_Earl Granville to Queen Victoria._
BRUTON STREET, _12th June 1859_.
(2 A.M.)
Lord Granville presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs
to submit that he saw Lord Palmerston immediately after he had left
Buckingham Palace. Lord Granville stated what had passed there,
omitting any reference to your Majesty's objection to the effect
likely to be produced on the Continent by Lord Palmerston's name, if
he had the direction of the Foreign Affairs. Nothing could be more
frank and cordial than Lord Palmerston's manner. He agreed to lead the
House of Commons; he said that he had certainly anticipated that your
Majesty would have sent for either Lord John or himself, but having
taken a part in the defeat of the present Government, he felt bound to
put aside any personal objects, and co-operate with me; and that there
was no person whom he should prefer or even like as much as myself. He
added that his co-operation must depend upon my being able to form a
strong Government. Lord Granville then saw Lord John Russell, and
had a very long conversation with him. Lord John had no objection
to serving under Lord Granville, but thought that he could not give
effect to his political views unless he was either Prime Minister
or Leader of the House of Commons, and he doubted whether he had
confidence in any one but Lord Palmerston for the Foreign Office. Lord
Granville again saw Lord Palmerston, who informed him that if he had
been sent for, he should have objected to go to the House of Lords,
and that he could not now give up the lead of the House of Commons
(which Lord Granville had already proposed to him to retain) to Lord
John. This answer rendered it unnecessary for Lord Granville to allude
to the objections to his holding the Foreign Office. Lord Granville
has seen Lord Clarendon, who acted up to the full spirit of your
Majesty's letter, but deprecates strongly the attempt to form a
Government without Lord John Russell. Sir George Grey is of the same
opinion. Sir George Lewis, Mr Herbert, and Mr Gladstone think every
effort should be made to secure Lord John, but that it would not be
impossible to form a Government without him. Mr Milner Gibson, with
whom Lord Granville had a more reserved conversation, considered it a
_sine qua non_ condition of support from the Liberal Party below the
gangway, that Lord John should be a member of the Government. Lord
Granville thinks that in his third interview with Lord Palmerston he
observed more dissatisfaction at not being sent for by your Majesty.
Lord Palmerston suggested that Lord John's absence from the Government
would make it more difficult for a Leader of the House, who was not
Prime Minister, to hold his position.
Lord Granville has written to Lord John asking for a final answer
before he informs your Majesty, whether he is able to attempt the task
which your Majesty has with so much kindness and indulgence laid upon
him.[50]
[Footnote 50: This letter, and Lord John's reply declining to
occupy only the third office in the State, and expressing
his anxiety for adequate security in the handling of Foreign
Affairs and Reform, are printed in Walpole's _Life of Lord
John Russell_, vol. ii. chap. xxvii.
Lord Granville then wrote to Lord John: "I am glad that
I wrote to you yesterday evening, as your answer gave me
information which I had not gathered from your conversation
in the morning. I came away from Chesham Place with the
impression that union between you and Palmerston with or
without me was impossible. Your letter afforded a good
opportunity of arrangement. As soon as I found by it that I
was an obstacle instead of a facility towards the formation of
a strong Government. I went to the Queen to ask her to
excuse me from the task which she had so unexpectedly and so
graciously imposed upon me. In answer to a question, I stated
to Her Majesty that it was disagreeable to me to advise as to
which of you and Palmerston she should send for, but that I
was ready to do so if it was her wish.
"The Queen did not press me. It is a great relief to have
finished this business. I have asked Palmerston to do whatever
would strengthen the Government, and assist him the most as
regards myself."]
[Pageheading: LORD PALMERSTON PREMIER]
_Queen Victoria to the Earl of Derby._
BUCKINGHAM PALACE, _12th June 1859_.
The Queen writes to inform Lord Derby that after a fruitless attempt
on the part of Lord Granville to form a Government comprising Lord
Palmerston and Lord John Russell, she has now charged Lord Palmerston
with the task, which she trusts may prove more successful....
_Viscount Palmerston to Queen Victoria._
94 PICCADILLY, _12th June 1859_.
Viscount Palmerston presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and
begs to report that he has been to Pembroke Lodge, and has had a
satisfactory conversation with Lord John Russell, who has agreed to
be a Member of the Government without any suggestion that Viscount
Palmerston should leave the House of Commons; but Viscount Palmerston
is sorry to say that Lord John Russell laid claim to the Foreign
Office in a manner which rendered it impossible for Viscount
Palmerston to decline to submit his name to your Majesty for that
post when the List of the new Government shall be made out for your
Majesty's consideration and approval....
_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._
_13th June 1859._
Lord Clarendon has just left the Queen. She had a long and full
conversation with him. Nothing could be more friendly than his
language, and he expressed himself ready to do anything for the
Queen's service. But he positively declines entering the Cabinet or
taking any _other office_. He says, as _Foreign_ Secretary, he should
be ready to join the Government should there be a vacancy; but that
he has never directed his attention much to general politics, and his
taking any other office, after having held the Foreign Seals during
a long and important time, would be of no use to the Government, and
would only injure himself. The Queen told him that he might have any
office almost (naming several of those which Lord Palmerston discussed
with her), but she could not urge nor press him to do what _he felt_
would injure him, and indeed she found him quite determined in his
purpose.
His absence from the Cabinet the Queen sincerely deplores, and she
knows that Lord Palmerston will feel it a serious loss.
[Pageheading: AN INDISCREET DISCLOSURE]
_Queen Victoria to Earl Granville._
BUCKINGHAM PALACE, _13th June 1859_.
The Queen is much shocked to find her whole conversation with Lord
Granville yesterday and the day before detailed in this morning's
leading article of the _Times_.[51] What passes between her and a
Minister in her own room in confidential intercourse ought to be
sacred, and it will be evident to Lord Granville that if it were not
so, the Queen would be precluded from treating her Ministers with that
unreserved confidence which can alone render a thorough understanding
possible; moreover, any Minister could state what he pleased, against
which the Queen would have no protection, as she could not well insert
contradictions or explanations in the newspapers herself.
[Footnote 51: A circumstantial account of the Queen's
conversation with Lord Granville had appeared in the _Times_,
and Lord Derby drew attention to the matter in the House of
Lords. Lord Granville in reply expressed his regret in not
having used more complete reserve, and frankly attributed the
disclosures to his non-observance of adequate discretion.]
_Earl Granville to Queen Victoria._
LONDON, _13th June 1859_.
Lord Granville presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and feels
deeply your Majesty's reproof.
Lord Granville was extremely annoyed this morning at seeing the
article in the _Times_ of to-day, repeating with some accuracy, but
in a vulgar, inflated manner, the account which Lord Granville gave
yesterday afternoon to many of his political friends, and which he
believed your Majesty had authorised him to do. Lord Granville in that
account laid much stress on the reasons which your Majesty gave for
sending for Lord Granville, as he found that attempts had been made to
attribute every sort of motive which might render the Court unpopular.
Besides the gross impropriety of the appearance of reporting your
Majesty's conversation, Lord Granville regrets the indirect attack
upon Lord John Russell.
Lord Granville begs respectfully to express to your Majesty his
vexation at the annoyance, which he has thus been the cause of
inflicting on your Majesty, particularly at a moment when your Majesty
had just given him an additional proof of the indulgent kindness and
confidence which your Majesty has been pleased to place in him.
[Pageheading: MR COBDEN]
_Viscount Palmerston to Queen Victoria._
94 PICCADILLY, _1st July 1859_.
Viscount Palmerston presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and has
been unable till within the last few minutes to make any Report about
Mr Cobden, from whom he had received no communication till about
an hour ago, when Mr Cobden came to him.[52] The result of a long
conversation between them has been that Mr Cobden, against the advice
of all his friends and of his constituents, has decided to decline
taking office. He grounds his decision upon feelings personal
to himself. He thinks that after having so often and so strongly
disapproved of the Foreign Policy of Viscount Palmerston as tending
too much to involve this country in war, it would be inconsistent for
him to join the present Cabinet, and he also said that, at his time of
life and with his general habits, he does not consider himself fit for
administrative office.
Viscount Palmerston used every [means] in his power to induce him
to change his decision, and showed that, with respect to present and
future action, there is no apparent difference between his views and
those of Mr Cobden, since both would desire that this country should
remain neutral in the war now raging in Italy. All his arguments,
however, were useless, and though Mr Cobden discussed the matter in
the most friendly and good-humoured manner, and promised to give out
of office all support to the Government, and said that he thought he
could do so more effectually out of office than in office, he could
not be persuaded to make any change in the answer which he came to
give.
Viscount Palmerston will consider what arrangement he may have to
propose to your Majesty in consequence of Mr Cobden's answer.
[Footnote 52: Mr Cobden had been visiting the United States.
On landing at Liverpool he learned that he had been elected
at Rochdale, and at the same time he received an offer of the
Board of Trade.]
THE MINISTRY AS FORMED BY VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
_in the month of June_ 1859.
_First Lord of the Treasury_ VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
_Lord Chancellor_ LORD CAMPBELL.
_President of the Council_ EARL GRANVILLE.
_Lord Privy Seal_ DUKE OF ARGYLL.
_Home Secretary_ SIR G. C. LEWIS.
_Foreign Secretary_ LORD JOHN (afterwards EARL)
RUSSELL.
_Colonial Secretary_ DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.
_Secretary for War_ Mr SIDNEY HERBERT (afterwards
LORD HERBERT OF LEA).
_Secretary for India_ Sir CHARLES WOOD (afterwards
VISCOUNT HALIFAX).
_Chancellor of the Exchequer_ Mr GLADSTONE.[53]
_First Lord of the Admiralty_ DUKE OF SOMERSET.
_President of the Board of Trade_ Mr MILNER GIBSON (appointed
in July).
_Postmaster-General_ EARL OF ELGIN.
_Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster_ Sir GEORGE GREY.
_Chief Secretary for Ireland_ Mr (afterwards VISCOUNT) CARDWELL.
