LOMBARDS KOP.[123]
[Footnote 123: See maps Nos. 3, 8 and 8 (_a_).]
[Sidenote: Boer forces unite Oct. 26th. French reconnoitres, Oct.
27th.]
On the very day of Yule's junction with Coxhead[124], Erasmus was in
touch with A. P. Cronje, next day with Lukas Meyer, who, still feeling
the blow of Talana, had moved timidly, wide on the left. At 4 a.m. on
the morning of the 27th a brigade of cavalry left Ladysmith under
Major-General French, and, proceeding to scout along the Newcastle and
Helpmakaar roads, was sighted at dawn by Meyer, who was then in laager
about seven miles south of Elandslaagte. The Boer leader, anticipating
a general attack, at once signalled to Erasmus, upon which a strong
contingent of the Ermelo burghers, accompanied by guns, made their way
across to him from their camp. French reconnoitred boldly, and at
10.35 a.m. he was able to send in to Sir George White his estimate of
the numbers confronting him. On Intintanyoni were 4,000-5,000 men.
Other strong bodies hovered between Rietfontein and Pepworth Hill,
whilst the enemy to his immediate front appeared to separate
themselves into two laagers, whose sites could be clearly
distinguished. One, sheltering about 2,000 men, lay at the junction of
the Beith and Glencoe roads, some five miles south-east of Modder
Spruit station, whilst the other, a much larger encampment, was
situated four miles nearer to the railway, that is to say, one mile
south-east of it.
[Footnote 124: See page 150.]
[Sidenote: Hamilton with Infantry and Artillery supports him.]
[Sidenote: Troops return to camp.]
Meanwhile Colonel Ian Hamilton had at 10 a.m. marched out of Ladysmith
to the Neks between Gun Hill, Lombards Kop and Umbulwana, with a
brigade consisting of the 1st Devonshire and 1st Manchester
regiments, the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers and the 2nd Gordon
Highlanders, with a brigade division of the 21st, 42nd and 53rd
batteries R.F.A., joined later by the 1st Liverpool regiment and the
13th battery R.F.A. This brigade, lying out all day in support of the
cavalry reconnaissance, caused continual apprehension to the enemy,
who covered all his positions with men and cannon in momentary
expectation of an attack. Altogether some 10,000 men with fifteen guns
were observed, and for the purpose intended by Sir George White, who
was only anxious to gain information, the object of the reconnaissance
was accomplished. The attack of the laagers was considered by Sir
George White, who rode out beyond Lombards Nek in the afternoon to
confer with General French and Colonel Hamilton; but after careful
examination it was ultimately decided to await a more suitable
opportunity, and the troops were withdrawn.
[Sidenote: Both Transvaalers and Free Staters approach Ladysmith, Oct.
28th.]
On October 28th Lukas Meyer with 2,000 men and three guns pushed
forward to Modder Spruit, where he went into laager behind a long flat
kopje, now called Long Hill, situated some four thousand yards
south-east of Pepworth Hill, the summit of which the Ermelo commando
had already piqueted. The Free Staters, coming down from Intintanyoni,
rode westward and lay in the evening upon the farm Kleinfontein,
joining hands with their allies of the Transvaal across Surprise Hill
and the heights above the Bell Spruit. Through their main laager on
Kleinfontein ran the railway line to Van Reenen's Pass.
[Sidenote: Cavalry reports Boer dispositions. Oct. 29th.]
On the 29th the cavalry made a reconnaissance eastwards, and reported
as follows. The laager which had been close to the Modder Spruit
station on the 27th had disappeared, but there were now two
encampments to the east and south-east of Lombards Kop, of which the
lower appeared to command the road to Pieters, thus threatening the
line of communication. Pepworth Hill was strongly occupied, and
artillery were now upon it; a large camp lay close to the north-west
of the height. The enemy was numerous upon Long Hill. Upon its flat
top two or three guns were already emplaced, and an epaulment for
another was in course of construction. Behind the hill was a laager.
[Sidenote: White decides on attack.]
This reconnaissance seemed to Sir G. White to furnish the reasons he
desired for assuming the offensive. The capture of Long Hill would at
least throw back the investing line of Transvaalers. It might do
more--break through it altogether, when a sweep north against Pepworth
would bid fair to drive together the Transvaal commandos in upon their
centre, and roll up the whole. The Free Staters, strung out as they
now are, thinly north-west and west, would then be cut off from the
rest.
[Sidenote: Plan arranged, Oct. 29th.]
[Sidenote: Carleton to approach Nicholson's Nek that night.]
[Sidenote: Cavalry by dawn of 30th to be on ridges n.e. of Gun Hill.]
[Sidenote: Grimwood to seize Long Hill.]
[Sidenote: Hamilton then to capture Pepworth.]
At 4 p.m. on the afternoon of the 29th his plans were formulated. Long
Hill was to be the primary, Pepworth Hill the secondary object, and to
secure them the whole of the troops were to be employed. His main army
he divided into two bodies, with separate missions. One, consisting of
No. 10 Mountain battery, the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers and the 1st
Gloucester regiment, all commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel F. R. C.
Carleton, of the first-named battalion, was to move at 10 p.m. that
night northward along the Bell Spruit. The duties of this force were
twofold: first, to cover the left flank of the main operation;
secondly, to gain and hold such a position towards Nicholson's Nek (if
possible, the Nek itself) as would enable the cavalry to debouch
safely upon the open ground beyond, should opportunity arise for a
pursuit, or, better still, an interception of the Transvaalers as they
fell back on the Drakensberg passes. The left flank thus provided for,
a cavalry brigade, consisting of the 5th Lancers, 19th Hussars, and
Colonel Royston's regiment of Colonials, under Major-General French,
were to reach the ridges north-east of Gun Hill before dawn, from
which, by demonstrating against the enemy's left, they would cover the
British right. Between these wings, the main infantry attack was to be
carried out by the 8th brigade, which, in the absence of its proper
commander, Colonel F. Howard, was under Colonel G. G. Grimwood, 2nd
King's Royal Rifles, whose five battalions would include the 1st and
2nd King's Royal Rifles, the 1st Leicestershire, and 1st King's
(Liverpool) regiments and the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers. The 1st
brigade division Royal Field artillery and the Natal Field battery
were to be attached to Grimwood's command. A general reserve of the
7th brigade, consisting of the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, 1st Manchester
and 1st Devonshire regiments, and, should it arrive from Maritzburg in
time, the 2nd Rifle Brigade, were to be under the command of Colonel
Ian Hamilton, who, besides his infantry, would have with him the 5th
Dragoon Guards, the 18th Hussars, the Imperial Light Horse, two
companies mounted infantry, and the 2nd brigade division of artillery.
