THE BRITISH FORCES CROSS THE SUTLEJ, AND ARE CONCENTRATED
AT KUSSOOR--VISIT OF GHOOLAB SINGH AND DHULEEP SINGH TO THE
GOVERNOR-GENERAL--THE ARMY ADVANCE TO LAHORE--THE SIKH ARMY DISPERSE
AND SURRENDER THEIR GUNS.
No action ever fought in the East was more decisive than that of
Sobraon, and few battles of modern times have exhibited a greater loss
in proportion to the numbers engaged.
It must appear that the enemy's intentions in building a bridge of
boats across the river, in face of the British army, was to deter Sir
Henry Hardinge from transferring the war to the opposite shore, where
the Sikh soldiery were well aware that they had much to apprehend from
national dissension as well as private intrigue amongst the sirdars.
As the British army, after its concentration, subsequent to the battle
of Ferozeshuhur, remained some time inactive, awaiting the arrival
of the siege train, the enemy began to regain confidence. It appears
probable that the Sikhs would, ere long, have commenced active hostile
measures, otherwise the attitude assumed at Sobraon must be quite
inexplicable.
It is almost superfluous to notice the error committed by the Sikhs in
neglecting to complete their entrenchments, (for which they had ample
time,) and in weakly garrisoning the weakest part of their works. To
that cause, and fighting with a river in their rear, which offered a
main obstacle to their retreat, must be attributed the enormous losses
suffered by the enemy, from which a hasty retirement had saved them on
former occasions.
In each action, the Sikhs had lost nearly all their cannon, and the
greater part of their artillerymen; and as these could not be replaced
by raw levies, each defeat had been more serious than at the first
glance it may have been considered. Indian history offers no parallel
to the resolution displayed by the enemy in preparing for a renewal of
active measures immediately after each defeat.[55] It had long been
a favourite saying with military men in India, that the Sikhs would
certainly fight one good battle when hostilities ensued, and that the
remainder of the war would amount to no more than the reduction of
their forts. This established maxim, however, did not prove that we
were very thoroughly acquainted with the Sikh disposition--and after
Ferozeshuhur, it lost all its advocates. The military theorists were
compelled to trace a new line of operations, which proved, even after
Sobraon, tolerably indefinite, for there were few officers in the army
who did not expect a smart action on the opposite shore.
The heavy losses suffered by the British at Sobraon, were mainly owing
to the strong works which the centre and right divisions of the army
so gallantly stormed. Had the attack upon those points been delayed
until the enemy's weaker parts on his right had been carried, (the Sikh
entrenchments being then taken in reverse,) his batteries would have
been rendered unserviceable, whilst our horse artillery might, with the
sappers' assistance, have been brought into the area of the works, to
act against the disordered masses. Under such circumstances, it appears
likely that the action would have been sooner over, and Sir Harry
Smith's and General Gilbert's divisions spared the storm in which they
suffered so heavily. At the same time that the enemy would have been
compelled to face his new assailants, being attacked by the reserve
division, his retreat would have been completely intercepted, and his
final and utter destruction been apparently inevitable.
As it happened, the Sikh losses were undoubtedly enormous. The
entrenchments were defended by about thirty thousand troops, Aeen
battalions and Bundookcheras, besides irregulars and cavalry, who
retreated early from the scene of action. Of this army, fully one
half were destroyed in the trenches, or in the passage of the river.
During the battle, four boats, connecting the bridge of boats with the
opposite shore, had been removed, which caused the whole fabric rapidly
to give way when oppressed with the weight of the retreating multitude.
This removal of the boats was generally understood to have been a
pre-concerted arrangement with Ghoolab Singh, for the destruction
of a force which caused him, as well as many others, considerable
disquietude. I give this merely as a prevalent report, and one likely
enough to be true, judging from the accomplishments in treachery which
the Sikh history evinces, in common with other nations of Hindostan;
but the secrets of the political department are necessarily maintained
for a time, and have not yet become public.
The revelation would certainly be inconvenient to Ghoolab Singh; and
its suppression, if founded in fact, is perhaps incumbent on those in
authority.
