than is above indicated, the drill-book was often revised, and a system
of tactics introduced, calculated to satisfy the conditions under which
troops have to move when opposed to modern arms of precision. The space
allowed to each man in the ranks has been increased, the rigid structure
of the British line has given way to a looser formation, and, greater
independence of individual action being deemed desirable, the
intelligence of the private soldier has been raised and cultivated. The
principles of the science of tactics remain constant, but the system
adopted necessarily varies as new weapons are invented; the problem
before us, therefore, was how to apply the principles to modern
conditions. Our forefathers resolved the question satisfactorily, as far
as their generation was concerned. They inculcated a stiff and rigid
discipline into the British army, and they endowed the rank and file
with a moral stamina sufficient to enable them to maintain themselves on
the field of battle in line, and thus develop to the fullest extent the
fire of their muskets. Our enemies, not so highly trained, could only
fight in column; and, hence, in no small degree, our victories and their
defeats. That the closest attention has been unremittingly given to this
great problem, all know already; but, as we have not yet had the
experience of a great war under new conditions, the results of our
labours are not yet practically tested.
It will be remembered that the Prince of Wales fell grievously ill in
the end of 1870, and that, hoping against hope, it appeared only too
likely that the august patient could not recover. The whole of the
English people, at home and abroad, were deeply agitated with anxiety
for the life of His Royal Highness, and great was the joy, sincerely
felt and universally expressed, when it pleased Providence to spare him
to the country, and to raise him up again in vigour and in health and
strength. Full of gratitude for this signal favour, the Queen commanded
a thanksgiving service to be held in St. Paul’s Cathedral, and proceeded
there, accompanied by His Royal Highness and the Royal Family (February
27, 1871). It need scarcely be said that all classes of Her Majesty’s
loyal subjects eagerly seized this opportunity of joining their prayers
to those of their Sovereign and of the Princess of Wales, and, as the
Royal procession moved to the Cathedral, the people made a demonstration
of sympathy, which showed how acutely they had felt the danger as long
as it existed, and how great was their happiness now that it was past.
The army was fully represented at this ceremony; small deputations from
every regiment in the British Isles had assigned to them a place in St.
Paul’s. The Brigade lined the streets; the 1st Coldstream, occupying a
portion of Oxford Street, near the Marble Arch, represented the
Regiment, as the 2nd Battalion was then at Windsor.
In the summer of 1873, the Shah of Persia visited England (June 18th)
and remained for a few days. It was the first time that the Monarch of
this distant Asiatic kingdom had ever come to Europe, and his reception
in this country was conducted on a scale of much magnificence. There
were, as usual, numerous Guards of Honour, the streets were lined by the
Brigade when he entered the Metropolis, and a review was held at Windsor
on the 24th, at which the whole of the London Battalions were present,
the public duties being found by the 2nd Battalion, 4th Regiment. The
Shah was also taken to the Tower on the 25th, when the 2nd Coldstream,
being quartered there, received him with two Guards of Honour.
The marriage of H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh to a Princess of Russia,
the only daughter of the Tsar Alexander II., and grand-daughter of our
late antagonist, Nicholas I., took place at St. Petersburg early in
1874, and was an event of some importance and novelty; for never before
had the reigning Houses of England and Russia been directly united by
the close ties of a family alliance. The marriage was looked upon as a
happy augury for the future, and strong expectations were entertained
that any past estrangement between the two countries might henceforth
cease, to the benefit, it was hoped, of both. On the occasion of the
public entry of Their Royal Highnesses, March 12th, a warm welcome
awaited them on the part of the people; the streets were lined by the
Brigade, both Battalions of the Regiment being present. In the following
May, the Tsar came to England, and proceeded first to Windsor (13th) for
two days, and was received by the 1st Coldstream, who were stationed
there. When His Majesty went to Guildhall, on the 18th, the streets were
again lined by the Brigade, and next day a review in his honour was held
at Aldershot, attended by the four West-End Battalions.
It may be interesting to note that the power, then vested in the Colonel
of the Regiment, to reduce a Non-commissioned officer summarily to the
ranks was exercised, in 1874, for the last time:—
_Regimental Order_ , 11th May. Sergeant Moss is reduced to Private by
order of Field-Marshal Sir William Gomm, G.C.B., for misconduct whilst
attached to the Lincoln Militia.
In the same year, the Coldstream lost a distinguished Officer,
Surgeon-Major Wyatt, whose report, on many important Regimental details
connected with the struggle in the Crimea, has been frequently consulted
in the preparation of the account given of the war in this work. The
event stands thus recorded in Regimental Orders, and requires no further
comment on our part:—
April 4th. _Death of Surgeon-Major Wyatt, C.B._ In announcing to the
Regiment the sad news of the death of Surgeon-Major Wyatt, C.B., the
Commanding Officer feels sure he will express the feelings of every
member of the Coldstream Guards when he says that a severer loss could
hardly have befallen the Regiment; nor can he record so melancholy an
event without bearing some tribute to the untiring zeal and brilliant
talents of an Officer who, during a service of nearly twenty-three
years, has won for himself a reputation almost as widespread in France
as in his own country. Few men stood higher in the profession to which
Surgeon-Major Wyatt belonged, and it is unquestionable that the energy
which he displayed during the siege of Paris, and the great
professional skill which he then had an opportunity of showing,
reflected no small credit on the corps of which he was such an
ornament. Considering the impaired state of his constitution he would
undoubtedly have been justified in declining to undertake the arduous
duties at the siege for which he was specially selected by the
Secretary of State for War, and it is certain his death was hastened
by the hardships and privations which, in his unflinching zeal, he so
voluntarily and nobly underwent.
The two Battalions were both represented at the funeral, the 1st finding
the firing party, and the 2nd the escort.
But this was not the only loss that the Regiment had to experience about
this time, for a greater cause for mourning was in store for them, when
their veteran Colonel, Sir William Gomm, died, March 15, 1875, in full
vigour of an unimpaired intellect, though more than ninety years of age.
Having entered the army as Ensign, in the year 1794, at an early age,
this distinguished Officer had served his Sovereign for more than eighty
years, and thus the last link which connected us with the past glories
of the great wars of the French Revolution was severed. The
Lieutenant-Colonel only expressed the universal feeling of sorrow that
prevailed in the Coldstream, when he issued the following short
sympathetic order upon this melancholy event:—
March 15, 1875. _Death of Sir William Gomm._ The Commanding Officer
has the painful duty to perform of announcing to the Regiment the sad
news of the death of their gallant and distinguished Colonel,
Field-Marshal Sir William Gomm, G.C.B., which took place this morning.
A notice of his distinguished services, which included more than one
battle during the last century, can hardly be recorded within the
limits of a Regimental Order, but the present occasion cannot be
allowed to pass without expressing the respect entertained by all
ranks for the example set to us by one of the most honourable careers
ever passed in the British army. The lively interest evinced by our
late Colonel in the welfare of the Regiment has been unceasing ever
since his first connection with it, and in him the Coldstream Guards
lose as kind and generous a friend as has ever been entrusted with its
interests. The Band and drums will cease to play in or out of barracks
until after the funeral; a band of crape will be worn by the Officers
on the left arm until after the appointment of a new Colonel shall
have been gazetted. A rosette of crape will be attached to the Colours
until after the funeral.
The Bands and drums of the Brigade ceased to play while the Coldstream
was in mourning, until after the funeral, which took place at
Rotherhithe, and was not accompanied by any military display; but all
available Officers of the Regiment were, of course, present upon so sad
an occasion.
General Sir William Codrington, G.C.B., the late Commander of the Forces
in the Crimea, now succeeded as Colonel of the Coldstream, and issued an
address to the Regiment:—
“_Regimental Order_ , April 5, 1875. The Commanding Officer has much
pleasure in promulgating the following notification received by him
from General Sir W. Codrington, G.C.B., and feels sure that the
Regiment will be gratified to learn that a renewal of that
distinguished Officer’s connection with the Coldstream Guards is as
keenly appreciated by himself as it is by all ranks of the Regiment.
“Her Majesty has been pleased to confer upon me the Colonelcy of the
Coldstream Guards, in succession to the late Field-Marshal Sir W.
Gomm, whose distinguished services were appreciated by the army and by
the Regiment in which he served so long and so well. The position in
which I am now placed by Her Majesty’s favour renews my former
services of thirty years in the Regiment, and although separated from
it in 1854, yet service in the field with another portion of the army
did not separate me so far from the Coldstream Guards as to prevent my
seeing and valuing, on many difficult occasions of war service, the
action of the Brigade of Guards of which the Coldstream formed part.
Twenty years have passed since these occurrences, but the recollection
of them has not passed away, nor the interest diminished in the
well-being of the Regiment with which Her Majesty has again connected
me by a duty which it will be a pleasure and an honour to carry out.”
From 1871, as we have seen, there had been but one Lieutenant-Colonel
and one Major in the Coldstream, the former being in command of the
Regiment and of one Battalion, the latter having the command of the
other Battalion. In 1875, however, the original establishment of one
Lieutenant-Colonel and two Majors was restored, and Colonel A. Lyon
Fremantle (son of a former well-known and distinguished Coldstream
Officer), being promoted Major to fill up the vacancy, was posted to the
command of the 1st Battalion (April 28th). The reason for this change
was that the Lieutenant-Colonels of Guards Regiments were to be
employed, in addition to the command of their own Regiments, in the
capacity of Brigadiers of the metropolitan Volunteer Corps, which were
then incorporated into three separate brigades. In order to discharge
these duties, Regimental Adjutants were shortly afterwards (1881) also
appointed, and these Officers, besides performing the ordinary work
attached to that position (carried out up to this date by a Battalion
Adjutant), acted as Brigade-Majors of the Volunteer brigades so created.
Captain and Lieut.-Colonel Hon. E. Digby was the first Regimental
Adjutant of the Coldstream.
Just before Colonel Goodlake, V.C., left the service (August 7, 1875),
Colonel Fremantle was transferred to the command of the 2nd Battalion,
and Colonel Hon. William Feilding succeeded the former Officer as Major
Commanding the 1st Battalion. On September 5, 1877, Colonel Hon. Percy
Feilding, C.B. retired upon half-pay, and the Lieutenant-Colonelcy
devolved upon Colonel Fremantle, who was replaced in the command of the
2nd Battalion by Colonel FitzRoy. Only a few days later, Colonel William
Feilding also went on half-pay (September 29th), and Colonel Julian
Hall, promoted Major, was posted to the command of the 1st Battalion.
The Regiment then stood thus (December, 1877):—
_Colonel._—General Sir William Codrington, G.C.B.
_Lieut.-Colonel._—Colonel A. Lyon Fremantle.
_Majors._—Colonels G. FitzRoy; Julian Hall.
_Captains._—Lieut.-Colonels G. Wigram; A. Lambton; Lord W. Seymour
(Staff); E. Burnell; FitzRoy Fremantle; (_Mounted_).
F. Manningham-Buller; G. FitzRoy Smyth; H. R. Eyre; J. B.
Sterling; C. D. Thomas; Viscount de Vesci; Hon. F. Wellesley; R. S.
Hall; W. Ramsden; Hon. E. Acheson; H. Aldenburg-Bentinck; Hon. L.
Dawnay; Hon. E. Digby; Hon. H. Corry; R. Follett.
_Lieutenants._—Captain Hon. E. Boscawen (Adjutant); Major R. Goff;
Captains Waller Otway; H. Bruce; Amelius Lockwood; Hon. R. Campbell
(Adjutant); Hon. G. Bertie; F. Graves-Sawle; A. Moreton; Hon. M.
Stapleton; R. Pole-Carew; J. G. Montgomery; Cyril Fortescue; F.
Manley; R. Barton; F. Arkwright; L. MacKinnon (I. of M.);
Lieutenants V. Dawson (I. of M.); Hon. E. Dawnay; Hon. H. Monck;
Lord D. Gordon; A. FitzRoy; J. Ross-of-Bladensburg; A. Codrington;
Hon. H. Legge; J. Gladstone; D. Dawson; C. Brand; Hon. F. Lambton;
Hon. G. Gore; H. Stopford; Hon. H. Gough; Hon. A. Henniker-Major;
Lord Sandhurst; A. Clarke-Jervoise; G. V. Boyle; Viscount Lambton;
Hon. A. Dawson; Hon. H. Amherst.
_Sub-Lieutenant._—H. Surtees.
_2nd Lieutenants._—Edgar Vincent; W. Corbet.
_Quartermasters._—J. Birch; W. Reynolds.
_Surgeon-Major._—C. V. Cay, M.D. _Battalion-Surgeon._—Surgeon-Major C.
Read.
_Surgeons._—A. Myers; J. Whipple, M.D.; J. Magill, M.D.
_Solicitor._—R. Broughton, Esq.
As the aspect of affairs in Ireland had improved, and as the
disturbances that distracted the people had entirely ceased, it was
found unnecessary to continue to keep a Guards Battalion any longer in
Dublin. At the spring change of quarters of the year 1876, therefore,
the Battalion there was not replaced, and the occupation of Shorncliffe
camp was again resumed as the out-quarter of the Brigade. The 1st
Coldstream accordingly went there at that time, and lost then, with
sincere regret, an Officer of much merit in Quartermaster Falconer, who,
having been in that position ever since 1853, left the Regiment in 1876.
This excellent Officer was born in the town of Coldstream; he had been
present with the Battalion during the whole of the war with Russia, and
had gained for himself, during his long period of service in the
Regiment, the sincere respect and the hearty good will of all ranks.
Major-General Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar retired from the command of
the Brigade of Guards, and was succeeded by Major-General F. Stephenson,
C.B., August 1, 1876, who retained that appointment until July 31, 1879,
when Major-General G. Higginson C.B., replaced him.
A second change was made in the course of this century in the title of
the Scots Fusilier Guards, and on April 4, 1877, it was promulgated for
general information that this Regiment would in future be designated by
the name of Scots Guards.
