ADMINISTRATION OF LINCOLN (CONTINUED), 1861-1865.
WAR FOR THE UNION (CONTINUED), 1863.
The Military Situation in the West--Siege and Capture of Vicksburg--The
Mississippi Opened--Battle of Chickamauga--"The Rock of
Chickamauga"--The Battle Above the Clouds--Siege of Knoxville--General
Hooker Appointed to the Command of the Army of the Potomac--His Plan of
Campaign Against Richmond--Stonewall Jackson's Stampede of the Eleventh
Corps--Critical Situation of the Union Army--Death of Jackson--Battle of
Chancellorsville--Defeat of Hooker--The Second Confederate
Invasion--Battle of Gettysburg--The Decisive Struggle of the War--Lee's
Retreat--Subsequent Movements of Lee and Meade--Confederate
Privateering--Destruction of the _Nashville_--Failure of the Attacks on
Charleston--The Military Raids--Stuart's Narrow Escape--Stoneman's
Raid--Morgan's Raid in Indiana and Ohio.
There were now such immense armies in the field and military operations
were conducted on so vast a scale that the reader must carefully study
the situation in order to gain an intelligent idea of the progress of
the momentous events. We will give our attention first to operations in
the West.
THE SITUATION IN THE WEST.
There were four Union armies in that section. The first was the one
under Rosecrans, which, on the opening days of the year, won the victory
at Murfreesboro' or Stone River, an account of which is given in the
preceding chapter. The second was near Holly Springs, under General
Grant; a third was in New Orleans, under General Banks, who had
succeeded General Butler; and the fourth was in Arkansas. The main
object of all these armies was to open the Mississippi. When that should
be accomplished, the Confederacy would be split in two. Hundreds of
thousands of beeves were drawn from Texas and the country beyond the
Mississippi, and to shut off this supply would be one of the most
effective blows that could be struck against the rebellion.
GRANT BEFORE VICKSBURG.
General Sherman had failed to capture Vicksburg, and General Grant
assumed command of the forces besieging it. He saw that the defenses
facing the Mississippi and the lower part of the Yazoo were too powerful
to be taken by storm. He decided as a consequence to turn the rear of
the lines, and, securing an entrance into the upper part of the Yazoo,
reach the rear of the batteries at Haines' Bluff.
In this important work he received valuable help from the ironclads of
Admiral Porter. With one of them he opened communication with the
squadron in the lower part of the Mississippi and disabled a Confederate
steamer under the guns of Vicksburg. Two of the boats groped their way
through the swamps and wooded creeks, where nothing more than canoes and
dugouts had ventured before, obtained a great deal of cotton and burned
much more, disregarded the torpedoes and fought the rebels along the
banks, explored new routes, and in the end both were captured by the
enemy.
[Illustration: ADMIRAL PORTER.]
Several ingenious plans were tried to capture these formidable
fortifications. One was an attempt to force a passage into the Upper
Yazoo. Another was to open a new channel for the Mississippi. Both were
failures, but the levees along the Yazoo were cut and many acres in the
rear of Vicksburg overflowed, while a great deal of Arkansas and
Louisiana was flooded. The object of all this was to shut off the
supplies of Vicksburg. Admiral Farragut now strove to pass from the
lower Mississippi by the Port Hudson batteries to Vicksburg. The effort
was made on the night of March 14th, which was of inky darkness. The
approach was discovered by the enemy, who kindled large bonfires on the
bank which revealed the passing vessels. The latter opened on the
batteries with great effect, but only two, including the flagship, were
able to get past, the thirteen being forced to turn back. The
_Mississippi_ ran aground and was set on fire and abandoned. With the
two vessels in hand, Farragut blockaded the mouth of the Red River and
gave valuable help to General Grant, but the land forces advancing from
Baton Rouge to aid in the attack on Vicksburg turned back upon learning
of the failure of Farragut's fleet to run past the batteries.
General Grant had set out to capture Vicksburg and nothing could turn
him from his purpose. His aim was to sever the Confederate
communications with the east by turning the defenses of the Yazoo and
the Mississippi. General McClernand was sent in the latter part of March
to occupy New Carthage to the south, while General Banks, by advancing
from New Orleans, threatened Port Hudson in conjunction with the fleet
lying near.
Banks' force was so large that the most the enemy could do was to delay
his advance by burning bridges and obstructing the river. In the latter
part of April, he established himself at Simmsport, near the junction of
the Atchafalaya and the Mississippi. Admiral Porter, who was lying with
his fleet above Vicksburg, now made the attempt to join Farragut below,
and it proved one of the most exciting experiences of the war.
RUNNING THE BATTERIES.
Naturally a dark night--April 16th--was selected, and eight gunboats,
three transports, and several barges loaded with supplies silently
dropped down the river in the impenetrable mist, while the thousands of
Union troops intently watched the hulls as they melted from sight in the
gloom. The hope was general that they would be able to float past
undiscovered, and, when an hour of intense stillness went by, the
watchers and listeners began to breathe more freely, though their
anxiety was only partly lifted.
[Illustration: DAVID G. FARRAGUT.]
Suddenly two crimson lines of fire flamed along the river front, and the
earth trembled under the stupendous explosion. The ships had been
detected, and the river was swept by a tempest of shot and shell that it
seemed must shatter to fragments every one of the craft. It should be
remembered that these batteries extended for a long distance along the
shore, and they opened one after the other, as the ships came opposite.
Thus the fleet became the target of battery after battery, and had a
continuous and extended gantlet to run before reaching safety.
The gunboats returned the fire as they swept by, and many of their shots
were effective, but in such a duel the advantage is always with the land
batteries. One of the transports was disabled, and another, directly
behind her, had to stop to avoid running into the injured craft. The
crew of the former, finding themselves the centre of a terrific fire,
launched the yawl, and, leaping into it, pulled for the shore. They had
scarcely left their vessel when it was fired by a shell, and, aflame
from stem to stern, it drifted down stream. Meanwhile, the transport
that had grounded was towed out of danger. With this exception, the
whole fleet got safely past, the loss being only one man killed and two
wounded on Porter's flagship.
General Grant was greatly pleased with this success. A few nights later
a second attempt was successful. He was thus enabled to send supplies to
the army, with which he intended to attack Vicksburg on the south.
Gradually shifting his own position, he reached a point opposite Grand
Gulf, a short distance below the mouth of the Big Black River.
CAPTURE OF GRAND GULF.
Although Grand Gulf was strongly fortified its quick capture was a
necessity. McClernand had been ordered several times to attack it, but
he was so laggard that Grant himself undertook the task. It proved one
of extreme difficulty, and he was obliged to make a change of plans, but
he handled his troops with admirable skill and with such effect that the
Confederate commander's position at Grand Gulf became untenable and he
withdrew. Grant rode into town and found the place in the possession of
Admiral Farragut.
The success was so brilliant that Pemberton, the Confederate general
commanding the forces at Vicksburg, became alarmed and telegraphed to
General Jo Johnston for reinforcements, but Johnston was too much
occupied with Rosecrans in Tennessee to spare any of his men, and about
all he could do was to send encouraging words to his subordinate.
GRANT'S FINE GENERALSHIP.
General Grant never displayed his great genius more strikingly than in
the operations before Vicksburg. For days and nights he seemed scarcely
to eat or sleep. He was here, there, and everywhere, and was familiar
with all the minute details of his momentous enterprise. General
Pemberton confessed in his reports that the amazing activity of Grant
"embarrassed him."
Grand Gulf was made the base of operations, and, well aware that
reinforcements would be hurried to the garrison, Grant hastened his
movements. While pressing his attack he learned that Johnston was at
Jackson with a strong force, with which to reinforce Pemberton. He
immediately dispatched McPherson and Sherman thither, and, after a
fierce fight, Jackson was captured. Grant learned from deserters that
Johnston, the chief Confederate commander in that section, had sent
peremptory orders to Pemberton to leave Vicksburg and attack him in the
rear. The latter, with his usual promptness, met this danger, and, by
decisively defeating the enemy at Champion Hill, he accomplished the
splendid feat of keeping Johnston out of Vicksburg and Pemberton in. It
was a great exploit, for Jo Johnston was one of the ablest generals of
the war, and the fine campaign which he had planned was brought to
naught. Not only was he kept out of Vicksburg, but it was made
impossible for him to send any help to Pemberton, around whom the Union
commander was drawing the coils more tightly each day.