Grimwood was to take Long Hill, and his path thereto was to be cleared
by the shrapnel of both brigade divisions. That position carried, he
was to hold it, whilst Colonel Hamilton, supported in turn by the fire
of the united artillery, was to throw his fresh infantry against
Pepworth Hill, and complete the victory.
[Sidenote: Carleton's column parades 11 p.m. Oct. 29th.]
At 10 p.m. Carleton left his parade ground with six companies (16
officers, 518 other ranks) and 46 mules, and at 11 p.m. arrived at the
rendezvous, the level crossing of the Newcastle road close to the
Orange Free State railway junction, where the rest of his command had
been awaiting him for an hour. It consisted of five and a half
companies (some 450 men) of the Gloucester regiment, with 57 mules and
a Maxim gun; the 10th Mountain battery, comprising 137 N.C.O.s and
men, 6 guns, with 100 rounds for each, 133 mules, with 52 Cape Boys as
muleteers, and 10 horses. The total strength of the column was thus
about 1,140 men and 250 animals.
[Sidenote: Grimwood starts same night at 12.30.]
[Sidenote: Grimwood's column broken by error.]
Half an hour after midnight Grimwood's brigade (8th) set out eastward
in the following order: 1st and 2nd battalions King's Royal Rifles,
1st Leicestershire regiment, 1st brigade division R.F.A., 1st King's
(Liverpool) regiment, and the Natal Field battery, with a rearguard of
the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers.[125] Another brigade division, the
2nd, joining the line of march soon after it was put in motion,
marched in front of the 1st Liverpool regiment. The whole pressed on
for a time quietly and in order. Soon, however, the last arrival, the
2nd brigade division of artillery, in pursuance of orders, when
between Flag and Limit hills, drew away from out of the column to the
left and passed under the shelter of Flag Hill. The two battalions
behind, not being aware of any special instructions given to the
artillery, followed it, whilst those in front still pursued their
proper route, so that Grimwood's force was cut in two and separated
whilst yet but half his march was over. An hour before dawn, Grimwood,
unconscious of the mishap to his rear, gained some low kopjes 1,800
yards from the south-eastern flank of Long Hill, and extended his
troops across them, the two battalions King's Royal Rifles in firing
line, Leicester in support, facing north-west. Here he waited for
light. One company, "F." of the 1st King's Royal Rifles, moved
cautiously forward to a small kopje, slightly in advance, to cover the
front.
[Footnote 125: These battalions were not complete. The King's
Royal Rifles had left two companies in Ladysmith, the Dublin
Fusiliers three, the Leicester regiment two, the King's
(Liverpool) regiment two.]
[Sidenote: French starting 3 a.m. dismounts 4,000 yards in rear of
Grimwood.]
[Sidenote: Hamilton at 4 a.m. moves on Limit Hill.]
[Sidenote: First news of disaster to Carleton.]
At 3 a.m. Major-General French rode out of Ladysmith with his two
regiments and pushed for Lombards Kop, dismounting his command in a
hollow basin between Gun Hill and Lombards Kop, some 4,000 yards in
rear, and out of sight, of Grimwood's infantry. The Natal Volunteers,
who had been on the ground since the previous night, went on, and,
dividing right and left, secured the summits of Lombards Kop and
Umbulwana Mountain. Colonel Hamilton, quitting his rendezvous between
Tunnel and Junction Hills at 4 a.m., moved, as directed, on Limit
Hill, which had been piqueted throughout the night by "G." and "H."
companies Gordon Highlanders. As Hamilton rode at the head of his
brigade, a man was brought to him who proved to be a muleteer of the
10th Mountain battery. He reported that a sudden disturbance had
occurred in the midst of Carleton's night march; all the mules of the
battery had broken away, and, so far as he knew, had never been seen
again. A little further on an officer of the Scottish Rifles, who had
been attached to the Gloucester regiment a few hours previously,
appeared amongst the Gordon Highlanders. He, too, told of a stampede
amongst the battery mules, and, in addition, of resulting disturbance
of some of the infantry companies, amongst others that which he
accompanied. Yet a third warning of misadventure on the left was
received before dawn. In the early morning the sentries of the piquet
of the Leicester regiment at Cove Redoubt, one of the northerly
outposts of Ladysmith, became aware of the sound of hoofs and the
rattle of harness coming towards them from the north, and the
soldiers, running down, captured several mules bearing the equipment
of mountain guns. A patrol of the 5th Dragoon Guards,[126] which had
been despatched by Sir G. White to try to get news of Carleton's
column, was checked at the Bell Spruit, but met on the road a gunner
of the 10th Mountain battery, who related the same tale as had already
reached that General. This man said that the battery had been suddenly
fired on at 2 a.m.; the mules had stampeded and disappeared. Both its
ammunition and portions of most of its guns had been carried off.
Finally, a brief note from Carleton himself to the Commander-in-Chief
announced what had then happened.
[Footnote 126: For gallantry on this occasion Second-Lieut.
J. Norwood, 5th Dragoon Guards, was awarded the Victoria
Cross.]
[Sidenote: Pickwoad shells Long Hill.]
[Sidenote: Pepworth replies.]
[Sidenote: Downing moves the two Brigade Divs. against Pepworth.]
[Sidenote: and silences the Boer guns.]
