Our doughboys actually thought that the American insignia was a huge

star, for all the magazines had firmly implanted that on their minds.

They didn’t care about the insignia of any other nation outside of the

American and German. To them one was a star and the other a cross,

anything else was either friendly or enemy; and they would take a chance

on it being enemy and fire at it.

One day before the Château-Thierry drive I was flying low along the

lines and from my map I was quite sure which was our own territory, and

which was that occupied by the Germans. I was well in the edge of our

own territory when I heard machine guns firing at me from the ground. My

first thought was that the Germans had advanced, so I directed the pilot

to dive down to investigate. As we dived the machine gunners became

convinced that we were going to fire upon them, so they turned loose

upon us. As we flew on back, other gun crews having seen those machine

guns firing at us, began firing too and although the pilot kept banking

the plane up so that they might see our American cocarde, they kept on

firing. About a half a kilometer back of the lines we began circling for

altitude, and I kept hearing a few shots from a gun. Then, in a few

seconds I saw a bullet go through the fuselage. Looking down on the edge

of an old trench I saw about three lads with rifles firing at us, and

they were good, old Yankee doughboys; I was sure of it.

I felt like turning loose a burst of about fifty rounds, aiming close to

this group in order to give them a real scare, then I realized that

there might be other troops around who might be grazed by a stray

bullet, so I marked the place very definitely on my map, flew back to

the airdrome and landed.

This was a serious matter, so I immediately made a trip up to the Front

to find out about it. I trudged around the trenches for an hour before

any plane came in sight, then one of our own airplanes came along,

flying very low. Suddenly I heard a rifle firing close by. I immediately

ran in the direction of the shooting and I discovered a half-grown kid

surrounded by a couple of his companions, coolly taking pot shots at

this American airplane. In a rage I jumped on him with all fours.

“Don’t you know that’s an American plane?” I demanded in a manner

neither affable nor pleasant. To my great surprise he responded that he

knew it was an American plane.

“Well,” I continued, speaking even more severely, “what do you mean by

firing on an American plane?”

This doughboy casually continued chewing his tobacco and looking at the

ground for some reason, apparently not from lack of composure, for he

would take an occasional spit at an old, rusty helmet about six feet up

the trench. The presence of an officer bothered him about as much as the

presence of a king affects a bolshevik.

“Well,” I again asked, “where do you get that noise of firing at a

friendly plane?”

This was just the opening he wanted, for he threw out his chest in all

his independent dignity and said, “There ain’t no friendly planes around

here. I ain’t seen any, no how. Them American planes ain’t got no

business being back this far from the lines and if them aviators ain’t

got nerve enough to go over there and scrap them Boche on their own

ground, we’ll force ’em over with our guns and put a little backbone in

’em.”

Then the lad gave me a full explanation as to why they had fired upon

these American planes and he claimed the American flyers always ran from

the Boche; the Boche came over and shot up the doughboys and he had

never seen an American plane going over and shooting up the Boche. Then

I asked him if he knew the functions of the airplanes. I wanted him to

know that some planes had to stay behind the lines at times.

“Yep,” he said, “they’re all fighters, all of ’em, or supposed to be,

but they don’t fight. They stay back here; they’re scared to go over.”

Then I asked him if he had ever heard of an observation plane and if an

observation plane shot a signal of six rockets to him what he would do.

He replied that he did not know anything about observation planes and

didn’t want to know anything about them, but that several times large

planes had flown back there and had fired fire rockets at the doughboys.

“How many rockets did they fire?” I asked.

“Oh,” he said, “lots of ’em. Sometimes three and six at one time.” I

knew six rockets was the official signal from an airplane to the

infantry, and that they were supposed to put out white pieces of cloth,

their panels, to tell the airplane exactly where they were.

“Well, what did you do when the airplane fired six rockets at you?” I

questioned in a more tolerating tone of voice.

“What did I do?” he answered as if surprised at such a silly question.

