The last left Gemai on December 19th.
-----
The Mounted infantry, provided with camels, had throughout the advance
been near the head of the column, and early in December were as far
forward as Shabatut (some 40 miles above Dongola). The Guards Camel
regiment reaching that place on the 4th, was brigaded with them under
the orders of Brigadier-General Sir Herbert Stewart, and until the 10th,
the force was practised in their new formations and drill.[439] On the
11th, the whole advanced to Korti, and arrived on the 15th; the Marines
detachment joined the Guards here. Shortly afterwards a portion of the
Heavy Camel regiment marched into that camp, and two battalions and a
squadron of the 19th Hussars also reached it.
-----
Footnote 439:
Article in the _Nineteenth Century_ , Nov., 1885, by Lieutenant
Douglas Dawson, Coldstream Guards.
-----
While these operations were in progress, some news had been received
from General Gordon. On the 17th of November a letter, dated the 4th,
announced that he could “hold out forty days with ease,” but “after that
it will be difficult;” also that there were at Metemmeh five of his
steamers with nine guns, awaiting orders.[440] Again, on the 31st of
December, a diminutive piece of paper had reached Lord Wolseley at
Korti, bearing the words, “Khartum all right, 14/12/84.—C. G. GORDON,”
but supplemented by a verbal message to the effect that the garrison
were in great straits, that provisions were running low, and would
therefore be exhausted before long.[441]
-----
Footnote 440:
The letter is given in Colvile’s _Official Account_ , part i. p. 121.
Footnote 441:
_Ibid._ , i. 138.
-----
Before the arrival of this last communication, however, arrangements had
already been made to advance in two directions from Korti: one column,
called the River column, under Major-General Earle, was to push along
the Nile through Abu Hamed towards Berber, while the other, under
Brigadier-General Sir H. Stewart, was to march across the desert and
seize Metemmeh.
Now, it was known that there were no supplies to be obtained at the
latter place; and as a sufficient number of camels do not seem to have
been procurable, it was found impossible to convey the Desert column,
with the whole of its stores, to its destination in one journey. The
distance to be traversed (176 miles) is, moreover, so great, that it was
imperative to establish one or two posts on the route. The principal
station was fixed at Jakdul wells, where water was plentiful, 98 miles
from Korti. Owing, however, to the scarcity of camels, it was necessary,
before the final advance could be made, to occupy that place and to make
several journeys to it, in order to victual it and organize it as a
depôt for future requirements. This preliminary operation took some days
to accomplish, and was not completed until the 14th of January, upon
which date Sir H. Stewart was enabled to start for Metemmeh.
The orders he received were to attack and occupy that town, to leave
there a portion of his force, and to return with the remainder to
Jakdul. Colonel Sir C. Wilson, R.E. (the Chief of the Intelligence
Department), and Captain Lord C. Beresford, R.N., with a small party of
seamen, accompanied the column, and both had special instructions given
to them. The latter was to take over one or two of the steamers which
were known to be at Metemmeh, and, when he had reported them to be
ready, the former was to proceed in them to Khartum, and to deliver a
letter to General Gordon. Sir C. Wilson was to be accompanied by a small
detachment of infantry; he might march the men through the city, and
show them to the garrison; but they were not to sleep there; and they
were to return with him to Metemmeh. Further, he was only to stay long
enough to confer fully with General Gordon, and, having done so, he was
to get back to Korti with all convenient despatch.[442] Lastly, he was
supplied with an estimate showing the approximate dates upon which the
troops were calculated to arrive at the different stations along the
route to Khartum. According to this estimate, General Earle was to reach
Abu Hamed about the 10th of February, Berber the 22nd, and Shendi the
5th of March; while the remainder “will commence to reach Metemmeh the
16th of January, and should be concentrated there with sixty days'
supplies by the 2nd of March,” adding, “If we hire many camels this date
may be anticipated.”[443]
-----
Footnote 442:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , part ii. p. 6, etc., where the full text
of all these orders are given.
Footnote 443:
Colonel Sir Charles Wilson, K.C.B., R.E., _From Korti to Khartum_ , p.
3, where this paper is given in full. (London, 1885.)
-----
Sir H. Stewart started from Korti on the 30th of December, with 78
Officers, 1029 men, 221 natives, 2206 camels, and 45 horses, among them
the Guards Camel regiment. Marching in the afternoons and at night, he
reached Jakdul, without opposition, early on the 2nd of January, and the
same day returned, leaving the Guards and Royal Engineers behind, under
Lieut.-Colonel Boscawen. He was again in Jakdul on the 12th. During the
interval, the water arrangements were improved, and the post
strengthened. In respect to this duty, Sir H. Stewart reports as follows
on the 14th January:—
The post at Jakdul has been vastly improved by Lieut.-Colonel Hon. E.
Boscawen and the Guards Camel regiment, during the eight days they
have been quartered there.... I think it right to state that nothing
but extreme hard work on the part of Officers and men could have
effected so complete a metamorphosis in this post, and I venture to
submit that it reflects the highest credit on the Guards Camel
regiment.
Leaving a garrison behind of 150 men of the Royal Sussex Regiment, the
force started from Jakdul at 2 p.m. on the 14th, consisting of two
squadrons of the 19th Hussars, the Naval division, half a Camel battery,
Royal Engineers, Guards, Heavy, and Mounted infantry Camel regiments, a
wing Royal Sussex (on camels), Medical and Transport details;
approximately, 115 Officers, 1687 men, 351 natives, 153 horses, 2888 (of
whom 860 transport) camels, 3 guns, and one Gardner. Next day, evidence
of the enemy’s proximity became apparent, and on the 16th the cavalry,
which had been pushed well to the front, reported that he had taken up a
position to bar our access to the Abu Klea wells. The advance was
continued, and in the afternoon, when it was too late to attack, we got
into close touch with him. A zeriba was then constructed, strengthened
by a hastily made wall and by mimosa thorn; and during the night the
Arabs fired into it, but without doing much mischief. Early on the 17th,
a small garrison was placed there, and the remainder emerged in square,
with skirmishers in front and on the flanks. The formation was as
follows:—Front face, Coldstream on the right, Royal Artillery in the
centre, Mounted infantry on the left; Right face, Scots Guards on the
left, then Grenadier Guards, Marines, Sussex Regiment; Left face,
Mounted infantry on the right, then Heavy Camel regiment; Rear face,
Heavies on the right, then Naval division, with the Gardner gun, and
Sussex; the 19th Hussars were outside on the left. We soon became
engaged, and several casualties occurred, the dervishes firing, and
apparently being driven back behind the folds of the ground. Our
progress was slow, for the cumbrous square formation had to be
maintained, and the camels, carrying the wounded, to be prevented from
straying outside.[444] We were making for a line of flags that was to be
seen in front of us, and many now believed that the enemy was in full
retreat.
-----
Footnote 444:
Nevertheless, some did lag behind, and would have been cut off, but
for the courage of Lieut.-Colonel Rowley, Grenadier Guards, who drove
them into the square, just as the Arabs began the attack which is
about to be described.
-----
“Just at this moment, when about 450 yards from the flags, as if they
had risen from the earth, up rose a line of spearmen all across the
wady, [gully], and at the same moment the whole wady behind appeared
black with them.”[445]
“The skirmishers at once retired, but as they did so directly in the
line of advance of the enemy, they screened him from the fire of the
square during the first stage of his charge, and it was not until the
spearmen were within 200 yards of the square that the fire could be
developed.”[446]
-----
Footnote 445:
_Nineteenth Century_ , loc. cit.
Footnote 446:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , part ii. p. 18.
-----
The sudden and fierce onslaught of some 5000 fanatics, who
held death in contempt, was eventually directed against the left rear
corner; and such was the impetus of the rush, that the Heavies were
pressed back by sheer weight of numbers into the centre of the square,
where the camels were, and almost as far as the front and right faces.
The square was practically broken, and a desperate hand-to-hand fight
followed, but it happily was only of brief duration. The Guards and
Marines had been unmoved by the shock; and keeping up a steady fire with
the front rank upon the masses of the Arabs, who were hovering near to
complete the victory should the rush be successful, they turned about
the rear rank to assist in the struggle that was going on behind
them.[447] In a few minutes the violence of the dervishes had expended
itself, and they fell back, slowly and sullenly, until we got our guns
to play upon them, and they left us in possession of the ground. The
cavalry then pushed forward to the wells, and, when the square was
reformed, it followed slowly on, the men elated by success, but
suffering agonies from thirst. At 5 p.m. the water was reached, but it
was not until early on the 18th that the zeriba was transferred to Abu
Klea, and the post there was then established and strengthened.
-----
Footnote 447:
“I was much struck by the demeanour of the Guards Officers. There was
no noise or fuss; all the orders were given as if on parade, and they
spoke to their men as if nothing unusual was going on” (_From Korti to
Khartum_ , p. 36).
-----
Our losses, which fell principally on the Heavies and the Naval
division, were very great, and amounted to 9 Officers and 65 men killed,
and 9 Officers[448] and 85 men wounded; total 168 of all ranks. Of the
former, Colonel Fred Burnaby (Royal Horse Guards) fell, well known for
his travels and for his adventurous character. Of the Coldstream
detachment 2 men (one a sergeant) were killed; Surgeon James Magill and
10 were wounded, of whom one died of his wounds. The strength of the
enemy is not accurately known; it is supposed to have been from 9000 to
11,000: his losses were considerable, and 800 lay dead in the open
ground close to the square.
-----
Footnote 448:
Two subsequently died of their wounds.
-----
In the afternoon of the 18th, the column started for the Nile, and
continued to move throughout the night. The troops, the native drivers,
and the animals were becoming exhausted by the toil they had undergone;
the men found it difficult to keep awake; the camels, insufficiently
fed, and at work incessantly for nearly three weeks, lagged behind, or
got off the track. The line of advance led through a thick mimosa scrub;
there was no moon, and, on account of the enemy’s proximity, bugles
could not be sounded to keep the column together. During the darkness,
therefore, there was much confusion, and it was not until dawn that
order could be restored. In a short time the river came into sight, some
four miles away. To the left front appeared a large and well-built town,
now recognized to be Metemmeh, and looking far more important and strong
than was represented on our maps or indicated in our reports. As the
British column, from its position near Abu Kru, gazed on the fertile
valley beneath, they perceived large crowds of armed men issuing from
the walls of Metemmeh, and it soon became clear that no water was to be
obtained without a fight.
A zeriba was at once formed, wherein to guard the stores and baggage,
before a force could advance to cut its way through the enemy. But as
this was being accomplished, the latter, creeping up through the long
grass and scrub, opened fire from concealed positions, and several
casualties occurred. Sir H. Stewart at this moment was severely wounded,
and the command devolved upon Sir C. Wilson.
At 2.30 the zeriba was ready, and garrisoned by half the Heavies, the
Cavalry, Artillery, and Naval division, while the remainder, under Sir
C. Wilson, emerged therefrom in square, the executive command of which
was entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel Boscawen. An important duty now devolved
upon this Officer, viz. to lead the square past the enemy in the bush to
the river, and to keep it as much as possible on the open ground. That
the losses at this particular period of the day were comparatively few,
may be ascribed to the manner in which the column was directed and
manœuvred at this time. Warned by the tactics of the dervishes at Abu
Klea, no skirmishers were extended; but as long as the enemy kept up his
fire from the scrub, our men, unable to reply with effect, were at a
disadvantage. Fortunately this did not last long; for the Arabs, unable
to restrain their fiery ardour, charged the square with fury, and were
met by the steady and withering fire of our soldiers. In less than five
minutes the fight was over.
“The seething mass of fanatics who had headed the charge were now a
heap of lifeless bodies, their comrades in rear had melted away into
the distance, and the British troops (sadly reduced in numbers since
their first fight at Abu Klea) made the echoes ring with a loud
cheer.”[449]
-----
Footnote 449:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , ii. 27.
-----
There was no more resistance that day, and Sir C. Wilson, having gone
forward to select a bivouac, the column was halted on the river as dusk
began to fall.
The joy of being once more near a plentiful supply of water, and the
sense of relief that the march across the desert had been at last
successfully accomplished, now filled the minds of our men, and atoned
in some degree for the hardships and privations they had just undergone;
but rest was also required, for not only the labours, but the excitement
and the dangers of the last few days had told severely upon them, and a
much-needed sleep was only partially obtained during the night of
January 19th-20th. Next day the bivouac was shifted to the village of
Gubat, which was placed in a state of defence; and the zeriba, formed
the day before, having been evacuated, the wounded and stores were
brought there.[450] The enemy was hovering near, but made no attempt to
interfere with our operations. In view of the orders given to the
Commander of the Desert column, and to secure our position at Gubat from
attacks which could be easily organized against us in Metemmeh, Sir C.