At dawn Pickwoad's brigade division, which was now deployed 1-1/2
miles south-eastward of Limit Hill, opened at Long Hill at 3,700
yards. But Long Hill was silent. The three gun emplacements visible
upon the crest were empty. Instead, at 5.15 a.m., a heavy piece fired
from Pepworth Hill, and a 96-pound shell fell near the town, its
explosion greeting the 2nd Rifle Brigade, which, having detrained at
2.30 a.m., was marching out to join Hamilton's force at Limit Hill.
The next, following quickly, burst in Pickwoad's line of guns, and
Coxhead's artillery, which attempted to reply, found itself far
outranged, whilst Pickwoad's three batteries maintained for a time
their bombardment of Long Hill. In a few moments four long-range
Creusots of smaller calibre (75 m/m) joined in from either side of the
96-pounder, two others from lower ground about the railway below the
height. Both Coxhead's and Pickwoad's batteries were covered with
missiles. Colonel C. M. H. Downing, commanding all the artillery,
quickly assumed the offensive. Dissatisfied with his position, the
left of which, lying to the east of Limit Hill, was so encumbered with
rocks that of the 53rd battery only two guns could fire at all, and
those of the other batteries of the 2nd brigade division only by
indirect laying, he drew that part of his line clear, and moved
Coxhead's three batteries, the 21st, 42nd, and 53rd, out into the
open, facing north-west, to within 4,000 yards of Pepworth.[127]
Troubled, while the change was in course of taking place, by the
accurate shooting from that hill, Downing then ordered Pickwoad to
change front to the left and come into action against Pepworth on the
right of, but some distance from, the 2nd brigade division. The guns
on the low ground under the shadow of Pepworth were soon mastered. The
battery upon its summit, at distant range for shrapnel, withstood yet
awhile; but ere long the gunners there, too, temporarily abandoned
their weapons, and only returned when a slackening of Pickwoad's fire
gave opportunity for a hasty round. At 6.30 a.m., therefore, and for
some half hour more, the trend of battle seemed to the artillery to be
in favour of the British. After that, however, fresh hostile guns
opened, and the rattle of rifles arose in ever-increasing volume, not
only from the broken ground to the right, where Grimwood's infantry
lay lost to view amongst the low, rolling kopjes by the Modder Spruit,
but also far to the rear, towards Lombards Kop. Yet no British were
seen advancing. It was evident that the infantry and cavalry were not
delivering but withstanding an onslaught.
[Footnote 127: This is shown on map 8 as the first artillery
position.]
[Sidenote: Grimwood expecting support from the right, suffers from
that quarter.]
The attack which Grimwood found to be developing rapidly against him
was less surprising from its suddenness than from the direction from
which it assailed him. Those with him, as described above, lay in the
precise position designed for them. He had taken the precaution of
covering his right rear, until it should be protected by the cavalry,
at first with a half company ("A.") of the Leicestershire regiment,
then with two more ("F." and "H.") of the same battalion and the Maxim
gun. Furthermore, a kopje to the right front, seen in the growing
light to command from the eastward that already occupied by "F."
company 1st King's Royal Rifles, was now crowned by "H." company of
the same battalion, and all had seemed safe on that side. But now a
raking fire from the right assailed all his lines, and Grimwood,
instead of outflanking, was outflanked.
Every moment this fire grew more severe; beyond the Modder, Boer
reinforcements were streaming in full view up to the line of riflemen
shooting along the Modder Spruit. Two guns, which began to shoot from
a well-concealed spot near the Elandslaagte road, now took the British
line in enfilade, and partially in reverse. The Boer gunners upon
Pepworth and the low ground east of it again fired, the smaller pieces
into the batteries and infantry, the great Creusot frequently into the
town.
[Sidenote: Grimwood fronts the new danger.]
Instead of the anticipated change of front to the left for the
destruction of the enemy Grimwood had now, therefore, to prepare a new
frontage most speedily, almost to his present rear, for the safety of
his brigade. "H." company 1st King's Royal Rifles, on the advanced
kopje, first turned towards the east, and coming under heavy fire from
three directions, was later reinforced by "A." company of the same
battalion. "B." company, which had lain in support of "F.," moved to
the new right of "H." and "A.," and, with "E." company, lined up along
the rocks facing the Modder Spruit. Meanwhile the officer commanding
"F.," the other advanced company, who had turned east, now found his
left assailed, and threw back half his command in that direction. The
tripod Maxim gun of the 2nd King's Royal Rifles was placed in the
centre of this company.[128]
[Footnote 128: It was found to be impossible to get the
wheeled gun of the 1st King's Royal Rifles over the boulders
of the kopje.]
[Sidenote: 2nd K.R.R. fills gap between 1st K.R.R. and Leicester
detachment.]
The 2nd King's Royal Rifles, which had lain in support whilst the
front circled round, were now sent to reinforce. Leaving two companies
still in support, the battalion changed front to the right, and,
extending from right to left, filled the gap between the right of the
1st King's Royal Rifles and the detached 2-1/2 companies of the
Leicester regiment. These, with a Maxim, somewhat isolated on the
kopje on what was now the right flank, were beginning to be hotly
engaged.
[Sidenote: The arrival of two companies R.D.F. connects Grimwood with
Cavalry.]
Thus under incessant and increasing fire the 8th brigade swung round,
pivoting on the left company 1st King's Royal Rifles, with the
detachment of the Leicester as "marker," so to speak, to its outer
flank. Two companies of the missing Royal Dublin Fusiliers[129] now
arrived to assist the Leicester, and were immediately assailed by some
sharpshooters who had worked around the right flank. They therefore
prolonged the line to the right, towards the northern spurs of
Lombards Kop, and here about 7 a.m. they joined hands with the
cavalry, whose movements must now be related.
[Footnote 129: See p. 176.]
[Sidenote: French's operations.]
Waiting until the artillery duel seemed to be going in favour of
Downing's batteries, French gave the word for advance about 5.30 a.m.
