RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY--OBSERVATIONS ON THE EFFECTS LIKELY TO BE
PRODUCED THEREBY--CONCLUSION.
The restrictions regarding officers visiting the city of Lahore being
removed, we hastened to take advantage of this liberty. The streets
and bazaars were so thronged with inhabitants, and the recently
disbanded soldiery, that it was exceedingly difficult to force a path
on horseback, and an elephant was found to be the most advantageous
mode of travelling. A brigade of our native infantry were cantoned
in the Badshahee mosque, a large, half-dismantled building, which
had stood the test of a good many pieces of artillery during the late
effervescences in Lahore. The walls which enclose it were speckled
with the prints of grape-shot and bullets, and the angry passions of
men had left their marks on every portion of the once sacred edifice.
The mosque afforded a strong military position, and Allah's mansion
promised a commodious quarter for Christian, Mahommedan, and Hindoo.
The gardens, amidst this general revolution, had not shared the same
fate, or had been more easily restored, for the flowers and shrubs were
flourishing and exhaling fragrance around, nourished, perhaps, by the
gory manure which had been lavishly spread on the parterres.
Adjoining these gardens, was the tomb of the old Lion of
Lahore--Runjeet Singh--as yet unfinished, but a humble monument to the
memory of such a chief. The Sikh nation, since Runjeet's death, had
been too busily employed in slaughtering each other to afford leisure
for national testimonies to the founder of their dynasty; but that
chieftain can dispense with monumental records to hand his name to
posterity. History will not neglect him.
Our engineers were actively employed in repairing the Badshahee mosque,
and in improving its defences, that it might become an eligible
situation for the garrison, which was destined to remain at Lahore for
the present, according to the articles of the treaty.
In other parts of the city, we found Lahore little altered from the
condition in which we left it on our return from Afghanistan in the
winter of 1839-40.
Very few European adventurers had withstood the late turbulency of the
population.
A German, who had superintended the manufacture of gunpowder, a
Spaniard, who had planned the engineer's work at Sobraon, and a
Frenchman, (Mons. Mouton,) who had held a subordinate command in the
cavalry and artillery, formed the wreck of the European officers in the
Sikh service.
The inhabitants, having now so far regained their confidence as to
feel assured that the British had no intention of plundering the city,
reopened their shops, and our camp was daily crowded with itinerant
tradesmen, offering their wares for sale. The prices put on their goods
led to a supposition that the vendors entertained a high opinion of our
wealth and a low one of our knowledge of the value of their merchandize.
The Shalimar Gardens, about four miles from the city, formerly the
chosen scene of the Ranee's entertainments, were a favourite resort
for our leisure hours. The luxuriant shrubberies and flower-beds, with
marble aqueducts and fountains, rendered these gardens a delightful
retreat from the noonday sun, which was now becoming oppressive under
our canvas abodes on the plain.
During several interviews held with the Sikh Durbar, the terms of
arrangement with the Lahore chiefs were finally settled, which provided
for the fulfilment of all the clauses specified in the before-mentioned
treaty with Ghoolab Singh. That chief[63] was selected as prime
vizier, whilst the Ranee continued as regent during the minority of
Dhuleep Singh. A force of 10,000 British troops, under command of Sir
John Littler, were named to occupy Lahore,[64] and assist the Sikh
Durbar in the fulfilment of the measures which were deemed necessary
for the future government of the country.
The native army of Lahore were to be re-enlisted under a reduced
system of pay--viz., under the same footing as they enjoyed during the
lifetime of Runjeet Singh; and their establishment was never to exceed
twenty-five battalions, of eight hundred men to each battalion, with
12,000 cavalry.
The Sikh Durbar, being unable to raise at once the sum of one and
a half crore of rupees demanded as an indemnification for the war
undertaken by the British government, ceded in perpetual sovereignty,
as equivalent for one crore of rupees, (one million sterling,) all
interest in the territories lying in the hill districts, between the
Beeas and Indus, including the provinces of Cashmere and Hazarah.[65]
Fifty lacs (500,000_l._) were paid down before the ratification of the
treaty.
If the British government should at any time wish to send troops
through the Punjaub, on notice being given, they are to be allowed to
pass through the Lahore territories. The Maharajah is never to retain
in his service any British subject, nor the subject of any European or
American state, without the consent of the British government being
previously obtained.
