THE ARRIVAL OF SIR REDVERS BULLER.
[Sidenote: Hopes of Sir George White's strength felt at home.]
Reports of the concentration of large commandos of Transvaal and Free
State burghers on the Natal border had been telegraphed home by the
High Commissioner and the Governor of Natal on the 28th of September,
and reached the Colonial Office during the night of the 28th-29th. The
plan, therefore, of an advance through the Orange Free State, which
was adopted by the Cabinet on the following day, by implication
assumed that the force assigned to Sir George White for the defence of
Natal would be sufficient to check the threatened invasion until a
forward movement of the army corps in the western theatre of war
should draw away from the republican host the Free State men for the
protection of their own territory.
[Sidenote: Situation when Sir R. Buller arrived.]
The events of the first three weeks of the war showed that Sir George
White, without assistance, would not be able to protect Natal, and the
situation which met General Buller on his disembarkation in South
Africa on the morning of the 31st October could not but cause him
grave anxiety. The Natal Field Force, after three strenuous efforts at
Talana, Elandslaagte and Lombards Kop to repel the enemy's columns of
invasion, lay concentrated at Ladysmith, and to the north, east, and
west was already closely watched by the enemy in superior strength.
General Buller was convinced that the troops needed rest, and could
for a time only act on the defensive. He therefore telegraphed to
General White, on 1st November, suggesting that he should entrench and
await events either at Ladysmith or at Colenso. Sir George's reply
showed that he had already entrenched himself at Ladysmith, and could
not now withdraw. South of Ladysmith there were only very weak posts
at Colenso and Estcourt, and one regular battalion at Maritzburg. For
the moment, the safety of the capital of Natal appeared to be
precarious, and Sir Redvers even deemed it necessary to request the
Naval Commander-in-Chief to take steps for the protection of Durban
from land attack. In Cape Colony the Boer forces close to the Orange
river had been strengthened by reinforcements from the commandos
originally assigned to watch the Basuto border. Moreover, there was
some reason to believe that another commando from the north was moving
down upon Kimberley, and this report, coupled with the lack of news
from Mafeking, rendered it for the moment doubtful whether
Baden-Powell might not have been overwhelmed.[136] The first units of
the expeditionary force were not due at Cape Town for some ten days.
The complete disembarkation at Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and East
London would not be finished until early in December.[137] The British
Commander-in-Chief could not hope, therefore, for at least a month,
that his field army would be complete in organisation, equipment, and
transport, and ready to commence an advance into the Free State.
Notwithstanding these anxieties, General Buller was at first inclined
to adhere to the scheme originally designed, and to wait until he
could remove the pressure on Ladysmith and Kimberley by striking
straight at Bloemfontein. He so informed Lord Wolseley in a telegram
despatched from Cape Town on 1st November. Yet a few hours later it
became evident that the whole case was graver than Sir Redvers had at
first conceived. Both from the telegrams of Sir George White and from
those of Sir Archibald Hunter, from whom, as his own chief-of-staff,
Buller had called for a personal report on affairs in Natal, it was
manifest that Ladysmith was certain to be cut off from the outer
world. General White telegraphed: "I have the greatest confidence in
holding the Boers for as long as necessary," but he added that
"reinforcements should be sent to Natal at once. Ladysmith strongly
entrenched, but lines not continuous and perimeter so large that Boers
can exercise their usual tactics." General Hunter reported that
"Ladysmith lies in a hollow, commanded by heights too distant for us
to hold, and now possessed by the enemy"; and that "the Boers are
superior in numbers, mobility, and long-range artillery." In Cape
Colony the Intelligence officers at Naauwpoort and Stormberg
telegraphed that a commando, 800 strong, had crossed the Orange river
at Norval's Pont, and that another Boer force, stated to be 3,000
strong, with two guns and a Maxim, was crossing the Bethulie bridge.
