argued that

the French seemed already committed to full retreat, they ought not to

be allowed to get away without punishment, and it followed that the

German Army should strike without delay. The French had, indeed, already

committed themselves to a further retreat; but when in the afternoon (of

the 14th) the VIIth Corps discerned their retrograde movement, a fight

began on the hither side of the Moselle, which, by the voluntary

intervention of the nearest bodies of troops, developed into a battle in

the course of the evening.

BATTLE OF COLOMBEY--NOUILLY.

(August 14th.)

The Commandant of Metz had declared his inability to hold that place for

a fortnight, if left to his own resources; but the chosen and intrenched

position on the Nied, taken up to cover the fortress, had been found

locally defective, and the French Head-quarter hoped to find a more

favourable defensive position in the vicinity of Verdun.

Military necessity outweighed even a politic regard for public opinion,

and the Emperor, although he had transferred the command-in-chief to

Marshal Bazaine, still remained with the army, for it would have been

impossible for him to return to Paris in existing circumstances.

Very early in the morning of the 14th August the multitudinous trains

were being withdrawn through the city, and towards noon the IInd, IVth,

and VIth Corps got in motion, while the IIIrd Corps remained in position

behind the deep valley of the Colombey brook, to cover the retirement.

When, at four in the afternoon, the break-up of the enemy was perceived,

General von der Goltz (commanding 26th Infantry Brigade) with the

advanced guard of the VIIth Corps struck him in the act, and wrenched

from him Colombey and the Chateau d'Aubigny on his right flank. But, at

the first cannon sound, the French columns immediately turned about,

fully equipped for fighting, and eager, after their many previous

disasters, to break the spell by a desperate effort. Castagny's Division

threw itself in greatly superior force upon the weak German detachment

in the isolated position of Colombey, which held its own only by the

utmost exertion.

Already the advanced guard of the Ist Army Corps was approaching by both

the high-roads from Saarbruecken and Saarlouis; and its batteries having

pushed on ahead, at once took part in the engagement. Passing through

Lauvallier, the infantry followed close, climbed the eastern slope of

the plateau of Bellecroix, and farther to the right drove the enemy out

of the wood east of Mey. But the presence at this point of the main body

of the French IIIrd Corps gave pause to the German offensive for the

time.

The 13th, 1st, and 2nd Divisions had meanwhile followed their respective

advanced guards, the two latter having been held in full readiness by

General von Manteuffel ever since his outposts had reported that the

enemy was moving. General von Zastrow, too, arrived on the field, and

took over the command of the left wing. Soon sixty field-pieces were in

action against the enemy. General von Osten-Sacken hurried forward the

25th Brigade through the hollow of Coincy, and climbed on to the edge of

the upland. The clump of fir-trees on the road to Bellecroix was taken

by storm, was surrounded on three sides, was lost again in a bloody

conflict, and was once more recaptured. Soon afterwards two batteries

succeeded in establishing themselves above Planchette, whose fire drove

the French back as far as Borny; yet still the conflict raged on both

sides with the utmost fury.

But now there threatened the German right the danger of being

out-flanked. General Ladmirault, on learning that Grenier's Division had

been driven out of Mey, immediately set out to its support with his

other two Divisions, retook the village, and pressed farther forward by

the Bouzonville road. General von Manteuffel had meanwhile given the

necessary orders for holding, at all hazards, the deep-cut trough of the

Vallieres brook which covered the flank. The 1st Brigade was posted

behind Noisseville as general reserve, the 4th, and part of the

artillery of the Ist Corps, marched by the Bouzonville road to confront

General Ladmirault near Poix, while the remaining batteries from the

southern slopes to the eastward of Nouilly enfiladed his advance. On the

left, Gluemer's Division (13th) had all this time been holding its ground

at Colombey, and now, at seven o'clock in the evening, Woyna's Brigade

came to its assistance, and took possession of the copses westward of

Colombey. A very welcome reinforcement now arrived from the IInd Army

remaining halted on the Seille.

The 18th Infantry Division, after a heavy march, had bivouacked near

Buchy in the afternoon, but when General von Wrangel (its commander) was

informed that fighting was audible from the locality of the Ist Army, he

promptly set his Division in motion in that direction. He drove the

enemy out of Peltre, and then in conjunction with Woyna's Brigade

occupied Grigy, somewhat in rear of the French position in front of

Borny.