The Maharajah agreed to recognise the independent sovereignty of
Ghoolab Singh to such hill territories as were guaranteed to him by
the British government, and that Sirdar was to be admitted to the
privilege of a separate treaty with the British, in consideration of
the good services rendered by him in procuring peace.
The limits of the Lahore territories are not to be changed without the
British concurrence.
This treaty, consisting of sixteen articles, was signed by the
Maharajah and his ministers, and by the governor-general of India and
his secretaries, on the 9th of March, 1846.
The day following the signature of this treaty, on the governor-general
paying a visit to the Lahore court, a paper was read, conveying the
thanks of the Sikh Sirdars to his excellency for his generosity,
kindness, and mercy shown towards the Sikh nation, and for having
consented to leave a force for the maintenance of the Sikh government,
until a satisfactory settlement of affairs could be arranged, provided
that could be effected within twelve months.
In the separate treaty concluded with Ghoolab Singh, the British
government transferred, as an independent possession to that chief, all
the hill countries east of the Indus[66] and west of the Ravee.
In consideration of this transfer, Ghoolab Singh bound himself to
pay to the British Government a sum of seventy-five lacs of rupees,
(750,000_l._ sterling.)
Ghoolab Singh bound himself to refer any disputes between himself and
any other state to the arbitration of the British Government. Also to
join, with his whole force, the British troops, when employed within
the hills adjoining his possessions; and the British engaged to aid in
protecting the sirdar from external enemies.
Ghoolab Singh engaged to take no British subject, nor European, nor
American, into his service without the consent of the British; and, in
acknowledgment of the supremacy of the British Government, promised to
present, annually, a horse, twelve shawl goats, and three pairs of
Cashmere shawls.
This treaty was concluded at Umritsir, on the 16th of March, 1846.
Whilst these treaties were in progress, continual meetings between
the chiefs occurred, and it was a matter of much interest to view
the changed deportment which the _vis fortioris_ had inflicted on
the Sikh sirdars. Runjoor Singh, who had directed the operations at
Buddewal and Aliwal, requested a special introduction to his friend,
Sir Harry Smith; and Tej and Lal Singh, the commandants at Moodkee and
Ferozeshuhur, now converted into ministers of state, were most diffuse
in their expressions of friendship and gratitude towards the British
chiefs.
The coin which was brought for the payment of the fine inflicted,
proved pretty correctly that the vast treasures stored by Runjeet Singh
in the treasury of Govindghur, had been melted down into soldiers' pay,
and that the sirdars had been too lavish in their expenditure to retain
much ready money for the benefit of the commonwealth.
Russian, Persian, Chinese, and Afghan currencies, intermingled with
gold and silver jewellery, were scraped together to meet the exigencies
of the case, and the far-boasted wealth of the Punjaub appeared to have
evaporated during a two months' campaign.
Silver being the current coin throughout India, the counting out of
large sums occupied a very considerable time, and thus afforded leisure
to the Lahore Durbar to make exertions to raise the sums of money
demanded, which they had with much alacrity promised to pay, but which
they counted out with much difficulty and evident reluctance.
News having ere this reached the furthermost parts of the country
of the termination of the war, it became necessary to hasten the
reduction of the Sikh forces to the stipulated amount; and orders were
forwarded to the killedars of forts, and commandants of districts, to
take measures for effecting this purpose. Less difficulty than was
apprehended was experienced with the portions of the army which were
cantoned in distant parts of the country, and, with the exception of a
fortress of great strength, named Kote Kangra, in the hill districts,
none of the Sikh officers held out for any time against the British
mandates.
The army of the Punjaub had been so heavily disabled at Sobraon, and
during each of the previous actions the loss in artillery had been so
considerable, that these circumstances could not be concealed from
their fellow-soldiers and countrymen, which tended to dishearten the
rest of the army for any further resistance.