The enemy's successes in Natal were, in fact, encouraging the Free
State commandos to establish connection with the disaffected in the
eastern and midland districts of Cape Colony. As regards the general
attitude of those in the Colonies who sympathised with the Boers,
General Buller was aware that for the most part they possessed arms
and ammunition, and that if their districts were invaded the young men
would join the enemy. The information in his possession led to a
belief that the greater number were for the moment still very
undecided, wondering which side would win, and that their whole
attention was fixed on Ladysmith and Kimberley. If the relief of those
places could be effected, the hostile elements, it was held, would not
stir; but if the two towns should fall, a dangerous rising was thought
probable. Meanwhile at Kimberley, although the reports of the officer
in command of the garrison did not appear to Sir Redvers to show any
immediate anxiety, yet the successful defence of that place depended
on other than the regular troops,[138] and there were indications that
the strain of the situation was being already felt. Urgent appeals
were addressed by the civil community to the High Commissioner,
drawing his attention to the large number of women and children
within the town, the possibility of the cattle, on which the meat
supplies of the invested population mainly depended, being captured by
the enemy, and the difficulty of maintaining order amongst the 10,000
"raw savages" employed in the mine compounds.
[Footnote 136: See Sir R. Buller's despatch to Secretary of
State for War, dated 1st November, 1899.]
[Footnote 137: Before leaving England Sir R. Buller had
informed the War Office that he proposed to disembark the 1st
(Methuen's) division at Cape Town, the 2nd (Clery's) at Port
Elizabeth, and the 3rd (Gatacre's) at East London; but,
having regard to possible changes in the strategic situation,
he requested that every ship should call at Cape Town for
orders.]
[Footnote 138: See Vol. II.]
[Sidenote: Difficulties to be dealt with.]
The consideration of these reports and representations made it evident
that the whole situation had changed from that contemplated when the
original plan of campaign had been drawn up. For an aggressive advance
on Bloemfontein there was as yet no adequate army. The component parts
of it were on the high seas. Even after they should have arrived, much
time and labour would be required, before they could be welded
together, and supplied with all that was needed for an offensive march
into a country so distant from the coast. On the other hand, if
Ladysmith should meanwhile fall, the Boer commandos at present
surrounding that town would be set free to seize not only Maritzburg
but probably also the seaport of Durban, the possession of which would
give to the republics direct access to the outer world, and would, as
was believed by both Boer and British, be a signal to all the
disaffected in Cape Colony to take up arms. In the western theatre of
war, the early relief of Kimberley was an object dear to the hearts of
all loyalists, and its loss would undoubtedly give an immediate
impetus to the wave of rebellion. The necessity for immediate action
was urgent, both in Natal and Cape Colony, but the former appeared for
the moment to present the more critical situation. Sir Redvers,
therefore, on the 2nd November, telegraphed to the War Office:
"I consider that I must reinforce Natal, hang on to Orange River
bridge, and give myself to organise troops expected from England.
I am, therefore, withdrawing the garrisons at Naauwpoort and
Stormberg. I shall send Gatacre's division on arrival to Natal,
and with Methuen's and Clery's try to keep the main line open,
and to relieve Kimberley. I do not wish to be pessimistic, but it
seems to me I shall have to wait until March to commence active
operations."
[Sidenote: Messages from and to home. "Extreme gravity."]
On receipt of this report Lord Lansdowne telegraphed an enquiry
whether the division sent to Natal should be replaced by a fresh
division from England. On the 3rd November, in consequence of further
reports from Natal, Sir Redvers telegraphed to the Secretary of State:
"Telegraphic connection with Ladysmith was interrupted yesterday,
and White's force is isolated. He is well supplied with
everything, except ammunition for his naval 12-pounders, which
are the only guns that can compete with hostile artillery. I
regard the situation as one of extreme gravity. Colenso bridge
and Maritzburg are held by one battalion each; we are protecting
Durban from the fleet. I shall despatch the first reinforcements
I receive to Durban, but I cannot conceal from myself that if the
enemy previously occupy, even with a small force, the country
south of Mooi River, the relief of White by troops just landed
will be an almost impossible operation, unless he can hold out
six weeks at least from now."
[Sidenote: Nov. 4/99. Sir Redvers decides to go to Natal.]
By the following day, 4th November, General Buller had been able to
work out his plans more in detail. It had become more and more
apparent that Natal, where now the bulk of the enemy's strength lay,
was for the moment the scene of most difficulty and danger, and that
the relief of Ladysmith was all-important. For these reasons Sir
Redvers decided to proceed himself to Natal for a time to supervise
personally that critical operation. He telegraphed, therefore, to the
Secretary of State:
"My intentions are as follows: I propose to send Clery and
Headquarters 2nd division to Natal to command. With him will go
the first three brigade Headquarters except Guards that arrive.