Wilson determined to capture that place, if this could be accomplished
without serious risk. On the 21st, therefore, he advanced against it
with the greater part of his force, but found it stronger than he
anticipated. During the day, Gordon’s steamers appeared on the scene,
and assisted in the attack; but they also brought news that another
horde of Arabs might be soon expected from the direction of Khartum, and
orders were therefore given to fall back upon Gubat.
-----
Footnote 450:
The horses had all been fifty-eight hours, and some even as many as
seventy-five hours, without water (_Nineteenth Century_ , loc. cit.).
The camels had not received anything to drink for six or seven days,
having been previously accustomed to be watered every second or third
day (_From Korti to Khartum_ , p. 95).
-----
The casualties during the 19th, 20th, and 21st, amounted to one Officer
and 22 men killed, and 9 Officers and 93 men wounded; total, 125: added
to this, two war correspondents to London newspapers (the _Morning
Post_ and _Standard_ ) also lost their lives. Among the severely
wounded, belonging to the Guards Camel regiment, were Lieutenant
Crutchley, Scots Guards, and Major H. Poë, Royal Marines; in the
Coldstream detachment two men were wounded. It is extremely sad to have
to relate that the brilliant Commander of the column, Sir H. Stewart,
never recovered from his wound, and died on the 17th of February, before
he could be taken even as far as Korti, deeply regretted by all who
served under his command, as well as by every one who knew his kindly,
generous, and manly character.
Directly the Queen learnt that the column had reached the Nile, and
heard of the pluck and endurance exhibited by her soldiers, Her Majesty
caused the Secretary of State to signify by telegram “her satisfaction
and warm thanks to her brave troops, and her deep concern for their
losses and sufferings, but especially for General Stewart’s severe
wound;” and in consideration of that Officer’s gallant service, Her
Majesty was also pleased to promote him to the rank of Major-General.
The Khedive, moreover, telegraphed his congratulations and thanks to the
men for the success they had achieved.
Sir C. Wilson had now a double function to discharge. His original
mission was to communicate a letter to General Gordon, and to give him
that moral support which the appearance of a few red-coats for a day or
two in Khartum might confer upon him.[451] But a new duty also obliged
him to provide for the safety of the small and sadly diminished force
which had just been unexpectedly placed under his command. To this most
important task he therefore applied himself. It was reported that
enemies were closing about him from Berber and from the south; Metemmeh
also was too strong to be taken by a _coup de main_. Thus it was
essential that he should see for himself the extent of the Arab
resources which might be brought to bear upon Gubat; and while he sent
the cavalry up the river, early on the 22nd, he embarked in a steamer,
and made his way down the stream. The results of these reconnaissances
were satisfactory, and he returned convinced that the dervishes were not
in such numbers as he had been led to believe. Meanwhile, the position
we occupied was strengthened, and communications with the Nile were
secured; Gubat, situated on a height about half a mile from the water,
could not be evacuated, and it was garrisoned by the Guards; and another
fort, connected with an island by a _tête de pont_, was constructed near
the river.
-----
Footnote 451:
Three British Officers were, moreover, to accompany Wilson to Khartum,
and to be left there with Gordon.
-----
Then a vexatious delay occurred. The steamers required repair, and it
was not until the afternoon of the 23rd, when too late to start on that
day, that they were reported fit to move. Accompanied by 20 men of the
Royal Sussex and 240 black troops, Sir C. Wilson left for Khartum on the
morning of the 24th. The passage up the river was rapidly made, in a
falling Nile, and on the 28th the beleaguered city was approached. It
would be outside the scope of this volume to give any account of the
numerous thrilling adventures and hairbreadth escapes that marked this
perilous journey. It is sufficient to say that Khartum had fallen on the
26th, and Gordon was killed. The whole place was in the hands of the
Mahdi, and the little band of Englishmen ran the gauntlet past the enemy
right up to Khartum, and under its guns, until they made sure that the
end had indeed come, and that there was no further use in remaining
where they were.[452] We now know that Gordon had been starved out, and
that his food ran short on the 3rd or 4th of January, when the last
issue of rations took place; that Omdurman, having fallen soon
afterwards (January 15th), the dervishes drew closer round Khartum; that
they could have entered it any day they chose, as the falling Nile laid
bare the weak points of the defences of the city; that at dawn on the
26th this helpless quarter was stormed; and that the place fell after a
few minutes' fighting. The expedition had been sent a month too late,
and the “game was played out before the British troops reached Gubat; at
that period nothing could save Khartum.”[453]
-----
Footnote 452:
An account of this journey is to be found in Colvile’s _Official
Account_ , part ii. p. 33, etc.—how the steamers ascended the river
with difficulty and advanced to Khartum in the teeth of hostile
batteries and under fire from the city; how the fall of the place
became undoubted; how the native crews of the steamers showed signs of
disaffection; how both steamers were wrecked on the return journey,
and how the small British party were exposed to imminent danger; how
Lieutenant Stuart-Wortley was sent down the river in an open row-boat,
and succeeded in reaching Gubat; and how a rescue party was
immediately organized under Lord Charles Beresford, who went to the
relief of Sir Charles Wilson, and those with him, in another steamer,
amid many difficulties, and in spite of the opposition of the
dervishes.
Footnote 453:
Major C. M. Watson, C.M.G., R.E., _Royal Engineers' Journal_, June 1,
1892. See _Fire and Sword in the Sudan_ , p. 342.
-----
Little occurred to the small British force near Metemmeh during this
interval. Convoys, under Lieut.-Colonel Hon. R. Talbot (1st Life
Guards), of about a thousand camels and 300 to 400 men, started for
Jakdul, to bring up supplies to the Nile, on January 23rd and on
February 2nd. Sir C. Wilson, also, after his gallant effort to reach
Khartum, left Gubat on the 6th, with an escort of twelve men of the
Coldstream, under Captain V. Dawson, and reached Korti on the 9th. These
and other movements took place without opposition on the part of the
enemy, and thus it appeared that the desert had been effectively swept
of Arabs; but they were still to be feared, and rumours were not wanting
to the effect that they were concentrating and were converging upon our
advanced position on the river. When Lord Wolseley heard of Sir H.
Stewart’s wound, he decided to send his Chief of the Staff,
Major-General Sir Redvers Buller, to replace him, and to despatch some
infantry to reinforce the Desert column. Accompanied by six companies of
the Royal Irish Regiment, who marched on their feet the whole way from
Korti, the new General reached Gubat on the 11th, and assumed command
there.
The fall of Khartum, reported at head-quarters on the 4th of February,
made a change in the conduct of the war, and the object of his mission
being no longer possible, the British Commander was left without
instructions as to his future proceedings.[454] He was thus unable to
send any precise orders to Sir R. Buller, who had already left Korti
before the death of General Gordon was known there, until he had
ascertained the views of Government upon the new situation that had
arisen. But these views were not at once forthcoming; for, the first
telegram, dated London, February 6th, gave no indication of the policy
to be pursued in the Sudan, and it was only after a more explicit
statement had been requested, that he was informed that “the power of
the Mahdi at Khartum must be overthrown.” Orders were then despatched to
the Desert column to hold on to the Nile, and, when Metemmeh was taken,
to combine with General Earle in an attack upon Berber. But before this
message was received, arrangements had been already taken for the
evacuation of Gubat. This determination had been rendered necessary
because the camels were insufficient in number, and were too much
reduced by hard work, to perform the transport service across the
desert; supplies were liable to run short; and a hostile force was
reported to be marching from Khartum.
-----
Footnote 454:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , part ii. p. 57.
-----
Accordingly, the last of the wounded left the Nile on the 13th under
escort, commanded by Colonel Talbot, consisting of portions of the
Guards, Heavy, and Mounted infantry Camel regiments. Early next day the
enemy showed signs of renewed activity, by attacking the convoy, which,
encumbered by wounded, many of whom were carried on stretchers, and by
Egyptian soldiers and camp followers who had come from Khartum in the
steamers, was not advantageously circumstanced to ward off a serious
attack. After keeping the enemy at bay by some sharp fighting, the Light
Camel regiment, which was luckily in the vicinity, came up to the
support of the convoy, and with their assistance the Arabs were soon
driven away. Our losses were two killed and six wounded, of whom one
belonged to the Coldstream.[455] On the same day, the 14th, Gubat was
finally evacuated by our troops. Abu Klea was reached on the 15th, and,
in order to reduce the consumption of water, for the wells were only
capable of supplying a moderate force, the Hussars, Guards, Heavies, and
the Sudanese who manned the steamers, were sent to Jakdul on the
16th.[456]
-----
Footnote 455:
This man, Lance-Sergeant Leaning, who died of his wounds, was noted
for his gallantry upon this occasion.
Footnote 456:
Owing to the amount of hard work done, the Guards were now without
boots; and this seems to have been the reason why they were selected
to go back.
-----
The River column, under Major-General Earle, had meanwhile started on
its way to Berber by Abu Hamed (January 24th), and found the ascent of
the Nile, through a hostile and practically unexplored country, by no
means an easy operation. The physical difficulties of the route seemed
to increase day by day, but by dint of hard work and perseverance the
troops continued to push on slowly. On the 10th of February, meeting the
enemy at Kirbekan, where he attempted to make a stand, they attacked and
defeated him; but the victory was unfortunately accompanied by the death
of the General—killed by a bullet fired from a stone hut, in which some
Arabs had taken refuge. The advance was immediately resumed, and was
continued until the 24th, when a point, 26 miles from Abu Hamed, was
reached. Here the troops were stopped by a message, dated head-quarters
20th, which ordered the column to return. A retrograde movement was
therefore at once commenced. The cause of this fresh order has now to be
briefly explained.
On receiving instructions directing the overthrow of the Mahdi’s power
at Khartum, Lord Wolseley decided that the first step was to reduce
Berber, and he therefore wished, as we have seen, to combine both the
River and Desert columns to secure that object. But insuperable
difficulties presented themselves to the execution of that design. In
the first place, the absence of all means of rapid communication between
Korti and the two columns was a serious obstacle to any form of combined
operations. Supplies for immediate and future use had, moreover, to be
carried along with the troops, over the formidable obstructions which
everywhere opposed our progress. The camels of the Desert column had
completely broken down, and there was no transport available; the men’s
boots were also worn out, and their marching powers were in consequence
diminishing day by day. The River column, moreover, though able to move
forward,—but only slowly, on account of the physical difficulties in the
way and the low condition of the Nile,—had not sufficient carrying power
to store Berber with the supplies which it would have been necessary to
place there.[457]
-----
Footnote 457:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , part ii. p. 72.
-----
These difficulties entailed a change of plan, and both columns were
therefore ordered to return. Sir R. Buller had been annoyed by hostile
demonstrations against him near Abu Klea since the 16th, and on that day
and on the next he lost three men killed, and 4 Officers, and 23
wounded. As soon as this advanced position had no longer to be held, he
evacuated it on the 23rd and 24th, in the face of a large number of
Arabs, estimated at not less than 8000 men, with such skill and judgment
that, having deceived them, they made no effort to interfere with his
movements. The retirement was everywhere continued, the Guards reaching
Korti on the 9th of March, and the last troops leaving the desert on the
16th. From Korti, the Guards went to Dongola on the 16th, and remained
there for some months; while the rest of the army also took up summer
quarters on the Nile, not further forward than Merowi,—to await the
coming of the autumn, when a fresh advance was to be made to free
Khartum from the despotism of the Mahdi.
[Illustration:
SERGEANT-DRUMMER 1895.
N.R.Wilkinson del. A.D.Innes & C^o. London. Mintern Bros.
lith.
]
CHAPTER XVII.
SECOND PART OF THE WAR IN THE SUDAN, 1884-1885—SUAKIN
CAMPAIGN.
Reasons for the expedition to Suakin—Departure of the Coldstream—Orders
to Lieut.-General Sir G. Graham—Position of the enemy—Advance
against Hashin—Engagement at Tofrek—Attack on a convoy, escorted by
the Coldstream and Royal Marines—Advance to Tamai—Construction of
the railway—Attack on T'Hakul—Abrupt end of the campaign—The
Coldstream proceed to Alexandria, and thence to Cyprus—Evacuation of
the Sudan; how the Mahdi took advantage of it; how the Dongolese
were treated—Position taken up south of Wady Halfa—Defeat of the
Arabs at Ginnis—Return of the Guards Camel regiment—Return of the
Coldstream from Cyprus—Honourable distinctions added to the
Colours—Officers of the Regiment in December, 1885.