The 5th Lancers and 19th Hussars, who had been lying in mass in the
hollow, quickly extended in a north-easterly direction, with orders to
work round the Boer left. The route taken by the brigade lay for some
distance within rifle range of the western flank of a line of low
kopjes, which, running down north-east as an irregular spur of
Lombards Kop, and parallel to the Modder Spruit, pointed in the
direction of Long Hill. At the termination of this ridge, the high
ground, dropping sharply to the plain, offered an outlet to the
eastward. For this gateway French's two regiments were making. They
had all but reached it when a sharp blaze of rifles broke from the
kopjes to their right. The squadrons thereupon wheeled to the right,
the troopers dismounted, and running a short way to the new front,
they soon reinforced a ridge, already thinly held by the right of
Grimwood's infantry, from whence they replied to the sharpshooters on
the kopjes beyond. It was soon evident that the Mausers were becoming
the masters of the carbines, and French, seeing the impossibility of
breaking through, at any rate at this period, ordered his brigade to
retire. As the men took to their horses, a gun, opening from the
enemy's left, threw shell rapidly amongst them, and made the
inequality of the combat yet more apparent. The two squadrons of the
5th Lancers, who were on the left, drew back over the plain, whilst
the 19th Hussars retraced their path under the ridges, both rejoining
General French under the lee of Lombards Kop, north of Gun Hill and of
their original point of departure. French immediately threw his
command forward again, and his two regiments, with some of the Natal
Carbineers, all dismounted, crowned the high ridges running northward
and downward from the summit of Lombards Kop, and were soon deep in
action with superior numbers all along the line. About 8 a.m.
Major-General J. F. Brocklehurst, who had only reached Ladysmith at 3
a.m., arrived at Lombards Kop with two squadrons ("B." and "D.") of
the 5th Dragoon Guards, followed by the 18th Hussars; and Downing,
withdrawing the 69th battery from the line of guns still shelling
Pepworth, despatched it with all haste in the same direction. Of
Brocklehurst's reinforcement, the two squadrons 5th Dragoon Guards
came up on the right of the 19th Hussars on the crest, and found
themselves at once under fire from the front and right flank. Of the
three weak squadrons of the 18th Hussars--all that remained after the
catastrophe of Adelaide Farm[130]--one was directed to reinforce the
19th Hussars on the eastern slope of Lombards, the other two climbed
to the right of the 5th Dragoon Guards to the south. Sharp fire from a
pom-pom and many rifles met them on the shoulder of the ridge, and it
seemed as if the British right was to be overmatched. But the 69th
battery, which had moved up the Helpmakaar road, escorted by a
squadron of the 5th Lancers, now arrived, and, boldly handled, quickly
relieved the pressure in this portion of the field by drawing the
enemy's attention to itself. Pushing on through the Nek which joins
Lombards Kop to Umbulwana this battery came into action on an
underfeature south of the road one mile beyond it, and enfiladed the
Boer left. Soon, however, it found itself the focus of an increasing
fusilade, and its commander, Major F. D. V. Wing, saw that to continue
to work the guns would entail a grave loss of men. He therefore
determined to withdraw from his dangerously advanced position. It was
impossible to bring up the teams, but the gunners ran the guns back by
hand. The battery withdrew almost intact, and, coming into action
again, kept the balance level by steady practice carried on from the
Nek itself.[131]
[Footnote 130: Following Talana, see p. 140.]
[Footnote 131: This is the position shown on map 8 (_a_).]
[Sidenote: Grimwood receives Artillery support.]
Meanwhile, Grimwood was being hard pressed on the low kopjes to the
northward, and his line became thinner every moment as he endeavoured
to meet the continual attempts upon his flanks. Two Boer guns shelled
steadily the much exposed 8th brigade from various points, and when
about 8 a.m. a pom-pom, joining in the bombardment, killed with its
first discharges some of the ammunition mules and scattered the rest
far and wide, Grimwood sent urgent messages to the artillery for
support. Sir G. White was at that moment himself with the batteries,
which were being enfiladed again, this time by some guns on the low
ground below and south of Pepworth. He promptly despatched the 21st
and 53rd batteries to positions from which, facing eastwards, they
could support both the cavalry and Grimwood. The 21st moved far
southward, and from a gap in the hills between the infantry and
cavalry soon rendered for the left of the latter the same service as
the 69th was performing for the right. The 53rd battery, coming into
action near the Elandslaagte road, engaged the Boer guns on Grimwood's
front, and though kept at extreme range by Sir G. White's orders,
succeeded in much reducing their effect. At the same time the 13th
battery also left the line facing Pepworth, and, wheeling eastward,
shelled the hostile artillery on the left front of the infantry with
good results.
[Sidenote: 9 to 11 a.m. a stationary battle.]
For two hours, from about 9 a.m. to 11 a.m., the engagement continued
with little movement of either army. The Boers, being now within 800
yards of the British, could advance no further, but sent a steady
stream of bullets against the ridges, pinning the cavalry to Lombards
Kop and the infantry to their line of hillocks along the Modder. By
9.30 a.m. Grimwood's last available reserve was put into the firing
line, and he could prolong his front no more, though the enemy still
threatened his flanks. The artillery was strangely dispersed. Far on
the right the 69th battery stood in action upon Umbulwana Nek; the
21st battery on the northern side of Lombards Kop covered French's
left and Grimwood's right; out in the open to their left rear the 53rd
battery shot above the heads of the right wing of the infantry, whilst
farther northward the 13th sent shrapnel over the left wing. Only the
42nd and 67th batteries remained on the site first held by the
artillery facing north-west, where the former suffered considerable
losses from the heavy enfilade and frontal fire which recommenced. For
the Boer artillerymen, encouraged by the diminution of the British
gun-power at this point, had not only returned to the pieces upon
Pepworth, but placed fresh ones upon the northernmost spurs of Long
Hill itself.
[Sidenote: Reserve absorbed by action.]
The reserve on Limit Hill, under Colonel Ian Hamilton's command, had
been reduced considerably by the successive demands of the battle. He
had been early deprived of most of his cavalry and all his artillery,
and shortly after 8 a.m., on a report coming of a hostile advance
against the left flank, two squadrons ("E." and "F.") of his remaining
mounted troops, the Imperial Light Horse, had left him to occupy some
kopjes on either side of the railway close to Aller Park, from which
they could see the enemy moving in strength about the heights of Bell
Spruit. At 10 a.m. the 1st Manchester regiment was also withdrawn from
Hamilton's brigade, the right half-battalion proceeding towards
Lombards Kop, the left half passing into the open as escort to the
artillery. The former portion eventually became incorporated with
French's firing line, whilst the latter lay out upon the shelterless
ground between the original artillery position and the new one taken
up by the 13th battery, where they suffered somewhat severely from the
intermittent shells.