These three brigades will be composed of the first line
battalions that arrive. Headquarters 1st division will land at
Cape Town, and Lord Methuen will command advance on Kimberley
with Guards' brigade and one other. Headquarters 3rd division
will land at Cape Town or East London, as circumstances require,
and will be completed with a new brigade, under Fetherstonhaugh,
formed of three extra regiments and one from line of
communications, or else colonial regiment.
"I propose to take charge of advance on Ladysmith. If under
Providence we are successful there and at Kimberley, I think
collapse of opposition possible. These proposals are subject to
High Commissioner's views of state of Cape Colony, and to what
may happen meantime anywhere else.
"Preparation of extra division seems desirable, but I do not yet
see need for its despatch from England. I shall speak with more
confidence when I see French, who is, I hope, en route here from
Ladysmith."
[Sidenote: More hopeful views.]
On the 5th November Sir Redvers telegraphed further to the War Office
that 40 days' supplies for the force under orders for Natal should be
shipped direct from England to Durban. The more hopeful view the
General Commanding-in-Chief was already taking may be judged from the
fact that on the following day, the 6th of November, he requested the
War Office to read "January" instead of "March" in the last sentence
of his above quoted cypher of November 2nd. Five days later, in reply
to a telegram from Lord Lansdowne, stating that another infantry
division was being mobilised, and asking by what date it would be
required, General Buller reported:
"The defence of Ladysmith seems to have so thoroughly checked
advance of enemy, that I have some grounds for hoping the
successful relief of Kimberley and Ladysmith may end opposition.
On the other hand, reliable Dutch here predict guerilla warfare
as a certainty. I think, therefore, that I ought to have another
division as soon as possible. My great want at present is mounted
men. I am raising as many as I can, and should like, as soon as
possible, a few good special service officers."
To this despatch the War Office answered on 14th November that a fifth
infantry division would be sent out at an early date, under command of
Sir C. Warren.
[Sidenote: The original scheme of march through Free State to be
carried out after relief of Ladysmith.]
In arriving at the decisions recorded in the above official telegrams,
Sir Redvers Buller had not abandoned the intention of carrying out
ultimately the original plan of campaign. On the contrary, with a view
to its resumption, after the relief of Ladysmith had been effected, he
determined to instruct the General Officer Commanding the 1st
division, Lieut.-General Lord Methuen, as soon as he had thrust aside
the Boer commandos between the Orange river and Kimberley, to throw
into that town supplies and a reinforcement of one and a half
battalions of infantry and some naval long-range guns, and then move
back to the Orange river, withdrawing with him the women and children
and natives. Meantime, while the cavalry division, as its units
arrived from England, was being prepared for the front at a camp near
Cape Town, its commander, Lieut.-General French, who had been recalled
from Ladysmith, was to form a flying column at Naauwpoort, with
instructions to risk no engagement, but to manoeuvre and worry the
enemy, and thus check any invasion of the central districts of the
Cape. On the eastern side of that colony, the Commander-in-Chief
decided to assemble at Queenstown a force, under Lieut.-General Sir W.
Gatacre, the commander of the 3rd infantry division, whose duty it
would be to operate northwards, and endeavour to stop recruiting by
the enemy and protect the loyal. On Lord Methuen's return to Orange
River, it was Sir Redvers' intention that he should march eastwards in
conjunction with French, occupy the bridges of Colesberg, Norval's
Pont and Bethulie, and thus prepare for the advance on Bloemfontein,
which would be undertaken as soon as the relief of Ladysmith set him
(Sir Redvers) free from Natal.
[Sidenote: Dissolution of Army organisation.]
The decision to despatch to Natal the bulk of the earliest
reinforcements arriving from home has been often referred to as "the
break-up of the army corps." In a sense it was much more than that.
