CHAPTER VIII.

STANDING AND WAITING.

The Ranger and her prizes arrived at Brest at a propitious time, both

for the fortunes of Jones and for those of his adopted country as

well. The secret treaty of alliance between the confederated colonies

and France had been signed on February 6th. The plenipotentiaries from

the United States had been publicly received at Versailles on March

23d. On the same day the French ambassador left England, and the

English ambassador, Lord Stormont, left France. The fleet of D'Estaing

put to sea from Toulon a fortnight later. In two weeks the English

fleet followed to American waters. The attempt was made on the part of

the French to execute the brilliant strategic plan which Jones had

devised, although, of course, the delay had rendered the effort

fruitless.

The successful cruise of the Ranger, the rich captures she had made,

the daring enterprises she had undertaken, the boldness and audacity

of her commander in venturing with a little vessel of such trifling

force into the very midst of the three kingdoms, and the brilliancy of

his capture of a war vessel of nominally superior, and at least really

equal, force, in a fair and open yardarm to yardarm fight, a thing to

which the French navy was not accustomed, awakened the greatest

admiration, and Paul Jones found himself in that most congenial of

positions to him--and to almost any other man--of being the observed

of all. On this expedition, his first real opportunity, he had

demonstrated that he possessed an ability to plan, and a courage to

carry out his conceptions, which put him in the front rank of the sea

officers of his day. With one single vessel, laboring under every

disadvantage conceivable, he had done what no European power or

combination of powers had been able to accomplish in centuries, with

all their resources at command. He had terrorized the whole English

seaboard, and filled the United Kingdom with uneasiness and unrest.

The gallant men who had gone before him and accomplished so much with

the Reprisal, the Revenge, and the others, had a worthy successor and

superior in this little Scots-American, who, as a citizen of the

world, in love with humanity, drew his sword for the cause of freedom.

The French admired him, the English hated him. The American prisoners

immediately felt the effect of his captures by the general

amelioration of their unhappy condition, and Franklin at last realized

that he had a man at hand upon whom he could depend to further his

bold designs. When the news reached America, it was received with

great joy, and the Naval Committee and the Congress generally knew

they had made no mistake in sending Jones to Europe. The young navy

looked to him with hope. His exploits were detailed and amplified in

the cafés and on the boulevards of Paris, and were related with

approbation even within the sacred confines of the court. He was the

hero of the hour.

But there is a homely maxim exemplified by frequent experience that

"Fine words butter no parsnips." It was true in this instance

undoubtedly, and Jones learned that there was no necessary connection

between glory and bread and butter. He was unable to procure actually

necessary supplies for his crew. All the vessels of the Continental

navy went to sea undermanned, ill-provided, and inadequately

provisioned, and the ship's purser, as a rule, had no money. The

seamen had not received their wages--no money at all, in fact, except

that which Jones himself had advanced out of his own pocket. With the

sanction of the Marine Committee he had made himself responsible for

the regular payment of the wages of the men. His pocket was now empty,

the last guineas having been given to the Irish fishermen

aforementioned. His own resources were always drawn upon freely for

the good of the service and his men; now they were entirely exhausted.

His provisions had been consumed, he did not know where to get any

more. In addition to his own people he had several prizes and over two

hundred prisoners who had to be cared for, and who were a healthy and

hungry lot.

When he arrived in France he had been authorized to draw upon the

commissioners to the extent of twelve thousand livres, with the

caution not to avail himself of the permission unless it were

imperatively necessary. With great prudence, and by the exercise of

rigid economy, he had avoided any inroad on the depleted and overtaxed

fund of the commissioners. Something, however, had to be done in this

instance, and without securing another authority, for which, indeed,

time was wanting, so pressing were his needs, he made drafts upon the

commissioners in the sum of twenty-four thousand livres, about five

thousand dollars.

Meanwhile he subsisted his crew and prisoners through the generosity

of the French naval authorities at Brest, which he secured by the

pledge of his own private personal credit. The draft was dishonored.

Certainly the commissioners were embarrassed almost beyond endurance

by the demands upon them from every side, but this was a matter to

which they should have given attention if it were humanly possible,

for they were the only resource that Jones had. His condition was

simply desperate. He knew not what to do nor where to turn. The

following extract of a letter to the commissioners on the 27th of May

exhibits his painful position:

"Could I suppose that my letters of the 9th and 16th current (the

first advising you of my arrival and giving reference to the events of

my expedition; the last advising you of my draft in favour of Monsieur

Bersolle, for twenty-four thousand livres, and assigning reasons for

the demand) had not made due appearance, I would hereafter, as I do

now, inclose copies. Three posts have already arrived here from Paris

since Comte d'Orvilliers showed me the answer which he received from

the minister, to the letter which inclosed mine to you. Yet you remain

silent. M. Bersolle has this moment informed me of the fate of my

bills; the more extraordinary as I have not yet made use of your

letter of credit of the 10th of January last, whereby I then seemed

entitled to call for half the amount of my last draft, and I did not

expect to be thought extravagant when, on the 16th current, I doubled

that demand. Could this indignity be kept secret I should disregard

it; and, though it is already public in Brest and in the fleet, as it

affects only my private credit I will not complain. I can not,

however, be silent when I find the public credit involved in the same

disgrace. I conceive this might have been prevented. To make me

completely wretched, Monsieur Bersolle has now told me that he now

stops his hand, not only of the necessary articles to refit the ship,

but also of the _daily provisions_. I know not where to find

to-morrow's dinner for the great number of mouths that depend on me

for food. Are then the Continental ships of war to depend on the sale

of their prizes for a daily dinner for their men? 'Publish it not in

Gath.'

"My officers, as well as men, want clothes, and the prizes are

precluded from being sold before farther orders arrive from the

minister. I will ask you, gentlemen, if I have deserved all this.

Whoever calls himself an American ought to be protected here. I am

unwilling to think that you have intentionally involved me in this

dilemma, at a time when I ought to expect some enjoyment.

"Therefore I have, as formerly, the honour to be, with due esteem and

respect, gentlemen, yours, etc."

How he managed under such circumstances he relates in a journal which

he prepared in later years for submission to the King of France.

"Yet during that time, by his [Jones'] personal credit with Comte

D'Orvilliers, the Duc de Chartres, and the Intendant of Brest, he fed

his people and prisoners, cured his wounded, and refitted both the

Ranger and the Drake for sea."