When the British Government made up their mind, early in February, 1885,
to put an end to the devastating tyranny of the dervishes, at all events
in Khartum, and sent instructions to the British Commander to that
effect, they also consulted him as to whether a strong expedition should
be despatched forthwith to Suakin. Under the impression that his
instructions to overthrow the power of the Mahdi at Khartum were
intended really to produce that result, Lord Wolseley gladly accepted
the offer that Osman Digna might be dealt with, without further delay.
We must refer the reader to the current history of the day to seek the
causes of the awakened energy which roused the Government to action at
this moment. Very few years have elapsed since 1885, and the events
which then took place can scarcely be forgotten. Suffice it to say that
the country, justly proud of General Gordon, was roused to indignation
when it was realized that, in spite of warnings from the military
authorities, the Government had delayed to take proper measures to
rescue him and those for whom he was responsible, until the season was
too far advanced, and until rescue was impossible. So also, the large
and unstinted sums of money, freely lavished upon the tardy expedition
that was at last despatched up the Nile, had failed to accomplish the
object which the nation had so much at heart. Under all these
circumstances, it was clearly judicious to propitiate the popular wrath
that began to manifest itself; and how could this be more efficaciously
done than by the public announcement that summary punishment was about
to be inflicted upon the murderers of the British hero, whose death was
so universally deplored? Hence it came about that a railway to Berber
was immediately to be commenced; that another expedition to protect it
was to be sent to Suakin; and that a still more extravagant expenditure
of treasure was to be wasted, now when it was too late, and when the
necessary outlay had been curtailed up to the summer of 1884,—that is,
as long as there was time to save the garrison of Khartum.
In January and February, 1885, Major-General Lyon Fremantle, in command,
as we have seen, at Suakin, since July, 1884, had been reinforced by a
squadron of cavalry, two battalions of infantry, and a battery of Royal
Horse Artillery, brought from Lower Egypt, and amounting to some 2500
men. With these he engaged in defensive operations against Osman Digna,
who had again begun to give trouble in the district. Prompt measures
were now taken to make them capable of assuming the offensive by raising
them to a total of about 13,000 men. The field force, so augmented, was
commanded by Lieut.-General Sir G. Graham, V.C., K.C.B., under the
general orders of Lord Wolseley, who was responsible for all operations
against the enemy; and composing it, there was a Guards Brigade, troops
of the Line, an Indian contingent, and, lastly, an Australian battalion
and battery furnished by the Government of New South Wales. This
Colonial corps of fighting men, and that provided by the Dominion of
Canada for the service of the boats on the Nile, form a new feature in
our military history, which we should be sorry to pass over in silence;
for they show the patriotic feelings which urge our brethren over the
sea, gallantly to take their share in any struggle in which the
interests of our Queen and Empire may be involved.
The following organization was adopted at Suakin: A Cavalry Brigade
(Colonel H. P. Ewart, C.B.), two squadrons of the 5th Lancers, and two
of the 20th Hussars, and a battalion Mounted infantry (4 companies).
Three batteries of artillery (one Royal Horse Artillery), and eventually
one battery New South Wales. The 1st or Guards Brigade[458]
(Major-General A. J. Lyon Fremantle), 3rd Grenadiers (Colonel Hon. W.
Home), 1st Coldstream (Colonel A. Lambton), and 2nd Scots Guards
(Colonel Hon. W. Trefusis). Subsequently, when they arrived, the New
South Wales Battalion, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Richardson,
were attached to this Brigade. The 2nd Brigade (Major-General Sir J. C.
McNeill, V.C., K.C.B.), three battalions of infantry (of the East
Surrey, Shropshire, and Berkshire Regiments), and one of Royal Marines.
The Indian Brigade (Brigadier-General J. Hudson, C.B.), one regiment of
cavalry (9th Bengal), three battalions infantry (15th Sikhs, 17th
Bengal, and 28th Bombay), and one company Madras Sappers. Royal
Engineers (one Railway and two Field companies, two Telegraph sections,
and one Balloon detachment). And four, eventually five, companies of the
Commissariat and Transport Corps.
-----
Footnote 458:
Captains Hon. N. Dalrymple, Scots Guards, and the Hon. F. Stopford,
Grenadier Guards, were respectively Brigade-Major of the Guards
Brigade, and Aide-de-camp to Major-General Fremantle.
-----
The 1st Coldstream were made up by a draft from the 2nd Battalion to 1
Warrant-officer, 80 Non-commissioned officers, 16 drummers, and 710
privates, out of which a detachment of 50 men was told off to form a
Mounted infantry company. Officers were posted as follows:—
_Commanding Officer._—Colonel A. Lambton.
_Mounted Majors._—Lieut.-Cols. J. B. Sterling; and R. S. Hall.
_Adjutant._—Lieutenant Hon. H. Legge.
_Quartermaster._—H. Folson.
_Medical Officer._—Surgeon A. Alexander.
Compy. Lieutenants.
No. 1. Lt.-Col. C. Fortescue. C. Frederick; and F. Maude.
No. 2. ” F. Manley. G. Sebright; and C. Holland.
No. 3. ” R. Follett. Earl of Wiltshire; and G. Milligan.
No. 4. ” L. D. MacKinnon. H. Shute.
No. 5. Capt. Hon. H. Monck. R. Winn (subsequently in command of
Regl. Transport).
No. 6. Lt.-Col. Hon. E. Digby. G. Wyndham; and J. Drummond-Hay.
No. 7. Lieut. J. Gladstone. D. J. Hamilton.
No. 8. Lt.-Col. Hon. H. Corry. Hon. Alan Charteris; and R. Grenfell.
The following Officers served on the Staff: Lieutenants Earl of
Wiltshire, and Hon. Alan Charteris, Aides-de-camp to Major-General Sir
J. McNeill; and Lieutenant Gladstone, Orderly Officer to Major-General
Fremantle. The detachment of mounted men was placed under the command of
Captain Ross-of-Bladensburg and Lieutenant G. Sutton, but until the
ponies were obtained, which did not take place before the 5th of April,
these Officers did duty with the Battalion, the former commanding No. 7
Company. It should also be stated that the Brigade furnished upon this
occasion a company of Army Signallers, under command of Lieutenant F.
Lloyd, Grenadier Guards, composed of 12 men from the 3rd Grenadiers, 12
from the 1st Coldstream, and 6 from the 2nd Scots Guards; the corps was
attached to the 3rd Grenadier Guards. Further, a Field Hospital was also
formed, of which Surgeons-Major C. Read (Coldstream), Lawrence
(Grenadiers), and A. Myers (Scots Guards), and Surgeon G. Robinson
(Scots Guards) were the Medical Officers.
The 1st Coldstream left Wellington Barracks shortly after 7 a.m. on the
19th of February, accompanied by a dense and enthusiastic crowd, and,
marching to Westminster Stairs, proceeded in two river steamers to
Gravesend, where they embarked on board the _Manorah_. Remaining a few
hours at Malta, they were detained a day at Suez, and reached Suakin on
the 8th of March. The Battalion then landed without delay, marched about
two miles, and encamped in an advanced position to cover the assembly of
the troops; they were joined by the 2nd Scots and 3rd Grenadier Guards,
who arrived respectively the 9th and 10th. There had been some alarms of
a disquieting nature when we reached the seat of war. The Arabs
frequently sent forward a few armed men at a time, who, crawling at
night past the outposts into the centre of the camp, attacked and
stabbed our soldiers and horses in the dark, even in the head-quarter
camp or to the rear of it, where at least every one had a right to
believe himself to be in safety, and guarded against depredations of the
sort. This disagreeable method of warfare was not easy to suppress, and
when the enemy was successful in his raid, it produced a “scare,” which
was calculated to disturb the equanimity of the troops. The dervishes,
in short, were hovering very near us at night, firing into us from the
bush (fortunately without much effect), though they seldom made any
demonstrations in the daylight. Detachments were sent out as soon as it
was dark, to watch all approaches leading to Suakin; but the nuisance
only came to an end, when we moved out to attack the enemy, and drove
him back from our neighbourhood. Meanwhile the Brigade camp, though it
had never been disturbed, was withdrawn somewhat closer to the town on
the 16th.
The orders which Sir G. Graham received were dated the 20th of February;
and they directed him, in the first place, to destroy the power of Osman
Digna, and, secondly, to give assistance and protection to the
construction of the railway. The military occupation of the Hadendowa
country, lying near the Suakin-Berber route, was to be accomplished; and
it was indicated that this would be best done by the Indian troops,
while the British portion of the army were to be placed in the hilly
region, which is to be found a little beyond Tambuk wells (25 miles from
Suakin), to a distance of 60 or 70 miles further on towards Berber. It
was also intimated that possibly Berber might not be attacked before the
autumn,[459] and, if so,—
“the railway cannot be pushed much beyond Ariab; and there, all the
railway plant and material necessary for the 100 miles between it
and Berber should be collected as soon as possible, so that the
advance, when the cool weather begins, and Berber is taken, may be
made at once.”[460]
-----
Footnote 459:
The date upon which Lord Wolseley ordered the River column to retire,
was the 20th of February. See _ante_, chap. xvi., p. 391.
Footnote 460:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , part ii. p. 181. The full text of this
despatch from the Secretary of State to Sir G. Graham is given in that
work.
-----
These instructions clearly show the intention of the British Government
at this critical moment in their fortunes, when public indignation was
rising against them; viz. to overthrow the power of the Mahdi at Khartum
in the autumn of 1885, now that it was not found possible to achieve
that object in the spring of the same year. This was to be effected by
the co-operation of two expeditions, under the supreme command of Lord
Wolseley,—one under his immediate leadership, concentrating in the
province of Dongola, to pass the summer there, and to emerge therefrom
when the suitable season came round for field operations; the other,
under Sir G. Graham, with the objects (1) to crush Osman Digna, and to
clear the country of the enemy, in order that the railway might be made,
and (2) to construct that railway at least as far as Ariab (some 145
miles from Suakin), and to place troops for its protection “where the
summer heats could be best endured.”[461]
-----
Footnote 461:
_Ibid._ , ii. 195.
-----
Sir G. Graham reached Suakin March 12th, and next day the railway was
begun.[462] A few days had to be spent in completing the assembly of the
force, and in perfecting the arrangements necessary for their supply.
The wells in the neighbourhood were sufficient to provide the camels and
horses with water, but as its quality and quantity could not be depended
upon for the troops of the expedition, ships fitted with condensing
boilers were brought to Suakin, and condensed sea-water was issued in
tins for their use, and was transported to the various camps by camels
or by railway.
-----
Footnote 462:
It is worthy of remark that this was _not_ a light railway, as had
been originally proposed; but a line of the ordinary gauge, such as is
constructed in England, for general traffic. See Map No. 8, p. 360.
-----
The country near Suakin is a flat sandy plain, intersected by khors, or
water courses (quite dry at this season of the year), which, extending
westward some ten or twelve miles, is terminated by a line of hills
running almost parallel to the sea coast. Near the town, the plain is
fairly open for about two or three miles, but afterwards, and especially
in the khors and at the foot of the hills, it is covered by thick masses
of mimosa thorny scrub, many of which look somewhat like large
gooseberry bushes six to eight feet high, and wide in proportion; in
many places they are tangled by the prickly pear, and by rank grass and
other undergrowth. The enemy was reported to have concentrated his main
force of some 7000 men at Tamai, a village about 16 miles away in a
south-westerly direction from Suakin. Another thousand or more were at
Hashin, eight miles due east of the town, where a valley penetrates into
the hills. It was here that the Arabs were supposed to live who troubled
our nights. To the north-west is the village of Handub, eleven miles
off, also occupied by dervishes; and to this place the railway to Berber
would have to run.
It was evidently desirable that our first movement should be directed
against Hashin. On the 19th of March, a reconnaissance was undertaken
against it, and next day an attack upon the position was made in force;
the 2nd Brigade in front, supported on the flanks by the Guards and
Indian troops, covered by the cavalry; the horse artillery and a Gardner
battery (4 guns) being in rear: altogether a little more than 8000 men.
