CHAPTER XXV.

President's Message, December, 1864.--General Sherman's March.--

Compensated Emancipation abandoned.--Thirteenth Amendment.--Earnestly

recommended by the President.--He appeals to the Democratic Members.

--Mr. Ashley's Energetic Work.--Democratic Opportunity.--Unwisely

neglected.--Mr. Pendleton's Argument.--Final Vote.--Amendment

adopted.--Cases arising under it.--Supreme Court.--Change of Judges

at Different Periods.--Peace Conference at Fortress Monroe.--

Secretary Chase resigns.--Mr. Fessenden succeeds him.--Mr. Fessenden's

Report.--Surrender of Lee.--General Grant's Military Character.--

Assassination of President Lincoln.--His Characteristics.--Cost of

the War.--Compared with Wars of Other Nations.--Our Navy.--Created

during the War.--Effective Blockade.--Its Effect upon the South.--

Its Influence upon the Struggle.--Relative Numbers in Loyal and

Disloyal States.--Comparison of Union and Confederate Armies.--

Confederate Army at the Close of the War.--Union Armies compared

with Armies of Foreign Countries.--Area of the War.--Its Effect

upon the Cost.--Character of Edwin M. Stanton.

Sustained by so emphatic a vote of popular confidence, President

Lincoln greeted Congress on the first Monday of December, 1864,

with a hopeful and cheerful message. He reported that our armies,

holding all the lines and positions gained, "have steadily advanced,

thus liberating the regions left in the rear." The President

regarded "General Sherman's march of three hundred miles directly

through an insurgent country" as the "most remarkable feature in

the military operations of the year." It was in progress when the

President delivered his message, and "the result not yet being

known, conjecture in regard to it cannot be here indulged." The

President reported that the actual disbursements in money from the

Treasury for the past fiscal year were $865,234,087.86.

Mr. Lincoln had finally abandoned the project of compensating the

Border States for their loss of property in slaves. The people of

those States had, through their representatives, blindly and

willfully rejected the offer when it was urged upon them by the

Administration, and had defeated the bill embodying the proposition

on the eve of its passage in the House when it had already passed

the Senate. The situation was now entirely changed. Maryland,

without waiting for National action and regardless of compensation,

had in the preceding October taken the matter under her own control

and deliberately abolished slavery. Mr. Lincoln now announced the

State as "secure to liberty and union for all the future. The

genius of rebellion will no longer claim Maryland. Like another

foul spirit being driven out, it may seek to tear her, but it will

woo her no more." There was no reason why the other Border States

should not follow her example--and there was the strongest argument

against compensating another State for doing what Maryland had done

of her own free will and from an instinct of patriotism, as the

one act which would conclusively separate her from all possibility

of sympathy with the rebellion.

Freed thus from what he may have regarded as the obligations of

his Border-State policy and upheld by the great popular majority

which he had received in the election, the President warmly

recommended to Congress the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment

to the Constitution. He called attention to the fact that it had

already received the sanction of the Senate, but failed in the

House for lack of the requisite two-thirds vote. There was no

doubt that the large Republican majority, already elected to the

Thirty-ninth Congress, would adopt the Amendment, but such adoption

implied postponement for a whole year, with loss of the moral

influence which would be gained by prompter action. It implied

also that the Amendment would depend solely upon Republican votes,

and the President was especially anxious that it should receive

Democratic support. Still another reason wrought upon the President's

mind. He believed the rebellion to be near its end, and no man

could tell how soon a proposition might come for the surrender of

the Confederate Armies and the return of the Rebel States to their

National allegiance. If such a proposition should be made, Mr.

Lincoln knew that there would be a wild desire among the loyal

people to accept it, and that in the forgiving joy of re-union they

would not insist upon the conditions which he believed essential

to the future safety and strength of the National Government.

Slavery had been abolished in the District of Columbia by a law of

Congress, and in Maryland by her own action. It still existed in

the other Border States and in Tennessee, and its abolition in the

remaining States of the Confederacy depended upon the validity of

the President's Proclamation of Emancipation.

THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT.

Without discussing the validity of the Proclamation Mr. Lincoln

incidentally assumed it, with an emphatic assertion of his own

position, which came nearer the language of threat than his habitual

prudence and moderation had ever permitted him to indulge. "In

presenting the abandonment of armed resistance on the part of the

insurgents as the only indispensable condition to ending the war,"

said the President, "I retract nothing heretofore said as to slavery.

. . . While I remain in my present position I shall not attempt to

retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation. Nor shall I return

to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that Proclamation

or by any of the Acts of Congress. _If the people should, by

whatever mode or means, make it an Executive duty to re-enslave

such persons, another, and not I, must be their instrument to

perform it._." This was fair notice by Mr. Lincoln to all the

world that so long as he was President the absolute validity of

the Proclamation would be maintained at all hazards.

This position enabled the President to plead effectively with

Congress for the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment and the

consequent avoidance of all possible conflicts between different

departments of the Government touching the legal character of the

Proclamation. Recognizing the fact that he was addressing the same

House of Representatives which had already rejected the anti-slavery

amendment, he made a special appeal, though without using partisan

names, to the Democratic members. "Without questioning the wisdom

or patriotism of those who stood in opposition," said the President,

"I venture to recommend the reconsideration and passage of the

measure at the present session. Of course the abstract question

is not changed, but an intervening election shows almost certainly

that the next Congress will pass the measure if this Congress does

not. Hence there is only a question of time as to when the proposed

amendment will go to the States for their action, and as it is to

go at all events, may we not agree that the sooner the better?"

He urged the argument still more closely upon the Democratic members.

"In a great national crisis like ours, unanimity of action among

those seeking a common end is very desirable, almost indispensable,

and yet no approach to such unanimity is attainable unless some

deference shall be paid to the will of the majority." Mr. Lincoln

found much encouragement in the fact that in the national election

"no candidate for any office whatever, high or low, ventured to

seek votes on the avowal that he was in favor of giving up the

Union. . . . In the distinct issue of Union or no Union the

politicians have shown their instinctive knowledge that there is

no diversity among the people."

The proposed Constitutional amendment was brought before the House

on the 6th of January by Mr. Ashley of Ohio, upon whose motion to

reconsider the adverse vote of the preceding session, the question

continued to have a parliamentary status. He made a forcible speech

in support of the amendment, but the chief value of his work did

not consist in speaking, but in his watchful care of the measure,

in the quick and intuitive judgment with which he discerned every

man on the Democratic side of the House who felt anxious as to the

vote he should give on the momentous question, and in the pressure

which he brought to bear upon him from the best and most influential

of his constituents. The issue presented was one that might well

make thoughtful men pause and consider. The instant restoration

to four millions of human beings of the God-given right of freedom

so long denied them, depended upon the vote of the House of

Representatives. It addressed itself to the enlightened judgment

and to the Christian philanthropy of every member. Each one had

to decide for himself whether so far as lay in the power of his

own vote he would give liberty to the slave, or forge his fetters

anew. The constitutional duty of not interfering with slavery in

the States could not be pleaded at the bar of conscience for an

adverse vote. There was no doubt that under the terms of the

Constitution such interference was unwarranted. But this was a

question of changing the Constitution itself so as to confer upon

Congress the express power to enlarge the field of personal liberty

and make the Republic free indeed. It came therefore as an original

and a distinct question whether millions of people with their

descendants for all time should be doomed to slavery or gifted with

freedom.

It was a singular opportunity for the Democratic party. Its members

had always professed to be endued with a broader spirit of liberty

than their opponents who under various organizations had confronted

them in the political contests of the preceding half-century. In

their evangelization of Liberty the Democrats had halted at the

color-line, but, as they alleged, only because the solemn obligations

of the Constitution forbade a step beyond. Here by the converging

exigencies of war it became of vast interest to the white race that

slavery should be smitten and destroyed. Its destruction was indeed

the deadliest blow that could be given to the Rebellion which was

threatening destruction to the Republic. It was not unfair to say,

as was said by many during the crisis, that it was brought to every

man's conscience to decide whether he would continue to imperil

the fate of the Union by refusing the enfranchise the slave.

THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT.

It fell to Mr. George H. Pendleton to play an important part in

this crisis. His leadership on the Democratic side of the House

had been confirmed by the popular voice of his party in the nomination

for the Vice-Presidency, and though he had been defeated in the

election he returned to the House with increased prestige among

his own political associates. The argument he had made the preceding

session was now repeated with earnest spirit and in plausible form.

He maintained that "three-fourths of the States do not possess the

constitutional power to pass this amendment." A colleague from

Ohio (Mr. S. S. Cox) had made a radical argument in the other

direction, asserting that "three-fourths of the States have the

right to amend the Constitution in every particular except the two

specified in the instrument; they have the right to do any thing,

even to erect a monarchy!" Without carrying the argument so far,

Mr. Cox might well have reminded his colleague that four years

before, in the winter of compromise preceding the war, the one

point sought to be gained by all who asked additional guaranties

for slavery was that the power to abolish the institution by

constitutional amendment should be taken from the States. It would

have been a precious consolation at the time to Mr. Pendleton's

Southern friends, to hear from him the argument that no such power

existed and that slavery was in no danger from its attempted

exercise. Such action by the Federal Government was the one thing

which the South had especially dreaded and which all the amendments

to the Constitution proposed by the Peace Congress of 1861 aimed

to prevent. Mr. Pendleton omitted his argument therefore at the

most pertinent time for its submission, but he made it now with

freshness and vigor and with evident effect upon his political

associates.

Mr. Pendleton was very effectively answered by many members on the

Republican side of the House; by General Garfield elaborately, by

Mr. Boutwell briefly but most pointedly. The debate was prolonged

and able. At least one-third of the entire House took part in it.

The ground was somewhat beaten, but many of the arguments were of

permanent historic interest. Among the most valuable were the

speeches of Mr. Glenni W. Scofield of Pennsylvania, Mr. John A.

Kasson of Iowa, and Mr. James S. Rollins of Missouri. As the

representative of a slave-holding constituency the argument and

vote of Mr. Rollins were of special weight. The tone and temper

of the speeches exhibited assurance on one side and failing confidence

on the other. The moral pressure was steadily for the Amendment

and its strength grew rapidly both in Congress and the country.

It had been borne into the minds of the people that slavery had

produced the war, and it seemed a righteous retribution that slavery

should end with the war. It had drawn the sword; let it perish by

the sword.

When the hour arrived for the final struggle, on Tuesday, January

31, 1865, the galleries of the House were filled in every part,

largely no doubt by friends of the measure. There were eight

absentees, without pairs. They were all Democrats. It may be

assumed that they assented to the amendment, but that they were

not prepared to give it positive support. This list comprised

Jesse Lazear of Pennsylvania, John F. McKinney and Francis C. Le

Blond of Ohio, Daniel W. Voorhees and James F. McDowell of Indiana,

George Middleton and A. J. Rogers of New Jersey, and Daniel Marcy

of New Hampshire. The members of the Democratic party who gave

their votes for the amendment, and thus secured its passage by the

Thirty-eighth Congress, were James E. English of Connecticut, Anson

Herrick, William Radford, Homer A. Nelson, John B. Steele and John

Ganson of New York, A. H. Coffroth and Archibald McAllister of

Pennsylvania, Wells A. Hutchins of Ohio, and Augustus C. Baldwin

of Michigan. Mr. Nelson had not voted at the first session, but

all the others are recorded against the proposition. With the aid

of these eleven, the vote was 119 yeas to 56 nays--more than the

constitutional two-thirds. When the announcement was made, the

Speaker became powerless to preserve order. The members upon the

Republican side sprang upon their seats cheering, shouting, and

waving hands, hats, and canes, while the spectators upon the floor

and in the galleries joined heartily in the demonstration. Upon

the restoration of order Mr. Ingersoll of Illinois rose and said,

"Mr. Speaker, in honor of this immortal and sublime event, I move

that this House do now adjourn." The Speaker declared the motion

carried, but Mr. Harris of Maryland demanded the ayes and noes,

and the House adjourned by a vote of 121 to 24.

The great act of Liberation, so far as Congress could control it,

was complete. The amendment was at once submitted to the States,

and by official proclamation of December 18, 1865,--less than eleven

months after Congress had spoken,--the Secretary of State announced

that it had been ratified by the Legislatures of twenty-seven States

and was a part of the Constitution. The result was attained by

the united action of one party and the aid of a minority of the

other party. The co-operation of the Democratic members had gained

for the cause of emancipation a whole year. The action was of

transcendent importance,--lofty in conception, masterful in execution.

Slavery in the United States was dead. To succeeding and not

distant generations its existence in a Republic, for three-quarters

of a century, will be an increasing marvel.

THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT IN COURT.

The language of the Thirteenth Amendment is so comprehensive and

absolute that vital questions of law are not likely at any time to

arise under it. The Article is in two parts. _First_, "Neither

slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime

whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within

the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

_Second_, Congres shall have power to enforce this Article by

appropriate legislation." By this Amendment the relation between

the National and State Governments, respecting the question of

Human Liberty, was radically changed. Before its adoption slavery

could be established or abolished in any State at the will of the

majority. The National prohibition now extended everywhere that

the flag floated; freedom of the person became thenceforth a matter

of National concern. The power of the State was subordinated to

the continuing and supreme authority of the Nation.

The Supreme Court has had occasion in a few cases only to deal with

the Thirteenth Amendment, and in those cases the questions raised

did not touch the validity or scope of the Article. In the case

of _White_ v. _Hart_, reported in 13 _Wallace_, the Court held that

a note given for slaves at a time prior to emancipation was a valid

contract and could be enforced. This judgment was rendered in the

face of the fact that the Reconstructed Constitution of the State

of Georgia, where the contract was made, contained a provision that

no Court should have or take "jurisdiction in any case of debt the

consideration of which was a slave or the hire thereof." The Court

held that the provision in the Georgia Constitution was invalid as

to all agreements made prior to its adoption, upon the ground that

it was a violation of the Constitution of the United States which

provides that no State shall make any law "impairing the obligation

of contracts." In the case of _Osborne_ v. _Nicholson_, 13 _Wallace_,

where the cause of action was a note given for a slave in Arkansas,

March 20, 1861, the Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment did

not constitute a bar to the claim. These cases serve to show the

narrow and restricted character of the issues made under the Article

--issues long since passed by the limitation of time.

One point in the adoption of the Amendment caused much speculation

at the time, not unaccompanied with anxiety. The whole number of

States was thirty-six. The assent of three-fourths of that number

was required to amend the Constitution. Twenty-seven States voted

through their Legislatures in favor of the Amendment--precisely

the requisite number. But of these, nine had been in rebellion

and had not at the time been restored to the enjoyment of their

rights as States in the Union. They had not been re-admitted to

representation either in the House or the Senate. The majority of

these States were not considered to be entitled to representation

in Congress for three years after they had given their formal assent

to the Thirteenth Amendment. The question as to whether they could

give valid assent to an amendment to the Constitution was one which

might possibly be raised. If they were not in condition to enjoy

representation in Congress, it might be asked how they could be in

condition to perform a much higher function. If they could not

participate in the enactment of Statute Law, how could they

participate in the far weightier duty of framing the Organic Law

of the Republic?

If the same judges who pronounced the Dred Scott decision had been

still on the Bench, serious trouble might have arisen. But there

had been a radical change in the Judicial Department, not simply

in the _personnel_ of the judges but in the views they entertained

touching the functions, powers, and duties of the Federal Government.