He could, of course, have relieved himself of some of his burden by

turning over his prisoners to France, but, as that country was still

nominally neutral, the people he had captured would have been set

free at the demand of England. As long as he held possession of them

it was possible that the circumstance would force an exchange for

Americans--a thing the commissioners had been bent upon since their

arrival in Europe. The English Government had long since sanctioned

and carried out the exchange of soldiers, but for arbitrary and

inadequate reasons seamen stood upon a different footing apparently.

When Franklin previously wrote Lord Stormont, the British ambassador,

offering to exchange one hundred men captured by the Reprisal for an

equal number of American seamen held in English prisons, no answer was

made to his letter; a second letter brought forth the following curt

reply:

"The king's ambassador receives no applications from rebels, unless

they come to implore his Majesty's mercy."

To this insulting and inexplicable message the following apt and

dignified reply was made:

"In answer to a letter which concerns some of the material interests

of humanity, and of the two nations, Great Britain and the United

States of America, now at war, we received the inclosed indecent

paper, as coming from your lordship, which we return for your

lordship's more mature consideration."

Of course, the ostensible reason for refusing this exchange was that

the captured seamen were traitors, and as such had no belligerent

rights, yet how they differed from soldiers it is impossible to see.

Indeed, the English authorities went so far as to call them pirates,

and they could not have treated them worse--short of hanging them--if

they had actually merited the opprobrious title. The real reason,

however, lay in the hope that the Americans, having no place in France

in which to confine their prisoners, would be compelled to set them

free. This hope was frequently justified, and it was not until March,

1779, that the persistent determination of Franklin brought about a

complete general recognition of the principle of exchange for which he

had so valiantly contended, although he had been partially successful

on particular occasions before that time. Jones knew the situation

perfectly, and so with his usual grim determination he held on to his

precious prisoners.

The prize agents were dilatory and incompetent. The seamen, lacking

food, clothes, salary, and prize money, were naturally mutinous and

discontented. But Jones repressed the crews, hurried up the sales, and

managed at last to weather all his troubles.

The malcontent Simpson was a constant incentive to discord and mutiny,

and he was finally removed to a French guardship, called the Admiral,

where he was well treated and allowed the freedom of the deck. While

there, he behaved in such a contumacious manner that D'Orvilliers, the

French commander, sent him to the prison of the port. All his expenses

during this interval were paid by Jones himself; indeed, when he did

not pay personally, nobody did. There was nothing sordid or avaricious

in Jones' character. He was greedy for glory and fame and reputation,

but he cared nothing whatever for money. To dismiss a tiresome

subject, Jones, with extraordinary complaisance, finally accepted

Simpson's apologies and released him on his parole not to serve in the

navy until he had been regularly tried by a court-martial. He even

went further than this. He offered to relinquish the command of the

Ranger to him in order that he might take her back to the United

States and there take his trial.

While these efforts were pending, the commissioners, misunderstanding

their tentative character, restored Simpson to the command of the

Ranger, unconditionally, much to Jones' disgust. He was quite willing

to relinquish the command of his little ship, because the King of

France had requested the commissioners to allow France to avail

herself of the services of Jones in a naval expedition which was

projected. But that such contumacy and lack of subordination as had

been exhibited by Simpson should go unpunished, and that he should

receive the absolute command of the ship as a reward for his action,

and should be allowed to return home without even an investigation,

was not only harmful to the service, but an apparent reflection upon

himself--though, of course, nothing was further from the

commissioners' thoughts, as they specifically declared. In the end

Jones acquiesced in the situation, and the matter was dropped. Simpson

was never employed in the service after he returned home.

The famous action between the Arethusa and the Belle Poule, on June

17th, having made it clear to every observer that war between France

and England was inevitable, though the formal declaration was not

issued until the following September, the first enterprise which it

was desired Jones should undertake under the auspices of France was

proposed to him by Franklin as follows:

"The Jersey privateers," he says, "do us a great deal of mischief by

intercepting our supplies. It has been mentioned to me that your small

vessel, commanded by so brave an officer, might render great service

by following them where greater ships dare not venture their bottoms;

or, being accompanied and supported by some frigates from Brest, at a

proper distance, might draw them out and then take them. I wish you to

consider of this, as it comes from _high authority_."

It was not a particularly brilliant prospect; all the hard work and

dangerous labor was to be performed by Jones, and the glory was to be

reaped by the French frigates; but, with a noble disinterestedness in

his desire to serve his country, he at once expressed his perfect

willingness to co-operate. Before anything came of it, however,

Franklin offered him the command of the Indien, in the following

letter:

(Private.)

"Dear Sir: I have the pleasure of informing you that it is proposed to

give you the command of the great ship we have built at Amsterdam. By

what you wrote to us formerly, I have ventured to say in your behalf,

that this proposition would be agreeable to you. You will immediately

let me know your resolution; which, that you may be more clear in

taking, I must inform you of some circumstances. She is at present the

property of the king; but, as there is no war yet declared, you will

have the commission and flag of the States, and act under their orders

and laws. The Prince de Nassau will make the cruise with you. She is

to be brought here under cover as a French merchantman, to be equipped

and manned in France. We hope to exchange your prisoners for as many

American sailors; but, if that fails, you have your present crew to be

made up here with other nations and French. The other commissioners

are not acquainted with this proposition as yet, and you see by the

nature of it that it is necessary to be kept a secret till we have got

the vessel here, for fear of difficulties in Holland, and

interception; you will therefore direct your answer to me alone. It

being desired that the affair rest between you and me, perhaps it may

be best for you to take a trip up here to concert matters, if in

general you approve the idea.

"I was much pleased with reading your journal, which we received

yesterday."

This is the first mention of the Prince of Nassau-Siegen, who will

appear prominently hereafter, and be described in his proper place.

Jones was naturally delighted with the flattering prospects, and at

once wrote to the prince, acquainting him of the pleasure he

anticipated in having him associated with him. A few days later

Franklin wrote Jones again as follows:

"Passy, _June 10, 1778_.

"Dear Sir: I received yours of 1st instant, with the papers inclosed,

which I have shown to the other commissioners, but have not yet had

their opinion of them; only I know that they had before (in

consideration of the disposition and uneasiness of your people)

expressed an inclination to order your ship directly back to America.