The fanatic Akalees, so notorious in the military annals of Runjeet
Singh, and who had been exceedingly abusive formerly to such British
officers as had attended at reviews of the Sikh army, were scarcely
ever beheld during our late engagements, nor did I see a man wounded
by a quoit[67] during any of the battles. I was told by a Sikh officer
in Lahore, that this race of priest soldiery had been so active and
forward during the Lahore massacres of the few preceding years,
that the greater portion of them had met with the fate they so amply
deserved, and were nearly destroyed. If this be true, it is certainly
one of the chief benefits conferred on the Punjaub by their sanguinary
revolutions.
The fate of the Sikh sirdars, since Runjeet's death, has presented
also a tragical catalogue: thirty-five have been murdered, seven died
a natural death, eleven were killed in the late actions, twelve remain
living at Lahore.
Under the present reduced state of the Sikh army, it is not the least
probable that the nation can ever become again the formidable enemy
which they have lately been found.
In the first place, their military establishment being numerically
reduced to one-third of their late numbers, and the extent of the
country requiring these to be quartered far apart, a British force of
superior numbers could, in a few days, in case of an insurrection,
take post under the walls of Lahore. The reduction of an army must,
doubtless, impair the martial propensities of a nation, and when these
weakened battalions are under the surveillance of the keen-eyes of the
British agents, who must, henceforward, dwell in Lahore, we may reckon
almost as safely on information reaching us of any irregularities, as
we might in the native forces of India.
But, as I have before stated, the principal confidence of all Indian
armies is placed in their guns. As the greater part of these are in
our possession, and the Lahore arsenal cannot be as busily employed
now, without our knowledge and consent, as formerly, the scarcity of
cannon will be an obstacle, to which it ought not to be difficult to
add a scarcity of artillerymen, for the profession is a noisy one, and
therefore their practice is easily overheard, and without unremitting
attention and practice, artillery are not usually very formidable.
In Ghoolab Singh, the British Government ought to possess a tower of
strength, for they have made him a greater man than he ever was before;
and it must palpably be his interest to maintain amicable relations
with the British, having paid beforehand for his alliance in solid
rupees. The tribute of a few goats and shawls cannot be very irksome
to the governor of Cashmere, as the price of the guarantee for his
dominions; and not being himself a Sikh by parentage, and most of his
army being also aliens to the Punjaubees, there cannot be much danger
of a collusion between that chief and any Sikh sirdars who might desire
a change of administration.
The establishment of so powerful a chief as Ghoolab Singh as our ally,
on a line of hill territories bordering the whole Punjaub on the north,
has afforded a security sufficient to deter the Sikhs from any thoughts
of hostility, so long as the chief of Cashmere remains contented with
his principality, or unable to discover more powerful friends than the
British.
I cannot for one moment do Ghoolab Singh the injustice of supposing,
that he would prefer the precarious sovereignty of the Punjaub to his
present secure and extensive government. The lesson which that sirdar
must have learned, when within a hair's breadth of being sacrificed
to a popular turmoil in Lahore, operated so favourably, that he
manifested the utmost desire to return to his mountains as soon as
practicable after the departure of the British authorities from the
Sikh capital. But should ambition whisper such a wild project in his
ear as to aim at the throne of Lahore, prudence would surely suggest
that the Sikh nation had recently experienced how much could be done
against the British with a chance of success.
The tract of country between the Beeas and the Sutlej, known as the
Jullundur Dooab[68] which was ceded to us in the first treaty arranged
by Ghoolab Singh at Kussoor, though _extending_ over territory, will,
on reference to the map, be seen to _contract_ the actual frontier line.
That frontier, uniting at the northern angle with the territories of
our ally, Ghoolab Singh, and overlooking, from a strongly defensible
country, the city of Umritsir and fort of Govindghur, has materially
altered our position relative to the Punjaub.
The new forts built as our outposts on that frontier will not, it is
to be devoutly hoped, be encumbered by large towns and cantonments; or,
if that be deemed indispensable, the area of the new fortresses should
be sufficiently extensive to admit all European inhabitants to take
refuge within their defences.
The part enacted during the late war by our old enemies, the Afghans,
has been a matter of surprise to many. The natural and religious
antipathy between the Afghans and Sikhs is a sufficient cause for a
want of co-operation at the outset, but the overthrow of the Feringhee
would have been a temptation which, if gilded with a fair chance
of success, must have overcome all minor prejudices. Situated at a
distance of five hundred miles from the scene of action, and the news
travelling at anything but a railroad pace over this long interval,
the Afghan chiefs learned of the Sikh invasion and the result of the
actions under so many shapes, that they were at a loss which to believe.