During the period under review, from 1871-1885, the country was engaged
in some minor wars. An expedition to Ashanti took place 1873-1874;
hostilities were undertaken on the North-West frontiers of India,
notably in Afghanistan, to keep out the influence of Russia, which we
feared, and to counteract the rapid advance of her forces towards our
borders; and operations were conducted against various native tribes in
South Africa, principally against the Zulus, and against the Transvaal
Republic in the same quarter of the world. In none of these were the
Coldstream employed;[395] but some of the Officers of the Regiment were
engaged in them in different capacities, and of them three lost their
lives. Lieutenant Hon. Alfred Charteris, Aide-de-camp to the General
Commanding the Ashanti expedition (Sir Garnet Wolseley), was attacked by
fever, contracted in that unhealthy climate, and died, deeply regretted,
on board ship when on his way home. The other two, Captains Hon. Ronald
Campbell and Robert Barton, fell the same day in South Africa, on March
28, 1879. The high estimation in which these two brave Officers were
held by their brothers in the Regiment, and the promise they gave of
future distinction, have never been forgotten by their companions; their
loss is still mourned, and their memory is preserved and cherished, for
they recall to the mind of those who knew them the type and embodiment
of the Coldstream Officer. Of the details of their services it is not
necessary to say more than this, that Captain Campbell, Chief Staff
Officer to Colonel Wood, V.C., C.B., (now General Sir Evelyn Wood), lost
his life while performing an act of daring gallantry, for which, had he
lived, he would have received the Victoria Cross; an Officer and a
soldier who followed him (Lieutenant Lysons and Private Fowler, 90th
Regiment), and who fortunately escaped unhurt, were both awarded that
high order of military merit. Captain Barton, in command of the Frontier
Light Horse, was also killed in the same neighbourhood. In Colonel
Wood’s despatch, the following sentences are worthy of record in these
pages.
“Camp, Kambula, Zululand, March 30, 1879.
“I directed Colonel Weatherley to dislodge one or two Zulus who were
causing us most of the loss” [the enemy being concealed behind rocks
or in caves], “but as his men did not advance rapidly, Captain
Campbell and Lieutenant Lysons and three men of the 90th, jumping over
a low wall, ran forward and charged into a cave, where Captain
Campbell, leading in the most determined and gallant manner, was shot
dead.... His Excellency” [Lieut.-General Lord Chelmsford, Commanding]
“knew Captain Hon. R. Campbell: he was an excellent Staff Officer,
both in the field and as regards office work, and, having shown the
most brilliant courage, lost his life in performing a gallant feat;
and though he fell, success was gained by the courageous conduct of
Lieutenant Lysons and Private Fowler, 90th Light Infantry. Captain
Barton, commanding the Frontier Horse, was always most forward in
every fight, and was as humane as he was brave. On the 20th January,
one of Umsabe’s men, whom Captain Barton wished to take prisoner
instead of killing him, fired at Captain Barton within two yards, the
powder marking his face. When last seen on the 28th, he was carrying
on his horse a wounded man.” Lieut.-Colonel Buller (now General Sir
Redvers Buller, V.C.), commanding the mounted troops of Colonel Wood’s
column, and who himself gained his Victoria Cross on that day for his
own gallantry, writes as follows:—“Captain Barton is also a great
loss; active, energetic, and intrepid, he was an excellent Officer,
and devoted to his profession.”[396]
-----
-----
Footnote 395:
After the battle of Isandlwhana, January 22, 1879, in which the Zulus
succeeded in overwhelming several companies of the 24th Regiment, some
Officers and Non-commissioned officers of the Brigade of Guards, under
Colonel Davies, Grenadier Guards, were sent to take charge of drafts
proceeding to South Africa to join that Regiment. The Coldstream
furnished one Officer (Captain Hon. G. Bertie) and two sergeants (one
of them, the present Superintending Clerk, Sergeant-Major W. Johnson).
The drafts were wrecked on their way out, but fortunately no loss of
life occurred. Arrived at the seat of hostilities, the Guardsmen did
duty with the 24th Regiment until the end of the war. The following
Brigade Order appeared in London, October 3rd:—
“In congratulating the detachment of Officers and Non-commissioned
officers sent to the Cape under the command of Colonel Davies,
Grenadier Guards, the Major-General has much pleasure in publishing,
for the information of the Brigade, the following order, issued by
Colonel Glyn, C.B., commanding 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment, dated
s.s. _Egypt_, October 1, 1879: 'The Officer Commanding cannot allow
the Officers of the Brigade of Guards and Militia who have been
attached to the 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment, during the late campaign
in South Africa, to leave the Battalion without recording his
appreciation of their services, and thanking them most sincerely for
the willing and energetic manner in which they have performed their
duties. Colonel Glyn assures them that they will always be held in
kindly remembrance both by himself and his Officers. To the
Non-commissioned officers of the Brigade of Guards, the Commanding
Officer also tenders his best thanks for the assistance they have
rendered when serving with the drafts and, subsequently, with the
Battalion in the field.”
Footnote 396:
_Supplement, London Gazette_, May 7, 1879. See Appendix XIII. Sir E.
Wood has written an account of Captain Campbell’s heroism in
_Pearson’s Magazine_ (Feb., 1896), “One of the Bravest Deeds I ever
saw.” See _Brigade of Guards Magazine_ , ix. 164.
-----
The grave outlook of foreign affairs in the spring of 1878, when Russia,
after a successful war with Turkey, forced a disastrous treaty upon the
Sultan (treaty of San Stefano), led many to think that England would
again become involved in further hostilities in the East, and for a time
there was serious anxiety on the subject. But, warned by the Crimea, we
were hardly inclined to embark in another quarrel with the Tsar. A
European Congress then assembled in Berlin to modify the Treaty of San
Stefano, and to conclude a new international agreement, known as the
Treaty of Berlin (July 13, 1878). As a demonstration, and indeed also to
take advantage of the opportunity to test the system introduced into the
army by short service, the reserves were called up in April, and, as we
have already seen, the summons to attend was well responded to by the
men. The Coldstream reserves were posted to the 2nd Battalion. The three
Guards Battalions first on the roster for active service (viz. the 2nd
Grenadiers, 2nd Coldstream, and 1st Scots Guards), each selected
thirty-two men to go to Aldershot to be trained as stretcher-bearers.
The Regimental transport was re-organized, and proceeded later to
Aldershot with the Battalions above-mentioned, to take part in the
summer drills; shortly after which (September 11th) its establishment
was fixed at one Officer, one sergeant, six drivers, three waggons, and
one small-arm ammunition cart. Later (January 25, 1879), this transport
was kept together as one corps, and the three Officers took it in turn,
for four months at a time, to have it in charge.
The efforts to extend and improve the training of Officers and men,
which have been already alluded to, were still continued, and in 1883,
it was ordered that Company Commanders should give personal attention to
the subject, and be responsible for the efficiency of the men placed
under their immediate command. Before this date, however, the Brigade
had already availed themselves of the advantages which Pirbright offered
for some of these purposes. A Guards camp having been opened for
musketry in 1881, it was soon utilized as a place where practical
instruction in military exercises (other than ordinary drill), could be
given by the Company Officers. In April, 1882, Commanding Officers were
enjoined to carry out a series of minor tactical operations in
conjunction with the course of musketry practice, and to examine their
Battalions by companies, and by double companies, in outpost duty,
attack formation, shelter-trench exercise, etc. The Battalions were also
to stay at Pirbright for fourteen days, five to be devoted to minor
tactics, four to preliminary drill, and five to musketry. Afterwards,
they remained a longer time in camp, and were thus enabled to all their
company training there, besides their musketry.[397]
-----
Footnote 397:
Guards being stationed in London, have no ground near their barracks
suitable for many of their military exercises.
-----
Following the example set us by Continental armies, we added sectional
and field firing to the course of target practice which was annually
carried out, and increased the number of rounds to be expended by the
trained soldier from 100 to 150 (1882). Musketry had received
considerable attention from the authorities, and it was held imperative
that the men should not only be able individually to shoot with
accuracy, but that they should also be trained to fire together, under
conditions that prevail in the field, and against objects similar to
those which present themselves to the aim of troops in war time. A Siege
Operations Committee having been appointed to conduct experiments at
Dungeness early in 1880, a detachment of the 1st Coldstream, then at
Shorncliffe, was told off to assist them in their labours. The following
Brigade Order (March 11, 1880) relates to this service:—
The Major-General has great pleasure in noticing the highly favourable
report of the conduct of a detachment of the 1st Coldstream Guards
under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Otway, employed under the Siege
Operations Committee at Dungeness. The President of the Committee
remarks upon the cheerful endurance and steady discipline of the men,
as well as the watchfulness and judgment of the Officers, and the
ability and energy with which Captain Fortescue carried out the daily
arrangements.
We have already had occasion to remark that, on the introduction of
signalling, great interest was taken in the subject in the Brigade, and
frequent allusions were made to the efficiency of the Guards in this
respect. An extract of an order, dated March 11, 1884, may be quoted:—
“His Royal Highness’s attention has been drawn to the energetic action
of Lieut.-Colonel Bonham, which is deserving of praise, as also to the
attention paid by the other Officers specially named, viz. Lieutenant
Lloyd, 1st Grenadiers, and Lieutenant Lovell, 2nd Coldstream. Will you
please convey an expression of His Royal Highness’s satisfaction to
the 1st and 2nd Coldstream Guards, the Royal Horse Guards, and the 3rd
Grenadier Guards, who have taken such good positions in the list of
relative efficiency.”
In the last chapter some notes were given upon the improvements which
were made in the canteen system after the Crimean war. In 1879, the
“coffee bar” was separated from the canteen proper, and thus two shops
were established in barracks for the soldiers' use, in one of which no
alcoholic liquor could be bought; this change was completed in London in
1880 and 1881. We may also state here that, through the instrumentality
of Officers of the Brigade, early in the latter year, a coffee tavern
was set up outside barracks in Buckingham Palace Road, for the use of
the Non-commissioned officers and men of the Guards; the arrangement
that was then made did not, however, continue for any great length of
time, and though the tavern still exists, its connection with the
Brigade is now severed.
A few changes in uniform since 1872 deserve a passing mention. Shoulder
straps were added to the Officers' tunics and blue coats (end of 1880),
and the gold cords on the former garments were then abolished. New
badges were put on these straps to show the military rank of the wearer.
Previous to this, although the rank of an Officer was indicated on the
collar of the tunic, no such distinction was to be seen on the blue
coat. In the following March, the dark grey cloth, adopted for the
trousers of Officers in the Brigade in 1830, gave place to a blue tweed.
Up to 1874 Non-commissioned officers and men wore buttons on the skirts
of the tunic, but they were then removed on account of the new valise
equipment which was introduced at that time, instead of the old
knapsack. Since that date the valise has been always carried by the
soldier, though the pattern has more than once been changed.
Some alterations were effected in the medical service of the Brigade. Up
to the year 1865, the Surgeons belonged exclusively to their respective
Regiments as much as any other Officer of the Guards, and their
promotion took place therein when vacancies occurred in their own corps
only. Forming a small body in each, it is evident that their advancement
was always uncertain, and too frequently was it exceedingly slow. To
relieve this stagnation, the Medical Officers of the Brigade, though
still belonging to and wearing the uniform of their respective
Regiments, are now placed upon one list according to seniority, and are
promoted in their turn into whatever corps the vacancy occurs. A better
flow of promotion is thus obtained, though the Medical Officers are
subject to the inconvenience of being sometimes obliged to change their
Regiments when they gain a step. Another change, made in April 2, 1881,
was the appointment of a Brigade Surgeon in the Guards to act as
Principal Medical Officer. This system replaced the old arrangement by
which the three Regimental Surgeons-Major took it in turn to do duty in
Brigade Waiting, and to act as the medical adviser to the Major-General.
Lastly, in 1881, the three Regimental hospitals were converted into
station hospitals, for the general use of all troops quartered in the
London garrison.
The grade, created to supplant the old military title of Ensign, met
with some vicissitudes. Sub-Lieutenants ceased to be so called in 1877,
and the name Second-Lieutenant was then substituted for it. In 1881,
however, the rank was altogether abolished, and Second-Lieutenants were
promoted Lieutenant, while young Officers joining the army were gazetted
Lieutenants. But this arrangement did not last long, and again there was
another change, for in 1887 Second-Lieutenants were re-introduced into
the army; but there appears to be no tendency to restore the old
traditional rank of Ensign.
One of the consequences of the abolition of purchase, clearly foreseen
by the authors of army reform, was to produce a state of complete
stagnation in promotion. To relieve this evil, a device was resorted to,
whereby Officers, their qualifications or inclinations notwithstanding,
were not allowed to remain in certain positions in their regiments for
more than a definite period or after attaining a specified age. For
instance, Commanding Officers of regiments and battalions were limited
to five years command (reduced to four in the case of the latter, 1881),
and all Captains were forced to retire from the service if not promoted
to Major before the age of forty. The relief thus afforded was not of
great advantage to the bulk of the juniors, and it constituted a
well-founded grievance to many who, while able and willing to serve were
thrown out of their profession through no fault of their own.[398] Now,
in 1881, a large number of Captains were doomed to be ejected, whereat
it appears the Secretary of State got seriously alarmed. Nor is it
surprising that he should fear the prospect of having between 3000 to
4500 vigorous and educated men going “up and down the country,” and
pointing out in every constituency the grievances to which they were
subjected by the hasty introduction of political army reforms that his
own party had effected in 1871.[399] He was constrained to save these
men, and the only way to do this was to promote them _en masse_ to the
rank of Major. Hence all Majors in the infantry below a Mounted Officer,
(since 1893, below the Second in command), are “Captains and Majors,”
fulfilling the duties of the former, and dignified with the rank of the
latter. They therefore enjoy the “double rank,” which was held to be so
objectionable, in 1871, when it prevailed in the Foot Guards. The
advantage, however, does not go on, for on becoming “Second in command,”
an Officer performs the duty of Major, but has no extra rank given to
him.
