SECTON I. OF MIRACLES
Previous to the arguments concerning miracles, it is requisite that we
give a definition of them, that the arguments may be clearly opposed to
the doctrine of miracles, the reality of which we mean to negative; so
that we do not dispute about matters in which we are all agreed, but
that we may direct our speculations to the subject matter or essence of
the controversy.
We will therefore premise, that miracles are opposed to, and counteract
the laws of nature, or that they imply an absolute alteration in either
a greater or less degree, the eternal order, disposition and tendency
of it; this, we conclude, is a just definition of miraculousness, and is
that for which the advocates for miracles contend, in their defining of
miracles. For if they were supposed to make no alteration in the natural
order of things, they could have no positive existence, but the laws of
nature would produce their effects, which would preclude their reality,
and render them altogether fictitious, inasmuch as their very existence
is premised to consist in their opposition to, and alteration of the
laws of nature: so that if this is not effected, miracles can have no
positive existence, any more than nonentity itself; therefore, if in the
course of the succeeding arguments, we should evince that the laws of
nature have not and cannot be perverted, altered or suspended, it will
foreclose miracles by making all things natural. Having thus defined
miracles, and stated the dispute, we proceed to the arguments.
Should there ever have been a miraculous suspension and alteration of
the laws of nature, God must have been the immediate author of it, as
no finite beings may be supposed to be able to alter those laws or
regulations, which were established by omnipotent power and infinite
perfection, and which nothing short of such power and perfection can
perpetuate. This then is the single point at issue, viz: whether
God has, or can, consistent with his nature as God, in any instance
whatever, alter or deviate from the laws, with which he has eternally
impressed the universe, or not.
To suppose that God should subvert his laws, (which is the same as
changing them) would be to suppose him to be mutable; for that it
would necessarily imply, either that their eternal establishment was
imperfect, or that a premised alteration thereof is so. To alter or
change that which is absolutely perfect, would necessarily make it
cease to be perfect, inasmuch as perfection could not be altered for the
better, but for the worse, and consequently an alteration could not meet
with the divine approbation; which terminates the issue of the matter
in question against miracles, and authorizes us to deduce the following
conclusive inference, to wit: that Almighty God, having eternally
impressed the universe with a certain system of laws, for the same
eternal reason that they were infinitely perfect and best, they could
never admit of the least alteration, but are as unchangeable, in their
nature, as God their immutable author. To form the foregoing argument
into syllogisms, it would be thus:--
God is perfect--the laws of nature were established by God; therefore,
the laws of nature are perfect.
But admitting miracles, the syllogism should be thus:--
The laws of nature were in their eternal establishment perfect;--the
laws of nature have been altered; therefore, the alteration of the laws
of nature is imperfect.
Or thus: the laws of nature have been altered;--the alteration has
been for the better; therefore, the eternal establishment thereof was
imperfect.
Thus it appears, from a syllogistical as well as other methods of
reasoning, that provided we admit of miracles, which are synonymous to
the alterations of nature, we by so doing derogate from the perfection
of God, either in his eternal constitution of nature, or in a supposed
subsequent miraculous alteration of it, so that take the argument either
way, and it preponderates against miracles.
Furthermore, was it possible, that the eternal order of nature should
have been imperfect, there would be an end to all perfection. For God
might be as imperfect in any supposed miraculous works, as in those of
nature; nor could we ever have any security under his natural or moral
government, if they were liable to change; for mutability is but another
term for imperfection, or is inseparably connected with it.
God, the great architect of nature, has so constructed its machinery,
that it never needs to be altered or rectified. In vain* we endeavor to
search out the hidden mystery of a perpetual motion, in order to copy
nature, for after all our researches we must be contented with such
mechanism as will run down, and need rectification again; but the
machine of the universe admits of no rectification, but continues its
never ceasing operations, under the unerring guidance of the providence
of God. Human architects make and unmake things, and alter them as
their invention may dictate, and experience may determine to be most
convenient and best. But that mind, which is infinitely perfect, gains
nothing by experience, but surveys the immense universality of things,
with all their possible relations, fitnesses and unfitnesses, of both a
natural or moral kind, with one comprehensive view.