Whilst the Sikhs were thus being effectually repelled from our
north-western frontier, the force in Scinde, under Sir Charles Napier,
was rapidly advancing, to co-operate with the British main column. That
energetic warrior hastened towards the scene of warfare, in advance of
his forces, but did not succeed in reaching the field of operations
before the final act of the tragedy had been performed, and the curtain
had fallen. Those who are acquainted with that chivalrous family may
judge of the disappointment endured by a Napier arriving too late for a
battle!
At the same time that the British army were concentrated at Kussoor,
Brigadier Wheler's division at Loodiana crossed the Sutlej, opposite
the fortress of Philoor, unopposed by the Sikhs, although a portion of
the Khalsas made their appearance in the neighbourhood; but finding
that the ground had been preoccupied, no attempt was made to molest
the British general.
On the 11th, 12th, and 13th of February, the whole of the British army
having been poured across the bridge of boats, advanced, and took
post on the strong defensible ridge at Kussoor, where a picket of the
enemy, which had occupied that position, fell back, and left them in
undisputed possession of the strongest ground between the river and the
metropolis.
The shattered remnant of the Sikh army, after the defeat at Sobraon,
had fallen back, and bivouacked in the neighbourhood of Umritsir, where
they remained irresolute, and awaiting the result of the deliberations
going on at Lahore. The whole _materiel_ of that army had been so
utterly dismantled, that little apprehension was entertained of even
such efforts as might be prompted by the influence of despair. Their
guns,[56] in which the main confidence of the Sikh army had ever
been placed, had been nearly all captured, and their artillerymen lay
on the field of Sobraon. The Aeen battalions, who had readily and
gallantly borne the brunt of battle in defence of the batteries and
entrenchments, had suffered most severely, especially in the two last
engagements. Under this combination of disasters, the Khalsa army was
from that day forth no longer worthy of consideration; nor is there any
probability that the Sikhs will ever again, during our time, arrive at
the same military predominance which they once possessed.
Still, it appeared doubtful that our advance towards the capital would
be effected without another struggle, for their mettle had been now
too fully tested to be treated any longer with contempt; though any
efforts which might be made when reinforced from Lahore must have been
hopeless, as no time had been allowed them to entrench themselves. It
was conjectured that the sirdars would willingly come forward to sue
for terms, but their influence with the Punchayut was not reckoned on
with much certainty.
In the midst of all doubts on this head, on the 15th of February Rajah
Ghoolab Singh, who had long corresponded through secret emissaries with
the British government, approached the lines of Kussoor in order to sue
for a suspension of hostilities, and, accompanied by a slender escort,
arrived at our outposts.
The Sikh chieftains, with little show of the pride or pomp of other
days, and dressed in the simplest garb of Asiatic soldiery, were
conducted to the quarters of Sir Henry Hardinge, and received with
solemn distrust.
No eagerness was manifested on the part of the British government to
negotiate with the deputation from the Lahore court; but Ghoolab Singh
and his companions exhibited such unquestionable proofs of uneasiness,
anxiety, and humility, that it was almost painful to behold the stately
and chilling deportment which it was deemed politically expedient to
assume towards the humbled Sikh chieftains. No firing of cannon, no
ceremonious salutes were made use of on the occasion; and when Ghoolab
Singh tendered his nazzur[57] he was requested to keep his presents
until he had sufficiently testified, by his future fidelity, the
dependence which might be placed upon his amicable professions towards
the British.
The crest-fallen chiefs appeared willing and anxious to assent to such
conditions as were demanded, and listened with affected humiliation and
evident apprehension to the catalogue of iniquities laid to the charge
of their countrymen. When, at length, Ghoolab and his chosen colleagues
retired to a secret and conclusive interview with the secretaries, it
was more with the air of malefactors about to receive their sentence,
than with the bearing of men who professed themselves the firm and
faithful advocates of British supremacy. The Sikh chiefs were vested
with full powers from the Lahore Durbar and the military Punchayut,
to arrange whatever terms could be obtained, and, after an interview
protracted to a late hour of the night, the rajah took his departure,
having assented to every proposal, and no doubt much relieved to find
the terms were not more stringent[58].
The conditions demanded on our part, and agreed to on that of Ghoolab
Singh, were--
1. The surrender to the British of the lands[59] lying between the
rivers Beeas and Sutlej.[60]
2. The payment of one and a half crore of rupees (a million and a half
pounds sterling) as an indemnity for the expenses of the war.