You will judge from what follows whether it will not be advisable for

you to propose their sending her back with her people, and under some

other command. In consequence of the high opinion the Minister of the

Marine has of your conduct and bravery, it is now settled (observe,

that it is to be a secret between us, I being expressly enjoined not

to communicate it to any other person), that you are to have the

frigate from Holland, which actually belongs to Government, and will

be furnished with as many good French seamen as you shall require. But

you are to act under Congress commission. As you may be likely to have

a number of Americans, and your own are homesick, it is proposed to

give you as many as you can engage out of two hundred prisoners, which

the ministry of Britain have at length agreed to give us in exchange

for those you have in your hands. They propose to make the exchange at

Calais, where they are to bring the Americans. Nothing is wanting to

this but a list of yours, containing their names and rank; immediately

on the receipt of which an equal number are to be prepared, and sent

in a ship to that port, where yours are to meet them.

"If by this means you can get a good new crew, I think it would be

best that you are quite free of the old, for a mixture might introduce

the infection of that sickness you complain of. But this may be left

to your own discretion. Perhaps we shall join you with the Providence,

Captain Whipple, a new Continental ship of thirty guns, which, in

coming out of the river of Providence, gave the two frigates that were

posted to intercept her each of them so heavy a dose of her 18- and

12-pounders that they had not the courage or were not able to pursue

her. It seems to be desired that you will step up to Versailles (where

one will meet you), in order to such a settlement of matters and plans

with those who have the direction as can not well be done by letter. I

wish it may be convenient to you to do it immediately.

"The project of giving you the command of this ship pleases me the

more as it is a probable opening to the higher preferment you so

justly merit."

In obedience to this request Jones went privately to Versailles, where

he spent some time in consultation with the commissioners and the

French ministry discussing the exchange of prisoners, and proposed

several plans of attack by which his services could be utilized. These

plans well indicate the fertility of imagination, the resourceful

genius, and the daring hardihood of the man. One of them was for

making another descent upon Whitehaven, another was to attack the Bank

of Ayr and destroy or ransom that town; another was to burn the

shipping on the Clyde. Expeditions on the coast of Ireland were

suggested. London might be distressed, he thought, by cutting off the

supplies of coal from Newcastle; but the most feasible projects were

the capture or destruction of the West Indian or Baltic fleets of

merchantmen or the Hudson Bay ships.

The Minister of Marine, M. de Sartine, lent an attentive ear to all of

the plans which were proposed, and Jones returned to Brest with high

hopes that he should be soon employed in an expedition to carry out

one or the other of these plans with adequate means to do it well. It

is quite likely that the minister was as earnest and honest in his

intentions as the king in his desire to make use of Jones, but the

formal declaration of war rendered it possible to prosecute the

enterprises which had been suggested by Jones, if it were thought

expedient to attempt them, under the French flag and with French

officers. As France had only intended to use him under the cover of

the American flag to harass England before war was declared, and as

that could now be done openly under her own flag, they did not see the

same necessity for his services as before.

The matter of finding employment for him was further complicated by

the fact that since a state of actual war existed the ministry was

besieged with applications from numbers of French officers for

command, and the ships which had been proposed for Jones were

naturally appropriated to the French themselves. Even if a command

could have been found for the American, there would have been a

natural disinclination, so great as to be nearly prohibitive of

success, on the part of the French officers to serving under a

foreigner. Time brought him nothing but disappointment, and the high

hopes he had cherished gradually waned.

Always a persistent and voluminous letter writer, in his desperation

he overwhelmed everybody with correspondence. Inaction was killing to

him. Not to be employed was like death itself to a man of his

intensely energetic temperament. His pride would not permit him to

return to the United States and seek a command when he had

specifically announced, in a letter to Congress by the returning

Ranger, that the King of France asked that he might make use of his

services, and therefore no command in America need be reserved for

him; and yet he now found himself a hanger on the outskirts of a court

and a ministry which had no further use for him.

The delicate situation of the commissioners, who had been themselves

scarcely more than on sufferance, did not permit them, in the

interests of expediency and diplomacy, to insist as strongly as they

would have liked to do, that the king and the ministry should keep

their engagement with Jones, which was, of course, an engagement with

them and with the United States. Diplomacy and persuasion were the

only weapons at their command. They certainly made good use of them.

Franklin, pending something else, procured the minister's order that

Jones should be received on the great French fleet of D'Orvilliers,

which was about to put to sea to engage the English fleet under

Keppel. He was very desirous of availing himself of this invitation,

which he himself sought, for it would give him an opportunity he could

not otherwise hope to enjoy, of perfecting himself in naval tactics

and the fine art of maneuvering and governing a great fleet. He never

allowed anything to interfere--so far as he was able to prevent

it--with his advancement in professional study. The permission,

however, to D'Orvilliers' great regret, arrived too late, for the

fleet sailed without him. The French admiral seems to have appreciated

the American captain, and to have highly esteemed him. It is stated

that the delay in transmitting the permission was intentional, and was

due to the jealousy of the French naval service.

Jones was exasperated by all these happenings almost to the breaking

point. In one letter he says: "I think of going to L'Orient, being

heartily sick of Brest." I should think he would be! As days passed

without bringing him any nearer to the fruition of his hope, he became

more modest in his demands and propositions. One significant phrase

culled from one of his letters well indicates the bold, dashing

character of the man: "I do not wish to have command of any ship that

does not sail fast, _for I intend to go in harm's way_."[7] In the

sentence which follows this statement, we get another touch of that

entire consciousness of his own ability and high quality which, though

warranted, it were better, perhaps, for his reputation if it were not

so evident in his writing: "I know, I believe, that this is no other

person's intention. Therefore, buy a frigate that sails fast and is

sufficiently large to carry twenty-six or twenty-eight guns on one

deck."

His state of mind may well be understood from this citation: "I have,

to show my gratitude to France, lost so much time, and with it such

opportunities as I can not regain. I have almost killed myself with

grief."

Chafing, fretting, writing letters, the time dragged on. At last he

addressed to the Minister of Marine, M. de Sartine, this emphatic

protest and statement which he calls, and justly, an explicit letter.

It is certainly sufficiently definite and clear, and shows that rank

and position did not deter him from a free and somewhat sarcastic

expression of his grievances and wrongs:

"Brest, _September 13, 1778_.

"Honoured Sir: When his excellency Doctor Franklin informed me that

you had condescended to think me worthy of your notice, I took such

pleasure in reflecting on the happy alliance between France and

America that I was really flattered, and entertained the most grateful

sense of the honour which you proposed for me, as well as the favour

which the king proposed for America, by putting so fine a ship as the

Indien under my command, and under its flag, with unlimited orders.

