SPEECH IN THE SENATE, ON THE VOTE OF HON. JOHN P. STOCKTON AFFIRMING
HIS SEAT IN THE SENATE, MARCH 26, 1866.
March 26th, immediately after the reading of the Senate
journal, Mr. Sumner rose to what he called a question of
privilege, and moved “that the journal of Friday, March 23,
1866, be amended by striking out the vote of Mr. Stockton
on the question of his right to a seat in the Senate.” The
circumstances of this vote appear at the close of the last
article. On his motion Mr. Sumner said:--
There are two ways, I believe, if there are not three, but there are
certainly two ways of meeting the question presented by the vote of
Mr. Stockton. I use his name directly, because it will be plainer and
I shall be more easily understood. I say there are two ways in which
the case may be met. One is, by motion to disallow the vote; the other,
by motion, such as I have made, to amend the journal. Perhaps a third
way, though not so satisfactory to my mind, would be by motion to
reconsider; but I am not in a condition to make this motion, as I did
not vote with the apparent majority. I call your attention, however,
at the outset, to two ways,--one by disallowing the vote, and the
other by amending the journal. But behind both, or all three, arises
the simple question, Had Mr. Stockton a right to vote? To this it is
replied, that his name was on the roll of the Senate, and accordingly
was called by our Secretary; to which I answer,--and to my mind the
answer is complete,--The rule of the Senate must be construed always in
subordination to the principles of Natural Law and Parliamentary Law,
and therefore you are brought again to the question with which I began,
Had Mr. Stockton a right to vote?
Had he a right to vote, first, according to the principles of Natural
Law, or, in other words, the principles of Universal Law? I take it
there is no lawyer, there is no man even of the most moderate reading,
who is not familiar with the principle of jurisprudence, recognized in
all countries and in all ages, that no man can be a judge in his own
case. That principle has been reduced to form among the maxims of our
Common Law,--_Nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa_. As such it
has been handed down from the earliest days of the mother country. It
was brought here by our fathers, and has been cherished sacredly by us
as a cardinal rule in every court of justice. No judge, no tribunal,
high or low, can undertake to set aside this rule. I have in my hand
the most recent work on the Maxims of Law, where, after quoting this
rule, the learned writer says:--
“It is a fundamental rule in the administration of justice,
that a person cannot be judge in a cause wherein he is
interested.”[7]