SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, on 76 there seemed to be some

misunderstanding between Dr. Siemers and myself. I understood that he

did not want to persist in the legal report on the _Altmark_ incident,

and I think Dr. Siemers thought that I wasn’t persisting. However, I

thought Dr. Siemers was withdrawing that.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, then, are you still objecting to that?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am still objecting to it if it is not

withdrawn, My Lord. However, the other ones in the list Your Lordship

mentioned—that is Numbers 18, 19, 48, 53, 81, 82, and 86—there is no

objection to.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Concerning Document 76, I agree with Sir David. Number 76

can be struck out, as far as I am concerned.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That’s all I wanted to know.

DR. SIEMERS: Number 80 about which I have spoken in detail with the

British Delegation...

THE PRESIDENT: You need not tell me about it.

DR. SIEMERS: I assumed there would be no objection. I would like to ask

that it be admitted in any case.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is right. In order that the Translation

Division should get on as soon as possible, the Tribunal has decided

upon these documents and the only questions upon which the Tribunal has

decided is that they shall be translated. The question of their

admissibility will be decided after they have been translated, and I

will take them in the categories of objection which are set out in Sir

David’s memorandum.

In Category A, the first category, Number 66 will be allowed. Number 76

as Dr. Siemers has now said, goes out. Numbers 101 to 106 will be

allowed, the rest are disallowed in A. In B the following documents will

be allowed: Numbers 39, 63, 64, 99, and 100. And, of course, Numbers 102

to 107, which are allowed under A. The rest will not be allowed.

Category C: The following will be allowed: Numbers 38, 50, 55, and 58.

The remainder are not allowed.

Category D: The following will be allowed: Numbers 29, 56, 57, 60, and

62.

Category E: The following will be allowed: Numbers 31, 32, 36, 37, 39,

41, and of course 99 and 101 which have already been allowed.

In the last category, Category F, the Tribunal has very great doubts as

to the relevance of any of the documents in that category, but it will

have them all translated with the exception of Document 73.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: My Lord, I wonder whether the Tribunal would

allow me to mention the document numbers of the additional extracts from

_Der Stürmer_ which were put in cross-examination of Streicher. I had

the numbers ready to present at a convenient time.

THE PRESIDENT: The exhibit numbers?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean read them?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: With the permission of the Tribunal, I have

proposed to hand in that schedule, which is in effect a catalogue or

index to the two bundles which the Tribunal had—Bundle A and Bundle

B—and I proposed then putting this schedule in as an exhibit itself,

which will become GB-450, (Document Number D-833), and if the Tribunal

agrees, that would save reading any numbers out.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There is another request I would make. The

original of the newspaper, _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, was put in, or

has been put in. Those volumes I have borrowed from a library, and I was

going to ask the Tribunal’s permission to have the extracts photographed

and to substitute with the Tribunal’s Secretariat the photostats, and

then take back the originals so that they might be returned.

THE PRESIDENT: There seems no objection to that.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged.

THE PRESIDENT: You have no objection to that, Dr. Marx?

DR. MARX: No, Mr. President, I have no objection to that. I reserve the

right to submit some counter documents if it should be necessary. But

the presentation of these documents is in accordance with what Colonel

Griffith-Jones stated in the course of the proceedings—if they are

submitted...

THE PRESIDENT: You have a copy of this document here, this exhibit.

DR. MARX: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I am asking you whether you had any objection to the

original of the Jewish newspaper being returned...

DR. MARX: No.

THE PRESIDENT: ...after it is photographed.

DR. MARX: No, I have no objection to that.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Dix?

DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, I believe you still had to supplement your answer

to a question I put to you yesterday. I put to you the point that

different memoranda, letters, _et cetera_ from you to Hitler were full

of National Socialist phraseology. I said you dealt with letters and

memoranda from the date of the seizure of power until later when you

went into opposition. The Prosecution, however, specifically in the oral

presentation of the charges, as I remember it, referred to at least one

letter which you addressed to Hitler before the seizure of power in

November 1932, and there is in the files another letter of similar

contents of August 1932. I think you should state your position with

respect to these two letters, supplementing your answer to my question.

DR. SCHACHT: I explained to you yesterday already that up to the

decisive election of July 1932, I had in no way intervened in the

development of the National Socialist movement, but remained completely

aloof from it. After that movement achieved its overpowering success in

July 1932, of which I spoke yesterday, I foresaw very clearly the

development which would now result. According to the principles of the

democratic political concept there was only one possibility, namely,

that the leader of that overwhelmingly large party would now have to

form a new government. I rejected from the first the other theoretical

possibility of a military government and a possibly resulting civil war,

as being impossible and incompatible with my principles.

Therefore, after I had recognized these facts I endeavored in everything

to gain influence over Hitler and his movement, and the two letters

which you have just mentioned were written in that spirit.

DR. DIX: What did you know about Hitler’s plans against Austria?

SCHACHT: I never knew anything about plans against Austria. Nor did I

know in detail the plans Hitler had for Austria. I only knew—like the

majority of all Germans—that he was in favor of an Anschluss of Austria

with Germany.

DR. DIX: What did you know about his plans against Czechoslovakia?

SCHACHT: I knew nothing of his plans against Czechoslovakia until about

the time of the Munich Conference.

DR. DIX: Did you, after the Munich Conference, that is to say, after the

peaceful, so far peaceful settlement of the Sudeten question, hear a

remark of Hitler’s about Munich which was of importance in your later

personal attitude toward Hitler? Will you tell the Tribunal the remark

which you heard?

SCHACHT: May I say first that, according to my knowledge of conditions

at that time, Hitler was conceded in Munich more than he had ever

expected. According to my information—and I expressed this also in the

conversation with Ambassador Bullitt at that time—it was Hitler’s

purpose to gain autonomy for the Germans in Czechoslovakia. In Munich

the Allies presented him with the transfer of the Sudeten-German

territories on a silver platter. I assumed, of course, that now Hitler’s

ambition would be more than satisfied and I can only say that I was

surprised and shocked when a few days after Munich I saw Hitler. I had

no further conversation with him at that time, but I met him with his

entourage, mostly SS men, and from the conversation between him and the

SS men I could only catch the remark: “That fellow has spoiled my entry

into Prague.” That is to say made it impossible.

Apparently he was not satisfied with the great success which he had

achieved in foreign politics, but I mentioned when I spoke about it

yesterday the fact that I assumed from that remark that he lacked the

glory and a glamorous staging.

DR. DIX: And what were your feelings in regard to your whole political

attitude towards Hitler after Munich?

SCHACHT: In spite of the foreign political success I regretted very

deeply, and so did my close friends, that by this intervention on the

part of the Allied Powers, our attempt to remove the Hitler regime was

ruined for a long time to come—we did not know at that time of course

what would happen in the future—but, naturally, at that moment we had

to resign ourselves to it.

DR. DIX: What did you know about Hitler’s plans against Memel?

SCHACHT: I knew nothing at all and never heard anything about it. As far

as I know, I learned of the annexation of Memel by Germany on my trip to

India, which I had already started at that time.

DR. DIX: And since you were in India at that time, you, of course, heard

nothing either about the negotiations, _et cetera_, which preceded the

attack on Poland?

SCHACHT: I had no knowledge about that and therefore I also knew nothing

of the May meeting of 1939 which has been discussed several times. In

the beginning of March I left Berlin and then stayed for some time in

Switzerland; at the end of March I set out for India via Genoa, and so I

learned nothing at all about the Hacha affair, that is the establishment

of the protectorate in Czechoslovakia, nor of Memel, nor of Poland,

since I did not return from the trip to India until the beginning of

August.

DR. DIX: The invasions of Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark have

been taken up here. Did you approve of these measures and actions?

SCHACHT: Under no circumstances.

DR. DIX: Were you ever able to express that disapproval anywhere and

how?

SCHACHT: Before the invasion of Belgium I was visited on the order of

the Chief of the General Staff, Halder, by the Quartermaster General,

the then Colonel, later General Wagner who after the collapse committed

suicide. He informed me of the intended invasion of Belgium. I was

shocked and I replied at that time, “If you want to commit that insanity

too, then you are beyond help.”

THE PRESIDENT: What time?

SCHACHT: Before the march into Belgium. Exactly when it was I could not

say. It may have been already in November 1939. It may have been in

April 1940. I no longer know exactly when it was.

DR. DIX: Even though you did not approve of that action, Germany was

after all engaged in a life and death struggle. Did not that cause you

to put your active co-operation at her disposal, since you were still

Minister without Portfolio, though you no longer held a special office?

SCHACHT: I did not do that.

DR. DIX: Did anyone ask you to do that?

SCHACHT: The visit, which I have just mentioned, of Quartermaster

General Wagner, upon order of the Chief of General Staff Halder, was

intended to persuade me to act in Germany’s interest during the expected

occupation of Belgium. I was to supervise and direct currency, finance,

and banking matters in Belgium. I flatly refused that. Later I was

approached again by the then Military Governor of Belgium, General Von

Falkenhausen, for advice concerning the Belgian financial

administration. I again refused to give advice and did not make any

statements or participate in any way.

DR. DIX: When did you for the first time...

SCHACHT: I could perhaps relate another instance when I was approached.

One day, shortly after America was drawn into the war, I received a

request from the newspaper published by Goebbels, that, on account of my

knowledge of American conditions, I should write an article for _Das

Reich_, to assure the German people that the war potential of the United

States should not be overestimated. I refused to write that article for

the reason that precisely because I knew American conditions very well,

my statement could only amount to the exact opposite. And so I refused

in this instance also.

DR. DIX: When did you hear for the first time of the meeting which we

call here simply the Hossbach meeting, or the meeting concerning the

Hossbach protocol?

SCHACHT: To my great surprise, I was informed of that meeting on 20

October 1945, here in my cell, and I was extremely astonished that

during all previous interrogations I had never been asked about this

record, because it can be seen clearly from it that the Reich Government

was not to be informed of Hitler’s intentions for war and therefore

could not know anything about them.

DR. DIX: Did you take part in similar conferences which were preparatory

to attacks, for instance the meeting of November 1940 in which the

attack on Russia was discussed? I do not wish to be misunderstood—the

Speer document which you spoke of yesterday discusses an attack which

according to Hitler was threatened by Russia. I am speaking now of

discussions in which the subject was an attack on Russia.

SCHACHT: The fear of an attack from Russia dates back to the fall of

1936 and therefore has as yet nothing to do with the war. I never took

part in any conference which indicated intentions of war, consequently

not in the conference on the intended attack on Russia, and I never

heard anything about it.

DR. DIX: Does that also apply to the meeting of May 1941?

SCHACHT: At the moment, I do not know which meeting that is, but I did

not in any way take part in any meeting in May 1941, as during the

entire period when I was Minister without Portfolio, I never took part

in any official conference.

DR. DIX: Then you also did not get any information about the conferences

which the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka had in Berlin?

SCHACHT: I did not have the slightest knowledge of the Matsuoka

conference except what may perhaps have been said on the radio or in the

press.

DR. DIX: Mention has been made in some way that you at one time had made

available 200,000 marks for Nazi propaganda purposes in Austria. Is

there any truth in this?