Arrived at a detached group of hills about a mile and a half from
Hashin, redoubts were constructed there by the East Surrey Regiment,
while the remainder continued to push forward, until the entrance of the
valley, previously mentioned, was reached. The 2nd Brigade, supported by
the Indian battalions, ascended the southern heights above this valley,
and soon drove the enemy therefrom. The Arabs, estimated at 3000 strong,
however, were favoured by the dense bush; they seemed to swarm through
it, and, hovering round, they dashed into our men with the greatest
bravery, whenever an opportunity presented itself. In this way, two
squadrons of Indian horse were somewhat severely handled by an almost
invisible foe. Meanwhile the Guards were in reserve, formed in square,
just under the heights which Sir J. McNeill had taken on our left front,
and close to a small rise in the ground on our right front, which we
called Bee-hive Hill. The redoubts in rear being complete soon after
midday, and garrisoned by the East Surrey, the 2nd and Indian Brigades
were ordered to retire, the Guards to cover the movement. The Arabs,
owing to the thick cover that concealed them, remained closer to our
position than they could otherwise have done, and perceiving our return
towards our camp, they opened a hot fire from the bush upon us,
principally from Bee-hive Hill, which was returned with steady volleys.
This proceeding soon silenced them, though the Brigade lost some men
during this short period of the day—1 Officer, Captain Dalison (Scots
Guards), and 2 men being killed, and 16 wounded. Our total casualties
amounted to 48 Officers and men killed and wounded, and of these the
Coldstream numbered 1 man died of wounds, and 8 wounded. The result of
the action was that we had no further trouble as far as Hashin was
concerned, and thenceforward the enemy’s night raids on our camp ceased.
An advance was now made towards Tamai, the centre of Osman Digna’s
resistance, and, on the 22nd of March, Sir J. McNeill was sent forward
to establish a post on the road to that place, eight miles off, with one
squadron of the 5th Lancers, the Berkshire Regiment, the Marines, a
detachment of the Naval brigade (with 4 Gardner guns), three Indian
battalions, and the Madras Sappers. On the same day, the Coldstream
proceeded towards Hashin, to convoy supplies to the East Surrey
Regiment, who were still in the redoubts constructed on the 20th, and
met with no misfortune, except that several of our men were struck down
by sun apoplexy. On returning home in the afternoon, we saw clouds of
dust rising out of the bush in the place where we conceived Sir J.
McNeill’s column to be, and wondered whether something unusual had
happened there. On returning to camp we heard, at first, exaggerated
accounts of what occurred, but it was not long before the real truth was
known. The column, finding the bush exceedingly thick and no natural
clearings in it, could only advance slowly, and halted some six miles
from Suakin. The men then began to construct a zeriba; and, while so
employed, they were necessarily scattered, some were unarmed, and a
large number of camels blocked the ground. The enemy, lurking unseen in
the scrub close by, crept up, and suddenly made a fierce onslaught on
the force. Unfortunately, one of the Indian battalions was somewhat
unsteady, and, though the Officers worked hard to rally the men, they
were rushed, and carried away to the rear. Then followed a battle of
short duration which is not easy to describe. The Berkshire—who gained
the title of “Royal” for their day’s work—stood manfully up to the
Arabs, though half the battalion were collecting brushwood and the other
half were at their dinners, and, together with the Marines, the Sikhs,
and the remaining Indian battalion, they maintained a hard fight for the
space of twenty minutes. They soon, however, gained the mastery, and
drove the enemy back with great slaughter. Isolated combats took place
at some distance from the zeriba on the road to Suakin, entailing
considerable loss, and towards evening the telegraph wire was cut. But
news had, before this, been received at head-quarters, to assure Sir G.
Graham that the danger was over, and that the attack had entirely
failed. The Arabs were computed at 5000 strong, and their losses at 1500
men. Our own casualties were severe; and amounted to 10 Officers and 131
men killed and missing, and to 5 Officers and 150 men wounded: total
296. Added to this, there were 157 native camel drivers killed and
missing, and 19 wounded. Total _personnel_ lost, 472 men; besides 501
camels. Among the wounded was Lieutenant Charteris, Coldstream Guards.
This action, known as the battle of Tofrek, occasioned more losses on
one day than in any other engagement during the whole war in the Sudan.
The Guards Brigade were sent early the following morning to reinforce
the zeriba and to bring up supplies and water. Forming a square, and
guarding 1200 camels, the march was slow, and took nearly six hours to
accomplish. Many of the loads were indifferently packed, and repeatedly
fell off; the drivers seemed to have little control over the animals,
which were bad movers and difficult to guide. The weather, also, was
oppressively hot, and the men suffered a good deal from thirst. Arriving
shortly before noon, the force halted for some hours; the Grenadier
Guards and the Indian Brigade then returned to Suakin with the wounded
and empty camels, leaving the Coldstream and Scots Guards and the rest
of the troops behind. The immediate neighbourhood of Tofrek was still
covered with hundreds of dead and numerous camels, many of which were
hamstrung, and had to be shot. Burial parties were actively at work, but
it was not easy to dispose quickly of the mass of dead bodies, both of
men and animals, that lay about in large numbers; added to which there
was little shade to be had from the broiling sun, and the water ration
for every purpose had to be reduced to a minimum. For the next few days,
the position in the zeriba was therefore anything but a pleasant one, as
may be readily imagined.
On the 24th, the Coldstream and the Marines began cutting a path one
hundred paces broad towards Suakin. After some hours' work, they
marched, under Colonel Lambton, about halfway to the town, to escort a
convoy to Tofrek, consisting of 425 camels and 818 carts, with 8000
gallons of water, which was brought up to that point by Indian troops.
The Arabs were still hovering near, and they fired upon the two
battalions as they proceeded on their journey, but without inflicting
much loss. On their return, however, the fire became somewhat hotter,
and was delivered at closer ranges than before, so that Colonel Lambton
was obliged to halt several times to return it, and to allow the wounded
to be attended to. The square, crowded with carts and camels that would
not keep a straight course, offered an excellent mark to the
sharpshooters concealed in the bush; but we were able to check this
attack by small volleys fired by marksmen at the spots where we saw the
enemy’s puffs of smoke appear. This lasted for an hour or more, when at
last, to our great satisfaction, some of the most daring of the
dervishes made an attempt to charge. They came on in line, guided by
flags at each flank, in the most gallant manner, and directed their
attack mainly against the left face of the square. But, unable to stand
our fire, they were very soon defeated, and most of them were killed,
though one or two did actually succeed in getting as far as our bayonets
before they fell. After this event they left us alone, and we got back
to the zeriba without further trouble. The casualties of the day
amounted to 24, of which the Coldstream lost 2 men killed or died of
wounds, and 8 wounded; three Officers were wounded, two belonging to the
Royal Marines, and Captain Hon. N. Dalrymple, Brigade Major of the
Guards Brigade; in addition, 5 native camel-drivers were killed.[463]
Some of the camels lagged behind, their drivers having abandoned them
while the fight was going on; others were squeezed out of the square,
which was from the beginning too full to hold them, and thus more than a
hundred were cut off by the enemy.
-----
Footnote 463:
Captain Dalrymple was succeeded as Brigade-Major by Captain Stopford.
-----
Next day, another convoy was taken from Suakin to the zeriba in the same
manner, the escorts meeting each other halfway between the two places.
This time it was not molested, but the occasion deserves mention, since
a captive balloon was then first employed; the latter, attached by a
rope to a waggon that moved in the square, enabled a proper look-out to
be kept upon the enemy in the bush. On the 26th, however, there was
another skirmish, but it was easily repelled with very little loss; and
on this day, the Grenadier Guards relieved the Scots Guards at Tofrek,
while the Coldstream remained there till the 28th, when they also
returned to head-quarters. After the 26th no further difficulty was
experienced with the Arabs; they were apparently disheartened, and had
retreated from the neighbourhood. A move, therefore, was made to Tamai.
Early on the morning of April 2nd, a force of 8000 men marched through
Tofrek to Tesela Hill, near Tamai, where a halt was made for the
night.[464] Next day, the advance was continued, and Osman Digna’s
head-quarters were occupied after a very slight resistance. Tamai, like
other villages in the country, is a mere collection of straw huts, and
it was speedily fired and destroyed, while the enemy made off into the
hilly region that lies to the south, where it would have been difficult,
and indeed unnecessary, to pursue him. The column therefore returned to
Suakin, and the attention of the troops was now directed more
particularly to the protection of the railway, which meantime had been
progressing. The Battalion lost only two men wounded, on the 3rd of
April.
-----
Footnote 464:
The New South Wales Battalion formed part of this force, having
reached Suakin on March 29th.
-----
At this time, also, ponies having arrived, the Guards Mounted infantry
detachments were formed into two companies (April 5th): the Grenadier
and Scots Guards company, under Captain St. John Mildmay, Grenadier
Guards; and the Coldstream company, under Captain Ross-of-Bladensburg,
to which was attached a half-company, furnished by the Royal Engineers,
under Lieutenant Sandbach, R.E. Ten days later, a Camel corps was formed
under the command of Major James, Scots Greys, consisting of 400 British
and 100 native soldiers, divided into five companies, of which one was
composed of Guardsmen (31 men taken from each of the three Battalions),
under Lieutenants Neil Menzies, Scots Guards, and G. Wyndham, Coldstream
Guards.
The railway, leaving Suakin in a north-westerly direction as far as
Handub (11 miles distant), bore round towards the west at this point,
and, passing through Otao (20 miles from Suakin) and Tambuk (25 miles),
was to continue across the hilly country to Ariab; from thence it was to
run to Berber, over a stretch of 100 miles of desert country, which is
watered only by the wells of O-Bak, lying nearly halfway between these
two places. To cover the construction of the line, a zeriba was made
(April 6th) by the Coldstream, the New South Wales Battalion, artillery,
etc., between Suakin and Handub, called No. 1 Station. On the 8th,
Handub was occupied, the Scots Guards being at No. 1 Station. On the
16th, the latter pushed on to Otao without meeting with any resistance;
and when the Coldstream followed on the 18th, the Scots moved to Tambuk,
finding no enemy there. On the 24th, a reconnaissance by a portion of
the Camel corps was made towards Es-Sibil; and by the 30th the railway
was completed as far as Otao. During this time the men were constantly
employed in clearing broad roads through the bush; in digging
watering-places, which had to be deepened daily as the supply became
exhausted; and in protecting the scattered parties of navvies at work on
the line. There were not many Arabs about, though few nights passed
without some shots being fired into the camp.
About the same period, also, reconnaissances were pushed in various
directions to prevent any advance from Tamai, and to clear the
neighbouring valleys of the enemy. The most important was one undertaken
in the early morning of the 7th of May, against a chief who had
collected a force at a place called T'Hakul, lying nearly 20 miles west
of Suakin and 10 south of Otao. The Brigade took no part in this
operation; but the company belonging to the Camel corps and the two
companies of Guards Mounted infantry were present, and forming part of
the force at Suakin, they paraded there a little before midnight on the
6th. A small column co-operated from Otao, and in the morning both
appeared before the camp of the Arabs and surprised it; the enemy fled
at our approach, leaving behind 1100 sheep, goats, and some camels. The
columns then returned to Otao and Suakin respectively; the latter,
however, on their way home, met parties of the enemy occupying heights
within range of which they had to pass; after a few volleys he quickly
disappeared. One Officer (of the Camel corps) and two men were wounded,
of whom one (a sergeant) belonged to the Coldstream (Mounted infantry).
This was the last operation conducted by Sir G. Graham’s force in the
neighbourhood of Suakin. The district had just been pacified and
relieved of the presence of the enemy: at this very moment, orders came
to evacuate it, and to withdraw the troops therefrom, except a small
garrison, which was to be left behind to guard the town.[465] We must
briefly explain how this came about.
The British Government never had much sympathy with the policy of
opposing the Mahdi, whose usurpation of power, founded upon rapine,
massacre, and slavery, had been dignified into the movement of a people
struggling for freedom! This strange opinion upon the upheaval that
swamped every vestige of civilization in the Sudan, was doubtless one
reason, but perhaps not the only reason, for the vacillating proceedings
pursued there, and for the consequent inability to effect, even at great
expense, any useful object. Unwilling to face with a firm resolution the
questions that required solution in that region, and prevented by public
opinion from adopting a policy of non-intervention, the Government did
nothing till popular clamour forced them to some action, and then the
steps they took, costing many lives and much treasure, could produce no
beneficial results. Thus, as we have seen, was the brave intention of
taking Khartum, and of restoring order there, published in February; and
so also, as soon as possible and upon the very first pretext, was that
intention abandoned. An opportunity very soon arose to facilitate this
procedure.