3. The disbandment of the Sikh army, and its reorganization on the
system and pay of the time of Runjeet Singh.[61] The limitation
of this army to be determined in communication with the British
government.
4. The surrender of all guns used in the late campaigns against the
British.
5. The entire control of the river frontier, and the organization of
future administration in the Punjaub.
It was also arranged that the young Maharajah, Dhuleep Singh, should
be sent from Lahore to meet the Governor-general on his advance from
Kussoor, and to accompany him to the capital.
Before leaving Kussoor, an officer and six privates, who had been
taken prisoners at Buddewal, were sent from Lahore, where they had
experienced the most liberal treatment from their captors, especially
after the news of Sobraon reached the capital.
The population of the district in which we were encamped professed much
satisfaction at the change of administration about to be effected.
One hoary headed old Mahommedan advanced towards a group of officers
in our lines, smacking his lips, and protesting that he felt immense
confidence in the new government, and had already enjoyed a fair
taste of its benefits, by eating a portion of a slaughtered bull,[62]
a food of which he had not partaken for upwards of forty years. The
superannuated epicure met with very little encouragement from our party.
On the morning of the 18th of February the whole British army advanced
from Kussoor towards Lahore, marching in order of battle, to guard
against any change of mind on the part of our newly acquired friends.
A brigade of cavalry were left in charge of the baggage, and this
onerous duty caused the troops to march more in the semblance of a
funeral procession than that of the advance of a victorious army.
The weather, at this season, was fine, though the sun at noon was
becoming rather severe. The country was generally open and cultivated,
but with large patches of low jungle or underwood interspersed, which
rendered it unfavourable for cavalry manoeuvres, and would have
afforded excellent shelter for the enemy's Light Infantry; but they had
had fighting enough to satisfy them for the present.
On the evening of the 18th, after our arrival in camp, at a small
village named Lullianee, the Sikh chiefs arrived from Lahore, escorting
their youthful Maharajah. The deputation were fully as humble in their
deportment as the most punctilious despot could have required; and
Dhuleep Singh, having been graciously forgiven for the offences of
his countrymen, and raised to the precarious honours of acknowledged
sovereignty, was at last treated to a royal welcome from the voices
of our heavy cannon. A proclamation had been issued from Kussoor,
giving notice that territorial aggrandisement was not the object of the
British government, but that they were desirous only of establishing
such authority at Lahore as would be competent to restrain the
soldiery from the perpetration of outrages similar to the past. The
chiefs and sirdars were invited to act in concert for the furtherance
of such an arrangement, and as the wording of the proclamation gave a
special invitation to the "well wishers of the descendants of Runjeet
Singh," the Lahore Durbar were made aware that the semblance and name
of a kingdom would not be taken from them.
Subsequently to Dhuleep Singh's visit at Lullianee, a second
proclamation was issued from our camp, giving notice that the Durbar
had acquiesced in all the terms, and that if no further opposition were
offered to the British arms, measures would be taken to re-establish
the descendants of Runjeet, and to protect the inhabitants.
The British army, continuing to advance in the same order as before,
came in sight of Lahore on the morning of the 20th of February, and
took up their encampment about three miles from the city, forming three
sides of a square, and occupying the parade ground and cantonments
recently held by the Aeen battalions.
The soldiers were strictly required not to stray from their lines or
visit the city, which at present was crowded with people of every
denomination, few of whom, it may be supposed, could feel very
favourably disposed towards their conquerors. The troops of Ghoolab
Singh were encamped near the walls, and held the most important
positions in the capital.
On the afternoon of our arrival, the secretary to government,
accompanied by a large military escort, under the directions of
Brigadier Cureton, proceeded to the palace with the young Maharajah.
Marching round the walls of the city, nearly suffocated with dust,
which rolled in dense columns and obscured the whole scene, we were
received and saluted by Ghoolab Singh's forces, drawn up on their
several posts around Lahore. Most of these were fine wiry looking
soldiers, and bore some resemblance in appearance to our Goorkha
battalions, though inferior in appointments, and evidently not half
disciplined. The gateway to the palace, then occupied by the Ranee,
opened from the north-western quarter of the city, and the escort
formed line fronting the citadel, whilst the governor-general's
representative and his party proceeded on their mission. On arriving at
the entrance, the political agent and a few officers proceeded to the
interior, and shortly afterwards a salute from the light guns announced
that the boy whom we had set up to be a king over the Sikhs had been
placed in the hands of his anxious mother, the Ranee, of drunken
notoriety.