From the point of view of organisation, the transfer of one or more
intact divisions of the original army corps to Natal would have been
immaterial, since they would have remained still under the supreme
control of the General himself. But the urgency of the situation
compelled the British Commander not only to detach portions of the
army corps, but to improvise hastily, from the general officers and
regimental units as they arrived in transports at Cape Town, special
forces with hardly any regard to the composition of the divisions as
originally fixed by the War Office. Thus to the commander of the 2nd
division, Lieut.-General Sir C. F. Clery, who was selected by Sir
Redvers Buller to make preparation for the relief of Ladysmith, and to
act as his second in command in that enterprise, two cavalry
regiments, four brigades of infantry,[139] two brigade divisions of
field artillery, a company of Royal engineers, and a pontoon troop
were assigned. But of these units, only the 4th brigade, commanded by
Major-General the Hon. N. G. Lyttelton, and Lt.-Colonel L. W. Parsons'
brigade division, R.F.A. (63rd, 64th, and 73rd batteries), belonged to
Clery's division. The 2nd infantry brigade, under Major-General H. J.
T. Hildyard, and Lt.-Colonel H. V. Hunt's brigade division (7th,
14th, and 66th batteries), being the first units of infantry and
artillery to arrive from England, were removed from Methuen's
division, and sent on at once to Natal. To these were subsequently
added both the infantry brigades of the 3rd division (the 5th, under
command of Major-General A. FitzRoy Hart, and the 6th, under
Major-General G. Barton), the 13th Hussars, originally designated as
corps troops, the Royal Dragoons, drawn from the 2nd cavalry brigade,
and the pontoon troop of the army corps.
[Footnote 139: The decision to despatch a fourth brigade to
Natal was made about 22nd November, after the development of
Joubert's raid south of the Tugela.]
[Sidenote: Various new distributions.]
The 3rd, or Highland brigade, under Major-General A. G. Wauchope, was at
first assigned by the Commander-in-Chief to Lord Methuen, to replace the
2nd brigade, transferred to Natal; but, as it was found later that
Wauchope's battalions would at the outset be needed to guard the railway
line in rear of Methuen's column, a 9th brigade, under Major-General
R.S.R. Fetherstonhaugh, was formed out of the infantry units already at
Orange River station, viz.: the half-battalion 1st Loyal North
Lancashire, 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 1st Northumberland
Fusiliers, and 2nd Northamptonshire. Lt.-Colonel F. H. Hall's brigade
division (18th, 62nd, and 75th batteries[140]) and the 9th Lancers were
also allotted to the 1st division.
[Footnote 140: The 62nd and half the 75th had been sent up to
Orange River in October; the other half of the 75th and the
18th batteries were delayed on the voyage out by the breaking
down of their transport, the _Zibenghla_, and did not land at
Cape Town until 1st November.]
[Sidenote: French's command.]
For Naauwpoort, General French, in addition to the original garrison
of that place, was at first given the assistance of the 12th Lancers,
a battery of R.H.A., and a half-battalion of the Black Watch, besides
two companies of M.I. To these other units were to be gradually added,
as soon as they became available.
[Sidenote: Gatacre's.]
Sir W. Gatacre was instructed to develop a force on the eastern
railway line from the original Stormberg garrison,[141] the 1st Royal
Scots (originally allotted as corps troops), the 2nd Northumberland
Fusiliers (a lines of communication battalion), the 2nd Royal Irish
Rifles (detached from the 5th brigade[142]), and the brigade division
(74th, 77th and 79th batteries), of the 3rd division, supplemented by
such colonial corps as he could gather together locally.
[Footnote 141: See Chapters II. and XVIII.]
[Footnote 142: This battalion was replaced in Hart's brigade
by the 1st Border regiment.]
The dates of the arrival of the various expeditionary units at Cape
Town and their disposal are shown in Appendix No. 7.
[Sidenote: Less serious injury of the recasting of army because of
ordinary British habit.]
The dislocation of the infantry divisions, which was caused by the
necessity for these sweeping changes, would have been even more
seriously detrimental had those divisions actually existed prior to
the embarkation of the troops from England; but, as has been shown in
an earlier chapter, one of the weak points of the British army in 1899
was the imperfect development in peace time of the higher organisation
of the troops. Except, therefore, in Major-General Hildyard's brigade,
which came direct from Aldershot,[143] and had been trained there by
its brigadier under the immediate eye of Sir R. Buller, that
confidence, which is established between troops and their superior
leaders by intimate mutual knowledge, did not exist, and could not be
affected by that reorganisation, which the strategical situation
necessitated.