On the right wing of the fighting line, the 2nd Division had also pushed

on towards Mey, by way of Nouilly and through the adjacent vineyards;

and, as darkness was setting in, that village and the adjoining woods

were wrenched from the enemy. The French had not advanced beyond Villers

L'Orme, and they now withdrew all along their line from that village to

Grigy. The Prussians, as they followed up after dark, were molested only

by the fire of the heavy guns of the forts, more especially Fort St.

Julien.

The engagement of August 14th cost them the heavy loss of 5000 men,

inclusive of 200 officers; while the French lost only 3600 men, their

IIIrd Corps being the heaviest sufferer. The vicinity of a great

fortress of course prevented the reaping of the fruits of victory by an

immediate pursuit. It was for the same reason that a battle on the part

of the Ist Army on that day had not been included in the concerted plan

of action, though the possibility of such an occurrence had been

foreseen. Although it was true that but one Division of the IInd Army

(the 18th) had been able to hasten to the aid of the Ist, and that after

the late opening of the fight, its assault on the left[7] flank of the

enemy had not failed of its effect.

The manner in which the battle originated rendered unity of direction

impossible.

It was but the advanced-guards of four Divisions which were the troops

principally engaged; and the daring attacks made on greatly superior

hostile forces by small bodies unfollowed by immediate supports

occasioned many critical moments, which might have been dangerous if the

enemy had pushed forward more energetically in closely concentrated

strength. But while, for instance, his IIIrd Corps received no support

from the Imperial Guard standing close behind it, the contrast presented

itself that on the Prussian side, in this as in the previous battles,

there shone forth, along with their ready acceptance of personal

responsibility, the eager mutual helpfulness of all the commanders

within reach of the battle-field.

An essential share of the success of the day must be attributed to the

artillery. Hurrying along in front, leaving the responsibility of

covering it to the advanced guards which reached forward before the main

bodies of the Divisions had time to come up, it drove the French

completely out of their positions before Metz, and back under the guns

of the defences of the place.

The protection so afforded to the enemy rendered it impossible that the

victory of Colombey-Nouilly should yield any trophies, but the supreme

Command was quite content with the results obtained. The retreat of the

enemy had been arrested, and a day had been gained for the crossing of

the Moselle by the IInd and IIIrd Armies.

_August 15th._--In the early morning of the 15th the cavalry had ridden

forward to the outworks of Metz, but found none of the enemy on this

side of the fortress. A few shells scared away the Imperial Head-quarter

from Longeville on the further side of the Moselle.

As King William was riding over to visit the Ist Army, immense clouds of

dust were observed rising on the further side of the fortress; and it

was no longer doubtful that the French had begun their retreat, and that

the IInd Army was henceforth free to follow across the Moselle with all

its Corps.

The Ist Corps of the Ist Army was necessarily left at Courcelles, south

of Metz, to protect the railway, the other two were brought up leftward

towards the Seille; and they were also by-and-by to cross the Moselle

higher up, so as to avoid interference from the fortress.

The French had started again on the retreat interrupted on the previous

day, but proceeded little more than four miles[8] beyond Metz on August

15th. Their cavalry only went somewhat farther ahead, by both the roads

to Verdun.

The IIIrd Corps of the German IInd Army crossed the Moselle at Noveant,

by the bridge which was found intact, and by a flying pontoon bridge;

its artillery, however, was forced to make a detour by Pont a Mousson.

It was not until late at night that the troops were all across and in

bivouac close to the left bank. One Division of the Xth Corps remained

at Pont a Mousson and the other advanced to Thiaucourt. The cavalry

scouted farther forward towards the Metz-Verdun road, and struck in on

the French cavalry near Mars la Tour. Several small engagements took

place, but when early in the afternoon twenty-four Prussian squadrons

had assembled, the French retired on Vionville. The Guard Corps and the

IVth Corps crossed at Dieulouard and Marbache, higher up the river.

The IIIrd Army advanced to the line Nancy-Bayon. On this day an attempt

to seize the fortress of Thionville by surprise proved a failure.

FOOTNOTES:

[7] Clearly should be "right."

[8] On the night of 15th, four of Bazaine's five Corps (less one

Division) bivouacked at distances of from eight to ten miles westward of

Metz; viz., from beyond Rezonville rearward to Gravelotte.

BATTLE OF VIONVILLE--MARS LA TOUR.

(August 16th.)

