SECTON I. OF THE NATURE OF FAITH AND WHEREIN IT CONSISTS
Faith in Jesus Christ and in his Gospel throughout the New Testament,
is represented to be an essential condition of the eternal salvation of
mankind. "Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law,
but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ,
that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works
of the law, for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified."
Again, "If thou shalt confess the Lord Jesus Christ, and believe in
thine heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou mayst be
saved." And again, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved,
but he that believeth not shall be damned." Faith is the last result of
the understanding, or the same which we call the conclusion, it is the
consequence of a greater or less deduction of reasoning from certain
premises previously laid down; it is the same as believing or Judging of
any matter of fact, or assenting to or dissenting from the truth of any
doctrine, system or position; so that to form a judgment, or to come to
a determination in one's own mind, or to believe, or to have faith, is
in reality the same thing, and is synonymously applied both in writing
and speaking, for example, "Abraham believed in God." Again, "for he,"
speaking of Abraham, "judged him faithful who had promised," and again
"his faith was counted unto him for righteousness." It is not only in
scripture that we meet with examples of the three words, to wit, belief,
judgment, and faith, to stand for the marks of our ideas for the same
thing, but also all intelligible writers and speakers apply these
phrases synonymously, and it would be good grammar and sense, for us to
say that we have faith in a universal providence, or that we judge
that there is a universal providence. These three different phrases, in
communicating our ideas of providence, do every one of them exhibit the
same idea, to all persons of common understanding, who are acquainted
with the English language. In fine, every one's experience may convince
them that they cannot assent to, or dissent from the truth of any matter
of fact, doctrine or proposition whatever, contrary to their judgment;
for the act of the mind in assenting to or dissenting from any position,
or in having faith or belief in favor of, or against any doctrine,
system, or proposition, could not amount to anything more or less, than
the act of the judgment, or last dictate of the understanding, whether
the understanding be supposed to be rightly informed or not: so that our
faith in all cases is as liable to err, as our reason is to misjudge
of the truth; and our minds act faith in disbelieving any doctrine or
system of religion to be true, as much as in believing it to be so. From
hence it appears, that the mind cannot act faith in opposition to its
judgment, but that it is the resolution of the understanding itself
committed to memory or writing, and can never be considered distinct
from it. And inasmuch as faith necessarily results from reasoning,
forcing itself upon our minds by the evidence of truth, or the mistaken
apprehension of it, without any act of choice of ours, there cannot be
any thing, which pertains to, or partakes of the nature of moral good or
evil in it. For us to believe such doctrines, or systems of religion, as
appears to be credibly recommended to our reason, can no more partake
of the nature of goodness or morality, than our natural eyes may be
supposed to partake of it in their perception of colors; for the
faith of the mind, and the sight of the eye are both of them necessary
consequences, the one results from the reasonings of the mind, and the
other from the perception of the eye. To suppose a rational mind without
the exercise of faith would be as absurd as to suppose a proper and
complete eye without sight, or the perception of the common objects
of that sense. The short of the matter is this, that without reason we
could not have faith, and without the eye or eyes we could not see, but
once admitting that we are rational, faith follows of course, naturally
resulting from the dictates of reason.
SECTON II. OF THE TRADITIONS OF OUR FOREFATHERS
It may be objected, that the far greater part of mankind believe
according to the tradition of their forefathers, without examining into
the grounds of it, and that argumentative deductions from the reason
and nature of things, have, with the bulk of them, but little or no
influence on their faith. Admitting this to have been too much the
case, and that many of them have been blameable for the omission of
cultivating or improving their reason, and for not forming a better
judgment concerning their respective traditions, or a juster and
more exalted faith; yet this does not at all invalidate the foregoing
arguments respecting the nature of faith: for though it be admitted that
most of the human race do not, or will not reason, with any considerable
degree of propriety, on the traditions of their forefathers, but receive
them implicitly, they nevertheless establish this one proposition in
their minds, right or wrong, that their respective traditions are right,
for none could believe in them were they possessed of the knowledge
that they were wrong. And as we have a natural bias in favor of our
progenitors, to whose memory a tribute of regard is justly due, and
whose care in handing down from father to son such notions of religion
and manners, as they supposed would be for the well being and happiness
of their posterity in this and the coming world, naturally endears
tradition to us, and prompts us to receive and venerate it. Add to this,
that the priests of every denomination are "_instant in season and out
of season,_" in inculcating and instilling the same tenets, which, with
the foregoing considerations, induces mankind in general to give at
least a tacit consent to their respective traditions, and without
a thorough investigation thereof, believe them to be right and very
commonly infallible, although their examinations are not attended with
argumentative reasonings, from the nature of things; and in the same
proportion as they may be supposed to fall short of conclusive arguing
on their respective traditions they cannot fail to be deceived in the
rationality of their faith.