“What do you think I’d a done? Why, I fired right back at ’em. There

ain’t nobody goin’ to fire at me and get off with it without me firing

back.”

The other buddies backed him up absolutely and I spent a half hour

explaining to them the real facts about the airplane game. They finally

came to my way of thinking on every point except the courage of the

American airman. They could not be dissuaded; they were convinced that

most American flyers were cowards and “yellow.”

I, of course, reported this firing on friendly airplanes to Headquarters

and an order was issued so as to acquaint the Infantry with the Allied

insignia. However, it was not until late in the Argonne offensive that

this misapprehension of the doughboy was entirely cleared away. Time and

time again when I would ask infantrymen, even officers, if they knew the

American airplane insignia, they would say it was a “Star,” but that

they had never seen any American planes on the front. Perhaps it is for

this reason that there are many doughboys who to-day declare they never

saw an American airplane over the front. They undoubtedly saw many

American planes, but they never saw any with the much-advertised star in

the cocarde.

We had a great lot of trouble with wireless equipment in our artillery

adjustments. When anything went wrong it was always blamed on the radio

attached to the airplanes and we, of course, always attributed the fault

to the artillery station on the ground because our wireless sets were

always tested from the air to our own squadron station before starting

on any mission. If the radio was not working, we always came down and

fixed it. But this continual, unsatisfactory coöperation on radio

communication was a serious affair all the way through and it was a bone

of contention between the Air Service and the Artillery in many

instances. Finally radio officers were appointed to inspect the

equipment on the airplane and the equipment on the ground and to

determine where the fault lay. This helped some, but the trouble was

never actually overcome. If the trouble was with the airmen, it was

perhaps due to failure to throw in their switch. An experience I had,

led me to believe that the trouble was more with the personnel than the

material. In each artillery regiment in trench warfare, there was one

battery designated to fire upon a sudden call from the airplane. This

battery was known as the fugitive target battery and the wireless crew

was supposed to be constantly on duty from daybreak until nightfall so

that when an airplane called, the designated battery could be

immediately notified and the adjustment of artillery fire undertaken at

once.

One day I decided to make a thorough reconnaissance of the Front and to

call the fugitive target battery to a certain regiment to make a rapid

adjustment. I crossed the line, found my target, which was a small

convoy on the road within a forest. I was well within range of the

fugitive target battery, so I immediately began to call the wireless

station of the battery. I called it for fully twenty-five minutes but I

could get no response. They did not put out any panel at all. I happened

to know the location of the wireless station in the next regiment, which

was also supposed to be looking out for fugitive target calls, so I

called them and they immediately displayed their panel that they

understood me. I was then certain that my wireless was O. K., so I flew

back to my first battery and began to call them again. After another

fifteen minutes I still received no response whatsoever. As the target

had long since disappeared and being without the range of the alert

battery of the next regiment, I flew home.

After making my report I called up the Colonel of the Regiment in which

the battery was located. He, of course, being a very busy man, was not

especially anxious to talk to a Lieutenant, so he transferred me to his

wireless officer. I told the wireless officer that I had called them for

forty minutes and had gotten absolutely no response and that I was sure

that my wireless was all right. He, in a very nice way, responded that

he was quite sure that my wireless was not all right, because he was

certain that the battalion concerned had their wireless in very good

shape. We got into quite an argument in which I told him that I called

the designated battery of the next regiment and that they had answered

and that I called my home station both on leaving and returning and that

they answered, but the Captain repeated that he didn’t give a

continental how many answered, he still knew his wireless stations were

all right and he didn’t want any argument over the telephone about it.

Whereupon I mentally cussed the whole Army, but merely said, “Yes, Sir,”

and hung up.