SCHACHT: I have not the slightest knowledge of that.

DR. DIX: Now we come to your dismissal as President of the Reichsbank.

As you have heard, the Prosecution asserts that you finally brought

about your own dismissal in order to evade the financial responsibility.

I ask you to reply to that accusation and to tell the Tribunal briefly

but exhaustively the reasons and the tactical deliberations leading to

your dismissal and that of your assistants. They appear here in the

memorandum of the Reichsbank Directorate which has been under

consideration several times.

SCHACHT: I should like to divide the question into two parts: The first

question is whether I tried to rid myself of my office as President of

the Reichsbank. My answer to that question is a most emphatic “yes.”

Since the middle of 1938, we in the Reichsbank always considered that if

there were no change in policy, we in no event wanted to continue in

office, because—and that brings me to the second part of the

question—we did not want to assume the responsibility which we were

then expected to bear.

For everything which we did previously and for a defensive rearmament in

order to achieve equal rights for Germany in international politics, we

gladly assumed responsibility, and we assume it before history and this

Tribunal. But the responsibility for continuing rearmament which

possibly in itself constituted a serious potential danger of war or

which would ever aim at war intentionally—that responsibility none of

us wanted to assume. Consequently, when it became clear that Hitler was

working toward a further increase in rearmament—and I spoke about that

yesterday in connection with the conversation of 2 January 1939—when we

became aware of that we wrote the memorandum which was openly quoted and

is in the hands of this Tribunal as an exhibit. It indicates clearly

that we opposed every further increase of state expenditure and would

not assume responsibility for it. From that, Hitler gathered that he

would in no event be able to use the Reichsbank with its present

Directorate and President for any future financial purposes. Therefore,

there remained only one alternative; to change the Directorate, because

without the Reichsbank he could not go on. And he had to take a second

step; he had to change the Reichsbank Law. That is to say, an end had to

be put to the independence of the Reichsbank from government decrees. At

first he did that in a secret law—we had such things—of 19 or 20

January 1939. That law was published only about 6 months later. That law

abolished the independence of the Reichsbank and the President of the

Reichsbank became a mere cashier for the credit demands of the Reich,

that is to say, of Hitler.

The Reichsbank Directorate did not want to continue along this line of

development. Therefore, on 20 January the President of the Reichsbank,

the Vice President, and the main financial expert, Reichsbank Director

Huelse, were dismissed; three other members of the Directorate of the

Reichsbank, Geheimrat Vocke, Director Erhard, and Director Blessing

pressed insistently for their resignation from the Reichsbank until it

was also granted. Two other members of the Reichsbank Directorate,

Director Puhl, whose name has been mentioned here already, and an eighth

director, Director Poetschmann, remained in the Directorate even under

the new conditions. They were both Party members, the only ones in the

Directorate, and therefore they could not easily withdraw.

DR. DIX: That is one accusation which is made by the Prosecution

concerning your reasons for writing the memorandum, that is to say, to

evade the financial responsibility. The second accusation is that not a

word of this memorandum expressly mentions limitation of armaments, but

that it essentially treats only matters of currency, technical questions

of finance, and economic considerations; and that it was therefore the

Dr. Schacht who in his capacity of Bank Director was concerned about the

currency, rather than the opponent of rearmament, who made himself heard

by this memorandum.

It is necessary that as co-author of the memorandum—as its main

author—you state your position with regard to this incriminating

interpretation of the memorandum.

SCHACHT: Even at an earlier time I said here that every objection which

I made and had to make to Hitler—and that applies not only to myself

but to all ministers—could only be made with arguments arising out of

the particular department administered.

Had I said to Hitler, “I shall not give you any more money because you

intend to wage war,” I should not have the pleasure of conducting this

animated conversation here with you. I could then have consulted a

priest, and it would have been a very one-sided affair because I would

have lain silently in my tomb, and the priest would have delivered a

monologue.

DR. DIX: This memorandum is certainly very important, and therefore we

have to pause here for a moment. In summarizing—and please check me—I

believe I can express your views in this way: This memorandum at the end

contained demands such as further means of raising funds by increase of

taxation or else by making use of the stock market—both impossible.

Taxation could not be increased any more. The stock market had just

unsuccessfully attempted a loan.

If these actually impossible demands had been granted, the Reichsbank

would have created guarantees that no further funds would be used for

one or another form of rearmament. This success was not to be expected;

rather you could expect your dismissal. Did my brief but comprehensive

summary of this matter express your views correctly?

SCHACHT: That entire letter was composed in such a way that there were

only two possible answers to it; either an alteration of financial

policy—and that meant a stop to rearmament, which would have amounted

to a complete change of Hitler’s policy—or else the dismissal of the

Reichsbank President; and that happened. We expected it because at that

time I no longer believed that Hitler would change his policy so

completely.

DR. DIX: Therefore, the Prosecution are right in saying that your

mission ended with your dismissal.

SCHACHT: Hitler certainly confirmed that himself and in the letter of

dismissal to me said it expressly. We heard from the testimony of Herr

Lammers in this Court that Hitler with his own hand wrote that addition

into the letter, that my name would remain connected with the first

stage of rearmament. The second stage of rearmament I rejected and

Hitler understood that very clearly, because when he received that

letter from the Reichsbank he said to those who were present: “This is

mutiny.”

DR. DIX: How do you know that?

SCHACHT: The witness Vocke who will, I hope, appear in this Court will

testify to that.

DR. DIX: Furthermore, the Prosecution asserted that your exit from the

political stage could not be attributed to your policy of opposition to

a war but to disputes with Hermann Göring over power and rank. As such,

that accusation seems to me to have been refuted already by statements

which Göring and Lammers have made up to now. We do not wish to

recapitulate. I merely want to ask you whether you have anything to add

to the statements made on this subject by Göring and Lammers, or whether

you disagree with them.

SCHACHT: In his oral presentation the prosecutor said that throughout

the entire material which he had studied he could not find one piece of

evidence for my opposition to a policy of war. I can only say in this

respect: If someone on account of his shortsightedness does not see a

tree on a level plain, there is surely no proof that the tree is not

there.

DR. DIX: You have heard from the Prosecution that you are accused of

having remained a member of the Cabinet as a Reich Minister without

Portfolio. That was also the cause for misunderstanding yesterday. I

merely wanted to express yesterday that you had resigned as an active

minister and head of a department, that you resigned as Minister of

Economy and His Lordship correctly pointed out, that of course you

remained a Minister without Portfolio, that is without a special sphere

of activity until January 1943. Of that you are accused by the

Prosecution. What caused you to remain Reich Minister without Portfolio?

Why did you do that? Did you have any particular financial reasons?

Excuse my mentioning that, but the trial brief, on Page 5, charges you

with that motive.

SCHACHT: I have already repeatedly explained here that my release from

office as Minister of Economy encountered very great difficulties, and

you have also submitted several affidavits confirming the fact.

Hitler did not, under any circumstances, want it to be known that a

break or even so much as a difference of opinion had occurred between

one of his assistants and himself. When he finally approved my release,

he attached the condition that nominally I should remain Minister

without Portfolio.

As regards the second accusation, it is as unworthy as it is wrong.

There was a law in Germany that if a person held two public offices he

could be paid only for one. Since I was in addition President of the

Reichsbank I continuously received my income from the Reichsbank, at

first my salary and later my pension; therefore as a minister I drew no

salary whatever.

DR. DIX: Did you then, during the entire period of your position as

Reich Minister without Portfolio, have any other function to fulfill in

that capacity? Did you take any part in important decisions of the

Cabinet, did you participate in discussions—in brief, was the Minister

without Portfolio just a fancy dress major or was the position one of

substance?

SCHACHT: I have already emphasized again and again in this Court—and I

can only repeat it again—that after I left the Reichsbank I had not a

single official discussion; I did not take part in a single ministerial

or official conference and that, unfortunately, it was not possible for

me to bring up any subject for discussion; for I had no factual basis or

pretext for such a possibility, for the very reason that I had no

particular field to administer. I believe that I was the only Minister

without Portfolio—there were also a few others—who was not active in

any way at all. As far as I know, Seyss-Inquart was undoubtedly Minister

without Portfolio; he had his administration in Holland. Frank was

Minister without Portfolio and had his administration in Poland.

Schirach—I do not know whether he was Minister without Portfolio; I

think it has been mentioned once, but I do not know if it is correct—he

had his Austrian administration in Vienna. I had nothing further to do

with the state administration or in any other way with the State or the

Party.

DR. DIX: What about the ordinary course of affairs? Were there perhaps

any circulars sent out by Lammers on which you acted?

SCHACHT: On the whole—and I think it is understandable after what I

have stated here—I watched carefully for every possibility of

intervening again in some way but I remember and state with absolute

certainty, that during the entire time until the collapse I received all

in all three official memoranda. The numerous invitations to state

funerals and similar social state functions really need not be mentioned

here as official communications. I did not participate in these

occasions either. However, these three instances are interesting. The

first time it was a letter from Hitler—pardon, from Himmler—a circular

or request or a bill proposed by Himmler who intended to transfer court

jurisdiction over the so-called asocial elements of the population to

the police, or rather the Gestapo, that is to say, a basic principle of

the administration of justice to separate the functions of prosecution

and judge...

DR. DIX: Well, that is known, Dr. Schacht. You can assume that is known.

SCHACHT: In regard to this question I immediately assented in the copy

of a letter which Reich Minister Frank had sent me in which he took a

stand against this basic violation of legal principles, and the bill was

not made law. It would indeed have been extremely regrettable, because I

am firmly convinced that I myself was a definite anti-social element in

Himmler’s sense.

The second instance was a letter concerning some discussions about state

property in Yugoslavia, after we had occupied Yugoslavia. I answered

that since I had not taken part in the preliminary discussions on the

draft of the law I should not be counted upon to assist in this matter.

Finally, the third incident—and this is the most important—occurred in

November 1942. Apparently by mistake there came into circulation the

draft for a law of the Reich Minister for Air, which contained the

suggestion of taking 15 and 16 year old students away from the high

school to enlist them for military service in the anti-aircraft defense,

the so-called Flakdienst. I answered this letter because it was a

welcome opportunity for me to state for once my opinion on the military

situation in a long detailed reply which I sent to Göring.

DR. DIX: On the third of November?

SCHACHT: It is a letter of 30 November, which on the second of December

I believe was given personally by my secretary to the adjutant of Göring

in a closed envelope, with the request that he himself open it.

DR. DIX: One moment, Dr. Schacht.

[_Turning to the Tribunal._] That letter has already been submitted

under Document Number 3700-PS by the Prosecution, but it is also in our

document book under Exhibit Number 23; Page 66 of the English text and

Page 59 of the German text. If we were not so pressed for time, it would

have been especially gratifying for me to read this letter here in full.

It is a very fine letter. However, I want to take time into

consideration and I merely ask you, Dr. Schacht, to state briefly your

opinion of its content.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will read the letter. It isn’t necessary for

you to read it now, is it?

DR. DIX: Very well. Well, then, would he speak quite briefly about the

letter before the recess or do you not wish to say anything further?