SECTON II. A SUCCESSION OF KNOWLEDGE, OR OF THE EXERTION OF POWER...
IN GOD, INCOMPATIBLE WITH HIS OMNISCIENCE OR OMNIPOTENCE, AND THE
ETERNAL AND INFINITE DISPLAY OF DIVINE POWER FORECLOSES ANY SUBSEQUENT
EXERTION OF IT MIRACULOUSLY
That creation is as eternal and infinite as God, has been argued in
chapter second; and that there could be no succession in creation, or
the exertion of the power of God, in perfecting the boundless work, and
in impressing the universe with harmonious laws, perfectly well adapted
to their design, use and end.
First. These arguments may be further illustrated, and the evidence
of the being of a God more fully exhibited, from the following
considerations, to wit: dependent beings and existences must be
dependent on some being or cause that is independent, for dependent
beings, or existences, could not exist independently; and, in as much
as by retrospectively tracing the order of the succession of causes, we
cannot include in our numeration the independent cause, as the several
successive causes still depend on their preceding cause, and that
preceding cause on the cause preceding it, and so on beyond numerical
calculations, we are therefore obliged (as rational beings) to admit an
independent cause of all things, for that a mere succession of dependent
causes cannot constitute an independent cause; and from hence we are
obliged to admit a self-existent and sufficient cause of all things, for
otherwise it would be dependent and insufficient to have given existence
to itself, or to have been the efficient cause of all things.
Having thus established the doctrine of a self-sufficient,
self-existent, and consequently all-powerful cause of all things, we
ascribe an eternal existence to this cause of all causes and effects,
whom we call God. And, inasmuch, as from the works of nature it is
manifest, that God is possessed of almighty power, we from hence infer
his eternal existence. Since his premised existence at (and not before)
any given era, would be a conclusive objection to the omnipotency of
his power, that he had not existed before, or eternally. For as God is
a being self-sufficient, self-existent, and almighty, (as before argued)
his power must apply to his own existence as well as to the existence of
things in general, and therefore, if he did not eternally exist, it must
be because he had not the almighty power of existence in himself, and if
so, he never could have existed at all; so that God must have eternally
existed or not have existed at all; and inasmuch as the works of nature
evince his positive existence, and as he could not be dependent on
the power, will, or pleasure of any other being but himself for his
existence, and as an existence, in time would be a contradiction to his
almighty power of self-existency, that he had not eternally existed;
therefore, his existence must have been (in truth) eternal.
Although it is to us incomprehensible that any being could be
self-existent or eternal (which is synonymous,) yet we can comprehend,
that any being that is not self-existent and eternal and dependent
and finite, and consequently not a God. Hence we infer, that though we
cannot comprehend the true God (by reason of our own finiteness,) yet
we can negatively comprehend that an imperfect being cannot be God. A
dependent being is finite, and therefore imperfect, and consequently not
a God. A being that has existed at a certain era (and not before) is a
limited one, for beyond his era he was not, and therefore finite, and
consequently not a God. Therefore, that being only who is self-existent,
infinitely perfect and eternal, is the true God: and if eternally
and infinitely perfect, there must have been an eternal and infinite
display, and if an eternal and infinite display, it could be nothing
short of an eternal and infinite creation and providence.
As to the existence of a God, previous to Moses's era of the first day's
work, he does not inform us. The first notice he gives us of a God was
of his laborious working by the day, a theory of creation (as I should
think) better calculated for the servile Israelitish Brick-makers, than
for men of learning and science in these modern times.
SECTON III. RARE AND WONDERFUL PHENOMENA NO EVIDENCE OF MIRACLES...
NOR ARE DIABOLICAL SPIRITS ABLE TO EFFECT THEM, OR SUPERSTITIOUS
TRADITIONS TO CONFIRM THEM, NOR CAN ANCIENT MIRACLES PROVE RECENT
REVELATIONS.