[Sidenote: Ladysmith threatened.]
Meanwhile Colonel W. G. Knox, who, in the absence of the army, had
been placed in charge of the defences of Ladysmith, was by no means
secure. Left with a garrison of a few companies of infantry, he
detailed two of these, with the 23rd of the Royal engineers, and the
two Boer guns captured at Elandslaagte, to cover the north of the
town, posting them upon a ridge north-west of Observation Hill. Here
he found himself confronted immediately by strong bodies and two guns
of the enemy, who manoeuvred about Bell's and the adjacent kopjes. He
was soon strengthened by two guns and 88 men of the 10th Mountain
battery, hastily collected and reorganised after their stampede from
Carleton's party. But at no time could Knox do more than hold his own,
and the strength and boldness of the Boers, who at one time
threatened the town, seemed the last confirmation of Carleton's fate.
[Sidenote: Sir George withdraws the troops.]
[Sidenote: 13th battery covers retreat.]
About 11 a.m. Sir G. White, having first despatched his Chief of the
Staff, Major-General A. Hunter, to investigate the situation, decided
to withdraw. To cover the movement he sent out three squadrons ("B.,"
"C." and "D.") of the Imperial Light Horse which remained in reserve
at Limit Hill. The 13th battery, receiving an order to support them as
closely as possible, galloped in and unlimbered 800 yards behind
Grimwood's line. So screened, the infantry began to retreat at 11.30
a.m. As the men rose from their shelters, a storm of fire broke from
the enemy's ridges. But the gunners of the 13th battery, turning the
hail of bullets from the infantry, faced it themselves. Almost the
whole volume of the enemy's fire soon centred on this battery. From
the right, four Boer guns concealed in the scrub raked the line; those
upon Long Hill bombarded from the left, whilst from the left rear the
heavy shells from Pepworth also struck in, hitting direct four of the
six guns. When twenty minutes had passed thus, and Grimwood's brigade
had almost removed itself into safety, the battery which had shielded
it looked as if it must itself be lost.
[Sidenote: 53rd battery relieves 13th.]
From their rear Major A. J. Abdy, commanding the 53rd battery, had
marked the perilous situation of the 13th and, obtaining permission
from Colonel Coxhead, advanced to succour it. Galloping to the front,
across a deep donga, the 53rd wheeled to the right of the 13th and
ranged upon some Boer artillery 2,350 yards to the eastward. By the
orders of Major-General Hunter, who was on the spot, the 13th retired
first, some 800 yards. But before it could come into action again, the
53rd, left alone on the plain, drew in its turn the fire of all the
Boer guns. A shell exploded beneath a limber, blowing the wheels to
fragments, so that the gun could not be removed, and had to be
temporarily abandoned. As soon as the 13th re-opened the 53rd was able
to draw back. In re-crossing the donga a gun upset, and the enemy's
shells burst over it, but whilst the battery fell back to a new site
to support the 13th, Lieutenant J. F. A. Higgins, having been left
with the team in the donga, succeeded in righting the gun, and
restored it to its place in the line. A few minutes previously,
Captain W. Thwaites, with six men, had ridden forward, and now
returned, bringing with him on a new limber the gun which had been
disabled in the open. Only the old limber and a wagon of stores
remained derelict.
[Sidenote: The Infantry, under the protection of the guns, get away.]
[Sidenote: The Naval guns appear and silence the Boers.]
So covered, the infantry had been getting away with unimpaired
discipline, but in great confusion, owing to the intermixture of units
and the extreme exhaustion of the men. Two Maxims were abandoned, but
useless, on the kopjes--those of the Leicestershire regiment and 2nd
King's Royal Rifles--the mules of both having been shot or stampeded
by the last outburst from the Boer lines. The enemy made no serious
attempt to follow up the retirement. Some Boers did indeed speed
forward to the now empty kopjes, and began shooting rapidly from
thence, but under the fine practice of the 13th battery the musketry
soon dwindled. The Creusot on Pepworth Hill sounded on the right, and
every part of the route to be traversed by the troops lay within range
of its projectiles. About noon, a report, as loud as that of the great
French cannon itself, came from the direction of the town, and the
batteries on Pepworth sank immediately to silence under the repeated
strokes of shells from British Naval guns. Captain the Honourable
Hedworth Lambton, R.N., had detrained his command of two 4.7-in.,
three 12-pr. 12-cwt. quick-firing guns, with some smaller pieces, 16
officers and 267 men at 10 a.m., the very time when the enemy's 6-in.
shells were bursting over the railway station.[132] After conferring
with Colonel Knox, he was in two hours on his way towards the fight
with the 12-pounders, reaching the place held by Hamilton's brigade.
But in view of the imminent retirement, this was too far forward, and
Lambton was ordered back. Whilst he was in the act of Withdrawing,
the gunners on Pepworth, descrying the strings of moving bullocks,
launched a shell which pitched exactly upon one of the guns, and
tumbled it over. Lambton, however, coming into action nearer the town,
opened heavily and accurately on his antagonist, and reduced him to
immediate silence.
[Footnote 132: Rear-Admiral Sir R. Harris, K.C.M.G., in Naval
command at the Cape, had been requested (October 24th) by Sir
G. White to send a heavy gun detachment to Ladysmith "in view
of heavy guns being brought by General Joubert from the
north." It will be seen with what promptitude the request was
acceded to and acted upon by the Naval commander. In
ninety-six hours the guns were disembarked from H.M.S.
_Powerful_ at Durban; seventeen hours later they were in
action.]
[Sidenote: The garrison reaches Ladysmith by 2.30 p.m.]
At 1 p.m. the cavalry on the right gave up the crests which they had
maintained so long, covered up to the last by the 21st battery on the
left, and on the right by the 69th battery, whose escort had been
strengthened by "C" squadron 5th Dragoon Guards taken from Limit Hill.