[Illustration: GRANT AFTER THE BATTLE OF BELMONT.]
Still the defenses of Vicksburg were too powerful to be captured by
storm, and Grant did the only thing possible--he besieged the city. The
siege began about the middle of May. The garrison had provisions for
barely two months, from which they had to supply the inhabitants of the
town. Jo Johnston saw the peril and set to work with such vigor to raise
a force to send to the relief of Pemberton, that Grant was hurried into
making an assault on the rebel works. This took place before daylight on
the morning of May 19th. Though successful at first, the Federals were
repulsed. A grand assault was undertaken three days later and pressed
with the utmost bravery, but it resulted in another repulse, in which
the loss of the assailants was three times greater than that of the
defenders. Porter tried to help with his fleet, but his vessels were so
badly injured by the batteries that they were compelled to withdraw from
action.
This failure showed that it was useless to try to capture Vicksburg
except through a regular siege, which was pressed henceforth without
intermission. Shells were thrown into the doomed city night and day; the
people lived in caves, on short rations, and underwent miseries and
sufferings which it is hard to comprehend in these days. All the time
Grant was edging closer and closer. Parallels and approaches were
constructed; mines sunk and countermining done. Several attempts were
made to relieve Vicksburg, but the bulldog-like grip of Grant could not
be loosened, and the condition of the garrison became much like that of
Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781.
FALL OF VICKSBURG.
The defenders displayed the greatest bravery and endurance, and held out
until the time came when it was apparent that it was a choice between
surrender and starving to death. That man who prefers to starve rather
than submit to a magnanimous foe is a fool. Pemberton had 21,000 troops
under his command, but 6,000 were in the hospitals, while Grant had
fully 60,000 soldiers waiting and eager to make the assault. On the 3d
of July, a flag of truce was displayed in front of Vicksburg, and a
message was sent to the Union commander, asking for an armistice with a
view of arranging for the capitulation of Vicksburg. Grant's reply was
his usual one, that the only terms he could accept were unconditional
surrender, and he, therefore, declined to appoint commissioners.
The commanders then met between the lines, and Grant agreed that the
garrison should be paroled and allowed to go to their homes, and that
the city, stores, arms, and supplies should belong to the conquerors.
Although the Union commander's terms "unconditional surrender" sounded
harsh, they always proved of a generous nature. There was a good deal of
criticism in the South of Pemberton for selecting the 4th of July for
making his submission, since the Union people would be sure to make a
greater ado over it. Pemberton's explanation was that he believed Grant
would be more disposed to give him liberal terms on that date than on
any other, and it would not be strange if he was partly right.
IMPORTANCE OF THE CAPTURE.
The capture of Vicksburg was one of the most important Union successes
of the war. In his official report, Grant thus summarized the results of
his campaign: "The defeat of the enemy in five battles outside of
Vicksburg; the occupation of Jackson, the capital of Mississippi; and
the capture of Vicksburg, its garrison and munitions of war; a loss to
the enemy of 37,000 prisoners, at least 10,000 killed and wounded, and
hundreds, perhaps thousands, who can never be collected or reorganized.
Arms and munitions of war for an army of 60,000 men have fallen into our
hands, beside a large amount of other public property and much that was
destroyed to prevent our capturing it."
Thus one of the great objects of the war was accomplished. The
Mississippi was opened throughout its entire length and the Confederacy
cut in twain. That President Davis felt the gravity of the blow (to
which one still more decisive was added about the same time) was proven
by his proclamation calling into service all persons in the Confederacy
not legally exempt, who were between the ages of eighteen and forty-five
years. He also appointed the 21st of August as a day of fasting,
humiliation, and prayer.
Grant's magnificent success greatly increased his popularity in the
North. His praises were in every one's mouth; he was declared to be the
ablest military leader that had yet appeared, and more than one saw in
him the coming saviour of the Union.
Perhaps it is slightly premature to say that the Mississippi was opened
from the hour of the surrender of Vicksburg. Port Hudson held out, but
its fall was a corollary of that of the more important city. It had
stoutly resisted several attacks, but, realizing the hopelessness of his
situation, the Confederate commander surrendered on the 9th of July, and
the opening of the Mississippi was fully completed.
ROSECRANS' CAMPAIGN.
The reader will recall that the battle of Murfreesboro' took place at
the very beginning of the year. Rosecrans, the Union commander, never
repeated the brilliant skill he had shown in fighting Bragg on Stone
River. He seemed to think that that repulse of the enemy was sufficient
to last a good while, for he remained idle throughout the several months
that followed. There were a number of brisk skirmishes and fights, but
none was of importance. When June arrived without anything of account
having been accomplished, the government suggested to Rosecrans that it
was time he took steps to drive Bragg into Georgia and thus secure
Eastern Tennessee, where the sentiment was strongly Union.
Rosecrans hesitated, but upon receiving a stronger intimation that he
ought to be up and doing, he began a series of movements, in the latter
part of June, which caused Bragg to withdraw to Chattanooga, where he
intrenched himself. Burnside then advanced from Ohio into Eastern
Tennessee, but was so delayed that Bragg was heavily reinforced from
Virginia. To protect his communications, he fell back, however, upon
the approach of the Federal army, which occupied Chattanooga.
Unaware of the increased strength of the enemy, Rosecrans divided his
army into three columns, separated by wide spaces of mountains, and
marched in loose order against his foe, observing which Bragg determined
to overwhelm each of the columns in detail.
The first demonstration was against General George H. Thomas, who
commanded the Federal left, and was encamped at the foot of Lookout
Mountain. That splendid officer eluded the enemy launched against him,
and effected a junction with the other two corps.
At the same time the centre of the three columns was attacked, but the
assault was repulsed, and the reunited Union army on the 18th of
September stood on the western bank of the Chickamauga, which stream was
well named, for the Indian word means "the river of death." The position
was twelve miles from Chattanooga, and it was a perilous one, for, as
has been stated, Bragg had been heavily reinforced, and Longstreet with
a powerful column of veterans from Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was
approaching. He, therefore, decided to make an attempt to recover
Chattanooga.
BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.
The Confederates crossed the Chickamauga, and, on the morning of the
19th, Rosecrans opened the battle by attacking the enemy's right wing.
The entire armies were soon involved, and the fighting lasted until
nightfall, with the result in favor of the Confederates. Although forced
from several positions, they gained and held the road leading to
Chattanooga, and the Union troops were driven almost to the base of
Missionary Ridge.
Late that night, Longstreet arrived with his fire-seasoned veterans. He
was one of Lee's best lieutenants, and it was arranged that the battle
should be renewed the next morning at daybreak, with Longstreet
commanding the left wing. From some cause, the Confederate attack was
delayed until ten o'clock, the delay giving the Federals time to throw
up a number of breastworks. Against these Bragg repeatedly charged with
his right wing, but was repulsed each time.
Thomas, in command of the Union left, also repelled a sharp attack, but
Longstreet routed Rosecrans, and, discerning a gap caused by the
transfer of the Union centre to strengthen the left, Longstreet led his
men impetuously into the opening, thus splitting the Union army in two.
Striking in both directions, he threw the two divisions into such
disorder and confusion that the frightened Rosecrans galloped in hot
haste to Chattanooga to secure his supply train and the pontoon-bridges
over the Tennessee. At the same time, he telegraphed the terrifying
tidings to Washington that the whole Union army had been beaten.
"THE ROCK OF CHICKAMAUGA."
At a crisis in the tremendous battle, General Hood, one of the
Confederate leaders, was wounded, and a halt was made until another
officer could be brought up to take his place. Short as was the delay,
it gave the Unionists time to rally and strengthen their endangered
points. Despite this advantage, the telegram of Rosecrans would have
been verified and the magnificent army destroyed except for one man. He
was George H. Thomas, the heroic commander of the Union left. Longstreet
launched his veterans against him again and again, but he beat them back
in every instance. Never did men fight more bravely than those
Americans, arrayed against each other, and never was finer generalship
displayed than by General Thomas, whose wonderful defense that day won
for him the name by which he will always be remembered--"The Rock of
Chickamauga."
[Illustration: GEORGE H. THOMAS.
"The Rock of Chickamauga."]