In the Head-quarter of the IInd Army there was the belief that serious

fighting with the French was no more to be anticipated on the Moselle,

and therefore two Corps, the IIIrd and the Xth, were ordered to march on

August 16th, northwards toward the road to Verdun by way of Gorze and

Thiaucourt, while the other Corps were directed to advance by forced

marches westwards towards the Meuse.

The French retreat from Metz was, however, not completely effected on

this day. The trains blocked every road, and in the forenoon three

Divisions still remained behind in the Moselle valley. The Emperor,

however, escorted by two brigades of cavalry, had departed at an early

hour by the road through Etain, which was still comparatively safe. As

the right wing of the army could not yet follow, the prosecution of the

retreat was postponed until the afternoon, and the left wing, which had

already begun the march, was sent back again into its bivouacs. But so

early as nine o'clock Prussian shells startled the troops from their

rest.

Major Koerber had advanced with four batteries close up to Vionville

under cover of the cavalry, and the French troopers, surprised by their

fire, fled in utter confusion through the camp of the infantry. The

latter, however, briskly got under arms in good order, and the artillery

opened a heavy fire. Destitute at first of infantry supports, the

Prussian guns were withdrawn. Matters soon became serious.

General von Alvensleben, fearing lest he should fail to overtake the

enemy, had started again with the IIIrd Corps after a short night's

rest. The 6th Division marched on the left, by Onville; the 5th, on the

right, followed the long forest valley on the way to Gorze. This valley

so capable of defence was found unoccupied by the enemy, who indeed had

taken very few precautions. The advanced-guard presently encountered

Berges' French Division on the open plateau south of Flavigny, and

General von Stuelpnagel (commanding 5th Infantry Division) soon

discovered that he had before him an enemy whom it would take all his

strength to beat. At ten o'clock he began operations by sending forward

the 10th Brigade (commanded by General von Schwerin); and opened fire

with twenty-four guns.

Both sides now assumed the offensive. The Prussians, on the right,

fought their way with varying fortunes through the wood, often in

hand-to-hand encounter, and, towards eleven o'clock, succeeded in

reaching the spur of the wood of St. Arnould projecting in the direction

of Flavigny. Their left wing, on the contrary, was repulsed; even the

artillery was in danger; but the 52nd Regiment hurried forward and

re-established the fight at the cost of bloody sacrifices. Its 1st

Battalion lost every one of its officers, the colours passed from hand

to hand as its bearers were successively shot down, and the commander of

the 9th Brigade, General von Doering, fell mortally wounded. General von

Stuelpnagel rode up into the foremost line of fire, inspiriting the men

with brave words, while General von Schwerin collected the remnants of

troops bereft of their leaders, and, reinforced by a detachment of the

Xth Corps from Noveant, carried the height in front of Flavigny, whence

the French presently retired.

On the assumption that the French were already prosecuting the retreat,

the 6th Division had been ordered forward towards Etain by way of Mars

la Tour, to bar the enemy also from the northern road to Verdun. When it

reached the height of Tronville, whence could be seen how things really

stood, the brigades wheeled to the right in the direction of Vionville

and Flavigny. The artillery going on in advance, formed a formidable

line of batteries, the fire of which prepared the way for a farther

advance, and by half-past eleven the 11th Brigade had taken possession

of Vionville in spite of heavy losses. From thence, and from the south,

in conjunction with the 10th Brigade, an attack was then directed on

Flavigny, which had been set on fire by shell-fire. The different

detachments were hereabouts very much mixed, but by skilfully taking

advantage of every fold of the ground, the individual regimental

officers succeeded in getting their men steadily forward, in spite of

the heavy fire of the hostile infantry and artillery. Flavigny was taken

by assault, and one cannon and a number of prisoners fell into the hands

of the brave Brandenburgers.

Vionville, Flavigny and the northern end of the forest of St. Arnould

constituted the points of support of the Prussian front now facing to

the east; but this front was more than four miles long, and the whole

infantry and artillery were engaged up to the hilt all in one line. The

second line consisted only of the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions and half

of the 37th Brigade near Tronville.

The position of the French was one of great advantage. Their left flank

leaned on Metz, their right was protected by formidable batteries on the

old Roman road and a strong force of cavalry; and so they could await

with confidence a frontal attack on the part of a venturesome enemy.

