SECTON I. ARGUMENTATIVE REFLECTIONS ON SUPERNATURAL...
AND MYSTERIOUS REVELATION IN GENERAL.
There is not anything which has contributed so much to delude mankind
in religious matters, as mistaken apprehensions concerning supernatural
inspiration or revelation; not considering that all true religion
originates from reason, and can no otherwise be understood but by the
exercise and improvement of it; therefore they are apt to confuse their
minds with such inconsistencies. In the subsequent reasonings on this
subject, we shall argue against supernatural revelation in general,
which will comprehend the doctrine of inspiration or immediate
illumination of the mind. And first--we will premise, that a revelation
consists of an assemblage of rational ideas, intelligibly arranged
and understood by those to whom it may be supposed to be revealed,
for otherwise it could not exist in their minds as such. To suppose a
revelation, void of rationality or understanding, or of communicating
rational intelligence to those, to whom it maybe supposed to be given,
would be a contradiction; for that it could contain nothing except it
were unintelligibleness which would be the same as to reveal and not
to reveal; therefore, a revelation must consist of an assemblage of
rational ideas, intelligibly communicated to those who are supposed
to have been the partakers or receivers of it from the first supposed
inspiration, down to this or any other period of time. But such a
revelation as this, could be nothing more or less than a transcript
of the law of nature, predicated on reason, and would be no more
supernatural, than the reason of man may be supposed to be. The simple
definition of supernatural is, that which is "beyond or above the powers
of nature," which never was or can be understood by mankind; the first
promulgators of revelation not excepted; for such revelation, doctrine,
precept or instruction only, as comes within the powers of our nature,
is capable of being apprehended, contemplated or understood by us,
and such as does not, is to us incomprehensible and unknown, and
consequently cannot for us compose any part of revelation.
The author of human nature impressed it with certain sensitive aptitudes
and mental powers, so that apprehension, reflection or understanding
could no otherwise be exerted or produced in the compound nature of
man, but in the order prescribed by the creator. It would therefore be a
contradiction in nature, and consequently impossible for God to inspire,
infuse, or communicate the apprehension, reflection or understanding
of any thing whatever into human nature, out of, above, or beyond the
natural aptitudes, and mental powers of that nature, which was of his
own production and constitution; for it would be the same as to inspire,
infuse, or reveal apprehension, reflection or understanding, to that
which is not; inasmuch as out of, beyond or above the powers of nature,
there could be nothing to operate upon, as a prerequisite principle
to receive the inspiration or infusion of the revelation, which might
therefore as well be inspired into, or revealed to nonentity, as to man.
For the essence of man is that, which we denominate to be his nature,
out of or above which he is as void of sensation, apprehension,
reflection and understanding, as nonentity may be supposed to be;
therefore such revelation as is adapted to the nature and capacity of
man, and comes within his powers of perception and understanding, is
the only revelation, which he is able to receive from God or man.
Supernatural revelation is as applicable to beasts, birds and fishes,
as it is to us; for neither we nor they are capable of being acted upon
supernaturally, as all the possible exertions and operations of nature,
which respect the natural or moral world, are truly natural. Nor does
God deviate from his rectitude of nature in matters of inspiration,
revelation or instruction to the moral world, any more than in that of
his government of the natural. The infinitude of the wisdom of God's
creation, providence and moral government will eternally remain
supernatural to all finite capacities, and for that very reason we
can never arrive to the comprehension of it, in any state of being and
improvement whatever; inasmuch as progression can never attain to that
which is infinite, so that an eternal proficiency in knowledge could not
be supernatural, but on the other hand would come within the limits and
powers of our nature, for otherwise such proficiency would be impossible
to us; nor is this infinite knowledge of God supernatural to him, for
that his perfection is also infinite. But if we could break over the
limits of our capacity, so as to understand any one supernatural thing,
which is above or beyond the power of our natures, we might by that rule
as well understand all things, and thus by breaking over the confines
of finite nature and the rank of being which we hold in the universe,
comprehend the knowledge of infinity. From hence we infer, that every
kind and degree ef apprehension, reflection and understanding, which
we can attain to in any state of improvement whatever, is no more
supernatural than the nature of man, from whence perception and
understanding is produced, may be supposed to be so: nor has or could
God Almighty ever have revealed himself to mankind in any other way or
manner, but what is truly natural.