[Footnote 53: Lord Aberdeen wrote, in a letter printed in
Parker's _Sir James Graham_, vol. ii. p. 388, that the wish
of Lord Palmerston, expressed in a speech at Tiverton, "to
see the Germans turned out of Italy by the war, has secured
Gladstone ... notwithstanding the three articles of the
_Quarterly_ and the thousand imprecations of late years."]
[Pageheading: MR BRIGHT]
_Viscount Palmerston to Queen Victoria._
94 PICCADILLY, _2nd July 1859_.
Viscount Palmerston presents his humble duty to your Majesty....
Viscount Palmerston has heard from several persons that Mr Bright
would be highly flattered by being made a Privy Councillor; would
your Majesty object to his being so made if it should turn out that he
wishes it? There have been instances of persons made Privy Councillors
without office, and if Mr Bright could be led by such an honour to
turn his thoughts and feelings into better channels such a change
could not fail to be advantageous to your Majesty's service....
_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._
BUCKINGHAM PALACE, _2nd July 1859_.
The Queen has received Lord Palmerston's letter of to-day. She is
sorry not to be able to give her assent to his proposal with regard
to Mr Bright.[54] Privy Councillors have sometimes exceptionally been
made without office, yet this has been as rewards, even in such cases,
for services rendered to the State. It would be impossible to allege
any service Mr Bright has rendered, and if the honour were looked upon
as a reward for his systematic attacks upon the institutions of the
country, a very erroneous impression might be produced as to the
feeling which the Queen or her Government entertain towards these
institutions. It is moreover very problematical whether such an
honour conferred upon Mr Bright would, as suggested, wean him from his
present line of policy, whilst, if he continued in it, he would only
have obtained additional weight in the country by his propounding his
views as one of the Queen's Privy Councillors.
[Footnote 54: In 1859, Lord Palmerston, in offering Mr Cobden
a seat in the Cabinet, rejected the idea of accepting Mr
Bright as a colleague, on the ground that his public speeches
made it impossible. Mr Bright, later in life, was a welcome
guest at Windsor, and the Queen became warmly attached to him
as one of her Ministers.]
[Pageheading: PACIFICATION OF INDIA]
_Earl Canning to Queen Victoria._
CALCUTTA, _4th July 1859_.
Lord Canning presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs
permission to offer to your Majesty his respectful thanks for your
Majesty's most gracious letter of the 18th of May.
Lord Canning ventures to believe that he is well able to figure to
himself the feelings with which your Majesty will have welcomed the
termination of the Mutiny and Rebellion in India, and of the chief
miseries which these have brought in their train. He hopes that your
Majesty will not have thought that there has been remissness in not
marking this happy event by an earlier public acknowledgment and
thanksgiving in India, as has already been done in England.[55] The
truth is, that although this termination has long been steadily and
surely approaching, it is but just now that it can be said to be
complete in the eyes of those who are near to the scene of action. It
is only within the last three weeks that the exertions of our Troops
on the Oudh and Nepaulese frontier, and in some other parts, have been
remitted, and almost every Gazette has recounted engagements with the
rebels, which, although they have invariably had the same issue, would
scarcely have consisted with a declaration that peace and tranquillity
were restored. Now, however, military operations have fairly ceased,
and the rains and the climate, which would make a continuance of those
operations much to be regretted, will do their work amongst the rebels
who are still in arms in the Nepaul jungles more terribly than any
human avengers.
Lord Canning has used every exertion and device to bring these
wretched men to submission; but many--it is difficult to say how many,
but certainly some few thousands--still hold out. With some of them
the reason no doubt is that they belong to the most guilty Regiments,
and to those which murdered their officers; but this cannot apply
to all; and it is to be feared that the prevailing cause is the bad
influence of their leaders--the Nana, Bala Rao, and the Begum;[56] or
rather the Begum's infamous advisers. It is certain that all of these,
believing their own position to be desperate, have spared no pains
to persuade their followers that the Government is seeking to entrap
them, and that, if they submit, their lives will be taken....
[Footnote 55: There had been a Public Thanksgiving in England
on the 1st of May.]
[Footnote 56: Bala Rao was a brother of Nana Sahib, chief
instigator of the Sepoy Mutiny. See _ante_, 4th July, 1857,
note 24.]
[Pageheading: A MILITARY ENQUIRY]
_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._
BUCKINGHAM PALACE, _5th July 1859_.
The Queen is much shocked to see that the Government last night moved
for a Committee of the House of Commons to enquire into the Military
Departments, without having previously communicated with the Queen
on the subject. She is the more surprised at this, as Lord Palmerston
told her, when she saw him on the formation of the present Government,
and she expressed her anxiety on the subject, that there would be no
more trouble about it, and he thought it would drop. The Queen
expects that the names of those who it is proposed should compose the
Committee, and the wording of it, will be submitted to her.
[Pageheading: CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION]
_Viscount Palmerston to Queen Victoria._
PICCADILLY, _5th July 1859_.
Viscount Palmerston presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs
to state that the re-appointment of the Committee on the Organisation
of the Military Departments was unavoidable. That Committee had
been affirmed by the House of Commons and consented to by the late
Government, and had begun its sittings; but when a Dissolution of
Parliament was announced, it suspended its further sittings, with the
understanding that it should be revived in the new Parliament; and to
have departed from that understanding would have been impossible. That
which Viscount Palmerston intended to convey in what he said to your
Majesty on the subject was, that the evidence given by Lord Panmure
might be deemed as having fully set aside the objection urged against
the present organisation by persons unacquainted with the bearing upon
it of the fundamental principles of the Constitution, namely, that the
Crown acts in regard to Military matters without having any official
adviser responsible for its acts. Such a condition of things, if it
could exist, would be at variance with the fundamental principles
of the British Constitution, and would be fraught with danger to the
Crown, because then the Sovereign would be held personally answerable
for administrative acts, and would be brought personally in conflict
in possible cases with public opinion, a most dangerous condition for
a Sovereign to be placed in.
The maxim of the British Constitution is that the Sovereign can do
no wrong, but that does not mean that no wrong can be done by Royal
authority; it means that if wrong be done, the public servant who
advised the act, and not the Sovereign, must be held answerable for
the wrongdoing.
But the Ministers of the Crown for the time being are the persons who
are constitutionally held answerable for all administrative acts in
the last resort, and that was the pith and substance of the evidence
given by Lord Panmure. Those persons who want to make great changes
in the existing arrangements were much vexed and disappointed by that
evidence, and the attempt made yesterday to put off the Committee till
next year on the ground that the evidence now to be taken would be
one-sided only, and would tend to create erroneous impressions, was
founded upon those feelings of disappointment.
Viscount Palmerston submits names of the persons whom Mr Sidney
Herbert proposes to appoint on the Committee, and they seem to be well
chosen.
_Lord John Russell to Queen Victoria._
PEMBROKE LODGE, _10th July 1859_.
(7 P.M.)
Lord John Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty. He has
just received from Lord Palmerston, who is here, the paper, a copy of
which is enclosed.[57]
Lord John Russell has to add that Lord Palmerston and he are humbly of
opinion that your Majesty should give to the Emperor of the French
the moral support which is asked. It is clearly understood that if the
Emperor of Austria declines to accept the propositions, Great Britain
will still maintain her neutral position.
But it is probable that her moral support will put an end to the
war, and your Majesty's advisers cannot venture to make themselves
responsible for its continuance by refusing to counsel your Majesty to
accept the proposal of France.
[Footnote 57: At the seat of war, a series of decisive French
victories had culminated in the battle of Solferino, on
Midsummer Day (see _ante_, Introductory Note to Chapter XXVIII).
But the French Emperor was beginning to think these successes
too dearly purchased, at the expense of so many French lives,
and, actuated either by this, or some similar motive, he
attempted, on the 6th of July, to negotiate through the British
Government with Austria. The attempt was a failure, but an
armistice was signed on the 8th, and again the Emperor sought
the moral support of England. The paper which Lord John
Russell submitted was a rough memorandum of M. de Persigny's,
proposing as a basis of negotiation the cession of Lombardy to
Piedmont, the independence of Venetia, and the erection of an
Italian Confederation.]
[Pageheading: FRANCE AND AUSTRIA]
_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._
PAVILION, ALDERSHOT, _10th July 1859_.
The Queen has just received Lord John Russell's letter with the
enclosure which she returns, and hastens to say in reply, that
she does not consider the Emperor of the French or his Ambassador
justified in asking the support of England to proposals he means to
make to his antagonist to-morrow. He made war on Austria in order to
wrest her two Italian kingdoms from her, which were assured to her by
the treaties of 1815, to which England is a party; England declared
her neutrality in the war. The Emperor succeeded in driving the
Austrians out of one of these kingdoms after several bloody battles.
He means to drive her out of the second by diplomacy, and neutral
England is to join him with her moral support in this endeavour.
The Queen having declared her neutrality, to which her Parliament and
people have given their unanimous assent, feels bound to adhere to it.
She conceives Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston ought not to ask
her to give her "moral support" to one of the belligerents. As for
herself, she sees no distinction between moral and general support;
the moral support of England _is_ her support, and she ought to be
prepared to follow it up.
The Queen wishes this letter to be communicated to the Cabinet.[58]
[Footnote 58: The Queen not having been informed whether this
instruction had been complied with, a correspondence took
place on the subject between the Prince and Lord Granville.
See the _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. i. chap. xiii.]
[Pageheading: END OF THE WAR]
_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._
OSBORNE, _12th July 1859_.