Holding his heroes well in hand, Thomas was ready to renew the battle
the next day, but Bragg did not molest him. The Confederates, however,
had won a victory, for they drove the Federals from the field and
retained possession of it. Thomas fell slowly back toward Chattanooga,
presenting a firm front to the enemy.
Chickamauga ranks as one of the great battles of the war. The Union
losses were: killed, 1,656; wounded, 9,749; missing, 4,774; total,
16,179. The Confederate losses were: killed, 2,268; wounded, 13,613;
captured and missing, 1,090; total, 16,971.
SUPERSEDURE OF ROSECRANS BY THOMAS.
Rosecrans' conduct of this battle caused his supersedure by Thomas,
while several division commanders were suspended, pending an inquiry
into their course. President Davis removed General Leonidas Polk, who
was thought to have shown hesitancy of action at critical points. Bragg,
however, was the most blamable, for, with the advantage overwhelmingly
in his favor, he refused to permit Longstreet to follow up his success.
One of the peculiarities of the Confederate President was his strong
likes and dislikes. He was a personal enemy of Jo Johnston, and more
than once humiliated him, but he was also a friend of Bragg, and, in the
face of indignant protests, retained him in chief command in the
southwest.
As soon as the Union army reached Chattanooga intrenchments were thrown
up. Bragg appeared before the town on the 23d, and, finding the position
too strong to be carried by assault, he laid siege to it. The situation
of the army became so dangerous that great uneasiness was felt in
Washington, where the wise step was taken of sending General Grant
thither, with his appointment to the command of the entire West.
Abundant reinforcements were hurried to the imperiled point, the entire
Eleventh and Twelfth Corps from the Army of the Potomac forming the
principal commands. The Federals became much the stronger, but Bragg did
not abandon his siege of Chattanooga.
Recalling the advance of Burnside from the Ohio to the relief of
Rosecrans, it should be stated that he did not arrive in time to take
part in the battle of Chickamauga, but occupied Knoxville on the 9th of
September. Bragg sent Longstreet with a strong force to attack Burnside,
the Confederate commander thereby weakening his army, which could ill
stand it. Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the night of October 20th, and
telegraphed Burnside to hold Knoxville at all hazards, while he gave his
attention to Bragg.
Sherman came up with his troops November 15th, and a week later Grant
had an army of 80,000 men on the ground, while the removal of Longstreet
left Bragg with only 50,000. His line, twelve miles long, embraced two
elevations commanding a view of Chattanooga Valley. Lookout Mountain was
on the south, while Missionary Ridge on the east was not quite so high.
The Confederate left wing rested on the former, and the right on
Missionary Ridge, with the Chattanooga flowing between. Bragg was
justified in considering his position impregnable.
THE BATTLE ABOVE THE CLOUDS.
Grant, however, held a different opinion. On the night of the 23d the
enemy's picket lines were forced back and an improved position secured.
The following morning, Hooker, having already crossed the river, was
ordered to attack the position on Lookout Mountain. His movements were
hidden for a time by a dense fog, and it was his intention to stop as
soon as the enemy's rifle-pits at the base were captured; but, when this
was accomplished, the men were carried away by their enthusiasm, noting
which Hooker ordered them to charge the Confederate position. Up the
mountain the cheering, eager fellows swept with irresistible valor. The
Stars and Stripes was planted on the crest and 2,000 of the fleeing
Confederates were made prisoners. The fog still lay heavy in the valley
below, a fact which has led to the battle being called the "Battle above
the Clouds."
DEFEAT OF THE CONFEDERATES.
The following morning was also foggy, but, when it lifted, Sherman's
corps was seen advancing against the Confederate right, close to
Chickamauga station. In the face of a heavy artillery fire the Federals
pressed on, but at the end of an hour they were compelled to retreat. By
order of Grant the attack was renewed, but another severe repulse
followed. Next a general movement against the left centre was ordered,
and this was successful. The enemy was driven in confusion toward
Ringgold, to the southeast, while a large number of prisoners and a vast
amount of supplies were captured.
General Hooker pursued and drove the Confederates out of Ringgold, but
they assumed so strong a position at Taylor's Ridge that Grant ordered
him not to attack, but to remain and hold Ringgold, Sherman, in the
meantime, marching against Longstreet. Bragg had blundered so much in
conducting this disastrous campaign that President Davis was forced to
replace him with Hardee.
RAISING OF THE SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE.
Meanwhile, Longstreet was besieging Burnside at Knoxville, where the
15,000 Union troops were threatened with starvation. The town was
invested November 17th, and the next day some of the outworks were
carried. Well aware that Grant, after his defeat of Bragg, would hurry
to the relief of Knoxville, Longstreet attacked on the 29th, but
suffered a bloody repulse. He stubbornly held his ground until he
learned that Sherman was close upon him, when he withdrew and started on
his march to Virginia. The campaign soon ended in Tennessee, which was
virtually recovered to the Union.
The reader will note that we have described the leading events in the
West and Southwest from the opening of the year to its close. Once more
it is necessary to return to January, 1863, in order to give a history
of the most important campaign of all--that against Richmond, which was
defended by the formidable Army of Northern Virginia, under the command
of General Robert E. Lee.
BURNSIDE SUPERSEDED BY HOOKER.
Burnside's management of the attack on Fredericksburg in December, 1862,
was so incompetent and disastrous that it was impossible for him to
retain the chief command. Knowing that several of his generals had
severely criticised him, Burnside sent a list of names to Washington,
giving the government the choice of removing them or accepting his
resignation. Prominent on Burnside's "black list" was the name of
Hooker. On the 26th of January Burnside's resignation was accepted, and
Hooker was made his successor.
The morale of the grand organization had been injured by its wretched
leadership, but the material itself could not have been finer. Hooker
set resolutely to work, and, by the 1st of May, the army was well
trained and disciplined, and numbered 130,000 men, of whom fully 12,000
were cavalry. Lee had about half as many troops.
Knowing it would not do to remain idle when the beautiful spring weather
came, Hooker had been carefully planning for another campaign against
Richmond. He had won a fine reputation for himself as a fighter and
skillful corps commander, and the hopes were high that he would lead his
superb army directly into the rebel capital. Everything seemed to be in
his favor, and the campaign opened promisingly.
THE NEW CAMPAIGN AGAINST RICHMOND.
Hooker's plan was to assail Lee at two points. The Rappahannock and
Rapidan were to be crossed a short distance west of Fredericksburg, and
the left wing attacked. While this was going on, Hooker's own left wing
was to occupy the heights and secure possession of the Richmond
Railroad. The powerful Union cavalry were to ride around Lee's position
and cut off his retreat to Richmond. This involved the destruction of
the railroads and bridges over the North and South Anna Rivers.
This important movement was begun April 27th. The main portion of the
corps of Meade, Howard, and Slocum, numbering 36,000 men, marched thirty
miles up the Rappahannock and crossed the stream without resistance. A
force then moved ten miles down the other side of the river, driving
away several Confederate detachments, and opened the way for Couch with
12,000 men to cross and join the other three corps. Taking different
routes, the 48,000 advanced toward Chancellorsville, which had been
named as the rendezvous. They were soon followed by Sickles with 18,000
men.
It was not until the Union movement had progressed thus far that Lee
read its purpose. He hastily called in his divisions, and, on the
forenoon of May 1st, the Army of Northern Virginia was drawn up in
battle-line in front of that dense-wooded district known as the
Wilderness.
Exultingly confident, Hooker ordered an advance that day from near
Chancellorsville toward Fredericksburg. Hardly had he started when he
learned that Lee was moving against him; he, therefore, paused and threw
up defenses. His aim was to flank Lee, and, to prevent it, the
Confederate commander took desperate chances. Keeping up a rattling
demonstration in front he sent Stonewall Jackson with 30,000 men around
the right of the Union army. Had Hooker known of this daring movement,
he could easily have crushed each division in detail.
STONEWALL JACKSON'S FLANK MOVEMENT.
Jackson carried out his programme with fearful completeness. Without his
purpose being suspected, he traveled fifteen miles, reaching the road
leading from Orange to Fredericksburg, on the southern side of the
Rapidan. He was thus within two miles of General Howard's Eleventh
Corps. The men were preparing supper with no thought of danger, when the
air was suddenly split by thousands of "rebel yells," and the graybacks
rushed out of the woods and swept everything before them. The whole
Eleventh Corps broke into a wild panic, and ran for their lives toward
Chancellorsville.