-----
Footnote 465:
With the dispersal of the force collected at T'Hakul, the political
question of the Eastern Sudan may be said to have been solved for the
time being; large numbers of the natives placed themselves
unconditionally at the disposal of Sir G. Graham, and a decided
movement was set on foot against Osman Digna, even among those who
were considered to be his closest adherents. It may be remarked that,
though Osman Digna appears as our principal opponent, he was not a
military leader likely to give much trouble once his followers had
been defeated; the fact being, that he himself never appeared on or
near the scene of conflict, but was content to urge on his men from
some safe position or inaccessible fastness. (Colvile, Official
Account, part ii., pp. 217, 323.)
There was a dispute in Asia over the frontier between the Russians and
Afghans, and, on the 30th of March, news reached London that the former,
having agreed to make no forward movement until pending questions had
been discussed, advanced and took possession of Panjdeh by force of
arms—a place held to be a portion of the territories of the Amir of
Afghanistan. For reasons connected with the safety of India, we had
espoused the cause of that Prince, and were bound to see that his
legitimate claims received proper consideration. It is unnecessary to
describe either the Panjdeh incident, or those that led up to this act
of aggression. It is sufficient to say that they created much excitement
in England, and soon drew public attention from the Sudan. The crisis
did not last long, and the dispute was soon settled, but it enabled
Government to wash their hands of the whole of the troublesome business
connected with Khartum.
“The first step taken towards opening the country for the railway [in
the neighbourhood of Suakin], was an attempt to form an alliance with
the neutral tribes dwelling on or near the Berber road; but it was
soon discovered that any such alliance must be dependent on a fixed
policy on the part of Her Majesty’s Government. The tribes appeared to
be anxious to come in, and to be thoroughly tired of the terrorism
established by Osman Digna, but they one and all said they could not
join us unless they were assured of our future protection against
Osman Digna, and unless we undertook that we would not go away, as we
had done in the previous year. In a telegram to the Secretary of State
for War, dated April 12, 1885, Sir G. Graham asked whether he might
give this assurance. In reply, the following telegram was sent to Lord
Wolseley, on the 15th of April, by the Secretary of State for War:
'Construction of railway for any considerable distance to be suspended
pending further consideration. Suakin to be held for the present, and
any position in neighbourhood necessary for protection from constant
attack, as last year. You should report on point to which railway
should now proceed, and instruct Graham, with reference to his message
of the 12th, not to enter into engagements with tribes inconsistent
with this policy.'”[466]
-----
Footnote 466:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , part ii. p. 212.
-----
This was, therefore, the end of the expedition to the Eastern Sudan,
and, as a matter of fact, orders soon arrived to break up the forces
assembled there. The Guards Brigade and the New South Wales contingent
were the first troops to take their departure. The Coldstream, having
marched from the front on the 14th of May, embarked on the 16th in the
_Deccan_, and started next day for Alexandria, where they arrived on the
23rd. The Battalion remained in the harbour, on board ship, until the
9th of June, when they marched to Ramleh, and camped on the beach. They
stayed there until the 1st of July, and, together with the Grenadiers,
embarked on H.M.S. _Orontes_, and proceeded on the 2nd to Cyprus.
Landing at Limasol on the 5th, they marched to Mount Troödos, and
reached that place on the 9th; the Scots Guards followed a few days
later, and the whole Brigade remained at Troödos till after the middle
of August. Major-General Fremantle stayed behind in Egypt, and Colonel
Lambton, being the senior Officer, assumed the command of the Brigade,
while that of the Battalion devolved upon Colonel Sterling, until the
27th, when Colonel Clive, Grenadier Guards, arrived from England as
Brigadier-General.
We left the Nile force getting into summer quarters in the province of
Dongola, in the spring of the year, and confidently expecting to resume
the offensive against Khartum as soon as the great heat should pass
away. But on the 13th of April a telegram reached Lord Wolseley,
informing him that, in the then condition of Imperial affairs, it was
probable the forward movement might have to be abandoned. The
announcement that this decision had been taken was made known in England
on the 21st, though on the 11th of May the troops were ordered to retire
northwards, and to evacuate the Sudan.
“As it was certain that anarchy would immediately follow our
withdrawal, and probable that a retreat on our part would allow the
dormant hostility of the natives to find vent, it was necessary that
the retreat, especially of the advanced portion of the force, should
be conducted as rapidly and unexpectedly as possible. Jaudet Effendi
[the then Governor of Dongola], was at once informed of the intended
retreat. He begged for fifteen days' start, before our policy was made
generally known, in order that he might take what steps he could, to
mitigate the murder and rapine for which he believed our retirement
would be the signal. This was granted him, and he at once started up
the river, and the movement was arranged to commence on the 21st of
May.”[467]
-----
Footnote 467:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , ii. 167.
-----
Once begun, the evacuation did not take long to accomplish; the enemy
offered no opposition, nor did he try to press our retreat. He was wise
enough to follow at a respectful distance, occupying the country as we
abandoned it. Indeed, ever since the return of the Desert and River
columns we experienced no further trouble with the Mahdi, who, relieved
of the danger with which he was threatened by the British advance,
turned his attention to other matters. He sent a considerable force to
the south of Khartum, to put down a rising which began to imperil his
authority in Kordofan, and, as soon as he became aware that we were
definitely about to withdraw from the province of Dongola and from the
vicinity of Suakin, he despatched more of his men to hasten the
reduction of Sennar and Kassala, both of which were besieged at that
moment. These two places fell in the middle of August.
The operation of withdrawing from the Sudan was extremely distasteful to
British Officers. The inhabitants of Dongola had trusted us, and had
served us; we had necessarily interfered with their government,
disturbed the means at their disposal for taking care of themselves, and
prevented them from making terms with the enemy. They had been induced
by us to resist the Arabs, to incur their vengeance, and to rely for
protection upon the power of England,—a nation who never deserted a
friend or turned away from a foe. We were pledged to defend this
unfortunate people, or to make some reasonable provision for their
future safety, but, in the face of the peremptory orders received from
home, any such arrangement was entirely out of the question. Hence it
was more than distressing to be forced to abandon these natives to the
slavery that was in store for them; and we cannot be astonished that
they reproached us bitterly for deserting them in this helpless
condition, and for leaving them to the cruel tyranny of the Mahdi. Many
appeared anxious to fly from their homes, but they were restrained by
the knowledge that, in that case, they must forfeit the whole of their
property; while others were unable to procure sufficient transport for
their families and effects.[468]
-----
Footnote 468:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , ii. 169.
-----
Nearly 13,000 natives accompanied the retreat, and by the end of June
these refugees, the supplies, and most of the troops were north of
Dongola. At this moment the Government of Mr. Gladstone came to an end,
and Lord Wolseley, who had from the first protested against the
precipitate withdrawal of the expedition, was empowered by the new
Cabinet to arrest the movement temporarily, until the situation had been
considered. It is sad to relate, that the evacuation had been too well
executed, and that it was then too late to return or repair the evil
that had already been done. By the 21st of July, that portion of the
British army destined to remain as a frontier force, for the protection
of Egypt, had taken up a position some ninety miles south of Wady Halfa,
and there they covered the construction of the Sudan railway, which was
completed to Akasheh on the 7th of August. Meanwhile the dervishes did
not invade the northern part of Dongola at once, for the Mahdi fell a
victim to his own debauchery, and, dying on the 22nd of June, left
affairs in the Sudan in an unsettled state.[470] Until, therefore, his
successor, the Khalifa Abdulla, had consolidated his position, no
further conquests were possible, and the province was only seized by him
in the middle of August. After this, the enemy advanced northwards with
the intention of invading Egypt, and he even ventured to lay siege to a
British fort on the frontier, in the month of November. In December,
however, he was attacked, and forced to retire, by Lieut.-General Sir F.
Stephenson, who defeated him at Ginnis on the 30th.
-----
Footnote 470:
See Major Wingate, R.A., _Ten Years' Captivity in the Madhi’s Camp_,
1882-92, (from original manuscripts of Father J. Ohrwalder, late
Priest of the Austrian Mission at Delen, in Kordofan), p. 160.
(London, 1892.)
-----
This event ends the war in the Sudan. Long before it took place the
Guards Camel regiment had been sent home. Starting from Dongola, where
they remained for nearly three months, they marched thence on the 1st of
June, and, proceeding mostly by river, they reached Alexandria on the
1st of July, having halted for two hours at Cairo, where they were
received by Lord Wolseley and Sir F. Stephenson. At Alexandria, they had
the good fortune to meet the Guards Brigade, then on their way to
Cyprus. They left Egypt on the 4th, and arrived in London on the 15th.
After an inspection by H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, the various
detachments composing the Camel corps returned to their respective
Regiments. The following Brigade Order appeared in London on the 21st:—
“Lieut.-Colonel Hon. E. Boscawen, Coldstream Guards, recently in
command of the Guards Camel regiment in the Sudan, having addressed to
the Major-General Commanding the Brigade of Guards his complete
satisfaction with the conduct and soldierlike qualities displayed by
all ranks under his command in the late Nile expedition, the
Major-General wishes to place on record his great pleasure at
receiving such a report, and his high appreciation of the manner in
which the several detachments composing the Guards Camel regiment have
so completely maintained the reputation of the Brigade. This order to
be read at the head of each Battalion at the first full parade.”[469]
-----
Footnote 469:
Colonel Boscawen’s report to the Officers Commanding 1st and 2nd
Coldstream Guards, contained the following: “As the various
detachments forming the Guards Camel regiment are shortly to return to
their several Battalions, I have the honour to report on the general
conduct of the Non-commissioned officers and men of the 1st and 2nd
Battalions Coldstream Guards, during the period of service on the Nile
expedition. The peculiar work which all ranks have been called upon to
perform has been trying and arduous, and for the most part quite novel
to the men. Nevertheless, it gives me the greatest satisfaction to
testify to the cheerful and zealous manner with which these
exceptional duties have been throughout accomplished. The behaviour of
the men in the field needs no comment from me. The period of inaction,
subsequent to the campaign, has been perhaps not the least tedious to
soldiers, who lately had seen a good deal of hard work and excitement,
but their behaviour has been uniformly unexceptionable.”
-----
The casualties of the Coldstream inflicted by the enemy in the field
have already been noted in their proper place; but no mention has been
made of those who died of disease during the two expeditions. It appears
that sickness was less common in the interior than was the case among
the troops stationed on the coast of the Red Sea; and six men only of
the Coldstream died of illness during the many months they were employed
on the Nile. The Regiment, however, had to deplore the death of
Lieutenant G. Sutton and of 13 men of the 1st Battalion who succumbed to
the climate of Suakin; while several Officers and 110 men had to be sent
to England invalided. Lieutenant Sutton, a young Officer of great merit
and of much promise, fell ill a short time before the end of the
expedition, and was sent for a short cruise, in the hope that his health
might be thereby re-established. He returned, as he thought, better, and
resumed duty; but a very few days later he was again obliged to be
placed upon the sick-list, and, becoming rapidly worse, he died at sea,
May 18th, on his way home, before the steamer reached Suez, to the great
sorrow of his brother Officers.
The Guards camp at Mount Troödos was broken up, and the 1st Coldstream
marched from that place on the 24th of August, down to Limasol, where
they embarked on board the _Orontes_ (26th) in company with the
Grenadiers, the Scots Guards being on the _Poonah_. The Battalion
reached Spithead early on the 10th of September, and proceeded next day
to London, where they received a hearty welcome from their friends and
the public at large.
The following extract of a letter, written by Colonel Lambton soon after
his return from the Sudan, to the Officer Commanding the 2nd Battalion,
refers to the men belonging to the latter, and temporarily posted to the
service Battalion for duty during the war:—
Now that the men belonging to the 2nd Battalion have left us, I should
like to express to you how satisfied I have been with their conduct
during the late campaign. I am glad to see there has been no
distinction between the two Battalions; all have done their best to
keep up the credit and reputation of the Regiment.
Medals for the Sudan campaign were issued to Officers, Non-commissioned
officers, and men on the 7th of November; and by General Order, January
10, 1886, it was intimated that Her Majesty the Queen had been
graciously pleased to approve of the three Regiments of Foot Guards
being permitted to bear the words “Suakin, 1885” upon their Colours.
Early in 1883, the record of Marlborough’s battles, which had been
somewhat strangely passed over in the past, were also added to the
Colours, and the Coldstream then showed the following honourable
distinctions, viz. “The Sphinx, superscribed 'Egypt.' Oudenarde.
Malplaquet. Dettingen. Lincelles. Talavera. Barrosa. Peninsula.
Waterloo. Alma. Inkerman. Sevastopol. Egypt, 1882. Tel el-Kebir. Suakin,
1885.”
In December, 1885, the Regiment stood as follows:—
_Colonel._—General Right Hon. Sir Thomas Steele, K.C.B.
