From this survey of the treaty, as seen in its origin and the questions
under it, I might pass at once to a survey of the possessions which
have been conveyed; but there are other matters of a more general
character which present themselves at this stage and challenge
judgment. These concern nothing less than the unity, power, and
grandeur of the Republic, with the extension of its dominion and its
institutions. Such considerations, where not entirely inapplicable, are
apt to be controlling. I do not doubt that they will in a great measure
determine the fate of this treaty with the American people. They are
patent, and do not depend on research or statistics. To state them is
enough.
* * * * *
1. _Advantages to the Pacific Coast._--Foremost in order, if not
in importance, I put the desires of our fellow-citizens on the
Pacific coast, and the special advantages they will derive from this
enlargement of boundary. They were the first to ask for it, and will be
the first to profit by it. While others knew the Russian possessions
only on the map, they knew them practically in their resources. While
others were indifferent, they were planning how to appropriate Russian
peltries and fisheries. This is attested by the resolutions of the
Legislature of Washington Territory; also by the exertions at different
times of two Senators from California, who, differing in political
sentiments and in party relations, took the initial steps which ended
in this treaty.
These well-known desires were founded, of course, on supposed
advantages; and here experience and neighborhood were prompters.
Since 1854 the people of California have received their ice from the
fresh-water lakes in the island of Kadiak, not far westward from Mount
St. Elias. Later still, their fishermen have searched the waters about
the Aleutians and the Shumagins, commencing a promising fishery. Others
have proposed to substitute themselves for the Hudson’s Bay Company
in their franchise on the coast. But all are looking to the Orient,
as in the time of Columbus, although like him they sail to the west.
To them China and Japan, those ancient realms of fabulous wealth, are
the Indies. To draw this commerce to the Pacific coast is no new idea.
It haunted the early navigators. Meares, the Englishman, whose voyage
in the intervening seas was in 1788, recounts a meeting with Gray,
the Boston navigator, whom he found “very sanguine in the superior
advantages which his countrymen from New England might reap from this
track of trade, and big with many mighty projects.”[19] He closes his
volumes with an essay entitled “Some Account of the Trade between the
Northwest Coast of America and China, &c.,” in the course of which[20]
he dwells on the “great and very valuable source of commerce” offered
by China as “forming a chain of trade between Hudson’s Bay, Canada, and
the Northwest Coast”; and then he exhibits on the American side the
costly furs of the sea-otter, still so much prized in China,--“mines
which are known to lie between the latitudes of 40° and 60°
north,”--and also ginseng “in inexhaustible plenty,” for which there
is still such demand in China, that even Minnesota, at the head-waters
of the Mississippi, supplies her contribution. His catalogue might be
extended now.
As a practical illustration of this idea, it may be mentioned, that,
for a long time, most, if not all, the sea-otter skins of this coast
found their way to China. China was the best customer, and therefore
Englishmen and Americans followed the Russian Company in carrying these
furs to her market, so that Pennant, the English naturalist, impressed
by the peculiar advantages of the coast, exclaimed, “What a profitable
trade [with China] might not a colony carry on, was it possible to
penetrate to these parts of North America by means of the rivers and
lakes!”[21] Under the present treaty this coast is ours.
The absence of harbors belonging to the United States on the Pacific
limits the outlets of the country. On that whole extent, from Panama
to Puget Sound, the only harbor of any considerable value is San
Francisco. Further north the harbors are abundant, and they are all
nearer to the great marts of Japan and China. But San Francisco itself
will be nearer by the way of the Aleutians than by Honolulu. The
projection of maps is not always calculated to present an accurate idea
of distances. From measurement on a globe it appears that a voyage
from San Francisco to Hong Kong by the common way of the Sandwich
Islands is 7,140 miles, but by way of the Aleutian Islands it is only
6,060 miles, being a saving of more than one thousand miles, with the
enormous additional advantage of being obliged to carry much less coal.
Of course a voyage from Sitka, or from Puget Sound, the terminus of the
Northern Pacific Railroad, would be shorter still.
The advantages to the Pacific coast have two aspects,--one domestic,
and the other foreign. Not only does the treaty extend the coasting
trade of California, Oregon, and Washington Territory northward, but it
also extends the base of commerce with China and Japan.