The German division especially, under the command of Carl Schurz, were
irrestrainable in their terror.
The majority, however, stood their ground bravely, and their commanders
put forth every effort to stop the wild stampede. A partial success was
attained, and the artillery poured in a fire which checked the pursuit.
Fortunately night was at hand, and the fighting soon ceased. The
position of the Union army was critical in the extreme. It was squeezed
in between Chancellorsville and the fork of the two rivers. What fate
awaited it on the morrow?
[Illustration: THOMAS J. ("STONEWALL") JACKSON.]
At this juncture, the Confederate cause received the severest blow in
its history. That remarkable man, Stonewall Jackson, was confident that
the destruction of the Union army was at hand, and he was impatient for
the morrow that he might complete the fearful work. In the dusk of early
evening he rode forward, accompanied by several of his staff, to
reconnoitre the Union position. Passing beyond the outer line of
skirmishers, the party halted in the gloom and peered toward the Federal
lines. Dimly discerned by a South Carolina regiment, they were mistaken
for the enemy, and a volley was fired at them. One of the staff was
killed and two wounded. Comprehending the blunder, Jackson wheeled and
galloped into the woods, but before the shelter could be reached, the
South Carolinians fired a second time.
Jackson was struck twice in the left arm and once in the right hand. His
frightened horse whirled about and plunged away. A limb knocked off his
hat and came near unseating him, but he managed to keep in the saddle
and guide his steed into the road, where one of his staff helped him to
the ground and supported him to the foot of a tree where he was laid
down. He was suffering so keenly that he could not walk, and was carried
on a litter to the rear. For a part of the way, all were exposed to such
a hot artillery fire that they had to pause several times and lie down.
[Illustration: HOUSE IN WHICH STONEWALL JACKSON DIED.]
The wound grew so bad that the arm was amputated, but pneumonia
followed, and Jackson died on Sunday, May 10th. His last words, uttered
in his delirium, were: "Let us cross over the river and rest under the
shadow of the trees."
BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.
The fighting at Chancellorsville was renewed at daylight, May 3d.
General Stuart succeeded to the command of Jackson's corps. The
superior numbers of the Union army and its compact formation gave it
all the advantage. It needed but one thing to insure overwhelming
success: that was competent leadership, and that was the one thing which
it did not have.
[Illustration: THE FATAL WOUNDING OF "STONEWALL" JACKSON
After his first great victory at Chancellorsville, "Stonewall" Jackson
believed that the destruction of the Union army was at hand, and in his
impatience for the morrow, that he might complete the work, he rode in
the dusk of the evening beyond his outposts to reconnoiter. A South
Carolina regiment mistook his party for the enemy and fired upon them,
mortally wounding their great commander.]
With the weaker army still separated, it forced the Federals back toward
the river, where Hooker was compelled to form a second line. Holding him
there, Lee turned toward Sedgwick, who was at Fredericksburg with 25,000
men. He had a good opportunity to assail Lee in the rear, but failed to
do so, and gave his efforts to capturing Marye's Heights, which was
defended by a weak garrison. It was easily taken, and Sedgwick sent a
column in the direction of Chancellorsville. On the road it encountered
some breastworks, thrown up by the force which Lee had dispatched to
check Sedgwick's advance. He was driven back, and the rebels, having
been reinforced, recaptured Marye's Heights. Sedgwick made a hurried
retreat, and thenceforward formed no factor in the battle.
Having disposed of him, Lee turned again upon Hooker. Early on the 5th,
he placed a number of his guns within range of United States Ford and
dropped a few shells among the wagon trains. Nothing, however, was
accomplished on this day, except that the dry and parched woods were set
on fire, and many of the wounded who were unable to help themselves were
burned to death. Every horror that can be conceived as to war was added
to the awful scene.
RETREAT OF THE UNION ARMY.
A heavy rainstorm caused the Rapidan and Rappahannock to rise so rapidly
that Hooker decided, after consulting his officers, to get back while he
had the chance to do so. The bridges were covered with pine boughs, and,
with the noise of the wheels deadened by the crashing thunder, the
wagons and artillery made the passage without discovery. By the
following morning, the entire Army of the Potomac was once more across
the Rappahannock and marching back to its old camp at Falmouth, and once
more the advance against Richmond had ended in woeful disaster.
The losses of the Unionists at Chancellorsville were: killed, 1,606;
wounded, 9,762; missing, 5,919; total, 17,287. The losses of the
Confederates were: killed, 1,665; wounded, 9,081; captured and missing,
2,018; total, 12,764.
THE SECOND CONFEDERATE INVASION.
After such a frightful Union defeat, it was no wonder that the
Confederates again decided to invade the North. Lee was not favorable to
the plan, but he must have felt that the prospect of success was better
than ever before. He made his preparations with great care, and
strengthened his army to 75,000 men, divided into three corps, commanded
respectively by Longstreet, Ewell, and A.P. Hill. He had in addition
15,000 cavalry under General J.E.B. ("Jeb") Stuart.
The northward march was begun the first week in June. Longstreet and
Ewell advanced upon Culpeper, while Hill remained near Fredericksburg,
aiming to deceive Hooker as to his intentions. Hooker quickly perceived
that most of the rebel army had disappeared from his front, but it was a
mystery to him where it had gone. A reconnoissance developed the
direction taken by the two missing corps. Unsuspicious of the grand
project that was in the mind of the Confederate commander, Hooker moved
down the Shenandoah Valley, taking the same course as Lee, but with the
Blue Ridge Mountains between them.
LEE'S PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS.
Passing through the defiles in this range, Lee dropped down on Milroy at
Winchester before he dreamed of danger. Most of his 7,000 men were
captured, but Milroy and a few escaped by a hurried flight at night. All
doubt now had vanished as to the intentions of Lee; he was aiming for
Pennsylvania, at the head of a powerful, well-organized army; Washington
and probably Philadelphia were in peril. The only check that could block
its way was the Army of the Potomac, and Hooker lost no time in moving.
He reached Fairfax Court-House on the night of the 14th, thus placing
himself on the flank of Ewell. The Confederates, however, held the
mountain passes securely and nothing effective could be done.
[Illustration: ROBERT E. LEE.
Confederate Commander-in-chief at Gettysburg.
(1807-1870).]
On the 22d the headquarters of Lee were at Beverly, ten miles from
Winchester, with which Lee kept up communication through A.P. Hill's
corps, which was between Culpeper and Front Royal. Ewell, without
hesitation, forded the Potomac into Maryland, while his cavalry pushed
on into Pennsylvania.
By this time the government was so alarmed that President Lincoln, on
the 15th of June, called by proclamation on the governors of Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and West Virginia to furnish 100,000 militia
for the protection of those States. Pennsylvania, the one in greatest
danger, was so laggard that she asked New Jersey to come to her help,
and that little State gallantly did so.
GENERAL MEADE APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Hooker deserved credit for appreciating his own unfitness for the
command of the army that was again to fight Lee. He crossed the Potomac
June 26th, making a movement which threatened Lee's communications, and
resigned the next day. At Frederick, on the 28th, he published an order
to the effect that the army had been placed in charge of Major-General
George G. Meade.
This was an excellent appointment. Although Meade was born, in 1815, in
Cadiz, Spain, he was an American, because his father was the United
States naval agent at the time. Meade was graduated from West Point in
1835, and won distinction in the war with the Seminoles and with Mexico.
The appointment was a surprise to him, but it pleased everybody, and he
modestly took hold, resolved to do the best he could.
MOVEMENTS OF GENERAL MEADE.
He adhered to the general plan of Hooker. His army numbered about
100,000, and no braver men lived anywhere. Nearly all of Lee's troops
were north of the Potomac, partly in Maryland and partly in
Pennsylvania. On the 27th of June the whole army was at Chambersburg,
Pennsylvania; but Lee was greatly hampered by the absence of Stuart and
his cavalry. That dashing officer was very fond of making raids, and,
giving a wider meaning to the permission of Lee than that general
intended, he was off on another of his bold ventures, with no certainty
as to when he would return. It was upon him that Lee was obliged to
depend for news of the Union army. Receiving none, he was on the point
of advancing against Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania, when he
paused upon receiving the first reliable news of the Army of the
Potomac.