The interview was not of long duration, much to our relief, as the
sombre walls which we were left to contemplate did not present a very
cheerful aspect, and the inhabitants of Lahore evinced no interest or
curiosity in the transactions.
The ceremonial being ended, we wound about the exterior of the city
towards our camp, thus completing the whole circuit of the walls, and
returned to our quarters about nightfall, after a tolerably fatiguing
day; but we had now become so well used to living in our saddles, that
it was rather a variety to pass the day anywhere else.
As the conclusion of the war now rested in the hands of the political
department, we were at length able to lie down at night, with some
hopes of not being trumpeted into our saddles before we had well fallen
asleep; and there were few soldiers of the British army who did not
take full advantage of this immunity, save the unfortunate members of
the standard guards and outlying pickets.
The remainder of the Sikh forces still continued encamped between the
river and Lahore, but an intimation was sent to them, that such as
chose to come into Lahore would receive payment of all arrears due
to them, and must then consider themselves as no longer required for
military service. The Irregular Cavalry hastened in crowds to take
advantage of this offer, but the regular battalions heard at first with
feelings of indignation that they were to be disbanded, and professed
their resolution to hazard another battle with the remaining thirty-six
cannon which had been saved from the wreck at Sobraon, owing to
their remaining on the opposite bank. The chiefs, Tej Singh and Lal
Singh, seeing the game was up, refused to lead the soldiers to action,
and having also assured the Sikh army that a great portion would be
re-enlisted for future service, and that those who were most ready to
accept the proffered terms would undoubtedly have the first choice in
re-enlistment, these arguments produced a salutary effect.
The surrender of all the cannon which had been used against the British
was at length reluctantly complied with, for the attachment of native
troops to their guns is proverbial throughout the East, and when this
point was carried, the complete dispersion of the regular battalions
ensued.
The reluctance on the Sikh part to abandon their profession, must
appear an inexplicable matter to those who judge of soldiers'
attachment to their trade by its unpopularity amongst our countrymen;
but throughout the greater portion of Asia military zeal is a prevalent
feature, and in the Indian armies, dismissal from the service has
hitherto been deemed one of the gravest punishments which could be
inflicted.
The most surprising feature in this campaign was the readiness with
which the Sikhs rose after each defeat, fresh for another contest.
But with that nation war is one of the principles of religion, and as
the wily Mahomet led his daring soldiers to believe that they were
fighting their way to Paradise, so the presumptuous Sikh was taught
that his greatest moral obligation consisted in being a brave soldier.
To further this object, he was trained in early youth to the use of
his weapons, and learned to consider them as the most useful part of
his costume. Under this hardy regime they rose from a sect into a
formidable nation. In this instance they formed no exception to the
general rule amongst all nations, where military prowess has always
been a necessary condition in the scale of ascendancy.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 55: Trained from childhood to the profession of arms, every
Sikh is by the tenets of his religion a soldier, not even excepting the
_priesthood_; nay, these church militants were the most intolerant and
unmanageable--the noisiest and worst soldiers in the army.]
[Footnote 56: Thirty-six pieces of cannon were all that could be
scraped together by the residue of the Sikh forces, and these were the
guns which had been used to man the batteries on the right bank.]
[Footnote 57: Presents offered at all amicable meetings with native
powers.]
[Footnote 58: The Sikh chiefs expressed much anxiety that the army
should not advance to the capital; but this suggestion was sternly
refused, and they were informed that the Governor-general would sign no
treaty except under the walls of Lahore.]
[Footnote 59: Governor-general of India to the secret committee, letter
dated Feb. 19, 1846.]
[Footnote 60: This tract is a strongly defensible country overlooking
the principal cities.]
[Footnote 61: The pay of the soldier, as before stated, had been
greatly increased.]
[Footnote 62: The bull is sacred amongst the Sikhs, and their Mussulman
subjects were prohibited from tasting the holy flesh.]