It fell to Mr. Lincoln's lot to appoint a majority of the judges

and thus practically to constitute a new Court. Washington, the

elder Adams, and Jackson were the only Presidents before him who

had appointed a Chief Justice, and when he nominated Mr. Chase,

there had been only one other chief justice named for sixty-three

years. He appointed as associate justices Noah Swayne of Ohio,

Samuel F. Miller of Iowa, David Davis of Illinois, all in 1862,

and Stephen J. Field of California the year following. Mr. Lincoln's

sound judgment was apparent in this as in other great duties.

There are single judges in our history who, in point of learning,

rank higher in the estimation of the legal profession, but perhaps

never a majority of the court who were superior in all the qualities

which adorn the Judicial character.

THE JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Considering that the tenure is for life, it seemed as if an

extraordinary number of Judicial appointments fell to one President.

But as the eminence which fits a man for the high station is not

attained until past the middle period of life, the changes are

necessarily somewhat rapid. Washington in his Presidency of eight

years nominated, for a Court of six members, eleven judges who

served, besides one who declined and one who was rejected. Down

to this period in our history (1884) it has fallen to the lot of

each of our twenty-one Presidents except Harrison, Tyler, and

Johnson, to nominate at least one associate justice. Under Jackson

and Van Buren the entire Court was revolutionized. A Chief Justice

and six associates were appointed, selected exclusively from their

political supporters. From that time onward until the Administration

of Mr. Lincoln, every judge was selected from the Democratic party,

with the exception of Benjamin R. Curtis who was appointed by

President Fillmore. When Mr. Lincoln entered upon his official

duties, the Judicial Department of the Government differenced in

every conceivable way from his construction of the Constitution in

so far as the question of slavery was involved. But one judge

could be expected to look with favor upon the course he would

pursue. The venerable John McLean, though placed on the Bench by

Jackson, had changed his political views and relations, and he

alone of all the justices sympathized with Mr. Lincoln.

The Southern States prior to 1860 had secured a large majority of

appointments on the Supreme Bench. In originally constituting the

Court Washington had equally divided the judges between the slave

States and the free States. After his Administration and until

the incoming of President Lincoln, the Court uniformly contained

a majority of Southern men. From the beginning of the Government

until the election of Mr. Lincoln, there had been eighteen associate

justices appointed from the slave States, and but fifteen from the

free States. The average term of service of the judges from the

South had been about fourteen years; from the North about twelve

years. From 1789 to 1860, the Chief Justice had been from the

South during the whole period with the exception of twelve years.

It is a fact worth noting that neither the elder nor the younger

Adams appointed a Northern man to the Bench. They appointed three

from the South. It is not among the least of the honors belonging

to the elder Adams that he gave to the country the illustrious

Chief Justice Marshall.

Directly after the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment came a wide-

spread rumor that negotiations for peace were in progress which

might interfere with the anti-slavery action of Congress. On the

8th of February Mr. Thaddeus Stevens moved and the House unanimously

adopted a resolution requesting "the President to communicate to

the House such information as he may deem not incompatible with

the public interest relative to the recent conference between

himself and the Secretary of State and Messrs. Alexander H. Stephens,

Robert M. T. Hunter, and John A. Campbell in Hampton Roads." Mr.

Lincoln replied at once, giving in detail every step which had led

to the conference, and all that was accomplished by it. It was

brought about by the elder Francis P. Blair, who under a flag of

truce had visited Richmond early in January. Mr. Lincoln had

steadily insisted on three preliminary conditions: First, the

absolute restoration of the national authority in all the States;

second, no receding from the positions taken on the slavery question;

third, no cessation of military operations on the part of the

Government till the hostile forces surrendered and disbanded. On

these conditions the Confederate agents could not treat, and the

conference came to no agreement. In his message Mr. Lincoln made

one significant remark. "By the other party it was not said that

in any event or on any condition they would ever consent to re-

union; and yet they equally omitted to declare that they would not

so consent." The proceedings left no special interest, except one

characteristic anecdote of Mr. Lincoln. The Confederate agents

desired the recognition of the power of "President" Davis to make

a treaty. Mr. Lincoln would not consent to this, would not in any

event or in any way recognize another "President" within the

territory of the United States. Mr. Hunter cited the example of

Charles I. treating with rebels in his own kingdom. Mr. Lincoln

replied that his only distinct recollection of that matter was that

Charles lost his head!

MR. FESSENDEN IN THE TREASURY.

Soon after the Baltimore Convention, Mr. Chase resigned his position

as Secretary of the Treasury. The relations between himself and

the President had become personally somewhat unpleasant, but that

there had been no loss of confidence or respect was proven by the

President's nomination of Mr. Chase to be Chief Justice of the

United States as the successor of the venerable Roger B. Taney,

who died on the 12th of October (1864). William Pitt Fessenden

succeeded Mr. Chase in the Treasury, and entered upon his duties

on the fifth day of July. He was admirably fitted by every mental

and moral quality for the position, but he did not possess the

physical strength necessary for the arduous labor which it imposed.

He consented in response to the very earnest request of Mr. Lincoln

to accept the trust for a brief period. It was of great importance

to the country, to the Administration, and to Mr. Lincoln personally

that Mr. Chase should be succeeded by a man of no less eminent

character.

In his report of December 6, 1864, Mr. Fessenden discussed the

financial situation with comprehensive ability. He urged additional

taxation, some plan for making the public lands available as a

source of revenue, and arrangements for carrying out the laws for

a sinking-fund. He opposed the suggestion of resorting to foreign

loans for any part of the money needed. He said, "This nation has

been able thus far to conduct a domestic war of unparalleled

magnitude and cost without appealing for aid to any foreign people.

It has chosen to demonstrate its power to put down insurrection by

its own strength, and furnish no pretense for doubt of its entire

ability to do so, either to domestic or foreign foes. The people

of the United States have felt a just pride in this position before

the world. In the judgment of the secretary it may well be doubted

whether the national credit abroad has not been strengthened and

sustained by the fact that foreign investments in our securities

have not been sought by us, and whether we have not found a pecuniary

advantage in self-reliance." Reciting the steps which he had taken

for placing loans, he declared; "These negotiations have afforded

satisfactory evidence not only of the ability of the people to

furnish at a short notice such sums as may be required but of the

entire confidence felt in the national securities. After nearly

four years of a most expensive and wasting war, the means to continue

it seem apparently undiminished, while the determination to prosecute

it with vigor to the end is unabated."

Liberal response was made by Congress to Mr. Fessenden's request

for enlarged power to borrow money. The internal revenue was made

more stringent, the tariff was amended and made still more protective,

and to facilitate the raising of troops the Conscription Act was

made more severe and exacting. Congress proceeded as if the war

were still to continue for years. Nothing was neglected, nothing

relaxed. But every one could see that the Confederacy was tottering

to its fall. Sherman's magnificent march across Georgia, to which

the President referred as in progress when he sent his message to

Congress, had been completed with entire success, with an _eclat_

indeed which startled Europe as well as America. He had captured

Savannah, and was marching North driving the army of General Joseph

E. Johnston before him. General Grant meanwhile was tightening

his hold on Richmond and on the army of General Lee. From his camp

on the James he was directing military operations over an area of

vast extent. The great victory which General Thomas had won over

Hood's army in the preceding December at Nashville had effectually

destroyed the military power of the Confederacy in the South-West,

and when Congress adjourned on the day of Mr. Lincoln's second

inauguration there was in the mind of the people everywhere a

conviction that the end was near.

The President himself spoke guardedly in his Inaugural address.

He simply said that "the progress of our armies is reasonably

satisfactory and encouraging. With high hope for the future, no

prediction in regard to it is ventured." The tone of the address,

so far from being jubilant as the mass of his hearers felt, was

ineffably sad. It seemed to bear the wail of an oppressed spirit.

The thought and the language were as majestic as those of the

ancient prophets. As if in agony of soul the President cried out:

"Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray that this mighty scourge

of war may speedily pass away. Yet if God wills that it continue

until all the wealth piled by the bondsman's two hundred and fifty

years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of

blood drawn with the lash shall be paid with another drawn with

the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must

be said that the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous

altogether."