Meade had pushed his advance beyond Middleton, where his left was lying
when he took command of the army at Frederick. This action of the Union
commander looked as if he intended to cross the mountains and attack the
Confederate rear. Ewell's corps was at York and Carlisle, but still
there was no knowledge whatever of the whereabouts of Stuart.
Lee now attempted to draw Meade away from the Potomac by concentrating
his army to the east of the mountains. Hill and Longstreet advanced to
Gettysburg, while Ewell was ordered to do the same. Lee himself lagged
in the hope that Stuart would join him, and because of that, Meade, who
was keenly on the alert, arrived in the neighborhood of Gettysburg
first. On the last day of June, he was within a few miles of the town,
while Lee was somewhat to the north and making for the same place.
Stuart and his cavalry had harassed the Army of the Potomac in Virginia,
but, unable to stay its advance, they crossed the Potomac, and, moving
to the east of Meade, entered Carlisle shortly after Ewell had left for
Gettysburg. Stuart's delay was owing to the fact that he did not know
Lee's whereabouts.
THE FIRST DAY AT GETTYSBURG.
The two mighty armies were now within striking distance of each other.
It was yet early in the day when a collision took place between a
Confederate division and Reynolds' Corps on the western side of the
town. Reynolds was one of the best officers in the Union army. He was
engaged in directing the movements of his troops when he was struck in
the head by a rifle bullet and instantly killed. General Doubleday
succeeded him in command, but was unable to drive back the enemy. Howard
arrived with the Eleventh Corps early in the afternoon and took charge
of the whole force. These were mainly composed of Germans, who were so
overwhelmingly stampeded by Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville. They
did not appear to have recovered from that panic, for they fled
pell-mell through Gettysburg, with the enemy whooping at their heels.
Nearly all who did not run were cut down or they surrendered.
Meade had sent Hancock to take chief command, and, aided by Howard, he
rallied the shattered corps on the crest of Culp's Hill, behind the
town. The keen eye of Hancock was quick to see that it was here the
decisive struggle must take place, and he sent an urgent message to
Meade, fifteen miles away, to lose not an hour in hurrying his troops
forward. Meade followed the counsel. Some of his men arrived that night,
some the next morning, while those from the greatest distance did not
come in until the following afternoon.
The line as formed by Hancock extended along Cemetery Hill on the west
and south of Gettysburg. It was a formidable position, and Lee, after
carefully studying it, decided to await the arrival of Longstreet and
Ewell with their corps before making his attack. Events proved that the
decision was a disastrous mistake on the part of the Confederate
commander.
When the sultry first day of July drew to a close, the Federal right
held Culp's Hill, the centre Cemetery Hill, the left was along Cemetery
Ridge, and the reserve on the right. This line curved in the form of a
horseshoe, with the projecting portion facing Gettysburg. Sedgwick, it
will be remembered, had not arrived, but the force was composed of a
hundred thousand veterans who had 200 cannon at command.
That night the Confederates were in Gettysburg and a part of the country
to the east and west. Ewell formed the left and held the town; Seminary
Ridge was occupied by Hill's Corps, and confronted the centre and left
of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. When Pickett's division came up on
the 3d, it was placed on the right of Hill's position and faced Round
Top.
Most of the succeeding day was spent by both armies in preparing for the
tremendous death-grapple. At about five o'clock in the afternoon, having
become convinced that the left and left centre of the Union line were
the weakest points, Lee directed his efforts against them. They were
held by Sickles, who made a blunder by advancing a portion of his force
beyond the battle-line and seizing a ridge. It was because of this
blunder that the first Confederate attack was made at that point.
Longstreet and Ewell opened with a sharp cannonade, under cover of which
Hood's division impetuously assaulted Sickles' left. He drove his right
wing between Sickles left and Little Round Top, and was steadily
succeeding in his purpose, when one of those apparently trifling things,
for which no one can account, interfered and brought about momentous
results.
[Illustration: GEORGE G. MEADE.
The Union commander-in-chief at Gettysburg.]
Little Round Top was the key to the position, and yet it had no real
defenders. Had Hood known this, he could have seized it without the
slightest difficulty. Perceiving its importance, he began working his
way toward it, and only some extraordinary interference could prevent it
speedily falling into his possession.
But General Gouverneur Warren, chief engineer, and his officers had
climbed Little Round Top and were using it as a signal station. Soon the
shots began flying so fast about them that they made hurried
preparations to leave. Warren, however, saw the importance of holding
the hill, and told his associates to make a pretense of doing so, while
he looked around for a force to bring to the spot.
Fortunately, a large body of reinforcements were hurrying past to
Sickles, who had sent an urgent call for them. Without hesitation,
General Warren detached a brigade for the defense of Little Round Top.
They ran up the slope, dragging a battery with them. Hardly had they
done so, when Hood made a fierce charge. The fighting was of the most
furious nature, and it looked for a time as if the yelling Texans would
carry the hill, but they were forced back, and, pressing their way up
the ravine at the foot, turned the left Union flank, but were forced
again to retire by a bayonet charge.
Sickles called for reinforcements when attacked by Longstreet, but with
their aid he could not hold his position. He was rushed back by the
terrific fighter, and Longstreet gained and held the key-point of the
line against the repeated assaults of the Union troops. Not only that,
but he was resistlessly advancing, when more reinforcements arrived and
attacked him just as he reached a wheatfield and grove of woods on the
western side of Plum Run. The Confederates were beginning to give way,
when Hood, having carried Sickles' extreme left, arrived. A vehement
charge carried Hood through two divisions that were doubled back on
their main line on Cemetery Ridge; Sickles' left having been crushed,
his centre and right were assailed, and the latter was driven back. In
the fighting Sickles lost a leg as well as his entire advanced position.
The close of the 2d of July brought brilliant, but only partial, success
to the Confederates. After reaching Cemetery Ridge, Longstreet's men
were repulsed by Hancock. The Confederate commander fell back to the
western side of the wheatfield, where he remained until morning. Ewell,
impetuously attacking the Union right centre at Cemetery and Culp's
Hill, kept back Federal reinforcements from reaching the left, which
Longstreet was pounding, drove out the Federal artillery and infantry,
and held the works. This was a most important success, and, if Ewell
could maintain his position throughout the morrow, General Lee would
have a chance of taking Meade's line in reverse. The conclusion of the
second day, therefore, left matters in dubious shape for both sides.
While the Confederates had made gains, they were not decisive. Still
they were such as to cause grave concern on the part of Meade and his
brother officers, who held a long, anxious consultation, and discussed
the question whether it was not wise to fall back and assume a new and
stronger position. The decision was to remain where they were.
THE THIRD DAY.
Naturally Lee strengthened his force near where Ewell had secured a
lodgment within the breastworks of Culp's Hill, with the purpose of
making his main attack there; but Meade could not fail to see the
utmost importance of driving out the enemy from his position. He shelled
it at daylight on the 3d, and sent a strong body of infantry against the
intruders. The Confederates made a desperate resistance, but in the end
were expelled, and the Union line re-established.
It will be seen that this miscalculation of Lee compelled him to change
his plans. Sitting on his horse, riding back and forth, often halting
and scanning the battlefield through his glasses, and continually
consulting his officers, he finally decided to direct his supreme effort
against the Union centre. Success there meant the defeat and rout of the
Union army, for, if the two wings could be wedged apart, they would be
overwhelmed and destroyed by the charging Confederates.
But the impressive fact was as well known to the Federals as to their
enemies, and nothing was neglected that could add to the strength of
their position. All night long troops kept arriving, and in the
moonlight were assigned to their positions for the morrow. It took Lee
several hours to complete his preparations for the assault upon the
Union centre. At noon he had 145 cannon posted on Seminary Ridge,
opposite Meade's centre, while Meade had 80 pieces of artillery lined
along the crest of Cemetery Hill.
PICKETT'S CHARGE.
At noon the Confederates opened with all their cannon, their object
being to silence the batteries in front, to clear the way for the charge
against the Union centre. The eighty Federal pieces replied, and for two
hours the earth rocked under the most prodigious cannonade ever heard on
this side of the Atlantic. Then the Union fire gradually ceased, and, as
the vast volume of smoke slowly lifted, a column of 5,000 gray-coated
men were seen to issue from the Confederate lines more than a mile away
and advance at a steady stride toward the Union intrenchments. Their
bayonets shone in the afternoon sun, and their fluttering battle-flags,
the splendid precision of their step, and their superb soldierly
appearance made so thrilling a picture that an involuntary murmur of
admiration ran along the Union lines, even though these same men were
advancing to kill and wound them.