"In obedience to your desire, I came to Versailles, and was taught to

believe that my intended ship was in deep water, and ready for sea;

but when the Prince [de Nassau] returned I received from him a

different account; I was told that the Indien could not be got afloat

within a shorter period than three months at the approaching equinox.

"To employ this interval usefully, I first offered to go from Brest

with Count D'Orvilliers as a volunteer, which you thought fit to

reject. I had then the satisfaction to find that you approved in

general of a variety of hints for private enterprises which I had

drawn up for your consideration, and I was flattered with assurances

from Messieurs de Chaumont and Baudouin that three of the finest

frigates in France, with two tenders and a number of troops, would be

immediately put under my command; and that I should have unlimited

orders, and be at free liberty to pursue such of my own projects as I

thought proper. But this plan fell to nothing in the moment when I was

taught to think that nothing was wanting but the king's signature.

"Another much inferior armament from L'Orient was proposed to be put

under my command, which was by no means equal to the services that

were expected from it; for speed and force, though both requisite,

were both wanting. Happily for me, this also failed, and I was thereby

saved from a dreadful prospect of ruin and dishonour.

"I had so entire a reliance that you would desire nothing of me

inconsistent with my honour and rank, that the moment you required me

to come down here, in order to proceed round to St. Malo, though I had

received no written orders, and neither knew your intention respecting

my destination or command, I obeyed with such haste, that although my

curiosity led me to look at the armament at L'Orient, yet I was but

three days from Passy till I reached Brest. Here, too, I drew a blank;

but when I saw the Lively it was no disappointment, as that ship, both

in sailing and equipment, is far inferior to the Ranger.

"My only disappointment here was my being precluded from embarking in

pursuit of marine knowledge with Count D'Orvilliers, who did not sail

till seven days after my return. He is my friend, and expressed his

wishes for my company; I accompanied him out of the road when the

fleet sailed, and he always lamented that neither himself nor any

person in authority in Brest had received from you any order that

mentioned my name. I am astonished therefore to be informed that you

attribute my not being in the fleet to my stay at L'Orient.

"I am not a mere adventurer of fortune. Stimulated by principles of

reason and philanthropy, I laid aside my enjoyments in private life,

and embarked under the flag of America when it was first displayed. In

that line my desire of fame is infinite, and I must not now so far

forget my own honour, and what I owe to my friends and America, as to

remain inactive.

"My rank knows no superior in the American marine. I have long since

been appointed to command an expedition with five of its ships, and I

can receive orders from no junior or inferior officer whatever.

"I have been here in the most tormenting suspense for more than a

month since my return; and, agreeable to your desire, as mentioned to

me by Monsieur Chaumont, a lieutenant has been appointed, and is with

me, who speaks the French as well as the English. Circular letters

have been written, and sent the 8th of last month from the English

admiralty, because they expected me to pay another visit with four

ships. Therefore I trust that, if the Indien is not to be got out, you

will not, at the approaching season, substitute a force that is not at

least equal both in strength and sailing to any of the enemy's

cruising ships.

"I do not wish to interfere with the harmony of the French marine;

but, if I am still thought worthy of your attention, I shall hope for

a separate command, with liberal orders. If, on the contrary, you

should now have no further occasion for my services, the only favour I

can ask is that you will bestow on me the Alert, with a few seamen,

and permit me to return, and carry with me your good opinion in that

small vessel, before the winter, to America."

His intense, burning desire for action, however, did not permit him to

degrade, as he thought, his Government and station by accepting the

command of a privateer which was tendered to him. In the command of a

speedy, smart privateer there is no limit to the plundering he might

have done and the treasure he might have gained, if that had been what

he wished. Many naval officers before and since his time have done

this and thought it not derogatory to their dignity. It is therefore

to Jones' credit that he was very jealous in this and many other

instances on the point of honor of serving in no ship, under no flag,

and with no commission save that of the United States. We shall see

this spirit again and again. The citizen of the world was beginning to

feel that the world as his country was hardly adequate to his needs;

in theory it was a very pretty proposition, but in practice it was

necessary to form and maintain a more definite and particular

relationship. As a final effort to better his condition and secure

that opportunity for which he thirsted, he prepared the following

letter to the king:

"Brest, _October 19, 1778_.

"Sire: After my return to Brest in the American ship of war the

Ranger, from the Irish Channel, his excellency Doctor Franklin

informed me by letter, dated June the 1st, that M. de Sartine, having

a high opinion of my conduct and bravery, had determined, with your

Majesty's consent and approbation, to give me the command of the ship

of war the Indien, which was built at Amsterdam for America, but

afterward, for political reasons, made the property of France.

"I was to act with unlimited orders under the commission and flag of

America; and the Prince de Nassau proposed to accompany me on the

ocean.

"I was deeply penetrated with the sense of the honour done me by this

generous proposition, as well as of the favour your Majesty intended

thereby to confer on America. And I accepted the offer with the

greater pleasure as the Congress had sent me to Europe in the Ranger

to command the Indien before the ownership of that vessel was changed.

"The minister desired to see me at Versailles to settle future plans

of operation, and I attended him for that purpose. I was told that the

Indien was at the Texel completely armed and fitted for sea; but the

Prince de Nassau was sent express to Holland, and returned with a very

different account. The ship was at Amsterdam, and could not be got

afloat or armed before the September equinox. The American

plenipotentiaries proposed that I should return to America; and, as I

have repeatedly been appointed to the chief command of an American

squadron to execute secret enterprises, it was not doubted but that

Congress would again show me a preference. M. de Sartine, however,

thought proper to prevent my departure, by writing to the

plenipotentiaries (without my knowledge), requesting that I might be

permitted to remain in Europe, and that the Ranger might be sent back

to America under another commander, he having special services which

he wished me to execute. This request they readily granted, and I was

flattered by the prospect of being enabled to testify, by my services,

my gratitude to your Majesty, as the first prince who has so

generously acknowledged our independence.

"There was an interval of more than three months before the Indien

could be gotten afloat. To employ that period usefully, when your

Majesty's fleet was ordered to sail from Brest, I proposed to the

minister to embark in it as a volunteer, in pursuit of marine

knowledge. He objected to this, at the same time approved of a variety

of hints for private enterprises, which I had drawn up for his

consideration. Two gentlemen were appointed to settle with me the

plans that were to be adopted, who gave me the assurance that three of

the best frigates in France, with two tenders, and a number of troops,

should be immediately put under my command, to pursue such of my own

projects as I thought proper; but this fell to nothing, when I

believed that your Majesty's signature only was wanting.