The fall of the military power of the rebellion was in the end more

rapid and more complete than the most sanguine had dared to expect.

The month of March was one of great activity with our military

forces. Three weeks after his inauguration the President went to

City Point, Virginia, partly to escape the pressure of duty at

Washington and party to be near the scene of the final triumph to

settle any important questions that might arise, if an offer of

surrender should be made by the Confederate commander. On the day

before his inauguration he had directed the Secretary of War to

say to General Grant that he wished him to "have no conference with

General Lee unless for the capitulation of his army or for some

purely military matter." The President did "not wish General Grant

to decide, discuss or confer upon any political question." He

would not submit such questions "to military conferences or

conventions." He returned to Washington on the 8th of April and

on the succeeding day the Army of Lee surrendered to General Grant.

THE SURRENDER OF GENERAL LEE.

The rejoicing throughout the Loyal States cannot be pictured.

Congratulation was universal. The end had come. Sympathy with

the South in her exhausted and impoverished condition mingled

largely with the exultant joy over a restored Union, a triumphant

flag, an assured future of National progress. Admiration was not

withheld from the soldiers of the Confederacy, who had borne their

banner so bravely against every discouragement on a hundred fields

of battle. The bearing of General Grant and General Lee at the

final surrender was marked by a spirit of chivalric dignity which

was an instructive lesson to all their countrymen--alike to the

victor and to the vanquished.

General Grant's active service in the field closed with the surrender

of Lee. All the commanders of Confederate forces followed the

example of their General-in-Chief, and before the end of the month

the armed enemies of the Union had practically ceased to exist.

The fame of General Grant was full. He had entered the service

with no factitious advantage, and his promotion, from the first to

the last, had been based on merit alone,--without the aid of

political influence, without the interposition of personal friends.

Criticism of military skill is but idle chatter in the face of an

unbroken career of victory. General Grant's campaigns were varied

in their requirements and, but for the fertility of his resources

and his unbending will, might often have ended in disaster. Courage

is as contagious as fear, and General Grant possessed in the highest

degree that faculty which is essential to all great commanders,--

the faculty of imparting throughout the rank and file of his army

the same determination to win with which he was himself always

inspired.

One peculiarity of General Grant's military career was his constant

readiness to fight. He wished for no long periods of preparation,

lost no opportunity which promptness could turn to advantage. He

always accepted, without cavil or question, the position to which

he might be assigned. He never troubled the War Department with

requests or complaints, and when injustice was inflicted upon him,

he submitted silently, and did a soldier's duty. Few men in any

service would have acquiesced so quietly as did General Grant, when

at the close of the remarkable campaign beginning at Fort Henry

and ending at Shiloh, he found himself superseded by General Halleck,

and assigned to a subordinate command in an army whose glory was

inseparably associated with his own name. Self-control is the

first requisite for him who aims to control others. In that

indispensable form of mental discipline General Grant exhibited

perfection.

When he was appointed Lieutenant-General, and placed in command of

all the armies of the Union, he exercised military control over a

greater number of men than has any general since the invention of

fire-arms. In the campaigns of 1864 and 1865, the armies of the

Union contained in the aggregate not less than a million of men.

The movements of all the vast forces were kept in harmony by his

comprehensive mind, and in the grand consummation which insured

Union and Liberty, his name became inseparably associated with the

true glory of his country.

Six days after the surrender of Lee, the Nation was thrown into

the deepest grief by the assassination of the President. The gloom

which enshrouded the country was as thick darkness. The people

had come, through many alterations of fear and hope, to repose the

most absolute trust in Mr. Lincoln. They realized that he had seen

clearly where they were blind, that he had known fully where they

were ignorant. He had been patient, faithful, and far-seeing.

Religious people regarded him as one divinely appointed, like the

prophets of old, to a great work, and they found comfort in the

parallel which they saw in his death with that of the leader of

Israel. He too had reached the mountain's top, and had seen the

land redeemed unto the utmost sea, and had then died.

CHARACTER OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

Mr. Lincoln had been some time in the Presidency before the public

estimate of him was correct or appreciative. The people did not

at first understand him. In the glamour of the Presidential canvass

they had idealized him,--attributing to him some traits above and

many below his essential qualities. After his election and before

his inauguration there was a general disposition to depreciate him.

He became associated in the popular mind with an impending calamity,

and tens of thousands who had voted for him, heartily repented the

act and inwardly execrated the day that committed the destinies of

the Union to his keeping. The first strong test brought upon Mr.

Lincoln was this depressing re-action among so many of his supporters.

A man with less resolute purpose would have been cast down by it,

but Mr. Lincoln preserved the _mens aequa in arduis_. Through the

gloom of the weeks preceding his inauguration he held his even way.

Perhaps in the more terrible crises through which he was afterwards

called to pass, a firmer nerve was required, but not so rare a

combination of qualities as he had shown in the dismal months with

which the year 1861 opened.

Mr. Lincoln united firmness and gentleness in a singular degree.

He rarely spoke a harsh word. Ready to hear argument and always

open to conviction, he adhered tenaciously to the conclusions which

he had finally reached. Altogether modest, he had confidence in

himself, trusted to the reasoning of his own mind, believed in the

correctness of his own judgment. Many of the popular conceptions

concerning him are erroneous. No man was farther than he from the

easy, familiar, jocose character in which he is often painted.

While he paid little attention to form or ceremony he was not a

men with whom liberties could be taken. There was but one person

in Illinois outside of his own household who ventured to address

him by his first name. There was no one in Washington who ever

attempted it. Appreciating wit and humor, he relished a good story,

especially if it illustrated a truth or strengthened an argument,

and he had a vast fund of illustrative anecdote which he used with

the happiest effect. But the long list of vulgar, salacious stories

attributed to him, were retailed only by those who never enjoyed

the privilege of exchanging a word with him. His life was altogether

a serious one--inspired by the noblest spirit, devoted to the

highest aims. Humor was but an incident with him, a partial relief

to the melancholy which tinged all his years.

He presented an extraordinary combination of mental and moral

qualities. As a statesman he had the loftiest ideal, and it fell

to his lot to inaugurate measures which changed the fate of millions

of living men, of tens of millions yet to be born. As a manager

of political issues and master of the art of presenting them, he

has had no rival in this country unless one be found in Jefferson.

The complete discomfiture of his most formidable assailants in

1863, especially of those who sought to prejudice him before the

people on account of the arrest of Vallandigham, cannot easily be

paralleled for shrewdness of treatment and for keen appreciation

of the reactionary influences which are certain to control public

opinion. Mr. Van Buren stands without rival in the use of partisan

tactics. He operated altogether on men, and believed in self-

interest as the mainspring of human action. Mr. Lincoln's ability

was of a far higher and broader character. There was never the

slightest lack of candor or fairness in his methods. He sought to

control men through their reason and their conscience. The only

art the employed was that of presenting his views so convincingly

as to force conviction on the minds of his hearers and his readers.

The Executive talent of Mr. Lincoln was remarkable. He was

emphatically the head of his own Administration, ultimate judge at

all points and on all occasions where questions of weight were to

be decided. An unwise eulogist of Mr. Seward attributes to him

the origination and enforcement of the great policies which

distinguished the Administration. So far is this from the truth

that in more than one instance the most momentous steps were taken

against the judgment and contrary to the advice of the Secretary

of State. The position of control and command so firmly held by

Mr. Lincoln was strikingly shown when the Peace Conference was

about to assemble at Fortress Monroe. He dispatched Mr. Seward to

the place of meeting in advance of his own departure from Washington,

giving him the most explicit instructions as to his mode of action,

--prescribing carefully the limitations he should observe, and

concluding with these words: "_You will hear all they may choose

to say, and report it to me. You will not assume to definitely

consummate any thing_." Assuredly this is not the language of

deference. It does not stop short of being the language of command.