_Lieut.-Colonels._—Commanding Regiment.—Col. G. Wigram, C.B.
” Battalions.—Colonels A. Lambton, C.B.;
and J. B. Sterling.
_Majors—Mounted._—Lieut.-Colonels R. S. Hall; Hon. E. Acheson; Hon. E.
Digby; and Hon. H. Corry.
_Dismounted._—Lieut.-Colonels R. Follett; Hon. E. Boscawen, C.B.
(Regimental Adjutant); F. Graves-Sawle; A. Moreton; and R.
Pole-Carew (Military Secretary to the Commander-in-chief in
India).
_Captains._—Lieut.-Colonels J. G. Montgomery; F. Manley; and L. D.
MacKinnon; Captains H. Wetherall; V. Dawson; J. Ross-of-Bladensburg
(A.D.C. to Lord Lieutenant, Ireland); and A. Codrington (Adjutant);
Major Hon. H. Legge; Captains J. Gladstone; D. Dawson (A.D.C. to the
Commander of the Forces, Ireland, H.S.H. Prince Edward of
Saxe-Weimer); and H. Stopford (lately A.D.C. to the Commander of
Forces, Ireland, Sir T. Steele).
_Lieutenants._—Hon. A. Henniker-Major (Adjutant); G. V. Boyle; Hon. H.
Amherst; H. Surtees (employed with Egyptian Army); W. Corbet (A.D.C.
to Major-General Hon. R. Monck); G. P. Bouverie (lately returned
from Special Service in Bechuanaland, South Africa); Hon. A.
Fortescue (lately returned from Special Service in Bechuanaland,
South Africa); B. Gosselin-Lefebre; Hon. R. Winn; P. Lovell; Earl of
Wiltshire; Sir C. Miller, Bart.; C. Kindersley; D. Hamilton; Hon.
Alan Charteris; H. Shute; E. Wigram; Granville Smith; C. Frederick;
G. Wyndham; G. Milligan; C. Holland; Hon. W. Lambton; J.
Drummond-Hay; F. Maude; R. Grenfell; F. Ramsden; C. Monck; Hon. V.
Spencer; J. Hall; J. Sterling; H. Hawkes; Hon. E. Charteris; G.
Taylor; S. Earle; J. Wingfield; Hon. E. Pakenham; Hon. H.
Baillie-Hamilton; J. McNeile; R. Skeffington Smyth.
_Quartermasters._—W. Webster; and H. Folson.
_Medical Officers._—Surgeons-Major C. Read; G. Perry; and J. Magill,
M.D.
” Surgeons A. Alexander; and W. Carte, M.B.
_Solicitor._—R. Broughton, Esq.
The 1st Battalion were on this date quartered at Chelsea barracks
(head-quarters and 5 companies), and at St. George’s (3 companies); the
2nd Battalion at the Tower. The writer of this portion of the History of
the Coldstream Guards here takes leave of them, and wishing them many a
glorious addition to their illustrious records, now bids them, with much
regret, farewell.
APPENDIX I.
1.
_Major-General Sir John Byng to the Duke of York._
“Nivelles, June 19, 1815.
”SIR,
“Your Royal Highness, I am sure, will wish to be informed of the
Conduct of the Brigade of Guards, and, unfortunately, that duty has
devolved upon me from my respected friend, General Cooke, being severely
wounded, having lost His Left Arm. In the brilliant affair of yesterday,
both Brigades have suffered severely, but I have the Authority of the
Duke of Wellington to say, they highly distinguished themselves, that
from the commencement to the end of the Action their conduct was most
excellent. It happened that Both had important duties to perform, which
they gallantly executed. At the commencement of the Action my Brigade,
which was on the extreme Right, had to occupy a House and Wood which it
was of the utmost consequence we should keep. Lieut.-Colonel Macdonell,
of the Coldstream, with two Light Companies, occupied the House, and the
Wood by the Light Companies of the 1st Brigade and some Battalion
Companies of the Battalion of the Coldstream, the whole under
Lieut.-Colonel Lord Saltoun’s Command. Against this post the first
Attack of the Enemy was made, and was successfully resisted, as were the
numerous efforts made to the close of the Day by the Enemy to get
possession. The Duke of Wellington Himself in the early part of the day
gave his particular attention to that point, and, when called to the
Left by a serious Attack on that point, He confided it to my care, with
directions to keep the House to the last moment, relieving the Troops as
they required it,—and the whole of the Brigade, except two Companies,
were required before the Action ceased; Colonels Hepburn and Woodford,
affording me every assistance, and giving a fine example to their
Battalions.
“The conduct of Lieut.-Colonel Macdonell in defending the House, even
when it was on fire, and maintaining it, as ordered, has, I have no
doubt, been particularly noticed to you by The Commander of the Forces.
It was admirable, as was that of Lieut.-Colonel Lord Saltoun. About four
o’clock, the command of the Division devolved upon me, and, having rode
over to see the 1st Brigade just at the time the attack was made by the
Enemy’s Cavalry, I had an opportunity of witnessing the steady manner in
which they received the several charges made to their front. I had also
to witness the gallantry with which they met the last Attack made by the
Grenadiers of the Imperial Guard ordered on by Bonaparte himself, the
destructive fire they poured in, and the subsequent Charge which
together completely routed the Enemy; a second attempt met with a
similar reception, and the loss they caused to the French, of the finest
Troops I ever saw, was immense. I beg you, Sir, to understand that my
presence or advice to General Maitland never was required, I merely
staid with Him as an humble Individual, when the assistance of every one
was required. His own judgment and gallantry directed everything that
was necessary. I cannot say too much in His praise, or in that of the
several Commanders his Battalions had. The conduct, Sir, of every
Officer and Man of both Brigades was everything I could wish; the
Officers on every occasion being conspicuous for their Gallantry.
Sincerely do I regret the loss of so many valuable Officers, such
excellent Men. I hope I have not trespassed too far on Your Royal
Highness in my wish to do justice to my gallant Friends and Soldiers. I
believe every one who witnessed their Conduct will confirm my statement.
The Staff of the Division afforded me every assistance; Lieut.-Colonel
Sir Henry Bradford, Assistant Quartermaster-General, was wounded. My
Brigade Major, Captain Stothert, has lost an Arm, and my Aide-de-camp,
Captain Dumaresq, was shot through the Body.
“I propose recommending to the Duke of Wellington, Lieut.-Colonel
Stanhope, of the First Guards, to do duty for Sir H. Bradford, and
Captain Walton, Adjutant of the Coldstream, to succeed Captain Stothert
as Brigade Major. Should I obtain His Grace’s assent, I hope the
Appointments will meet with your approval.
“I have, etc.
“(Signed) JOHN BYNG,
“Major-General.”
2.
GENERAL ORDERS, NIVELLES, JUNE 20, 1815.
“The Field Marshal takes this opportunity of returning to the army his
thanks for their conduct in the glorious action fought on the 18th
inst., and he will not fail to report his sense of their conduct in the
terms which it deserves to their several Sovereigns....
“As the army is about to enter the French territory, the Field Marshal
desires it may be understood by the troops of the several nations
composing the army which he has the honor to command, that their
Sovereigns are in alliance with the King of France, and that France
therefore must be considered as a friendly country. No article is to be
taken from any individual by any officer or soldier, without payment for
the same. The Commissaries of the army will supply the troops with all
that they require in the usual manner, and no requisition is to be made
direct on the country or its magistrates, by any officer or soldier. The
Commissaries will receive directions, either from the Field Marshal or
from the Generals commanding the troops of the several nations (if these
troops should not be supplied with provisions by the British
Commissariat) to make requisitions as may be necessary for the supply of
the troops, for which they will give the usual voucher and receipt; and
they will understand that they will be responsible to issue and account
for what they will thus receive from the country in France, in the same
manner as they would if they purchased supplies for the troops in their
own country respectively....”[471]
-----
Footnote 471:
_The Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, during his
Various Campaigns, etc._ , (compiled by Colonel Garwood), viii. 156.
(London, 1847.)
-----
3.
PROCLAMATION OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE, JUNE 22,
1815.
“Je fais savoir aux Français que j’entre dans leur pays à la tête d’une
armée déjà victorieuse, non en ennemi (excepté de l’usurpateur, prononcé
l’ennemi du genre humain, avec lequel on ne peut avoir ni paix ni
trève), mais pour les aider à secouer le joug de fer sous lequel ils
sont opprimés. En conséquence, j’ai donné les ordres ci-joints à mon
armée, et je demande qu’on me fasse connaître tout infracteur. Les
Français savent cependant que j’ai le droit d’exiger qu’ils se
conduisent de manière que je puisse les protéger contre ceux qui
voudraient leur faire du mal. Il faut donc qu’ils fournissent aux
réquisitions qui leur seront faites de la part des personnes autorisées
à les faire, en échange des reçus en forme et ordre; et qu’ils se
tiennent chez eux paisiblement, et qu’ils n’aient aucune correspondance
ou communication avec l’usurpateur ennemi, ni avec ses adhérents. Tous
ceux qui s’absenteront de leur domicile après l’entrée en France, et
tous ceux qui se trouveront absens au service de l’usurpateur, seront
considérés comme ses adhérents et comme ennemis; et leurs propriétés
seront affectées à la subsistance de l’armée.
“Donné au Quartier-Général, à Malplaquet, ce 22 Juin, 1815.”[472]
-----
Footnote 472:
_Ibid._ , viii.
-----
APPENDIX II.
1.
GENERAL ORDER, PARIS, OCTOBER 28, 1815.
“Before the troops go into barracks or cantonments, an officer of each
troop or company is to visit the barracks or cantonments which the
soldiers are to occupy, and to ascertain the state in which they are.
The name of the owner of the house in which the troops will be cantoned,
and the names of the soldiers cantoned in the house, must be kept. On
marching days, the barracks and cantonments of each company are to be
visited by an officer, once if possible after the troops will have
arrived, and once before they will march; and upon halting days the
barracks and cantonments of the soldiers must be visited twice every day
by the officer of the company or troop to which they belong; these
visiting officers will observe whether any article has been taken away,
if the troops are in cantonments, and will inquire whether the owner of
the house has any complaint to make of the men. Non-commissioned
officers must be cantoned with the squads to which they belong, and the
officers as near as possible to their companies; the Field-officers with
their regiments; the Generals and Staff as near as possible to their
brigades and divisions.
”WELLINGTON.”[473]
-----
Footnote 473:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 215.
-----
2.
_Lieut.-Colonel Sir C. Broke to Lieut.-General Lord Hill._
“Paris, October 29, 1815.
““MY LORD,
“I am desired by His Grace the Duke of Wellington to inform you
that the circumstances attending the present situation of the army
render it expedient that His Grace should request you will call the
attention of the officers under your command to the necessity of the
strictest discipline and most exact regularity of the troops in the
cantonments which they are about to occupy; and in order to ensure the
uniform conduct of the service, His Grace desires that the following
points may be attended to:—
“Billets are to be made by the mayors, or persons acting for them. They
are to be applied for by officers of the Quartermaster-General’s
Department of Divisions; or if there are no officers of the
Quartermaster-General’s Department, by Staff officers of divisions or
brigades; or if there are no Staff officers, by Quartermasters. Where
there are no mayors or persons having authority to issue billets, the
billets are to be arranged and portioned by the officers of the
Quartermaster-General’s Department of the Divisions; or if there are no
officers of the Quartermaster General’s Department, by Staff officers of
divisions or brigades; or if there are no Staff officers, by
Quartermasters. All billets when granted are to be made use of. If the
owner of a house refuse a billet, it is to be made good, if necessary by
force; but this measure must be sanctioned by the officers of the
Quartermaster-General’s Department’s of Division; or if there are no
officers of the Quartermaster-General’s Department, by the Staff
officers of divisions or brigades; or if there is no Staff officer, by
the Quartermaster authorised to arrange the billets. If the owner of a
house takes away his furniture, or by other means endeavours to deter
officers from entering the billet, the Commanding officer is to place
soldiers in the house. No inhabitant is to be required to accommodate
persons that are not entitled to billets; and it is particularly desired
that officers will not give grounds for complaint by taking their wives
or families into billets without having the consent of the owner of the
house to do so.
“Officers are to be warned against shooting over the country without
having permission of the proprietors. The General Orders of the army
have already given sufficient caution upon this subject.
“The situation of the troops will require that military precautions
should be attended to. Alarm posts are to be established, guards and
pickets are to be posted, and sufficient measures taken for the security
of the communications and for the safety and tranquillity of the
cantonments. The most efficient steps are to be taken for the prompt and
certain circulation of orders, so that the whole or any part of the
troops may be collected at the shortest notice.