SCHACHT: Yes. I would like to say in this connection, if it is

permitted, that to my knowledge this letter has already been read here

by the American Chief Prosecutor, that is...

DR. DIX: Read?

SCHACHT: Or mentioned, or at least the most important points were read.

I believe it is sufficient if you submit the letter to the Court in

evidence.

DR. DIX: Yes, that has been done.

Now, that constituted your entire activity as Reich Minister without

Portfolio?

SCHACHT: Yes, that was the end of it.

DR. DIX: Therefore if one wanted to define your position in one word,

one would say, just a kind of retired major (Charaktermajor).

SCHACHT: I don’t know what a “Charaktermajor” is, at any rate, I was

never a major, but I have always had character.

DR. DIX: But, Dr. Schacht, that is a historical remark about authority

conferred by Kaiser Wilhelm, the First as German Emperor on Bismarck.

THE PRESIDENT: I think this is a convenient time to break off.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, we spoke of the letter, dated 30 November 1942, to

Göring. Did that letter have any consequences?

SCHACHT: Yes, the letter had very considerable consequences. It had the

result that on 22 January I did at last receive my long hoped-for

release from my position of a nominal Minister without Portfolio. The

reason given for it, however, was less pleasant. I believe the letter is

already in the files of the Tribunal. It is a letter attached to the

official document of release from Lammers.

DR. DIX: Yes, very well. We put a question on that subject during

Lammers’ hearing.

SCHACHT: Yes. But I should only like to refer to the statement which

says: “...in view of your entire conduct in the present fateful struggle

of the German nation...”—so that was my whole attitude.

DR. DIX: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, it is Number 26 of the document

book. It is on Page 76 of the English text and on Page 69 of the German

text.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Please continue.

SCHACHT: It was, therefore, my entire attitude during this war which led

to my dismissal, and the letter of dismissal also contained the

statement that I would be dismissed for the time being. According to

Lammers’ statement, as we have heard, this expression “for the time

being” was included in the letter, also on the Führer’s initiative. I

was very clearly aware of this wording when I received the letter.

Two days later I was removed from the Prussian State Council, of which I

was a member—a body, incidentally, which had not met for at least 8

years. At any rate, I was not at the meetings. Perhaps it was 6 years, I

do not know. The text of that decision was communicated to me by the

chairman of that State Council, Hermann Göring, and because of its

almost amusing contents, I still recollect it very clearly. It stated:

“My answer to your defeatist letter undermining the power of

resistance of the German people is that I remove you from the

Prussian State Council.”

I say it was amusing because a sealed letter written by me to Göring

could not possibly shake the power of resistance of the German people. A

further result was that Party Leader Bormann demanded from me the return

of the Golden Party Badge and I did that at once. After that I was

particularly closely watched by the Gestapo. I gave up my residence in

Berlin immediately, within 24 hours, and for the whole day the Gestapo

spies followed me all over Berlin both on foot and by car. Then I

quietly retired to my estate in the country.

DR. DIX: Now, since the trial brief has mentioned material and pecuniary

reasons for the decisions which you made, it appears to me justified and

necessary to ask what was the position regarding your property and your

income after 1933? In your reply please take into consideration that it

is striking that in 1942 there was an increase in your income.

SCHACHT: A few months ago, apparently with the approval of the Military

Government, there appeared in the press a list of donations which the

Party leaders and ministers in Germany received and, in that connection,

of their income and their property. I was also listed, not under

“donations,” but it was stated that in 1942 I had an unusually high

income. This list is incorrect, since it is a gross figure which is

mentioned and it does not take into consideration the fact that the war

profit tax was later deducted from it. When the list was compiled the

tax was not yet determined, so that about 80 percent must be deducted

from the sum which is given there. The income is then no longer striking

in any way. In regard to my property, the list shows that over a period

of 10 years it has hardly changed, and I want to emphasize here

particularly that in the last 20 years my property remained

approximately the same and did not increase.

DR. DIX: If I remember rightly you reduced your own salary as President

of the Reichsbank at a certain time on your own initiative?

SCHACHT: When, on Hitler’s suggestion, President Hindenburg in March of

1933 appointed me again to the position of President of the Reichsbank,

Hitler left it to me to fix my own income. At that time, I voluntarily

reduced my income to less than 25 percent of my former income from the

Reichsbank.

DR. DIX: Did you ever receive presents or donations from Hitler, either

in money or in valuables?

SCHACHT: As I have just mentioned, I have never received any kind of

donations from Hitler, and I think he would hardly have risked offering

me one. I did, indeed, receive one present from Hitler, on the occasion

of my 60th birthday. He gave me a picture which certainly had the value

of about 20,000 marks. It was an oil painting by a German painter

Spitzweg; and would have been worth approximately 200,000 marks if it

had been genuine. As soon as the picture was brought into my room I

recognized it as a forgery, but I succeeded about 3 months later in

tracing the original. I started proceedings on the subject of the

genuineness of the picture, and the forgery was established before a

court.

THE PRESIDENT: It is not appropriate for the Tribunal to listen to this.

DR. DIX: Did Hitler ever bestow on you the right to wear a uniform or

give you any kind of decoration or military rank?

SCHACHT: If the Tribunal will permit me I would like to say that I

returned the forgery and it was never replaced; so that I have received

no presents from Hitler.

Hitler offered me a uniform. He said I could have any uniform I desired

but I only raised my hands in refusal and did not accept any, not even

the uniform of an official, because I did not wish to have a uniform.

DR. DIX: Now, another subject: Did you know anything about the

concentration camps?

SCHACHT: Already in the year 1933, when Göring established concentration

camps, I heard several times that political opponents and other disliked

or inconvenient persons were taken away to a concentration camp. That

these people were deprived of their liberty perturbed me very much at

the time, of course, and I continuously demanded, as far as I was in a

position to do so during conversations, that the arrest and removal to

concentration camps should be followed by a clarification before the law

with a defense and so on, and suitable legal proceedings. At that early

time the Reich Minister of the Interior Frick also protested

energetically along the same lines. Subsequently this type of

imprisonment, _et cetera_, became less known in public, and in

consequence I assumed that things were slowly abating. Only much

later—let us say the second half of 1934 and 1935...

DR. DIX: When you met Gisevius, you mean?

SCHACHT: Yes, when I met Gisevius—I heard on repeated occasions that

not only were people still being deprived of their liberty, but that

sometimes they were being ill-treated, that beatings, _et cetera_, took

place. I have already said before this Tribunal that as a result, as

early as May 1935, I personally took the opportunity of drawing Hitler’s

attention to these conditions and that I told him at the time that such

a system was causing the whole world to despise us and must cease. I

have mentioned that I repeatedly took a stand against all these things

publicly, whenever there was a possibility of doing so.

But I never heard anything of the serious ill-treatment and

outrages—murder and the like—which started later. Probably because,

firstly, these conditions did not begin until after the war, after the

outbreak of war, and because already from 1939 onwards I led a very

retired life. I heard of these things and of the dreadful form in which

they happened only here in prison. However, I did hear, as early as 1938

and after, of the deportation of Jews; but because individual cases were

brought to my notice I could only ascertain that there were deportations

to Theresienstadt, where allegedly there was an assembly camp for Jews,

where Jews were accommodated until a later date when the Jewish problem

was to be dealt with again. Any physical ill-treatment, not to speak of

killing or the like, never came to my knowledge.

DR. DIX: Did you ever take a look at a concentration camp?

SCHACHT: I had an opportunity of acquainting myself with several

concentration camps when, on 23 July 1944, I myself was dragged into a

concentration camp. Before that date I did not visit a single

concentration camp at any time, but afterwards I got to know not only

the ordinary concentration camps but also the extermination camp in

Flossenbürg.

DR. DIX: Did you not, while in Flossenbürg, receive a visit from a

“comrade-in-ideas”—if I may say so?

SCHACHT: I know of this matter only from a letter which this gentleman

sent to you or to this Tribunal, I believe, and in which he describes

that visit. I can only, on my own observation...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think it is improper to give the contents of a

letter from a person unidentified. I have said to this Tribunal before

that these letters which come from unidentified persons—if he is

identified, it has not been done in evidence—come to all of us. I am

sure members of the Tribunal get a great many of them. If that is

evidence, then the Prosecution should reopen its case, because I have

baskets of them.

I think it is highly improper to take communications and put them in

evidence directly and it is even more improper to relate all of them by

oral testimony when the document is not produced. I think this kind of

evidence has no probative value and I object to it.

DR. DIX: May I be permitted to say that I would never do anything

improper nor have I done it. I do not intend in any way to submit this

very harmless jocular letter to the Tribunal as evidence. But this

letter, which reached me through quite regular channels, informed Dr.

Schacht and myself that there existed a plan to murder him in

Flossenbürg. That is why I also questioned the witness Kaltenbrunner on

this matter. The only reason why I am asking Dr. Schacht is that I

expect him to inform the Tribunal that according to this information

there was in fact at that time an order to murder him. This fact, not

the letter, is not without some significance, because if a regime wants

to kill a man then that is at least proof of the fact that it is not

particularly well-disposed toward him. That is the only reason why I

asked that this letter be submitted, and it is, of course, also at Mr.

Justice Jackson’s disposal. It is really quite an amusing letter,

written by a simple man.

But I would never have considered submitting this letter as a document

in evidence. If the Tribunal have objections to hearing the matter, a

matter which was also discussed when Kaltenbrunner was examined, then I

shall willingly omit it. I am quite astonished that the matter should be

given so much significance.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal thinks that the letter isn’t being

offered in evidence, and therefore you ought not to refer to it. Well,

then, don’t refer to it.

DR. DIX: All right, we shall leave it.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, now, at last you were released. What

did you do then?

SCHACHT: After that time I did nothing more apart from continuing my

efforts towards the removal of Hitler. That was my only political

activity. For the rest, I was living on my estate.

DR. DIX: Did you not go on a journey in the spring of 1939?

SCHACHT: Excuse me, you are speaking of the time after the dismissal as

President of the Reichsbank, I thought you meant minister. I was just

talking of 1943.

DR. DIX: No. No.

SCHACHT: You are going back to the year 1939. After the dismissal in

January 1939 I already mentioned that Hitler suggested to me that I

should go on an extensive journey abroad and at the time I went to India

by way of Switzerland, where I again saw my friends.

DR. DIX: Were you in any way politically active in India?

SCHACHT: In India I merely traveled as a tourist. I was not politically

active but, of course, I visited several governors and I spent 3 days as

the Viceroy’s guest in his house in Simla.

DR. DIX: Did you not have political connections with Chinese statesmen

in Rangoon?

SCHACHT: When I was in Burma, after leaving India, I received a visit in

Rangoon from a Chinese friend who had visited me before in Berlin on

occasion and who had been commissioned by his government to talk to me

about the Situation of China.

DR. DIX: That is Chiang Kai-Shek’s China?