SECTON II. CONTAINING OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROVIDENCE...
AND AGENCY OF GOD, AS IT RESPECTS THE NATURAL AND MORAL WORLD, WITH
STRICTURES ON REVELATION IN GENERAL.
The idea of a God we infer from our experimental dependence on something
superior to ourselves in wisdom, power and goodness, which we call God;
our senses discover to us the works of God which we call nature, and
which is a manifest demonstration of his invisible essence. Thus it is
from the works of nature that we deduce the knowledge of a God, and not
because we have, or can have any immediate knowledge of, or revelation
from him. But on the other hand, all our understanding of, or
intelligence from God, is communicated to us by the intervention of
natural causes, (which is not of the divine essence;) this we denominate
to be natural revelation, for that it is mediately made known to Us by
our senses, and from our sensations of external objects in general,
so that all and every part of the universe, of which we have any
conception, is exterior from the nature or essence of God; nor is it
in the nature of things possible for us to receive, or for God
to communicate any inspiration or revelation to us, but by the
instrumentality of intermediate causes, as has been before observed.
Therefore all our notions of the immediate interposition of divine
illuminations, inspiration, or infusion of ideas or revelations into
our minds, is mere enthusiasm and deception; for that neither the divine
mind, nor those of any finite intelligences can make any representation
to, or impression on our external senses without the assistance of some
adequate, intermediate cause. The same is the case between man and man,
or with mankind in general; we can no otherwise hold a correspondence
but by the aptitude, and through the medium of our senses. Since this
is the only possible way in nature by which we can receive any notices,
perceptions, or intelligence from God or man.
Nothing can be more unreasonable than to suppose, because God is
infinitely powerful, that he can therefore inspire or infuse perception,
reflection or revelation into the mind of man in such a way or manner
as is incompatible with the aptitudes and powers of their nature: such
a revelation would be as impossible to be revealed by God, as by a mere
creature. For though it is a maxim of truth, "That with God all things
are possible," yet it should be considered, that contradictions, and
consequently impossibilities are not comprehended in the definition of
things, but are diametrically the reverse of them, as may be seen in
the definition of the word things, to wit: "whatever is." There is no
contradiction in nature or truth, which comprehends or contains all
things, therefore the maxim is just, "That with God all things are
possible," viz: all things in nature are possible with God; but
contradictions are falsehoods which have no positive existence, but are
the negatives to things, or to nature, which comprehends, "Whatever
is;" so that contradictions are opposed to nature and truth, and are
no things, but the chimeras of weak, unintelligent minds who make false
application of things to persons, or ascribe such powers, qualities,
dispositions and aptitudes to things as nature never invested them with;
such are our deluded notions of the immediate operations of the
holy spirit, or of any mere spirit, on our minds independent of the
intervention of some adequate, natural or intermediate cause. To make
a triangle four square, or to make a variety of mountains contiguously
situated, without vallies, or to give existence to a thing and not
to give existence to it at the same time, or to reveal anything to
us incompatible with our capacity of receiving the perception of it,
pertains to those negatives to nature and truth, and are not things
revealed, nor have they any positive existence as has been before
argued; for they are inconsistent with themselves, and the relations
and effects which they are supposed to have upon and with each other. It
derogates nothing from the power and absolute perfection of God that he
cannot make both parts of a contradiction to be true.
But let us reverse the position concerning revelation, and premise that
it is accommodated to our capacity of receiving and understanding it,
and in this case it would be natural, and therefore possible for us to
receive and understand it; for the same truth which is predicated on
the sufficiency of our capacity to receive and understand a revelation,
affirms at the same time the possibility of our receiving and
understanding it. But to suppose that God can make both parts of a
contradiction to be true, to reveal and not reveal, would be the same as
ascribing a falsehood to him and to call it by the name of power.
That God can do anything and everything, that is consonant to his moral
perfections, and which does not imply a contradiction to the nature of
the things themselves, and the essential relation which they bear to
each other, none will dispute. But to suppose, that inasmuch as God is
all-powerful, he can therefore do everything, which we in our ignorance
of nature or of moral fitness may ascribe to him, without understanding,
whether it is either consonant to moral rectitude, or to the nature of
the things themselves, and the immutable relations and connections which
they bear to each other, or not, is great weakness and folly. That God
cannot in the exercise of his providence or moral government, counteract
the perfections of his nature, or do any manner of injustice, is
manifestly certain; nor is it possible for God to effect a contradiction
in the natural world, any more than in the moral. The impossibility of
the one results from the moral perfections of God, and the impossibility
of the other from the immutable properties, qualities, relations and
nature of the things themselves, as in the instances of the mountains,
vallies, &c., before alluded to, and in numberless other such like
cases.