To unite the East of Asia with the West of America is the aspiration
of commerce now as when the English navigator recorded his voyage.
Of course, whatever helps this result is an advantage. The Pacific
Railroad is such an advantage; for, though running westward, it will
be, when completed, a new highway to the East. This treaty is another
advantage; for nothing can be clearer than that the western coast must
exercise an attraction which will be felt in China and Japan just in
proportion as it is occupied by a commercial people communicating
readily with the Atlantic and with Europe. This cannot be without
consequences not less important politically than commercially. Owing
so much to the Union, the people there will be bound to it anew, and
the national unity will receive another confirmation. Thus the whole
country will be a gainer. So are we knit together that the advantages
to the Pacific coast will contribute to the general welfare.
* * * * *
2. _Extension of Dominion._--The extension of dominion is another
consideration calculated to captivate the public mind. Few are so cold
or philosophical as to regard with insensibility a widening of the
bounds of country. Wars have been regarded as successful, when they
have given a new territory. The discoverer who had planted the flag
of his sovereign on a distant coast has been received as a conqueror.
The ingratitude exhibited to Columbus during his later days was
compensated by the epitaph, that he had “found a new world for Castile
and Leon.”[22] His discoveries were continued by other navigators,
and Spain girdled the earth with her possessions. Portugal, France,
Holland, England, each followed the example of Spain, and rejoiced in
extended empire.
Territorial acquisitions are among the landmarks of our history. In
1803, Louisiana, embracing the valley of the Mississippi, was acquired
from France for fifteen million dollars. In 1819, Florida was acquired
from Spain for about three million dollars. In 1845, Texas was annexed
without purchase, but subsequently, under the compromises of 1850,
an allowance of twelve and three fourth million dollars was made to
her. In 1848, California, New Mexico, and Utah were acquired from
Mexico after war, and on payment of fifteen million dollars. In 1854,
Arizona was acquired from Mexico for ten million dollars. And now it is
proposed to acquire Russian America.
The passion for acquisition, so strong in the individual, is not less
strong in the community. A nation seeks an outlying territory, as an
individual seeks an outlying farm. The passion shows itself constantly.
France, passing into Africa, has annexed Algeria. Spain set her face
in the same direction, but without the same success. There are two
great powers with which annexion has become a habit. One is Russia,
which from the time of Peter has been moving her flag forward in every
direction, so that on every side her limits have been extended. Even
now the report comes that she is lifting her southern landmarks in
Asia, so as to carry her boundary to India. The other annexionist is
Great Britain, which from time to time adds another province to her
Indian empire. If the United States have from time to time added to
their dominion, they have only yielded to the universal passion,
although I do not forget that the late Theodore Parker was accustomed
to speak of Anglo-Saxons as among all people remarkable for “greed of
land.” It was land, not gold, that aroused the Anglo-Saxon phlegm.
I doubt, however, if this passion be stronger with us than with
others, except, perhaps, that in a community where all participate in
government the national sentiments are more active. It is common to the
human family. There are few anywhere who could hear of a considerable
accession of territory, obtained peacefully and honestly, without a
pride of country, even if at certain moments the judgment hesitated.
With increased size on the map there is increased consciousness of
strength, and the heart of the citizen throbs anew as he traces the
extending line.
* * * * *
3. _Extension of Republican Institutions._--More than the extension
of dominion is the extension of republican institutions, which is a
traditional aspiration. It was in this spirit that Independence was
achieved. In the name of Human Rights our fathers overthrew the kingly
power, whose representative was George the Third. They set themselves
openly against this form of government. They were against it for
themselves, and offered their example to mankind. They were Roman in
character, and turned to Roman lessons. With cynical austerity the
early Cato said that kings were “carnivorous animals,” and probably at
his instance it was decreed by the Roman Senate that no king should be
allowed within the gates of the city. A kindred sentiment, with less
austerity of form, has been received from our fathers; but our city can
be nothing less than the North American continent, with its gates on
all the surrounding seas.