SCHACHT: Chiang Kai-Shek’s China which was already at war with Japan at

the time. The other China did not then exist and this gentleman asked me

upon the request of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Chinese Cabinet...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I can’t see the slightest relevancy to this. In the

first place, we heard it once and secondly, after we had heard it it has

no relevancy to the case. We have no charge against him that he did

anything in China and we will stipulate that he was as pure as snow all

the time he was in China. We haven’t a thing to do with that and it is

taking time here that just gets us nowhere and is keeping us away from

the real charge in the case.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal quite understands that you say it is

irrelevant. Why do you say it is relevant?

DR. DIX: I regret that Mr. Justice Jackson and I understand each other

too little. The matter is relevant in the following connection: In this

testimony and also in an affidavit which has been read...

THE PRESIDENT: I think we heard three times that the Defendant Schacht

went to India. Three times in his evidence he dealt with the fact that

he went to India and China. How is it relevant?

DR. DIX: I am not speaking of the journey to India. It had to be

mentioned only briefly to explain the connection of time. I put a

question, referring to Schacht’s negotiations in Rangoon with the envoy

from Chiang Kai-Shek—with the Chinese—and at that point Mr. Justice

Jackson raised his objection. But the fact that Schacht maintained

friendly connections with Chiang Kai-Shek’s Government and gave support

to it, that fact is relevant, and for the same reason for which I

attached importance to the fact that it became clear here that in regard

to the Union of Soviet Republics also Schacht pursued a pro-Soviet line

in his economic policy during the years when Hitler was conducting a

political campaign against Russia. Here we have a second instance, where

he is demanding relations which were contrary to the principles of

Hitler’s policy; that is relations with Chiang Kai-Shek, and so against

Hitler’s ally, Japan. It is in this connection that the negotiations

with the Chinese are of significance. They will take only a moment’s

time at most. They were merely to be mentioned in passing.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you consider his relations

with China of any importance, it can be stated in one sentence.

DR. DIX: I am of the same opinion.

SCHACHT: I will sum it up in one sentence. In a written memorandum I

advised Chiang Kai-Shek’s government to continue holding out against

Japan, giving as reason that the economic resources of China would last

longer than the economic resources of Japan; and I advised Chiang

Kai-Shek to rely primarily on the United States of America in his

foreign policy.

DR. DIX: Then upon your return from India, that is, in August 1939, you

found a situation which must have appeared quite tense to someone who

was just coming back. Did you not then attempt to contact the Cabinet or

Hitler in order to discuss this situation?

SCHACHT: Of course, I found a very tense situation in the question of

Poland and I used my return as an occasion for writing a letter to

Hitler, a letter to Göring, and a letter to Ribbentrop; that is to say,

the three leading men, in order to inform them that I had come back from

India, leaving it to their discretion and expecting that at least one of

them would ask me for an account of my experiences; and then, I should

have had an opportunity of talking to the leading men once again. To my

very great surprise, I did not get an answer from Hitler at all; I

received no reply from Göring; and Herr Von Ribbentrop answered me that

he had taken note of my letter. There was therefore no other way for me

but to make my own inquiries regarding the real state of affairs on

Poland, and when things became critical I took the well-known step,

which has already been described here by Herr Gisevius; namely the

attempt to gain access to the Führer’s headquarters.

DR. DIX: We need not repeat that. The only question which I still want

to ask you is what were you going to tell the generals, particularly

General Von Brauchitsch, at that last moment?

SCHACHT: That he still had a chance to avert a war. I knew perfectly

well that bare economic and general political statements would of course

accomplish nothing with Von Brauchitsch because he would then certainly

have referred to Hitler’s leadership. Therefore I wanted to say to him

something of quite a different nature and, in my opinion, that is of the

most decisive significance. I was going to remind him that he had sworn

an oath of allegiance to the Weimar Constitution. I wanted to remind him

that the Enabling Act did not delegate power to Hitler but to the Reich

Cabinet and I wanted to remind him that in the Weimar Constitution there

was and still is a clause, which has never been annulled and according

to which, war cannot be declared without previous approval by the

Reichstag. I was convinced that Brauchitsch would have referred me to

his oath sworn to Hitler and I would have told him: “I also have sworn

this oath. You have sworn no oath other than your military one, perhaps,

but this oath does not in any way invalidate the oath sworn to the

Weimar Constitution; on the contrary, the oath to the Weimar

Constitution is the one that is valid. It is your duty, therefore, to

see to it that this entire question of war or no war be brought before

the Cabinet and discussed there, and when the Reich Cabinet has made a

decision, the matter will go before the Reichstag.” If these two steps

had been taken, then I am firmly convinced that there would have been no

war.

DR. DIX: You never reached Brauchitsch. We do not want to repeat the

description of that whole affair or of your attempts at the

Bendlerstrasse and so on. Have you anything to add to Gisevius’

testimony or do you wish to change anything in it?

SCHACHT: I can only confirm that Gisevius’ statement is correct in every

single point and I myself merely want to add that Canaris mentioned

among many reasons which then kept us from making the visit, that

Brauchitsch would probably have us arrested immediately if we said

anything to him against the war or if we wanted to prevent him from

fulfilling his oath of allegiance to Hitler. But the main reason why the

visit did not come about was quite correctly stated by Gisevius.

Moreover it is also mentioned by General Thomas in his affidavit which

we shall later submit. The main reason was: the war was canceled. And so

I went to Munich on a business matter and to my surprise while in

Munich, war was declared on Poland; the country was invaded.

DR. DIX: You mentioned the Reichstag a short time ago. A meeting of the

Reichstag did in fact take place, though not before the war or before

the declaration of war, but immediately thereafter. At the time you were

still a Minister without Portfolio.

Normally you would have had to sit on the minister’s bench during that

meeting.

Did you take part in that meeting?

SCHACHT: I did not participate in that meeting at all and I would like

to add at once that during the entire war, I was present at only one

meeting of the Reichstag. I could not avoid it, considering the matters

which I already mentioned here yesterday. It was after Hitler’s return

from Paris. I had to participate in this meeting of the Reichstag, which

followed the reception at the station because, as I said, it would

otherwise have been too obvious an affront. It was the meeting during

which political matters were not dealt with at all, but at which the

field marshal’s rank was granted by the dozen.

DR. DIX: Now, this last effort which has just been mentioned to stop the

outbreak of war through Canaris brings us to the particular chapter of

your attempts at a coup to overthrow Hitler and his government. We want

to make it a rule, if possible, not to repeat what the witness Gisevius

has already stated but only to supplement or correct or state what you

know from your own memory. Before I touch upon that chapter, however,

may I ask you whether you know from information you received or from

other indications, that your oppositional attitude and that of your

similarly minded friends, and your oppositional aims, were known in

authoritative circles abroad?

SCHACHT: I do not wish to repeat anything; I merely want to point out

that I have already stated repeatedly here that I continually discussed

the situation in Germany—thus also my own position—with my friends

abroad—not only with Americans, Englishmen, and Frenchmen but also with

neutrals—and I would like to add one more thing; foreign broadcasting

stations did not tire at all of speaking constantly about Schacht’s

opposition to Hitler. My friends and family received a shock whenever

information on this subject transpired in Germany.

DR. DIX: When did your attempts to overthrow the Hitler government

begin?

SCHACHT: As early as 1937 I tried to determine which groups in Germany

one might rely upon in an attempt to remove the Hitler regime.

Unfortunately in the years 1935, 1936, and 1937, I got to know that all

those circles in which I had placed my hope were failing, namely the

scientists, the educated middle class, and the leaders of economy.

I need only mention that the scientists permitted themselves to listen

to the most nonsensical National Socialist lectures without opposing

them in the least. I call attention to the fact that when the economic

leaders saw that I was no longer a figure in economy, they disappeared

from my anteroom and thronged into that of Göring. In a word, one could

not rely upon these circles. Consequently, one could depend only on the

generals, on the military, because according to my conception at the

time, one could certainly count on an armed resistance even by the SS

bodyguard.

Therefore, as has been stated here—and I do not want to pursue it

further—I tried at first to contact such generals as Kluge, for

instance, merely in order to ascertain whether among the military there

were people with whom one could speak openly. And this first occasion

led me to a great many generals whom I contacted in the course of time.

DR. DIX: That was then in the year 1937; now we come to 1938, still

limiting ourselves by what Gisevius has already said, merely touching on

it briefly and confirming it. By the way, were you in any way directly

or indirectly involved in the negotiations at Godesberg or Munich?

SCHACHT: In no way.

DR. DIX: Now we continue with your political work, aiming at a revolt.

Is Gisevius’ account of the year 1938 correct or is there something to

be added to it?

SCHACHT: Gisevius’ statement is complete and reliable.

DR. DIX: That also applies to the attempt at a _coup d’état_ in the late

summer of 1938?

SCHACHT: Yes.

DR. DIX: Then came the war. Did you fold your arms after war broke out?

SCHACHT: No; throughout the entire war I pleaded with every general whom

I could contact. I used the same arguments which I have just mentioned

in connection with the prospective interview with Brauchitsch;

therefore, it was not merely theory, but I actually spoke to all these

generals.

DR. DIX: Was not a visit to General Hoeppner significant in this

connection?

SCHACHT: In 1941 I tried not only to get in touch with General Hoeppner

but in a whole series of conversations I attempted to make him take

action. Hoeppner was perfectly willing and prepared and later he too,

unfortunately, lost his life as a consequence of 20 July 1944.

In the year 1942—and this has not been mentioned here up to now,

because Gisevius did not participate—I tried again to mobilize General

Von Witzleben to renewed activity. I went on a special journey to

Frankfurt-on-the-Main, where he had his headquarters at that time, and

Von Witzleben proved as ever to be completely resolved to act, but he

told me that, of course, he could only do so if he again received a

command at the front. Then I...

DR. DIX: At that time Frau Strünck, who knew of these matters, was in

Frankfurt?

SCHACHT: She knew of these things and can confirm them.

DR. DIX: Perhaps I may tell the Tribunal at this point that Frau Strünck

was granted me as a witness and she was here. In order to save time,

however, I have decided to dispense with this witness since she could

make only cumulative statements on what Gisevius has already said and I

do not think it is necessary. Schacht himself has just stated the only

piece of information which she could have added, namely this trip, this

special journey to Frankfurt to Von Witzleben. On the strength of

experience the Tribunal will itself know that in the course of a

revolutionary movement, stretching over years such as this, many

journeys are made and in respect to this particular journey it is not

important to submit special evidence. In order to save time, therefore,

I have decided to dispense with the testimony of Frau Strünck. Excuse

me, I merely wanted to say this now. Then there is the next...

SCHACHT: May I perhaps say one more thing? I of course always

participated in the conversations—mentioned by Gisevius here—with the

other generals, that is the group of Beck, Fromm, Olbricht, _et cetera_.

These things did not come about for some time on account of the

negotiations abroad for which the generals were always waiting. I think

that enough has been said here about this topic and I need not make

further report on it. I come then to one last point, which does not

become apparent from Gisevius’ statement but about which an affidavit

from Colonel Gronau will be submitted here. I can mention it quite

briefly in order to save time. Naturally, together with the group of

Beck, Goerdeler, my friend Strünck, Gisevius, and others I was

completely informed of, and initiated into, the affair of 20 July.