The possibility of continuing the march to Verdun on this day, under the

protection of a strong covering rearguard, was, no doubt, out of the

question. Supposing the Marshal earnest above everything to effect his

retreat, he could do so only by fighting hard for his right of way, and

by so freeing himself from the enemy blocking his path.

It is not easy to discern, from a purely military standpoint, why this

course was not resorted to. There was the full certainty that only part,

and probably only a small part, of the German host could as yet have

reached the left side of the Moselle, and when in the course of the day

the Divisions detained about Metz arrived, the French had greatly the

superiority in strength. But it seems that the Marshal's chief

solicitude was lest he should be forced to relinquish his touch of

Metz; and he gave almost his whole attention to his left wing.

Constantly sending fresh reinforcements thither, he massed the whole

Guard Corps and part of the VIth Corps opposite the Bois des Ognons,

whence an attack was exceptionally improbable. One is tempted to assume

that political reasons alone thus early actuated Bazaine in his resolve

to cling to Metz.

Meanwhile the Prussians slowly but surely made their way beyond Flavigny

and Vionville, and, assisted by a heavy fire from the artillery,

compelled the right wing of the IInd French Corps to retire on

Rezonville, a movement which became a flight when the French Generals

Bataille and Valaze were killed.

To regain the lost ground the French Guard Cuirassier Regiment threw

itself resolutely on the pursuers. But its attack was cut short by the

rapid fire of two companies of the 52nd Regiment drawn up in line, which

reserved their fire till the enemy were within 250 paces. The horsemen

sweeping right and left rushed into the fire of more infantry behind;

243 horses strewed the field, and only the remnants of the regiment

wheeled about in swift flight, pursued by two Hussar regiments which had

dashed forward from Flavigny. A French battery in front of Rezonville

had hardly time to discharge a few shots before it was surrounded. For

want of teams the Prussians could not, indeed, carry off the captured

guns; but the Commander-in-Chief of the French army, who had himself

brought them up, was for several minutes in imminent danger of being

taken prisoner.

The 6th Prussian Cavalry Division had also been ordered to the front.

After passing through the line of artillery and deploying as well as the

limited space permitted, it found itself face to face with fresh and

completely formed troops. Marshal Bazaine had taken the precaution of

substituting for the routed bodies of the IInd Corps the Guard Grenadier

Division, which he had at last prevailed on himself to bring up from

his unengaged left wing, but not without filling the vacancy by a

Division of the IIIrd Corps. Thus the Prussian cavalry was received with

such an overwhelming musketry and artillery fire that it halted, and

deliberately retired, its retreat being covered by two squadrons of

Uhlans, which time after time showed a front against the enemy. The

cavalry had not actually engaged, but its advance had gained time and

opportunity for the artillery to move further forward in one line from

the spur of the wood to Flavigny.

It was now two o'clock. So far General von Alvensleben had deceived the

enemy with regard to the slenderness of his force by acting incessantly

on the offensive. But the battle was now at a standstill, the battalions

were visibly thinned, their strength was sapped by four hours of hard

fighting, and the ammunition of the infantry was almost exhausted. Not a

battalion, not a battery remained in reserve behind the fighting line

standing there in the fire. It was now required to conserve the success

won with so much blood by acting thenceforth on the defensive.

The left wing was in especial danger, being under the fire of the

powerful artillery deployed on the Roman road. Their greatly superior

numbers enabled the French to extend farther and farther to the right,

threatening thus completely to envelop the Prussian flank.

Marshal Canrobert, in the French centre, had discerned the right moment

to press forward against Vionville with all his might. At this critical

instant there was on the German side only a small detachment of the 5th

Cavalry Division available to check this effort. Two brigades had

necessarily been sent to strengthen the left flank, and of the 12th

Brigade remaining in rear of Vionville two squadrons had been detached

to the Tronville copses. The two regiments ordered to undertake the task

of charging the advancing enemy--the Magdeburg Cuirassiers and the

Altmark Uhlans--were consequently each but three squadrons strong, in

all 800 horses.

General von Bredow, commanding the 12th Cavalry Brigade, first traversed

in column the shallow hollow sinking down from Vionville, then wheeled

to the right and mounted the slope to the eastward, both his regiments

on one front. Received immediately with heavy artillery and infantry

fire, he threw himself on the hostile ranks. The first line is ridden

over, the line of guns is broken through, gunners and teams are put to

the sword. The second French line is powerless to resist this vigorous

onslaught, and even the more distant batteries limbered up to drive

away.