-----
Footnote 398:
The automatic system of facilitating a flow of promotion at no cost to
the State, which purchase produced, may perhaps be illustrated by the
fact that, from 1814 to 1871, or during fifty-seven years, the
Coldstream had twenty-one Lieutenant-Colonels; or each, on an average,
served in that capacity for a period of about two years and nine
months. Whereas, between 1871 and 1895, there have been five
Lieutenant-Colonels, whose average period of command has nearly
reached the full five years allowed by the new regulations.
Footnote 399:
See _The Army Book for the British Empire_ , p. 57.
-----
The introduction of Warrant-officers into the army was brought about at
this time also; and the Sergeant-Major and Bandmaster (and later the
Regimental Clerk) were so promoted.
These things were effected in July, 1881; and then the following changes
were made in the establishment of the Coldstream: The companies were
reduced from 20 to 16 (8 per Battalion, instead of 10, as had been
provided during the Crimean war). The Lieutenant-Colonel remained in
command of the Regiment, but instead of two Majors Commanding
Battalions, the designation of these Officers was altered, and they were
called Lieutenant-Colonels Commanding Battalions. Of the Captains there
had been twenty, or one to each Company, and the four seniors used to be
called Acting-Majors, or Mounted Officers; instead, there were now eight
Majors in the Regiment (the four seniors being mounted,[400] and the
four juniors unmounted), and nine Captains. Lastly, the rank of
Second-Lieutenant was abolished, and instead of 20 Lieutenants and 20
Second-Lieutenants, there were 36 Lieutenants. The differences in the
two establishments are to be seen in the following table:—
May, 1881. July, 1881.
20 Companies. 16 Companies.
1 Colonel. } 1 Colonel. }
1 Lieut.-Colonel } Field-Officers. 1 Lt.-Col. Com. } Field-Officers.
Regt.
2 Majors. } 2 Lt.-Cols. Com. }
Batns.
20 Captains. 8 Majors. }
20 Lieutenants. 9 Captains.
20 Second-Lieutenants. 36 Lieutenants.
2 Adjutants. 3 Adjutants.
(1 per Battn. and 1 Regtal).
2 Quartermasters. 2 Quartermasters.
2 Surgeons-Major. 2 Surgeons-Major.
3 Surgeons. 3 Surgeons.
1 Solicitor. _Total Officers_ 1 Solicitor. _Total Officers_
74. 68.
2 Serjeants-Major. 2 Sergts.-Major.
(Warrant-officers).
1 Staff Clerk.
2 Quartermaster-Sergeants. 2 Quartermaster-Sergeants.
1 Bandmaster. 1 Bandmaster. (Warrant-officer).
2 Sergt.-Instructors of Musketry. 2 Sergt.-Instructors of Musketry.
2 Drum-Majors. 2 Sergeant-Drummers.
2 Armourer-Sergeants. 2 Armourer-Sergeants.
2 Orderly Room Sergeants. 6 Orderly Room Sergeants.
2 Pioneer Sergeants. 2 Pioneer Sergeants.
20 Colour-Sergeants. 16 Colour-Sergeants.
2 Sergeant Cooks. 2 Sergeant Cooks.
60 Sergeants. 48 Sergeants.
_Total Sergeants, etc._, 97. _Total Warrant-officers, Sergts.
etc._, 86.
32 Drummers and Fifers. 32 Drummers and Fifers.
_Total_ 32. _Total_ 32.
80 Corporals. 80 Corporals.
1420 Privates. 1420 Privates.
_Total Rank and File_, 1500. _Total Rank and File_, 1500
—— ——
1703 _Total._ 1686 _Total._
-----
Footnote 400:
The dismounting of two “mounted” Majors took place in 1893; and now
there are in the Regiment two “mounted” (or a “Second in command” per
Battalion) and six “unmounted” Majors.
-----
[Illustration:
UNDRESS CAP PRIVATES
ABOUT 1850.
]
[Illustration: OFFICER 1849]
N. R. Wilkinson del. A.D. Innes & C^o. London. Mintern Bros.
lith.
On the 10th of November, 1880, Colonel Fremantle having left the
Regiment, Colonel FitzRoy was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel, when Colonel
Wigram, promoted Major, assumed the command of the 2nd Battalion. On the
completion of five years period of command, Colonel Julian Hall retired
on half-pay, September 29, 1882, and was succeeded in the command of the
1st Battalion by Colonel Arthur Lambton, who thus became
Lieutenant-Colonel of a Battalion in the Coldstream, and who was
appointed to serve for four years in that capacity. Colonels FitzRoy and
Wigram, C.B., finished their periods of five years simultaneously,
November 10, 1885. The latter, placed on half-pay for a few weeks, was
brought back as Lieutenant-Colonel of the Regiment (December 16th), and
the command of the 2nd Battalion devolved upon Colonel Sterling
(November 10th).
By the death of General Sir William Codrington, G.C.B., on the 6th of
August, 1884, the Coldstream lost their Colonel, who had served as such
for more than nine years. The following Regimental Order was published:—
_August 7, 1884._ The Commanding Officer has the painful duty to
perform of announcing to the Regiment the sad news of the death of
their gallant and distinguished Colonel, General Sir William
Codrington, G.C.B., which took place yesterday afternoon, 6th inst. A
band of crape will be worn by the Officers for a month; the Band and
the drums and fifes will not play until after the funeral.
The funeral was accompanied with military honours, and took place at
Woking Cemetery on the 9th. All Officers attending it were dressed as
for Guard, and, including the firing party of 50 men, there was a
detachment present of the 1st Battalion, consisting of 100
Non-commissioned officers and men under three Officers.
Sir W. Codrington was succeeded by General Right Honourable Sir Thomas
Steele, K.C.B., at that time Commander of the Forces in Ireland, whom
Her Majesty appointed the new Colonel of the Regiment.
In the same year, Lieut.-General Higginson, C.B., vacated the command of
the Brigade of Guards, and was replaced by Major-General R. Gipps, C.B.,
April 1, 1884.
The 1st Coldstream was first on the roster for duty in Ireland, and at
the end of 1880 was quartered in Chelsea and St. George’s Barracks.
Serious troubles once more affected that country, and Government was
sorely perplexed how to deal with them. The presence of the Guards was
again required, and the Battalion was despatched there at a few days'
notice, by two special trains from Victoria Station, _viâ_ Holyhead
(December 6th). Upon this, the 2nd Grenadiers, then at Shorncliffe, were
brought to town, and that out-quarter was given up. On the 15th of
December, a detachment of 100 men from the 2nd Battalion joined the 1st
in Dublin, and five days later the 1st Scots Guards left London for the
same destination. The Coldstream were quartered in Richmond Barracks,
but the Scots Guards were scattered through the town, their
head-quarters in Ship Street, with detachments in Richmond, and in Linen
Hall barracks.
A novel procedure was now adopted with respect to the command of these
two Battalions, which shows how critical the authorities conceived the
situation to be. Shortly after their arrival in Dublin, the
Major-General Commanding the Brigade and the Home District proceeded
there accompanied by his Brigade Staff, and left Colonel Gipps, Scots
Guards (the senior Officer) with the District Staff to command the Home
District; but the arrangement did not last long, and the latter,
temporarily promoted Brigadier General, took General Higginson’s place
in Ireland, who thereupon returned to London, February 15, 1881.[401]
-----
Footnote 401:
On the 7th of December, 1881, Colonel FitzRoy, Coldstream Guards,
temporarily promoted Brigadier-General, proceeded to Dublin to relieve
Colonel Gipps, appointed Major-General.
-----
The stay of the Battalion in Dublin, lasting until March, 1882, was not
more pleasant then than it had been during the Fenian troubles of 1866;
but the duties assigned to the troops were everywhere cheerfully
undertaken and zealously discharged. Among these duties two may be
specially mentioned. In the first place, such was the violence of the
mobs that collected to interfere with the due administration of the law,
that a collision was apprehended every time a writ was served, a seizure
made in a farm, an eviction put into execution, or any other legal
process carried out. To avoid the danger, the Irish authorities
established the rule that the force protecting the sheriff or other
officer employed, should be so overwhelmingly strong, as to put an end
to all thoughts of resistance, on the part of those who assembled to
frustrate the course of justice. The Royal Irish Constabulary were, of
course, always employed on these occasions, but it was also believed
that the presence of red-coats would have a greater effect with the
excited populace, and for this purpose numerous military posts covered
the disturbed districts; but the Guards in Dublin, occupying a central
position there, were not obliged to furnish any of these detachments.
Soldiers, therefore, were often requisitioned to escort the civil
authorities, and the two Guards Battalions (as well as those that
succeeded them in Dublin during the troubles), were often employed in
this manner—generally by despatching small parties of some fifty men
under an Officer. On one occasion, however, the 1st Coldstream had to do
more than this. There was a series of evictions near New Pallas, in the
county of Limerick, and the whole Battalion, together with a portion of
Scots Guards, were sent there for two days to guard the sheriff, who had
to execute the judgment of the Court. It was, at least, an uncommon
service for so large a force to perform; and the Battalion was in all
conscience powerful enough to prevent any breach of the peace!
The other duty to which allusion has been made, refers to what was
called “personal protection.” Many landlords, and indeed others, were in
danger of their lives from the outrage-mongers that infested the land.
In order to afford adequate protection to these persons, soldiers were
told off to reside in their houses, to accompany them in all their
movements, and to be responsible for their safety. The Coldstream and
Scots Guards furnished a number of men to perform this duty, and an
Officer from each Regiment was appointed to inspect them frequently, and
to satisfy himself that this novel service was efficiently discharged.
That this was the case may be gathered from the following order, issued
in London, dated March 17, 1882:—
“By desire of the Field-Marshal the Commander-in-Chief, I have the
honour to transmit to you the enclosed report on the conduct of the
Coldstream and Scots Guards, while employed on protection duty in
Limerick and Clare under the order of Clifford Lloyd, Esq., Resident
Magistrate at Tulla, and to request that you will be so good as to
express to all concerned, His Royal Highness’s approbation of their
conduct in the performance of the duties they have been called upon to
undertake, and which are quite unusual with soldiers. His Royal
Highness has much pleasure in recognising the valuable services
rendered by Captain Fortescue, Coldstream Guards, and by Lieutenant
Romilly, Scots Guards, which have been brought to the notice of His
Excellency the Lord-Lieutenant.”
But the Coldstream had some further experiences. It will be remembered
that Mr. Parnell, the leader of the Irish agitation, was arrested as a
suspect, October 13, 1881, under an Act of Parliament which had been
passed in the spring of that year. The authorities, expecting some
resistance, made every military preparation in Dublin to prevent a riot;
and their precautions being sufficient, and their resources ample, the
capture was very easily accomplished without mishap. Still, the
quick-witted Irish very soon realized that the Government in London were
afraid of them. They had early perceived that the Cabinet, instead of
facing the difficulty boldly, dallied with it, and failed to support the
Chief Secretary, Mr. Forster, in his strenuous efforts to cope with it.
Hence, seeing no strength in the authority that should have protected
them, the people were constrained to obey those who did wield power in
the country, by setting its laws at defiance and by oppressing it
without mercy. The winter, 1881-82, was disturbed and troubled. The
No-rent conspiracy was in full swing; murder clubs, under the name of
Moonlighters, kept the land in terror; juries were intimidated, and
refused to discharge their functions; and the executive was all but
paralysed. It was, moreover, known that a gang of assassins, called “the
Invincibles,” had bound themselves together to murder Mr. Forster, and
it was afterwards ascertained that they had made numerous desperate
attempts upon his life, all of which were happily unsuccessful.
Meanwhile, in January, 1882, the 2nd Grenadiers were sent to Cork, and
for two months there was the unprecedented number of three Guards
Battalions in Ireland, until March, when the 2nd Coldstream relieved the
1st Battalion, who returned to England, and were soon after followed by
the 1st Scots Guards. So the gloomy spring passed, when a new
complication arose. Mr. Forster had remained at his post with steadfast
courage, and scorned the imminent personal danger that surrounded him,
with which he knew he was threatened. But he was unable to stand by a
leader of whose policy he disapproved, or to follow him in the tortuous
intrigue, which became known in history as the “Kilmainham treaty.” He
resigned, and the then Lord-Lieutenant (Lord Cowper), having also
withdrawn from office, Lord Spencer was appointed in his place, and
arrived in Dublin, May 6, 1882, accompanied by his new Chief Secretary,
Lord Frederick Cavendish.
On that very afternoon, in broad daylight, while walking through the
Phœnix Park, which was then full of people, Lord F. Cavendish and Mr.
Burke, the Under-Secretary, were murdered by the Invincibles, who had
for so long unsuccessfully lain in wait to assassinate Mr. Forster. The
event sent a thrill of horror through the United Kingdom, and
effectively and at last forced the Government to open their eyes to the
true nature of the conspiracy with which they had to deal. The
miscreants got away, and for a time there was little information to be
obtained as to the perpetrators of this foul deed, and twelve months had
to elapse before the conspirators were convicted and punished. The 2nd
Coldstream, quartered in Dublin when this tragedy took place, were not
called upon to act in the emergency. There was nothing, indeed, for
soldiers to do at the crisis, except to redouble their vigilance; for it
soon became clear that the Irish were as much the victims of the
agitators and outrage-mongers who had mastered them, as were the
officials who suffered by their violence.
In less than three months both the Guards Battalions, quartered in
Dublin and in Cork, were required to proceed on active service to Egypt,
and left the scenes of internal discord and disorder to meet the open
foes of their country. The 3rd Grenadiers replaced them in Dublin
(August 8th), and since that time there has been only one Battalion in
Ireland. The Coldstream did not return there till the autumn of 1887,
when the agitation had assumed a new phase, although the crisis had by
no means passed away, nor the difficulties come to an end. Thanks,
however, to the vigour of Government, to the remedial measures
introduced, to the disappearance of Parnell, to the absence of another
leader of character, and to the quarrels that have split up the
Nationalist party into hostile fragments, the people are now steadily
quieting down; and, eschewing agitation, they are improving their
material prosperity under the new laws which have been enacted for their
benefit.