However, and I think it was mutual, we told each other whenever possible

only those things which the other absolutely had to know, in order not

to embarrass the other man, should he at any time be submitted to the

tortures of the Gestapo. For that reason, apart from being in touch with

Beck, Goerdeler, Gisevius, and Strünck, _et cetera_, I had another

connection with the generals who were at the head of this revolt and

that was the General of Artillery Lindemann, one of the main

participants in the coup, who unfortunately also lost his life later.

DR. DIX: Perhaps it would be proper—and also more intelligible in

connection with your participation in 20 July—if I read a brief part of

Colonel Gronau’s affidavit which refers to Lindemann.

[_Turning to the Tribunal._] It is Exhibit Number 39 of our document

book, Page 168 of the German text and Page 176 of the English text. I

shall omit the first part of the affidavit, but I ask the Tribunal to

take judicial notice of it; essentially it contains only matters on

which evidence has already been given. I shall read only the part that

deals with 20 July. It begins on Page 178 of the English text and on

Page 170 of the German text, and I start with Question 5:

“Question 5) You brought Schacht and General Lindemann together.

When was that?

“Answer 5) In the fall of 1943, for the first time in years, I

again saw General Lindemann, my former school and regiment

comrade. While discussing politics I told him that I knew

Schacht well, and General Lindemann asked to be introduced to

him, whereupon I established the connection.

“Question 6) What did Lindemann expect from Schacht, and what

was Schacht’s attitude toward him?

“Answer 6) The taking up of political relations with foreign

countries following a successful attempt at revolt. He promised

his future co-operation. At the beginning of 1944 Lindemann made

severe reproaches that the generals”—that should read “he

severely reproached Lindemann”; it is incorrectly copied

here—“because the generals were hesitating so long. The attempt

at revolt would have to be made prior to the landing of the

Allies.”

“Question 7) Was Lindemann involved in the attempted

assassination of 20 July 1944?

“Answer 7) Yes, he was one of the main figures.

“Question 8) Did he inform Schacht of the details of this plan?

“Answer 8) Nothing about the manner in which the attempt was to

be carried out; he did inform him, however, of what was to

happen thereafter.

“Question 9) Did Schacht approve the plan?

“Answer 9) Yes.

“Question 10) Did Schacht put himself at the disposal of the

military in the event of a successful attempt?

“Answer 10) Yes.

“Question 11) Were you arrested after 20 July 1944?

“Answer 11) Yes.

“Question 12) How were you able to survive your imprisonment?

“Answer 12) By stoically denying complicity.”

Now, we have left the years 1941 and 1942 and to explain the Putsch in

logical sequence we reached the year 1944, something that could not be

avoided, but we must now go back again to the year 1941. You have

already mentioned, in passing, the efforts made abroad. In 1941 you were

in Switzerland. Did you make any efforts in that direction there?

SCHACHT: Every time I went abroad I talked at length to my foreign

friends and again and again looked for some way by which one might

shorten the war and begin negotiations.

DR. DIX: In this connection, the Fraser letter is of importance. I think

the Fraser letter and the way it was smuggled into Switzerland has been

sufficiently discussed by the witness Gisevius. I have on two occasions

stated the contents briefly, once when the translation was discussed and

again during the discussion on the admissibility of the letter as

evidence before the Court. I do not think I need do it here nor that I

need read it. I should merely like to submit it. It is Exhibit 31, on

Page 84 of the German and Page 91 of the English text. And—I say this

now, we shall discuss it later—the same applies to the article which

appeared this year in the _Basler Nachrichten_ and which deals with a

conversation which an American had with Schacht recently. I shall not

read that either since I have already stated the main points of its

contents. I submit it as Exhibit Number 32, Page 90 of the German text

and Page 99 of the English text. I might point out that this article has

already been the subject of certain accusations made during the

cross-examination of Gisevius by the representative of the Soviet

Prosecution.

GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to raise one objection in regard to Document

32; this is an article about Dr. Schacht and his ideas by an unknown

writer describing his conversations with an unknown economist. The

article in question was published in the _Basler Nachrichten_ on 14

January 1946, that is, when the present Trial was already well under

way, and I cannot consider that this article can be presented in

evidence with regard to Schacht’s case.

DR. DIX: I might—may I, before the Tribunal decides, say something very

briefly?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

DR. DIX: The article has already been admitted as evidence. We have

discussed it, and the Tribunal approved the article as evidence. The

Tribunal can, of course, revoke that decision. I think, for me it

would...

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal has always made it clear that the

allowance of these documents is a provisional allowance and that when

the document is actually offered in evidence, they will then decide the

relevancy or its admissibility, rather, and its relevancy.

DR. DIX: That is quite beyond doubt. I merely wanted to point out that

we have already discussed the question once before. Of course, the

Tribunal can today reject the document. I shall...

THE PRESIDENT: The allowance is provisional. It is not a question of the

Tribunal’s reversing its previous decision. The previous decision was

merely provisional, and the question of admissibility now comes up for

decision.

DR. DIX: It is quite clear to me, Your Lordship. I am merely surprised

at the objection raised by the Soviet Prosecution, inasmuch as the

representative of the Soviet Delegation himself referred to that article

in his observations during the cross-examination of the witness

Gisevius. It is true, he did not submit it to the Tribunal, but he

referred to it in his observations to the witness Gisevius. However, if

the Tribunal has the slightest objections to allowing the article as

documentary evidence, then I shall ask permission to leave it. I will

then—and I think I may—ask the witness Schacht whether it is true that

in 1941 he had a conversation with an American who was a professor of

national economy, a conversation which dealt with the possibility of

peace. I leave it to the Tribunal. For me, it is no—I thought it would

be simpler, if I submitted the article.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, as you have raised the objection to this

document, what have you to say about the point that Dr. Dix makes that

you used the document yourself in cross-examination?

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, we did not use this document in the

cross-examination of the witness Gisevius. An explanatory question was

asked in order to reach a decision on this point and I particularly

emphasize...

THE PRESIDENT: Will you say that again? I did not understand you.

GEN. RUDENKO: I say, that we did not use this document during the

cross-examination of the witness Gisevius, but we did ask an explanatory

question in order that when the document was presented by Dr. Dix, we

could object to it as being of no probative value. I especially...

THE PRESIDENT: But did you not put the contents of the document to

Gisevius? I do not remember. What I want to know is did you not put the

contents of the document?

GEN. RUDENKO: No, no, we did not submit the contents, and we did not

discuss the substance of the document. We merely asked a question—did

the witness Gisevius know about the article in the _Basler Nachrichten_

of 14 January 1946? That was the question, and the witness answered that

it was known to him.

DR. DIX: May I say one more thing? It appears to me that the Soviet

Delegation does not desire to have the article submitted as evidence. I

therefore withdraw it as evidence. And since I have no due reasons to

the contrary, no factual reason to the contrary, 1 can certainly fulfill

this wish of the Soviet Delegation. I would like the Tribunal to

consider the matter as settled.

May I now put my question?

[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, you had conversations in

Switzerland?

SCHACHT: Yes.

DR. DIX: What was the subject of these conversations, in broad outlines,

and with whom did you have them?

SCHACHT: This article, which has just been discussed...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: First, Your Honor, may I interpose an objection?

The reason I did not join in the Soviet objection to this document was

that I want to know who this economist is. I want to check this thing.

There are very peculiar circumstances about this document, and I object

to his retelling a conversation with an unknown economist. All I ask is

that he identify time and place and person with whom he had his

conversation, so that we can do a little verifying of this effort to get

something before the Tribunal that did not appear until 1946.

DR. DIX: The question is now being given a significance which its

comparative triviality really does not merit. I shall, therefore,

dispense with this question too. Please do not now refer to the

conversation with the professor, and I shall leave it to the Prosecution

to put the question which Mr. Justice Jackson has just mentioned during

cross-examination.

Well, your conversations in Switzerland, then, excepting that with the

unknown professor.

SCHACHT: Yes, I tried again and again to shorten the war and to bring

about some form of mediation which I always sought for particularly

through the good offices of the American President. That is all that I

can say here. I do not think I need go into details.

DR. DIX: Very well. Did you in your letters to Ribbentrop and

Göring—you have already mentioned Hitler—or besides, did you, during

the war, state your views about the policy of the war in writing at any

time? First of all, as far as Hitler was concerned.

SCHACHT: I mentioned my discussion with Hitler in February 1940. In the

summer of 1941 I wrote a detailed letter to Hitler, and the witness

Lammers has admitted its existence. I do not think he was asked about

the contents of this letter here, or he was not allowed to talk about

it. If I may come back to it; in that letter, I pointed out somewhat as

follows—I shall use direct language—“You are at present at the height

of your success.”—This was after the first Russian victories.—“The

enemy believes that you are stronger than you really are. The alliance

with Italy is rather a doubtful one, since Mussolini will one day fall

and then Italy will drop out. Whether Japan can still come to your aid

at all is questionable in view of Japan’s weakness in the face of

America. I assume that the Japanese will not be so foolish as to wage

war against America. The output of steel, for instance, in spite of

approximately similar population figures, amounts to one-tenth of the

American production. I do not think, therefore, that Japan will enter

into the war. I now recommend you at all events to reverse foreign

policy completely and to attempt with every means to conclude a peace.”

DR. DIX: Did you state your views to Ribbentrop during the war?

SCHACHT: I do not know when it was. On one occasion Herr Von Ribbentrop

conveyed to me through his State Secretary, Herr Von Weizsäcker, the

reproachful message that I should not indulge in defeatist remarks. That

may have been in 1940 or in 1941, during one of those 2 years. I asked

where I had made defeatist remarks and it appeared that I had talked to

my colleague Funk and had given him extensive reasons why Germany could

never win this war. I held this conviction unchangeable at all times

before and during the war, even after the fall of France. I answered

Ribbentrop through his State Secretary that I, as Minister without

Portfolio, considered it my duty to state my opinion to a ministerial

colleague in its true conception, and in this written reply I maintained

the view that Germany’s economic power was not sufficient to wage this

war. This letter, that is, a copy of this letter was sent both to

Minister Funk and to Minister Ribbentrop through his State Secretary.

DR. DIX: I think, Your Lordship, this would be a suitable moment...

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

DR. DIX: I spoke before of 20 July. Do you recall a statement made by

Hitler about you in connection with 20 July?

SCHACHT: Codefendant Minister Speer was present and told me about it. It

was on 22 July 1944 when Hitler issued the order to his circle for my

arrest. At that time he made derogatory remarks about me and stated that

he had been greatly hindered in his rearmament program by my negative

activities, and that it would have been better if he had had me shot

before the war.

DR. DIX: To conclude I come to a few general collective questions.

Voices were heard within the country, and also abroad—and even the

Prosecution, although recognizing your intellectual capacities and the

services you rendered, appears to consider it also—that it was

incomprehensible that a man as clever as you did not recognize the true

nature, the real intentions of Hitler in time. I would like you to state

your position with regard to that accusation.