Akbar Khan, having assembled his forces, was hurrying in a state of
commotion towards the lower gorge of the Khyber pass, when the news
of the Sikh defeat at Sobraon reached him, which induced that chief
to refrain from any further proceedings. If any entertain a doubt as
to whether his real intentions were to co-operate with the British or
with the Sikhs, this last measure must amply explain them, for what
better opportunity could have presented itself to the mountain chief
for striking a blow at Peshawur than the period of paralyzation ensuing
after so many rapid and severe defeats of the Sikh forces?
Had matters befallen otherwise, there is little doubt that success
on the part of the Sikhs would have ensured the performance of the
promises of assistance sent by Akbar Khan to Lahore, and such a swarm
of Eastern warriors would have spread over our north-western provinces,
as had never been seen since the days of the victorious Nadir Shah.
Affairs being now in a train for settlement, it was no longer deemed
necessary to keep the whole army concentrated at Lahore. Two regiments
(the 16th Lancers and 31st Foot) were permitted to volunteer previously
to proceeding to Calcutta and embarking for England, and as, during
such occasions, liquor is freely administered, and discipline
necessarily relaxed, the camp afforded daily evidence of the prevailing
tastes of the English soldier.
It is a general opinion in the service, and I believe a correct one,
that soldiers who have served long in India are not the best material
for home employment. It does not at all surprise me, that men who have
been employed in storming batteries and overcoming armies, whose days
have been passed in marching under the fiery beams of an Eastern sun,
and whose nights have been spent in watchfulness through the chilling
damps of a January night in India, should not feel much relish for
resuming their recruit's skin. When a man has done the utmost which
the service requires of him, nay more, when his conduct has become the
theme of encomium, and he has enjoyed a private's full share of the
thanks of Parliament, he is not generally over well pleased when set
assiduously to work at battalion drill with a herd of recruits, to help
and make a new regiment. It is on this account, I think, that soldiers
who have served in India are not the best qualified for English duties,
and not because the habits they have contracted in the East have become
so inveterate that they are unable to shake them off. Yet, with this
conviction on my mind, it certainly was a painful sight to witness the
breaking up of a regiment, which must ensue under the volunteering
system. A man awakes on the morrow after his intoxication, and finds
that he had bound himself with hopeless fetters to exile. Another
presents himself as a willing offering for service in the East, which
he could hardly hope to see to an end, abandoning all ties of home
and kindred, and embracing with satisfaction, as his adopted country,
in lieu of old England, the land of the stranger and of the heathen.
How many an anxious mother, or orphan sister, has looked forward,
with eager expectation, for the return of a regiment to their native
country, and found that after all the perils of war had been overcome,
the blandishments of an Eastern bazaar had induced the expected son
or brother to abandon and forget the natural ties of kindred, and to
separate himself for ever from those who ought to have some hold on his
affections!
On the evening of the 3rd of March, previously to the breaking up of
the army, the three British cavalry regiments which had been engaged in
the late actions, assembled to dine together, when the extensive tables
spread under long rows of tents exhibited a motley array of uniforms,
and an equally varied collection of dinner-equipage, such as will
rarely be met with again. The number of black bottles would have been
startling to the advocates of plate and decanters; but on this occasion
they were all applied to their legitimate purposes. Formerly, the case
had been widely different; for many regiments, after the sorrows of
Buddewal, had devoted those unseemly flagons, not only to the service
of wine, but to the more urgent calls of illuminating the tables; and
Guinness's portly bottles had often stood in homely familiarity beside
their more slender and elegant claret brethren; both alas! degraded to
the vile purpose of supporting wax candles.
The next morning, the two regiments above-named quitted their
fellow-comrades to commence their roasting expedition towards Calcutta;
and a few days afterwards, the greater part of the army returned
towards their allotted cantonments in India, leaving Sir John Littler,
with ten thousand men, to form the garrison of Lahore.