Comets, earthquakes, volcanoes, and northern lights (in the night,) with
many other extraordinary phenomena or appearances intimidate weak minds,
and are by them thought to be miraculous, although they undoubtedly
have their proper natural causes, which have been in a great measure
discovered. Jack-with-a-lantern is a frightful appearance to some
people, but not so much as the imaginary spectre. But of all the
scarecrows which have made human nature tremble, the devil has been
chief; his family is said to be very numerous, consisting of "legions,"
with which he has kept our world in a terrible uproar. To tell of all
the feats and diabolical tricks, which this infernal family is said to
have played upon our race, would compose a volume of an enormous size.
All the magicians, necromancers, wizards, witches, conjurors, gypsies,
sybils, hobgoblins, apparitions and the like, are supposed to be under
their diabolical government: old Belzebub rules them all. Men will face
destructive cannon and mortars, engage each other in the clashing of
arms, and meet the horrors of war undaunted, but the devil and his
banditti of fiends and emissaries fright them out of their wits, and
have a powerful influence in plunging them into superstition, and also
in continuing them therein.
This supposed intercourse between mankind and those infernal beings, is
by some thought to be miraculous or supernatural; while others laugh at
all the stories of their existence, concluding them to be mere juggle
and deception, craftily imposed on the credulous, who are always gaping
after something marvellous, miraculous, or supernatural, or after that
which they do not understand: and are awkward and unskilful in their
examination into nature, or into the truth or reality of things, which
is occasioned partly by natural imbecility, and partly by indolence and
inattention to nature and reason.
That any magical intercourse or correspondence of mere spirits with
mankind, is contradictory to nature, and consequently impossible, has
been argued in chapter sixth. And that nothing short of the omnipotent
power of God, countermanding his eternal order of nature, and impressing
it with new and contrary law, can constitute a miracle has been argued
in this, and is an effect surpassing the power of mere creatures, the
diabolical nature not excepted. From hence we infer, that devils cannot
work miracles. Inattention to reason, and ignorance of the nature of
things makes many of mankind give credit to miracles. It seems that by
this marvellous way of accounting for things, they think to come off
with reputation in their ignorance; for if nature was nothing but
a supernatural whirligig, or an inconstant and irregular piece of
mechanism, it would reduce all learning and science to a level with the
fanaticism and superstition of the weak and credulous, and put the wise
and unwise on a level in point of knowledge, as there would not, on
this thesis, be any regular standard in nature, whereby to ascertain the
truth and reality of things. What is called sleight-of-hand, is by
some people thought to be miraculous. Astrological calculations of
nativities, lucky and unlucky days and seasons, are by some, regarded,
and even moles on the surface of the skin are thought to be portentive
of good or bad fortune.
"The Swedish Laplanders, the most ignorant mortals in Europe," are
"charged with being conjurors, and are said to have done such feats, by
the magic art, as do not at all fall far short of miracles; that they
will give the sailors such winds as they want in any part of their
voyage; that they can inflict and cure diseases at any distance; and
insure people of success in their undertakings; and yet they are just
such poor miserable wretches as used to be charged with witchcraft
here," viz: in England and in New England, "and cannot command so much
as the necessaries of life: and indeed, none but very credulous and
ignorant people give credit to such fables at this day, though the whole
world seems to have been bewitched in believing them formerly." "The
24th of March, 1735, an act passed in the Parliament of Great Britain
to repeal the statute of I _Jac's_, entitled an act against conjuration,
witchcraft, and dealing with evil and wicked spirits, and to repeal an
act in Scotland entitled Amentis Witchcraft." It is but forty-six
years since the supreme legislature became apprized of the natural
impossibility of any magical intercourse between mankind and evil and
wicked spirits; in consequence whereof they repealed their statute laws
against it, as they were naturally void, unnecessary, and unworthy of
their legislative restriction. For that such a crime had no possible
existence in nature, and therefore could not be acted by mankind; though
previous to the repeal of those laws, more or less of that island
had fallen a sacrifice to them; and the relations of those imaginary
criminals were stamped with infamy by such executions, which had the
sanction of law, alias of the legislature and the judges, and in which
many learned attorneys have demonstrated the turpitude of such capital
offences, and the just sanction of those laws in extirpating such pests
of society from the earth; to which the clergy have likewise given their
approbation, for that those capital transgressors made too free with
their devils.