SCHACHT: I should like very much to have known the gentlemen who are now

judging me, at a time when it might have been of use. These are the

people who always know afterwards what ought to have been done before. I

can only state that first of all, from 1920 until the seizure of power

by Hitler, I tried to influence the nation and foreign countries in a

way which would have prevented the rise and seizure of power by a

Hitler. I warned the country to be thrifty but I was not heeded. I

repeatedly warned the foreign nations to develop an economic policy

which would enable Germany to live. I was not heeded, although as it now

appears, I was considered a clever and foresighted man. Hitler came to

power because my advice was not followed. The German people were reduced

to great economic need and neither...

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President. For 2 days now we have been listening to

lengthy explanations on the part of the Defendant Schacht, and I rather

think that the explanations which have just been given by the Defendant

Schacht are not definite answers to questions concerned with the

Indictment brought against him, but mere speeches. I consider that they

will only prolong the Trial.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal is, I think, fully apprised with

the case on behalf of Defendant Schacht. They don’t want to stop him

putting forward his defense fully, but they would be glad if you could

make it as short as possible and if he could make it as short as

possible.

DR. DIX: My Lord, I am certain that I shall be through by the recess,

and perhaps even before the recess; but I beg you to bear in mind that

the defendant is accused of having assisted in the seizure of power. The

question arises, how was it that...

THE PRESIDENT: I wasn’t ruling that this evidence was inadmissible. I

was only asking you to get on with it as quickly as you could.

DR. DIX: Very well. Dr. Schacht, please continue and try to comply with

the suggestions of the representative of the Soviet Prosecution as far

as possible.

SCHACHT: As briefly as possible. I will not go into detail; I will

merely state that due to the collapse of 1918 and the unsatisfactory

conditions of the Versailles Treaty, Germany was faced with a severe

depression. The democratic parties, which had a firm hold on the regime

at that time, were not able to improve the situation; and the other

nations did not know what policy to take towards Germany. I do not

reproach any one; I merely state facts. Consequently, in this state of

depression, Hitler received a larger majority in the Reichstag than had

ever been the case since the formation of the Reich.

Now, I ask the people who, although silent at the time, can tell me now

what I should have done; I ask them what they would have done. I have

stated that I was against a military regime, that I wanted to avoid a

civil war, and that, in keeping with democratic principles, I saw only

the one possibility: To allow the man to lead the government once he had

come to power. I said further that from the moment I realized this I

tried to participate in the government, not with the intention of

supporting this man in his extremist ideas, but to act as a brake and,

if possible, to direct his policies back into normal channels.

DR. DIX: Then there came a time later when you recognized the dangers,

when you yourself suffered under the unbearable conditions of terror and

of suppressed opinion, so that perhaps this question is pertinent and

admissible: Why did you not emigrate?

SCHACHT: Had it been only a question of my personal fate, nothing would

have been simpler, especially since, as we have heard before, I would

have been offered that opportunity and it would have been made easy for

me. It was not merely a question of my own welfare; but as I had devoted

myself to the public interest since 1923, it was the question of the

existence of my people, of my country. I know of no instance in history

where emigrants were of help to their own nation. Of course, I speak of

those emigrants who leave of their own free will, not those that have

been expelled. It was not the case in 1792, at the time of the French

Revolution; it was not the case in 1917, during the Russian Revolution;

and it was not the case at the time of the National Socialist revolution

which we witnessed. To sit in a safe harbor abroad and to write articles

which no one reads in the home country...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, we don’t want a historical lecture, do we?

DR. DIX: I believe we can stop here. He merely wanted to state why he

did not emigrate. [_Turning to the defendant._] You have been

understood.

SCHACHT: Thank you.

DR. DIX: In the course of these proceedings, either in a letter or in a

poem—I do not know which at the moment—there was some mention of your

thoughts on the possibility of dying a martyr’s death; whether it would

have served the cause of peace and the German nation, if you had done

more than you did; if you had sacrificed your life...

SCHACHT: I think that you are referring to a quotation from one of my

notes, which a representative of the American Prosecution read here, in

which I spoke of the silence of death.

DR. DIX: Yes.

SCHACHT: If I had sacrificed myself, it would not have been of the

slightest use because the circumstances of my sacrifice would never have

become known. Either I would have disappeared in some prison or I would

have died there, and no one would have known whether I was alive or not;

or I would have been the victim of a planned accident, and it would not

have been possible to become a martyr. Martyrs can be effective only if

their martyrdom becomes known to the public.

DR. DIX: May I ask for the attention of the Tribunal for a moment?

Yesterday I was denied a question concerning the social attitude of the

diplomatic corps and its influence on men like Schacht, for instance.

The question which I want to put now is not the same question; otherwise

I would not put it. But it has nevertheless...

THE PRESIDENT: The objection that I made was to the use of the word

“attitude,” because I don’t see how witnesses can give evidence about

the attitude of a corps. I said I think especially that the fact that

the diplomatic corps were present at the Party rally might be given in

evidence, but I said that the word “attitude” was far too general. What

is it you want to put now?

DR. DIX: Yesterday, the question which I framed in the following manner

was denied: “How was Schacht influenced by the collective attitude of

the diplomatic corps?” That question was denied, and that concludes the

matter. Now, I should like first to clarify the matter because I do not

want to create the impression of smuggling into the proceedings a

question which may raise the same objections. On the one hand, it is

essential for my line of defense to show that people from abroad with

judgment, who were above being suspected of wanting to prepare for an

aggressive war, had the same attitude toward the regime as Schacht had.

On the other hand, it is one of the strong points of my defense to show

that the work of these people in their opposition was not only not

supported by foreign countries but was actually made more difficult.

That is the _thema probandum_ that is important for me, and on this

theme—but please, Herr Schacht, do not answer before I have received

the permission of the Tribunal—this theme...

THE PRESIDENT: State exactly what the question is.

DR. DIX: Yes, I will put the question now. According to my notes I

intended to refer to the tokens of honor, which the Nazi regime received

from abroad, and to the representatives and numerous state visits paying

honor to the regime, which have already been mentioned here. I wanted to

ask the defendant what influence these frequent marks of great honor had

on the work and aims of this group of conspirators. However, since that

question is very similar to the one that has been rejected—and I prefer

to make my objections myself rather than to have them made to me—I

wanted to submit the question to the Tribunal first and make sure that

it is admissible.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the question being: “What effect did the

recognition of the Nazi regime from abroad have upon the group of

conspirators with whom the Defendant Schacht was in contact?” That is

the question, is it not? Well, that question, as the Tribunal thinks,

you may put.

DR. DIX: It is admissible if “Anerkennung” is translated correctly as

“honor”—honor, not recognition in the sense of recognition of a

government in diplomatic official language, but honor, respect. It is a

difficulty of translation and I do not want a misunderstanding—may I

put to him, first, the individual official visits which I have noted, so

that he can answer the question? May I do that?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may; actual visits?

DR. DIX: Yes. The list will not be complete.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I remind you that in 1935, the delegate of

the Labor Party, Alan Hartwood...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that you ought to put the question in

the general way in which I put it to you, and not go into details of

each visit or the details of each number of visits.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If Your Honor pleases, I want to object to it as

generalities, because it already appears that the United States did not

participate in this and I tried to keep the European politics out of

this case, and this is the entering wedge. Now, I don’t want to get into

this sort of thing. I think it is entirely irrelevant that some

foreigner, deceived by the appearance which the Defendant Schacht was

assisting in putting up, didn’t start a war earlier. This thing is

entirely irrelevant. The United States has desired to keep this sort of

thing out of this case because it is endless if we go into it. It seems

to me, if Herr Schacht wants to put the responsibility for his conduct

on some foreigner, that foreigner should be named. He has already said

that the United States representatives, Mr. Messersmith and Mr. Dodd,

had no part in it because they were always against them. Now, it gets

into a situation here which seems to me impossible before this Tribunal,

and I cannot understand how it constitutes any defense for mitigation

for Schacht to show that the foreign powers maintained intercourse with

Germany even at a period of its degeneration.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question is relevant but should

be put without detail.

DR. DIX: I will put the question without detail, and I would like to say

that I cannot, of course, speak of myself and America in the same

breath; but I, too, am trying to avoid foreign politics. However, my

question does not concern foreign politics.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Here is the one question: What influence

did the honors which were showered upon the Nazi regime by foreign

countries, in a manner well known to you, have on the work of your group

of conspirators?

SCHACHT: Throughout the years from 1935, up to and including 1938,

numerous statesmen from almost all other nations came to Berlin to visit

Hitler, including some crowned heads. From America, for instance, there

was Under Secretary of State Phillips.

DR. DIX: Do not mention any names.

SCHACHT: I said that only because names were expressly mentioned here.

It is not limited to Europe. I do not intend to make any political

explanations, I merely say that there were so many visitors, which meant

not only recognition but respect for Hitler, that this man appeared a

very great man in the eyes of the German people. I still remember that

in 1925, I believe, the King of Afghanistan, Amanullah, appeared in

Berlin. He was the first foreigner to visit the Social Democratic

Government, and there was a celebration because at last a great man from

another country had visited us. In the case of Hitler, starting with

1935 there was one visitor after another; and Hitler went from one

foreign political success to another, which made it extremely difficult

to enlighten the German people and made it impossible to work for that

enlightenment within the German nation.

DR. DIX: And now, two final questions.

You have heard the speech by the British Attorney General Shawcross, who

said that there should have been a point where the servants of Hitler

refused to follow him. We want to accept that point of view, and I ask

you: Do you believe that you yourself acted in accord with that

postulate of the leader of the British Delegation?

SCHACHT: I not only accept it, but I fully approve of it. From the very

moment when I recognized what a harmful individual Hitler was, what a

threat to world peace, I broke with him, not only secretly, but publicly

and personally.

DR. DIX: So you consider that when you realized the truth you did

everything humanly possible to try and save humanity from the disaster

of this war and bring it to an end, once it had started.

SCHACHT: I know of no one in Germany who would have done more in that

respect than I did. I warned against excessive armament. I impeded, and

if you like, sabotaged effective armament through my economic policy. I

resigned from the Ministry of Economics against the will of Hitler; I

publicly protested to Hitler against all the abuses of the Party; I

continuously warned people abroad and gave them information; I attempted

to influence the policy of other nations with respect to the colonial

question in order to achieve a more peaceful atmosphere. Credits for

continued armaments...

THE PRESIDENT: I think we have heard this more than once, you know.

DR. DIX: Yes.

SCHACHT: May I be permitted one sentence: I blocked Hitler’s credits and

I finally tried to remove him.

DR. DIX: Gentlemen, I am now at the end of my presentation of evidence

for Schacht’s case, and I have only one request. During the last few

days, I have received a large number of letters and also affidavits from

well-known people who know Schacht. I will examine them; and if I should

decide that any of the affidavits are relevant, I will get in touch with

the Prosecution and discuss with them whether they have any objection to

having them translated, so that we can perhaps submit them to the

Tribunal—not to have them read, but merely to have them put in

evidence. May I request that I be granted this right.

At the end of my entire presentation, I will briefly submit my

documents; this has been only partially done.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants’ counsel wish to ask any

questions?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have only a few questions to put to Dr. Schacht.

How long have you known Herr Von Neurath, Dr. Schacht?