[Footnote 143: Major-Generals Lyttelton and Hart no longer
had under their command the whole of the battalions which had
composed their brigades at Aldershot.]
[Sidenote: Yet serious enough. Sir Redvers goes to Natal without a
staff.]
Nevertheless, as regards staff arrangements, serious inconvenience was
for the moment inevitable. Sir F. Forestier-Walker, although appointed
officially to the post of General Officer Commanding the lines of
communication, had, through some oversight in London, not been given
the full staff, as prescribed by the regulations, for an officer
performing those onerous duties, and had been forced to improvise
assistants from such special service officers as he could lay hands
on. There was from the outset, therefore, a shortage of staff.
Officers were, moreover, urgently required for the development of
local troops and for censorship duties. The original Headquarter staff
had been calculated on the hypothesis that the whole of the
expeditionary corps would operate in the western theatre of war, Sir
George White being responsible for the Natal command. The
rearrangement carried out by Sir R. Buller created in Natal a second
field army. For this no Headquarter staff was available, without
robbing the Cape of needed men. He therefore kept with him only his
personal staff during his temporary absence in Natal, and issued
orders there through the divisional staff of General Clery. He decided
to leave the rest of the Headquarter staff at Cape Town to supervise
the disembarkation of the reinforcements from England and their
formation into a field army.
[Sidenote: Help from the fleet.]
The reports of the fighting during the opening phases of the war had
shown that our difficulties were mainly due to three causes--the
superior numbers of the enemy, their greater mobility, and the longer
range of their guns. In the operations he was now about to undertake,
Sir Redvers hoped partially to make good these deficiencies by
borrowing ships' guns from the Navy and by locally raising mounted
men. The Naval Commander-in-Chief had already lent one contingent,
under Commander A. P. Ethelston, R.N., to garrison Stormberg. Another
such contingent, under Captain the Hon. H. Lambton, R.N., was in
Ladysmith, and, at the request of Sir R. Buller, Captain Percy Scott,
R.N., in H.M.S. _Terrible_, had been despatched to Durban to arrange
the land defences of that port. Rear-Admiral Harris, with the approval
of the Admiralty, now consented to the Stormberg party being brought
back to Cape Town, with a view to its marching under the command of
Capt. R. C. Prothero, R.N., with Lord Methuen's column, to Kimberley
and there remaining as a reinforcement of the garrison. The Naval
Commander-in-Chief further agreed to organise yet a third detachment
to assist in the relief of Ladysmith. The cheerfulness with which the
Naval authorities rendered assistance to the army in this time of
stress and strain was only in conformity with the traditions of both
services; yet the readiness shown by the officers and men of the Royal
Navy and Marines in adapting themselves and their weapons to the
circumstances of a land campaign won the profound admiration even of
those who were best acquainted with the practical nature of the
normal training of the personnel of the fleet.
[Sidenote: Raising colonial corps, for Natal.]
The calling out of colonial mounted corps, both in Cape Colony and
Natal, is mentioned in Chapter I. and Chapter II. Mounted men were
urgently needed by all the columns in process of preparation, but,
adhering to his opinion that success in the relief of Ladysmith was
the most crucial matter, Sir Redvers decided to despatch to Natal the
first unit enlisted at Cape Town--the South African Light Horse. The
first party of "Light Horse" embarked at Cape Town for Natal on the
22nd November. In Natal itself two mounted corps, under the command of
Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) A. W. Thorneycroft, Royal Scots
Fusiliers, and Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) E. C. Bethune, 16th
Lancers, were already being formed.
[Sidenote: Brabant in eastern districts.]
Mr. Schreiner, the Prime Minister of Cape Colony, had, at the
suggestion of General Buller, endeavoured to raise in the districts of
Middleburg, Cradock, and Somerset East, a burgher force to maintain
internal order and repel invasion, but the local civil authorities
were unanimous in advising that an application of the Cape Burgher law
would furnish some recruits for the enemy. Captain Brabant (now
Major-General Sir E. Brabant), an ex-Imperial officer, was, with the
concurrence of the Cape Government, instructed to raise a mounted
corps from the loyalists in the eastern districts.
[Sidenote: Work now done.]