It is indeed the expression of one who realized that he was clothed

with all the power belonging to his great office. No one had a

more sincere admiration of Mr. Seward's large qualities than the

President; no one more thoroughly appreciated his matchless powers.

But Mr. Lincoln had not only full trust in his own capacity, but

a deep sense of his own responsibility--a responsibility which

could not be transferred and for which he felt answerable to his

conscience and to God.

CHARACTER OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

There has been discussion as to Mr. Lincoln's religious belief.

He was silent as to his own preference among creeds. Prejudice

against any particular denomination he did not entertain. Allied

all his life with Protestant Christianity, he thankfully availed

himself of the services of an eminent Catholic prelate--Archbishop

Hughes of New York--in a personal mission to England, of great

importance, at a crisis when the relations between the two countries

were disturbed and threatening. Throughout the whole period of

the war he constantly directed the attention of the nation to

dependence on God. It may indeed be doubted whether he omitted

this in a single state paper. In every message to Congress, in

eery proclamation to the people, he made it prominent. In July,

1863, after the battle of Gettysburg he called upon the people to

give thanks because "it had pleased Almighty God to hearken to the

supplications and prayers of an afflicted people and to vouchsafe

signal and effective victories to the Army and Navy of the United

States," and he asked the people "to render homage to the Divine

Majesty and to invoke the influence of his Holy Spirit to subdue

the anger which has produced and so long sustained a needless and

cruel rebellion." On another occasion, recounting the blessings

which had come to the Union, he said, "No human counsel hath devised,

nor hath any mortal hand worked out, these great things. They are

the gracious gifts of the Most High God who, while dealing with us

in anger for our sins, hath nevertheless remembered mercy."

Throughout his entire official career,--attended at all times with

exacting duty and painful responsibility,--he never forgot his own

dependence, or the dependence of the people, upon a Higher Power.

In his last public address, delivered to an immense crowd assembled

at the White House on the 11th of April, to congratulate him on

the victories of the Union, the President, standing as he unconsciously

was in the very shadow of death, said reverently to his hearers,

"In the midst of your joyous expression, He from whom all blessings

flow must first be remembered"!

Not only in life but in treasure the cost of the war was enormous.

In addition to the large revenues of the Government which had been

currently absorbed, the public debt at the close of the struggle

was $2,808,549,437.55. The incidental losses were innumerable in

kind, incalculable in amount. Mention is made here only of the

actual expenditure of money--estimated by the standard of gold.

The outlay was indeed principally made in paper, but the faith of

the United States was given for redemption in coin--a faith which

has never been tarnished, and which in this instance has been

signally vindicated by the steady determination of the people.

Never, in the same space of time, has there been a National

expenditure so great.

Other nations have made costly sacrifices in struggles affecting

their existence or their master passions. In the memorable campaigns

of the French in 1794, when the Republic was putting forth its most

gigantic energies, the expenses rose to 200,000,000 francs a month,

or about $450,000,000 a year. For the three years of the rebellion,

after the first year, our War Department alone expended $603,314,411.82,

$690,391,048.66, and $1,030,690,400 respectively. The French

Directory broke down under its expenditures by its lavish issue of

_assignats_ and the French Republic became bankrupt. Our Government

was saved by its rigorous system of taxation imposed upon the people

by themselves. Under Napoleon, in addition to the impositions on

conquered countries, the budgets hardly exceeded in francs the

charges of the United States for the rebellion, in dollars. Thus

in 1805 the French budget exhibited total expenditures of 666,155,139

francs, including 69,140,000 francs for interest on the debt. In

the same year the minister stated to the Chambers that income was

derived from Italy of 30,000,000 francs, and from Germany and

Holland 100,000,000, leaving 588,998,705 to be collected from

France. In 1813 the French expenditures had risen to 953,658,772

francs, and the total receipts from French revenue were 780,959,847

francs. The French national debt has been measured since 1797 by

the interest paid, fixed at that time at five per cent. From 1800

to 1814, the period of the Consulate and the Empire, this interest

was increased by 23,091,635 francs, indicating an addition of twenty

times that sum to the principal of the debt. The Government of

the Restoration added in 1815, 101,260,635 francs to the annual

interest. Thus the cost of the Napoleonic wars to France may be

stated at about $487,000,000 added to the principal of the debt,

or less than one-fifth of the increment of our national obligations

on account of the rebellion. The French burdens were extended over

the whole period from 1800 to 1814. Our own were concentrated into

the space of four years.

NATIONAL EXPENDITURES IN THE WAR.

The total expenditures of Great Britain during the French Revolution

and the career of Napoleon were L1,490,000,888, or nearly five

times that sum in dollars. The largest expenditures in any single

year were in 1815, L130,305,958, or in dollars, $631,976,894.

After 1862 our expenditures were not so low as that in any year,

and they were more than double that sum in the closing year of the

war when the great armies were mustered out of service and final

payment was made to all.

The British expenditures in the war against the French during the

period of the Revolution were a little more than L490,000,000 and

against Napoleon a little less than L1,000,000,000; or $4,850,000,000

in the aggregate, for twenty-three years. The total outlay was

therefore larger than our payments on account of the rebellion.

But there was no period of ten years in her wars with the French,

in which Great Britain expended so much as the United States expended

in four years. The loss of Great Britain by discounts in raising

money or by the use of depreciated paper was greater than that

incurred by the United States. A leading English authority says

that of the vast burden up to 1816, the "artificial enhancements

due to discounts in raising money were so great that for every L100

received into the treasury a national debt of L173 was created."

No other wars than those of England and France can be compared with

ours in point of expenditure. For the war between France and

Germany in 1870 the indemnity demanded by the conqueror was

5,000,000,000 francs, equivalent in American money to $930,000,000.

This sum was much in excess of the outlay of Germany. The expenses

of France on her own account in that contest were 1,873,238,000

francs, or $348,432,068, and this is only from one-half to one-

third of the annual outlay of the United States during the rebellion.

France added to the interest charge at this time 349,637,116 francs,

indicating that the whole sum of the indemnity and other war

expenditures has passed into the principal of the permanent debt

of the country.

The one grand feature of this lavish expenditure of wealth by the

Government of the United States is that it was directed and enforced

by the people themselves. No imperial power commanded it, no kingly

prerogative controlled it. It was the free, unbiased, unchangeable

will of the Sovereign People. They declared at the ballot-box, by

untrammeled popular suffrage, that the war must go on. "The American

people,"--said Henry Winter Davis in the House of Representatives

at one of the most exciting periods of the struggle,--"the American

people, rising to the height of the occasion, dedicate this generation

to the sword, and, pouring out the blood of their children, demand

that there be no compromise; that ruin to the Republic or ruin to

the Rebel Confederacy are the only alternatives; that no peace

shall be made except under the banner of Victory. Standing on this

great resolve to accept nothing but Victory or ruin, Victory is

ours!"

At the outbreak of hostilities the Government discovered that it

had no Navy at its command. The Secretary, Mr. Welles, found upon

entering his office but a single ship in a Northern port fitted to

engage in aggressive operations. In the beginning of the great

contest which was at once to be waged upon the seas, wherein the

Government proposed to close Southern ports, and the South to

destroy Northern commerce, the advantage was clearly with the South.

From Cape Henry to the Rio Grande the Navy of the United States

was called upon to create an effective blockade against all ingress

and egress. The conformation of the coast, which along great

distances prevented the entrance and exit of ocean-going vessels,

materially aided in the task, but it was still such a one as had

never before been attempted in the naval history of the world.

The line to be subjected to blockade was as long as the line from

the Bay of Biscay to the Golden Horn and in many respects it was

far more difficult to control.

This blockade was an absolute necessity imposed on the United

States. The South relied with implicit faith upon its ability to

secure by the sale of cotton the means of carrying on the war.