Admitting a revelation to be from God, it must be allowed to be
infallible, therefore those to whom it may be supposed to have been
first revealed from God, must have had an infallible certainty of their
inspiration: so likewise the rest of mankind, to whom it is proposed as
a Divine Law, or rule of duty, should have an infallible certainty,
that its first promulgators were thus truly inspired by the immediate
interposition of the spirit of God, and that the revelation has been
preserved through all the changes and revolutions of the world to
their time, and that the copies extant present them with its original
inspiration and unerring composure, or are perfectly agreeable to it.
All this we must have an infallible certainty of, or we fail of an
infallible certainty of revelation, and are liable to be imposed upon by
impostors, or by ignorant and insidious teachers, whose interest it may
be to obtrude their own systems on the world for infallible truth, as in
the instance of Mahomet.
But let us consult our own constitutions and the world in which we live,
and we shall find that inspiration is, in the very nature of things,
impossible to be understood by us, and of consequence not in fact true.
What certainty can we have of the agency of the divine mind on ours? Or
how can we distinguish the supposed divine illuminations or ideas from
those of our own which are natural to us? In order for us to be certain
of the interposition of immediate divine inspiration in our minds
we must be able to analyze, distinguish, and distinctly separate the
premised divine reflections, illuminations or inspiration from our own
natural cogitations, for otherwise we should be liable to mistake our
reflections and reasonings for God's inspiration, as is the case with
enthusiasts, or fanatics, and thus impose on ourselves, and obtrude our
romantic notions on mankind, as God's revelation.
None will, it is presumed, pretend that the natural reflections of our
minds are dictated by the immediate agency of the divine spirit; for
if they were thus dictated, they would be of equal authority with any
supposed inspired revelation. How then shall we be able to distinguish
or understand our natural perceptions, reflections or reasonings, from
any premised immediately inspired ones? Should God make known to us, or
to any of us, a revelation by a voice, and that in a language which we
understand, and admitting that the propositions, doctrines, or subject
matter of it, should not exceed our capacity, we could understand it
the same as we do in conversation with one another; but this would be an
external and natural revelation, in which God is supposed to make use
of language, grammar, logic and sound, alias of intermediate causes, in
order to communicate or reveal it, which would differ as much from an
immediately inspired revelation, as this book may be supposed to do; for
the very definition of immediate inspiration precludes all natural
or immediate causes. That God is eternally perfect in knowledge,
and therefore knows all things, not by succession or by parts, as we
understand things by degrees, has been already evinced; nevertheless all
truth, which we arrive at the understanding of, accords with the divine
omniscience, but we do not come at the comprehension of things by
immediate infusion, or inspiration, but from reasoning; for we cannot
see or hear God think or reason any more than man, nor are our senses
susceptible of a mere mental communion with him, nor is it in nature
possible for the human mind to receive any instantaneous or immediate
illuminations or ideas from the divine spirit (as before argued,) but
we must illuminate and improve our minds by a close application to the
study of nature, through the series whereof God has been pleased to
reveal himself to man, so that we may truly say, that the knowledge of
nature is the revelation of God. In this there can be no delusion, it is
natural, and could come from none other but God.