"Another armament, composed of cutters and small vessels, at L'Orient,

was proposed to be put under my command, to alarm the coasts of

England and check the Jersey privateers; but happily for me this also

failed, and I was saved from ruin and dishonour, as I now find that

all the vessels sailed slow, and their united force is very

insignificant. The minister then thought fit that I should return to

Brest to command the Lively, and join some frigates on an expedition

from St. Malo to the North Sea. I returned in haste for that purpose,

and found that the Lively had been bestowed at Brest before the

minister had mentioned that ship to me at Versailles. This was,

however, another fortunate disappointment, as the Lively proves, both

in sailing and equipment, much inferior to the Ranger; but, more

especially, if it be true, as I have since understood, that the

minister intended to give the chief command of an expedition to a

lieutenant, which would have occasioned a very disagreeable

misunderstanding; for, as an officer of the first rank in the American

marine, who has ever been honoured with the favour and friendship of

Congress, I can receive orders from no inferior officer whatever. My

plan was the destruction of the English Baltic fleet, of great

consequence to the enemy's marine, and then only protected by a single

frigate. I would have held myself responsible for its success had I

commanded the expedition.

"M. de Sartine afterward sent orders to Count D'Orvilliers to receive

me on board the fleet agreeably to my former proposal; but the order

did not arrive until after the departure of the fleet the last time

from Brest, nor was I made acquainted with the circumstance before the

fleet returned here.

"Thus have I been chained down to shameful inactivity for nearly five

months. I have lost the best season of the year, and such

opportunities of serving my country and acquiring honour as I can not

again expect this war; and, to my infinite mortification, having no

command, I am considered everywhere an officer cast off and in

disgrace for secret reasons.

"I have written respectful letters to the minister, none of which he

has condescended to answer; I have written to the Prince de Nassau

with as little effect; and I do not understand that any apology has

been made to the great and venerable Dr. Franklin, whom the minister

has made the instrument of bringing me into such unmerited trouble.

"Having written to Congress to reserve no command for me in America,

my sensibility is the more affected by this unworthy situation in the

sight of your Majesty's fleet. I, however, make no remark on the

treatment I have received.

"Although I wish not to become my own panegyrist, I must beg your

Majesty's permission to observe that I am not an adventurer in search

of fortune, of which, thank God, I have a sufficiency.

"When the American banner was first displayed I drew my sword in

support of the violated dignity and rights of human nature; and both

honour and duty prompt me steadfastly to continue the righteous

pursuit, and to sacrifice to it not only my own private enjoyments,

but even life, if necessary. I must acknowledge that the generous

praise which I have received from Congress and others exceeds the

merit of my past services, therefore I the more ardently wish for

future opportunities of testifying my gratitude by my activity.

"As your Majesty, by espousing the cause of America, hath become the

protector of the rights of human nature, I am persuaded that you will

not disregard my situation, nor suffer me to remain any longer in this

unsupportable disgrace.

"I am, with perfect gratitude and profound respect, Sire, your

Majesty's very obliged, very obedient, and very humble servant,

"J. Paul Jones."

This letter, at once dignified, forceful, respectful, and modest, was

inclosed to Dr. Franklin with the request that it should be delivered

to the king. The deference paid to Franklin's opinion, the eager

desire to please him, the respect in which he held him, is not the

least pleasing feature of Jones' character, by the way. The letter in

question was withheld by Franklin with Jones' knowledge and

acquiescence, and the king, it is probable, never saw it. There was,

in fact, no necessity for its delivery, for the appeals, prayers, and

importunities had at last evoked a response. The minister, worn out by

the persistence of Jones, determined, since none of the French naval

vessels were available, to buy him a ship and assemble a squadron and

send him forth.

The inquiry naturally arises why the French Government should care to

go to the trouble and expense of doing this. Before the war was

declared their action was understandable, but afterward the then

operating cause disappeared. Yet there was another reason aside from

the fact that M. de Sartine was willing to keep his promise if he

could, and that was this:

It was not the custom to harry, plunder, and ravage the seacoasts in

the wars between France and England. Military or naval forces were the

sole objects of attack, and by a specific though unwritten law of

custom, the efforts of the rival combatants were confined to ships of

war, fortifications, and armies, and, of course, to merchant vessels

belonging to the enemy. The peaceful seashore towns were generally let

alone unless the inhabitants in exposed localities provoked

retaliation by aggression--a thing they usually took good care not to

do. To introduce the practice would be unfortunate and nothing would

be gained, by France especially. The King of France, however, was more

than willing to have the coasts of his neighbor ravaged, if no

retaliation on his own unprotected shores were provoked thereby. No

convention of any sort, expressed or understood, existed between Great

Britain and the United States which would prevent such action on the

part of the Americans. Great Britain was making a bloody ravaging

warfare on the coasts of North America, and, never dreaming of

reprisal, paid no attention whatever to this law of war, save when it

suited her to do so, on our seaboard. Franklin and the commissioners

wisely realized that the only way to stop this merciless and brutal

burning and plundering was to let the enemy experience the thing

himself. They were therefore in entire accord with the desire of the

French king. To produce the result he would furnish the squadron, they

the flag. It was a charming arrangement from the king's point of view.

Consequently the reason for the encouragement given Jones is apparent,

and the determination of the minister is therefore explained and

understood.

Jones received word early in November through the commissioners, with

a solemn assurance from De Sartine, that a suitable ship would be

purchased for him at the expense of France and a squadron assembled

under his supreme command. Let those who would reproach Jones for his

part in this plan remember that (as in his previous cruise) he only

carried out the orders of Franklin. There was no sentimental nonsense

about the old Quaker. He knew what was the best remedy for the

deplorable conditions in America, and he grimly prepared to apply it.

He had no illusions in the premises at all; it was a pure matter of

business, and with sound policy he so treated it. Jones' appeals, be

it understood, were only for a ship or ships and an opportunity to get

into action with the enemy. His orders were outside of his control.

All he had to do as a naval officer was to carry them out to the best

of his ability when he received them. Therefore a censure of Jones is

a censure of Franklin.

It was first designed to employ Jones and his proposed squadron for a

descent upon Liverpool, for which purpose five hundred men from

Fitzmaurice's Irish regiment were to be taken on the ships. Pending

the assembling of the squadron, and while Jones was busily engaged in

seeking for a proper vessel for himself in various French ports,

Lafayette arrived from America, and sought the command of the land

forces of the proposed expedition. His desire was a notable tribute to

the sailor, by the way. The change was most agreeable to Jones, to

whom, of course, the reputation and abilities of Lafayette were well

known, and who would naturally prefer association with such a

distinguished man in the undertaking, but, as usual, there were delays

on the part of the minister.