Furthermore, the repeal of those laws, as far as the wisdom and
authority of the British Parliament may be supposed to go, abrogated
that command of the law of Moses, which saith, "Thou shalt not suffer a
witch to live," and not only so, but the doctrine of the impossibility
of intercourse, or of dealing with wicked spirits, forecloses the
supposed miraculous casting out of devils, of which we have sundry
chronicles in the New Testament.
But to return to the annals of my own country, it will present us with a
scene of superstition in the magical way, which will probably equal any
that is to be met with in history, to wit: the Salem witchcraft in New
England; great numbers of the inhabitants of both sexes were judicially
convicted of being wizards and witches, and executed accordingly; some
of whom were so infatuated with the delusion, that at their execution
they confessed themselves guilty of the sorcery for which they were
indicted; nor did the fanaticism meet with a check until some of the
first families were accused with it, who made such an opposition to the
prosecutions, as finally to put an end to any further execution of the
Salemites.
Those capital offenders suffered in consequence of certain laws,
which, by way of derision, have since been called the _Blue Laws_,
in consequence of the multiplicity of superstition, with which they
abounded, most of which are repealed; but those that respect sorcery
have had favorite legislators enough to keep them alive and in force to
this day.
I recollect an account of prodigies said to have been carried on by the
Romish Clergy in France, upon which his most Christian Majesty sent one
of his officers to them with the following prohibition, to wit: "by the
command of the king, God is forbid to work any more miracles in this
place;" upon which the marvellous work ceased.
There has been so much detection of the artifice, juggle and imposture
of the pretenders to miracles, in the world, especially in such parts
where learning and science have prevailed, that it should prompt us to
be very suspicious of the reality of them, even without entering into
any lengthy arguments from the reason and nature of things to evince the
utter impossibility of their existence in the creation and providence of
God.
We are told, that the first occasion and introduction of miracles into
the world, was to prove the divine authority of revelation, and the
mission of its first teachers; be it so. Upon this plan of evincing the
divinity of revelation, it would be necessary that its teachers should
always be vested with the power of working miracles; so that when their
authority or the infallibility of the revelation which they should
teach, should at any time be questioned, they might work a miracle;
or that in such a case God would do it; which would end the dispute,
provided mankind were supposed to be judges of miracles, which may be
controverted. However, admitting that they are possible, and mankind in
the several generations of the world to be adequate judges of them,
and also, that they were necessary to support the divine mission of the
first promulgators of revelation, and the divinity which they taught;
from the same parity of reasoning, miracles ought to be continued to
the succeeding generations of mankind, co-extensive with its divine
authority, or that of its teachers. For why should we in this age of the
world be under obligation to believe the infallibility of revelation, or
the heavenly mission of its teachers, upon less evidence than those of
mankind who lived in the generations before us? For that which may be
supposed to be a rational evidence, and worthy to gain the belief and
assent of mankind at one period of time, must be so at another; so
that it appears, from the sequel of the arguments on this subject, that
provided miracles were requisite to establish the divine authority of
revelation originally, it is equally requisite that they be continued to
the latest posterity, to whom the divine legislator may be supposed to
continue such revelation as his law to mankind.
Nothing is more evident to the understanding part of mankind, than that
in those parts of the world where learning and science has prevailed,
miracles have ceased; but in such parts of it as are barbarous and
ignorant, miracles are still in vogue; which is of itself a strong
presumption that in the infancy of letters, learning and science, or in
the world's non-age, those who confided in miracles, as a proof of the
divine mission of the first promulgators of revelation, were imposed
upon by fictitious appearances instead of miracles.