At 2.30 p.m. French's command was in Ladysmith, following the 1st
Manchester regiment, which had retired on the right of the cavalry.
With the exception of four companies of the 1st Devonshire regiment,
left upon Limit Hill, the rest of the troops engaged had reached their
camps a short time previously. Only the tents of Carleton's two
battalions were seen to be empty when evening fell.
[Sidenote: Carleton's night march begins 11.15 p.m. 29th Oct./99.]
[Sidenote: The disaster.]
Carleton's detachment had moved from the rendezvous at 11.15 p.m. in
the following order: first, under Major C. S. Kincaid, a small party
of 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers, who marched with fixed bayonets; then
Colonel Carleton himself, with Major W. Adye, D.A.A.G. for
Intelligence, and the guides; behind them the 1st Royal Irish
Fusiliers, followed by their 46 mules; then the 10th Mountain battery,
with 133 mules; then the 57 mules of the 1st Gloucester regiment; next
five and a half companies of that battalion, and finally a small
rearguard, under Captain B. O. Fyffe, of the Gloucester. The valley of
the Bell Spruit was wrapped in profound darkness, yet the force pushed
on at a rapid pace, and, in spite of the noise of its progress, was
undetected by the Boer piquets on the hills on either side. Shortly
after 1 a.m. the van was opposite the southern spur of the height
called Kainguba, at the other extremity of which, some two miles due
north, lay the object of the expedition, Nicholson's Nek. The column
was here in perfect order, the road to the Nek was good, and there was
promise of about two hours of darkness to conceal the remainder of the
march. But Colonel Carleton, thinking more of the lateness of his
start than of the excellence of his progress, and remembering that his
orders had not bound him absolutely to Nicholson's Nek, came to the
conclusion at this point that, if, as seemed possible, he could not
reach the Nek before dawn, it would be extremely rash to be surprised
by daylight in a narrow defile. He decided, therefore, at least to
make good the dangerous high ground on his left by occupying the
nearest crest of Kainguba above him, intending, if time allowed, to
continue his march to the Nek from this vantage ground. He therefore
wheeled the leading files to the left, and at their head began the
boulder-obstructed and finally almost precipitous ascent of the
mountain, ordering guides to be left to indicate the point of the
change of direction to the units following the Royal Irish Fusiliers.
When the head of that battalion had climbed two-thirds of the steep a
mysterious and fatal incident occurred. Suddenly from the darkness
encircling the clambering soldiers broke out a roar "like that of an
approaching train,"[133] there was a rush of hoofs and the clatter of
scattering stones. In a moment a group of loose animals, whether
horses, mules or cattle, it was impossible to discern, bounding down
the rocky precipice, tore past the last companies of the Royal Irish
Fusiliers and disappeared as quickly as they had come into the gloom
of the valley. The rear of the Irish Fusiliers checked and staggered
back upon the long line of ammunition mules. The natural timidity of
these animals, many of them almost untrained, had been increased by
their long wait at the rendezvous, and by the fact that they were led
by strange and unskilled men. Now it became an uncontrollable panic.
Leaping round, dragging their muleteers with them, they plunged
backwards in terror, wrenched themselves loose, and thundered over the
steep slope upon all below them. The battery mules and those of the
Gloucester regiment were dashed downwards and joined the riot, and the
whole mass poured upon the Gloucester regiment, which had just begun
to breast the hill. A shout arose; the men of the front companies were
buffeted and swept from the track in every direction. A few shots rang
sharply from behind, and a few more faintly from a startled Boer
piquet on Surprise Hill. Then the uproar died away in the valley of
the Bell Spruit, leaving the column disordered and amazed at its own
wreck. It was a disaster complete, sudden, and incurred by no fault of
officers or men. Up to this point the night march, conducted in deep
darkness and between the enemy's piquets, had been a conspicuous
success, and now in one swift moment the hand of fate had changed
order into chaos, and success into destruction. But the troops quickly
recovered, and indeed but few had yielded to the shock. Many had
gathered about their officers with fixed bayonets; many, hurled to the
ground, had nevertheless gripped their weapons and looked not for
safety, but the enemy. Only fifty of the infantry, and these included
many who had been actually stunned by the onset of the frenzied mules,
failed to fall into the ranks at the summons of the officers, who,
even before the tumult had ceased, were strenuously working to
re-organise their commands.
[Footnote 133: The simile of an officer present.]
[Sidenote: 2 a.m. the column reaches summit without guns or reserve
ammunition.]
About 2 a.m. the leading files pressed over the crest on to the top of
the mountain. An hour of uncertainty and, had the enemy been near, of
extreme danger followed. Most of the Irish Fusiliers were now upon the
summit, disposed, as best could be, for defence. But the Gloucester at
the bottom were not yet formed, and when, about 3 a.m., they came up
in such order as they had been able to contrive, they brought only
nine of their fifty-nine mules with them. The Irish Fusiliers had
recovered but eight. The reserve of ammunition was thus practically
swept away. The Mountain battery did not appear at all. Only two of
the gun mules eventually arrived, carrying portions of two pieces.
Eighty-eight gunners and one hundred and thirty mules had dropped out,
and not a complete gun of all the six was available.
[Sidenote: bivouacks on southern edge and awaits dawn.]
[Sidenote: The ground.]
[Sidenote: Carleton chooses a defensive position.]
[Sidenote: Distribution of companies.]
When at last both regiments reached the top they were formed in line
of quarter-columns--Gloucester on the right. Guided by Adye, they
moved towards the southern extremity of the ridge, where they halted,
lay down around the crest, and waited for light. Dawn revealed the
nature of the position which the diminished detachment occupied.