SCHACHT: I cannot state the exact year, but at any rate for a very long

time; for many, many years.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: For some time, for about 4 years, you were both

colleagues as ministers in the government. During that time, did you

have any contact with him other than in purely official capacity?

SCHACHT: Unfortunately not enough, but of course I saw him from time to

time. I would have liked to have seen him more often.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But from conversations with him, or from what you

heard about him, you certainly formed an opinion about his political

views.

SCHACHT: I was well acquainted with his views.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And what was the trend of his political thought?

SCHACHT: I had the impression that basically Von Neurath believed in a

conservative policy, but was open to conviction where progressive

measures were concerned. He was above all in favor of peaceful

international co-operation.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you consider it possible, or do you have any

reason to believe, that under certain circumstances he would also resort

to belligerent methods or that he would even consider them, if the

peaceful understanding which he desired was quite impossible?

SCHACHT: According to my understanding of Neurath, I think that he was

entirely averse to any aggressive policy.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You witnessed the various...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, will you kindly put the earphones on,

the Tribunal thinks these questions are not questions which can properly

be put because of their general nature.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you have the impression that in everything

that he achieved, particularly in the occupation of the Rhineland, Herr

Von Neurath...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, this is not a proper question to put to

a witness, “Did you have an impression about him?” You can ask him what

he said and what he did; what did Von Neurath do and what did he say?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes; then I will not put this question. I have

only one last question.

[_Turning to the defendant._] You know that on the 4th of February 1938

Von Neurath resigned as Foreign Minister. What did you and your

immediate circle say to the resignation of Von Neurath from foreign

politics? What impression did it make upon you?

SCHACHT: I believe I have already said in the course of the

interrogation that I considered Von Neurath’s resignation a very bad

sign, for it meant departing from the previous policy of understanding

in foreign politics.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Any other defendants’ counsel want to ask questions?

Does the Prosecution desire to cross-examine?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think it might save time, Your Honor, if we could

take our recess at this time. It is a little early, I know, but it takes

some time to arrange our material.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

[_A recess was taken._]

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Schacht, according to the transcript of the

testimony at Page 8698 (Volume XII, Page 460), you said that in 1938 you

told a certain lady while you were dining: “My dear lady, we have fallen

into the hands of criminals. How could I ever have suspected that!” You

recall that testimony?

SCHACHT: It was not I who gave that testimony; it came from an affidavit

submitted here by my Defense Counsel, but it is correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am sure you want to help the Tribunal by telling

us who those criminals were.

SCHACHT: Hitler and his confederates.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you were there; you know who the co-operators

were. I am asking you to name all that you put in that category of

criminals with Hitler. Hitler, you know, is dead.

SCHACHT: Mr. Justice, it is very difficult for me to answer that

question fully because I do not know who was in that close conspiracy

with Hitler. The Defendant Göring has told us here that he considered

himself one of that group. There were Himmler and Bormann, but I do not

know who else there was in the small circle of men who were trusted by

Hitler.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have only named three men. Let me put it this

way: You named four men criminals, three of whom are dead and one of

them you say admitted...

SCHACHT: I can add one more, if you will permit me. I assume that the

Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop was also always acquainted with Hitler’s

plans. I must assume that; I cannot prove it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whom else did you include when you were talking to

the lady?

SCHACHT: On that evening I did not mention any names.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But whom did you have in mind? You surely were not

making charges against your own people, who were in charge of your own

government, without having definite names in mind.

SCHACHT: I have taken the liberty of mentioning the names to you.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Are those all?

SCHACHT: I do not know, but I assume that there were more. I would add

without hesitation, Heydrich. But I cannot know with whom...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Heydrich is a dead man.

SCHACHT: I regret that these people are dead, I would have liked to see

them die some other way; but...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, are those the only people that you included?

SCHACHT: I have no proof of the fact that there was anyone else in this

conspiracy about whom I could say that there is proof that he was a

conspirator.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Dr. Schacht, at the time the Nazis seized

power you had a world-wide acquaintance and very great standing as a

leading banker in Germany and in the world, did you not?

SCHACHT: I do not know whether that is so, but if that is your opinion I

do not wish to contradict you.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, at first you would admit that? Wouldn’t you?

SCHACHT: I do not contradict.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And yet as we understand it, you made public

appearances in Germany before the German people in support of the Nazi

regime, alongside of characters such as Streicher and Bormann.

SCHACHT: Mr. Justice, I have taken the liberty of explaining here that

until July 1932 I did not in any way come forward publicly for Hitler or

the Party and that, on the contrary, in America for instance, I warned

the people against Hitler. At that time I—the name Bormann was, of

course, unknown to me at the time; and Streicher’s paper, _Der Stürmer_,

was just as revolting to me before that time as afterwards. I did not

think that I had anything in common with Herr Streicher.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I didn’t either, but that is why I wondered

about your appearing with him publicly before the German people after

1933 when the Nazi regime was consolidating its power. You did that,

didn’t you?

SCHACHT: What did I do, Mr. Justice?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I spoke of your appearances, publicly, before the

German people with Streicher and Bormann in support of the Nazi program

after the seizure of power.

SCHACHT: I do not think so. I was never seen publicly with Herr

Streicher or with Mr. Bormann—certainly not at that time. It is quite

possible that he attended the same Party rallies as I, or that I sat

next to him; but, at any rate, in 1933 I was never seen publicly either

with Streicher or with Bormann.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask to have you shown the photograph from the

Hoffmann collection, marked Number 10. You have no difficulty

recognizing yourself in that, do you?

SCHACHT: No.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And on the right sits Bormann?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And next to him the Minister of Labor?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And on the other side of you is Hitler?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And beyond him, Streicher?

SCHACHT: I do not recognize him; I do not know whether it is Streicher,

but perhaps it is.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I will offer the photograph in evidence. And

perhaps the identification will be sufficient.

And also Frick is in that picture?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This becomes Exhibit Number USA-829.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I will ask to have you shown...

THE PRESIDENT: Justice Jackson, what is the date of that photograph?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There is no date given on the photographs. Perhaps

the defendant can tell us.

SCHACHT: Mr. Justice, you said that in 1933 I had permitted myself to be

seen publicly with Streicher and Bormann as a representative of the

National Socialist Party; and I should like to know, therefore, where

this picture was taken and when. I cannot identify it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I asked you about after 1933. Schacht, do you deny

this is a photograph...

SCHACHT: No, no. By no means, I am merely asking when it was taken. I do

not think this refers to 1933 or 1934.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When was it, if you want to tell us?

SCHACHT: I do not know; I cannot tell you.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will show you another photograph—two

photographs, Numbers 3 and 4. Number 3 shows you marching with Dr.

Robert Ley among others.

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Number 4 shows you entering the hall, marching, and

giving the Nazi salute.

SCHACHT: Yes, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Ley the man who suppressed the labor unions of

Germany?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those are correct photographs, are they not?

SCHACHT: Certainly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I offer them in evidence under Exhibit Number

USA-829.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I will show you photographs marked Numbers

1 and 2 and 6—and 7. Now let us look at Number 1. Do you recall where

that was taken?

SCHACHT: Yes—one moment, if it is the number I have here—yes, just a

minute.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Where was it taken?

SCHACHT: I think Number 1 is a picture from the Reich Chancellery, if I

am not mistaken.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Among the persons appearing in Number 1 is Frick?

SCHACHT: Gürtner, Goebbels, Popitz, Schacht, Papen, Göring, and others,

and Hitler in the middle.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Neurath, do you recognize?

SCHACHT: Neurath. Yes; I think he is immediately on Hitler’s right, in

the background.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Goebbels?

SCHACHT: Yes, I said Goebbels.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You identify Funk as present in the picture, at the

extreme right, only a part of his body showing.

SCHACHT: Who is that?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Funk, the Defendant Funk.

SCHACHT: No, that is Göring.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Back of Göring and back of Neurath.

SCHACHT: I beg your pardon. Perhaps I have a different picture. I beg

your pardon. That is Number 2. On Number 2 I see from left to right:

Popitz, Rust, Göring, Neurath, Hitler, Blomberg, Schacht, Gürtner,

Krosigk, Eltz von Rübenach, and then at the very back on the right,

Funk.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And let us take Number 7. Who do you identify as

your company in that photograph?

SCHACHT: On the extreme left, my late wife; then the Vice President of

the Reichsbank, Dreyse, Hitler, and myself. There is an adjutant of

Hitler, and the heavy-set man on the right—I do not know who he is.

This is a photograph taken when the foundation of the new Reichsbank

building was laid in 1934. Directly behind me, on the right, is

Blomberg.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Number 6?

SCHACHT: One moment. That is the picture where I am walking alongside

Hitler, is that right? That is Hitler’s entrance in my company, on the

occasion when the foundation of the new Reichsbank building was laid.

Behind me, or rather behind Hitler, you can see Geheimrat Vocke, who is

to appear as a witness here tomorrow, and several other gentlemen from

the directorate of the Reichsbank.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I offer the remaining photographs, 1, 6, and 7 in

evidence under the same number.

So that it would appear, Dr. Schacht, that a good deal of your present

company was the company that started off with you in 1933 and 1934?

SCHACHT: Is that a question?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, is that not true?

SCHACHT: No. If you had photographed me with my other acquaintances just

as often, the number would be 10 times as great.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified—and I refer to Page 8650 of the

record (Volume XII, Page 424)—that there were reasons of principle why

you did not become a Party member and that Party membership would not be

compatible with your principles?

SCHACHT: That is right.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you also testified—I refer to Page 8692 of the

record (Volume XII, Page 455)—that from 1932 to the 30th of January

1933—I am quoting you, “I have not written or spoken a single word

publicly for Hitler.”

SCHACHT: I think that is right, if you emphasize “publicly.”

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You must emphasize “publicly”?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I want yet to ask you about the next thing. You

also said:

“I have never helped in any way to exert influence in favor of

Hitler through discussions with any of the competent gentlemen:

Hindenburg, Meissner, _et cetera_; and I did not participate in

any way in the appointment of Hitler to Reich Chancellor.”

Is that correct?

SCHACHT: That is correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, are there any words that we have to emphasize

in that in order to understand it correctly?

SCHACHT: No, in reference to Hitler’s becoming Chancellor, please note I

said, “competent men.”

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I don’t just know what you mean by that, but

I’ll give you a chance to explain.

SCHACHT: Yes. When I say “competent,” I mean those people who could

decide as to who was to be Chancellor. Of course, I did say that Hitler

would be Chancellor and must become Chancellor, and I expressed those

convictions in private circles.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you say that in public?

SCHACHT: No, I said that only in a circle of my friends, business

acquaintances, and such like.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to quote you a statement by Von Papen:

“When I was Chancellor of Germany, in 1932, Schacht came to see

me in July or August while I was at home. He said, ‘here’s a

very intelligent man.’—It was in the presence of my wife and I

have never forgotten it.—He said, ‘Give him your position. Give

it to Hitler. He is the only man who can save Germany.’”

Did you say that or didn’t you?