John Adams, in the preface to his Defence of the American
Constitutions, written in London, where he resided at the time as
minister, and dated January 1, 1787, at Grosvenor Square, the central
seat of aristocratic fashion, after exposing the fabulous origin of
the kingly power in contrast with the simple origin of our republican
constitutions, thus for a moment lifts the curtain: “Thirteen
governments,” he says plainly, “thus founded on the natural authority
of the people alone, without a pretence of miracle or mystery, and
_which are destined to spread over the northern part of that whole
quarter of the globe_, are a great point gained in favor of the rights
of mankind.”[23] Thus, according to the prophetic minister, even at
that early day was the destiny of the Republic manifest. It was to
spread over the northern part of the American quarter of the globe, and
it was to help the rights of mankind.
By the text of our Constitution, the United States are bound to
guaranty “a republican form of government” to every State in the
Union; but this obligation, which is applicable only at home, is an
unquestionable indication of the national aspiration everywhere.
The Republic is something more than a local policy; it is a general
principle, not to be forgotten at any time, especially when the
opportunity is presented of bringing an immense region within its
influence. Elsewhere it has for the present failed; but on this account
our example is more important. Who can forget the generous lament of
Lord Byron, whose passion for Freedom was not mitigated by his rank as
an hereditary legislator of England, when he exclaims, in memorable
verse,--
“The name of Commonwealth is past and gone
O’er the three fractions of the groaning globe”?
Who can forget the salutation which the poet sends to the “one great
clime,” which, nursed in Freedom, enjoys what he calls the “proud
distinction” of not being confounded with other lands,--
“Whose sons must bow them at a monarch’s motion,
As if his senseless sceptre were a wand”?
The present treaty is a visible step in the occupation of the whole
North American continent. As such it will be recognized by the world
and accepted by the American people. But the treaty involves something
more. We dismiss one other monarch from the continent. One by one they
have retired,--first France, then Spain, then France again, and now
Russia,--all giving way to the absorbing Unity declared in the national
motto, _E pluribus unum_.
* * * * *
4. _Anticipation of Great Britain._--Another motive to this
acquisition may be found in the desire to anticipate imagined schemes
or necessities of Great Britain. With regard to all these I confess
doubt; and yet, if we credit report, it would seem as if there were
already a British movement in this direction. Sometimes it is said that
Great Britain desires to buy, if Russia will sell. Sir George Simpson,
Governor-in-chief of the Hudson’s Bay Company, declared, that, without
the strip on the coast underlet to them by the Russian Company, the
interior would be “comparatively useless to England.”[24] Here, then,
is provocation to buy. Sometimes report assumes a graver character.
A German scientific journal, in an elaborate paper entitled “The
Russian Colonies on the Northwest Coast of America,” after referring
to the constant “pressure” upon Russia, proceeds to say that there are
already crowds of adventurers from British Columbia and California now
at the gold mines on the Stikine, which flows from British territory
through the Russian possessions, who openly declare their purpose of
driving the Russians out of this region. I refer to the “Archiv für
Wissenschaftliche Kunde von Russland,”[25] edited at Berlin as late as
1863, by A. Erman, and undoubtedly the leading authority on Russian
questions. At the same time it presents a curious passage bearing
directly on British policy, purporting to be taken from the “British
Colonist,” a newspaper of Victoria, on Vancouver’s Island. As this was
regarded of sufficient importance to be translated into German for the
instruction of scientific readers, I am justified in laying it before
you, restored from German to English.
“The information which we daily publish from the Stikine
River very naturally excites public attention in a high
degree. Whether the territory through which the river flows
be regarded from a political, commercial, or industrial point
of view, it promises within a short time to awaken a still
more general interest. Not only will the intervention of the
royal jurisdiction be demanded in order to give it a complete
form of government, but, if the land proves as rich as there
is now reason to believe it to be, it is not improbable that
it will result in negotiations between England and Russia
for the cession of the sea-coast to the British Crown. It is
not to be supposed that a stream like the Stikine, which is
navigable for steamers from one hundred and seventy to one
hundred and ninety miles, which waters a territory so rich in
gold that it will attract myriads of men,--that the commerce
upon such a road can always pass through a Russian gateway of
thirty miles from the sea-coast to the interior. The English
population which occupies the interior cannot be so easily
managed by the Russians as the Stikine Indians of the coast
manage the Indians of the interior. Our business must be in
British hands. Our resources, our energies, our spirit of
enterprise cannot be employed in building up a Russian emporium
at the mouth of the Stikine. We must have for our merchandise a
depot over which the British flag waves. By the treaty of 1825
the navigation of the river is secured to us. The navigation
of the Mississippi was also open to the United States before
the Louisiana purchase; but the growing strength of the North
made the acquisition of that territory, either by purchase or
by force of arms, an inevitable necessity. We look upon the
sea-coast of the Stikine region in the same light. The strip
of land which stretches along from Portland Canal to Mount St.