The Confederate Government did not believe that the United States

would hazard a conflict with the manufacturing nations of Europe,

by attempting a blockade that would prevent the export of the

staple; or if they did believe it, they looked upon it as the

fatuous step on the part of the National Government that would

promptly induce intervention by the combined power of England and

France. This reliance was explicitly stated in advance by Mr.

Hammond of South Carolina, who three years before the inauguration

of Mr. Lincoln, on the fourth day of March, 1858, made this

declaration in the United-States Senate:--

"Without firing a gun, without drawing a sword, should the North

make war on us, we could bring the whole world to our feet. What

would happen if no cotton was furnished for three years? I will

not stop to depict what every one can imagine, but this is certain,

England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world

with her. No, you dare not make war on cotton. No Power on earth

dares to make war upon cotton. _Cotton is King_."

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BLOCKADE.

Boastful and impotent as the declaration of Mr. Hammond now seems,

it had a better basis of fact to stand upon than many of the fiery

predictions in which Southern statesmen were wont to indulge. The

importance of cotton to the civilized world could hardly be

exaggerated, and yet it was this very importance that forced the

United States to the course which was pursued. The National

Government could not permit the export of cotton without constantly

aggrandizing the power of the rebellion, and it could not prevent

its export without tempting the manufacturing nations of Europe to

raise the blockade. The Administration wisely prepared to enforce

the blockade and to meet all the consequences.

To accomplish its undertaking, the energy of the Nation was devoted

to the creation of a navy. By the end of the year 1863 the government

had six hundred vessels of war which were increased to seven hundred

before the rebellion was subdued. Of the total number at least

seventy-five were ironclad. It may be instanced with laudable

pride that one enterprising man, honorably distinguished as a

scientific engineer, constructed in less than a hundred days an

armored squadron of eight ships, in the aggregate of five thousand

tons burden, capable of steaming nine knots per hour and destined

for effective service upon the rivers of the South-West. When the

contractor, Mr. James B. Eads of St. Louis, agreed to furnish these

steamers to the Government, the timber from which they were to be

built was still standing in the forest and the machinery with which

the armor was to be rolled was not constructed.

A year after the first battle was fought the naval force of the

United States had practically interdicted all legitimate commerce

with the Southern States. No more effective method of warfare

could have been devised. At the outbreak of the war the States in

rebellion were able to manufacture but few of the articles

indispensable to the ordinary life of a people. Their wealth was

purely agricultural. Cotton and tobacco were their only exports.

For a supply of manufactures the South had depended wholly upon

its trade with the North and with Europe. The natural effect of

the war was greatly to lessen production, and the blockade made it

impossible to find a market for any large portion of the diminished

product of cotton. As a striking evidence of the prosperity in

the South at the time it complained of oppression, the largest

cotton crop which had ever been grown was that of 1860. It numbered

more than five million two hundred thousand bales, nearly four and

a half millions of which had found a ready market in Europe and

the North before the outbreak of the war. The crop of 1861 was

little more than one-half that of the preceding year. Of the three

and a half millions which remained available for export at the end

of 1861 it was estimated that up to August, 1862, not more than

fifty thousand bales had been carried to England, the principal

foreign consumer.

The demand for food created by the Southern army caused a majority

of the plantations to raise corn, and the cotton crop of 1862 did

not amount to more than one million bales, very little of which

found a foreign market; and the supply and exportation diminished

from this time onward. Cotton which sold in December, 1861, in

Liverpool for 113/4_d_. per pound had risen in December, 1862, to

241/2_d_. per pound, and as a result, half a million persons in

England, dependent for their daily bread upon this manufacturing

industry, were thrown out of employment and reduced to beggary.

So great was the distress that by April, 1863, nearly two million

pounds sterling had been expended for their relief, and this sum

does not include the vast amounts expended in local volunteer

charities. English manufacturers saw that the supply of the raw

product from America could no longer be depended upon, and efforts

were made to introduce the manufacture of the inferior staple from

India, but the experiment proved in the main unsatisfactory and

unprofitable.

The stringency of the blockade which prevented the exportation of

cotton, prevented also the importation of manufactured articles.

While compelled to acknowledge this fact, the Confederate Secretary

of State, Mr. Benjamin, attempted very cleverly to turn it to

account by showing the advantages which would accrue to the commercial

and manufacturing classes of England by the speedy triumph of the

rebellion. Writing to Mr. Mason, who represented the Confederacy

in England, Mr. Benjamin said, "The almost total cessation of

external commerce for the last two years has produced the complete

exhaustion of all articles of foreign growth and manufacture, and

it is but a moderate computation to estimate the imports into the

Confederacy at three hundred millions of dollars for the first six

months which will ensue after the treaty of peace." The unexpressed

part of the proposition which this statement covered was the most

interesting. The merchants and ship-owners of England were to

understand that the sale and transportation of this vast amount of

fabrics would fall into the hands of England if the Confederacy

should succeed, and that if it should fail, the domestic trade of

the United States would absorb the whole of it. It was a shrewd

appeal to a nation whose foreign policy has always been largely

influenced by considerations of trade.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BLOCKADE.

The economic condition of the South at this time may be compared

to that of a man with full purse, lost in a desert. Southern cotton

would easily sell in the markets of New York or Liverpool for four

times its price in Charleston, while the manufactures of Manchester

or of Lowell were worth in Charleston four times the price in

Liverpool or New York. Exchange was rendered by the blockade

practically impossible. When the profits of a successful voyage

from Liverpool to Charleston and return, would more than repay the

expense of the construction of the best steamer and of the voyage,

the temptation to evade the blockade was altogether too strong to

be resisted by the merchants and manufacturers of England. Blockade-

running became a regular business with them, and the extent to

which it was carried may be inferred from the fact that during the

war the American fleet captured or sunk more than seven hundred

vessels bound from British ports to ports of the Confederacy. How

many vessels escaped our navy and safely ran the blockade may never

be known, but for three years it was a steady contest between the

navy of the United States and the blockade-runners of England.

The persistent course of the latter was stimulated both by cupidity

and by ill will to this country. They were anxious to make pecuniary

gains for themselves and to aid the Confederacy at the same time.

They were checked only by the extra-hazardous character imparted

to the trade by the alertness and superior vigilance of our cruisers

which sent many millions of English ventures to less profitable

markets and many millions to the adjudication of our own Prize-

courts.

The establishment and maintenance of a blockade is not accounted

by naval officers as the most brilliant service to which in the

line of their profession they may be deputed, but it was a service

of inestimable value to the cause of the Union, and it was performed

with a skill and thoroughness never surpassed. The blockade required

an enormous force of men. In addition to the marines, to the large

body of soldiers transferred from time to time to the navy, and to

the rebel prisoners that joined in the service, there were 121,807

men specially enlisted in the navy during the war. But for the

aid thus rendered by the navy, the hard fight would have been longer

and more sanguinary. Had not the South been thus deprived of the

munitions of war, of clothing and of all manner of supplies which

England and France were eager to furnish her, we should not have

seen the end of the civil war in 1865, and we should have been

subjected to all the hazards implied by the indefinite continuance

of the struggle.

The census of 1860 shows that the thirty-three States and seven

Territories, which at that time composed the United States, contained

a population of 31,443,791. Fifteen of these States with 12,140,296

inhabitants were slave-holding, more than four millions of the

population being slaves; eighteen with an aggregate population of

19,303,494 were classed as free. Four of the fifteen slave States,

Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky, whose people numbered

three and one-half millions, constituted what were known as the

Border slave States--West Virginia being added to the list in 1862.

Though a considerable proportion of the inhabitants of these States,

from association and interest, sympathized with the South, they

contributed to the Union cause an army equal to two hundred thousand

men enlisted for three years, and throughout the war they were

loyal to the National Government. Many of the inhabitants of these

States fought in the Confederate Army, but this loss was more than

compensated by the effective aid rendered by the loyal men who

joined the Union Army from the rebellious States. Tennessee

furnished more than thirty thousand men to the armies of the Union,

and from almost every State which formed a portion of the Confederacy

men enlisted in the loyal forces. It may with reasonable precision

be affirmed that the encouragement which the Confederacy received

from the slave States that remained true to the Union, was more

than offset by the effective aid rendered by loyal men residing

within the limits of the rebellious States.