Jones traveled about from port to port, looking at different ships

which it was proposed to purchase for him. The minister offered him

the Duc de Broglie, a large new ship lying at Nantes, capable of

mounting sixty-four guns. He inspected her, and would have taken her

gladly, but he felt utterly unable properly to man such a large ship,

and he was reluctantly compelled to dismiss her from consideration.

There was also at Nantes a smaller ship, the Ariel, of twenty guns,

which had been captured from the English, which he was willing to

accept if nothing better turned up. Another vessel that he looked at

was a great old-fashioned merchant ship, lying dismantled at L'Orient,

which had been some fourteen years in the India trade, and was very

much out of repair. She was called the Duc de Duras. Jones thought she

might do in default of anything else, and he so informed the minister.

However, in spite of the promises that had been made and reiterated to

him, and the determination which had been arrived at, nothing was

done. His visits of inspection were fruitless, his propositions were

disregarded as before. Furthermore, the plan to send Lafayette with

him fell through because France was at that time projecting a grand

descent in force upon England, and Lafayette was designated to command

a regiment in the proposed undertaking. Like other similar projects,

the plan was never put in operation. Though France did enter the

Channel with sixty-six French and Spanish ships of the line, she did

not accomplish as much with this great armada as Paul Jones did with

the little squadron he finally was enabled to assemble.

Meanwhile he was at his wits' end. The year had nearly passed and

nothing had been done. He had been put off with promises until he was

desperate. Chance, it is stated, threw in his way one day, as he sat

idle at Nantes, gloomily ruminating on the prospect, or lack of it,

and almost making up his mind to go back to the United States in the

first vessel that offered and seek such opportunity for service as

might arise there, a copy of Franklin's famous book of maxims, called

Poor Richard's Almanac. As the harassed little captain sat listlessly

turning its pages, his eyes fell upon this significant aphorism:

"If a man wishes to have any business faithfully and expeditiously

performed, let him go on it himself; otherwise he may send."

The truth of the saying inspired him to one final effort before he

abandoned European waters. He went to Versailles in November, 1778,

for one last visit, and there settled the matter. His determination

and persistence at last, as it had many times before, brought him

success. De Sartine directed the purchase of the Duras, which Jones,

from his love for Franklin and the circumstance just related, with the

consent of the minister, renamed the Bon Homme Richard, that being the

French equivalent for Poor Richard, or Good Man Richard, which was the

caption of the almanac.

De Sartine appointed as the agent and commissary of the king for the

purchase and refitting of the Duras and the other vessels of the

squadron, and for the disposal of any prizes which might be taken, in

short, as his representative with entire liberty of action, Monsieur

le Ray de Chaumont. This gentleman, belonging, of course, to the

nobility of the country, was a man of considerable influence at the

court, where he had held the responsible dual position of Grand Master

of the Forests and Waters of the King. Since the arrival of the

American commissioners he had shown his devotion to the cause of

liberty and to them personally by many and conspicuous acts of

kindness.

It was his private residence at Passy that Franklin made his

headquarters during his long tenure of office. De Chaumont had offered

him the use of this house, and with generous and splendid hospitality

had refused to accept of any remuneration by way of rental. Realizing

the pressing necessity of the struggling colonists for every dollar

they could scrape together, he positively declined to impair their

limited resources by any charge whatsoever. Franklin endeavored to

change his decision, and when John Adams replaced Deane he made the

same effort, but the generous Frenchman refused to recede from his

determination. He also placed his private purse at the disposal of

Franklin, and in every way showed himself a worthy and disinterested

friend of America.

He was one of those romantic Frenchmen who espoused the cause of the

rights of man under the influence of the new philosophy of Rousseau

and Voltaire; somewhat, it would seem, from motives similar to those

proclaimed by Jones himself. He had nothing to gain by his action and

much to lose should the effort of the colonists result in failure. He

was a man of affairs and possessed an ample fortune. To anticipate

events, it may be stated that he spent it all in the cause to which he

had devoted himself, and eventually became bankrupt. He was not a

military man; still less was he aware of the exigencies and demands of

the naval service. For the present, however, he did his work

efficiently and well.

The Duras was purchased immediately, as were two other merchant

vessels, the Pallas and the Vengeance, all at the cost of the

royal treasury. To these were added the Cerf, a king's cutter, a

well-appointed and efficient vessel, and the United States ship

Alliance, a new and very handsome frigate built at Salisbury,

Massachusetts, in 1778, which had arrived in Europe with Lafayette as

a passenger. Jones had specifically asked that the American frigate

should be assigned to his squadron--a most unfortunate request, as it

afterward turned out.

The Duras was an East Indiaman of obsolete type; a large,

old-fashioned ship with a very high poop and topgallant forecastle.

She had made, during many years of service, a number of round voyages

to the East Indies. While stoutly built for a merchant ship, as

compared to a man-of-war of her size she was of light and

unsubstantial frame. In the absence of particular information I

suppose her to have been of something under eight hundred tons burden.

Neglect had allowed her to fall into such a bad condition that her

efficiency as a proposed war vessel was further impaired by her

inability to stand the necessary repairs.

Jones, however, surveyed her and determined to make her do. Indeed,

there was no choice; it was that or nothing. He hoped to effect

something with her which would warrant him in demanding a better ship;

so, with a sigh of regret for the Indien, he set to work upon her,

doing his best to make her efficient. By his orders she was pierced

for twenty-eight guns on her main deck and six on the poop and

forecastle. In order to further increase her force, Jones, after much

deliberation, resorted to the hazardous experiment of cutting six

ports in the gun room, on the deck below the gun deck, close to the

water line; so close, in fact, that, with anything like a sea on, to

open the ports would be to invite destruction by foundering.[8] Only

under exceptionally favorable circumstances, therefore, could these

guns be used. At best the gun-room battery could only be fought in the

calmest weather and smoothest water. In this dangerous place he

mounted six old and condemned 18-pounders, which were all that he

could obtain from the French arsenals. On the main deck fourteen

12-pounders and fourteen 9-pounders were mounted.[9] Two 9-pounders

were placed aft on the quarter-deck, two in each gangway, and two on

the forecastle. All the guns were old and worn out; many of them had

been condemned by the French Government as unfit for use. The six guns

on the lower deck were mounted three on a side, but a sufficient

number of ports had been cut to admit of shifting the guns and working

the whole battery on either side. New guns had been ordered cast for

the Richard at the French gun foundries; but the usual delays

compelled Jones to take what he could, and finally sail with these old

makeshifts. The guns intended for the Bon Homme Richard arrived after

she had gone.