“Attention must be paid in the billets of soldiers to the ammunition,
and to its security against accident or robbery; for this the frequent
company inspection will be a precaution.
“The parks of artillery are to be formed where they can be protected;
they are never to be without guards, and troops should be sufficiently
near to afford them support.
“If an attroupement or riotous assembly of the inhabitants against the
military takes place, the troops are to be under arms, and the
attroupement is to be fired upon. Any act of violence against the
soldiery is to be immediately noticed, and the offenders are to be
secured. The service must be respected. The General Officers are to take
care that the discipline and good conduct of the troops merit the
respect demanded. The mayors are to be informed of the measures that
will be taken, and are to be desired to warn the inhabitants against
taking part in the disturbances that may subject them to military
punishment.”
3.
_The Same to the Same._
“Paris, October 30, 1815.
“MY LORD,
“It is the Duke of Wellington’s desire that a place of rendezvous
should be fixed upon for each division of the army. The routes by which
the troops may best move to the place of rendezvous should be
reconnoitred, and such instructions given as may render the assembly
easy and expeditious. The places of rendezvous or general alarm posts of
the troops under your Lordship’s command should be:—
“For the 2nd Division—Versailles, or about the cantonments of the
division that are nearest to Paris.
“For the 4th Division—Longjumeau, or about the cantonments of the
division that are nearest to Paris.
“Baron Estorff’s Cavalry—Bièsvres, or about the cantonments of the
brigade nearest to Paris.
“The Nassau troops—Ecouen or Pierrefitte, or about the cantonments of
the troops nearest to Paris.
“The ground fixed upon should be clear of the towns or villages, and
towards Paris. The troops when assembled are to be in marching order,
with their baggage. If any other point of assembly is desired, the
instructions that may be given will express it. The brigades and
battalions of the divisions are, however, at the same time, to have
their alarm posts.”[474]
-----
Footnote 474:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 218, 219.
-----
APPENDIX III.
_From the Duke of York to the Duke of Wellington._
“Horse Guards, November 9, 1815.
“MY LORD DUKE,
“Having received an intimation from His Majesty’s Government
that a contingent British force, consisting of 30,000 troops, shall be
maintained in France for a certain period after the definitive treaty
of peace, and the period having now arrived for carrying into effect
the organization of this force, and for removing the remainder of the
British army to this country, I have the Prince Regent’s commands to
acquaint your Grace that the following are the corps selected to
remain in France, according to this arrangement, under the command of
your Grace, viz.:—
CAVALRY.
Present Recruits Total.
strength. from
England.
1st Dragoon Guards 392 58 450
2nd ” ” 418 32 450
3rd Dragoons 365 40 405
7th Hussars 357 93 450
11th Light Dragoons 387 63 450
12th ” ” 341 109 450
13th ” ” 343 70 413
15th Hussars 347 103 450
18th ” 386 64 450
Waggon Train Troops 600 .. 600
INFANTRY.
First Foot Guards, 3rd Battalion .. .. 1200
Coldstream Guards, 2nd Battalion 996 204 1200
1st Foot, 3rd Battalion .. .. 1000
3rd Foot, 1st ” 827 173 1000
4th ” ” ” 662 150 712
5th ” ” ” 1116 .. 1000
6th ” ” ” 781 69 850
7th ” ” ” 868 132 1000
9th ” ” ” 1051 .. 1000
21st ” ” ” 804 196 1000
23rd ” 671 29 700
27th ” ” ” .. .. 1000
29th ” 808 22 830
39th ” ” ” 842 108 950
40th ” ” ” 694 106 800
43rd ” ” ” 1044 .. 1000
52nd ” ” ” 987 13 1000
57th ” ” ” 601 149 750
71st ” ” ” 803 130 933
79th ” ” ” 692 80 772
81st ” ” ” .. .. 1000
88th ” ” ” 1130 .. 1000
91st ” ” ” 848 100 948
95th ” 1st ” (six companies) 577 .. 600
” ” 2nd ” ” ” 534 .. 600
Staff Corps 302 .. 200
———
Cavalry and Infantry .. .. 27,613
Artillery .. .. 2000
Officers and Non-commissioned officers .. .. 3300
———
Total 32,913
———
“With regard to the cavalry, the detachments of men from the depôts in
this country will be forwarded without delay; and your Grace will be
pleased to order a transfer of horses from the corps that are to
return to England to complete the regiments remaining in France to 420
horses each, leaving five dismounted men in each troop.
“Your Grace will order the 3rd Battalion of the First Guards to be
completed to 1,200 from the 2nd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion of the
Coldstream will be completed from the 1st Battalion in this country to
the same number.
“Your Grace will also be pleased to order the transfer of such
effectives as may be required from the 4th Battalion of the Royals,
3rd Battalion of the 27th, and 2nd Battalion of the 81st, to complete
the 3rd Battalion of the former and the 1st Battalions of the two
latter corps to 1,000 rank and file. The remaining transfers from the
2nd Battalions and depôts necessary to complete the corps in the
manner specified in the foregoing list will be forwarded from this
country without delay, and will probably reach their destination
before the final departure of the troops returning home; but until
their arrival, your Grace will keep such corps from among those
destined for England as may be necessary to keep the contingent
complete in the first instance.
“Having made this selection of the corps to remain in France as the
British contingent under your command, it remains for me to convey to
your Grace, the Prince Regent’s command that the following corps shall
be marched for embarkation to ,[475] under the charge of the Staff
that is not destined to remain in France, as soon as your Grace shall
have completed your arrangements.
-----
Footnote 475:
Blank in manuscript.
-----
R. and F.
1st Life Guards 233
2nd ” ” 191
Royal Horse Guards 302
3rd Dragoon Guards 310
1st Dragoons 293
2nd ” 298
6th ” 309
10th Hussars 448
16th Light Dragoons 390
23rd ” ” 384
Waggon Train 800
First Foot Guards, 2nd Battalion 720
Third ” ” ” ” 1139
1st Foot, 4th Battalion 500
12th ” 2nd ” 610
14th ” 3rd ” 593
16th ” 617
25th ” 2nd Battalion 426
27th ” 3rd ” 585
28th ” 497
30th ” 2nd Battalion 575
32nd ” 555
33rd ” 470
35th ” 2nd Battalion 575
36th Foot 416
37th ” 2nd Battalion 542
38th ” 654
41st ” 860
42nd ” 472
44th ” 2nd Battalion 737
51st ” 558
54th ” 547
58th ” 1st Battalion 630
59th ” 2nd ” 458
62nd ” ” ” 538
64th ” 508
69th ” 2nd Battalion 454
73rd ” ” ” 490
78th ” ” ” 327
81st ” ” ” 390
82nd ” 1st ” 825
90th ” 1st ” 820
92nd ” 526
95th ” 3rd Battalion 480
2nd Garrison Battalion 992
7th Veteran ” 670
———
Total 24,714
———
“I am further to acquaint your Grace that the Prince Regent has been
pleased to approve of Lieut.-General Lord Combermere to command the
cavalry and Lieut.-General Lord Hill the corps of infantry, under your
command; and upon the calculation that the corps of cavalry will
consist of three brigades, and that your Grace will find it expedient
to form the infantry, exclusive of the Guards, into three divisions
and eight brigades, the following are the Officers who it is proposed
to attach to these respective corps:—
Lieut.-General Sir Lowry Cole, G.C.B.
” ” Sir Henry Clinton, G.C.B.
” ” Sir Charles Colville, G.C.B.
Major-General Sir James Kempt, G.C.B.
” ” Sir Thomas Brisbane, K.C.B.
” ” Lord Edward Somerset, K.C.B.
(Cavalry).
” ” Sir Thomas Bradford, K.C.B.
” ” Sir John Lambert, K.C.B.
” ” Sir Manley Power, K.C.B.
” ” Sir C. Grant, K.C.B. (Cavalry).
” ” Sir P. Maitland (Guards).
” ” Sir John Keane, K.C.B.
” ” Sir Frederick Adam, K.C.B.
” ” Sir H. Vivian, K.C.B. (Cavalry).
Adjutant-General, Major-General Sir E. Barnes, K.C.B.
Quartermaster-General, Lieut.-General Sir George Murray, G.C.B.
“Your Grace will be pleased to make a selection of the Staff for the
Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General’s Departments, as well as
the Medical, Commissariat, and Pay Departments, which you think
adequate to the service; and when your Grace shall have made your
selection of the members and the individuals, I request you will send
a list for the Prince Regent’s final approval.
“I am, my Lord Duke,
“Yours sincerely,
“FREDERICK.”[476]
-----
Footnote 476:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc., of the Duke of Wellington_ , xi. 228.
-----
APPENDIX IV.
DISTRIBUTION OF THE BRITISH CONTINGENT IN
FRANCE, APRIL 10, 1816.
CAVALRY.
Head-quarters. Stations. No. of No. of No. of
Officers. Men. Horses.
1st Brigade Cassel 1st Dragoon Frevent and
Gds. adjacents 30 458 438
2nd ” ” Avesnes and
adjacents 22 437 420
2nd Dragoons Bailleul 26 431 579
2nd Brigade Samer 7th Hussars Etaples and 14
detachments 25 459 430
12th Lt. Fruges and 9
Dragoons detachments 30 499 433
18th Hussars Deserves and 9
detachments 24 468 426
R. H. Samer and 4
Artillery detachments 4 170 189
3rd ” Cassel 11th Lt. Wormhout and 4
Dragoons detachments 28 462 405
15th Hussars Bourbourg and
vicinity 24 496 437
13th Lt. Hazebrouck and
Dragoons 7
detachments 27 394 398
R. H. Samer
Artillery 4 164 171
INFANTRY.
FIRST DIVISION (Head-quarters, Cambrai):—
1st Brigade Cambrai Grenadier Gds. Cambrai 27 1259 75
Coldstream Gds. Cambrai 11 257 29
Marcoing 5 231 9
Gouzeacourt 4 226 9
Gonnelieu 1 3 3
Villers Glishain 3 116 5
Honnecourt 2 117 5
Villers Ploich and Beaugaart 3 116 10
Banteau and Bantouzelle 2 113 3
— —— —
Total Coldstream Guards 31 1179 73
7th ” St. Leger 43rd Regiment Bapaume and 10
detachments 43 1079 69
7th ” Amblainsville
and 13
detachments 37 933 54
23rd ” Hamelincourt
and 13
detachments 39 722 52
Commissariat Sapignies,
Farreuil,
Bapaume 3 90 126
8th ” Beaumez 27th Regiment Bugny and 14
detachments 44 988 67
40th ” Havincourt and
8
detachments 26 653 48
1st Battalion Bourlon and 5
Rifle Brigade detachments 30 503 57
Commissariat Bugny 1 30 46
Divisional R. Artillery Bapaume 8 216 90
” Commissariat ” 1 10 17
SECOND DIVISION (Head-quarters, St. Pol):—
3rd Brigade St. Pol 3rd Regiment Croix and 15
detachments 35 1013 50
39th ” Bethincourt
and 18
detachments 43 968 62
91st ” St. Pol and 18
detachments 43 992 61
Commissariat Vallum,
Bailleul,
Maisnil 2 90 140
4th ” ” 4th Regiment Fauquembourg
and 15
detachments 29 814 52
52nd ” Upen de Aval
and 24
detachments 39 1003 70
79th ” Wizernes and
16
detachments 37 671 42
Commissariat Clety, Dohen 2 52 80
6th ” Lillers 6th Regiment Lillers and 6
detachments 35 843 38
29th ” Chocques and 5
detachments 31 861 59
71st ” Norrein Fonte
and 18
detachments 35 864 62
Commissariat Bourcq, St.
Hilaire 1 40 74
Royal Sappers Well, Pernes,
and Miners Floringham 8 101 63
Divisional R. Artillery Lillers, St.
Pol, Lillers
Barbent 15 258 285
” Commissariat Le Parcq 2 34 49
” R. Waggon Train Aubigny and 1
detachment 4 76 104
THIRD DIVISION (Head-quarters, Valenciennes):—
2nd Brigade Valenciennes 3rd Battn. Valenciennes
Royals 36 1132 49
57th Regiment ” 43 705 30
2nd Battalion Les Celles and
Rifle Brigade 2
detachments 29 553 40
5th ” ” 5th Regiment Valenciennes 37 1152 49
9th ” St. Amand 40 1032 36
21st ” Valenciennes 42 1004 43
9th ” ” 81st ” ” 37 1076 40
88th ” ” 34 1113 56
Royal Artillery ” and St. Amand 13 376 304
” Waggon Train Raillencourt and 3
detachments 15 166 255
” Staff Corps Proville and 1 detachment 11 168 ..