The Governor-general, who had now been raised to the honour of a
peerage, proceeded by the sacred city of Umritsir towards his summer
abode in the Himalayah mountains; and the forces under Brigadier
Wheler, with some additional native corps, occupied the newly-ceded
territories in the Jullundur Dooab.
Amidst this general departure and dispersion of our forces, there
remained but one troublesome and refractory party, in the killedar,
or native governor of a fort, near the foot of the hills, called Kote
Kangra. Deaf to the orders from the Lahore Durbar, he resolutely
objected to surrender his command; and the fort was known to be so
strong, that it was found necessary to despatch additional troops, with
some guns of heavier metal, to reduce the place.
For upwards of three months, this obstinate killedar continued
to refuse possession of his fortress. After numerous parleys and
conferences, which were accorded with the humane intention of
preventing any further bloodshed on either side, a suitable train of
battering-guns reached the British camp, when, seeing that any further
resistance would be hopeless, the commandant of the fort surrendered to
the detested Feringees, marching out his garrison with the honours of
war.
Thus ended the sanguinary struggles with an enemy who had caused the
British supremacy in India to quake to its foundations, and who had
so far profited by the often-repeated lessons taught them in European
tactics, that it is not surprising that clauses should be inserted in
the treaties to restrict such inconvenient knowledge for the future.
But, although the instruction may be discontinued, yet the information
gained, and the practical purposes to which it has been applied, cannot
be annihilated by treaties and proclamations. Few will now venture to
question the soundness of the maxim, that our Indian empire must be
maintained by the sword.
The practical comment on the late war has been a large reduction of
our native army, recently promulgated. If this be followed by an
augmentation of the European troops employed in the north-western
provinces, we may understand the economy, and applaud the policy, which
dictated such a measure; but if, with the extension of territory, a
reduction of the forces--which already had just sufficed to turn the
scale in our favour--should ensue, a second campaign on the Sutlej will
be likely to render the abolition of the Queen's and Company's forces
in India a probable result.
My tale of Eastern Wanderings, and of the campaigns in which it has
been my lot to bear a humble share, is told.
The subject of these pages has beguiled many a leisure hour in camp and
quarters. I hope I may not have retaliated unfavourably on such of my
readers as have been liberal enough to accompany me throughout my long
journey.
I have spoken freely on all subjects connected with military matters,
because I take the deepest interest in my profession, and feel
convinced that the trade of war cannot be better served than by a
minute and free investigation of all its details.
If, in the description of active operations, any errors of details
may be detected, let me be judged leniently; for the confusion of the
field of battle not only prevails at the moment, but its din will often
bewilder the mind of the eye-witness long after the cannon have ceased.
That it is not an easy matter to be accurate in such details, may be
inferred from the fact, that in the despatches of Sobraon, especial
thanks were given to a brigadier for his exertions in the field during
that day, when the innocent hero of the despatch was fast asleep
on a sick bed at Ferozepore. Such is the fortune of war, that the
feather-bed is often more prolific of honour than the path of thorns,
and "the bubble reputation sought in the cannon's mouth."
Now that the scene of active operations has closed, I cannot flatter
myself that the author of these volumes can have excited sufficient
interest in his movements to be followed any further in his pilgrimage.
Therefore, on the sun-burnt plains of Lahore we will part; and we
cannot do so under more favourable terms than those emphatically
recommended by the eccentric Terence--
"Vos valete et plaudite."
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 63: Rajah Lal Singh was afterwards made vizier, but recently
deposed for treachery.]
[Footnote 64: These troops to be withdrawn as soon as affairs have
been satisfactorily settled.--Government notification, Camp, Umritsir,
March 16th. Within the last few months, the Sikh government, feeling
themselves still inadequate to continue the government unassisted,
petitioned that the British force might for the present be retained at
Lahore, which was agreed to, the Lahore government paying for their
protectors.]
[Footnote 65: Treaty between the British government and the court of
Lahore, Nov. 4.--Government notification.]
[Footnote 66: This includes the whole of Cashmere, and other smaller
tracts, in addition to the lands formerly held by Ghoolab Singh.]
[Footnote 67: The favourite weapon of the Akalees.]
[Footnote 68: Dooab (two rivers) is a term applied to any tract of land
lying between two rivers.]
T.C. Savill. Printer, 4, Chandos Street, Covent Garden.