Furthermore, the author of Christianity warns us against the impositions
of false teachers, and ascribes the signs of the true believers, saying,
"And, these signs shall follow them that believe, in my name shall they
cast out devils, they shall speak with new tongues, they shall take up
serpents, and if they drink any deadly thing it shall not hurt them,
they shall lay hands on the sick and they shall recover." These are the
express words of the founder of Christianity, and are contained in
the very commission, which he gave to his eleven Apostles, who were to
promulgate his gospel in the world; so that from their very institution
it appears that when the miraculous signs, therein spoken of, failed,
they were considered as unbelievers, and consequently no faith or trust
to be any longer reposed in them or their successors. For these signs
were those which were to perpetuate their mission, and were to be
continued as the only evidences of the validity and authenticity of it,
and as long as these signs followed, mankind could not be deceived
in adhering to the doctrines which the Apostles and their successors
taught; but when these signs failed, their divine authority ended.
Now if any of them will drink a dose of deadly poison, which I could
prepare, and it does not "hurt them," I will subscribe to their divine
authority, and end the dispute; not that I have a disposition to poison
anyone, nor do I suppose that they would dare to take such a dose as
I could prepare for them, which, if so, would evince that they were
unbelievers themselves, though they are extremely apt to censure others
for unbelief, which according to their scheme is a damnable sin.
SECTON IV. PRAYER CANNOT BE ATTENDED WITH MIRACULOUS CONSEQUENCES
Prayer to God is no part of a rational religion, nor did reason
ever dictate it; but, was it duly attended to, it would teach us the
contrary.
To make known our wants to God by prayer, or to communicate any
intelligence concerning ourselves or the universe to him, is impossible,
since his omniscient mind has a perfect knowledge of all things, and
therefore is beholden to none of our correspondency to inform himself of
our circumstances, or of what would be wisest and best to do for us
in all possible conditions and modes of existence, in our never ending
duration of being. These, with the infinitude of things, have been
eternally deliberated by the omniscient mind, who can admit of no
additional intelligence, whether by prayer or otherwise, which renders
it nugatory.
We ought to act up to the dignity of our nature, and demean ourselves,
as creatures of our rank and capacity, and not presume to dictate any
thing, less or more, to the governor of the universe; who rules not by
our proscriptions, but by eternal and infinite reason. To pray to God,
or to make supplication to him, requesting certain favors for ourselves,
or from any, or all the species, is inconsistent with the relation which
subsists between God and man. Whoever has a just sense of the absolute
perfection of God, and of their own imperfection, and natural subjection
to his providence, cannot but from thence infer the impropriety of
praying or supplicating to God, for this, that, or the other thing; or
of remonstrating against his providence: inasmuch, as "known to God are
all our wants;" and as we know, that we ourselves are inadequate judges
of what would be best for us, all things considered. God looks through
the immensity of things, and understands the harmony, moral beauty and
decorum of the whole, and will by no means change his purposes, or
alter the nature of the things themselves for any of our entreaties or
threats. To pray, entreat, or make supplication to God, is neither
more nor less than dictating to eternal reason, and entering into the
province and prerogative of the Almighty; if this is not the meaning and
import of prayer, it has none at all, that extends to the final events
and consequences of things. To pray to God with a sense, that the prayer
we are making will not be granted any more for our making it, or that
our prayer will make no alteration in the state, order or disposal
of things at all, or that the requests, which we make, will be no more
likely to be granted, or the things themselves conferred upon us by
God, than as though we had not prayed for them, would be stupidity or
outright mockery, or "to be seen of men," in order to procure from them
some temporary advantages. But on the other hand for us to suppose, that
our prayers or praises do in any one instance or more alter the eternal
constitution of things, or of the providence of God, is the same as to
suppose ourselves so far forth to hold a share in the divine government,
for our prayers must be supposed to effect something or nothing, if they
effect nothing they are good for nothing; but that they should effect
any alteration in the nature of things, or providence of God, is
inadmissible: for if they did, we should interfere with the providence
of God in a certain degree, by arrogating it to ourselves. For if there
are any particulars in providence, which God does not govern by his
order of nature, they do not belong to the providence of God, but of
man; for if in any instance, God is moved by the prayers, entreaties, or
supplications of his creatures, to alter his providence, or to do that
in conformity thereto, which otherwise, in the course of his providence,
he would not have done; then it would necessarily follow, that as far
as such alteration may be supposed to take place, God does not govern by
eternal and infinite reason, but on the contrary is governed himself by
the prayer of man.