The Queen has to acknowledge the receipt of Lord John Russell's letter
reporting to her the result of the deliberations of the Cabinet, which
has very much relieved her mind. Lord John does not say whether
her letter was read to the Cabinet, but from his former letter she
concludes it was. She is most anxious that there should exist no
misapprehension on their part as to the Queen's views. Our position
must be consistent and precisely defined. A negotiation to stop the
effusion of blood, and to attain "a peace which would be for the
interests of all belligerents," is a very vague term. Who is to
judge of those interests? Is M. de Persigny or the Emperor Napoleon's
opinion to be the guide, as they just now proposed to us? Austria must
be considered the exponent of her own interests. Prussia has explained
to us the interests of Germany in the maintenance of the line of the
fortresses on the Mincio, and was answered; her views were entirely
erroneous, and her apprehensions exaggerated. It will require the
greatest caution on our part not to lose our neutral position, nor
to be made the advocate of one side. Are the wishes of the Lombards,
Tuscans, etc., really ascertainable, while their countries are
occupied by French and Sardinian armies? The Queen encloses an extract
of a letter from the first Napoleon to his son, Prince Eugene,[59]
showing how the expression of a wish for annexation has already of old
been used as a means for conquest.
[Footnote 59: Eugene de Beauharnais, Duke of Leuchtenberg, son
of the Empress Josephine by her first marriage, and adopted
son of Napoleon I.]
[Pageheading: ASCENDANCY OF FRANCE]
_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._
OSBORNE, _13th July 1859_.
The Queen has received the news of a concluded peace,[60] which Lord
John Russell has sent to her yesterday, with as much surprise as it
must have caused Lord John. It was a joyous intelligence, as far
as the stopping of the further effusion of innocent blood and the
security against further diplomatic complications is concerned, but
it gives cause for serious reflection. The Emperor Napoleon, by
his military successes, and great apparent moderation or prudence
immediately after them, has created for himself a most formidable
position of strength in Europe. It is remarkable that he has acted
towards Austria now just as he did towards Russia after the fall of
Sebastopol; and if it was our lot then to be left alone to act the
part of the extortioner whilst he acted that of the generous victor,
the Queen is doubly glad that we should not now have fallen into the
trap, to ask Austria (as friends and neutrals) concessions which he
was ready to waive. He will now probably omit no occasion to cajole
Austria as he has done to Russia, and turn her spirit of revenge upon
Prussia and Germany--the Emperor's probable next victims. Should he
thus have rendered himself the master of the entire Continent, the
time may come for us either to obey or to fight him with terrible odds
against us. This has been the Queen's view from the beginning of this
complication, and events have hitherto wonderfully supported them. How
Italy is to prosper under the Pope's presidency, whose misgovernment
of his own small portion of it was the ostensible cause of the war,
the Queen is at a loss to conceive. But the Emperor will be able to
do just as he pleases, being in military command of the country, and
having Sardinia, the Pope, and Austria as his debtors.
The Queen would like this letter to be communicated to the Cabinet.
[Footnote 60: The armistice had arranged that the Emperors
should meet at Villafranca, where peace was concluded. See
_ante_, Introductory Note to Chapter XXVIII. The Italian
Confederation was to be under the presidency of the Pope.]
_Lord John Russell to Queen Victoria._
FOREIGN OFFICE, _13th July 1859_.
Lord John Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty; he will
read your Majesty's letter to the Cabinet to-morrow.
The Emperor Napoleon is left no doubt in a position of great power.
That position has been made for him by allowing him to be the only
champion of the cause of the people of Italy.
But that is no reason why we should seek a quarrel with France, and
there is some reason to doubt whether the speeches made in the House
of Lords, while they display our weakness and our alarm, are really
patriotic in their purpose and tendency.
To be well armed, and to be just to all our neighbours, appears to
Lord John Russell to be the most simple, the most safe, and the most
honest policy.
_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._
OSBORNE, _14th July 1859_.
The Queen acknowledges the receipt of Lord John Russell's
communications of yesterday. She entirely agrees with him "that we
have no reason to seek a quarrel with France," and that "the most
simple and most safe and most honest" line of conduct for us will be
"to be well armed, and to be just to all our neighbours."
She trusts that as the poor Duchess of Parma[61] appears to be
overlooked in the Italian Peace merely because nobody thinks it his
business to befriend her, we shall in the above spirit ask for justice
and consideration for her.
The Queen concurs with Lord John that it will now be useless to
communicate to France the advice given to the Porte.
[Footnote 61: Louise Marie de Bourbon, daughter of the Duc de
Berri, and widow of Charles III., Duke of Parma. She was at
this time Regent for her son Robert, a minor (born 1848), the
present Duke.]
[Pageheading: THE VIEWS OF THE POPE]
[Pageheading: THE POPE ON ENGLISH LIBERALISM]
[Pageheading: THE TEMPORAL POWER]
_Mr Odo Russell to Lord John Russell._
(_Submitted to the Queen._)
ROME, _17th July 1859_.
MY LORD,--Some days since a letter from the "Pontifical Antechamber,"
directed to "Signor Odoni Russell, Agente Officioso di Sua Maesta
Britannica," informed me that His Holiness the Pope desired to see me.
In consequence I proceeded to the Vatican, and was ushered into the
presence of His Holiness by Monsignore Talbot, the "Cameriere" in
waiting, who immediately withdrew, and I remained alone with the Pope.
His Holiness welcomed me with his usual benevolence and good humour.
He seemed very gay, and spoke with more than customary frankness, so
much so indeed that I have felt some hesitation as to the propriety of
submitting what passed between us to your Lordship. But after mature
reflection, I think it best you should be in possession of an accurate
and conscientious account of the sentiments of His Holiness in the
present important juncture of affairs.
"Caro mio Russell," the Pope said, "you have been so long at Naples
that I was already thinking of sending after you to bring you back; we
do not like you to leave us, and the more so as I have heard you were
attached to the Mission of Mr Elliot,[62] who is a son of Lord Minto;
and if he entertains the same political views as his father, he is a
dangerous man to the peace of Italy. Now I knew Lord Minto here, and
although he may be a very good man, I do not think him a man of any
capacity, and his doctrines were calculated to bring on the ruin of
Italy."
I replied, "I cannot agree with your Holiness, for I consider Lord
Minto to be a very clever man, whose honest, sound, and liberal views,
had they been listened to, might have prevented the crisis which is
now convulsing Italy."
The Pope said, "Well, of course you belong to his party, but, _Poveri
noi!_ what is to become of us with your uncle and Lord Palmerston at
the head of affairs in England? They have always sympathised with the
turbulent spirits of Italy, and their accession to power will greatly
increase the hopes of the Piedmontese Party. Indeed, I well know what
the English Government want: they want to see the Pope deprived of his
temporal power."
I replied, "Again I regret to find your Holiness so entirely mistaken
with respect to the policy of England. We derive great happiness from
our free institutions, and we would be glad to see our neighbours in
Europe as happy and as prosperous as we are, but we have no wish to
interfere with the internal concerns of other nations, or to give
advice without being asked for it; least of all as a Protestant
Power would _we_ think of interfering one way or the other with the
Government of your Holiness."
The Pope said, "I do not doubt the good intentions of England, but
unfortunately you do not understand this country, and your example
is dangerous to the Italian minds, your speeches in Parliament excite
them, and you fancy because constitutional liberties and institutions
suit you, that they must suit all the world. Now the Italians are a
dissatisfied, interfering, turbulent and intriguing race; they can
never learn to govern themselves, it is impossible; only see how they
follow Sardinia in all she tells them to do, simply because they love
intrigue and revolution, whilst in reality they do not know what they
want; a hot-headed people like the Italians require a firm and just
government to guide and take care of them, and Italy might have
continued tranquil and contented, had not the ambition of Sardinia led
her to revolutionise the whole country. The Grand Duke of Tuscany,
for instance, is an excellent and just man, and nevertheless, at the
instigation of Piedmont, he was turned out of the country, and for no
earthly purpose. I suppose you have read Monsieur About's book about
Rome[63]? well, all he says is untrue, pure calumny, and it would be
easy for me to have it all refuted; but he is really not worthy of
such an honour. His book, I see, has been translated into English,
and I have no doubt it will be much read and believed in England. Such
books and our refugees mislead your countrymen, and I often wonder at
the language your statesmen hold about us in the Houses of Parliament.
I always read their speeches. Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell,
and Mr Gladstone do not know us; but when I think how kindly and
hospitably Lord Granville was received at Rome last winter, and then
read the extraordinary speech he made last February about us, I think
the gout he suffered from here must have gone to his head when he
reached England, and I wonder how Her Majesty the Queen could send
for him to form a Government! Then again, Mr Gladstone, who allowed
himself to be deceived about the Neapolitan prisoners--he does not
know us and Italy--and Mr Cobden,--I knew him in 1847--he is always in
favour of peace, and he must be very fond of animals, for when he came
here from Spain he wanted me to write to that country and put a stop
to bull-fights--a very good man, but I do not know his views about
Italy. And Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, do you think he will be
employed again? he seemed so anxious to get a place. Mr Disraeli was
my friend; I regret him. But tell me, _caro mio Russell_, if you are a
prophet, how all this war and fuss is to end?"
I replied, "Your Holiness has better claims to being a prophet than
I have, and I sincerely hope all this may end well for Italy; but
as regards the present and the past, I must again say that I deeply
regret to see your Holiness misconceive the honest views and sincere
sympathies of the statesmen you have named, for the welfare of Italy;
they would like to see Italy independent, prosperous, progressing and
contented, and able to take care of herself without foreign troops.
Your Holiness has done me the honour to speak freely and openly with
me; permit me to do the same, and ask your Holiness what England must
think when she sees the temporal power of your Holiness imposed
upon three millions of people by the constant presence of French
and Austrian bayonets, and when, after ten years of occupation,
the Austrians withdraw suddenly, there is at once an insurrection
throughout the country; and if the French were to leave Rome it is
generally acknowledged that a revolution would compel your Holiness to
seek refuge in some foreign country. At the same time, when the troops
of your Holiness are employed as at Perugia,[64] the Government is
too weak to control them; they pillage and murder, and, instead
of investigating their conduct, the excesses committed by them are
publicly rewarded."
The Pope smiled, paused, took a pinch of snuff, and then said
good-humouredly: "Although I am not a prophet, I know one thing; this
war will be followed by an European Congress, and a Congress about
Italian Affairs is even worse for us than war. There will be changes
in Italy, but mark my words, whatever these changes are, the Pope will
ever be the Pope, whether he dwells in the Vatican or lives concealed
in the Catacombs.