But the rapture of victory and the impetuosity of the charge carried the

handful of troopers too far, and after a gallop of 3000 paces they found

themselves surrounded by the French cavalry, which attacked them from

all sides. There was no scope for a second charge, and so after several

encounters with the French horse the brigade was forced to cut its way

back through the French infantry, whose bullets accompanied it home.

Only one-half of the command returned to Flavigny, where it was

reorganized into two squadrons. The devoted self-sacrifice of the two

heroic regiments effected the result, that the French entirely

discontinued their attack on Vionville.

At three o'clock four of their Divisions advanced towards the Tronville

copses. Barby's cavalry brigade (11th), watching the western verge, had

to retire before the enemy's fire, and the German infantry occupying the

wood also had to yield to a strength so superior; the batteries which

were in action between Vionville and the copses were assailed in rear

from the west through the glades of the copses, and were likewise forced

to retire. But not until the lapse of an hour did the French succeed in

overcoming the obstinate resistance of four staunch battalions.

At the subsequent roll-call near Tronville, it was ascertained that the

24th Regiment had lost 1000 men and 52 officers, and that the 2nd

Battalion of the 20th Regiment had lost all its officers. The 37th

demi-Brigade, which of its own accord had been fighting valiantly in

support since noon, took possession of the village of Tronville and

prepared it for an obstinate defence.

It was not till after three that the IIIrd Corps, which had been

fighting for seven[9] hours almost single-handed, received effective

assistance.

While the Xth Corps was on the march through Thiaucourt, its advanced

guard heard cannon-fire from the direction of Vionville. The Corps

Commander, General von Voigts-Rhetz, immediately set out for the

battle-field, and having personally ascertained how matters stood, he

sent back the requisite orders to his approaching troops.

In this instance again it was the artillery which, hurrying on in

advance, masterfully struck into the conflict. Its fire, in conjunction

with that of the promptly further advancing batteries of the IIIrd

Corps, checked the French rush made on both sides of the Tronville

copses simultaneously. At half-past three the head of von Woyna's

Brigade (39th) fell on, drove the enemy back into the wood, and finally,

supported by Diringshofen's Brigade (40th), took possession of its

northern outskirts.

The right wing of the IIIrd Corps had also received some reinforcement.

The 32nd Brigade of the VIIIth Corps, on being called upon to assist the

5th Division, fatigued though it was by a long march, immediately

advanced from the Moselle by Arry. The 11th Regiment joined it, and

three batteries were sent ahead to commence operations; this force

emerged at five o'clock from the forest of St. Arnould. It at once made

an assault on the heights in front of Maison Blanche, but, though it

made three strenuous efforts in succession, failed to carry them, since

Marshal Bazaine had greatly strengthened his position in front of

Rezonville. Then the French, in their turn, took the offensive there;

but were equally unable to establish themselves firmly on the heights,

swept as they were by the well-directed fire of the Prussian artillery;

and they had to withdraw from the attempt. Petty struggles for this

position were renewed later on both sides, but those spurts came to

nothing because of the fire of the respective artillery; and the

fighting on the German right became in the main stationary.

That on the German left two French Divisions had retired before a few

newly-arrived battalions, and had evacuated the Tronville copses, can

only be explained by a report having reached Bazaine's head-quarters

that the enemy was coming in upon his right flank in the vicinity of

Hannonville.

The enemy referred to was Wedell's Brigade (38th), which, while on the

march in the direction of Etain according to its original orders, had

received counter-instructions while halted at St. Hilaire at noon, to

hurry to the field of battle. General von Schwartzkoppen (commanding

19th Infantry Division) decided to march by the highway to Mars la Tour,

in the hope of falling on the enemy either in flank or in rear. But the

French meanwhile had extended their reinforced right wing to the sunken

valley west of Bruville, where three Divisions of their cavalry were

massed in position.

