SECTON I. A TRINITY OF PERSONS CANNOT EXIST IN THE DIVINE ESSENCE...
WHETHER THE PERSONS BE SUPPOSED TO BE FINITE OR INFINITE: WITH REMARKS
ON ST. ATHENASIUS'S CREED
Of all errors which have taken place in religion, none have been so
fatal to it as those that immediately respect the divine nature. Wrong
notions of a God, or of his providence, sap its very foundation in
theory and practice, as is evident from the superstition discoverable
among the major part of mankind; who, instead of worshipping the true
God, have been by some means or other infatuated to pay divine homage
to mere creatures, or to idols made with hands, or to such as have no
existence but in their own fertile imaginations.
God being incomprehensible to us, we cannot understand all that
perfection in which the divine essence consists, we can nevertheless
(negatively) comprehend many things, in which (positively) the divine
essence does not and cannot consist.
That it does not consist of three persons, or of any other number of
persons, is as easily demonstrated, as that the whole is bigger than a
part, or any other proposition in mathematics.
We will premise, that the three persons in the supposed Trinity are
either finite or infinite; for there cannot in the scale of being be
a third sort of beings between these two; for ever so many and exalted
degrees in finiteness is still finite, and that being who is infinite
admits of no degrees of enlargement; and as all beings whatever must
be limited or unlimited, perfect or imperfect, they must therefore be
denominated to be finite or infinite: we will therefore premise the
three persons in the Trinity to be merely finite, considered personally
and individually from each other, and the question would arise whether
the supposed Trinity of finites though united in one essence, could be
more than finite still. Inasmuch as three imperfect and circumscribed
beings united together could not constitute a being perfect or infinite,
any more than absolute perfection could consist of three imperfections;
which would be the same as to suppose that infinity could be made up
or compounded of finiteness; or that absolute, uncreated and infinite
perfection, could consist of three personal and imperfect natures.
But on the other hand, to consider every of the three persons in the
supposed Trinity as being absolutely infinite, it would be a downright
contradiction to one infinite and all comprehending essence. Admitting
that God the Father is infinite, it would necessarily preclude the
supposed God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost from the god-head,
or essence of God; one infinite essence comprehending every power,
excellency and perfection, which can possibly exist in the divine
nature. Was it possible that three absolute infinites, which is the
same as three Gods, could be contained in one and the self-same essence,
why not as well any other number of infinites? But as certain as
infinity cannot admit of addition, so certain a plurality of infinites
cannot exist in the same essence; for real infinity is strict and
absolute infinity, and only that, and cannot be compounded of infinities
or of parts, but forecloses all addition. A personal or circumscribed
God, implies as great and manifest a contradiction as the mind of
man can conceive of; it is the same as a limited omnipresence, a weak
Almighty, or a finite God.
From the foregoing arguments on the Trinity, we infer, that the divine
essence cannot consist of a Trinity of persons, whether they are
supposed to be either finite or infinite.
The creed-mongers have exhibited the doctrine of the Trinity in an
alarming point of light, viz.: "Whoever would be saved before all things
it is necessary that he hold the Catholic faith, which faith, except
every one doth keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish
everlastingly." We next proceed to the doctrine, "The Father is eternal,
the Son is eternal, and the Holy Ghost is eternal, and yet there are not
three eternals but one eternal." The plain English is, that the three
persons in the Trinity are three eternals, individually considered, and
yet they are not three eternals but one eternal.
To say that there are three eternals in the Trinity, and yet that there
are not three eternals therein, is a contradiction in terms, as much as
to say, that there are three persons in the Trinity and yet there are
not three persons in the Trinity.
The first proposition in the creed affirms, that "the Father is
eternal," the second affirms that "the Son is eternal," the third
affirms that "the Holy Ghost is eternal," the fourth affirms that "there
are not three eternals," and the fifth that there is "but one eternal."
The reader will observe, that the three first propositions are denied by
the fourth, which denies that there are three eternals, though the three
first propositions affirmed, that there were three eternals by
name, viz. the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. The fifth proposition is
unconnected with either of the former, and is undoubtedly true, viz.
"but there is one eternal." "The Father is God, the Son is God, and the
Holy Ghost is God, and yet there are not three Gods but one God." Here
again we have three Gods by name, affirmed to have an existence by the
three first propositions, by the fourth they are negatived, and the
fifth affirms the truth again, viz. that there is "but one God."
Admitting the three first propositions to be true, to wit, that there
are three Gods, the three could not be one and the same God, any more
than Diana, Dagan and Moloch may be supposed to be the same; and if
three Gods, their essences and providences would interfere and make
universal confusion and disorder.
"The Father is Almighty, the Son is Almighty, and the Holy Ghost is
Almighty, and yet there are not three Almighties but one Almighty." Here
we have three Almighties and at the same time but one Almighty. So that
the point at issue is brought to this simple question, viz. whether
three units can be one, or one unit three or not? Which is submitted to
the curious to determine. Our creed further informs us, that the three
persons in the Trinity are co-eternal together and co-equal, but in
its sequel we are told that one was begotten of the other; and when we
advert to the history of that transaction, we find it to be not quite
eighteen hundred years ago, and took place in the reign of Herod, the
King of Judea, which faith except "we keep whole and undefined," we have
a threat, that "without doubt we shall perish everlastingly."
SECTON IX. ESSENCE BEING THE CAUSE OF IDENTITY...
IS INCONSISTENT WITH PERSONALITY IN THE DIVINE NATURE
One God can have but one essence, which must have been eternal and
infinite, and for that reason precludes all others from a participation
of his nature, glory, and universal and absolute perfection.
When we speak of any being who by nature is capable of being rightfully
denominated an individual, we conceive of it to exist but in one
essence; so that essence as applied to God, denominates the divine
nature; and as applied to man, it denotes an individual: for although
the human race is with propriety denominated the race of man, and though
every male of the species, is with equal propriety called man, for
that they partake of one common sort of nature and likeness, yet the
respective individuals are not one and the same. The person of A is not
the person of B, nor are they conscious of each other's consciousness,
and therefore the joy or grief of A, is not and cannot be the joy or
grief of B; this is what we know to be a fact from our own experience.
The reason of this personal distinction is founded in nature, for though
we partake of one common nature and likeness, yet we do not partake of
one and the same essence. Essence is therefore, in the order of nature,
the primary cause of identity or sameness and cannot be divided.
From hence we infer, that the doctrine of the Trinity is destitute of
foundation, and tends manifestly to superstition and idolatry.
SECTON III. THE IMPERFECTION OF KNOWLEDGE...
IN THE PERSON OF JESUS CHRIST, INCOMPATIBLE WITH HIS DIVINITY
That Jesus Christ was not God is evident from his own words, where,
speaking of the day of judgment, he says, "Of that day and hour knoweth
no man, no not the angels which are in Heaven, neither the Son, but the
Father." This is giving up all pretention to divinity, acknowledging in
the most explicit manner, that he did not know all things, but compares
his understanding to that of man and angels; "of that day and hour
knoweth no man, no not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son."
Thus he ranks himself with finite beings, and with them acknowledges,
that he did not know the day and hour of judgment, and at the same time
ascribes a superiority of knowledge to the lather, for that he knew the
day and hour of judgment.
That he was a mere creature is further evident from his prayer to the
father, saying, "father if it be possible, let this cup pass from me,
nevertheless, not my will but thine be done." These expressions speak
forth the most humble submission to his father's will, authority and
government, and however becoming so submissive a disposition to the
divine government would be, in a creature, it is utterly inconsistent
and unworthy of a God, or of the person of Jesus Christ, admitting him
to have been a divine person, or of the essence of God.