Our great proficients in prayer must need think themselves to be of
great importance in the scale of being, otherwise they would not indulge
themselves in the notion, that the God of nature would subvert his laws,
or bend his providence in conformity to their prayers. But it may be
objected, that they pray conditionally, to wit: that God would answer
their prayers, provided they are agreeable to his providential order or
disposal of things; but to consider prayer in such a sense renders it,
not only useless, but impertinent; for the laws of nature would produce
their natural effects as well without it, as with it The sum total of
such conditional prayer could amount to no more than this, viz: that God
would not regard them at all, but that he would conduct the kingdom of
his providence agreeable to the absolute perfections of his nature;
and who in the exercise of common sense would imagine that God would do
otherwise?
The nature of the immense universality of things having been eternally
adjusted, constituted and settled, by the profound thought, perfect
wisdom, impartial justice, immense goodness, and omnipotent power
of God, it is the greatest arrogance in us to attempt an alteration
thereof. If we demean ourselves worthy of a rational happiness, the laws
of the moral system, already established, will afford it to us; and as
to physical evils, prudent economy may make them tolerable, or ward most
of them off for a season, though they will unavoidably bring about the
separation of a soul and body, and terminate with animal life, whether
we pray for or against it.
To pray for any thing, which we can obtain by the due application of our
natural powers, and neglect the means of procuring it, is impertinence
and laziness in the abstract; and to pray for that which God in the
course of his providence, has put out of our power to obtain, is only
murmuring against God, and finding fault with his providence, or acting
the inconsiderate part of a child; for example, to pray for more wisdom,
understanding, grace or faith; for a more robust constitution--handsomer
figure, or more of a gigantic size, would be the same as telling God,
that we are dissatisfied with our inferiority in the order of being;
that neither our souls nor bodies suit us; that he has been too sparing
of his beneficence; that we want more wisdom, and organs better fitted
for show, agility and superiority. But we ought to consider, that "_we
cannot add one cubit to our stature_," or alter the construction of our
organic frame; and that our mental talents are finite; and that in a
vast variety of proportions and disproportions, as our Heavenly Father
in his order of nature, and scale of being saw fit; who has nevertheless
for the encouragement of intelligent nature ordained, that it shall
be capable of improvement, and consequently of enlargement; therefore,
"_whosoever lacketh wisdom_" instead of "_asking it of God_," let him
improve what he has, that he may enlarge the original stock; this is
all the possible way of gaining in wisdom and knowledge, a competency of
which will regulate our faith. But it is too common for great faith and
little knowledge to unite in the same person; such persons are beyond
the reach of argument and their faith immovable, though it cannot remove
mountains. The only way to procure food, raiment, or the necessaries or
conveniences of life, is by natural means; we do not get them by wishing
or praying for, but by actual exertion; and the only way to obtain
virtue or morality is to practice and habituate ourselves to it, and
not to pray to God for it: he has naturally furnished us with talents or
faculties suitable for the exercise and enjoyment of religion, and it is
our business to improve them aright, or we must suffer the consequences
of it. We should conform ourselves to reason, the path of moral
rectitude, and in so doing, we cannot fail of recommending ourselves to
God, and to our own consciences. This is all the religion which reason
knows or can ever approve of.
Moses, the celebrated prophet and legislator of the Israelites,
ingratiated himself into their esteem, by the stratagem of prayer, and
pretended intimacy with God; he acquaints us, that he was once admitted
to a sight of his back-parts! and that "_no man can see" his "face and
live_;" and at other times we are told that he "_talked with God, face
to face, as a man talketh with his friend_;" and also that at times God
waxed, wroth with Israel, and how Moses prayed for them; and at other
times, that he ordered Aaron to offer sweet incense to God, which
_appeased his wrath_, and prevented his destroying Israel in his _hot
displeasure!_ These are the footsteps, by which we may trace sacerdotal
dominion to its source, and explore its progress in the world. "_And the
Lord said unto Moses, how long will this people provoke me?