Thus when General von Wedell advanced to the attack on both sides of

Tronville, which the French themselves had fired, his brigade--only five

battalions strong--found itself in face of the long deployed front of

the 4th French Corps. The two Westphalian regiments advanced steadily

under the storm of shell and mitrailleuse fire till they suddenly

reached the edge of a deep ravine hitherto unseen. This, however, they

soon traversed, and were climbing the farther ascent, when they were met

by a murderous shower of bullets from the French infantry which hemmed

them in closely on every side. After almost every one of the commanders

and regimental officers had fallen, the wreck of the battalions fell

back into the ravine; 300 men were taken prisoners, having no strength

left to ascend the steep southern rise after the fatigue of a

twenty-eight miles march. The remainder rallied at Tronville under the

shot-torn colours which Colonel von Cranach, the only officer who still

had a horse under him, had brought back in his own hand. Seventy-two

officers and 2542 men were missing out of 95 officers and 4546 men--more

than half. The French followed up their success, but were checked on the

right by the headlong charge of the 1st Guard Dragoons, which cost that

regiment 250 horses and nearly all its officers; and on the left by the

4th squadron of the 2nd Guard Dragoons, which attacked three times its

strength of Chasseurs d'Afrique.

But there now imminently threatened the charge of a great mass of French

cavalry, which disclosed itself on the open plateau of Ville sur Yron.

This consisted of Legrand's Division and de France's Guard Brigade in

four compact echelons, overlapping each other to the right. On the

German side, all the still disposable cavalry joined Barby's brigade,

and the body thus made up, consisting only of sixteen squadrons, was

formed for action in two lines west of Mars la Tour. Farther in advance

stood the 13th Dragoons, halted to receive the Guard-squadron on its

return from its recent charge. The 13th galloped forward to meet the

charge of Montaigu's Hussar Brigade, which constituted the first line of

the French cavalry mass, and which broke through the (over-wide)

intervals of the Prussian squadrons. But General von Barby promptly

appeared with the other regiments on the upland of Ville sur Yron, where

at a quarter to seven the cavalry masses came into collision.

A mighty cloud of dust concealed the varying phases of the hand-to-hand

encounter of 5000 horsemen which gradually declared itself in favour of

the Prussians. General Montaigu, severely wounded, was taken prisoner,

and General Legrand fell while leading his Dragoons to the assistance of

the Hussars.

De France's Brigade allowed the enemy to approach within 150 paces, and

then its Lancer regiment rushed impetuously upon the Hanoverian Uhlans;

but the latter outflanked it, and received unexpected assistance from

the 5th squadron of the 2nd Guard Dragoons, which, returning from a

reconnaissance, plunged forward over fences and ditches and fell upon

the enemy in flank, while the Westphalian Cuirassiers at the same time

broke his front. The Chasseurs d'Afrique strove in vain to hinder the

enveloping tactics of the Hanoverian Dragoons; the clouds of dust

drifted farther and farther northward, and the whole mass of French

horse drew away towards the wooded slopes of Bruville, behind which

there were still five regiments of Clerembault's Cavalry Division.

Clerembault permitted one of his brigades to cross the valley, but the

fleeing Hussars and some misunderstood signals threw it into confusion.

It was borne back, and not until the French infantry confronted the

Prussian pursuers in the covering valley did the latter desist from the

pursuit.

The Prussian regiments quietly re-formed and then withdrew at a walk to

Mars la Tour, followed at a great distance by part of Clerembault's

Division.

This, the greatest cavalry combat of the war, had the effect of making

the French right wing give up all further attempts to act on the

offensive. The Germans mourned the loss of many superior officers, who

always, at the head of their men, had set them a glorious example.

Prince Frederick Charles had hastened to the field of battle. The day

was nearly at an end, darkness approaching, and the battle won. The

Prussians in the evening stood on the ground which in the morning had

been occupied by the French. Though General von Alvensleben had in the

first instance been under the impression that he would have only the

French rear-guard to deal with, he did not hesitate for a moment to

become the assailant when he found the entire French Army before him.

With his single Corps he maintained the fight till the afternoon, and

drove back the enemy from Flavigny to Rezonville, a distance of more

than two miles. This was one of the most brilliant achievements of all

the war.

Thanks to the valuable assistance of the Xth Corps it was possible to

carry on the battle through the afternoon on the defensive, but only by

most resolute counter-attacks by the cavalry, and by the unflinching

tenacity of the artillery.

It was clearly most unadvisable to challenge by renewed attacks an enemy

who still outnumbered the Germans; which action, since no further

reinforcements could be hoped for, could not but jeopardize the success

so dearly bought. The troops were exhausted, most of their ammunition

was spent, the horses had been under the saddle for fifteen hours

without fodder; some of the batteries could only move at a walk, and the

nearest Army Corps on the left bank of the Moselle, the XIIth,[10] was

distant more than a day's march.

