Such are obvious considerations of a general character. The interests
of the Pacific States, the extension of the national domain, the
extension of republican institutions, the foreclosure of adverse
British possession, and the amity of Russia,--these are the points we
have passed in review. Most of these, if not all, are calculated to
impress the public mind; but I can readily understand a difference of
opinion with regard to the urgency of negotiation at this hour. Some
may think that the purchase-money and the annual outlay that must
follow might have been postponed another decade, while Russia continued
in possession as trustee for our benefit; and yet some of the reasons
for the treaty do not seem to allow delay.
At all events, now that the treaty has been signed by plenipotentiaries
on each side duly empowered, it is difficult to see how we can refuse
to complete the purchase without putting to hazard the friendly
relations which happily subsist between the United States and Russia.
The overtures originally proceeded from us. After a delay of years, and
other intervening propositions, the bargain was at length concluded.
It is with nations as with individuals. A bargain once made must be
kept. Even if still open to consideration, it must not be lightly
abandoned. I am satisfied that the dishonoring of this treaty, after
what has passed, would be a serious responsibility for our country. As
an international question, it would be tried by the public opinion of
the world; and there are many who, not appreciating the requirement of
our Constitution by which a treaty must have “the advice and consent
of the Senate,” would regard its rejection as bad faith. There would
be jeers at us, and jeers at Russia also: at us for levity in making
overtures, and at Russia for levity in yielding to them. Had the Senate
been consulted in advance, before the treaty was signed or either power
publicly committed, as is often done on important occasions, it would
be under less constraint. On such a consultation there would have been
opportunity for all possible objections, and a large latitude for
reasonable discretion. Let me add, that, while forbearing objection
now, I hope that this treaty may not be drawn into a precedent, at
least in the independent manner of its negotiation. I would save to the
Senate an important power justly belonging to it.