"Lastly, I will give you some advice. Prepare and take care of
yourselves in England, for I am quite certain the French Emperor
intends sooner or later to attack you."
The Pope then beckoned to me to approach, and making the sign of the
Cross, he gave me his blessing in Latin, then with both his hands,
he took one of mine, pressed it, and said with great warmth, "Be our
friend in the hour of need." I have the honour to be, etc., etc.,
ODO RUSSELL.
[Footnote 62: Mr (afterwards Sir) Henry Elliot, P.C., G.C.B.,
was Plenipotentiary to Naples. He was subsequently Ambassador
at Vienna, and died in 1907.]
[Footnote 63: Edmond About, a French journalist (1828-1885),
had published _La Question Romaine,_ an attack on the Papacy.
See De la Gorce, _Histoire du Second Empire_, vol. ii. p.
365.]
[Footnote 64: An insurrection against the Pope at Perugia bad
been put down with great cruelty on the 20th of June.]
[Pageheading: DISAPPOINTMENT OF CAVOUR]
_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._
OSBORNE, _18th July 1859_.
The Queen returns these interesting letters to Lord John.[65]
The whole aspect of affairs gives cause for serious reflection and
great anxiety for the future.
The conduct of France as regards Italy shows how little the Emperor
Napoleon cared for, or thought of, its independence when he undertook
this war, which (though in the last instance begun by Austria) _he_
brought on, for purposes of his own.
The manifesto of the Emperor of Austria shows how unfortunate for her
own interests the policy of Prussia has been.[66] She had made herself
answerable for the issue of the war by restraining the minor states,
and stands now humiliated and isolated. Her position in Germany is at
present very painful, and may be for the future very dangerous.
The Queen feels strongly that we are not without considerable
responsibility in having from the first urged her to take no part in
the war, which certainly had great influence on her actions--and she
will very naturally look to us not to desert her when the evil hour
for her may come.[67]
[Footnote 65: These were letters from Lord Cowley and Sir
James Hudson in reference to the Peace of Villafranca. The
former announced, as a result of his conversation with the
Empress and other persons, that among the causes which induced
the French Emperor to consent to peace were his horror at
any further sacrifice of life and time, disgust at what he
considered Italian apathy for the cause which the French
were upholding, and distrust of the intentions of the King
of Sardinia and Count Cavour. Sir James Hudson described the
unanimous feeling at Turin that the Nationalist cause had been
betrayed. Cavour, he wrote, could obtain no further response
to his remonstrances with Napoleon than "Il fait bien chaud:
il fait bien chaud." Moreover, Napoleon knew (continued Sir
James) "that Mazzini had dogged his footsteps to Milan, for,
the day before yesterday, sixty-six Orsini bombshells were
discovered there by the chief of the Sardinian police, who
arrested the man (a known follower of Mazzini) who had them.
The story is that he brought them from England for the purpose
of using them against the Austrians!!" Count Cavour, who
resigned in disgust and was succeeded by Rattazzi, remained
out of office till the following January.]
[Footnote 66: He stated that he believed he could obtain
better terms direct from the French Emperor than those to
which England, Russia, and Prussia were likely to give their
moral support as a basis of mediation.]
[Footnote 67: Lord Cowley wrote to Lord John Russell on the
20th of July:--
"... The two Emperors met in the most cordial manner, shaking
hands as if no difference had existed between them. As soon as
they were alone, the Emperor of Austria took the initiative,
and stated at once that he was ready to cede to the Emperor
of the French, for the sake of the restoration of peace, the
territory which the latter had conquered, but that he could
not do more, giving the reasons which I have mentioned to
your Lordship in former despatches. The Emperor of the French
replied that his own position in France, and the public
declarations which he had made, rendered something in addition
necessary: that the war had been undertaken for the freedom of
Italy, and that he could not justify to France a peace
which did not ensure this object. The Emperor Francis
Joseph rejoined that he had no objection to offer to the
Confederation which formed part of the Emperor Napoleon's
programme, and that he was ready to enter it with Venetia, and
when the Emperor Napoleon remarked that such a result would be
a derision, if the whole power and influence of Austria were
to be brought to bear upon the Confederation, the Emperor
Francis Joseph exclaimed against any such interpretation being
given to his words, his idea being that Venetia should be
placed on the same footing, in the Italian Confederation, as
Luxemburg holds in the Germanic Confederation....
"In the course of conversation between the two Imperial
Sovereigns, the Emperor of Austria remarked to the Emperor of
the French with many expressions of goodwill, and of a desire
to see the dynasty of the latter firmly established on
the throne of France, that His Majesty took an odd way to
accomplish his end. 'Believe me,' said the Emperor Francis
Joseph, 'dynasties are not established by having recourse to
such bad company as you have chosen; revolutionists overturn,
but do not construct.' The Emperor Napoleon appears to have
taken the remark in very good part, and even to have excused
himself to a certain degree, observing that it was a further
reason that the Emperor Francis Joseph should aid him in
putting an end to the war, and to the revolutionary spirit to
which the war had given rise.
"The Emperors having separated in the same cordial manner in
which they had met, the Emperor of the French himself drew up
the preliminaries and sent them in the evening to Verona
by his cousin, the Prince Napoleon. Being introduced to the
Emperor of Austria, who received His Imperial Highness
very courteously, His Majesty said, after reading the
preliminaries, that he must beg the Prince to excuse him for
a short time, as he had others to consult before signing them.
He then went into an adjoining room where, according to Prince
Napoleon's account, a loud and angry discussion ensued, in
which the Prince distinguished the Emperor's voice broken by
tears, as if His Majesty had been obliged to have recourse to
persuasion, to silence the opposition made to the conditions,
and it was not until some time had elapsed that His Majesty
returned and signed the paper containing them, or rather
I infer that he retained the paper signed by the Emperor
Napoleon, and returned one of similar purport signed by
himself; for among all the curious circumstances connected
with this transaction, not the least curious is the fact that
there does not exist any document recording the preliminaries
with the double signature of both Emperors."]
[Pageheading: INDIAN AFFAIRS]
_Queen Victoria to Sir Charles Wood._
OSBORNE, _23rd July 1859_.
The Queen's attention has been attracted by No. 86 (Foreign
Department) of the printed abstracts of letters received from India,
relating to the affairs of Bussahir.[68] She would ask Sir C. Wood
to consider, with his Council, whether means could not be found for
making acts of confiscation, sequestration, spoliation, transfer of
Government, or whatever they may be called, dependent upon some formal
and judicial proceeding which should secure the Queen from acts being
done in her name--which might not be entirely justifiable morally, as
well as legally--which should relieve the Government agents from
the fearful responsibility of being sole advisers on steps implying
judicial condemnation without trial on their mere personal opinion,
and from which they derive themselves additional personal advancement
in power, position, possibly emolument, etc., etc., and lastly, which
would give the people of India security that the Government only acts
after impartial judicial investigation and the sifting of evidence.
The Queen would wish a report to be made to her upon this important
subject.
[Footnote 68: Bussahir was a State in the upper course of the
Sutlej. In January, the Punjab, including the Sutlej States,
had been made a distinct presidency, but Bussahir was not
finally included until 1862.]
[Pageheading: NON-INTERVENTION]
_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._[69]
OSBORNE, _21st August 1859_.
The Queen sends the enclosed draft to Lord John Russell; she is very
sorry that she cannot give her approval to it. There are many points
in it to which she cannot but feel the gravest objections. It is
unnecessary, however, for her to go into these details, as it is
against the principle of England volunteering at this moment the
intrusion of a scheme of her own for the redistribution of the
territories and Governments of Northern Italy, that she must above all
protest. Moreover, a step of such importance, reversing the principle
of non-intervention, which the Queen's Government has hitherto
publicly declared and upheld, should, in the Queen's opinion, not be
brought before her without having received the fullest deliberation
and concurrence of the assembled Cabinet.
[Footnote 69: A month earlier, on his return from the war, the
Emperor had tried to enlist British support in his scheme for
a European congress. But the Cabinet decided (24th July),
with the Queen's full concurrence, that no answer should
be returned to this proposal, till a Treaty, embodying the
preliminaries of Villafranca, should have been signed.]
_Lord John Russell to Queen Victoria._
PEMBROKE LODGE, _23rd August 1859_.
Lord John Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty; he begs
to explain that with respect to reversing the principle of
non-intervention, he has never proposed any such course. If
intervention were to mean giving friendly advice, or even offering
mediation, your Majesty's Government from January to May would have
pursued a course of intervention, for they were all that time advising
Austria, France, Sardinia, and Germany.
If by friendly and judicious advice we can prevent a bloody and
causeless war in Italy we are bound to give such advice.
If we refrain from doing so, we may ultimately be obliged to have
recourse to intervention; that is to say, we may have to interfere
against the ruthless tyranny of Austria, or the unchained ambition
of France. It is with a view to prevent the necessity of intervention
that Lord John Russell advises friendly representations.
[Pageheading: NON-INTERVENTION]
_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._
ALDERSHOT, _23rd August 1859_.
... With regard to Lord John's letter of to-day, the Queen wishes
merely to say that from the outbreak of the war our negotiations have
ceased, and that the war is not over till the peace is concluded. Our
interference before that period may be prompted by a desire to prevent
a future war; but our first duty is not to interfere with the closing
of the present. The desire to guard Italy against "the ruthless
tyranny of Austria, and the unchained ambition of France" may produce
a state of things in Italy, forcing both to make common cause against
her, and backed by the rest of Europe to isolate England, and making
her responsible for the issue. It will be little satisfaction then to
reflect upon the fact that our interference has been merely _advice_.