In February, 1881, that is, shortly after the two Battalions went in
haste to Ireland at the end of the previous year, the Tower was vacated
by the Foot Guards, and was occupied by a Line regiment until November,
1882. There were then four Battalions in the West End, and this
continued to be the force maintained there—excepting for the two months,
January 25th-March 22nd, 1882, when, as we have seen, three Battalions
were stationed in Ireland—until the departure of a Guards Brigade of
three Battalions for Egypt. During this war, Dublin was still occupied
by a Battalion, but Windsor was vacated, and, until the return of the
Brigade from active service in November, the 2nd King’s Royal Rifle
Corps furnished the Kensington Palace and the Magazine guards. In the
following year, 1883, London was the scene of dynamite outrages,
perpetrated by the agents of the same secret societies, of American
origin, which financed and supported the agitation in Ireland. “For a
time the air was dense with rumours of plots and explosives,” and all
minds were filled with vague alarms. A measure to punish dynamiters was
passed in haste through all its stages in both Houses of Parliament, in
one day (April 9th), and received the Royal assent next day at
noon.[402] The garrison of the Metropolis also required strengthening,
and a Line regiment being brought to the Tower, there were then five
Guards Battalions in the West End. Extra guards were mounted on Somerset
House, the Royal Courts of Justice, and Millbank prison, the London
duties were increased, the public offices protected, and other
precautions taken. The panic was considerable while it lasted, but it
passed away in about six months, and in the summer the garrison of
London assumed its normal strength and condition.
-----
Footnote 402:
_Ann. Reg._ , 1883, part i., p. 84.
-----
This ends the history of the Coldstream up to 1885, as far as affairs in
the United Kingdom are concerned; and we now turn to events that
occurred in Egypt and in the Sudan, 1882-1885. Before doing this,
however, we may briefly allude to a subject which possesses much
interest to all Guardsmen. Some members of the Coldstream may perhaps be
unaware that the exquisite decorations that adorn the interior of the
Royal Military Chapel in Wellington barracks have been scarcely twenty
years in existence. Before that time the walls were cold and bare, and
the building contained little to show how zealously the Brigade guard
the great traditions of the past,—traditions which they have
inherited,—and how warmly they cherish the memory of the Officers,
Non-commissioned officers, and men who, ever since the formation of the
standing army, have faithfully and bravely performed their duty to the
Sovereign of this realm. Numerous are the monuments placed in the Chapel
to record the military virtues of departed Guardsmen of every rank, and
their deeds on many a hard-fought field of strife; while these memorials
furnish a proof of the solid union which knits the three Regiments of
the Household Infantry together, in love for their profession and in
devotion to their Queen and country.
CHAPTER XV.
THE WAR IN EGYPT, 1882.
Origin of the war—Emancipation of Egypt from Turkish rule;
introduction of European control—Deposition of Ismail
Pasha—Tewfik becomes Khedive—Military revolts—Disorganization
of the country—Joint action of the English and French; its
failure—Naval demonstration—Bombardment of the forts of
Alexandria—The French withdraw and leave Great Britain to act
alone—British troops sent to Egypt—The Suez Canal seized—Base
of operations established at Ismailia—Action of Tel
el-Makhuta—Clearing the communications—Actions at Kassassin,
August 28th and September 7th—Character of the Egyptian
army—Night march on Tel el-Kebir—The enemy is overwhelmed,
September 13th—Pursuit; losses—End of the war—Return of the
Coldstream to England.
The hostilities conducted by England in Egypt in 1882 have been
described as a mere bondholders' war. This, in a sense, is true, for our
intimate relations with that country, which eventually led to military
operations, were ostensibly due to our desire to protect the financial
interests of those who had lent money to its ruler. But this is far from
being the whole truth, because other and higher motives induced Great
Britain to intervene in the internal affairs of the native government.
Facing alike the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and containing within
its limits the isthmus of Suez, Egypt, besides being the key of the
valley of the Nile, commands the most convenient water communications to
India, to the further East, and to Australia. Having interests of a
vital nature to defend in this far-distant quarter of the globe, it is
evident we could never remain unconcerned if anarchy were to prevail in
a region through which the main lines pass that connect together
portions of the British Empire. Nor was the problem a new one. At the
close of the last and at the commencement of the present century,
England was struggling with the French for supremacy in India, and at
that time Napoleon—then in the beginning of his great career—made a
descent upon Egypt to secure a road to that Empire for his own nation.
We were then obliged to drive his soldiers out, and, having succeeded in
doing this, we prevented the French from forming an Asiatic dominion.
Still the trouble continued, in a minor degree, until 1809, when we took
the island of Mauritius from them, on which they depended, to base their
operations against our possessions. From this date their power in the
East declined; and England, relieved from rivalry, has thenceforward
been able to exercise an undivided influence in India. If in the
beginning of this century it was necessary to prevent France from
interfering with our national expansion; so was it also the more
necessary to restrain the Egyptians from obstructing (as we apprehended)
our communications in 1882,—when the Suez canal having been opened
(1869), nearly all our Eastern commerce was squeezed through that narrow
passage, and when the importance of African exploration was adding
greater value to the valley of the Nile.
Egypt has passed through some vicissitudes during the last sixty years.
Still considered in theory to be a portion of the Turkish Empire, it was
formerly ruled directly by the Porte, until Muhammad Ali, the
Governor-General, or Vali, rebelled, and wrested concessions from the
Sultan. In 1841, the Governorship was vested in him and in his heirs,
and subsequent Firmans having been granted in his favour, Egypt became
practically an independent principality. The last privilege accorded to
his successors was the right to contract foreign loans without the
previous consent of the Porte, and this right to run into debt was
freely indulged in by Muhammad Ali’s grandson, Ismail Pasha. The latter,
after becoming Viceroy—or Khedive, as the title is called—embarked in
wild speculations, and indulged in unbounded extravagance. Desiring,
like his grandfather, to erect an independent state by the adoption of
European civilization, he failed to understand how this civilization was
to be brought about. He hastened to produce its effects by an immense
expenditure of money, but he omitted to establish an efficacious
administration to curb peculation, or to introduce order into his
affairs. Numerous speculators of every nationality rushed forward to
help him to dissipate his fortune, and it was not long before he
involved the people in financial ruin. As the import of alcohol corrupts
a barbarous tribe, so did the influx of foreign gold demoralize this
Muslim government.
Now, even if England had been prepared to let the bondholders shift for
themselves in this crisis, so were not the other European nations; and
to prevent so important a country from falling into the hands of any one
of them, all agreed to intervene and regulate the evil that had been
brought about. Thus Ismail, emancipated from the rule of Turkey, fell
under the domination of European control. It is scarcely necessary to
describe the various steps taken to secure reform in the financial
concerns of Egypt. England and France were more interested in the matter
than any other of the Powers. They acted harmoniously together, assumed
a joint direction over the affairs of the country, and gradually
tightened their hold upon the government. Thereupon the Khedive became
restive, and as he would not fall in with the new order established to
correct his maladministration, he was removed from Cairo. The authority
of the Sultan, as Suzerain, was now requisitioned by Europe: Ismail was
deposed, and his son, Tewfik Pasha, reigned in his stead, by favour of
the Western Powers (June 26, 1879).
It was easy to see that such an undefined condition of things was not
likely to last long. However beneficial to the people an honest
administration might be, the interference of foreign officials in the
internal affairs of another state, to whose ruler they owed no
allegiance, could not but produce friction, and lead to trouble. It is
true, Tewfik was pliant, and submitted without difficulty to the
unprecedented constitution that was forced upon him; also, that there
was little or no public opinion in the country, and apparently no centre
of resistance to thwart the action of England and France. Nevertheless,
the new Khedive soon lost his authority over his subjects, and
resistance did arise, sooner than might have been expected. It
originated where it ought least to have been found—in the army, where
insubordination showed itself as soon as the native government was
weakened and became contemptible in the eyes of the people, and when
economy was introduced into the war department. Early in 1881, a
military rising was threatened, and with difficulty was it appeased;
but, later, a more serious event occurred (September 9th), when the
Colonel of one of the native regiments, named Arabi Bey, took the lead,
and, surrounding the Khedive’s palace with 4000 men, demanded, with arms
in his hands, the redress of grievances from his Prince. Destitute of
all real power, Tewfik was unable to crush this revolt; he met the
mutineers, tried to conciliate them, and gave in to their demands. A
change of government took place, and the Chamber of Notables was
convened. From that moment Arabi’s influence grew stronger, the army
became devoted to him, and around him rallied all groups of the people
who were dissatisfied with foreign interference. “Egypt for the
Egyptians” was now the cry, and the newly appointed Chamber, far from
allaying the trouble, added fuel to the flames of discontent that were
already kindled. It was evident the crisis could not be much longer
deferred.
The French urged the British Government to take active measures to
support the Joint Control which then existed in Egypt, and the latter
were quite willing to carry out this advice. On the 6th of January,
1882, an Identical or Dual Note was presented to the Khedive, expressing
the determination of the two nations “to ward off by their united
efforts all cause of external or internal complications which might
menace the _régime_ established in Egypt.” The Notables answered this
challenge by claiming the right of regulating the national budget, and
Tewfik’s action became somewhat uncertain. It could not be accurately
ascertained whether he meant to stand by his European allies who had
placed him upon the throne, or whether he was about to throw in his lot
with the national party. At any rate, Arabi, advanced to the dignity of
Pasha, became still more powerful, and was appointed Minister for War.
Now, in England, there was a certain feeling in favour of the Egyptians,
and this might be expected to find expression among the supporters of
the Liberal party then in power, who claim, perhaps with greater
emphasis than others, to respect the liberties of mankind, and to listen
to the grievances of all who complain. It is against our custom to
stifle the voice of an assembly, however feebly it may be supposed to
represent the wishes of a people, and in this crisis there were not
wanting some who hesitated to sanction the use of coercive measures. Nor
was there a total absence of a _primâ facie_ cause of discontent; for
the European officials of every nationality had multiplied in Egypt, and
in 1882 there were as many as 1324, receiving salaries from the taxes
that amounted to a considerable proportion of the revenue,—to £373,704
per annum.[403] It is possible that if we had not deferred to the French
at this juncture, we might have put an end to the commotion without
resorting to war, and that, had we been the sole trustee for European
interests, we might have found some satisfactory solution to the
difficulty. But, as had happened before, we were fettered by our
alliance with the French, which was not defined, and in order to
maintain our relations with them, we followed their lead.
-----
Footnote 403:
_Annual Register_, 1882, pt. i. 361 (note). See, also, D. Mackenzie
Wallace, _Egypt and the Egyptian Question_, p. 135 (London, 1883).
-----
The Dual Note having only intensified the trouble, our Government
despaired of maintaining order unless some vigorous action were taken to
disperse it. They believed that the best course under the circumstances
was to resort to the only legal means which then existed: viz. to
revive, in some shape, the dormant rights of suzerainty which the Sultan
claimed, which in theory had never been abrogated, and which had been
made use of, as we have seen, less than three years before, with the
consent of all the European Powers. It was therefore contemplated to
utilize the Turks, under certain conditions and restrictions, to put an
end to the deadlock, and to prevent Egypt from becoming the prey to the
anarchy that appeared to be imminent. Whether the remedy would have
proved efficacious and satisfactory need not now be discussed; for the
French objected to any such arrangement, and, to please them, we
acquiesced in the objection. Then they proposed that the Anglo-French
fleets should make a demonstration before Alexandria, and in this we
readily concurred without any agreement as to subsequent action. The
plan was therefore put into execution (May 20th). But far from appeasing
the tumult, this step only aggravated it. The authority of the Khedive
was now completely effaced, and Arabi became dictator. The excitement of
the people increased, a serious riot occurred in Alexandria (June 11th),
and earthworks for the defence of the town began to be thrown up. It was
not easy to recede before this defiance. The British Admiral demanded
that the construction of fortifications should be stopped, and, later,
that they should be surrendered to him. The demand was resisted. It was
then deemed necessary to take them at any risk, and to destroy by force
the power of Arabi, who was proclaimed a rebel against his Prince.[404]
And now a strange event occurred. The French, though they succeeded in
inducing our Government to defer to their wishes, were not bound to us
in any way. Having gone just far enough to ensure an armed intervention,
they refused to take their share in it, and, when hostilities were
imminent, their fleet sailed away from the scene where they must
commence.
-----
Footnote 404:
The precise date, says a writer of the day, on which the Khedive’s
troops became rebels could be no more accurately ascertained than that
of the discovery that the “military tyranny” imposed by Arabi,
received the cordial sympathy and support of nearly every class
throughout Egypt (_Annual Register_, 1882, i. 369). It was not until
the 16th of July, after the war began, that the Khedive issued an
order dismissing Arabi from his post as Minister of War (_Military
History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt_, p. 16; prepared in the
Intelligence Branch of the War Office, by Colonel J. F. Maurice, Royal
Artillery). As we have frequently drawn from this work, in future it
will be referred to as “Maurice, _Official Account_.”
-----
The bombardment of the earthworks followed on the 11th of July, and it
is needless to say that our navy soon reduced the enemy’s guns to
silence, and drove him out of Alexandria. Arabi’s troops having retired,
blue-jackets and marines were landed to restore order in the town.
Meanwhile a force, drawn from Malta and Gibraltar, had been concentrated
at Cyprus, and was commanded by Major-General Sir Archibald Alison,
Bart., K.C.B., who arrived in the island, July 14th. These troops were
speedily moved therefrom, and, reaching Alexandria on the 17th, they
took up a line fronting the Egyptian army at Kafr-ed-Dauer, that lay a
few miles south of the coast covering the road to Cairo.[405]
-----
Footnote 405:
See Maps No. 9, p. 379, and No. 8, p. 360. Some future historian may
perhaps consider what the result would have been if the fleet had been
provided with a land force when the war was begun by the bombardment
of the 11th, and whether the revolt against foreign interference could
have been strangled in Alexandria, before it grew and required a
regular invasion to suppress it. Into these matters we do not propose
to enter; it is sufficient to say that no means were prepared to take
military advantage of the peculiar nature of the communications which
join Alexandria with the rest of the country, and that Arabi’s troops
got away unhurt.