They formed the division of General George E. Pickett, and no more
magnificent charge was ever made. They advanced in a double line, their
own artillery ceasing firing as they gradually passed within range with
beautiful regular step, which seemed to hasten, as if even with their
perfect discipline they could not restrain, their eagerness to join in
the death-grapple.
The Union artillery remained silent until half the space was crossed,
when it burst forth, and the Confederates went down by the score. The
gaps could be seen from every point of the immense field, but those who
were unhurt immediately closed up and continued their dauntless advance
without a tremor. Coming still closer under the murderous artillery
fire, they broke into the double-quick, and it looked as if nothing
could check them.
Waiting until within a few hundred yards, the artillery and musketry
blazed forth again. Through a misconception of orders, the Confederate
line had become disjointed, and the supports of Pickett were repelled
and a large number killed or taken prisoners, but Pickett's own division
came on unfalteringly, let fly with a volley at the breastworks in front
of them, and then, with their resounding yells, dashed up the crest of
Cemetery Ridge and drove out the defenders at the point of the bayonet.
[Illustration: CUSHING'S LAST SHOT.]
Immediately the hand-to-hand fighting became like that of so many
tigers. Guns were clubbed, men wrestled and fought and struck with their
bare fists, while a fire was converged upon the assailants of so
murderous a nature that even the daring Pickett saw that every one of
his men would be killed, if they remained. He gave the order to fall
back, and the survivors broke into a run down the slope for their own
lines.
[Illustration: Drawn by W.B. DAVIS.
PICKETT'S RETURN FROM HIS FAMOUS CHARGE.
"General, my noble division is swept away."]
Pickett's charge ranks among the famous in modern history, and was one
of the most striking incidents of the war. The double column which
marched across that fire-swept field numbered 5,000 of the flower of the
Confederate army. Thirty-five hundred were killed, wounded, or taken
prisoners. Of the three brigade commanders, one was killed, the second
mortally wounded, and the third badly hurt. One only of the fourteen
field officers returned, and out of the twenty-four regimental officers,
only two were unhurt. The ferocity of the charge resulted in many deaths
among the Unionists, and General Hancock was painfully wounded, but
refused to leave the field until the struggle was over.
And all this valor had gone for naught. The Southerners had attempted an
impossible thing, and the penalty was fearful. Unspeakably depressed,
General Lee saw the return of the staggering, bleeding survivors, and,
riding among them, he did all he could to cheer the mute sufferers by
his sympathetic words. He insisted that the failure was wholly his own
fault, and that not a word of censure should be visited upon anyone
else.
The expectation of the Confederates was that the Federals would follow
up this repulse with an immediate advance, and preparations were
hurriedly made to repel it; but the ammunition was low on Cemetery
Ridge, and the furious struggle had exhausted the defenders. Day was
closing and the great battle of Gettysburg was ended.
THE FEARFUL LOSSES.
The Union losses were: killed, 3,070; wounded, 14,497; missing, 5,434;
total, 23,001. The Confederate losses were: killed, 2,592; wounded,
12,706; captured and missing, 5,150; total, 20,448. To quote from Fox's
"Regimental Losses in the American Civil War:" "Gettysburg was the
greatest battle of the war; Antietam the bloodiest; the largest army was
assembled by the Confederates in the Seven Days' Fight; by the Unionists
at the Wilderness."
THE DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR.
Gettysburg has been styled the Waterloo of the Southern Confederacy.
"Highest tide" was reached by its fortunes during those three first days
in July, 1863. Lee put forth his supreme effort, and the result was
defeat. He and his leading generals clearly saw that their cause had
received its death-blow, and, as one of them expressed it, the fighting
thenceforward was for terms. They were not yet conquered, and severe
work remained to be done, but never again did the Lost Cause come so
near success. Its sun, having reached meridian, must now go down until
it should set forever in gloom, disaster, and ruin.
General Lee could not fail to perceive that all that remained to him was
to leave the country before overtaken by irretrievable disaster. He
withdrew Ewell's Corps that night from Gettysburg and posted it on
Seminary Ridge, where intrenchments were thrown up. The town was
occupied by Meade, and the dismal morrow was spent by the Confederates
in burying their dead and removing their wounded. At night the retreat
was begun by the Chambersburg and Fairfield roads, which enter the
Cumberland Valley through the South Mountain range. Great battles always
produce violent storms, and one of these added to the unspeakable
wretchedness of the homeward march. Finding Lee was retreating, Meade
sent Sedgwick in pursuit. The rear guard was overtaken on the night of
the 6th, but its position was too strong to be attacked and the Union
army took a route parallel to that of the Confederate. There was
considerable skirmishing, but nothing decisive occurred, and the
retiring army reached Hagerstown, where it found the fords of the
Potomac so swollen as to be impassable. Lee, therefore, intrenched, and
stayed where he was until the 13th, by which time the river had fallen
sufficiently to be forded, and he once more re-entered Virginia. Meade,
fearful that the great prize was about to escape him, made strenuous
efforts to intercept him, but failed, and returned to the Rappahannock,
while Lee established himself in the neighborhood of Culpeper.
[Illustration: ENTRANCE TO GETTYSBURG CEMETERY.]
A period of inactivity now followed. Both Meade and Lee sent strong
detachments from their armies to the southwest, where, as we have seen,
they had the most active kind of service at Chickamauga, Missionary
Ridge, Knoxville, and other places. When Lee had considerably depleted
his forces, Meade thought the prospect of success warranted his making a
move against him. Accordingly, he sent his cavalry across the
Rappahannock, whereupon Lee withdrew to a position behind the Rapidan,
which was so strong that Meade dared not attack, and he, therefore,
attempted a flank movement. Before, however, it could be carried out, he
was called upon to send two more of his corps to the southwest, because
of the defeat of Rosecrans at Chickamauga. These corps were the Eleventh
and Twelfth under the command of Hooker.
This withdrawal compelled Meade to give up his purpose, and he remained
on the defensive. By-and-by, when the troops were returned to him, he
prepared once more to advance, but Lee anticipated him by an effort to
pass around his right flank and interpose between him and Washington.
Crossing the Rapidan on the 9th of October, he moved swiftly to Madison
Court-House, without detection by Meade, who did not learn of it until
the next day, when his outpost was attacked and driven back on the main
army at Culpeper. This was proof that the Union right flank had been
turned, and Meade immediately started his trains toward the
Rappahannock, following a few hours later with his army. On the further
side of Bull Run, he fortified himself so strongly that Lee saw it was
useless to advance further, and, on the 18th of October, he returned to
the line of the Rappahannock.
Meade started for Richmond on the 7th of November. The Confederates were
found occupying earthworks on the north of the Rappahannock. An
impetuous assault drove them out and across the river. Meade pushed on
to Culpeper, and Lee hurriedly retreated across the Rapidan.
Meade's judgment was that no further advance should be made, but the
clamor of the North forced him to try another of the many attempts to
capture Richmond. He crossed the river on the 26th and 27th of November,
his aim being to divide the Confederate army by a rapid march on Orange
Court-House. But it seemed as if the flood-gates of heaven were then
opened. The rain fell in torrents day and night, and the country became
a sea of mud and water. Bridges had to be laid to connect different
portions of the army, and all offensive movements were for a while out
of the question. The delay gave Lee time to form his troops into a
compact mass, so that when the Unionists were ready to attack, it was so
evident that another Fredericksburg massacre would follow that the plan
was abandoned.
In truth, Lee felt so strong that he was disposed to advance himself,
but was dissuaded by the belief that some blunder of the Union commander
would give him a better opportunity, but Meade was too wise to do so. On
the 1st of December he returned to his old quarters on the Rapidan. The
weather had become extremely cold, and both armies went into winter
quarters.
The principal military movements of this year have now been described,
but it remains to tell of the operations on the seacoast and of the
leading military raids.
PRIVATEERING.
The Confederates displayed great activity and ingenuity in the
construction of ironclads and in running the blockade. Their vessels
continually dodged in and out of a few of the leading ports, the
principal one being Wilmington, North Carolina. The profits in a single
cargo of a blockade-runner were so enormous that the owners were
enriched by several successful voyages, while a single one would
reimburse them for the loss of their ship. Under such circumstances it
was no wonder that they took desperate chances, and firms were organized
who paid liberal salaries to the officers of vessels, who advertised
among their friends the regular dates of their departure, and, the worst
of it was, they were very regular in keeping them.