[Pageheading: FOREIGN POLICY]
_Viscount Palmerston to Queen Victoria._
94 PICCADILLY, _23rd August 1859_.
Viscount Palmerston presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and
begs to state that Lord John Russell has shown him your Majesty's
communication, in which your Majesty objects to a proposed despatch
to Lord Cowley, on the ground that it would be a departure from the
principle of non-intervention which has been publicly proclaimed
as the rule for Great Britain in the late events between France and
Austria. But Viscount Palmerston would beg humbly to submit to your
Majesty that the intervention which all parties agreed that this
country ought to abstain from, was active interference by force of
arms in the war then going on, but that neither of the great political
parties meant or asserted that this country should not interfere by
its advice and opinions in regard to the matters to which the war
related. Viscount Palmerston can assert that neither he nor any of
those who were acting with him out of office ever contemplated giving
such a meaning to the doctrine of non-intervention; and that such a
meaning never was attached to it by the Conservative Leaders while
they were in office, is proved from one end of their Blue Book to the
other.[70] The whole course of the Derby Government, in regard to
the matters on which the war turned, was one uninterrupted series of
interventions by advice, by opinions, and by censure now addressed to
one party and now to another. Whatever may be thought of the judgment
which was shown by them, or of the bias by which they were guided, the
principle on which they acted was undoubtedly right and proper.
England is one of the greatest powers of the world, no event or series
of events bearing on the balance of power, or on probabilities of
peace or war can be matters of indifference to her, and her right to
have and to express opinions on matters thus bearing on her interests
is unquestionable; and she is equally entitled to give upon such
matters any advice which she may think useful, or to suggest any
arrangements which she may deem conducive to the general good.
It is no doubt true that the Conservative Party, since they have
ceased to be responsible for the conduct of affairs, have held a
different doctrine, and in their anxiety lest the influence of England
should be exerted for the benefit of Italy, and to the disadvantage of
Austria, have contended that any participation by Great Britain in the
negotiations for the settlement of Italy would be a departure from the
principle of non-intervention; but their own practice while in office
refutes their newly adopted doctrine in opposition; and if that
doctrine were to be admitted, Great Britain would, by her own act,
reduce herself to the rank of a third-class European State.
[Footnote 70: This was the Blue Book, the production of which
would, according to Lord Malmesbury, have saved the Derby
Ministry.]
[Pageheading: ITALIAN POLICY]
[Pageheading: THE QUEEN AND LORD JOHN RUSSELL]
_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._
OSBORNE, _24th August 1859_.
The Queen is really placed in a position of much difficulty, giving
her deep pain. She has been obliged to object to so many drafts sent
to her from the Foreign Office on the Italian Question, and yet, no
sooner is one withdrawn or altered, than others are submitted exactly
of the same purport or tendency, if even couched in new words. The
Queen has so often expressed her views that she is almost reluctant
to reiterate them. She wishes, however, Lord John to re-peruse the two
drafts enclosed, which just came to her. If they have any meaning or
object, it must be to show to France that it would be to her interest
to break in the Treaty of Zurich the leading conditions to which
she pledged herself to Austria at Villafranca. Those preliminaries
contained but three provisions affecting Austria: (1) That Austria
was to cede Lombardy; (2) That an Italian Confederation should be
encouraged, of which Venetia was to form part; (3) That the Dukes of
Tuscany and Modena were to return to their Duchies. The two latter
clauses must be considered as compensations for the losses inflicted
in the first. Both the latter are now to be recommended by England, a
neutral in the war, to be broken.
Now, either it is expected that our advice will not be listened to, in
which case it would not be useful and hardly dignified to give it,
or it is expected that France will follow it. If, on finding herself
cheated, Austria were to feel herself obliged to take up arms again,
we should be directly answerable for this fresh war. What would then
be our alternative? Either to leave France in the lurch, to re-fight
her own battle, which would entail lasting danger and disgrace on this
country, or to join her in the fresh war against Austria--a misfortune
from which the Queen feels herself equally bound to protect her
country.
As this is a question of principle on which she clearly understood her
Cabinet to have been unanimous, she must ask her correspondence to be
circulated amongst its members, with a view to ascertain whether they
also would be parties to its reversal, and in order to prevent the
necessity of these frequent discussions, which, as the Queen has
already said, are very painful to her.
[Pageheading: MEDIATION OF LORD GRANVILLE]
_Earl Granville to the Prince Albert._
LONDON, _29th August 1859_.
SIR,--In the middle of last week I received at Aldenham a letter from
Mr Sidney Herbert,[71] in which he told me that he had just received
a visit from Lord Palmerston, much perturbed and annoyed, saying that
the Queen had objected to all Lord John's despatches, and appeared to
think that it was objectionable for England to give any advice on the
subject of Italian affairs. Mr Herbert gave some good advice to Lord
Palmerston, but, from the tone of his letter, I gather that he
thought the objections made at Osborne unreasonable. I answered that
I entirely concurred with him in the interest of everybody, that no
feelings of irritation should exist between the Sovereign and her
leading Ministers; that it was possible that the Queen, forgetting
how very sensitive Lord John was to criticism, had pulled him up more
sharply than he liked, but that I was convinced the objections made
were not exactly those mentioned by Lord Palmerston. I heard nothing
more till I received on Saturday evening a telegram, summoning me to a
Cabinet this day. I came to Town immediately, and saw Lord Palmerston
yesterday. I enquired the reason of the sudden summons for a Cabinet.
He told me that there had been a discussion between the Queen and Lord
John; that the Queen had objected to his (Lord John's) proposal that
the despatch of 25th July should be now communicated to the French
Government. Lord John had informed him of the fact, and had requested
him to communicate with the Queen on the subject. Lord Palmerston
then read to me a well-written memorandum on the abstract question of
giving advice, which he had sent to Her Majesty. He told me that he
had been to Osborne; that the Queen had expressed a wish through Sir
Charles Wood that he should not discuss the whole matter with her;
that he had had a satisfactory conversation with your Royal Highness,
of which he gave me an abstract, which, however, contained his own
arguments at greater length than your Royal Highness's. He said that
Lord John had made a mistake with respect to the end of the despatch,
in which Lord Cowley is desired to withhold it till after the Peace of
Zurich was concluded. Lord John gave a different interpretation to it
from what appeared to be the case, as described by a previous letter
of Lord John, in which he had said that the sentence was added at
the suggestion of the Cabinet, and with his entire approval. Lord
Palmerston states that the Queen did not feel herself authorised
to sanction a departure from what had been decided by the Cabinet,
without the concurrence of the Cabinet, and that she thought it
desirable, if the Cabinet met, that they should agree on the future
policy as regards Italy. Lord John also wished for a Cabinet.
I replied that there seemed to be a double question: first, a
difference between the Queen and Lord John Russell and himself; and
second, the whole question of our Italian Policy. On the first point
I could not but remember the apprehension generally felt at the
formation of his first Government; that the feeling between the
Sovereign and himself might not be such as to give strength to the
Government; that the result, however, was most satisfactory. I was not
aware of either the Queen or himself having given way on any one
point of principle, but the best understanding was kept up in the most
honourable way to both, and that, at the end of his Ministry, I knew
that the Queen had expressed to several persons how much she regretted
to lose his services. That I most sincerely hoped that there was
no chance of misunderstanding now arising; that would be most
disadvantageous to the Sovereign, to the public service, to the
Government, and, above all, to himself. He interrupted me by assuring
me that there was not the slightest chance of this. He repeated to
me flattering things said by the Queen at the close of his last
Administration, and told me that it was impossible for the Queen to
have been more kind and civil than at his visit last week at Osborne.
I continued that in Italian matters I believed the Cabinet was agreed.
Our language to Italian Governments ought to show sympathy with Italy,
and let them know that we were anxious that they should be left free
to act and decide for themselves; that it should inform them in the
clearest manner that in no case were they to obtain active assistance
from us, and it ought to avoid giving any advice as to their conduct,
which might make us responsible for the evil or danger which might
accrue from following such advice. That our language to France and
Austria ought to press upon them in every _judicious_ manner the
expediency of doing that which was likely to secure the permanent
happiness of Italy, and to persuade them to abstain from forcing upon
the Italians, persons and forms of Government to which they objected;
nothing like a menace or a promise to be used....
I then saw Sidney Herbert, who told me that Charles Wood's report
had entirely changed the aspect of things; that it was clear that the
Queen had come to the assistance of the Cabinet, instead of opposing
them; that reason had been entirely on her side, and that Johnny had
reduced the question now to the single point, which was not of much
importance, whether the 25th July despatch should now be communicated
or not. He told me that Lord John was in a state of great irritation,
and ready to kick over the traces. I dined at Lord Palmerston's, and
met Sir Charles Wood and Mr Gladstone. I had some guarded conversation
with the latter, who seemed very reasonable. Sir Charles Wood gave me
all the information which I required. It appears to me that the
really important point is that the whole Cabinet should know the real
question between the Queen and her Ministers, and that, if Lord John
can find plausible reasons for changing the date of the communication
of the despatch, it may be better for the Queen to consent to this.
Some of us will take care to have a decided opinion about the future
course of our policy.
I presume Sir George Grey will be at the Cabinet, and will be able to
report to your Royal Highness what has passed. If he is not there, I
will write again. I have the honour to be, Sir, with great respect,
your Royal Highness's obedient, humble, and faithful Servant,
GRANVILLE.
[Footnote 71: See Lord Fitzmaurice's _Life of Lord Granville_,
vol. i. chap. xiii.]
[Pageheading: THE QUEEN'S POSITION]
_Earl Granville to the Prince Albert._
PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, _29th August 1859_.
SIR,--The Cabinet was very satisfactory. Lord John looked ill, and
evidently ashamed of much of his case. Many of the Cabinet
thought that the despatch of 25th July had not only been sent but
communicated. Others attached a different meaning to the closing
paragraph than what it appears to bear. Lord John produced a most
objectionable draft of despatch in lieu of that of the 25th. It was
universally condemned, and Lord Palmerston was empowered to tell the
Queen that the Cabinet now thought that the despatch of the 25th might
be communicated.
Lords Palmerston and John Russell asked for further powers during the
Recess, and recommended that we should give an opinion in favour of
annexation of duchies to Sardinia. This was decidedly objected to, and
we all professed our readiness to meet again if necessary.[72]
The Cabinet thoroughly understood what had passed between the Queen
and her two Ministers, although we could not get Lord John to show us
all we required.