The Alliance was a frigate-built ship of thirty-two guns, 9- and

6-pounders, manned by two hundred and fifty men, and commanded by

Pierre Landais. Landais was an ex-officer of the French navy, who had

been dismissed for insubordination and incapacity. Ignorant of these

facts, knowing only that he had been a navy officer, and wishing to

please their royal ally, and perhaps pay a delicate compliment also to

Lafayette, who was a passenger upon the ship on her first cruise, the

marine commissioners had appointed him to the command of this fine and

handsome little frigate. The Alliance was one of the fastest ships of

her day; indeed, she may be regarded as the precursor of that long

line of splendid frigates and sloops of war which have been the pride

of American shipbuilders and the admiration of foreign navies.

Properly re-armed and refitted, under the command of stout old John

Barry she did splendid service on several occasions later in the war.

Her swiftness and mobility, it was believed, would add greatly to the

usefulness of Jones' squadron.

The Pallas was a fairly efficient merchant ship, frigate built,

carrying thirty 6-pounders, commanded by Captain de Cottineau de

Kloguene. The Vengeance was a twelve-gun brig of little force, and the

Cerf a sixteen-gun cutter, under the command of Captains Ricot and de

Varage respectively.

After many difficulties and disheartening delays, chiefly overcome by

Jones' invincible determination and persistence, the squadron was at

last made ready for use. The first duty assigned to the daring

commodore was a cruise for the driving of the enemy's ships out of the

Bay of Biscay, and convoying merchant ships bound from port to port

along the coast. It was not a particularly congenial duty, but he

entered upon it zealously and without complaint.

The squadron sailed on the 19th of June, 1779. During the night of the

20th the Alliance ran foul of the Richard, and as a result of the

collision the mizzenmast of the Alliance was carried away, while the

Richard lost her head, cutwater, jib boom, etc. The blame for the

accident mainly rested on Landais, who, it was afterward developed,

had behaved disgracefully on this occasion, showing such a lack of

presence of mind and seamanly aptitude, coupled with such timidity and

shrinking from duty, that, when the accident occurred, he not only

gave no orders, but basely ran below to load his pistols, leaving the

ship to be extricated from her critical situation by the junior

officers. Perhaps he was afraid that the infuriated Jones would attack

him for the mishandling of his ship. Jones, who had been below when

the accident occurred, immediately assumed charge of the Richard, and

by prompt action averted a more serious disaster. To do Landais

justice, however, the officer of the watch on the Richard also must

have been culpable, for he was subsequently court-martialed and broken

for his lack of conduct on this occasion.

Refusing to return to port, and patching up the two ships as well as

possible from their present resources, Jones performed the duties

assigned to him, driving the enemy's ships out of those waters and

safely delivering his convoy. On the return voyage, Captain de Varage,

of the Cerf, had a spirited encounter with a heavily armed privateer

of greater force than his own, which lasted for an hour and ten

minutes and resulted in the privateer striking her flag. Before he

could take possession, however, other ships of the enemy appeared, and

he was forced to abandon his prize. The Richard chased several sail,

two of which were thought to be frigates, and the officers and men

manifested every disposition to get into action; but the ships sighted

were all able to run away from the cumbrous and slow-sailing American

ship.

On the last day of June the squadron put into L'Orient again to repair

damages. During the cruise it is interesting to note that Jones

dispatched thirty pounds, in the shape of a draft, through a friend in

Dublin, to Scotland for the use of his family. He frequently made them

remittances from his scanty supplies of money, and, in fact, he never

forgot them, however busy with great undertakings he may have been.

Instructions were received at L'Orient from Franklin intended to

govern the future movements of the squadron. They had, of course, been

prepared after consultation with De Sartine. Jones was directed to

cruise off the west coast of Ireland to intercept the West Indian

ships and then to proceed to the northward, passing the Orkneys, and

range down the coast of Scotland and endeavor to capture the Baltic

fleet--which, by the way, had been one of his original projects. After

carrying out these orders he was instructed to proceed to the Texel

about August 15th, where he would find further directions awaiting

him. Prizes were to be sent to Dunkirk or Ostend in France, or Bergen

in Norway, consigned to such agents as De Chaumont should designate.

Jones was very much disappointed, naturally, with the Richard, and in

acknowledging the receipt of these instructions he made a last effort

to get the Indien. It was intimated that such might be the result of

his cruise when he arrived at the Texel, if it were successful, but

that no change could be made in his orders at present. Franklin

refused to attempt to have them modified by consulting with the

ministry, and, in a way gentle but sufficiently decided, he directed

Jones to finish repairing the ships with all speed and proceed to

carry out the orders he had received. The commodore, swallowing his

disappointment and dissatisfaction with a rather ill grace, it must be

confessed, hastened to get his ships in shape for the proposed

expedition.

During the cruise in the Bay of Biscay a mutinous spirit had broken

out among the English seamen, with whom in part Jones had been forced

to man his ship in default of other men, which had become sufficiently

developed to result in an organized conspiracy to take the Richard.

The plot was discovered and the ringleaders were put in irons. When

the Richard arrived at L'Orient, these men, two quartermasters, were

court-martialed; but, instead of being sentenced to death, as they

deserved, they were severely flogged with the cat-o'-nine-tails.

Jones, who, if he erred, leaned to the side of mercy, seems to have

been greatly relieved at this termination of the affair. At this time

the lieutenant of the Richard, who had been in charge of the watch

during the collision, was also court-martialed and dismissed the

service.

These several unfortunate happenings had given De Sartine a very low

idea of the efficiency and value of the Bon Homme Richard and the

squadron, which galled Jones extremely. Indeed, I imagine De Sartine

looked upon Jones in the light of a nuisance more than anything else.

The repairs progressed very slowly, and it was not until August that

the ships were ready to proceed. Meanwhile an event of the greatest

importance had occurred in the arrival of a cartel at Nantes with one

hundred and nineteen exchanged American prisoners. Many of them

entered on the Richard, and Jones was thus enabled to weed out a large

proportion of the mutinous and disorderly element in his crew. The

fine qualities of some of these new recruits enabled him to replace

many of his petty officers--invaluable adjuncts to an efficient

crew--with experienced seamen who could be depended upon, not merely

as sailors, but as men who, fresh from the horrors and brutalities of

English prisons, were more than ready to fight against the red flag

wherever it was planted. They leavened the whole mass.