The _Alabama_ and other privateers were busy on the ocean, and the
Confederates strained every nerve to send others to sea. The _Nashville_
was a fine steamer that was in the Ogeechee River, Georgia, waiting for
a chance to slip out and join the commerce destroyers. She had a
valuable cargo of cotton, and the Federal cruisers were alert to prevent
her escape. They would have gone up the river after her, but there were
too many torpedoes waiting for them, and the guns of Fort McAllister
were too powerful.
Captain Worden, of the old _Monitor_, was now in command of the
_Montauk_, and he was delighted on the night of February 27th to observe
the _Nashville_ lying stuck fast in shallow water above Fort McAllister.
The opportunity was too tempting to be neglected, and the next morning,
despite a hot attack from the fort, he fired into the _Nashville_ until
she broke into flames and soon after blew up.
FAILURE OF THE ATTACKS ON CHARLESTON.
Naturally the desire was strong in the North to humble Charleston, where
the baleful secession sentiment was born and brought all the woe upon
the country. General Beauregard was in command of that department, and
he made every preparation for the attack, which he knew would soon come.
In a proclamation he urged the removal of all non-combatants, and called
upon the citizens to rally to the defense of the city.
A fleet of ironclads was always lying outside of Charleston, watching
for an opportunity to give its attention to the forts or city. One
tempestuous night in January a couple of rams dashed out of the harbor,
and, in a ferociously vicious attack, scattered the ironclads, and
compelled a gunboat to surrender. Thereupon the Confederates claimed
that the blockade had been raised, but no one paid any attention to the
claim.
An expedition was carefully organized for the capture of Charleston, and
placed in command of Admiral Samuel F. Dupont. The fleet, numbering a
hundred vessels, left the mouth of the North Edisto River on the 6th of
April, and on the same day crossed the bar and entered the main channel
on the coast of Morris Island.
A dense haze delayed operations until the following day, when a line of
battle was formed by the ironclads, the wooden vessels remaining outside
the bar. A raft was fastened to the front of the _Weehawken_, with which
it was intended to explode the torpedoes. The cumbrous contrivance
greatly delayed the progress of the fleet, which advanced slowly until
the _Weehawken_ had passed the outer batteries and was close to the
entrance to the inner harbor. Then Fort Moultrie fired a gun, instantly
followed by that of Fort Sumter, and the batteries on Sullivan and on
Morris Island. Then a hawser, which the Confederates had stretched
across the channel with the purpose of clogging the screws of the
propellers, was encountered, the _Weehawken_ was compelled to grope
around for a better passage, and everything went wrong. The _New
Ironsides_ made an attempt to turn but became unmanageable, two other
ironclads ran afoul of her, and matters were in a bad way when Admiral
Dupont signaled for each one to do the best it could.
After a time, eight ironclads secured position in front of Fort Sumter,
at distances varying from a third to half a mile. This placed them in
direct range of 300 heavy guns which concentrated their appalling fire
upon them, the shots following one another as rapidly as the ticking of
a watch. The _Keokuk_, which ran close to Fort Sumter, was struck ninety
times, in the course of half an hour, in the hull and turrets, and
nineteen shots pierced her sides close to and below the water-line. Her
commander with great difficulty extricated her from her perilous
position, and she sank the next day.
The fight was another proof of the fact that, in all such engagements,
the preponderating advantage is with the land batteries. The ships of
the squadron were severely injured, but they inflicted no perceptible
damage upon the forts. Admiral Dupont had gone into the battle against
his judgment, and he now signaled for the ships to withdraw. All with
the exception of the _New Ironsides_ returned to Port Royal on the 12th
of April.
This failure caused great disappointment in the North and to the
government. Admiral Dupont was ordered to hold his position inside of
Charleston bar, and to prevent the enemy from erecting any new defenses
on Morris Island. The admiral replied that he was ready to obey all
orders, but, in his judgment, he was directed to take an unwise and
dangerous step. Thereupon he was superseded by Rear-Admiral Dahlgren,
and preparations were begun for a combined land and naval attack upon
Charleston.
[Illustration: ATTACK ON CHARLESTON, AUGUST 23D TO SEPTEMBER 29, 1863
"After a time eight ironclads secured position in front of Fort Sumpter,
at a distance varying from a third to half a mile. This placed them in
direct range of 300 heavy guns, which concentrated their appalling fire
upon them, the shots following one another as rapidly as the ticking of
a watch."]
One of the best engineer officers in the service was General Quincy A.
Gillmore, who had captured Fort Pulaski at Savannah the previous year.
He was summoned to Washington, and helped the government to arrange the
plan of attack upon Charleston. The most feasible course seemed to be
for a military force to seize Morris Island and bombard Fort Sumter from
that point, the fleet under Dahlgren giving help. There was hope that
the monitors and ironclads would be able to force their way past the
batteries and approach nigh enough to strike Charleston.
Accordingly, a sufficient detachment was gathered on Folly Island, which
lies south of Morris Island, and batteries were erected among the woods.
On the 10th of July, General Strong with 2,000 men attacked a force of
South Carolina infantry at the southern part of Morris Island, and drove
them to Fort Wagner at the opposite end. The Confederates were
reinforced, and, in the attack on Fort Wagner, the Federals were
repulsed and obliged to retreat, with heavy loss.
On the night of the 18th, in the midst of a violent thunderstorm, a
determined assault was made upon Fort Wagner, one of the newly formed
negro regiments being in the lead. The fighting was of the most furious
character, but the Federals suffered a decisive defeat, in which their
losses were five times as great as those of the defenders.
General Gillmore carried parallels against the fort, and the ironclads
assisted in the bombardments; but, though it continued for weeks, the
city of Charleston seemed to be as far from surrender as ever. A part of
the time the weather was so intolerably hot that operations were
suspended.
Gillmore, however, was so near Charleston that he was able to reach it
with his heaviest guns, and he prepared to do so. His principal piece
was a Parrott, which threw a 100-pound ball, and was christened the
"Swamp Angel."
The first shot was fired at midnight, August 22d. As the screeching
shell curved over and dropped into the sleeping city, with its frightful
explosion, it caused consternation. The people sprang from their beds
and rushed into the streets, many fleeing to the country. Beauregard
sent an indignant remonstrance, telling Gillmore that all civilized
nations, before bombarding a city, gave warning that the non-combatants
might be removed. Gillmore explained his reason for his course, and
agreed to wait until the following night before renewing the
bombardment.
At that hour it was resumed, with the promise of grave results, but at
the thirty-sixth discharge the Swamp Angel exploded, and thus terminated
its own career. General Gillmore continued to push his parallels against
Fort Wagner. Although the ironclads could not pass the obstructions to
the inner harbor so as to help, Gillmore persevered, and finally
rendered Forts Wagner and Gregg untenable. The evacuation occurred on
the night of September 6th. As soon as the Federals took possession,
they had to make all haste to repair the ramparts to protect themselves
against the fire from Fort Moultrie and James Island, whose guns were
immediately turned upon them.
By this time, Fort Sumter was in ruins, its artillery could not be
served, and its garrison comprised only a detachment of infantry. Upon
being summoned to surrender by Dahlgren, the commander invited the
admiral to come and take the fort. The effort to do so was made by a
military force and the ironclads on the 9th of September, but failed. No
more important attempts followed. The result had shown that the defenses
of Charleston were practically impregnable, and, though shells were
occasionally sent into the forts and city, the latter was not captured
until near the end of the war, and then it was brought about, as may be
said, by the collapse of the Confederacy itself.
When the war began the Southerners were the superiors of the Northerners
as regarded their cavalry. Horseback riding is more common in the South
than in the North, but it did not take the Union volunteers long to
acquire the art, and, as the war progressed, the cavalry arm was greatly
increased and strengthened. One of the natural results of this was
numerous raids by both sides, some of which assumed an importance that
produced a marked effect on the military campaigns in progress, while in
other cases, the daring excursions were simply an outlet to the
adventurous spirit which is natural to Americans and which manifests
itself upon every opportunity and occasion.
ONE OF GENERAL STUART'S RAIDS.