-----
Preparations were now actively pushed forward to follow up the first
blow struck by the British fleet for the purpose of restoring the
authority of the Khedive. A vote of credit was agreed to in Parliament,
troops were ordered to be got ready to proceed to the seat of war, and a
portion of the reserves were called up to serve during the emergency
(July 25th). The French also at last plainly expressed their intentions,
by declining definitely to take part in the expedition which had now to
be undertaken. The decision was made on the 29th of July in their
Chambers, by a majority of 416 against 75 votes. Thus Great Britain was
obliged to act alone, and if this was the result, it may seem to be a
pity that she had not been allowed to have a free hand from the
beginning. Be this as it may, she gained the advantage of being at least
unfettered in the military operations that followed, and hence the
dangers and inconvenience of a joint occupation were happily avoided.
As early as the 3rd of July, General Sir Garnet Wolseley, G.C.B.,
appointed to take command of the expedition in case hostilities were
undertaken, confidentially traced the plan of operations to be pursued.
Soon the field army was organized, among which a Guards Brigade was
included; and on the 30th of July, the first troops, the 1st Scots
Guards (Colonel Knox), left England on board the _Orient_.[406] The
other two Battalions of this Brigade, the 2nd Grenadiers (Colonel P.
Smith), and the 2nd Coldstream (Colonel G. Wigram), being at Cork and
Dublin respectively, left these stations for the seat of war as soon as
they received drafts from London to fit them to take the field. For this
purpose, the 2nd Battalion obtained from the 1st Coldstream, one
Colour-sergeant, 9 sergeants, and 204 rank and file (28th); and on the
1st of August, having proceeded to Kingstown from Richmond Barracks,
Dublin, they embarked, about 750 strong, on board the _Iberia_, and
started for Alexandria. They reached their destination on the 13th, and
moved immediately to Ramleh, where the Brigade was collecting under the
orders of Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, K.G.[407]
The following Officers formed part of the Battalion:—
_Commanding the 2nd Battalion._—Colonel G. Wigram.
_Mounted Majors._—Colonels A. Lambton; F. C. Manningham-Buller.
_Dismounted Majors and Captains._—Lieut.-Colonels J. B. Sterling;
Viscount de Vesci; R. S. Hall; W. F. Ramsden; Hon. E. Acheson; R. W.
Follett; Hon. E. Boscawen.
_Lieutenants._—Captains R. Pole-Carew; J. G. Montgomery; F. C. Manley;
L. D. Mackinnon: Lieutenants Hon. E. Dawney; Hon. H. Monck; J. R.
Gladstone; D. F. R. Dawson; G. V. Boyle; W. O. Corbet (in command of
Regimental transport); G. P. Bouverie; Hon. A. Fortescue; P. A.
Lovell (Signalling Officer); D. J. Hamilton; Hon. Alan Charteris;
and H. G. Shute; also H. Somers-Cocks (who left Portsmouth for
Egypt, August 16).
_Adjutant._—Lieutenant Hon. A. Henniker-Major.
_Quartermaster._—W. Webster.
_Medical Officers._—Surgeon-Major G. Perry; Surgeon J. Whipple, M.D.
-----
Footnote 406:
Lieut.-General Willis and Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught,
with their Staffs, were on board the _Orient_.
Footnote 407:
Captain Ivor Herbert, Grenadier Guards, was appointed Brigade Major;
Major R. Lane, Rifle Brigade, Aide-de-camp to His Royal Highness.
-----
The following Officers, also belonging to the Regiment, served upon the
Staff:—
Lieut.-Colonel Lord William Seymour, attached to the British Admiral.
Captain Pole-Carew, Orderly Officer to H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught.
Lieutenant A. Codrington, Aide-de-camp to Lieut.-General Willis,
commanding the First Division.
Before this date, Sir A. Alison had been covering the concentration of
the army at Alexandria, and, by means of strong reconnaissances, he
endeavoured to make the enemy believe that the invaders meant to attack
him from the north. But this was not the intention of Sir G. Wolseley,
whose object was to seize the Maritime Canal, and, basing himself upon
Ismailia, to advance thence to the capital of Egypt. In this manner, the
main water-way between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea would be
secured from any attempt which Arabi might make upon it, and the
invading army would obtain the best route into the interior. The route,
it is true, was far from being a good one, for it lay in a desert of
deep sand; but none of the communications of the country, other than by
rail or canal, are good, and, in fact, roads, as we understand them, may
be said to have no existence. The one selected, however, besides the
strategical advantage it offered, of enabling an army to turn the Delta,
and to proceed by the shortest way to Cairo, had along its course a
fresh-water canal, where drinking water was to be obtained, and a
railway; and both of these served as easy lines of supply. Arabi,
indeed, had done his best to render these communications useless, but he
could only obstruct them temporarily; and, though he thereby impeded our
advance, he was not able to arrest it.
The British Commander had from the beginning believed that the enemy
would make a stand at Tel el-Kebir, some thirty miles from Ismailia, on
the road to Cairo; and if this were to prove to be correct, he
determined to deliver a crushing and effective blow there, and so bring
the campaign to a speedy and prompt conclusion. We shall see that he was
entirely right in the opinion he had formed, and successful in carrying
out his plan. To ensure this success, it was necessary to push advanced
troops, of sufficient strength, from Ismailia to a point within striking
distance of Arabi’s position, behind which the water and rail
communications could be restored, and where the main army could be
concentrated for the final battle.
The forces massing at Alexandria from the middle of July came, as we
know, from the Mediterranean stations, and from the United Kingdom; but
troops, native and British, also were despatched to the seat of war from
India; and these, beginning to arrive on the 20th of August, landed at
Suez, and, later, at Ismailia. The whole formed an Army-Corps, under the
command of General Sir G. Wolseley (who landed in Egypt on August 15th),
and was made up of a cavalry division, two infantry divisions, corps
troops, and an Indian contingent. Each division was formed of two
brigades and divisional troops.
The Cavalry Division, 23 squadrons, mounted infantry, and 6 guns, under
Major-General Drury-Low: the 1st Brigade (Brigadier-General Sir Baker
Russell) contained, among others, three squadrons of Household cavalry,
under Colonel Ewart, 2nd Life Guards;[408] the 2nd Brigade
(Brigadier-General Wilkinson), Indian cavalry. The First Division, 8
battalions, 2 squadrons, and 12 guns, under Lieut.-General Willis: 1st
Brigade (three Guards Battalions), Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of
Connaught; 2nd Brigade (4 Battalions), Major-General Graham, V.C. The
Second Division, 9 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 12 guns, under
Lieut.-General Sir E. Hamley: 1st Brigade (4 battalions), Major-General
Sir A. Alison; 2nd Brigade (4 battalions), Major-General Sir E. Wood,
V.C. The Corps troops contained one battery of Royal Horse Artillery,
and three batteries of Field Artillery, 24 guns. The Indian contingent,
under Major-General Sir H. Macpherson, V.C., 4 battalions (of which 2
were native), 1 company Beluchis, 6 guns (mountain battery). Total
force, including a reserve at Aden of 2 native battalions, not brought
into the field, amounted to 23 battalions, 27 squadrons, and 60 guns,
besides Engineers, Marines, Marine Artillery, siege trains, etc.; or to
1180 Officers, and 28,300 men.[409]
-----
Footnote 408:
One squadron from each Regiment of Household Cavalry.
Footnote 409:
Appendix No. XIV. contains the order of battle.
-----
Although all this army had not landed, yet a sufficient force had been
collected to seize the Suez Canal, and to begin the real business of the
campaign. Ample preparations had already been made by the Navy for this
operation. The final details having been settled, a simultaneous landing
was effected by blue-jackets and marines at all the important places
from Port Said to Suez; and the water-way was cleared from end to end by
4 a.m. on the morning of the 20th of August.[410] Meanwhile, those
portions of the Cavalry and First Divisions that were at Alexandria were
embarked on board ship, while those of the Second Division were left
behind to protect the town, and to keep up the delusion that Egypt was
to be invaded from the north. In order to give the greater currency to
this idea, it was further given out that the troops on board ship were
destined to make an attack on Abukir. The 2nd Coldstream, which since
their arrival at Ramleh had been facing south towards Kafr-ed-Dauer,
re-embarked on the _Iberia_ on the 18th of August, and the whole fleet,
consisting of 8 ironclads and 17 transports, left in the direction of
Abukir at noon on the 19th, and approached Port Said next day, in the
early morning. As soon as possible the ships entered the canal, and,
piloted by Officers of the Royal Navy, were concentrated at Ismailia.
They grounded occasionally as they steamed through the difficult
passage, and delayed the procession; but these accidents did not
materially check the movement, which was not confined merely to the
fleet that sailed from Alexandria, but included also transports,
conveying troops direct to the seat of war, from England by Port Said,
and from India by Suez. General Graham, having landed with a small force
of infantry on the evening of the 20th, pushed forward to Nefisha early
next day; and the Guards Brigade, arriving at their destination late on
the 21st, disembarked on the 22nd. For two days they were busily engaged
in fatigue duties at Ismailia, during which time the concentration of
troops continued with unabated energy, so that on the evening of the
23rd about 9000 men were on shore.[411]
-----
Footnote 410:
Three ships, one French and two English, delayed the operation for a
few hours.
Footnote 411:
Maurice, _Official Account_ , p. 36. See Map No. 8, p. 360.
-----
The invaders were dependent for drinking water upon the fresh-water
canal previously mentioned, that runs from the Nile near Cairo to
Ismailia; and now a fear seized the military authorities that Arabi
might be able to destroy its banks, and stop the greater portion of our
supply, not only at Nefisha and Ismailia, but also as far as Suez. It
was therefore determined to send forward a small force on the 24th,
under General Graham, to occupy El-Magfar, where the danger was most to
be apprehended, and to prevent the occurrence of any such calamity. The
force (1 battalion, 3 squadrons, and 2 guns) was not a large one; but it
met with no resistance, and soon accomplished its object, not, however,
without causing the enemy to show that he was concentrating a formidable
body of men in a position further up the canal, at Tel el-Makhuta. It
was evident that the British advanced detachment, if attacked with
energy, might be unable to hold its own, and be obliged to fall back;
but it was also clear that an initial advantage could be gained if we
could bring up a sufficient force to cause the Egyptians to evacuate the
ground they were engaged in taking up. Accordingly Sir G. Wolseley, who
was present, sent back immediately to direct that the Guards Brigade at
Ismailia and a battalion of infantry at Nefisha should move to the front
without delay.
Meanwhile, the advanced troops became engaged, and a very unequal fight,
as far as the numbers of the combatants were concerned, took place under
the orders of General Willis. But the large Egyptian forces showed no
disposition to close with the small body opposed to them, and the latter
maintained their position until reinforcements, consisting of all the
three arms, arrived to their support. Just before sundown the Guards
Brigade appeared on the scene, the Coldstream leading; the Battalion
then coming into the advanced line, under shell fire which happily was
not effective, occupied an extended line of outposts during the night.
The day had been exceedingly hot and oppressive, and the operations as
well as the want of water had greatly exhausted the men, both those who
fought and those who marched to their support under a scorching sun and
through the burning sand.
“A scarcely less trying task had fallen to the lot of the Brigade of
Guards. A march over the two miles of heavy road between Ismailia and
Nefisha, difficult at any time, was, during the burning hours of the
midday sun of an exceptionally hot day, a very serious task indeed.
Throughout all the rest of the campaign, both before and after this,
troops were ordered to march in the cool hours of the early morning,
or of the late afternoon and evening. The sudden necessity for taking
advantage of the enemy’s stand at Tel el-Makhuta alone made this
severe task imperative. Even for troops in presence of the Egyptians,
the direst enemies all that day were the sun and the parching glare of
the desert sand. But at least they had the excitement of actual
fighting, and were able at all times to take advantage of any shade
that waggons and hillocks afforded, and they had not during those
hours of fierce heat the additional labour of plodding over sand,
burning to the feet and ankle deep. Man after man during the march was
knocked down by the severity of the strain, and by stroke of the sun.
All who were physically able pushed on with honest pride and steady
discipline, but it was not until 6.20 p.m. that the march was over,
and that H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught was able to bring up his Brigade
to the support of the troops engaged.”[412]
-----
Footnote 412:
Maurice, _Official Account_ , p. 49. One man of the Coldstream, struck
down by sun apoplexy, died at Nefisha next day (25th).
-----
N^o. 8.
[Illustration:
THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF
TEL EL-KEBIR
FROM THE
SUEZ CANAL TO ZAGAZIG
AND THE COUNTRY ROUND
SUAKIN
]
Mintern Bros. Photo lith. A.D. Innes & C^o. London.
At daybreak (25th), an advance was made by the First Division, General
Graham in front, followed by the Guards Brigade in support, and,
protecting the right flank, the King’s Royal Rifles and Marine Light
Infantry, who had just come up, in second line; the Cavalry, under
General Drury Low, on the extreme right front. Tel el-Makhuta was found
to be abandoned by the enemy; but the Cavalry, still pushing on, found
him at Mahsama, where, after a short struggle, they not only dislodged
him but captured his camp, seven Krupp guns, and a large quantity of
ammunition, stores, and provisions. Next day we took possession of
Kassassin, and it was occupied by General Graham, the Guards being left
at Tel el-Makhuta.