STRENGTH OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

As the source of supply for an army the Southern Confederacy had

eleven States with an aggregate population of nine millions. It

is difficult to estimate with accuracy the numerical strength of

the army which they organized at the beginning of the war. In a

semi-official publication it was asserted that the army numbered

more than five hundred thousand men, but as twenty thousand of this

army were credited to Maryland and thirty-five thousand to Missouri,

the number given was evidently a gross exaggeration. The statement

was probably made for effect upon the North rather than in the

interest of truth. A member of the Confederate Congress from North

Carolina stated in debate in 1864 that the Confederate muster-roll

numbered more than four hundred thousand men, "of whom probably

one-half were not there." During the entire period of the war it

is probable that eleven hundred thousand men were embodied in the

Confederate Army, though its effective strength did not at any time

consist of more than one-half that number. But this force was

obtained by the South at great sacrifice. The necessity of a

stringent conscription act was felt as early as April 16, 1862, at

which time the first Enrolment Act was passed by the Confederate

Congress. Under this Act, which was amended on the 27th of September

of the same year, Mr. Davis issued on the 15th of July, 1863, his

first conscription proclamation which called into the service of

the Confederacy all white men between the ages of eighteen and

forty-five who were not legally exempted from military service.

The date of the proclamation shows that it was forced upon the

Confederates by Lee's abortive invasion of Pennsylvania, and was

intended to fill the ranks of the army which had been shattered

and beaten on the field of Gettysburg. Further legislation by the

Confederate Congress in February, 1864, extended the enrolment so

as to include all white male residents of the Confederate States

between the ages of seventeen and fifty. In February, 1865, Mr.

Davis estimated that more than one hundred and fifty thousand men

were added to the Confederate armies by this forced conscription.

Comparing the strength of the Confederate Army with the population

from which it was recruited, and taking into account the absolute

lack of provision made for the comfort of the Southern soldier,

the insufficient provision made for his sustenance and clothing,

and the consequent desertion which made it imperative to repair

diminished strength, it is evident that the conscription legislation

bore with fearful severity upon the people of the South. Comprehensive

as was the Enrolment Act, which rendered liable to military duty

the entire male population between the ages of seventeen and fifty,

the South was compelled to overstep its self-imposed limit. The

forces which Lee and Johnston surrendered contained so many boys

unfitted by youth and so many men unfitted by age for military

service, that a Northern General epigrammatically remarked that

for its armies the Confederacy had been compelled in the end to

rob alike the cradle and the grave.

Grave misstatements however have been made in regard to the diminished

forces of the Confederacy at the cessation of the war. The astounding

assertion has crept into statements intended to be historical that

Lee surrendered an army of only ten thousand men, and Johnston an

army of most insignificant numbers in comparison with that of

Sherman. An accurate count made of the forces surrendered by the

Confederacy and paroled by the North at the conclusion of the war,

shows that the following numbers were embodied in the various

Southern armies and were rendering active service in the field:--

The army of Virginia under General Robert E. Lee . . . . 28,356

The army of Tennessee under General Joseph E. Johnston . . 37,047

The army of Florida under Major-General Samuel Jones . . . 2,113

The army of Alabama under Lieutenant-General Richard Taylor . 12,723

The Trans-Mississippi army of General E. Kirby Smith . . . 10,167

The Arkansas army of Brigadier-General M. Jeff Thompson . . 5,048

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95,454

These figures are given as the result of actual count made of the

paroles signed, and have been verified by officers both of the

Union Army and of the Confederate Army. They represent the actual

force engaged in the field, and upon the basis of calculation

adopted in the North would indicate a Confederate Army of nearly

three hundred thousand men at the close of the struggle. When the

frequent desertions from the Southern Army are remembered, and

their losses in prisoners and those disabled in the fearful fights

of the months which preceded the surrender of Lee, it will not be

exaggeration to say that the South had at the opening of General

Grant's campaign in Virginia the preceding summer more than five

hundred thousand men borne upon the rolls of its armies. The waste

of the Confederate forces during the sixty days immediately preceding

the final surrender was very great. The knowledge of the situation

had penetrated the ranks, and the men lost spirit and hope. The

result which followed was precisely that which has always happened

with armies so circumstanced. The ranks melted away, and there

were neither resource nor discipline to fill them again.

THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES.

It would be but poor compliment to the soldiers of the Union to

withhold just recognition of the brave opponents who met them on

so many hard-fought fields. Nor is there any disposition among

loyal men to stint the praise which is always due to courage.

Never perhaps was an army organized with fighting qualities superior

to those of the army put into the field by the Confederacy. They

fought with an absolute conviction, however erroneous, that their

cause was just; and their arms were nerved by the feeling which

their leaders had instilled deeply into their minds, that they were

contending against an intolerable tyranny and protecting the

sacredness of home. In a war purely defensive, as was that of the

Confederacy, an army such as they raised and maintained can baffle

the efforts of vastly superior numbers. The Confederates found

from their own experience how changed was the task when they assumed

the offensive and ventured to leave their own territory, with their

perfect knowledge of its topography and with a surrounding population

of sympathizers and helpers. In their first attempt at invasion

they did not get beyond cannon-sound of the Potomac, and in the

second they were turned back by the result of the first battle.

These facts do not impeach the prowess of the Confederate soldiery,

but they illustrate the task imposed on the Army of the Union and

they suggest the vast difference in the responsibilities which the

invading and the defensive forces were called upon to meet.

For so large an army as the Government of the Union was compelled

to raise, volunteering could not be relied upon as a steady resource

for recruitment. Great as was the ardor among the loyal people at

the beginning of the struggle, it was soon found, as it has always

been found in other nations, that unaided patriotism could not

supply the heavy demands constantly made to repair the waste from

the casualties of war and from the ravages of disease. The Act of

Congress of March 3, 1863, provided for the enrolment of all able-

bodied male citizens between the ages of twenty and forty-five

years, while the Act of February 24, 1864, granted freedom to all

male slaves between the ages of twenty and forty-five who might

enlist in the Northern armies. Reward was made to go with duty,

and by the Act of July 4, 1864, Congress ameliorated the rigors of

the conscription by paying to each drafted man a bounty for one

years' service, at the same time doubling and trebling the amount

for two and three years' service respectively. The Secretary of

War was by the same law directed to discharge from service at the

request of parents all persons under the age of eighteen years who

might have enlisted in the army, and it was made an offense punishable

with loss of commission for any officer knowingly to enlist a person

less than sixteen years of age. Conscription laws have been

unpopular in all countries, and though resisted among us on one

occasion with riot, they were upheld with strong courage by the

mass of the loyal people. Representatives in Congress who had

voted for the enactments were returned by large majorities, and

Mr. Lincoln was re-elected with an overwhelming expression of

popular favor at the very time when he was directing the enforcement

of the draft. The vote of 1864 was perhaps the most significant

exhibition of patriotism made during the war, and had an extraordinary

influence in discouraging those who were directing the fortunes of

the Confederacy.

In the Loyal States the Government called for more than 2,750,000

men at various time throughout the war. In the South nearly every

white person capable of bearing arms rendered at one time or another

service in the army. A leading military authority of England,

speaking of the strength of the armies of the United States and of

the Confederacy, says, "The total number of men called under arms

by the Government of the United States between April, 1861, and

April, 1865, amounted to 2,759,049, of whom 2,656,053 were actually

embodied in the armies. If to these be added the 1,100,000 men

embodied by the Southern States during the same time, the total

armed forces reach the enormous amount of nearly 4,000,000, drawn

from a population of only 32,000,000 of all ages. Before this vast

aggregate, the celebrated uprising of the French nation in 1793,

or the recent efforts of France and Germany in the war of 1870-71,

sink into insignificance. And within three years the whole of

these vast forces were peaceably disbanded and the army had shrunk

to a normal strength of only 30,000 men."