The re-enforcement was of the greatest value; but Jones' good fortune

did not end here, for before he sailed again he was joined by a young

American naval officer of the highest capacity and courage, named

Richard Dale, who had been captured in the Lexington and held a

prisoner in England. He had effected a most daring and romantic escape

from the Mill Prison by the assistance of an unknown woman, whose name

and the circumstances of their acquaintance remained a mystery; Dale

absolutely refused to divulge them to the day of his death.

Jones found in him a congenial spirit and an able subordinate. He

promptly appointed him first lieutenant of the Richard, and between

the two men there speedily developed a friendship as lasting as it was

unaffected and disinterested. Next to Jones himself, in the early

records, stands the name of this young man, then scarcely twenty-three

years of age. Aside from the great commodore, it was he who

contributed more to the subsequent success of the Richard than any

other man. At the request of De Sartine, Jones also received on the

Richard a battalion of royal marines, who were all French of course,

and who had been augmented until they numbered one hundred and

thirty-seven officers and men, under Lieutenant-Colonel de Chamillard

de Warville. It was supposed by the minister that they could at least

keep order on the ship! The time limited to the expiration of the

cruise was extended to the end of the month of September.

The total complement of the Richard, therefore, according to Jones'

statement, was about three hundred and eighty officers, men, and boys,

including the one hundred and thirty-seven marines. A roll of officers

and men is given by Sherburne in his Life of Jones.

On this list, which purports to contain the names of those who were on

board on the date of the battle with the Serapis, are enumerated the

names of but two hundred and twenty-seven officers and men. It omits

the name of de Chamillard and another colonel of infantry, de Weibert,

who were actually on board, and gives no names of the French marines.

Adding the two hundred and twenty-seven to the one hundred and

thirty-seven, we get three hundred and sixty-four, which is as near as

we can come to Jones' figures. There may have been others whose names

were added later on, but at any rate it is safe to take Jones'

statement as practically correct.

Assuming that the known factors fairly represented the whole crew, we

find that among the officers twenty-four were Americans, two were

Frenchmen, and six British, including Jones and two surgeon's mates.

Among the seamen fifty-five were American born, sixteen Irish,

sixty-one British, twenty-eight Portuguese, twenty who are not

described, of whom seven were probably Portuguese, and fifteen of

other nationalities, including, according to Cooper, some

Malays--possibly Filipinos learning thus early to fight for freedom

under, not against, the Stars and Stripes! Thus, scarcely more than

one fifth of the complement were native Americans. The marines, of

course, were efficiently organized and commanded, and were of the

usual character of the men in the French service. The rest of the

crew, with the exception of the Americans, who were filling the posts

of petty officers, were a hard-bitten, reckless crowd of adventurers,

mercenaries, bravos, and what not, whom only a man like Jones could

control and successfully direct. Under his iron hand they developed

into as ready a crew as ever fought a ship, and in our estimation of

his subsequent success the fact must not be lost sight of that he made

out of such a motley assemblage so efficient an organization. The

officers were fairly capable, though none of them reached the standard

of Dale, and at least one of them left the cruise with a serious cloud

upon his reputation.

Perhaps two thirds of the crew of the Alliance were English seamen who

had been recruited from the men of the line of battle ship Somerset,

which had been wrecked in America, and a large number of her crew

captured. They enlisted on the Alliance in the hope of capturing her

and making their escape, thus avoiding a sojourn in American prisons.

On the way to France, owing to the presence of these men on the ship,

a conspiracy had developed, the successful termination of which was

only prevented by the resolution and courage of Lafayette and the

passengers with the regular officers of the ship. There were but a

small number of Americans on the Alliance, owing to the fact that she

was commanded by a Frenchman, under whom Americans generally refused

to sail. The officers, with few exceptions, were poor in quality. Her

crew had been somewhat improved before the squadron sailed, by the

enlistment of some of the prisoners from the cartel, but it was still

far from being an efficient body of men, and under such a captain as

Landais there was no hope of it ever becoming so.

The officers and crew of the Pallas, Vengeance, and Cerf were French

_in toto_, the officers all holding French commissions. The squadron

was entirely at the charges of the French Government, although each of

the officers sailed with a supplementary American commission issued by

Franklin and his _confrères_, and all the vessels were under the

American flag.

De Chaumont had been indefatigable in fitting out the ships as best he

could, and personally he had done everything in his power to further

the success of the enterprise. If his labors had ceased there, the

results would have been better; but, probably under the direction of

the minister, and influenced by the natural reluctance of the French

officers and men to serve under the command of an officer of another

country, de Chaumont prepared a concordat, which he suppressed until

just before the time of sailing, when it was exhibited to Jones and

the other captains and their signatures demanded. By the terms of this

singular document the officers and men and the several vessels of the

squadron, instead of being under the absolute charge of Jones himself,

as is the case with every properly organized expedition, were formed

into a species of alliance offensive and defensive; and while, of

course, the headship was necessarily under Jones while he lived, he

was so hampered and restricted by the various articles of the

agreement as to feel himself scarcely more than first among his

equals. He was left with full responsibility for success, but so shorn

of power and ability to compel obedience to his orders as to render it

necessary for him to resort to persuasion to effect his end. Any

ordinary commander would have withdrawn at the last moment, but Jones

was determined upon effecting something; so, with great reluctance and

unavailing protests, he signed the concordat, and the ill-assorted

squadron proceeded on its way.[10]

Surely never before was such an expedition for warlike purposes put

forth upon the narrow seas! It is difficult to see what result any

sane man could have legitimately expected from it. That it

accomplished anything was due to Jones himself--commodore by virtue of

a paper agreement, just as binding and effective as any of the several

signers wished it to be! The world had long known him as a man

remarkable for audacity in conception, boldness in planning, hardihood

in carrying out, and downright courage in the supreme moment. As a

seaman and a fighter he had few equals and no masters. But the cruise

developed that he possessed other qualities of leadership which are

sometimes lost sight of in this brilliant galaxy, qualities which his

previous experience had not led us to expect him to exhibit. He was

shown to be considerate, tactful, forbearing, persuasive, holding

himself under strong restraint. Naturally of a passionate, impetuous,

uncontrollable nature, that he exhibited these qualities speaks well

for the man. He had learned to control his feelings in the bitter

school of procrastination, evasion, and disappointment of the past

year.

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