Meanwhile the disembarkation of men, horses, guns, and stores of all
sorts still continued at Ismailia. As the English advanced troops had
reached Kassassin,—within striking distance of Tel el-Kebir, where Arabi
was known to be entrenching, with the object of making a definite stand
against us,—it was now necessary to bring up all available forces for
the assault of his lines. General Sir E. Hamley was therefore ordered
round to Ismailia from Alexandria with the Second Division (except Sir
E. Wood’s brigade, which was directed to remain there for the defence of
the town and neighbourhood); so also was the Indian contingent moved up
from Suez. While the concentration was in progress, communications were
restored as rapidly as possible between the base and Kassassin. The line
of railway was repaired where it was torn up, and where embankments of
earth had been found to block it; and rolling stock brought out from
England was landed and placed upon it. The fresh-water canal also was
cleared by removing the dams, which had been constructed across it at
Makhuta and Magfar. The Guards Brigade remained at Makhuta until the 9th
of September, busily engaged in digging away the obstructions that
impeded the traffic on the railway and on the canal at these two points,
and partly in throwing up redoubts to strengthen the lines of
communications. It was a laborious work;—
“for the skilful dam-makers ... had so wattled in reeds, telegraph
wires, and other binding materials into the mass of the earthworks,
that our men, standing in the muddy canal without any convenient
foothold, had the greatest difficulty in removing the obstacles.”[413]
-----
Footnote 413:
Maurice, _Official Account_ , p. 55.
-----
Supplies also ran short, on account of the impossibility of conveying
them across the deep sand, through which lay the only road to the front,
until the railway or canal could be used.
“But the most trying circumstance which the rapid movement had
entailed was the absence of tents and camp equipage. These were pushed
on by rail and canal as rapidly as the condition of both permitted,
but for some days the necessity of depending for chance shade upon the
shelter of the trees and villages under that glaring sun called for
much endurance on the part of the troops so employed. It was the price
paid for the rapid successes of the 24th and 25th. The tents reached
the troops at Tel el-Makhuta on the 28th. The valises of the men
reached them on the following day.”[414]
-----
Footnote 414:
_Ibid._ , p. 57.
-----
Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties to be overcome, the scorching
heat, and the shadeless glare, the work was well and expeditiously
performed. The following communication from Colonel Drake, Commanding
Royal Engineer of the First Division, refers to what the Brigade did at
this period of the campaign:—[415]
_Tel el-Makhuta_, August 30, 1882. I wish to bring to the notice of
the Lieutenant-General Commanding, the excellent work which has been
done by the Brigade of Guards on the important work, of opening the
communications on the railway and canal. Engineering work, always
fatiguing to troops fully employed on military duties, has been
especially harassing in this climate; but in consequence of the great
interest shown in the work by the Guards Officers in charge of
parties, it has been executed by the men cheerfully and well, and it
is my opinion, that had this spirit not been shown by Officers and
men, the progress of the army must have been for several days delayed.
-----
Footnote 415:
An extract of a report upon the signalling performed in Egypt by the
Coldstream is reproduced in Appendix No. XIV.
-----
Once, on the 28th of August, this labour was interrupted for a brief
space. On that day the enemy attempted to make an attack on Kassassin,
which, owing to the fact that it was commanded by hills in his
possession, was not a strong military position. Having made a
demonstration in the morning, which resulted only in a distant artillery
fire of little value, Arabi ordered a more vigorous attack upon General
Graham in the afternoon, and this produced some fighting, and a charge
conducted in moonlight by the three squadrons of the Household Cavalry.
The Egyptians then retired, and the action came to an end; but as soon
as it was perceived that the enemy was endeavouring to recapture
Kassassin, the Guards Brigade were hurried forward from Makhuta to the
threatened point, and were placed in reserve. The three Battalions did
not return to their quarters until midnight.
On the 7th of September, communications were cleared, a railway service
was established, the main bulk of the supplies and stores—of which large
quantities had already been despatched to the front—were ready to be
sent forward, and the remaining troops, hitherto kept back at Ismailia,
were awaiting to be moved to Kassassin. Orders to concentrate the army
there were given, when Arabi made one more attempt to defeat the
advanced troops opposed to him at that place, before the rest came into
position (September 9th). His previous efforts had failed; and it was
scarcely likely that, having effected so little before—although in
contact with a small portion of the British forces only—he would now be
able to achieve a success at this late stage of the war. The attack was
nevertheless a formidable one in point of numbers, and almost the whole
of the hostile forces, supported by a powerful artillery, were employed
in it. But it was easily repulsed, and the enemy was pursued towards Tel
el-Kebir, where he ran for shelter.[416] During the action, the Guards
Brigade were once more moved forward from Makhuta to remain in reserve
should their services be required; but they were not brought into
action. It seems probable that, had the advance of the First and Cavalry
Divisions, who were then present, been continued, Arabi would then and
there have been driven out of his entrenched position. The pursuit,
however, was not pressed home. Instead of returning to their former
camp, the Guards remained for the next few days on the ground they
occupied on the evening of the 9th.
-----
Footnote 416:
Our losses amounted to 3 killed and 77 wounded.
-----
The Egyptian army could scarcely be considered a very formidable foe.
The Generals had shown little military capacity, the native Officers no
enterprise or power of leadership, and the men in consequence had
displayed but a small amount of valour. Drawn principally from the
fellaheen, or the peasantry of the country, the ranks of the forces
opposed to us were filled with men who had no desire to excel in the
profession of arms; and during the first combats of the campaign we
gained ample proof of their inefficiency in the field.[417] As regards
their numbers, we are informed that at the date of the bombardment (July
11th), the Egyptian army consisted in all of about 9000 men, 288 field
guns, and only 750 horses. Of these, 5000 were in Alexandria, the rest
being dispersed over the country. The reserves were called in
afterwards, and the 9000 expanded to 60,000, by the 20th of August; when
15,000 were before Alexandria, 12,000 at Tel el-Kebir, 11,000 at Cairo,
and 22,000 were distributed in remote garrisons unmolested by the
invaders; besides this, there were 6000 Beduin Arabs, half at Tel
el-Kebir and the remainder before Alexandria. Again, later, 40,000 raw
recruits without training were enlisted, and the total of the army
reached the high figure of 100,000 men, not counting the Beduins. For
all these men, it appears, arms were available, and 11,000 untrained
draft horses were procured.[418] These vast numbers of undisciplined and
unorganized men could do little to serve Arabi’s cause, and they seem to
have been rather a source of weakness to him. Unable to fight, they were
liable to panic, and their presence was more calculated to unsteady the
few soldiers who alone possessed some knowledge of their duties than to
augment the strength of the army.
-----
Footnote 417:
Arabi’s force contained a few battalions of Sudanese, or black troops;
the latter were his best soldiers, and fought well.
Footnote 418:
Maurice, _Official Account_ , p. 40, etc.
-----
By the evening of the 12th of September, the whole available British
forces were at Kassassin, some eight miles from Tel el-Kebir, and
numbered 634 Officers, and 16,767 Non-commissioned officers and men, 61
guns, and 6 gatlings. Previous to this date, several reconnaissances had
been undertaken towards the enemy’s entrenched position to examine his
works, and to observe his strength, disposition, and habits. The
knowledge so gained could only confirm the poor opinion in which the
enemy deserved to be held. His lines were continuous, stretching from
the canal for a distance of some 6000 yards; but they were not
apparently protected by any advanced works, nor provided with efficient
inner entrenchments. They seemed to present little difficulty to
storming parties, nor were any formidable obstacles visible.[419] The
left (north) flank, moreover, was entirely open and unguarded; and,
lastly, no outposts secured the front during the night. Thus feebly did
Arabi venture to oppose the army of one of the great Powers of Europe;
and if he was unable to bring civilized science to his aid, so also were
his troops incapable of displaying the wild heroism that belongs to the
barbarian. In short, he invited a night attack either on his left flank
or in front; with the certainty that, if the invaders could reach unseen
the position he endeavoured to fortify, they could turn it or penetrate
it, before he was ready to meet them; and the whole of his defences
would be rendered useless. This would bring about his complete defeat,
and the dispersal of his raw levies, who eagerly watched for an early
opportunity to desert and fly to their homes.
-----
Footnote 419:
The lines were afterwards found to consist of a parapet from 3 to 5½
feet high, with a ditch in front, about 4 feet deep; they were
stronger in the south, near the canal, than on the north, where, in
fact, they died away, as it were, into nothing in the desert.
-----
It is, however, one thing to perceive after the event, what ought to be
done, but quite another thing to determine beforehand, the best line of
action, and to ensure a result as successful and decisive as the assault
on Tel el-Kebir proved to be. The night march across the desert was by
no means an easy operation. It entailed the bringing up the whole army
in battle array, through the dark, close to a given position at a given
time. Careful arrangements to prevent confusion had to be therefore made
on the part of the leaders, from the Commander-in-chief downwards; and
attention and rigid discipline were more than ever required on the part
of the men who were thus led to the assault. It is needless to say that
all ranks vied with one another in discharging correctly the important
functions that every man had to perform during that night; and in this
manner was the difficult operation carried through without hitch, and
even without temporary delay. It should be added here, that fortune also
favoured us in no small degree. Arabi had, in fact, constructed one, and
only one, advanced work in front of his lines of defence; but it had not
been discovered during our reconnaissances, and we were ignorant of its
existence. By good luck that work was avoided by our columns, as they
went forward in the dark to the attack. Thus we managed to cross the
desert unperceived by so dangerous a tell-tale of our movement, and
arrived at dawn before the hostile lines, close enough to storm them
before the Egyptians even knew that we were in their vicinity.
A conspicuous point in the lines had been selected upon which to direct
the march of the Second (Hamley’s) Division; Sir A. Alison’s Highlanders
in front, followed by a brigade formed of the two Divisional battalions
of the infantry divisions, under Lieut.-Colonel Ashburnham, C.B., King’s
Royal Rifle Corps. The First Division was on Sir E. Hamley’s right, with
an interval of 1200 yards; General Graham’s brigade in front, supported
by the Guards 1000 yards in rear. Forty-two guns were placed between the
two divisions, in line with the Guards Brigade. The Cavalry Division
with 12 guns Royal Horse Artillery were on the extreme right. The Indian
contingent and the Mountain battery, on the south of the canal, with
orders to move off an hour after the rest of the army.
The troops began to strike their tents when dusk set in, and marched to
their various rendezvous not without difficulty. It was, of course,
imperative that every corps should reach its starting-point in proper
order, and there was naturally some moving backwards and forwards in the
dark before the masses were correctly formed and aligned. The Brigade
took post in their usual formation, the Coldstream on the left, and each
Battalion was in columns of half battalions. Everything was ready at 11
p.m.; the men then lay down till 1.30 a.m. of the 13th of September,
when they arose in silence, and commenced the advance. We had the
advantage of meeting no obstacles in the way; the trackless gravelly
soil everywhere afforded an easy passage, and, guided by the stars
alone, the army maintained the direction of their march.
At night, however, men are always somewhat under the influence of a
vague and undefined feeling. The absence of sound, the inability to see
for more than a few feet, the sense of isolation which every group
experiences, the strange surroundings, the uncertainty of the future,
the idea that some untoward event may happen,—all contribute to produce
a suppressed excitement almost akin to nervousness.[420] The principal
danger lay in the fact that should the centre halt, the wings would
continue to move, and so wheel inwards, until one flank faced the other.
This actually occurred in the Highland Brigade; but the mishap went no
further, and was very speedily rectified by the vigilance, discipline,
and intelligence of all ranks. The First Division moved more slowly than
the Second, and its leading brigade appears to have executed some
changes of formation during the night; the Guards, following in support,
made no change in this respect, but marched in the order in which they
had originally started. Just before reaching the enemy’s position, the
British army was in an irregular _echelon_; the left was forward and
nearest to the enemy, and the right was about 800 yards back.
-----
Footnote 420:
“It is impossible adequately to convey an impression of the absolute
silence which prevailed, and of the entire absence of any indication
of the existence of a moving army at only a few yards from each of the
columns” (Maurice, _Official Account_ , p. 82).
-----
The Egyptians say their forces at Tel el-Kebir amounted to 20,000 men
and 75 guns; but there seems reason to believe that they have
under-estimated their numerical strength, and that they had from 25,000
to 30,000 men present.[421]
-----
Footnote 421:
Maurice, _Official Account_ , p. 92. If there is no exaggeration in
the total numbers which, we are told, the rebel government collected
after the bombardment of the 11th of July, and in the number of guns
which were at their disposal at that date, it would appear likely that
at least 30,000 men instead of 20,000 men must have been present at
Tel el-Kebir; and it is somewhat a surprise to find that Arabi had
only so small a force of artillery defending his lines, as 75 guns,
when as many as 288 were apparently available at his orders.
-----
As the enemy had no outposts to cover his front; and as we had been
fortunate enough to pass by the only advanced work he had constructed,
without coming in contact with it,—though our left was at one time
unpleasantly close to it,—he had no sort of warning that our whole army
was approaching his defensive position, and would assault it at
daybreak. He was completely surprised. At 5 a.m., when the first gleam
of light was beginning to appear, the Highlanders were close to Tel
el-Kebir, and, dashing forward, they carried, after a brief but sharp
struggle, the defensive lines in which Arabi apparently had placed so
much confidence. While this fight was proceeding, General Graham’s
brigade hurried up, and penetrated the Egyptian lines, where they
presented a smaller obstacle than did those which faced the Second
Division. The battle lasted scarcely half an hour. By the end of that
time, the enemy was entirely overpowered, and his forces were
annihilated and completely dispersed. The Guards followed, and got into
the works as soon as possible, but the short action was then practically
at an end.
“The first of the enemy’s shells landed in the middle of some
vedettes, about eighty yards to our left front; nearly all the rest
fell about one hundred yards in rear of us. As we advanced the
Egyptians did not seem to alter their elevation. The bullets were
falling all around us; but firing ceased at about 6 a.m., except our
guns blazing at the flying Arabs.”[422]
-----
Footnote 422:
Captain Shute (Coldstream Guards), _Diary_ .