Behind, the southern end of the mountain dropped almost sheer to the
valley. In front, to the northward, the hill-top first sloped downward
somewhat to a point, where, like Talana, it was narrowed by a deep
re-entrant on one side, then rose to a new sky line, which hid from
the British troops the remainder of the ridge some 1,200 or more yards
from the southern crest. Over it the hill-top narrowed, and ran on for
a mile and a half towards Nicholson's Nek. A jungle of tall grass,
hiding innumerable boulders, clothed the mountain up to and a little
beyond the sky line, ceasing some 700 yards from the southern crest,
and between this thicket and the British line were dotted a few ruined
stone kraals, of a circular shape and some two feet high. Across the
valley of the Bell Spruit, to the east, a group of kopjes stood within
long rifle range of, but lower than, Kainguba. In the midst of the
British position itself, a small knoll, crowned by two trees, and
nearly as high as the grass-grown sky line in front, arose at the end
of the mountain before it plunged into the depth behind. Carleton, now
decided to stand on the defensive where he was, despatched a message
at 3.55 a.m. by a native, acquainting Sir G. White with his mishap,
his position, and his plan, and issued orders for the disposition and
entrenchment of the troops. The left or western crest of the hill was
assigned to the Gloucester regiment, the right to the Irish Fusiliers,
a reserve, consisting of two companies ("G." and "H.") of the latter
battalion, taking post in front of the knoll at the southern extremity
of the summit. The men began at once to build sangars. The position of
the Gloucester, which it is necessary to describe in detail, was as
follows: Along half of the southern and south-western crest lay "A."
company, its right being prolonged by "B." company, and at first by
"C." This last-named unit, however, was soon extended across the north
of the hill, at right angles to the crest and "B." company, and had
half completed a defensive wall when it was again pushed forward about
100 yards to the front, "B." company increasing its extension along
the crest to maintain junction with the left of "C." The right flank
of "C." company was marked by a round kraal, behind which stood up a
small tree, and beyond this the line across the mountain-top was taken
up by a company ("E.") of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, which, in its
turn, linked on to the defenders ("A.," "B.," "F." companies Royal
Irish Fusiliers) of the eastern crest. The formation thus took the
shape of a semicircle, behind a diameter, composed of one company
Gloucester and one Royal Irish Fusiliers, facing the rise to the
northward. Some 700 yards back from these the arc followed the contour
of the mountain in rear. Thus back from the fighting line the ground
sloped upwards, hiding from it the reserves, and exposing
reinforcements from them, or men retreating back to them, to the full
view and fire of anyone upon the shoulder which arose in front. Over
the brow of this rise "D." company Gloucester entrenched itself in a
position to support both "C." company Gloucester and "E." company
Royal Irish Fusiliers. Though less than 150 yards in rear, "D."
company was, owing to the bulging ground, invisible to "C." company,
and the officers of the latter knew nothing of the proximity of its
support. The movements necessary to these dispositions had scarcely
begun when a slow rifle-fire, commencing from Surprise Hill to the
south-west, showed that the presence of the British on the mountain
was discovered, and from the very first the toiling soldiers thus
found themselves taken in flank and reverse. Stones of manageable size
were scarce, tools were lacking with which to move the large ones,
and, with the smaller, defences of but the most paltry dimensions
could be erected. At this time the danger of the dead ground ahead,
and below the left front, became apparent to Carleton, and "E."
company of the Gloucester, moving out beyond the front line, took post
upon the densely-grown summit of the rise, 400 yards in front of "C."
turning its left section to face west. Here it was shortly joined by
the half of "H." company, some twenty men in all, sent forward by the
O.C. Gloucester in response to Carleton's order (which did not name
any precise strength) to reinforce.
[Sidenote: 7 a.m. Boers appear.]
At 7 a.m. bands of mounted men came down from Intintanyoni to the
heights east of Bell Spruit, whence they opened fire upon the right
rear of the British position. An hour later a hostile battery of
apparently four guns suddenly appeared upon the northern end of these
heights, and, unlimbering for action, threatened Kainguba in silence
for some time, only to disappear northwards without firing a shot. A
number of horsemen were seen to ride away with it, and these, bearing
to the left, vanished behind Nicholson's Nek.
[Sidenote: 9 a.m. they threaten rear.]
At 9 a.m. a movement still more threatening was descried from the
lines of the Royal Irish Fusiliers. Groups of horsemen, breaking away
from the main laager visible at Pepworth, came riding up the valleys
and behind the crests towards the northern end of Kainguba. On the
right, amongst the Irish Fusiliers, the Maxim of the Gloucester
regiment stood ready for action, and the officer in charge commenced a
slow fire upon the stream of Boers. Opening at 1,200 yards, he
gradually increased the range to 2,000 yards, and the trotting
horsemen had just broken into a gallop as the bullets began to lash
amongst them, when an order was received not to fire unless the enemy
showed in masses at closer distances, ammunition being scarce.
[Sidenote: Boer movements.]
At 2 a.m. Commandant Van Dam, lying in bivouac with his Johannesburg
Police[134] beneath Pepworth, received orders from Joubert in person
to proceed at once to the northern summit of Kainguba and hold the
ridge above Nicholson's Nek. The Boer officer thereupon galloped for
that spot with 400 men, being warned of the proximity of British
troops by a Field Cornet of the Pretoria commando, who lay with thirty
men on the northern slope of the high ground east of Bell Spruit.
Gaining the Nek, the Police found it occupied by 150 Free Staters, who
moved away further west on their approach. Van Dam's plan was quickly
made. Sending a message to the Free Staters that if they would ride
round to the flank and rear of the British, he would attack straight
over the top of the mountain, he left fifty burghers in the Nek in
charge of the horses, and led the remainder on foot in straggling
order up the hill. The crest was gained and half the summit traversed
before shots rang out from the shelters of the advanced companies of
the Gloucester. But the Boers fired no round until, at 800 yards, the
foremost British sangar was visible through the long grass. Meanwhile
the Free Staters, under Christian De Wet and Steenkamp, crept around
the foot of the steep ground under Van Dam's right, swinging
northward. Then they, too, began to climb, and by 10 a.m. Carleton's
column was entrapped.
[Footnote 134: Or South African Republic Police (the
"Zarps").]
[Sidenote: Development of attack.]