Mention has been made of the embarrassment caused General Lee during his
Gettysburg campaign by the absence of Stuart with his calvary on one of
his raids. In the autumn, Stuart started out on a reconnaissance to
Catlett's Station, where he observed French's column in the act of
withdrawing from the river, whereupon he turned back toward Warrenton.
Taking the road leading from that town to Manassas, he found himself
unexpectedly confronting the corps of General Warren. Thus he was caught
directly between two fires and in imminent danger of defeat and capture,
for his force was but a handful compared with either column of the
Federals. Fortunately for the raider, he and his men were in a strip of
woods, and had not been seen, but discovery seemed certain, for their
enemies were on every hand, and the slightest inadvertence, even such as
the neighing of a horse, was likely to betray them.
Stuart called his officers around him to discuss what they could do to
extricate themselves from their dangerous situation. No one proposed to
surrender, and it looked as if they would be obliged to abandon their
nine pieces of horse artillery and wait until night, when they might cut
their way out.
[Illustration: THE SWAMP ANGEL BATTERY BOMBARDING CHARLESTON.]
Stuart did not like the idea of losing his guns. At any rate, he would
not consent, until another plan which had occurred to him was tried.
Several of his men were dismounted, and each was furnished with a musket
and infantry knapsack. The uniform was not likely to attract notice in
the darkness, in case they met any Federals. These messengers were
ordered to pick their way through the Union lines to Warrenton, where
they would find General Lee, who was to be told of the danger in which
Stuart was placed. The Confederate commander could be counted upon to
send prompt help. Fortunately for Stuart, two of his men succeeded in
getting through the Union lines and reaching Lee.
At the best, however, the night must pass before help could arrive, and
it need not be said that the hours were long and anxious ones to the
troopers hiding in the woods, with the Federal camp-fires burning on
every side, and the men moving about and likely to come among them at
any moment. They were so close, indeed, that their laughter and
conversation were plainly heard.
The alert horsemen suddenly observed two Union officers coming toward
them. Their careless manner showed they had no thought of danger, and
they were strolling along, when several dark figures sprang up from the
ground, shoved their pistols in their faces, and warned them if they
made the least outcry they would be instantly shot. The prisoners saw
the shadowy forms all around them, and were sensible enough to submit
and give no trouble. The night gradually wore away, and just as it was
growing light, and while the Union division on the heights of Cedar Run,
where they were posted to protect the rear of General Warren, were
preparing breakfast, they were alarmed by the firing of musketry from
the advance of a Confederate column coming up the Warrenton road.
"That means that Uncle Bob has sent us help!" was the gratified
exclamation of Stuart to his delighted friends; "we must take a hand in
this business."
The cavalry opened fire on the Union lines, which were thrown into some
confusion, during which Stuart limbered up his guns and quickly rejoined
Ewell.
STONEMAN'S RAID.
As has been stated, General Hooker at the opening of the battle of
Chancellorsville was confident that he was going to defeat Lee. In order
to cut off his retreat, he sent General Stoneman, with 2,300 cavalry, on
April 28th, to the rear of the Confederate army. Stoneman crossed the
Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford, where his force was divided. One-half, led
by General Averill, headed for the Orange Railroad, a little way above
Culpeper, then occupied by Fitzhugh Lee, with a force of 500 men. He was
attacked with such vigor that he hurriedly retreated across the Rapidan,
burning the bridges behind him. Averill, instead of pursuing, turned
about and made his way back to Hooker, in time to accompany him in his
retreat to the northern bank of the Rappahannock.
Meanwhile, Stoneman crossed the Rapidan on the 1st of May, and galloped
to Louisa Station, on the Virginia Central Railroad, a dozen miles to
the east of Gordonsville. There he paused and sent out several
detachments, which wrought a great deal of mischief. One of them
advanced to Ashland, only fifteen miles from Richmond, while another
went still closer to the Confederate capital. These bodies of troopers
caused much alarm, and a general converging of the enemy's cavalry
caused Stoneman to start on his return, May 6th. For a time he was in
great danger, but his men were excellently mounted, and, by hard riding,
they effected a safe escape along the north bank of the Pamunkey and
York Rivers, and rejoined their friends at Gloucester.
GRIERSON'S RAID.
During the siege of Vicksburg a daring raid was made in the rear of the
city by Colonel B.H. Grierson. In this instance his work was of great
help to General Grant, for he destroyed the Confederate lines of
communication, and checked the gathering of reinforcements for
Pemberton. Grierson, who conceived the plan of the raid, left La Grange
on the 17th of April with three regiments of cavalry. After crossing the
Tallahatchie, he rode south to the Macon and Corinth Railroad, where the
rails were torn up, telegraph lines cut, and bridges and other property
destroyed. To do the work thoroughly detachments were sent in different
directions, and they spared nothing.
Grierson now changed his course to the southwest, seized the bridge over
Pearl River, burned a large number of locomotives, and forced his way
through a wild country to Baton Rouge, which he found in the possession
of Unionists. He had been engaged for a fortnight on his raid, during
which he destroyed an immense amount of property, captured several
towns, fought several sharp skirmishes, and carried off many prisoners.
John S. Mosby was the most daring Confederate raider in the East. Some
of his exploits and escapes were remarkable, and an account of them
would fill a volume with thrilling incidents. General Lee did not look
with favor on such irregular work, but accepted it as one of the
accompaniments of war, and it cannot be denied that Mosby gave him
valuable help in more than one instance.
MORGAN'S RAID.
John H. Morgan was famous in the southwest as a raider and guerrilla. At
the beginning of July, 1863, he seized Columbia, near Jamestown,
Kentucky, and advanced against Colonel Moore at Greenbrier Bridge. His
reception was so hot that he was obliged to retreat, whereupon he
attacked Lebanon, where there was considerable vicious fighting in the
streets. One of Morgan's regiments was commanded by his brother, who was
killed. The incensed leader set fire to the houses, and, although the
defenders surrendered, the place was sacked. Then the invaders retreated
before the Union cavalry who were advancing against them. Their course
was through Northern Kentucky, where they plundered right and left, and
spread dismay on every hand.
Reckless and encouraged by their successes, they now swam their horses
over the Ohio River, and, entering Indiana, gave that State its first
experience in war. The local militia were called out, but the
experienced cavalry easily brushed them aside. They knew, however, it
would be different when they met the regular Union cavalry who were
riding hard after them. To escape them, Morgan started for western
Virginia. When he entered Ohio, the State was terrified, and even
Cincinnati trembled, but the raiders had no thought of stopping until
they readied western Virginia, where they would be safe.
The telegraph had carried the news of Morgan's movements everywhere, and
the determination was general that he should not be allowed to escape
from the entanglements in which he and his men had involved themselves.
The militia guarded all the fords of the Ohio; gunboats steamed back and
forth; the roads were blocked by felled trees, and everything possible
was done to obstruct the band, who were so laden with plunder that their
exhausted animals had to proceed slowly.
It is stated by credible witnesses, who saw the formidable company
riding along the highway when hard pressed, that nearly every man in the
saddle was sound asleep. They dared not make any extended halt through
fear of their pursuers, and when they did pause it was because of their
drooping animals.
Reaching the Ohio at last, Morgan planted his field guns near Buffington
Island, with the view of protecting his men while they swam the river.
Before he could bring them into use, a gunboat knocked the pieces right
and left like so many tenpins. Abandoning the place, Morgan made the
attempt to cross at Belleville, but was again frustrated. It was now
evident that the time had come when each must lookout for himself.
Accordingly, the band broke up and scattered. Their pursuers picked them
up one by one, and Morgan himself and a few of his men were surrounded
near New Lisbon, Ohio, and compelled to surrender. He and his principal
officers were sentenced to the Ohio penitentiary, where they were kept
in close confinement until November 27th, when through the assistance of
friends (some of whom were probably within the prison), he and six
officers effected their escape, and succeeded in reaching the
Confederate lines, where they were soon at their characteristic work
again.
Morgan was a raider by nature, but, as is often the case, the "pitcher
went to the fountain once too often." While engaged upon one of his
raids the following year he was cornered by the Federal cavalry, and in
the fight that followed was shot dead.
Far below these men in moral character were such guerrillas as
Quantrell, who were simply plunderers, assassins, and murderers, who
carried on their execrable work through innate depravity, rather than
from any wish to help the side with which they identified themselves.
Most of them soon ran their brief course, and died, as they had lived,
by violence.