-----
The cavalry was ordered immediately to pursue the enemy to Cairo, the
infantry advancing into and occupying the Egyptian camp and the bridge
at Tel el-Kebir. The former pushed boldly on to a suburb of the capital,
whence Lieut.-Colonel Herbert Stewart went forward with a small force of
fifty men, and secured the capitulation of the town and the surrender of
Arabi (September 14th). Egypt now lay at the mercy of the British
army.[423]
-----
Footnote 423:
See Appendix No. XIV., giving Her Majesty’s message to the British
army, and Sir G. Wolseley’s General Orders, issued after the battle of
Tel el-Kebir.
-----
The losses of Arabi’s forces at the battle of the 13th of September can
scarcely be reckoned by the killed and wounded; for such was the extent
of the disaster he experienced, that he had no further troops at the end
of the action. Many fled to their homes, many rushed wildly onwards
panic-stricken; all idea of further resistance had come to an end; every
man only thought how he could best make his submission, and welcome the
conquerors with demonstrations of joy. The Egyptian casualties are
reckoned at 2500, and 58 of their guns were captured. The British lost 9
Officers and 48 men killed, 27 Officers and 355 men wounded, and 30
missing, total 469. Of these the Highlanders lost 45 killed, 180
wounded, and 6 missing; General Graham’s brigade 9 killed, 119 wounded,
and 24 missing; the Guards Brigade 1 man killed, and 2 Officers and 20
men wounded; in the Coldstream, 1 Officer (Lieut.-Colonel J. B.
Sterling), and 7 men were wounded,—of the latter, one man subsequently
died of his wounds.[424]
-----
Footnote 424:
Lieut.-Colonel Balfour, Grenadier Guards, reckoned among the wounded,
died of his wounds; as did also two Officers of the Highland Brigade.
-----
The victorious forces pushed on towards Cairo after the battle, and
secured all the railway centres which communicated with the Egyptian
garrisons, still held by the enemy. There was little trouble in causing
these garrisons to submit, and by the 24th the whole country was
pacified and disarmed. General Willis, with his 2nd Brigade and
Divisional infantry, remained at Tel el-Kebir for a short time longer,
while Sir G. Wolseley, with the Duke of Connaught, and a company of the
Scots Guards as escort, went by train, on the afternoon of the 14th, to
the capital, followed by the rest of the Scots Guards, by the
Coldstream, and by the Grenadier Guards. Owing to obstructions on the
line, the Commander-in-chief did not reach his destination until the
morning of the 15th; and the Coldstream, starting the same day, reached
Cairo that afternoon. The Battalion were then quartered in the Abdin
barracks.
The rebellion had now been crushed, and the Khedive’s authority having
been completely restored, Tewfik entered his capital in state on the
25th, and resumed his place in the government of the country. British
troops, and among them the Guards, lined the streets, which were gaily
decked with triumphal arches and inscriptions of welcome. If it is
allowable to compare a small event with a great one, the scene was in a
very minor degree (in principle, at least), not wholly unlike that which
attended the return of the Bourbons to Paris in 1815. The “Usurper” in
this case was not redoubtable, nor had he scourged Europe as had his
proto-type; but he had interfered with the legal gains of European
bondholders, and withstood the wishes and designs of the Western
nations. The people, also, in the two cases, not having much will of
their own, like many others in a similar position, were influenced by
one very simple and burning desire—to give their hearty applause to the
strongest party.
A draft from England left for the Battalion, under Lieut.-Colonel F.
Graves-Sawle and Lieutenant E. Wigram, September 11th; but they were too
late to take part in any of the hostilities that marked the campaign,
and they went no further than Malta.
There is little more to record. The six weeks spent in Cairo passed
agreeably enough, and many eagerly availed themselves of the opportunity
to see the sights and the remains of an ancient civilization that makes
Egypt one of the most interesting countries in the world. Nor was a
race-meeting forgotten, held on the 28th of September, even though other
national sports and pastimes had to be discarded on account of the heat.
A serious accident, that occurred the same day at the railway-station of
Cairo, may also be mentioned. An accidental explosion took place in a
waggon laden with ammunition, near the platform, and, as the flames
could not be got under, the station buildings were soon destroyed, and
much rolling stock and a considerable amount of stores were burnt.
Troops were at once sent to the spot, and amongst them the 2nd
Coldstream assisted to clear away the _débris_, and guard the place;
several smaller explosions continued even during the night.
On the 30th of September a review was held before the Khedive, and the
spectacle was made as imposing as possible to impress the natives, not
only by the appearance of English troops, but also by the presence of
the Indian contingent—Mussulmans like themselves—in the service of Her
Majesty. Two days later, the Khedive gave a garden party at the Gezireh
palace, to which all Officers were invited in “full dress,” the latter
being defined for the occasion, “red serges, swords, and forage caps.”
Lastly, there was the famous procession of the “Sacred Carpet,” carried
through Cairo on its way to Mecca, and escorted by British troops—an
incident which gave rise to some comment in England.
“I had a good deal of difficulty,” writes Captain Shute in his diary,
“to find the camel with the carpet, as it had gone another way to the
station so as to avoid the British escort. Tremendous procession of
Arabs with banners; behind the camel with the carpet came several more
camels bearing pilgrims to Mecca, and their baggage.”
The health of the troops gave some cause for anxiety on account of fever
and other illnesses, which broke out among them; and, in consequence,
several Officers and men of the Battalion had to be sent home invalided.
But the sickness was not abnormally great, considering the fatigues and
the privations to which the men were subjected during the campaign; the
losses of the Battalion in this respect amounted to eighteen men, of
whom twelve died of fever.
Soon after the Carpet incident the war organization of the invading army
was broken up, and Sir A. Alison, being left in Cairo with a British
force, while the re-settlement of Egypt was being accomplished,
arrangements were made to send the remainder home to England, and the
Indian contingent to India. The Coldstream, leaving their quarters in
Cairo on the 31st of October by train for Alexandria, embarked there,
the next day, on board the _Batavia_, and, reaching Portsmouth on the
16th, proceeded thence to Chelsea barracks.
It only remains to record that, in recognition of the services of the
army in Egypt in 1882, Her Majesty was graciously pleased to augment the
honourable distinctions upon the Colours of the regiments engaged in the
campaign by the words “Egypt, 1882,” and “Tel el-Kebir.”
Thus was the war in Egypt conducted, and thus did the British army
conquer Arabi Pasha, and subject the country once more to the rule of
Tewfik. A new period now commenced, when Egypt was placed under the
protection of England—a temporary protection only, as the Foreign
Secretary of the day eagerly announced,—who assumed the responsibility
of forming a pure administration out of discordant elements, and of
educating the people to respect the system which was introduced for
their benefit. The success that has attended our efforts, under
difficult circumstances, is an interesting subject; so also is the
resentment which the French pretend to feel—because we are obliged to
stay in a land we conquered and saved from what might have been anarchy,
when they would not move themselves to put an end to the trouble. But
the consideration of these matters does not enter into the scope of this
volume, as the Coldstream was not employed in the work of Egyptian
reconstruction. A question, closely connected with our intervention,
did, however, still remain to be settled, and it very speedily involved
us in further military operations, in which the Regiment took its share.
We must therefore devote the next two chapters to the causes and conduct
of this war.
CHAPTER XVI.
FIRST PART OF THE WAR IN THE SUDAN, 1884-85—EXPEDITION
UP THE NILE.
General description of the possessions of the Khedive in 1882—Rebellion
in the Sudan; rapid rise of the Mahdi—Policy of the British
Government—General Gordon sent to Khartum; he is cut off and
besieged there—General Lord Wolseley goes to Egypt—Formation of a
Camel Corps, of which the Guards compose a Regiment—Problem how to
effect the rescue of Gordon—The Nile route selected—Advance to
Korti—News from General Gordon—Two columns advance from Korti: one
across the Bayuda Desert, the other up the river—Battles of Abu Klea
and Abu Kru—The Nile reached near Metemmeh—Sir C. Wilson’s effort to
proceed to Khartum—Death of General Gordon—Change of plan entailed
by this event—Battle of Kirbekan—Retrograde movement of both
columns—Troops placed in summer quarters.
Egypt proper is generally a long and narrow strip of land formed by the
valley of the Nile.[425] Outside the influence of that river, there is
nothing but desert, and it is due to the fact that the stream branches
out into a Delta at Cairo, that there is any breadth at all in the
country. This great water artery receives no affluents for more than
1500 miles from its mouth—the Atbara River, meeting it above Berber,
being the last tributary that joins it,—and throughout a considerable
portion of its lower course, reckoned from the Nubian Desert northwards,
the people can only live by congregating close to its banks. A great
part of the soil, in fact, which is situated a few miles from the Nile
or from the canals that are fed by it, constructed for purposes of
irrigation, is a mere barren waste, covered by sand, and unfit for
habitation. To the south of the Nubian Desert there is the fertile
province of Dongola, and, separated from it by another desert, a rich
country, which, owning Khartum as its chief town, is watered by the
tributaries of the great river that flow down from the Abyssinian
mountains. This large region, usually called the Sudan,—which includes
the seaboard from Suakin to Massowa, and extends to about the line of
latitude eleven degrees north,—was for many a century overrun by wild
tribes of nomad Arabs, until 1820, when the Egyptians, having begun then
to invade it, gradually brought it under their rule. Later, the
territories lying still further to the south, were opened up to the
energy of the Khedives; and at the time of the war in 1882, Tewfik’s
sway, outside Egypt proper, stretched to the great water reservoirs in
the heart of the African continent close to the equator, where the Nile
takes its rise. In the government of these enormous dominions the
Khedives had been assisted by more than one Englishman, who succeeded in
partially checking the evils of the slave-trade that prevailed among the
natives, and in introducing some form of civilization in their midst. By
far the most celebrated of these administrators was Colonel, afterwards
Major-General, C. Gordon, C.B., whose illustrious name is now a
household word in England.
-----
Footnote 425:
Map No. 9, p. 379.
-----
In 1881, a rebellion broke out in the Sudan, and this calamity was
mainly brought about by two causes. In the first place, the Egyptians
misgoverned the country, and had been obliged to relax their hold upon
it, on account of the troubles that eventually involved them in war with
England. Their administration, always corrupt, became weak, and as a
matter of course the Arabs grew discontented with it. But, in the next
place, the people were deeply stirred by a tradition that fixed this
time—the completion of twelve centuries from the Hegira, November 12,
1882—as the moment when a great chief was to arise, to regenerate Islam,
and to restore the Mussulman world to its former power, glory, and
magnificence. Nor had the Sudanese to wait for the exact date fixed in
the prophecy; for a native of Dongola, named Muhammad Ahmad, proclaiming
himself to be the long-expected Mahdi, enrolled his followers, whom we
call Dervishes, headed a serious revolt, and preached a “Jehad,” or a
“Holy War,” against the authority of the Khedive. By October, 1882, when
the British were in possession of Egypt, the struggle had begun in
earnest, and the rebels had obtained some important advantages. To meet
the danger, 10,000 men of Arabi’s late army were despatched during the
winter to the south; and in March, 1883, General Hicks Pasha, a retired
British Officer who had served in India, reached Khartum to direct
military operations against the enemy. It is sad to relate that he was
poorly supported at Cairo; that, in endeavouring to drive the Mahdi from
his head-quarters at El-Obeid, he cut himself off from his
communications; and that his whole force was surrounded and entirely
destroyed. General Hicks and his Staff died with arms in their hands on
the field of battle, and none survived to tell the tale of their
misfortunes (October 7, 1883).[426] With this disaster, the bulk of the
Egyptian forces were annihilated; the dervishes acquired an immense
addition to their former strength, both material and moral: Khartum was
in danger, and there were only some 2000 men left to defend it.[427]
-----
Footnote 426:
Colonel Arthur Farquhar (late Coldstream Guards) accompanied this
ill-fated expedition, and perished in it. Some account of the good
services rendered by this Officer is given in Slatin Pasha’s recent
publication (_Fire and Sword in the Sudan, 1879-95_ , by Rudolf C.
Slatin Pasha, C.B.; translated by Major F. R. Wingate, C.B., D.S.O.,
R.A.; London, 1896; chap. viii.).
Footnote 427:
_History of the Sudan Campaign_ (compiled at the Intelligence
Department of the War Office, by Colonel Colvile, C.B., Grenadier
Guards), part i. p. 16 (London, 1889).
-----
Nor was this the only trouble, for the dervishes of the Eastern Sudan,
led by one Osman Digna, also raised the standard of revolt, and gained
several successes over the Egyptians in the autumn of 1883. In order to
save so important a port as Suakin from the ruin that seemed imminent, a
force of nearly 4000 men was despatched to oppose the rebels, under a
former British Officer, General Baker Pasha, who had rendered
distinguished service in the Turkish army during the war with Russia in
1877. But all his efforts were of no avail, for his troops also were
overwhelmed and destroyed, February 4, 1884.
These events showed how impossible it was for the Khedive to cope
single-handed with the Mahdi; so also did they put the British
Government in no small difficulty. Our intervention in Egypt had
weakened the military resources of the country, and had imposed
responsibilities upon us which had not been foreseen when we began
hostilities by the bombardment of the forts of Alexandria. We little
imagined then, that we should not only have to guard the frontiers from
the irruption of savage hordes of Arabs, but also be obliged to try to
save the Egyptian garrisons in the Sudan from the perils that menaced
them, and to prevent that slave-dealing region from relapsing into the
darkness and barbarism that oppressed it in the past. And yet little was
done. The revolt was not met at once, and it had time to grow into
formidable proportions. The power of the Mahdi increased with great
rapidity; the native tribes were unsupported, and had to submit to the
terror he inspired. It was then too late to act, unless we were prepared
to re-conquer the huge provinces which had already been devastated. It
is indeed a calamity that the first-fruits of the regeneration we
determined to effect in Egypt, should thus have been unfortunately
coupled with the abandonment of many of the Khedive’s troops to a
merciless foe, and with the obliteration of the work of civilization in
an immense tract of country, by the most cruel form of a hateful
tyranny.