The weak company and a half in front of the Gloucester, badly
sheltered from the converging fire, could do little more than check
the foremost burghers. This, however, they did so effectually for a
time that Van Dam, fearing for the issue of a merely frontal attack,
and hearing nothing of the Free Staters, who had not yet reached their
goal, ordered one of his officers, Lieutenant Pohlmann, to take fifty
men out of sight under the hill to the right, and not to fire a shot
until he arrived within decisive range of the British. Pohlmann moved
boldly and skilfully, and, appearing suddenly upon the left of "E."
company Gloucester, poured a destructive shower over the defences. The
captain of "E." company perceived at once the hopelessness of his
situation, asked and received permission to retire, and took his men
and those of "H." company back under a heavy fusilade and with severe
loss, passing the left flank of "C." company, into whose sangars many
dropped for shelter. The section detached to the left, not receiving
the order--unable to retire, if it had received it--was shot down to a
man. The commander was taken prisoner. Carleton, who had not
authorised this retirement, and placed as he was, knew nothing of the
necessity for it, then ordered Major S. Humphery to reinforce the
diminished companies, and send them back to the abandoned sangars.
This Humphery found to be impossible, and thus the front of the
position receded to the line of "C." company Gloucester and of "E."
company Royal Irish Fusiliers, slightly to their right rear. Nor was
this to remain long unbroken; for most of the men of this company of
Royal Irish Fusiliers, finding their feeble defences crumbling to
nothing under the tremendous fire, drew off gradually towards their
comrades on the right, and soon the officers of "C." company
Gloucester saw that the prolongation of their line had vanished, and
that their right was now completely exposed.
[Sidenote: 11:30 a.m. A heliograph cannot be answered.]
About this time (11.30 a.m.) a heliograph from Sir G. White's main
body was seen. Carleton called for signallers to read the message; but
so deadly was the fire that three men were wounded in succession, and
one man thrice, as they stood by Carleton spelling out the signal.
This ran:--"Retire on Ladysmith as opportunity offers." The only
heliograph with the column had vanished in the stampede, and Carleton,
encircled by musketry, knew that he was as powerless to obey the order
as to acknowledge it.
[Sidenote: A fatal misunderstanding.]
The Boers, who had turned "E." company, Gloucester, crawled on to
within forty yards of the right of "B." company, threatening to roll
it up, and Lieutenant C. S. Knox, its commander, surrounded by dead,
found it necessary to go back to fetch up more men. Near him, in the
sangar of "C." company, lay Captain S. Willcock of "H." company, and
Knox, before starting back, waved his arms to attract his attention,
shouting to him that the Boers were coming up from behind, that he,
Knox, had to go back, and that Willcock must look to his left. But
Knox, with a gesture of his arms, had unwittingly imitated the
military signal to retire, and the musketry, which was now one
sustained roar upon the mountain, drowned all of his shouting, except
the words "from behind." Willcock, therefore, imagining that he was
receiving an order to retire, which might have been sent forward from
the commanding officer, passed it on to Captain Fyffe, who, in turn,
communicated it to Captain Duncan, the senior officer in the sangar.
In the short retirement which followed nearly forty-five percent fell.
[Sidenote: Duncan occupies a kraal, and then surrenders.]
Following their retreating companies, Captains Duncan and Fyffe (the
latter wounded) halted by a small ruined kraal some fifty yards back,
leaped into it with six or eight men, and determined to make a stand.
Behind the kraal, the ground sloping upwards, hid the rest of the
British lines entirely from a man lying prone in the sorry shelter. So
close now were the Boers that the uproar of their rapid and incessant
shots overwhelmed all else. To the occupants of the kraal it seemed as
though silence had fallen over the British part of the position, and
this, though "D." company was shooting steadily, unshaken in the
sangar not fifty yards to their right rear. They thought that Colonel
Carleton had taken his column from the hill, and that they were alone.
For a few moments they lay, the helpless focus of hundreds of rifles,
and then, after a brief conversation with his wounded junior, Duncan
decided to surrender. Two handkerchiefs tied to the muzzle of an
uplifted rifle were apparently invisible to the Boers, whose fire
continued unabated. But the white rags, fluttering just clear of the
brow of the rise, were marked in an instant from the sangar of "D."
company, of whose proximity Duncan and his party were absolutely
unaware, and Captain R. Conner, who lay there with the commanding
officer of the Gloucester, rushed out towards them over some fifty
yards of bullet-swept ground shouting an enquiry. Meanwhile, as the
storm of lead still beat upon the shelter, Duncan, taking a towel from
a soldier near him, tied it to his sword and held it aloft. For a
minute or two the enemy did not desist, and in this interval Conner,
running by order of his commanding officer, across to Colonel
Carleton, acquainted him with the fact that the flag had been upraised
in Duncan's sangar. At the same time a bugle, whether British or Boer
will never be known, sounded the "cease fire" somewhere on the British
left. There was a hasty consultation between Carleton and Adye as to
the possibility of repudiating the surrender altogether, or of
applying it solely to the small party which had yielded. But the
former officer, raising his eyes towards the spot, saw that the enemy
had practically decided the question for him. Having passed by
Duncan's kraal they were close in front of his main line, moving
quickly forward with shouts and waving of hats, with rifles held
confidently at the "trail." Many were already on the flank of the
right portion of the British line, which, surrender or not as it
would, was thus placed in an utterly untenable position. This right,
consisting of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, absorbed in action to the
front, knew nothing of the events on the left.
[Sidenote: Carleton submits for all.]
There was yet time to disown the flag. The Boers had so far possessed
themselves only of Duncan's sangar; but Carleton shrank from doing
what he knew would be construed into the blackest treachery by his
opponents, which he knew, moreover, could but prolong the resistance
of his trapped and exhausted battalions some half an hour or less.
Calling a bugler to him he bade him sound the "cease fire," set a
match to his maps and papers, and, with Adye, walked out towards the
enemy. Some of the Irish Fusiliers still fought on whilst Carleton,
meeting Commandant Steenkamp, handed over to him his sword and
revolver; it was some time before the bursts of firing ceased
altogether on the right. At about 1.30 p.m. 37 officers and 917 men
became prisoners of war.[135]
[Footnote 135: For detailed casualties, etc., see Appendix
6.]