But after all it may be that some of the human race may have been
traditionally or accidentally right, in many or most respects. Admitting
it to be so, yet they cannot have any rational enjoyment of it, or
understand wherein the truth of the premised right tradition consists,
or deduce any more satisfaction from it, than others whose traditions
may be supposed to be wrong; for it is the knowledge of the discovery
of truth alone, which is gratifying to that mind who contemplates its
superlative beauty.
That tradition has had a powerful influence on the human mind is
universally admitted, even by those who are governed by it in the
articles or discipline of their faith; for though they are blind with
respect to their own superstition, yet they can perceive and despise it
in others. Protestants very readily discern and expose the weak side of
Popery, and Papists are as ready and acute in discovering the errors of
heretics. With equal facility do Christians and Mahometans spy out each
others inconsistencies and both have an admirable sagacity to descry the
superstition of the heathen nations. Nor are the Jews; wholly silent
in this matter; "O God the heathen are come into thine inheritance, thy
holy temple have they defiled." What abomination must this have been in
the opinion of a nation who had monopolized all religion to themselves!
Monstrous vile heathen, that they should presume to approach the sanctum
sanctorum! The Christians call the Mahometans by the odious name
of infidels, but the Musslemen, in their opinion, cannot call the
Christians by a worse name than that which they have given themselves,
they therefore call them Christians.
What has been already observed upon tradition, is sufficient to admonish
us of its errors and superstitions, and the prejudices to which a
bigoted attachment thereto exposes us, which is abundantly sufficient to
excite us to a careful examination of our respective traditions, and not
to rest satisfied until we have regulated our faith by reason.
SECTON III. OUR FAITH IS GOVERNED BY OUR REASONINGS...
WHETHER THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO BE CONCLUSIVE OR INCONCLUSIVE, AND NOT
MERELY BY OUR OWN CHOICE
It is written that "Faith is the gift of God." Be it so, but is faith
any more the gift of God than reflection, memory or reason are his
gifts? Was it not for memory, we could not retain in our minds the
judgment which we have passed upon things; and was it not for reasoning,
in either a regular or irregular manner, or partly both, there could be
no such thing as judging or believing; so that God could not bestow the
gift of faith separate from the gift of reason, faith being the mere
consequence of reasoning, either right or wrong, or in a greater or less
degree, as has been previously argued.
Still there is a knotty text of scripture to surmount, viz: "He that
believeth shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be
damned." This text is considered as crowding hard upon unbelievers in
Christianity; but when it is critically examined, it will be found not
to militate at all against them, but is merely a Jesuitical fetch to
overawe some and make others wonder. We will premise, that an unbeliever
is destitute of faith, which is the cause of his being thus denominated.
The Christian believes the gospel to be true and of divine authority,
the Deist believes that it is not true and not of divine authority; so
that the Christian and Deist are both of them believers, and according
to the express words of the text, "shall be saved," and a Deist may as
well retort upon a Christian and call him an infidel, because he differs
in faith from him, as a Christian may upon the Deist; for there is the
same impropriety in applying the cant of infidelity to either, as both
are believers; and it is impossible for us to believe contrary to
our judgments or the dictates of understanding, whether it be rightly
informed or not. Why then may there not in both denominations be honest
men, who are seeking after the truth, and who may have an equal right to
expect the favor and salvation of God.