Gladstone took me aside after it was over to say that I must have
thought him stupid yesterday evening, that now he knew the facts he
thought Her Majesty had been put to most unnecessary annoyance. The
Chancellor said something of the same sort. I never saw the Cabinet
more united.
The Duke of Argyll, Lord Elgin, and Mr Cardwell were absent. I am,
Sir, with great respect, your obedient, humble, and faithful Servant,
GRANVILLE.
[Footnote 72: "Pam. asked for fuller powers to act during the
recess, which was met by a general assurance of readiness
to come up by night trains." Lord Granville to the Duke of
Argyll. See the _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. i. p. 358.]
[Pageheading: SARDINIA AND CENTRAL ITALY]
_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._
Balmoral, _5th September 1859_.
Lord John Russell will not be surprised if the despatches of Lord
Cowley and drafts by Lord John in answer to them, which the Queen
returns to him, have given her much pain. Here we have the very
interference with advice to which the Queen had objected when
officially brought before her for her sanction, to which the Cabinet
objected, and which Lord John Russell agreed to withdraw, carried
on by direct communication of the Prime Minister through the French
Ambassador with the Emperor; and we have the very effect produced
which the Queen dreaded, viz. the French Minister insinuating that
we called upon his master to do that which he would consider so
dishonourable that he would rather resign than be a party to it! What
is the use of the Queen's open and, she fears, sometimes wearisome
correspondence, with her Ministers, what the use of long deliberations
of the Cabinet, if the very policy can be carried out by indirect
means which is set aside officially, and what protection has the Queen
against this practice? Lord John Russell's distinction also between
his own official and private opinion or advice given to a Foreign
Minister is a most dangerous, and, the Queen thinks, untenable theory,
open to the same objections, for what he states will have the weight
of the official character of the Foreign Secretary, whether stated
as his private or his public opinion. His advice to the Marquis
d'Azeglio[73] is moreover quite open to the inference drawn by Count
Walewski, that it is an encouragement to _Sardinia_, to Military
intervention in and occupation of the Duchies, and Lord John Russell's
answer hardly meets this point if left as it stands at present;
for "the _name_ of the King of Sardinia,... _the chief of a
well-disciplined army_," will have little influence unless he is
prepared to use that army.
The Queen must ask Lord John to instruct Lord Cowley to state to Count
Walewski that no opinions expressed on Foreign Policy are those of
"Her Majesty's Government" but those which are given in the official
and regular way, and that Her Majesty's Government never thought of
advising the French Government to break the solemn engagements into
which the Emperor Napoleon entered towards the Emperor of Austria at
Villafranca.
The Queen asks Lord John to communicate this letter to Lord
Palmerston.
[Footnote 73: Massimo d'Azeglio, Sardinian Commissioner in the
Romagna. He had been Prime Minister of Sardinia from 1849 till
1852, when Cavour, who had been in his ministry, succeeded
him.]
[Pageheading: ENGLAND INVOLVED]
_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._
BALMORAL, _6th September 1859_.
The Queen returns Lord Palmerston's letter, together with the other
papers sent to her, to Lord John. She is glad to find that he thinks
that no answer ought to be given to Count Persigny, but she thinks
it important that it should be _stated to him that no answer can
be given_. Unfortunately, here has been again the Prime Minister
declaring that he _quite agrees_ with the French Ambassador, but that
the proposal should come officially from France to be placed before
the Cabinet. The inference must be that the Cabinet and the Queen
will, as a matter of course, agree also, when it is so submitted. Now
what is it that Lord Palmerston has approved? A plan for an alliance
of England with France for the purpose of _overruling_ Austria, if the
Duchies in which she is the heir, and to which the Archdukes were to
return in accordance with the stipulations of Villafranca, were given
to Sardinia and Austria should object. It is hoped indeed that this
will not immediately lead to war with her, but France is to expect
that she will not be left to fight single-handed for an object
declared to be more English than French! Thus we are dragged step by
step into the position of a party in the Italian strife. The Queen
thinks it incumbent upon her not to leave Lord John Russell in
ignorance of the fact that _she_ could not approve such a policy
reversing our whole position since the commencement of the War.
The Queen must leave it to Lord John to consider how far it would be
fair to his colleagues in the Cabinet to leave them unacquainted with
the various private steps lately taken, which must seriously affect
their free consideration of the important question upon which they
have hitherto pledged themselves to a distinct principle.
_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._
BALMORAL, _6th September 1859_.
The Queen returns to Lord Palmerston his correspondence with M. de
Persigny. Lord John Russell will have sent him her letter to him on
this subject. She has nothing to add, but to repeat her conviction
of the great danger and inconvenience arising out of such private
communications, and the apprehension she must naturally feel that
the attempt to convince the Emperor Napoleon that it would be for his
interest to break his word to the Emperor of Austria should reflect
upon the honour of the Queen's Government. She must insist upon this
being distinctly guarded against.
[Pageheading: LORD JOHN RUSSELL'S CRITICISMS]
_Lord John Russell to Queen Victoria._
ABERGELDIE, _7th September 1859_.
Lord John Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty; he
cannot refrain from making some remarks on your Majesty's letter of
yesterday.
Lord Palmerston appears to have answered M. de Persigny by saying
that he personally agreed with him, but that the proposition he had
sketched must come from the French Government; that it must come from
them officially, and it would then have to be maturely considered by
the Cabinet.
Lord John Russell sees nothing to object to in this language. It might
be embarrassing to Lord Palmerston if such a proposition were to
come from France, and were to be rejected by the Cabinet. But Lord
Palmerston could easily explain the matter to M. de Persigny. Lord
Palmerston does not appear to have committed your Majesty, or Lord
John Russell, or the Cabinet in any way.
On the other hand, your Majesty cannot mean that the Cabinet is to
be precluded from maturely considering any proposition which may come
officially from France.
Lord John Russell feels, on his own part, that he must offer to your
Majesty such advice as he thinks best adapted to secure the interests
and dignity of your Majesty and the country. He will be held by
Parliament responsible for that advice. It will be always in your
Majesty's power to reject it altogether.
Lord John Russell is of opinion that there never was a time when it
was less expedient to fetter this country by prospective engagements.
But it does not follow that the policy pursued last autumn and winter,
and which ended in a war in Italy, would be the best course in any
future contingency. Should another war arise it will be very difficult
for Great Britain to remain neutral. For this reason it is desirable
to prevent such a war, if possible. It was difficult last winter, and
may be still more difficult this winter. For the present there is no
better course than to keep this country free from engagements. After
the peace of Zurich is made, or not made, we shall see our way better.
Lord John Russell has never concealed his opinions from his
colleagues. He even warned them that France might make such a
proposition as M. de Persigny now contemplates.
The enclosed letter from Lord Palmerston and Mr Fane's[74] despatch
will show the feelings which exist between Austria and Prussia. The
Emperor Napoleon does not appear to have satisfied Prince Metternich.
His object evidently is to gain time.
[Footnote 74: Julian Henry Fane, son of the eleventh Earl of
Westmorland, and Secretary of Embassy at Vienna.]
_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._
BALMORAL, _7th September 1859_.
The Queen has received Lord John Russell's letter. She can ask for
nothing better than "that we should be kept from any engagements," and
she never could have intended to convey the impression that she wished
to "see the Cabinet precluded from taking into consideration any
proposal France might make." What she objects to is binding beforehand
the Government by expressions of opinion of its leading members to the
French Government, and thus _bringing about_ those French proposals
which it will be most embarrassing to the Cabinet either to reject
or adopt. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, that the French
Government should be told that the opinions given were private
opinions not binding the Government. Lord John has not yet sent to the
Queen drafts in conformity with her wishes expressed in her letter of
the day before yesterday.
[Pageheading: LETTERS TO FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS]
_Viscount Palmerston to Queen Victoria._
BROADLANDS, _9th September 1859_.
Viscount Palmerston presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and has
had the honour to receive your Majesty's communication of the 6th of
this month; and although he had the honour of addressing your Majesty
yesterday afternoon, he deems it his duty to submit some observations
upon this communication.
Your Majesty states that Viscount Palmerston in his letter to Count
Persigny endeavoured to persuade the Emperor of the French to break
his word to the Emperor of Austria, but Viscount Palmerston must beg
very respectfully but entirely to deny that accusation....[75]
Your Majesty is pleased to observe upon the danger and inconvenience
of private communications with Foreign Ministers, and to add that
your Majesty must insist upon this being distinctly guarded against.
Viscount [Palmerston] would be very desirous of knowing the precise
meaning of those last words. If your Majesty means that what is to be
guarded against is any attempt to induce a Foreign Sovereign to break
his word, Viscount Palmerston cordially subscribes to that opinion,
and maintains that he has not done so in the past, and declares that
he has no intention of doing so in the future. But if your
Majesty's meaning is that Viscount Palmerston is to be debarred
from communicating with Foreign Ministers except for the purpose
of informing them officially of formal decisions of the British
Government, Viscount Palmerston would beg humbly and respectfully to
represent to your Majesty that such a curtailment of the proper and
constitutional functions of the office which he holds would render
it impossible for him to serve your Majesty consistently with his own
honour or with advantage to the public interest.
[Footnote 75: Lord Palmerston then gives a very long and
detailed account of his position.]
[Pageheading: THE QUEEN'S OPINION]
_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._
BALMORAL, _11th September 1859_.