It was determined to evacuate the Sudan; and General Gordon was
requested by the British Government to accomplish this difficult and
perilous mission. Accompanied by Lieut.-Colonel Donald Stewart, 11th
Hussars, he cheerfully accepted it, and reached Khartum unattended by
any force, February 18, 1884. He immediately placed the town in a state
of defence, infused new life and hopes into the panic-stricken garrison
and inhabitants, and took early measures to carry out his instructions.
But it was not long before he perceived the impossible nature of the
task that had been allotted to him. He had no soldiers available to
secure the withdrawal of the many for whose safety he was responsible,
and soon the Mahdi surrounded him, intercepted his supplies, and cut off
his communications with Egypt. In March, the enemy threatened Shendi.
The month following, he established himself in the vicinity of that
place. And towards the end of May, Berber fell. Gordon was thus shut out
from the rest of the world, and he was little more than a prisoner in
Khartum—besieged there, and fighting for his life and for those
entrusted to his charge. Retreat was impossible, and the end must
infallibly come, as soon as his powers of resistance were exhausted,
unless an expedition were sent to his relief.
Meanwhile Major-General Sir G. Graham and a British field force of some
5000 men had been landed in the neighbourhood of Suakin, to defend that
seaport and coast from the inroads of Osman Digna (February 28, 1884).
In less than a month, he had inflicted severe losses upon the followers
of that chieftain, and had pacified the district. But this was all; and
these successes bore no fruit. Graham was not ordered to advance in
force upon Berber to guard that important town and the communications
thereto with the Red Sea.[428] Instead of this, he was withdrawn from
Suakin on the 3rd of April, leaving only a small garrison behind him.
Hence, just at this critical moment, when it was obvious that the
nearest and the ordinary road to Khartum should have been secured and
made easily accessible by a light railway, the opportunity of
approaching General Gordon was neglected, and the means of enabling him
to accomplish his mission were denied him.[429] On General Graham’s
departure there was a pause for several months, during which no further
operations took place as far as we were concerned,[430] though the Arabs
continued to advance northwards; and, unopposed, they re-occupied their
former positions in the Eastern Sudan from which they had just been
expelled.
-----
Footnote 428:
A proposition had been made at this time to send 200 or 300 cavalry to
Berber, which probably they could have reached. But the General
Commanding in Egypt (Lieut.-General Sir F. Stephenson, K.C.B.) opposed
it, on the grounds that it was undesirable to fritter away our troops
in small detachments, that so weak a force in the Mahdi’s country and
unsupported there, could achieve no success, and must only add to the
numbers who had to be rescued from the Sudan.
Footnote 429:
The reader will presently see that a strong force was landed at Suakin
in the spring of 1885, to construct a railway to Berber, _when it was
too late_.
Footnote 430:
Except some battalions pushed to the frontier of Egypt to guard it
against invasion, that appeared to be threatening; also the first
preparations for laying a line of railway from Suakin to Berber, but
which was stopped at the end of August. Major-General A. Lyon
Fremantle (late Coldstream Guards) assumed command at Suakin at the
end of July.
-----
During this interval of inaction in the field, the British Cabinet
deliberated on the situation, and, having asked for advice, considered
the merits of the various schemes relating to the invasion of the Sudan
that were placed before them by the military authorities at home and on
the spot. As a result, they at length announced their determination in a
despatch, dated August 8th, when Khartum had been already beleaguered
and hidden from their view for many months. In this paper[431] they
expressed their opinion that “General Gordon, acting on his
instructions,” might still “secure the withdrawal from Khartum, either
by the employment of force or of pacific means, of the Egyptian
garrisons and of such of the inhabitants as may desire to leave;” they
announced their intention “to undertake operations for the relief of
General Gordon, should they become necessary, and to make certain
preparations in respect thereof;” and they further indicated their
resolution that the expedition—“whose general scope” was to enable
Government “to give directions at a very short notice for the despatch
of a brigade of troops of all arms to proceed to Dongola,”—was to
advance, “should the necessity arise,” along the valley of the Nile.
-----
Footnote 431:
Given in full in Colvile’s _History of the Sudan Campaign_ , part i.
p. 45. Hereafter referred to as “Colvile, _Official Account_ .”
-----
In order to produce an early moral effect upon the enemy, and to
facilitate a prompt advance into the Sudan, which every one knew was
imperative if Gordon was to be saved, Sir F. Stephenson, on the receipt
of this despatch, was anxious to send up troops without delay to
Dongola. But such a proceeding did not at once commend itself to
Government, and they still hesitated before venturing so far, even
though the movement could have been made with perfect safety. At the
same time, 400 boats, each suitable for the conveyance of 12 men and 100
rations per man up the Nile, were ordered in England on the 12th of
August, and a further number of 400 were also put in hand on the 22nd.
But it was not till a month later (September 20th) that the first
British battalion entered Dongola, and it was also only then decided (on
the 21st) that, “if necessary,” the expedition might proceed beyond that
place.[432]
-----
Footnote 432:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , part i. p. 53.
-----
Meantime, General Lord Wolseley, having been sent to Egypt to take
command, reached Cairo on the 9th of September, and two days later he
wrote home to request that a special Camel Corps might be immediately
placed at his disposal, in addition to the troops whom he proposed
should take part in the campaign. The new corps, 1200 strong, was
composed of detachments of 40 men, with one or two Officers, taken from
every Battalion of the Foot Guards (280 men), from the 16 Regiments of
Cavalry at home (640 men), and from two Battalions of the Rifle Brigade
(80 men); also 100 men from the three Regiments of Household Cavalry,
and a similar number from the Royal Marines. The corps was divided into
three sections, viz. the Guards (to which the Marines were eventually
attached), the Heavy, and the Light Camel regiments. The detachments
were quickly got together; they left England on the 26th of September,
and landed at Alexandria on the 7th of October.
The command of the Guards Camel regiment was assigned to Lieut.-Colonel
Hon. E. Boscawen, Coldstream Guards; the Adjutant being Lieutenant C.
Crutchley, Scots Guards; the Signalling Officer, Lieut.-Colonel Bonham,
Grenadier Guards; and the Medical Officer, Surgeon J. Magill, Coldstream
Guards. The following Officers, two from each Battalion, also formed
part of the corps:[433]—
Lieut.-Colonels C. Rowley and I. Herbert; Captain E. Crabbe; Lieutenants
Count Gleichen, D'Aguilar, and R. Wolridge-Gordon: Grenadier Guards.
Lieut.-Colonel F. A. Graves-Sawle; Captain Vesey Dawson; Lieutenants
Douglas Dawson, and Hon. H. Amherst: Coldstream Guards.
Lieut.-Colonels M. Willson, and Sir W. Gordon-Cumming, Bart.;
Lieutenants A. Drummond, and B. Baden-Powell: Scots Guards.
-----
Footnote 433:
The detachments furnished by the Coldstream amounted to: from the 1st
Battalion, three sergeants, two corporals, one drummer, and 38
privates; from the 2nd Battalion, two sergeants, three corporals, one
drummer, and 38 privates. Total, 92 of all ranks.
-----
The rest of the British troops required for field operations were drawn
from our force already in occupation of Egypt.[434] Of these, 3½
battalions of infantry, and one of Marines, one squadron, most of the
artillery, and a portion of the Royal Engineers were left in garrison at
Alexandria, Cairo, and Suakin. The remainder, 9 battalions, 3 squadrons
(of the 19th Hussars), the Mounted infantry, a Camel battery, and Royal
Engineers took part in the expedition, and were disposed along the Nile
to guard the communications, and to form the fighting force.[435] In
addition, the Egyptian army was also utilized, but all, except a Camel
battery which was pushed to the front later on, were left upon the lines
of communication, not further south than Hannek.
-----
Footnote 434:
Except one Battalion, which came from India, and some 390 Canadians
(called “Voyageurs”), under Lieut.-Colonel Denison, brought to Egypt
to help our men to pilot the boats up the Nile.
Footnote 435:
The numerical strength, together with the Camel corps, appears to have
been about 10,000 men and 6 guns, and eventually 6 additional guns,
belonging to the Egyptian army. Subsequently Dongolese troops fought
with us against the enemy.
-----
N^o. 9.
[Illustration:
SKETCH MAPS TO ILLUSTRATE
EGYPTIAN _and_ SUDAN
EXPEDITIONS
Mintern Bros. Photo-lith. A.D. Innes & C^o. London.
]
Khartum, inaccessible from the south, is cut off from all ordinary
communications with the north by large tracts of almost waterless
desert, that lie between the town and Egypt and the Red Sea. The
determination, therefore, to relieve Gordon entailed a military problem
of considerable difficulty, relating to the manner in which he should be
reached in time, by a sufficient number of troops and quantities of food
supplies, and thus be enabled to retreat from the Sudan together with
those he was pledged to save. This problem has been enunciated as
follows: How to “place a force of about 5000 fighting men at or near
Shendi, at the latest by the end of the year, and to carry with them,
not only supplies for themselves, but also for the inhabitants and
garrison of Khartum.”[436] Two proposals had been made to solve it:—
1. By taking the Nile route, and advancing to the neighbourhood of
Dongola, to continue either along the river by Abu Hamed, or else to
strike across the Bayuda Desert to Metemmeh, situated on the Nile
opposite Shendi. There were many difficulties attending this proposal.
The distance from Cairo to Shendi, or Metemmeh, is as much as 1527
miles, and the navigation of the river is greatly obstructed by
cataracts, so that frequent disembarkations of men and stores would be
necessary to surmount these obstacles. Hence much time, which was an
essential element in the problem, would be consumed. Between Cairo and
Dongola (1033 miles), and indeed for quite 100 miles further on, no
enemy was to be expected; but beyond this point it was uncertain where
he might be met. The desert road from Korti, some 100 miles above
Dongola, to Metemmeh, had the advantage of avoiding the loop of the Nile
that passes round Abu Hamed, and of thus saving a distance of more than
200 miles. But it was likely to be occupied by the enemy; a distance of
24 miles, in the face of the dervishes, would have to be traversed
without water from station to station; and even if the route were opened
up, it did not offer facilities for the transport of stores, which was a
far more serious difficulty to be overcome than the mere conveyance of
the troops. The desert, in short, was only suited to enable the British
Commander to take a short cut towards Khartum, and to make a dash
forward to Gordon’s relief, should his position become critical; and it
was in view of this consideration that he requested (September 9th) to
have a Camel corps allotted to him, as we have just seen. But under any
circumstances the expedition would have to proceed forward across many
obstacles, for more than 1100 miles from Cairo, before he could avail
himself of the services of that corps.
-----
Footnote 436:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , part i. p. 58. Shendi is about one
hundred miles north of Khartum.
-----
2. The other plan was to base the army of relief at Suakin, and to push
therefrom to Berber, a comparatively short distance of 245 miles. But
this project, though it contained several important advantages, also
presented no small difficulties. Instead of having to form a fighting
base at so very remote and inaccessible a place as Dongola, or Korti, it
would have been established at Suakin, in easy and direct communication
with the centre of our national resources, and where men, and stores of
even the heaviest description, could be readily accumulated as they were
required. Owing to the fact that Osman Digna had been unmolested since
the spring of the year, he had again taken up an offensive attitude in
the Eastern Sudan; Berber also was occupied by the enemy, and hence it
was hopeless to suppose that there would be any less fighting upon this
route than there would be on the other. This, however, taken by itself
was not of great moment. But another circumstance of the utmost
importance has to be mentioned. There appears to be a more serious
dearth of water in one section of the desert, between the Red Sea and
the Nile, than in the worst place on the road from Korti to Metemmeh;
and a greater distance to be traversed from well to well in the former
(58 miles) than in the latter (24 miles). Herein lay the main difficulty
of the Suakin-Berber route. To overcome it, a light railway was
necessary to span the whole distance; and it had been calculated that it
would have taken three months to achieve such an undertaking. If
successful, the advance from Berber to Shendi (95 miles) would have been
easily accomplished.
It is not our intention to compare these two methods of solving the
problem that had to be faced—rendered exceedingly difficult, and perhaps
not in any manner to be solved, within the short space of time allotted,
by the unfortunate way in which the Mahdi had been allowed to
consolidate his power, and to become a formidable foe. An effort has
rather been made to give, as clearly as it is possible in a few words, a
short account of the obstacles which beset both these routes, of the
conditions which surrounded the two proposals, and to explain some of
the considerations that had to be weighed when the Nile route was
adopted.
The first stage of the campaign is the history of the advance over more
than a thousand miles to Dongola, and across the many obstacles, formed
by rapids and cataracts, that interfere with the navigation of the
river. The most troublesome obstructions blocking the passage did not
begin till Gemai was reached, just above Wady Haifa, and about 780 miles
from Cairo. Up to this place, progress was made by rail and by river
steamers; though even in this section, the journey entailed five
disembarkations. Here the boat service began, and the first serious
difficulty had soon to be met; afterwards many others had to be
surmounted, always at the expense of much labour and of valuable time.
“To write a detailed account,” says Sir H. Colvile, “of the prolonged
struggle between man and nature which the ascent of these cataracts by
six hundred English boats involved,—how company after company, and
battalion after battalion, unloaded and loaded, rowed and tracked, day
by day, and hour by hour, under a blazing sun, against that
ever-rushing, ever-changing torrent, between unchanging walls of
burning basalt,—to tell all this in detail would be to tell an
unequalled tale of pluck, determination, and endurance, but one which
would be of little practical use in a military history.”[437]
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Footnote 437:
Colvile, _Official Account_ , part i. p. 117.
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The boats ordered in England had been despatched to Egypt with the
utmost promptitude, and such was the energy displayed that the first
troops embarked in them at Gemai on the 1st of November.[438] Assisted
by the Canadian “Voyageurs,” nearly three-fourths of the fighting force
were past that station on the 18th, struggling forward; though only some
1300 men were as far as Dongola. The Guards Camel regiment marched from
Assuan (547 miles from Cairo), and on this date were south of Dal. Korti
having been selected as the point of concentration instead of Dongola,
it was now calculated that the first infantry battalion should arrive
there by the middle of December, and the last on January 22, 1885.
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