OUR POSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Like the military values of space research, the practical value of space

exploration in terms of world prestige has also been acknowledged almost

from the beginning of the satellite era.

The White House, in its initial statement on the national space program,

declared:

It is useful to distinguish among (the) factors which give

importance, urgency, and inevitability to the advancement of space

technology (one of which) is the factor of national prestige. To be

strong and bold in space technology will enhance the prestige of

the United States among the peoples of the world and create added

confidence in our scientific, technological, industrial, and

military strength.[18]

Only recently, however, has the full impact and meaning of this phase of

our national space program come to be widely recognized. It has been

stated, perhaps in its most forceful and succinct form, by an American

official in a unique position to know. The Director of the U.S.

Information Agency, part of whose job is to keep track of the esteem in

which America is held abroad, has told Congress:

Our space program may be considered as a measure of our vitality

and our ability to compete with a formidable rival and as a

criterion of our ability to maintain technological eminence worthy

of emulation by other peoples.[19]

This element of space exploration takes on particular significance in

light of the current international struggle to influence the minds of

men, in light of the rising tide of nationalism throughout the world,

and in light of the intensification of the cold war as demonstrated by

the now-famous U-2 incident and the hardening attitude of oriental

communism.

In the words of an influential newspaper:

Wholly apart from the intellectual compulsions that now drive man

to move higher and higher into the high heavens, it seems clear

that our country can be niggardly in this field only at the risk of

being completely and forever outclassed by Russia--a gamble that

could have the most fearful political, economic, and military

consequences.[20]

Incidentally, there is another prestige factor to be considered. This is

what might be called the chain-reaction factor: the likelihood that

technological preeminence in the space field will attract top talent

from other parts of the world to the banner of the country which

develops it, and thus constantly nourish and replenish the efforts of

that country. It is a consideration which has not received general

attention, although it has been discussed before some of the world's

leading space scientists.[21]

Here again, as with the military situation, the Soviets are making every

effort to exploit their dexterity in space. They are pursuing the

prestige gambit directly and indirectly. In the first category, for

example, they give top priority to space exhibits in important public

forums--as their duplicate sputniks strategically placed at the world's

fair and the United Nations attest. Premier Khrushchev's delight in

making gifts to foreigners of miniature Soviet pennants similar to that

carried in Lunik II--which hit the Moon--is another instance.[22]

The indirect drive for prestige via space technology is far more

important. It has been described by a congressional committee as

follows:

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union in

the last several years has demonstrated a great skill in

coordinating its progress in missilery, its success in space

missions, and its foreign policy and world image. Shots seem to

have been timed to maximize the effects of visits of Soviet leaders

and to punctuate Soviet statements and positions in international

negotiations. This is not to equate their space activities with

hollow propaganda. Empty claims do not have a positive effect for

long. Nor is there any firm evidence that it has been possible for

political policymakers to call their shots at times inconsistent

with good scientific and technical needs. The conclusion is rather

that the many elements of scientific, technical, military,

political, and psychological policy are all weighed, and tests

which make a full contribution to such a combined strategy are

carried out and supported with appropriate publicity.[23]

There is also evidence that scientific endeavor by the Russians for

prestige purposes is having repercussions on internal policy. Great

emphasis is currently being placed on the demonstrable usefulness of

scientific effort--to the extent that Soviet colleges, research

institutions, examining boards, and academies of science have been

directed to be more exacting in conferring scientific degrees and

titles. Newness and usefulness are requisite, but, at the same time,

degrees may now be awarded for other than dissertations; inventions and

textbooks of major importance may also earn a degree for their

authors.[24]

Within the prestige context, it is true that the United States must

labor under certain handicaps because of the nature of its democratic

system.

No effort is made in the American space program to hide the failures

which result from its highly complex character. Our burnups, misfires,

explosions, fizzles, and lost or wayward vehicles are well publicized.

Those of the Soviet Union rarely are. Even though most nations are well

aware that the Russians must be having their troubles, too, the

appearance of uniform success fostered by the U.S.S.R. inevitably

contributes to an image of scientific superiority. In addition, the

Soviets have developed a habit of striving for spectacular "firsts,"

most of which undoubtedly are undertaken almost as much for prestige

reasons as for scientific ones.

[Illustration: FIGURE 4.--Symbolic of the American effort in

space is this Thor-Able rocket, shown here launching the Tiros weather

satellite into a near-perfect orbit. This same vehicle, which launched

the record-breaking 23 million-mile communication probe--Pioneer V--has

contributed enormously to U.S. prestige abroad.]

Still, the United States has not done badly from the prestige angle. So

far as the world's scientific fraternity is concerned, it may even be

well in the lead.

In the first 30 or so months following the opening of the space age, as

signaled by the launching of Sputnik I in October 1957, the United

States put 21 satellites into orbit out of 42 attempts. Two out of five

deep-space probes were successful. The degree of success for all major

launchings ran better than 50 percent. The American effort has been

based on a broad scope of inquiry and includes long-range

communications, weather reporting, navigation and surveillance vehicles,

as well as information-gathering satellites.

During the same period the Soviets launched four Earth satellites, one

deep-space probe, one lunar-impact probe and one satellite into a much

elongated Earth orbit which circled and photographed the Moon. Most of

their vehicles have been substantially heavier than those launched by

the United States, although complete information on their scientific

purposes and the result obtained has never been disclosed.

The world political value of such programs cannot be discounted. To the

extent that the welfare of the United States depends upon its stature in

the eyes of the rest of the world (which is believed considerable) and

to the extent that the scientific capability of the United States

influences such stature (which is also believed considerable) our space

venture has very marked practical utility. It may even mean the

difference between freedom and dictatorship, between survival and

oblivion.

The Practical Values of Space Exploration Report of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, Eighty-Sixth Congress, Second Session · 第 28 / 56 题