Commissariat Waggon St. Pol, Valenciennes,
Train Sancourt, Oissy, and 10
detachments 48 1343 1810
_Note._—Several of the detachments were commanded by Non-commissioned
officers only.[477]
-----
Footnote 477:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xi. 355.
-----
APPENDIX V.
SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE BAND OF THE COLDSTREAM
GUARDS.
The Band of the Coldstream Guards dates from the 16th of May, 1785, when
twelve German musicians were enlisted by the Duke of York, Colonel of
the Regiment, and were sent to England to replace the eight civilian
performers who were hired by the month, for the purpose only of playing
the King’s Guard to the Palace and back. They were brought over by Mr.
Eley, who was appointed “Music Major.” Mr. Eley was succeeded by Messrs.
Weyrauch, Denman, and Willman. In 1825, Mr. Charles Godfrey—who, having
joined the 1st Royal Surrey Militia as drummer at an early age, entered
the Coldstream in 1813—was appointed Bandmaster in 1825, by the Colonel,
the Duke of Cambridge; and he remained in that position until his death
in 1863, though his military service ended in 1834. The following
Regimental Order was issued on the 18th of December, 1863:—“The
Commanding Officer is desired by General Sir William Gomm to express his
sense of the loss the Regiment has experienced in the decease of Mr.
Godfrey; the acknowledged efficiency of the band is in itself a proof of
his talents as bandmaster, whilst the esteem and respect which he has
earned from all ranks, during a period of upwards of fifty years’
service, sufficiently attest his worth as a man and a soldier.” He was
succeeded by his son, Mr. F. Godfrey, who retained the bandmastership
until 1880, when Mr. Thomas was appointed; the latter was replaced by
Mr. Rogan in 1896. The band consisted, in 1888, of a Bandmaster, two
Sergeants, two Corporals, and forty Musicians.
Three negroes were added; they carried two tambourines and a set of
Turkish bells, and they continued part of the band until 1837, when they
were abolished.[478]
-----
Footnote 478:
Taken from _Music for the People_ , by Robert A. Marr.
-----
The Drums date from 1650, when the Regiment contained one Drum-Major and
twenty Drummers; the former was reduced in 1657, and replaced in 1670,
and a second Drum-Major was appointed in 1810. In 1758, four fifers were
added to the two Grenadier Companies, two to each. On the 6th of
November, 1815, “it being desirable that the several duties of the drum
and fife should be performed in the same manner throughout the service,
and it being essential that one general principle or system of
instruction should be laid down for the guidance of Regiments,” three
books, viz. _A Treatise on Music for the Study of Boys in Her Majesty’s
Service; Instructions for the Fife_; and _Instructions for Beating the
Drum by Note_ , which had been prepared by Drum-Major Potter of the
Coldstream Guards, were sent by the Adjutant-General to the Officer
Commanding the Regiment, for the use of the Coldstream. “It is His Royal
Highness’s command that, after a reasonable period, you will be pleased
to forward a report of the progress of the drummers and fifers, of a
nature calculated to enable the Commander-in-Chief to determine as to
the expediency of the mode of instruction, therein prescribed, being
generally adopted in the service. The treatise which has been prepared
for boys intended to be trained as drummers and fifers, it is
recommended to use in the Regimental School, in order that as soon as
the boys are able to read and write they may be required to copy parts
thereof on their slates, and which may also from time to time be
explained to them by the Drum and Fife-Majors.”
In reply, the Commanding Officer stated, on the 6th of January, 1816,
that, having inspected the boys, they appeared completely acquainted
with the duties of the drum and fife, in the course of one month’s
teaching according to the system proposed in the books above-mentioned;
also that the boys belonging to the Regimental school of the Regiment,
were prepared, without difficulty, in the mode proposed for the further
instruction from “the Drum and Fife-Majors.”
Subsequently, the following General Order was issued by H.R.H. the
Commander-in-Chief, dated December 28, 1816: “The mode of instruction
for drum and fife, practised in the Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards,
having been referred to several Regiments in order to ascertain whether
its adoption would be attended with advantage, and the reports which
have been received appearing satisfactory, the Commander-in-Chief, with
a view of assimilating the respective ‘Calls and Beats‘ throughout the
several Regiments of Infantry, is pleased to command that the system of
instruction for the drum and fife, introduced by Drum-Major Potter, of
the Coldstream Guards, shall be considered as the established system,
and be adopted accordingly.”
APPENDIX VI.
1.
GENERAL ORDER TO THE ALLIED ARMY OF OCCUPATION,
NOVEMBER 10, 1818.
“ORDRE DU JOUR.
“Il est impossible au Feld Maréchal Duc de Wellington de prendre congé
des troupes qu’il a eu l’honneur d’avoir sous ses ordres, sans leur
offrir ses remercîmens pour la bonne conduite, par laquelle elles se
sont distinguées pendant tout le temps de son Commandement. Trois ans se
sont presque écoulés depuis que les Souverains Alliés ont bien voulu
confier au Feld Maréchal le Commandement de cette partie de leurs forces
militaires que les circonstances du moment leur avaient rendu nécessaire
de continuer en France. Si cette mesure adoptée par Leurs Majestés s’est
effectuée d’une manière qui leur a paru satisfaisante, ce succès ne doit
être attribué qu‘à la conduite conciliante observée en toute occasion
par leurs Excellences les Généraux Commandans en Chef; au bon exemple
qui a été donné par elles à leur subordonnés, les Généraux et autres
Officiers de l‘Armée, et à l’assistance que ceux-ci leur ont rendue;
comme aussi à l’exacte discipline qui a toujours regnée dans tous les
Contingents. Ce ne peut être qu’avec des sentimens de regret que le Feld
Maréchal voit le moment arrivé où la séparation de l‘Armée doit terminer
les relations de service, et les liaisons, qu’il a eues avec Leurs
Excellences les Généraux Commandans, et avec les autres Officiers de
leurs Corps. Le Feld Maréchal ne peut se dissimuler combien ces
relations ont été avantageuses pour lui; et il prie les Généraux
Commandans en Chef des différens Contingents, de vouloir bien agréer
eux-mêmes, et communiquer aussi à ceux qui sont sous leurs ordres, les
assurances du vif intérêt qu’il ne cessera de prendre à tout ce qui les
regarde, et combien lui seront chers les souvenirs des trois années
pendant lesquelles il a eu l’honneur d‘être placé à leur tête.
“LE LIEUTENANT-GÉNÉRAL,
“Chef de l‘Etat Major Général de l‘Armée Alliée.”[479]
-----
Footnote 479:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xii. 795.
-----
2.
GENERAL ORDER, CAMBRAI, NOVEMBER 10, 1818.
“Upon the return to England of the troops which have so long served
under the command of the Field Marshal, he again returns them his thanks
for their uniform good conduct during the period in which they have
formed part of the Army of Occupation. The Field Marshal has, in another
Order, addressed to the Army of Occupation at large, expressed his
sentiments regarding the conduct of, and his obligations to, the General
Officers and Officers of the Army. These are especially due to the
General Officers and Officers of the British Contingent; and he begs
them to accept his best acknowledgments for the example they have given
to others by their own good conduct, and for the support and assistance
they have invariably afforded him to maintain the discipline of the
Army. After a service of ten years‘ duration, almost without
interruption, with the same Officers and troops, the Field Marshal
separates from them with regret; but he trusts that they will believe
that he will never cease to feel a concern for their honour and
interest.
“WELLINGTON.”[480]
-----
Footnote 480:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xii. 826.
-----
3.
GENERAL ORDER, PARIS, DECEMBER 1, 1818.
“The Field Marshal has great satisfaction in publishing to the troops
which have lately served under his command the following letter from
H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief, conveying the Prince Regent’s gracious
approbation of their conduct while serving in France.
“‘Horse Guards, November 27, 1818.
“‘MY LORD DUKE,
“‘The Army of Occupation having now finally returned from
France, I have the Prince Regent’s commands to convey to your Grace
the thanks of His Royal Highness for the discipline and good order
which has been so successfully maintained, to the honour of the
British arms, during the period it has been stationed in that
country. I have frequently had occasion to address your Grace, by
command of the Sovereign, in the language of just commendation of
the brilliant victories achieved under the guidance of your genius;
but although the events of peace do not furnish the grounds for
conveying the warmth of expression which a sense of the
distinguished actions of warfare so strongly called forth, yet the
conduct of the army, while stationed in the country of their former
enemy, where the discipline and good order established by your Grace
were calculated to conciliate the inhabitants, and to uphold the
character of the British arms in the view of surrounding nations,
cannot fail to draw forth the Prince Regent’s cordial approbation
and thanks, as well as the gratitude of the country to your Grace
and to them. I am commanded to request that your Grace will be
pleased to make these sentiments known to the General and other
Officers who have been under your command, in any manner you may
think proper.
“‘FREDERICK,
“‘Commander-in-Chief.’”[481]
-----
Footnote 481:
_Supplementary Despatches, etc._ , xii. 856.
-----
APPENDIX VII.
COLDSTREAM GUARDS HOSPITAL.
A Hospital for the Regiment was first established in 1814, previous
to which date the sick were attended in their own quarters. Premises
were secured in Rochester Row, and a lease of seven years obtained,
Dec. 25, 1814, at a rental of £90 per annum, by Colonel Hon. Henry
Brand, at that time the Lieut.-Colonel of the Regiment. In June,
1823, the lease was renewed for twenty-one years, at £145 a year, to
Colonels Woodford, Sir Henry Bouverie, and Macdonell. The lease was
then again renewed, June, 1844, for fourteen years, at the same
rent, and on payment of a fine of £200. In 1855 an addition was made
to the premises on the south side, and a lease for this addition was
granted to Colonels Hon. G. Upton and Lord Frederick Paulet, for
3-1/4 years, at a yearly rent of £113 10_s_. The lease of the whole
premises was further renewed in 1858, for a term of forty years, to
Colonels Hon. George Upton, Lord Frederick Paulet, and W. Newton, on
payment of a fine of £315, and at a yearly rent of £185. The sum of
£3850 was then spent on rebuilding the greater part of the Hospital.
Before this lease expired, Government took over the Hospital, and
this transaction, begun in 1881, was finally completed in 1889.
APPENDIX VIII.
THE NULLI SECUNDUS CLUB.
Appendix No. 256 of Colonel MacKinnon’s _Origin and Services of the
Coldstream Guards_ (ii. 373) contains an account of the formation
and history of the Nulli Secundus Club up to the year 1832. Since
then, the rules were altered (1869) so as to render Officers
eligible for ballot who leave the Regiment after having served
therein for three years, (reduced to two years in 1896). On account
of the new arrangements introduced into the Medical Service of the
Brigade (see _ante_, p. 340), Medical Officers transferred to the
Coldstream from another regiment of the Brigade, are eligible for
election, provided they are members of the First or Third Guards
Clubs. And lastly, the service of Medical Officers when attached to
the Regiment, counts towards election to the Nulli Secundus Club;
but they are not eligible for election until permanently appointed
to the Regiment.
The signal honour graciously conferred upon the members of the Nulli
Secundus Club by His Majesty William IV., of receiving them annually
at dinner, has already been adverted to in the text (see _ante_, p.
92).
In the year 1883, the club held its centenary celebration, when all
Officers belonging to the Coldstream, who were not members at the
time, were invited to dinner. Colonel G. R. FitzRoy, Lieut.-Colonel
of the Regiment, presided. The meeting took place at the Albion
Tavern, Aldersgate Street, on May the 30th.
The following is the roll of members of the Nulli Secundus Club.
ORIGINAL MEMBERS.
Fremantle, J. E.
Bosville, Thomas B.
Webb, Nathaniel.
Knight, Francis.
Calvert, George.
Gascoyne, Isaac.
1783.
Gould, Charles.
Vachell, Richard.
Bridgeman, John.
Hewgill, Edwin.
Fraser, John Henry.
Calcraft, John.
Boscawen, Nicholas.
1784.
Fane, Hon. Thomas.
Sutton, John.
Wyndham, Hon. William,
Cavan, Earl of.
1785.
Thoroton, Thomas.
Finch, Hon. Edward.
Morshead, William.
Stopford, Viscount (afterwards Earl of Courtown).
Boscawen, William A. S.
Morgan, Charles (afterwards Sir Charles, Bart.).
1786.