Germany with a population of 41,000,000 can in time of war furnish

an army of 1,250,000 men. France with a population of 36,000,000

claims that she can set more than 1,500,000 men afield. With a

population of less than 25,000,0000 from which to levy troops, the

Government of the United States had when the war closed more than

1,000,000 men upon the muster-rolls of the army to be paid off and

discharged. Of this vast force probably not more than forty per

cent. were available for operations on the field. The wounded,

the sick, those upon furlough, upon detail in other service, upon

military service elsewhere than in the field, together with those

in military parlance absent or "not accounted for," would, it is

estimated, be equal to sixty per cent. of the entire army.

AREA OF THE WAR AND ITS COST.

The area over which the armies of the Union were called to operate

was 800,000 square miles in extent,--as large as the German Empire,

France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and Holland combined. Those who

led in the secession movement relied confidently upon the impossibility

of overcoming a population inhabiting so great an expanse of

territory. Their judgment was confirmed by that of the best military

critics of Europe who looked pityingly upon the folly of the United

States for undertaking a task which after years of suffering and

great loss of life could end only in defeat, with hopeless bankruptcy

for the surviving remnant of the Republic. Could the Government

have had the advantage of a small area for its military operations,

its power to overcome the rebellion would have been greatly enhanced,

and an army not exceeding half of that which was raised could have

vindicated the authority of the flag and maintained the integrity

of the Union. The National expenditures would have been decreased

in even greater ratio, for aside from reducing the number of troops,

the enormous cost involved in transportation would have been lessened

by hundreds of millions of dollars in the four years of the war.

Another cause of increased expenditure was the haste necessarily

attendant upon all the military preparations of the Government.

Armies were to be created from the basis of an organization hardly

greater than would serve as a police force for the Republic. When

Fort Sumter was fired upon, the Army of the United States, rank

and file, scarcely exceeded sixteen thousand men. The Government

was compelled to equip its vast forces from stores of which hardly

a nucleus existed. Arms, ammunition, military supplies, were all

to be instantly gathered. The growth of the great host, its

equipment, its marshaling, its prodigious strength, are among the

marvels and the glories of our history. To admit that mistakes

were made is only to say that the work was in human hands. Criticism

may well be drowned in the acclaim of success. No National emergency

has ever been met with greater courage, promptness, or skill.

The loss to the country and the expenditures from its Treasury

could not be estimated when the war closed. We knew that a half-

million citizens of the Republic had laid down their lives--three

hundred thousand in defending the Union, two hundred thousand in

attempting to destroy it. We knew the enormous amounts which had

been paid in supporting our armies. But we were not wholly prepared

for the millions that must be paid in satisfaction of claims which

there had been no mode of reckoning. Nor had there been any standard

by which an estimate could be made of the sums required by the

pensions which the gratitude and the justice of the Government

would be called upon to grant. It was soon apparent that the need

of relief was proportional to the magnitude of the struggle, and

the Government prepared to respond with a munificence never

paralleled.

THE CHARACTER OF EDWIN M. STANTON.

Nine months after the outbreak of hostilities the organization and

equipment of the National forces were placed under the direction

of Edwin M. Stanton as Secretary of War. Outside of his professional

reputation, which was high, Mr. Stanton had been known to the public

by his service in the Cabinet of Mr. Buchanan during the last three

months of his Administration. In that position he had undoubtedly

exhibited zeal and fidelity in the cause of the Union. He was a

member of the Democratic party, a thorough believer in its principles,

and a hearty opponent of Mr. Lincoln in the contest of 1860. In

speech and writing he referred to Mr. Lincoln's supporters in the

extreme partisan phrase of the day,--as "Black Republicans." He

had no sympathy with Mr. Lincoln's views on the subject of slavery,

and was openly hostile to any revival of the doctrine of Protection.

If Mr. Buchanan had been governed by the views of Mr. Stanton he

would undoubtedly have vetoed the Morrill Tariff bill, and thus an

unintended injury would have been inflicted upon the reviving credit

of the nation. A citizen of the District of Columbia, Mr. Stanton

was not called upon to make a personal record in the Presidential

election of 1860, but his sympathies were well understood to be

with the supporters of Breckinridge.

With these political principles and affiliations, Mr. Stanton was

not even considered in connection with the original organization

of Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet. But the fact of his being a Democrat

was now in his favor, for Mr. Lincoln was anxious to signify by

some decisive expression, his appreciation of the patriotism which

had induced so large a proportion of the Democratic party to lay

aside prejudice and unite in support of his Administration. He

had a high estimate of Mr. Stanton's capacity, derived from personal

intercourse in a professional engagement some three years before.

He had learned something of his powers of endurance, of his trained

habits of thought, of his systematic method of labor, and he had

confidence that at forty-seven years of age, with vigorous health

and a robust constitution, Mr. Stanton could endure the strain

which the increasing labor of the War Department would impose.

His nomination was confirmed without delay, and the whole country

received his appointment with profound satisfaction.

No Cabinet minister in our history has been so intemperately

denounced, so extravagantly eulogized. The crowning fact in his

favor is that through all the mutations of his stormy career he

was trusted and loved by Mr. Lincoln to the end of his days. He

was at all times and under all circumstances absolutely free from

corruption, and was savagely hostile to every man in the military

service who was even suspected of irregularity or wrong. He

possessed the executive faculty in the highest degree. He was

prompt, punctual, methodical, rapid, clear, explicit in all his

work. He imparted energy to every branch of the service, and his

vigorous determination was felt on the most distant field of the

war as a present and inspiring force.

Mr. Stanton had faults. He was subject to unaccountable and violent

prejudice, and under its sway he was capable of harsh injustice.

Many officers of merit and of spotless fame fell under his displeasure

and were deeply wronged by him. General Stone was perhaps the most

conspicuous example of the extremity of outrage to which the

Secretary's temper could carry him. He was lacking in magnanimity.

Even when intellectually convinced of an error, he was reluctant

to acknowledge it. He had none of that grace which turns an enemy

to a friend by healing the wounds which have been unjustly inflicted.

While oppressing many who were under his control, he had the keenest

appreciation of power, and to men who were wielding great influence

he exhibited the most deferential consideration. He had a quick

insight into character, and at a glance could tell a man who would

resist and resent from one who would silently submit. He was

ambitious to the point of uncontrollable greed for fame, and by

this quality was subject to its counterpart of jealousy, and to an

envy of the increasing reputation of others. It was a sore trial

to him that after his able and persistent organization of all the

elements of victory, the share of credit which justly belonged to

him, was lost sight of in the glory which surrounded the hero of

a successful battle.

But his weaknesses did not obscure the loftiness of his character.

The capricious malignity and brutal injustice of the Great Frederick

might as well be cited against the acknowledged grandeur of his

career, as an indictment be brought against Stanton's fame on his

personal defects, glaring and even exasperating as they were. To

the Nation's trust he was sublimely true. To him was committed,

in a larger degree than to any other man except the President alone,

the successful prosecution of the war and the consequent preservation

of the Union. Against those qualities which made him so many

enemies, against those insulting displays of temper which wounded

so many proud spirits helplessly subject to him for the time,

against those acts of rank injustice which, in the judgment of his

most partial eulogist, will always mar his fame, must be remembered

his absolute consecration to all that he was and of all he could

hope to be, to the cause of his country. For more than three years,

of unceasing and immeasurable responsibility, he stood at his post,

by day and by night, never flagging in zeal, never doubting in

faith. Even his burly frame and rugged strength were overborne by

the weight of his cares and by the strain upon his nerves, but not

until his work was finished, not until the great salvation had

come. Persecution and obloquy have followed him into the grave,

but an impartial verdict must be that he was inspired with the

devotion of a martyr, and that he wore out his life in a service

of priceless value to all the generations of his countrymen.