Notwithstanding all these considerations, an order from Prince Frederick

Charles's Head-quarter issued at seven o'clock, commanded a renewed and

general attack on the enemy's positions. The Xth Corps was quite

incapable of answering this demand; and only part of the artillery went

forward on the right followed by some infantry. The batteries indeed

reached the much-disputed plateau south of Rezonville, but only to be

exposed on two sides to the fire of infantry and artillery. Fifty-four

guns of the French Guard alone, in position on the farther side of the

valley, were taking them in flank. The Prussian batteries were compelled

to retreat to their previous position, but two brigades of the 6th

Cavalry Division still pressed forward. Scarcely able to discern in the

increasing darkness where lay their proper line of attack, they came

under very sharp infantry fire, and withdrew with great loss.

Fighting did not entirely cease until ten o'clock. On either side 16,000

men had fallen. On either side pursuit was out of the question. The

Germans reaped the fruits of this victory solely in its results. The

troops, worn out by a twelve hours' struggle, bivouacked on the

victorious but bloody field, immediately opposite the French position.

Those Corps of the IInd Army which had not taken part in the battle,

were on that day on march towards the Meuse. The advanced guard of the

IVth Corps on the left wing was heading towards Toul. This fortress,

commanding a railway-line of importance to the further progress of the

German Army, was reported to be but feebly held, and it was resolved to

attempt its capture by a _coup de main_. But the bombardment of it by

field-artillery proved quite ineffective. Bastions of masonry and wide

wet ditches made a storm impossible. An attempt to batter down the gates

by shot and thus gain an entrance proved a failure. Finally the

undertaking was given up, and not without some loss on the part of the

Germans.

At the Royal Head-quarter in Pont a Mousson it had become known by about

noon on the 16th that the IIIrd Corps was engaged in serious conflict,

and that the Xth and IXth were hastening up to its support. The

far-reaching consequences of this information were recognized at once.

The French were arrested in their withdrawal from Metz, but it was to be

presumed as a certainty that they would again make strenuous efforts to

force open their interrupted line of retreat. The XIIth Corps was

therefore ordered to set out for Mars la Tour as early as three o'clock

next morning; the VIIth and VIIIth Corps to stand in readiness at Corny

and Arry. The bridging operations were to be pushed with the utmost

vigour during the night. The Head-quarter of the IInd Army sent from

Gorze the order to the Guard Corps to make a forced march to Mars la

Tour, and there take up a position on the left of the XIIth Corps. The

execution of these orders was facilitated by the foresight of the

Commanders, who had in the course of the day received news of the battle

which was being fought. Prince George of Saxony at once placed his

Division on the march to Thiaucourt, and the Prince of Wuertemberg

assembled the Infantry of the Guard in its cantonments farther northward

in readiness for an early march.

_August 17th._--On this morning, at sunrise, the French outposts were

observed still occupying the sweep of front from Bruville to Rezonville.

Behind them were noticed a stir and much noise of signalling, which

might be the indications equally of an attack or of a retirement.

The King arrived from Pont a Mousson at Flavigny as early as six

o'clock. The reports sent in to headquarters until noon by the

reconnoitring cavalry were somewhat contradictory; they left it

uncertain whether the French were concentrating towards Metz, or were

pursuing their retreat by the two still open roads through Etain and

Briey. Preparations for the offensive were nowhere observed. By one

o'clock, after a skirmish on the way, the head of the VIIth Corps had

reached the northern skirt of the Bois des Ognons, over against which

the French subsequently abandoned Gravelotte. The VIIIth Corps stood

ready at Gorze, the IXth, IIIrd, and Xth remained in their positions,

the XIIth and the Guard Corps were on the march. Seven Corps and three

Cavalry Divisions could be counted on for the following day; for to-day

all attacks were forbidden.

In making the dispositions for the impending battle of August 18th, two

possible contingencies were foreseen and had to be provided for. To meet

both the left wing was to be sent forward in a northerly direction

through Doncourt towards the nearest of the routes still open for the

retreat of the French. If the enemy were already retiring, he was to be

at once attacked and detained while the right wing was hurrying up in

support.