It will readily be conceived from the brief summary of the facts which
have been above recorded that the tasks which the Commander-in-Chief,
assisted by the Headquarter and lines of communication staffs, had to
carry out during the first three weeks of November were of an
overwhelming nature. These included the reorganisation of the various
bodies of troops which, from the 9th November onwards, arrived daily
in Table Bay from England; the disembarkation of the units; their
equipment for the field and despatch to the front; the issue of
operation orders to the troops in Natal and Cape Colony already in
touch with the enemy; the establishment of supply depôts for the field
forces, the defence of Maritzburg and Durban from the Boer raid, which
threatened those very important towns; the protection of the lines of
railway through Cape Colony, with the mere handful of troops at first
available; and the checking of the invasion of the Free Staters across
the Orange river. To these must be added the anxious watching of the
signs in disaffected districts of smouldering rebellion, which a
single success of the enemy might fan into a burst of flame; these and
other cares formed an accumulation of pressing duties and heavy
responsibilities, which fully justify the frank statement of Sir R.
Buller to Lt.-Gen. Forestier-Walker on 20th November that "Ever since
I have been here we have been like the man who, with a long day's work
before him, overslept himself and so was late for everything all
day."[144] The position of affairs in South Africa throughout these
anxious weeks, in fact, forcibly proved the truth of Lord Wolseley's
warning, addressed on 3rd September, 1899, to the Secretary of State
that: "We have committed one of the greatest blunders in war, namely,
we have given the enemy the initiative. He is in a position to take
the offensive, and by striking the first blow to ensure the great
advantage of winning the first round."
[Footnote 144: See the end of this chapter.]
[Sidenote: Improved prospects.]
Yet by the 22nd November the labours of the Headquarter staff of the
army in South Africa, assisted by the fullest co-operation of the two
Governors, Sir Alfred Milner and Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, and aided by
the strenuous exertions of the lines of communication staff in Cape
Colony and Natal, had sensibly improved the general situation in both
the western and eastern theatres of war. In Cape Colony, no part of
Bechuanaland and Griqualand West, it is true, except the areas
defended by the garrisons of Mafeking, Kuruman and Kimberley, remained
under British authority. But cheery reports from Colonel Baden-Powell
gave promise of a prolonged stand at the little northern town, while
Lord Methuen's column had on the previous day (the 21st November)
crossed the Orange river and made good the first eleven miles of its
march on Kimberley. Southward, Major-General Wauchope's brigade was
holding the section of the railway line from Orange River station, viâ
De Aar, to Naauwpoort, the latter station having been re-occupied, and
the formation of a column, to harass and menace the enemy in the
direction of Colesberg, had commenced under the direction of
Lieut.-General French. On the eastern side of the Colony only had the
Boers made any substantial advance; a strong Free State commando had
seized Burghersdorp and detached parties to Aliwal North and Lady
Grey. Sir W. Gatacre, on the other hand, had assumed command of
colonial corps and one and a half battalions of regular troops at
Queenstown, and was preparing to move northward, to check the
commandeering of British subjects, which Commandant Olivier had
instituted in the territory occupied by his burghers. The Basuto
chiefs remained true to their allegiance to the "Great White Queen,"
and by tacit consent their territory was treated by both sides as
neutral. In Griqualand East and the native territories east of Cape
Colony, the Pondo, Tembu and Fingo tribes continued loyal, and
arrangements for the defence of these great masses of native
population against Boer raids were being made by Major Sir H. Elliott,
who as Commandant-General, under the sanction of the Governor, was
defending the passes leading from Barkly East with the Cape Mounted
Rifles and some Volunteers.
[Sidenote: Natal. Sir G. White detains bulk of Boers. Time thus
gained.]
In Natal Sir George White was holding his own at Ladysmith, and, as he
had anticipated, detaining north of the Tugela the main strength of
the enemy's army. After some hesitation on the part of the Boer
leaders, a raid in force had been made to the south, and had for the
moment caused much alarm. But the delay in the movement had greatly
diminished its chances of reaching Maritzburg, although the local
condition was still one of some anxiety. Reinforcements as they
arrived at Durban had been pushed rapidly up by rail north of
Maritzburg, and the British troops were now echeloned along the
railway up to Estcourt. The vanguard of the enemy's raiding column had
reached Mooi River, and his scouts had even penetrated as far as
Nottingham Road, but a day's ride from Maritzburg. The Boers were,
therefore, well in rear of the British advanced posts, and
Lieut.-General Clery felt some doubt whether a temporary retirement
from Estcourt might not prove necessary. The chief difficulty was the
lack of mounted troops to bring the enemy to action and put a stop to
his pillaging the outlying farms of the Natal colonists.