Elias, with a breadth of thirty miles, and which, according
to the treaty of 1825, forms a part of Russian America, _must
eventually become the property of Great Britain_, either as the
direct result of the gold discoveries, or from causes as yet
not fully developed, but whose operation is certain. For can we
reasonably suppose that the strip, three hundred miles long and
thirty miles wide, which is used by the Russians solely for the
collection of furs and walrus-teeth, will forever control the
entrance to our immense northern territory? It is a principle
of England to acquire territory only for purposes of defence.
Canada, Nova Scotia, Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, and the
greater part of our Indian possessions were all acquired for
purposes of defence. In Africa, India, and China the same rule
is followed by the Government to-day. With a power like Russia
it would perhaps be more difficult to arrange matters; but
if we need the sea-coast in order to protect and maintain our
commerce with an interior rich in precious metals, then we must
have it. The United States needed Florida and Louisiana, and
took them. We need the coast of New Norfolk and New Cornwall.
“It is just as much the destiny of our Anglo-Norman race to
possess the whole of Russian America, however desolate and
inhospitable it may be, as it has been that of the Russian
Northmen to possess themselves of Northern Europe and Asia. As
the Wandering Jew and his phantom, so will the Anglo-Norman and
the Russian yet gaze at each other from the opposite sides of
Behring Strait. Between the two races the northern halves of
the Old and New World must be divided. America must be ours.
“The recent discovery of the precious metals in our hyperborean
Eldorado will most probably hasten the annexation of the
territory in question. It can hardly be doubted that the gold
region of the Stikine extends away to the western affluents of
the Mackenzie. In this case the increase of the business and
of the population will exceed our most sanguine expectations.
Who shall reap the profit of this? The mouths of rivers, both
before and since the time of railroads, have controlled the
business of the interior. To our national pride the thought,
however, is intolerable, that the Russian griffin should
possess a point which is indebted to the British lion for its
importance. The mouth of the Stikine must be ours,--or at least
a harbor of export must be established on British soil from
which our steamers can pass the Russian belt. Fort Simpson,
Dundas Island, Portland Canal, or some other convenient point,
might be selected for this purpose. The necessity of speedy
measures, in order to secure the control of the Stikine, is
manifest. If we let slip the opportunity, we shall live to see
a Russian city arise at the gates of a British colony.”
Thus, if we credit this colonial ejaculation, caught up and preserved
by German science, the Russian possessions were destined to round and
complete the domain of Great Britain on this continent. The Russian
“griffin” was to give way to the British “lion.” The Anglo-Norman was
to be master as far as Behring Strait, across which he might survey
his Russian neighbor. How this was to be accomplished is not precisely
explained. The promises of gold on the Stikine failed, and it is not
improbable that this colonial plan was as unsubstantial. Colonists
become excited easily. This is not the first time that Russian America
has been menaced in a similar way. During the Crimean War there seemed
to be in Canada a spirit not unlike that of the Vancouver journalist,
unless we are misled by the able pamphlet[26] of Mr. A. K. Roche, of
Quebec, where, after describing Russian America as “richer in resources
and capabilities than it has hitherto been allowed to be, either by the
English, who shamefully gave it up, or by the Russians, who cunningly
obtained it,” the author urges an expedition for its conquest and
annexion. His proposition fell on the happy termination of the war, but
it exists as a warning, with notice also of a former English title,
“shamefully” abandoned.
This region is distant enough from Great Britain; but there is
an incident of past history which shows that distance from the
metropolitan government has not excluded the idea of war. Great
Britain could hardly be more jealous of Russia on these coasts than
was Spain in a former day, if we listen to the report of Humboldt.