In case the enemy should be remaining about Metz, the German left wing

was to swing eastwards and out-flank his farthest north position, while

the right was to hold his left closely engaged until this movement was

accomplished. The battle, under these circumstances, probably could not

be decided until late in the day, owing to the wide-sweeping movement of

a portion of the army. A peculiar feature of the situation was that both

parties had to fight with inverted front, and sacrifice for the time

their respective lines of communication. The consequences of victory or

defeat would thus be greatly enhanced or aggravated, but the French had

the advantage of having as their base a large place of arms with its

resources.

A decision having been arrived at, by two o'clock orders were published

at Flavigny for an advance by echelons from the left wing. The guidance

of individual Corps during the battle was to turn on the reports which

should be brought in. The King then returned to Pont a Mousson.

As early as nine o'clock in the morning the Saxon Cavalry Division had

reached the Etain road to the west of Conflans, and had reported no

enemy visible except a few stragglers. Still, this only proved that on

the 17th the French had not yet taken up their retreat.

In rear of its cavalry the XIIth Corps arrived during the day in the

vicinity of Mars la Tour and Puxieux, and left of it the Guard

bivouacked in the evening at Hannonville sur Yron, in accordance with

order. The IInd Corps, which ever since it left the railway had followed

close on the IInd Army, reached Pont a Mousson, and was ordered to march

forward by Buxieres at four next morning.

FOOTNOTES:

[9] Five; viz. from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m.

[10] The Hessian Division of the IXth Corps was on the left bank, much

nearer the field than the XIIth--so near indeed that portions of it were

actually engaged; and its other Division crossed the river in the night.

The _Staff History_ assigns the proximity of the IXth Corps as a leading

reason for the action of Prince Frederick Charles which Moltke

denounces. Both the VIIth and VIIIth Corps (the latter of which had a

brigade engaged in the battle) were more immediately available than the

distant XIIth.

BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE--ST. PRIVAT.

(August 18th.)

Marshal Bazaine had not thought it advisable to prosecute the march to

Verdun now that the Germans were so close on the flank of such a

movement. He preferred to concentrate his forces near Metz, in a

position which he rightly considered as almost impregnable.

Such an one was afforded him by the range of heights stretching along

the western verge of the valley of Chatel. Their face looking toward the

enemy sloped away like a glacis, while the short and steep decline in

the rear afforded cover for the reserves. Along the flat crown of the

heights from Roncourt to Rozerieulles, a distance of about seven miles,

were posted the VIth, IVth, IIIrd, and IInd Corps in succession from the

north; for which distance there were available from eight to ten men to

the pace (Schritt). A brigade of the Vth Corps stood near Ste. Ruffine

in the valley of the Moselle; the cavalry was in rear of both flanks. In

front of the IInd and IIIrd Corps shelter-trenches had been thrown up,

battery emplacements and covered ways of communication constructed, and

the farmsteads lying out to the front converted into little forts. To

approach this (left) wing from the west it was necessary to cross the

deep ravine of the Mance. The VIth Corps on the other hand was wholly

without an engineer park; and it is indicative of the general

ill-equipment of the French that, for the transport of the wounded to

the rear, in spite of the enormous trains, provision waggons had to be

unloaded and their contents burnt. This Corps was therefore unable to

construct fortified flank defences toward the forest of Jaumont, such as

would have given to the right wing the character of formidable strength.

This would undoubtedly have been the place for the Guard, but in his

apprehension of an attack from the south the Marshal held that Corps in

reserve at Plappeville.

The King returned to Flavigny at six o'clock on the morning of the 18th.

All commanding officers were instructed to send their reports thither,

and officers of the General Staff belonging to the Royal Head-quarter

were besides sent out in different directions to report information as

to the progress of the engagement.

The following were the initial dispositions. The VIIth Army Corps, which

was to form the pivot for the eventual wheel to the right, occupied the

Bois de Vaux and Bois des Ognons; the VIIIth, which the King had

reserved at his own disposition, stood halted near Rezonville ready to

march to the north or to the east, as might be required. The IXth Corps,

on its left, advanced towards St. Marcel, while the IIIrd and Xth

followed in second line. The Guard and XIIth Corps moved in a northerly

direction.

In consequence of the Head-quarter of the IInd Army having ordered the

XIIth Corps, although it stood on the right,[11] to form the extreme

left, a serious delay occurred from the crossing of the respective lines

of march. The Saxon troops had not entirely passed through Mars-la-Tour

until nine o'clock, and till then the Guard Corps could not follow.

Meanwhile the advanced guard of the XIIth Corps had already reached

Jarny, and pursued its march as far as Briey without encountering the

enemy.