I immediately dispatched another plane to call the same battery and to

keep on calling them until they answered. Then I got into the car and

drove up to the battalion concerned. I paid my respects to the Major

commanding the battalion and told him the trouble—that we had called and

had received no response. He was sort of peeved at the whole world so he

said he was getting disgustingly tired of these airplanes hollering

about the Artillery’s wireless; that his wireless was all right and it

was the inefficient airplanes; that his wireless men were on duty and

had been from daybreak until night. I told him I would like to go over,

if I might, and look over his wireless station. He became very indignant

and said, “Lieutenant, that is quite an unnecessary request. I know the

efficient condition of my units and I know my wireless is listening now

and I know that they have been listening in all day.”

I was beginning to become accustomed to these rebuffs by this time so I

smoothed it over the best I could and finally he agreed to take the time

to walk over to the wireless station with me. The plane I had dispatched

ahead was circling above and I knew he was calling. We went to the

wireless station, which was a sort of improvised one down in a dug-out.

The place was deserted and there was not a person in sight. The Major

was sore, but apologetic. He remembered that Battery C was supposed to

furnish the detail and that they were supposed to be on the job

permanently. So we went over and found the Captain of Battery C and the

Battalion Signal Officer, a Second Lieutenant, who were busily engaged

in a poker game. The Major, in a terrible voice, demanded, “Where in

’ell are those radio operators?” The poor Lieutenant meekly gave the

only answer he could think of. “Why, Major,” he said, “they are right

over there at the station; they have been there all day.”

The Major calmly asked, “Lieutenant, have you inspected the radio unit

to-day?”

Whereupon the Lieutenant solemnly said, “No, Sir, I have not inspected

it, but I am positive that the operators are right on the job,” and he

described definitely the place from which we had just come.

We asked him the name of his radio operators. They were all privates.

With the Captain and the Radio Officer we went over to the radio

station. It was still deserted. The Major began to tell the Lieutenant

in language that will not permit of repetition just what he thought of

him. The Lieutenant was speechless, and out of sympathy for him I made

the suggestion that there was an airplane above which was probably

calling them now and that it might be a good idea if we could get some

one there at the station to listen in. The Radio Officer grasped the

opportunity, jumped down and put the clickers to his ears, and the first

thing he said was, “Q-P-R, Q-P-R—that’s our call!” I felt like a million

dollars, for this time the Artillery was forced to concede that it was

not the fault of the airplane. With the assistance of the Major and the

Captain we manipulated the panels while the wireless officer took the

calls and the lad in the airplane did the adjustment. Then we went back

to find out where the radio operators were; that is, the three privates.

The Captain dispatched an orderly to find the first sergeant. In about

five minutes the sergeant was located and made his appearance. He was an

old non-commissioned officer and was seasoned by experience in many

climes and in dealing with many classes of men. He was rather heavy, and

had not shaved for several days, which fact, in addition to his heavy,

disheveled mustache, gave him the appearance of a hardboiled bulldog.

“Sergeant,” began the Captain, “do you know where the radio operators

are?”

“Yes, sir,” grumbled the top soak, affirmatively nodding his head with

self-satisfaction that he quite well knew where they were.

“Well,” went on the Captain, “I want to see them at once. If you will

show me their quarters it will save time.”

“They ain’t in their quarters,” came the reply. “They’re in the

kitchen.”

We went to the kitchen and found the three expert radio operators—two

were scrubbing big, black pans and the third was peeling spuds.

For moral effect, the Captain called the Top Sergeant off to one side.

The rest of us had to laugh.

“Why have you got these men in the kitchen?” hotly demanded the Captain.

“Well, Sir,” replied the Sergeant, closing in his jaws firmly in

determination, “there ain’t no more reason why the rest of the battery

should do K. P. and excuse the wireless men. I heard one of ’em say

yesterday that he ain’t never done no K. P. since he’d been in this

man’s army, and that kind er talk is bad for the morale of the battery,

so I just stuck ’em all on fer a few days to show the fellers they ain’t

no favors played in this battery.”

“Yes, but what about the radio?” asked the Captain. “You should have

left one of them on the job.”