SCHACHT: I do not know whether I said that he was the only man who could

save Germany, but I did tell him that Hitler would and must become

Chancellor. But that was in August or July of 1932, after the July

elections; and it has nothing to do with Hitler’s nomination, which did

not take place until after the Schleicher Cabinet, about which I have

been examined here.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Dr. Schacht, I just asked you if you had not

testified that you had nothing to do with his coming to the

Chancellorship and you said...

SCHACHT: That is the truth.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...and it is here said that you asked Von Papen to

give the place to him and...

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...and do you contend—and I want you to say

anything you want to about this—do you contend that that was not aiding

Hitler to the Chancellorship?

SCHACHT: I do not know whether it was aiding Hitler. In the course of my

examination here, I have been asked whether I had exerted any influence

in connection with Hitler’s election or his nomination for the

Chancellorship in January 1933. I have given the names of Hindenburg,

Meissner, and so forth, that is to say, Hindenburg’s circle. Since the

beginning of November 1932, Papen was no longer Chancellor and thus he

had no influence upon these matters at all. I did not talk to Papen at

all during those weeks. On the contrary, after the elections of 1932, I

said that it was inevitable that a man who had obtained so many votes in

the Reichstag must take over the political lead.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now let me get you correctly. When you saw Hitler

was going to win you joined him?

SCHACHT: No.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I’ll just make it clear what you do mean. You

did not assist him until he had already accumulated more votes than any

other Party in the Reichstag?

SCHACHT: I did not join Hitler when I saw that he would win, but when I

had discovered that he had won.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh, well, I’ll accept the amendment.

You have referred to your letter to Hitler on the 29th of August 1932...

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...in which you advised him not to put forward any

detailed economic program?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You told him there was no such program on which 14

millions could agree?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that economic policy is not a factor for

building up a party?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you added that, “You can always count on me as

your reliable assistant”; did you not?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then that was after he had won?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then on the 12th of...

SCHACHT: November.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, I just want to refer to that document as

EC-456, Exhibit Number USA-773. Now, then, on the 12th of November 1932,

you wrote a letter to him, in which you said, among other things, “I

have no doubt that the present development of things can only lead to

your becoming Chancellor.”

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “It seems as if our attempt to collect a number of

signatures from business circles for this purpose is not altogether in

vain...”

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were collecting signatures for this purpose?

SCHACHT: Not I, but I participated.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were assisting.

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was Document Number EC-456.

Now, as of November 1932, a document was prepared for a large number of

industrialists to sign, urging the selection of Hitler as Chancellor, in

substance, was there not?

SCHACHT: I no longer remember the document, but I assume that that is

the document.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And men like Schacht, Schröder, and Krupp, and a

great number of industrialists signed that document, did they not?

SCHACHT: That is possible, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was sent to Von Hindenburg?

SCHACHT: I do not know.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, the purpose of it was to aid Hitler in

obtaining the Chancellorship?

SCHACHT: That is possible.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It is addressed to the Reich President, is it not?

Document Number 3901-PS, Exhibit Number USA-837.

SCHACHT: I have not seen it; but it is probably correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you do not deny that that occurred?

SCHACHT: I assume that it is correct. I have not seen it, but I do not

doubt it at all.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then, in November of 1932 you communicated to

Hitler the result of your money-raising campaign, did you not?

SCHACHT: I do not know anything about that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I’ll remind you from your own interrogation.

Well, I’ll remind you first, of your testimony, in which you say that it

appears that you did not plead for funds but that Göring pleaded for

funds; and I ask if you did not, on the 9th of October 1945, give these

answers to these questions as to events of February 1933?

SCHACHT: Events of what?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Events of February 1933.

SCHACHT: Yes, thank you very much.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Going back to 1933. This is the question:

“Prior to the time that Hitler appointed you as President of the

Reichsbank, do you recall a meeting in the home of Göring?

“Answer: ‘Yes. That was a financial meeting. I have been

interrogated about that several times already.’

“Question: ‘Tell me about it.’

“Answer: ‘Yes, I will. Hitler had to go to the elections on 5

March, if you will remember, and for these elections he wanted

money for the campaign. He asked me to procure the money and I

did. Göring called these men together and I made a speech—not a

speech, for Hitler made the speech—then I asked them to write

down the amounts and to subscribe for the elections, which they

did. They subscribed a total of 3 millions and they allocated

the sum among themselves.’

“Question: ‘Who were the people who made up that subscription

list?’

“Answer: ‘I think that all of them were bankers and

industrialists. They represented the chemical industry, iron

industry, textile industry, all of them.’

“Question: ‘Representatives of all the industries?’

“Answer: ‘All of them; all of the big industries.’

“Question: ‘Do you recall any of their names?’

“Answer: ‘Oh certainly; Krupp was there—the old gentleman,

Gustav. He arose from his seat and thanked Hitler and was very

enthusiastic about him at the time. And then there was

Schnitzler—I think it was he—and Vögler for the United Steel

Works.’”

Did you give that testimony?

SCHACHT: Certainly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, at that meeting you have referred to Document

Number D-203, which is a record of the meeting—at that meeting Göring

said this in substance, did he not?

“The sacrifices which are required would be so much easier for

industry to bear if it knew that the election of 5 March would

surely be the last one for the next 10 years, probably even for

the next 100 years.”

You heard that, did you not?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now yesterday or the day before you were

interrogated about your support and about the tribute that Goebbels paid

to you; and you said to the Court, “It is not my fault if Goebbels made

a mistake.” Do you recall that?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I ask you, if testifying about Dr. Goebbels you

did not say this to the interrogator of the United States, on the 17th

day of October 1945, Exhibit Number USA-616 (Document Number 3729-PS)?

“Question: ‘When did you become interested in becoming a

co-worker of Hitler?’

“Answer: ‘I should say in the years of 1931, 1932.’

“Question: ‘And that was when you saw that he had a mass

movement that was likely to take power?’

“Answer: ‘Quite right; it was growing continually.’

“Question: ‘And did you publicly record your support for Hitler

in those years?’

“Answer: ‘I think I made a statement in December 1930 once at

the Bavarian People’s Party, upon coming back from America. I

said that there was a choice for any future Government, either

to hold against 25 percent socialists, or against 20 percent

National Socialists.’

“Question: ‘But what I mean—to make it very brief indeed—did

you lend the prestige of your name to help Hitler come to

power?’

“Answer: ‘I stated publicly that I expected Hitler to come into

power for the first time that I remember in November 1932.’

“Question: ‘And you know, or perhaps you don’t, that Goebbels in

his diary, records with great affection...’

“Answer: ‘Yes.’

“Question: ‘...the help that you gave him at that time?’

“Answer: ‘Yes, I know that.’

“Question: ‘November 1932?’

“Answer: ‘You say the book is called _From the Kaiserhof to the

Reich Chancellery_?’

“Question: ‘That’s right; you have read that?’

“Answer: ‘Yes.’

“Question: ‘And you don’t deny that Goebbels was right?’

“Answer: ‘I think his impression was that he was correct at that

time.’”

Did you give that testimony?

SCHACHT: Yes. I never doubted that Goebbels was under this impression; I

merely said that he was mistaken.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you didn’t—Well, I won’t bother. Now, you

made some extensive quotations from Ambassador Dodd yesterday, the day

before. Did you not?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And let’s have this understood: Ambassador Dodd was

consistently and at all times opposed to the entire Nazi outfit, wasn’t

he?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So you got no encouragement from him to be in this

outfit?

SCHACHT: Oh, no.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you testified, as I understood you, that

Ambassador Dodd invited you to go to the United States of America and

you say—I am quoting from Page 8670 of the record (Volume XII, Page

439):

“At that time, 1937, he called on me and urged me to go with

him, or follow him as soon as possible, and change my residence

to America. He said that I would find a very pleasant welcome in

America. I believe he never would have said that to me if he had

not had a friendly feeling towards me.”

You said that to the Tribunal?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I think you intended to convey to the Tribunal

the impression that Ambassador Dodd had great confidence in you and

great friendship for you?

SCHACHT: I had that impression.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Have you read his entire diary, or did you confine

yourself to reading extracts?

SCHACHT: Yes. I also know of the passage where he said, “You would make

a very bad American,” or something like that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, yes, you didn’t mention that to the Tribunal.

SCHACHT: I think that would be better for the Prosecution.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we are not disappointing you then.

Are you not familiar with his entry under the date of December 21, 1937,

where he speaks of the luncheon at which you were present?

“Schacht spoke of the defeat of Germany in 1918 as wholly due to

Woodrow Wilson’s bringing America into the World War. But I said

Wilson’s Fourteen Points were the one great promise of

international peace and co-operation, and every country on both

sides had helped to defeat his purpose. Don’t you think Wilson,

50 years from now, will be regarded as one of the greatest

presidents the United States has ever had? He evaded an answer

but turned his attention to the Japanese-Chinese war and opposed

Germany’s alliance to Japan. Then he showed the true German

attitude, quoting, ‘If the United States would stop the Japanese

War and leave Germany to have her way in Europe, we would have

world peace.’”

SCHACHT: What is the question?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you make those statements?

SCHACHT: I do not know whether I said it, but even today it seems an

extremely reasonable statement. I am of the opinion that it was correct

with one exception, I believe...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, now let’s get this straight. As I understand

you correctly, you can have peace, world peace, if Germany was left to

have her way in Europe?

SCHACHT: Yes. May I say that there were various opinions about the path

Germany was to take; mine was a peaceful one.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, he goes on:

“I did not comment, and others also failed to make remarks.

Schacht meant what the Army Chiefs of 1914 meant when they

invaded Belgium, expecting to conquer France in 6 weeks, namely;

domination and annexation of neighboring little countries,

especially north and east.”

SCHACHT: Am I to reply?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you say that?

SCHACHT: No, no.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was that what Dodd said about your conversation?

SCHACHT: But I did not say that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you?

SCHACHT: No, may I...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was the impression?

SCHACHT: No, may I answer please?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask you this question: What is the impression

received over the course of his acquaintance with you by a man whom you

describe as being a decent fellow and a friend of yours?

SCHACHT: May I answer that I have already stated that Mr. Dodd was the

victim of many misconceptions. In this case, too, he does not say that I

said it; he says, “Schacht meant.” That was his opinion which he

attributed to me. I never said that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I so understood it; but it was the estimate of a

friendly observer, I take it from you.

SCHACHT: A friendly observer who continually misunderstood; Ambassador

Henderson has proved that in his book.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He may have misunderstood Henderson; but there is

never any doubt that he understood the Nazi danger from the beginning,

is there?

SCHACHT: Yes; but he misunderstood my attitude.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, when you went and asked first the Foreign

Minister and then Hitler to go to the United States, or have some one go

to the United States, you testified, on Page 8708 of the record (Volume

XII, Page 467) that you told Hitler this:

“It seems vital to me that there should be someone constantly in

America who could clarify German interests publicly, in the

press, _et cetera_.”

Did you say that?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, is that what you actually said to Hitler?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I call your attention to your own letter,

Document Number 3700-PS to the Reich Marshal.

“In the beginning of 1940 I proposed to the Führer that I should

go to the United States in order to attempt to slow down

America’s assistance to England in the matter of armaments and,

if possible, to prevent America becoming involved more deeply in

the war.”