Lord Palmerston has written (on the 8th) a long letter to the Queen,
which, besides giving his private opinion on the politics of Italy,
which were not disputed, purports to show that when a principle
of policy had been adopted by the Cabinet and sanctioned by the
Sovereign, the Foreign Secretary ought not to be impeded in carrying
out the details, either by objections raised to them by the Sovereign,
or by making them dependent on the meetings of Cabinets, difficult to
obtain at this time of year. Now the question raised by the Queen
was _just the reverse_. The principle adopted by the Cabinet and
sanctioned by the Queen was: not to interfere by active advice with
the peace to be made at Zurich; the Foreign Secretary had submitted a
draft which had appeared to the Queen to be in contradiction to this
principle, which, upon the Sovereign's objection, he withdrew; the
Cabinet was summoned and rejected a similar draft submitted to them,
and the Queen then complained that the very same advice should have
been given by the Prime Minister in an indirect way to which the
Sovereign and Cabinet could not agree openly. Lord Palmerston's letter
was not communicated to the Queen until it had been alluded to in a
public despatch, and Count Walewski had insinuated to our Ambassador
that, rather than be a party to a line of conduct, which he would look
upon as dishonourable for his master, he would resign office. What the
Queen has asked for is: an intimation to the French Government that
private communications like that of Lord Palmerston to M. de Persigny
must not be looked upon as the official expression of the opinion of
Her Majesty's Government, and that we disclaim ever having intended
to induce the Emperor to break his engagements made at Villafranca,
whatever they may have been. The Queen does not conceive that Lord
Palmerston can object to this course, nor does he attempt to do so in
his letter.
_P.S._--Since writing the above the Queen has received Lord
Palmerston's letter of the 9th. As she has just written at length,
she does not conceive that it would be necessary to make any further
observations in reply, except to a distinct question put by him in
the latter part of his letter, viz. what the Queen wishes to have
"distinctly guarded against."
It is the danger and inconvenience of private communications with
Foreign Ministers, without a distinct understanding that they are
strictly private, and not to be treated as conveying the opinions of
Her Majesty's Government, where the sanction of the Crown and adhesion
of the Cabinet have not been obtained. Lord John Russell has now
expressed this in a paragraph in one of his drafts to Lord Cowley,
which he will send to Lord Palmerston.
As a proof of the necessity of such caution, the Queen, has only to
refer to the public use made of Lord Palmerston's private letter
to Count Persigny, and the use made to our prejudice by the Emperor
Napoleon at the time of the armistice at Villafranca of a private
communication with Count Persigny, which was represented to imply
assent to certain conditions of peace by England, with a desire of
pressing them on Austria, when no opinion had been expressed by the
Government to justify such an inference.
[Pageheading: ST JUAN]
_The Duke of Newcastle to Queen Victoria._
DOWNING STREET, _26th September 1859_.
The Duke of Newcastle presents his humble duty to your Majesty.
Your Majesty will receive from Sir George Lewis full information
of the serious intelligence which has been received to-day from
Washington and Vancouver Island respecting the Military occupation
by United States troops of the island of St Juan,[76] and of the view
taken of it by your Majesty's Government.
The Duke of Newcastle begs leave to receive your Majesty's
instructions upon the acceptance of an offer made by Lord Clarendon
whilst on a visit at Clumber last week. Lord Clarendon received not
long ago a private letter from the President of the United States. He
proposes that in answering this letter he should express his concern
at these untoward events, and particularly at their occurrence at a
time when, if not speedily settled, they would prevent the fulfilment
of a project which he had reason to think had been in contemplation--a
visit to Washington by the Prince of Wales on his return from Canada.
Lord Clarendon expresses his belief that nothing would so much gratify
Mr Buchanan as a visit from His Royal Highness to the United States
during his Presidency....
Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell see no objection to such a
letter from Lord Clarendon, which, whilst it would carry weight as
coming from one occupying so high a position in this country, would
bear no official character; but as the name of the Prince of Wales
would be used, however hypothetically, such a letter would not be
written by Lord Clarendon or accepted by the Government without your
Majesty's sanction.
The Duke of Newcastle therefore requests to be favoured with your
Majesty's commands that he may communicate them to Lord Clarendon.
[Footnote 76: A dispute had arisen out of the Oregon affair
(see _ante_, vol. ii., Introductory Notes to Chapters XIV,
and XV), concerning the rival claims of this country and
the United States to the small island of St Juan, situated
between Vancouver Island and the State of Washington, which
is adjacent to the Canadian frontier.]
_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._[77]
WINDSOR CASTLE, _1st December 1859_.
The Queen returns Lord Cowley's interesting letter. She trusts that
it will be made quite clear to the Emperor that he has no chance
of getting us to join him in the war with Austria, which he may be
tempted or driven to renew. This alternative constantly recurs to his
mind....
[Footnote 77: On the 10th of November the Treaty of Zurich,
embodying the terms arranged at Villafranca, had been
signed, and a Congress was determined upon, to settle Italian
affairs.]
[Pageheading: ENGLAND AND FRANCE]
_Lord John Russell to Queen Victoria._
FOREIGN OFFICE, _1st December 1859_.
Lord John Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty; he
has written to Lord Cowley, according to your Majesty's gracious
permission. The question of supporting the Emperor of the French, if
Austria should attempt force to impose a government in Italy against
the popular will, must be judged of according to the circumstances,
should they arise. Lord John Russell is certainly not prepared to say
that a case may not arise when the interests of Great Britain might
require that she should give material support to the Emperor of the
French. But he considers such a case as very improbable, and that
the fear of such an alliance will prevent Austria from disturbing the
peace of Europe.
_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._
WINDSOR CASTLE, _2nd December 1859_.
The Queen was extremely sorry to find from Lord John Russell's letter
of yesterday that he contemplates the possibility of our joining
France in a fresh Italian war or demonstration of war against Austria,
which the Queen had put entirely out of the question. If the Emperor
of the French were allowed to believe in such a possibility, he would
have it in his power to bring it about, or obtain a just cause
of complaint against us, if we abandoned him. It would be just as
dangerous and unfair towards the Emperor to mislead him in this
respect as it would be for the Queen to conceal from Lord John that
under no pretence will she depart from her position of neutrality
in the Italian quarrel, and inflict upon her country and Europe the
calamity of war on that account.
[Pageheading: SIR JAMES HUDSON]
_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._
WINDSOR CASTLE, _6th December 1859_.
The Queen has received Lord John Russell's letter recommending Sir
James Hudson[78] as the Second Representative at the Congress of
Paris. The Queen must decline sanctioning this selection. Lord John
Russell has in his last letters avowed his conviction that England
cannot again remain neutral in an Italian war, and his opinion that
she ought to support France and Sardinia by arms if Austria were to
attempt to recover her supremacy by force. Lord Cowley wrote on the
29th ult. that Prince Metternich declared that Austria kept her Army
ready because she could not permit either the military occupation
of the Duchies by Sardinia or their annexation to that kingdom. Lord
Palmerston sent to the Queen yesterday evening the copy of a letter he
wrote to Count Persigny urging the Emperor Napoleon by every argument
he can find to consent to this annexation, even to the length of
assuring him that such a state would always be obliged to lean on
France.
The Queen cannot help drawing her conclusions from these facts, and
feels more than ever the great responsibility resting on her, to
preserve to her people the blessings of peace. She wishes this letter
to be communicated to Lord Palmerston and to the Cabinet.
The Queen approves of Lord Cowley as her First Representative at the
Congress.
[Footnote 78: Sir James Hudson, Minister at Turin, had been
a sympathiser in the policy of Cavour, to an extent almost
incompatible with his position as a British representative.]
[Pageheading: CENTRAL ITALY]
_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._
OSBORNE, _7th December 1859_.
The Queen has received Lord John Russell's letter of yesterday.
Although to avoid a long written discussion, she has not in her last
letter stated any reason for her objecting to Sir James Hudson as
Plenipotentiary at the Congress, she has no objection to state to Lord
John that it is simply her want of confidence in him, being the result
of her having watched his conduct at his post at Turin during these
last years. The Queen's representative at Paris ought to be a person
in whom she can have entire confidence, that _English_ interests alone
will sway his conduct. From Lord John Russell's letter it appears
that many of his colleagues in Cabinet saw equal objections to the
appointment.
The Queen repeats her wish that her letter of yesterday may be
communicated to the Cabinet.
Lord Cowley's letter, which she returns, is not calculated to
diminish the Queen's alarm as to the direction in which we are being
systematically driven, viz. _War_ to support the Emperor Napoleon,
who almost claims such support already as his right! He has already
shifted his ground further, and asks for it in case Austria should
oppose "the armed interference of Sardinia in the affairs of Central
Italy." Now Sardinia can have no more right to such interference than
Austria; yet the Emperor says "he is quite determined to renew the
war in case Austria resists." It is under these circumstances that the
advice of the Prime Minister of England to the Emperor, to withdraw
the only impediment which restrains the action of Sardinia, becomes a
matter of such grave moment.
The Queen is determined to hold to her neutrality in the Italian
intrigues, revolutions, and wars. It is true, Lord John says, "it
becomes a great power like Great Britain to preserve the peace of
Europe, by throwing her great weight into the scale which has justice
on its side." But where justice lies, admits of every variety of
opinion.
The Party placed in absolute power by a revolution and a foreign
invasion is not necessarily the exponent of the real wishes of a
people, and Lord Cowley reports Mr Layard "hot from Italy to confirm
him in the opinion he has always held, that the annexation of Tuscany
to Sardinia is not practicable." This, however, Lord Palmerston urges,
and if it be agreed to by the Emperor and attempted by Sardinia,
Lord John would probably wish England to fight for it as the cause of
justice.
Has Lord John ever contemplated the probability of Austria not being
abandoned a second time by Germany, when attacked by France? The
Emperor is sure to have calculated upon this, and has not played his
game badly, if he can get the Alliance of England to sanction and
foster his attack upon the Rhine, which would inevitably follow.
The Queen believes this to be a cherished object of France, and the
success certain if we become her dupes. The Queen can hardly for a
moment bring herself to think of the consequences.
She would wish this letter also to be shown to the Cabinet.
[Pageheading: MEETING OF THE CABINET]
_Earl Granville to the Prince Albert._
LONDON, _8th December 1859_.