“Oh, well, Captain,” came back the “Top” Sergeant, “it ain’t goin’ to

make no difference; these airplanes don’t call the station more than

once every two or three days and we ain’t got enough men to waste on

sitting around awaiting for ’em to call and they don’t do nothing for us

when they do call.”

Thus I found one of the main reasons for this early lack of results.

These old timers did not take the Air Service seriously. They had no

faith in its present capabilities nor its future development. To them an

Army was composed of Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery. Every other arm or

service was experimental. I am glad to say, however, that later this

battery, in fact the entire regiment of Artillery, became very

proficient in the work with the Air Service and the results were,

indeed, satisfactory to all.

In the actual advance at Château-Thierry the ground liaison—that is, the

communication by telephone, wireless telegraph and ground telegraph

between the line units and the Air Service—became poorer and poorer as

the troops advanced until it was really in a deplorable state. The area

over which troops passed was all shell torn and it was impossible to

move our flying fields farther up because we could not cease operations

in order to make the move since we had no reserve Air units, and worse,

we had no fields prepared and the Germans had destroyed theirs in the

retreat.

As the days advanced conditions became more terrible. The entire corps

headquarters had only one telephone wire and one ground telegraph line

to the Corps Advance Headquarters and from there only one out to the

various Divisional Posts of Command and in front of those Posts of

Command almost everything was done by runners. Our little force at the

Corps Air Service Headquarters was all worked down. After the first few

days the drive ceased to be exciting and it became purely drudgery and

habit. We were all irritable and cross. We were overworked and loss of

sleep was showing very much in our dispositions. This particular day

things were getting pretty bad up the line. The German artillery was

making a strong defense and all of our Command Posts were getting their

full share of German artillery fire. At noon our radio operator told me

that some one had been trying all morning to put through a message to

us, but that we had been unable to receive it. Either the transmitting

set at the line was not working or our receiving set was not. At any

rate, something was urgently wrong somewhere at the front or they would

not have been so persistent. About nine-thirty they started trying to

call us and they kept on until eleven-thirty, but the operator could not

get anything definite out of the sound. In addition, at about a quarter

of twelve they succeeded in getting a telephone call through, but we

could not hear. We tried to relay it, but that did not work. We worked

an hour on that—until a quarter of one. Then they managed to get a

priority call through on the ground telegraph, which telegram was dated

at the Post of Command at one-thirty in the afternoon and was delivered

to me at one-forty. The telegram read as follows:

“To Chief of Air Service. First Army Corps.

German artillery firing on my Post of Command. Stop it!

General.”

Of course, we all had a real laugh at the situation; that is, Mathis and

I, for we were the only ones there, Brereton being away on business and

Harwood being up at the front on liaison. Of course, such a request was

obviously impossible. An airplane can spot certain batteries when

firing, but when there are fifteen hundred different guns firing

continuously on fifteen hundred different objectives one can imagine

what possibility an airplane would have of picking out the particular

battery that was firing on this particular post of command. At the same

time, as it was signed in code by a General, it was imperative that

something be done because that unit had not been any too friendly toward

the Air Service, and, of course, the wishes of a General must always

have immediate attention.