Unless we could do this, we should compound them together at a venture,
and form a revelation like Nebuchadnezzar's idol, "partly iron and
partly clay," alias partly divine and partly human. The Apostle Paul
informs us, that sometimes he "spake, and not the Lord," and at other
times speaks doubtfully about the matter, saying, "and I think also
that I have the spirit of God," and if he was at a loss about his
inspiration, well may we be distrustful of it. From the foregoing
speculations on the subject of supernatural inspiration, it appears,
that there are insuperable difficulties in a mere mental discourse with
the divine spirit; it is what we are unacquainted with, and the law
of our nature forbids it. Our method of conversation is vocal, or by
writing, or by some sort of external symbols which are the mediate
ground of it, and we are liable to errors and mistakes in this natural
and external way of correspondence; but when we have the vanity to
rely on dreams and visions to inform ourselves of things, or attempt
to commune with invisible finite beings, or with the holy spirit, our
deceptions, blunders and confusions are increased to fanaticism itself;
as the diverse supposed influence of the spirit, on the respective
sectaries, even among Christians, may witness, as it manifestly, in
their empty conceit of it, conforms to every of their traditions. Which
evinces, that the whole bustle of it is mere enthusiasm, for was
it dictated by the spirit of truth and uniformity itself, it would
influence all alike, however zealots persuade themselves and one another
that they have supernatural communion with the Holy Ghost, from whence
they tell us they derive their notions of religion, and in their frenzy
are proof against reason and argument, which if we tender them, they
tell us, that it is carnal and depraved reasoning, but that their
teachings are immediately from God, and then proceed to vent upon us all
the curses and punishments, which are written in the book of the law.
There has in the different parts and ages of the world, been a
multiplicity of immediate and wonderful discoveries, said to have been
made to godly men of old by the special illumination or supernatural
inspiration of God, every of which have, in doctrine, precept and
instruction, been essentially different from each other, which are
consequently as repugnant to truth, as the diversity of the influence of
the spirit on the multiplicity of sectaries has been represented to be.
These facts, together with the premises and inferences as already
deduced, are too evident to be denied, and operate conclusively
against immediate or supernatural revelation in general; nor will
such revelation hold good in theory any more than in practice. Was
a revelation to be made known to us, it must be accommodated to our
external senses, and also to our reason, so that we could come at the
perception and understanding of it, the same as we do to that of things
in general. We must perceive by our senses, before we can reflect with
the mind. Our sensorium is that essential medium between the divine and
human mind, through which God reveals to man the knowledge of nature,
and is our only door of correspondence with God or with man.
A premised revelation, adapted to our external senses, would enable our
mental powers to reflect upon, examine into, and understand it. Always
provided nevertheless, that the subject matter of such revelation, or
that of the doctrines, precepts or injunctions therein contained, do
not exceed our reason, but are adapted to it as well as to our external
senses. To suppose that God, merely from his omnipotence, without the
intervention of some adequate intermediate cause could make use of
sound, or grammatical and logical language, or of writing, so as to
correspond with us, or to reveal any thing to us, would run into the
same sort of absurdity, which we have already confuted; for it is the
same as to suppose an effect without a suitable or a proportionable
cause, or an effect without a cause; whereas, effects must have adequate
causes or they could not be produced. God is the self-existent and
eternal cause of all things, but the eternal cause can no otherwise
operate on the eternal succession of causes and effects, but by the
mutual operation of those causes on each other, according to the fixed
laws of nature. For as we have frequently observed before that of all
possible systems, infinite wisdom comprehended the best; and infinite
goodness and power must have adopted and perfected it; and being once
established into an ordinance of nature, it could not be deviated from
by God: for that it would necessarily imply a manifest imperfection in
God, either in its eternal establishment, or in its premised subsequent
alteration, which will be more particularly considered in the next
chapter.
To suppose that Almighty power could produce a voice, language, grammar,
or logic, so as to communicate a revelation to us, without some sort of
organic or instrumentated machine or intermediate vehicle, or adequate
constituted external cause, would imply a contradiction to the order of
nature and consequently to the perfection of God, who established it;
therefore, provided God has ever given us any particular revelation, we
must suppose, that he has made use of a regular and natural constituted
and mediate cause, comprehended in the external order of nature, rightly
fitted and abilitated to make use of the vocal power of language, which
comprises that of characters, orthography, grammar and logic, all which
must have been made use of, in communicating a supposed revelation to
mankind, which forecloses inspiration.
Furthermore, this heavenly dictating voice should have been accommodated
to all languages, grammars and logical ways of speaking, in which a
revelation may have been divulged, as it would be needful to have been
continued from the beginning to every receiver, compiler, translator,
printer, commentator on and teacher of such revelation, in order to have
informed mankind in every instance, wherein at any time they may have
been imposed upon by any spurious adulterations or interpolations, and
how it was in the original. These, with the refinements of languages and
translations, are a summary of the many ways, wherein we may have been
deceived by giving credit to antiquated written revelation, which would
need a series of miracles to promulgate and perpetuate it in the world
free from mistakes and frauds of one kind or other, and which leads me
to the consideration of the doctrine of miracles.