[Sidenote: Sir Redvers, 22nd Nov./99, starts for Natal.]
Such were throughout South Africa the facts known to him when Sir
Redvers Buller, having issued instructions for the guidance of the
senior officer in Cape Colony, Sir F. Forestier-Walker, and for the
three commanders in the field, Lieut.-Generals Lord Methuen, French,
and Sir W. Gatacre, embarked at 7 p.m., the 22nd November, in the S.S.
_Mohawk_ for Natal. His military secretary, Col. the Hon. F. Stopford,
and aides-de-camp accompanied him. The rest of the Headquarter staff
remained at Cape Town.
[Sidenote: His views at that time.]
The appreciation of the situation written by the General
commanding-in-chief forty-eight hours earlier will place the reader in
possession of his views on the eve of his embarkation for Durban. The
memorandum ran as follows:--
Cape Town,
_November 20th, 1899_.
GENERAL WALKER,
Before starting for Natal I think I should leave you my
appreciation of the situation.
1. Ever since I have been here we have been like the man, who,
with a long day's work before him, overslept himself and so was
late for everything all day.
2. In disposing the troops which arrived from England I have
considered that it was of the first importance to keep Cape
Colony from rebellion, even if by so doing I temporarily lost
Maritzburg.
3. I consequently have formed a strong column under Lord Methuen
which is in a position to take the field and I am forming a force
of mounted men and horse artillery under General French, which
will, I hope, be able to meet any commandos which may invade the
Colony. I have also done all I can to safeguard the western and
eastern lines of railway.
4. The state of Kimberley necessitated the first employment of
Lord Methuen's force in that direction. He starts to-day. General
French is at Naauwpoort, organising a column to attack Colesberg
at the earliest possible date.
5. My hope is that the Boers at Colesberg will have been defeated
before Lord Methuen returns from Kimberley.
On his return he should send a force to attack the Boers at
Burghersdorp. There should then be 1,000,000 rations at Orange
River and 1,000,000 at De Aar, and I have directed that supply
should be accumulated at Port Elizabeth and East London. He can
then open new lines of supply as he moves eastward.
6. As soon as they can be occupied General Gatacre's force should
be advanced to Molteno or Stormberg, and any force at
Burghersdorp should be attacked.
If the Burghersdorp force has meanwhile advanced south it would
be attacked by Lord Methuen, aided by part of General French's
force, the two being based on Naauwpoort or Middleburg.
7. The exact nature of this operation must depend on the actual
circumstances at the time. The main point is, there will be
rations at De Aar and near it to enable a force under Lord
Methuen to move along the line eastward, repairing it as he goes,
and strong enough to clear the northern districts.
8. As soon as ever circumstances admit the bridges at Norval's
Pont and Bethulie will, of course, be seized; in short, the plan
is, clear the northern districts by working from west to east,
seize the bridges, and, as occasion admits, bring the shorter
lines of supply into use. Then concentrate for an advance on
Bloemfontein.
9. I think there are enough troops in the Colony to work this
programme, except that:
(1) There should be a battalion at Port Elizabeth.
(2) General Gatacre wants another battalion and a battery of
field artillery.
(3) General French should have the second battery Royal Horse
artillery, and eventually three cavalry regiments, and, if
possible, one more battalion.
10. With regard to Natal, I propose to send the 6th Dragoon
Guards and 10th Hussars, the 63rd, 64th, and 73rd batteries Royal
Field artillery, the remainder of General Hart's Brigade, _i.e._,
three battalions, as soon as they come in. We must do with them
the best we can.
11. I think the Colonial contingents had better go to Natal.
12. In my opinion, so long as General White holds Ladysmith the
force able to attack you from the Orange Free State is not likely
to be serious, but if Natal goes you will have to concentrate for
defence, and you should make up your mind what positions to hold.
Probably the best military positions about Queenstown,
Middleburg, and Beaufort West will be found most convenient.
REDVERS BULLER,
General.