I knew there was no answer that I could send back over the wire that

would quiet the situation, so we simply acknowledged the receipt of the

message. At the same time I knew there was no use to send a special

airplane for this request because we already maintained a plane over the

front every hour of the day, the one duty of which was to report by

wireless the location of any enemy batteries seen firing. I was mighty

busy on a multitude of other things, but still the General must be

answered, so I finally decided the best thing to do was to go up to the

Post of Command and explain the entire situation, telling why it could

not be done. After an hour and a half rough riding we finally approached

the Post of Command concerned. I left the car about a quarter of a mile

away so as to not attract the attention of the German airplanes to the

presence of a Command Post. All the way up I had been considering just

what I would say, because, being a Lieutenant, I wouldn’t have much

chance with a General, and yet I felt that since I had to do it I ought

to have something worth saying. I had decided upon my whole speech—I

would simply say that the mission was not only impossible but such a

request was preposterous—an airplane was a great thing, but it had a

limit of activity. At the same time I was in great fear of being laughed

at and being balled out, because in a great many cases a Lieutenant

speaking with a General, with the slight difference in rank, is at a

disadvantage. I knew I had to make some sort of a stab so, though I was

determined on my speech, I really felt very much like a bashful school

boy. As to procedure I had it all fixed up that I would go in, click my

heels together, salute smartly and explain to the General that I was the

Operations Officer for the Corps Air Service, whereupon I thought he

would certainly have some deference for me on account of the important

position I was holding with such low rank. My greatest hope was that he

would be reasonable and would take my statement regarding the situation

as final and authoritative, without further argument. I concluded that

the best way would be to impress him with the knowledge I had on the

particular subject and not give him a chance to come back. To do this I

must be absolutely firm and convincing in what I had to say, but at the

same time, way down deep in my heart I felt it was a hopeless task, for

these “higher ups” are inclined to consider nothing but results—and

since we could not give him the results he wanted, he would conclude

that the Air Service had failed, and as the line units had done on

several other similar occasions, they would merely remark, “the same old

story,” shrug their shoulders and pass it up. I, of course, expected to

find the General down in his dug-out, being heavily shelled, but I was

determined to show him that I was a real hero by walking right through

the shell-fire and calmly explaining to him why we couldn’t help him.

This last decision really required nerve on my part, for if there is any

one thing I cannot stand, it is shell-fire on the ground. It did not

worry me so much in the air, for there seemed to be such a good chance

to dodge, but on the ground—well, I had been caught in it several times

and, in each instance, I made the necessary distance to safety in

considerable less than record time on the fastest tracks.

I picked up a stray doughboy to guide me to the Post of Command. To my

absolute surprise I found that everything was apparently quiet. However,

the surroundings bore the unmistakable evidence that the region had

undergone a very heavy and prolonged bombardment. I could not understand

this; in fact, I was certain that we had come to the wrong Post of

Command.

“Orderly,” I said to a lad standing at the door, “is this the P. C. of

General Blank?” using the proper code name.

“That’s right, Sir,” he smartly answered.

“When did the bombardment stop?” I demanded.

“About two o’clock, Sir,” he replied.

“May I see the General?” I asked.

“What is the name, Sir?”

“Just tell the General or Chief of Staff that Lieutenant Haslett of the

Air Service would like to see either of them at their convenience. There

is nothing urgent.”

The orderly stepped inside and almost immediately a Lieutenant came out.

“I’m the General’s aide,” he said, extending his hand. “The General will

see you at once. Come right in.”

The door opened and I was ready with my speech. Out rushed the General

and his Chief of Staff and the rest of his staff around him—none of them

less in rank than a Lieutenant Colonel. Of course, I stood at attention,

stiff as an iceberg, but they thawed me out by a cordial “Are you

Haslett, the Operations Officer of the Air Service?”

I had never before in my life spoken to such a high ranking General and

in a quivering, quick voice which indicated that I expected to be

crucified at the next moment I said, “Yes, Sir.” The General advanced,

put out his hand and said, “Lieutenant, I want to congratulate you. That

is the first time we have ever had efficient service and coöperation

from your airplane crowd. All morning while we tried to get you by

wireless and we knew we had not succeeded, for you did not answer—they

were firing upon us terribly; and then we tried to get you on the

telephone, but I think the bursting shells around us was one of the

reasons you could not hear; but when we got that telegram through at

one-thirty and you acknowledged receiving it at a quarter of two—it was

simply fine. We saw an airplane circle overhead promptly at two o’clock

and that artillery stopped firing at exactly five minutes after two. Now

that’s what I call splendid work, and I am going to tell the Corps

Commander about it.”

Luck on the Wing: Thirteen Stories of a Sky Spy · 第 7 / 18 段