I will smite them with the pestilence, and disinherit them, and I
will make of thee a great nation, and mightier than they_," but Moses
advertises God of the injury, which so rash a procedure would do to
his character among the nations; and also reminds him of his promise
to Israel, saying, "_Now if thou shall kill all this people as one man,
then the nations, which have heard the fame of thee will speak, saying,
because the Lord was not able to bring this people into the land, which
he swear unto them, therefore he hath slain them in the wilderness_."
That Moses should thus advise the omniscient God, of dishonorable
consequences which would attend a breach of promise, which he tells us,
that God was unadvisedly about to make with the tribes of Israel, had
not his remonstrance prevented it, is very extraordinary and repugnant
to reason; yet to an eye of faith it would exalt the man Moses, "and
make him very great;" for if we may credit his history of the matter, he
not only averted God's judgment against Israel, and prevented them from
being cut off as a nation, but by the same prayer procured for them
a pardon of their sin. "_Pardon, I beseech thee, the iniquity of this
people_," and in the next verse follows the answer, "_and the Lord
said I have pardoned according to thy word_." It seems that God had
the power, but Moses had the dictation of it, and saved Israel from the
wrath and pestilential fury of a jealous God; and that he procured
them a pardon of their sin, "_for the Lord thy God is a jealous God_."
Jealousy can have no existence in that mind, which possesses perfect
knowledge, and consequently cannot, without the greatest impropriety,
he ascribed to God, who knows all things, and needed none of the
admonitions, advice or intelligence of Moses, or any of his dictatorial
prayers. "_And the Lard hearkened unto me at that time also_;"
intimating that it was a common thing for him to do the like. When
teachers can once make the people believe that God answers their
prayers, and that their eternal interest is dependent on them, they soon
raise themselves to opulency, rule and high sounding titles; as that
of _His Holiness--the Reverend Father in God--The Holy Poker--Bishop of
Souls_--and a variety of other such like appellations, derogatory to the
honor or just prerogative of God; as is Joshua's history concerning the
Lord's hearkening unto him at the battle of the Amorites, wherein he
informs us, that he ordered the sun to stand still, saying, "_Sun stand
thou still upon Gidaen, and thou Moon in the valley of Ajalon, so
the Sun stood still and the Moon stayed until the people had avenged
themselves upon their enemies;" so the Sun stood still in the midst of
Heaven, "and hasted not to go down about a whole day;_" and then adds,
by way of supremacy to Himself above all others, and in direct
contradiction to the before recited passages of Moses concerning the
Lord's hearkening unto him, or to any other man but himself, saying,
"_And there was no day like that before it, or after it, that the Lord
hearkened unto the voice of a man_." There is not any thing more evident
than that if the representation given by Joshua, as matter of fact, is
true, those exhibited by Moses concerning the Lord's hearkening unto him
are not: though the representations of fact by Moses and by Joshua,
are allowed to be both canonical, yet it is impossible that both can be
true. However, astronomy being but little understood in the age in which
Joshua lived, and the earth being in his days thought to be at rest, and
the sun to revolve round it, makes it in no way strange, that he caught
himself by ordering the sun to stand still, which having since been
discovered to have been the original fixed position of that luminous
body, eclipses the miraculous interposition of Joshua. Furthermore, if
we but reflect that on that very day Israel vanquished the Amorites
with a great slaughter, "_and chased them along the way that goeth to
Bethoron, and smote them to Azekah, and unto Makkedah_," in so great a
hurry of war, clashing of arms, exasperation and elevation of mind, in
consequence of such triumphant victory, they could make but a partial
observation on the length of the day; and being greatly elated with such
an extraordinary day's work, Joshua took the advantage of it, and told
them that it was an uncommon day for duration; that he had interposed in
the system and prescribed to the sun to stand still about a whole day;
and that they had two days' time to accomplish those great feats. The
belief of such a miraculous event to have taken place in the solar
system, in consequence of the influence which Joshua insinuated that he
had with God, would most effectually establish his authority among the
people; for if God would hearken to his voice well might man. This
is the cause why the bulk of mankind in all ages and countries of the
world, have been so much infatuated by their ghostly teachers, whom they
have ever, imagined to have had a special influence with God Almighty.