I refer again to his authoritative work, “Essai Politique sur la
Nouvelle-Espagne,”[27] where it is recorded, that, as early as 1788,
even while peace was still unbroken, the Spaniards could not bear the
idea of Russians in this region, and when, in 1799, the Emperor Paul
declared war on Spain, the hardy project was formed of an expedition
from the Mexican ports of Monterey and San Blas against the Russian
colonies; on which the philosophic traveller remarks, in words which
are recalled by the Vancouver manifesto, that, “if this project had
been executed, the world would have witnessed two nations in conflict,
which, occupying the opposite extremities of Europe, found themselves
neighbors in the other hemisphere on the eastern and western boundaries
of their vast empires.” Thus, notwithstanding an intervening circuit of
half the globe, two great powers were about to encounter each other on
these coasts. But I hesitate to believe that the British of our day, in
any considerable numbers, have adopted the early Spanish disquietude at
the presence of Russia on this continent.
* * * * *
5. _Amity of Russia._--There is still another consideration concerning
this treaty not to be disregarded. It attests and assures the amity of
Russia. Even if you doubt the value of these possessions, the treaty is
a sign of friendship. It is a new expression of that _entente cordiale_
between the two powers which is a phenomenon of history. Though unlike
in institutions, they are not unlike in recent experience. Sharers of
common glory in a great act of Emancipation, they also share together
the opposition or antipathy of other nations. Perhaps this experience
has not been without effect in bringing them together. At all events,
no coldness or unkindness has interfered at any time with their good
relations.
The archives of the State Department show an uninterrupted cordiality
between the two Governments, dating far back in our history. More
than once Russia has proffered her good offices between the United
States and Great Britain; once also she was a recognized arbitrator.
She offered her mediation to terminate the War of 1812; and under her
arbitration questions with Great Britain arising under the Treaty of
Ghent were amicably settled in 1822. But it was during our recent
troubles that we felt more than ever her friendly sentiments, although
it is not improbable that the accident of position and of distance had
influence in preserving these undisturbed. The Rebellion, which tempted
so many other powers into its embrace, could not draw Russia from her
habitual good-will. Her solicitude for the Union was early declared.
She made no unjustifiable concession of _ocean belligerence_, with all
its immunities and powers, to Rebels in arms against the Union. She
furnished no hospitality to Rebel cruisers, nor was any Rebel agent
ever received, entertained, or encouraged at St. Petersburg,--while,
on the other hand, there was an understanding that the United States
should be at liberty to carry prizes into Russian ports. So natural
and easy were the relations between the two Governments, that such
complaints as incidentally arose on either side were amicably adjusted
by verbal explanations without written controversy.
Positive acts occurred to strengthen these relations. As early as 1861,
the two Governments agreed to act together for the establishment of a
connection between San Francisco and St. Petersburg by an inter-oceanic
telegraph across Behring Strait; and this agreement was subsequently
sanctioned by Congress.[28] Meanwhile occurred the visit of the
Russian fleet in the winter of 1863, intended by the Emperor, and
accepted by the United States, as a friendly demonstration. This was
followed by a communication of the Secretary of State, dated 26th
December, 1864, inviting the Archduke Constantine to visit the United
States, where it was suggested that such a visit “would be beneficial
to us and by no means unprofitable to Russia,” but “forbearing to
specify reasons,” and assuring him, that, coming as a national guest,
he “would receive a cordial and most demonstrative welcome.”[29]
Affairs in Russia prevented the acceptance of this invitation.
Afterwards, in the spring of 1866, Congress by solemn resolution
declared the sympathies of the United States with the Emperor on his
escape from the madness of an assassin,[30] and Mr. Fox, at the time
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, was appointed to take the resolution
of Congress to the Emperor, and, in discharge of this trust, to declare
the friendly sentiments of our country for Russia. He was conveyed
to Cronstadt in the monitor Miantonomoh, the most formidable ship of
our navy, and thus this agent of war became a messenger of peace.
The monitor and the minister were received in Russia with unbounded
hospitality.
In relations such as I have described, the cession of territory seems
a natural transaction, entirely in harmony with the past. It remains
to hope that it may be a new link in an amity which, without effort,
has overcome differences of institutions and intervening space on the
globe.