SIR,--Lord John stated in what appeared to me a very fair way what
had taken place between himself and Lord Palmerston in their
communications with Her Majesty, and read Her Majesty's letters. At
the end of his statement the Chancellor asked what was the question to
be decided by the Cabinet. Lord John answered that he wished to know
whether he was to inform Her Majesty that the Cabinet were of opinion
that they were still respectfully of opinion that Sir James Hudson was
the fittest person to be named Second Plenipotentiary, or whether he
should acquiesce in Her Majesty's commands, reserving his own opinion
as to the fitness of Sir James. The Chancellor answered: "Undoubtedly
the second course will be the best." I then stated my reasons, or
rather repeated them, for objecting to Sir James Hudson. Mr Gladstone
made a hesitating remark. Sir G. Lewis and the Duke of Argyll, Sir
Charles Wood, and Sir George Grey--the latter very strongly--supported
the second course proposed by Lord John. Lord Palmerston spoke with
some temper and dogmatically as to who were right and who were wrong,
but advised Lord John to take the second course. The appointment of
Lord Wodehouse[79] was proposed. Some of us do not think it a very
good one, but there are no sufficient grounds for our opposing it.
I am not sure that Gladstone would not go any lengths in supporting
Lords Palmerston and John Russell on the Italian Question, although
he is more cautious than they are. The feeling of the rest of the
Cabinet, as far as I can judge, is perfectly sound about war, and on
our taking an English and not a purely Sardinian attitude; but they
are all inclined to sympathise with the national feeling in Italy, and
averse to the restoration of the Dukes by force or by intrigue.
Lord John was sore and nervous, but talked of his letter to the Queen,
and Lord Palmerston's to Persigny, as "unlucky." Lord Palmerston seems
convinced that he is perfectly in the right, and everybody else in the
wrong, and would, I am sure, take advantage of any step, taken without
sufficient consideration by the Queen, to make a stand for his own
policy....
I have the honour to be, Sir, with great respect, your Royal
Highness's obedient and faithful Servant,
GRANVILLE.
[Footnote 79: Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
and afterwards, as Earl of Kimberley, a member of successive
Liberal Cabinets.]
[Pageheading: DIVORCE CASES]
_Queen Victoria to the Lord Chancellor_ (_Lord Campbell_).
WINDSOR CASTLE, _26th December 1859_.
The Queen wishes to ask the Lord Chancellor whether no steps can be
taken to prevent the present publicity of the proceedings before the
new Divorce Court. These cases, which must necessarily increase when
the new law becomes more and more known, fill now almost daily a large
portion of the newspapers, and are of so scandalous a character that
it makes it almost impossible for a paper to be trusted in the hands
of a young lady or boy. None of the worst French novels from which
careful parents would try to protect their children can be as bad
as what is daily brought and laid upon the breakfast-table of every
educated family in England, and its effect must be most pernicious to
the public morals of the country.[80]
[Footnote 80: Lord Campbell replied that having attempted in
the last session to introduce a measure to give effect to the
Queen's wish, and having been defeated, he was helpless to
prevent the evil.]
_Queen Victoria to the Emperor of the French._
WINDSOR CASTLE, _le 31 Decembre 1859_.
SIRE ET MON CHER FRERE,--Je viens comme de coutume offrir a votre
Majeste nos felicitations bien sinceres a l'occasion de la
nouvelle annee. Puisse-t-elle ne vous apporter que du bonheur et du
contentement! L'annee qui vient de s'ecouler a ete orageuse et penible
et a fait souffrir bien des c[oe]rs. Je prie Dieu que celle dans
laquelle nous entrons nous permette de voir s'accomplir l'[oe]uvre de
la pacification, avec tous ses bienfaits pour le repos et le progres
du monde. Il y aura encore a reconcilier bien des opinions divergentes
et des interets apparemment opposes; mais avec l'aide du Ciel et une
ferme resolution de ne vouloir que le bien de ceux dont nous avons a
regler le sort, il ne faut pas en desesperer.
Nous avons eu le plaisir de posseder pendant quelques semaines notre
chere fille et son mari, qu'il nous a ete bien doux de revoir au sein
de notre famille. Notre fils aine passe ses vacances avec nous, mais
retournera prochainement a Oxford pour reprendre ses etudes.
Lady Ely vient de nous dire qu'elle a trouve votre Majeste ainsi que
l'Imperatrice et le petit Prince dans la meilleure sante ce qui nous a
fait bien du plaisir d'entendre.
Le Prince me charge d'offrir ses hommages les plus affectueux a votre
Majeste, et, en vous renouvelant les expressions de ma sincere amitie,
je me dis, Sire et cher Frere, de V.M.I, la bonne et affectionnee
S[oe]ur et Amie,
VICTORIA R.
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
TO CHAPTER XXIX
At the end of 1859, Mr Cobden had offered his services to the
Government to negotiate a commercial treaty with France, and had been
warmly encouraged in the scheme by Mr Gladstone. In January 1860, he
was officially appointed a Plenipotentiary, with Lord Cowley, for
this purpose, and on the 23rd of that month the treaty was signed. It
included mutual remissions and reductions of import duties, and was
contingent on obtaining the assent of the British Parliament, but
neither party was fettered by any engagement not to extend similar
concessions to other countries. In February, on the introduction of
the Budget, the treaty was brought before the House of Commons, and
ratified by a great majority; at the same time Mr Gladstone abolished
a large number of import duties, but increased the income-tax for
incomes over L150, from ninepence to tenpence in the pound. His
proposal to repeal the paper duties was rejected by the Peers, the
majority in its favour in the Commons having sunk to nine. A Commons
Committee was appointed to deal with this conflict between the Houses,
and resolutions defining the powers of the Peers in money bills were
passed by the Lower House, Lord Palmerston clearly showing himself in
sympathy with the Lords. Mr Gladstone expressed a desire to resign,
in consequence of his difference with his colleagues, while Lord Derby
and Lord Malmesbury intimated privately that they would support Lord
Palmerston in office against any Radical secession. A Reform Bill of
Lord John Russell, reducing the Borough Franchise to L6, and making a
moderate redistribution of seats, was received with indifference, and
eventually dropped.
Italian affairs mainly absorbed the attention of the country. The
intended international congress was abandoned, owing to the attitude
adopted by the French Emperor towards the Pope, but the former now
obtained the annexation of Savoy and Nice, not, as had been arranged
in 1858 as a reward for assisting to set Italy free "from the Alps to
the Adriatic"--an ideal which had not been realised--but as a price
for assisting Piedmont to incorporate the Central Italian Provinces.
The annexation was strongly resented, and suspicions of French designs
were aroused to such an extent as to give a substantial impetus to the
Volunteer movement in this country. By the summer, 130,000 Volunteers
had been enrolled, and, at a review in Hyde Park, 21,000 men
marched past the Queen, while in August, in consequence of the
same apprehensions, it was decided by a large vote to carry out the
recommendations of the National Defence Commission.
The Swiss made an ineffectual protest against the annexation of that
part of Savoy which had been neutralised by the treaty of Vienna,
while, on the other hand, the Emperor Napoleon maintained that the
people of Savoy and Nice had the same right to transfer their country
to France, as Tuscany and the Aemilia (under which name the Duchies
of Parma and Modena and the Romagna were now united) had to place
themselves under the King of Sardinia. This they decided in March,
by universal suffrage, to do; a few days later the treaty for the
annexation of Savoy and Nice was signed, and in April it was ratified
in the Piedmontese Parliament, Garibaldi, the deputy for Nice, his
native town, voting against it. In the same month, a _plebiscite_,
taken in the provinces affected, showed an immense majority in favour
of annexation. Garibaldi himself was soon afterwards engaged in
rendering assistance to the Sicilians in their insurrection against
the despotic King Francis II. Assuming the title of "Dictator of
Sicily, in the name of Victor Emmanuel," Garibaldi attacked and
occupied Palermo, and having established his ascendency in the island,
invaded the Neapolitan territory on the mainland. The Sardinian
Government, for diplomatic reasons, disavowed the expedition, but gave
a retrospective assent to it later in the year.
The French Emperor's policy in Syria added to the distrust with which
he was regarded. The Maronites, a Christian tribe, had been attacked
and massacred by the Druses, and the Emperor had proposed to send
troops to restore order. This step was eventually taken, after a
European conference had been held; but the Emperor's proposal was
so severely criticised that he wrote a long letter to the French
Ambassador in London, reviewing and justifying his policy in Italy and
elsewhere, since the Peace of Villafranca.
Garibaldi had ignored the instructions of Victor Emmanuel to abstain
from further operations against Naples, until the two Sicilies had
voted for absorption into United Italy; King Francis fled to Gaeta,
and Garibaldi entered the capital. At the same time, Cavour, in spite
of a French protest, determined upon the invasion of the Papal States,
and acted so promptly that in three weeks all effective opposition to
the Italian cause in that territory was put down, and Umbria and the
Marches were conquered. In October, the Piedmontese Parliament voted
for the annexation of such of the southern Italian provinces as should
declare themselves in favour of it; the Two Sicilies having accepted
the offer by overwhelming majorities, the King and Garibaldi joined
hands at Teano, and finally defeated the Bourbon army, afterwards
entering Naples. The Marches and Umbria also declared for
incorporation in the new Kingdom.
In July, the Prince of Wales, accompanied by the Duke of Newcastle,
left England for a tour in Canada, where he was welcomed with
unbounded enthusiasm; he afterwards proceeded to the United States,
visiting New York, Chicago, and other great cities, being received
by President Buchanan at Washington. The Prince returned home in the
course of November.
The Abolitionist troubles, which for some time had been acute in the
States, came to a crisis in the last days of the year, South Carolina
adopting autonomous ordinances, declaring her own independence and
sovereignty as a State, and her secession from the Union.
The refusal of the Chinese Government to ratify the Treaty of
Tien-tsin, and an unwarranted attack on certain British ships, led to
a revival of hostilities. A desire being expressed by the Chinese to
resume negotiations, some of the British representatives despatched
for that purpose were treacherously captured, and treated with great
cruelty. The allied troops of England and France thereupon, marched
to Pekin, when reparation was made, and retribution, exacted for the
outrages. A Convention was eventually signed on the 24th of October.