“All observers are agreed that there is continual peril of an
explosion and that the crazy frontiers of the peace treaties
cannot be indefinitely maintained. Here, too, rigorous
non-interference should be the King of the British chariot. What
vital interests have we in Austria or in Czechoslovakia, or in
Romania, or in Lithuania or Poland?”
This merely describes the seething state of Europe at that time, and in
this overheated boiling pot which was always on the point of exploding,
there was Germany, unarmed. I considered that a most serious danger to
my country.
Now, I shall probably be asked whether I considered Germany threatened
in any way. No, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I did not consider Germany
threatened directly with an attack, nor was I of the opinion that Russia
was likely to attack Germany. However, for example, we had experienced
the invasion of the Ruhr in 1923 and these past events and the actual
situation made it imperative for me to demand equality for Germany and
to support a policy that would attempt to achieve this.
I assume that we shall deal with the reasons for the carrying out of the
rearmament and with the reaction of foreign countries, _et cetera_.
DR. DIX: What did you know at the time about Germany’s efforts to cause
the other nations to disarm? Did that have anything to do with your
decisions?
SCHACHT: Let me tell you the following:
Fundamentally, I was not in favor of rearmament. I only wanted equality
for Germany. That German equality could be brought about either by means
of disarmament on the part of the other nations or by our own
rearmament. I would have preferred, in fact I desired disarmament on the
part of the others, which anyway had been promised to us. Consequently I
most zealously tried all along for years to prevent a rearmament, if
general disarmament could be brought about.
The disarmament on the part of the others did not take place, although
the Disarmament Committee of the League of Nations had repeatedly
declared that Germany had met her obligations regarding disarmament.
To all of us who were members of the so-called National Government at
the time, and to all Germans who participated in political life, it was
a considerable relief that during the first years Hitler, again and
again, strove for and suggested general disarmament. Afterwards, of
course, it is easy to say that that was a false pretense and a lie on
Hitler’s part, but that false pretense and that lie would have blown up
quite quickly if the countries abroad had shown the slightest
inclination to take up these suggestions.
I remember quite well what was told Foreign Minister Eden of Great
Britain when he visited Germany at the beginning of 1934, because I was
present at the social festivities. Quite concrete proposals concerning
Germany’s obligations in all disarmament questions, in case disarmament
on the part of the others was begun and carried out, were made to him.
It was promised to Eden that all so-called half-military units, like the
SS, the SA, and the Hitler Youth, would be deprived of their military
character if only the general disarmament could be accelerated by those
means.
I could produce a number of quotations regarding these offers to disarm,
but since it is the wish of the President not to delay the proceedings,
I can forego that. They are all well-known statements made by statesmen
and ministers, ambassadors, and such, all of which have the same tenor,
namely, that it was absolutely essential that the promise made by the
Allies should be kept; in other words, that disarmament should be
carried out.
DR. DIX: Excuse me if I interrupt you, but we can do it more quickly and
more simply by asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of Exhibit
Number Schacht-12, which I have been granted, without my reading it,
Page 31 of the English translation of my document book. These are
pertinent remarks and speeches made by Lord Cecil and others, by the
Belgian Foreign Minister, _et cetera_. There is no need to read them;
they can be presented. I just hear that they have been presented, and I
can refer to them.
Pardon me, please. Continue.
SCHACHT: Well, in that case I am finished with my statement. Hitler made
still further offers but the other countries did not take up a single
one of these offers, and thus, unfortunately, only one alternative
remained, and that was rearmament. That rearmament carried out by Hitler
was financed with my assistance, and I assume responsibility for
everything I have done in that connection.
DR. DIX: Do I understand you correctly? Can one draw the conclusion from
your statement that there were other reasons for your assistance in the
rearmament program, that you had the tactical consideration that, by
putting German rearmament up for discussion, the debate on disarmament
amongst the other governments might be started again? This debate, so to
say, had died down?
SCHACHT: If I may, I will illustrate it briefly by means of an example:
Two parties have a contract with each other. One party does not live up
to that contract, and the other party has no way of making him fulfill
his obligations. Thus the other party can do nothing except, in turn,
not adhere to the contract. That is what Germany did. That is what I
supported. Now, of course, I must say that I had expected a type of
reaction which in such a case must always be expected from the partner
to a contract, namely, that he would say, “Well, if you do not keep up
the contract either, then we shall have to discuss this contract again.”
I must say—and I can quite safely use the word—it was a disappointment
to me that Germany’s rearmament was not in any way replied to by any
actions from the Allies. This so-called breach of contract on Germany’s
part against the Versailles Treaty was taken quite calmly. A note of
protest was all; nothing in the least was done, apart from that, to
bring up again the question of disarmament in which I was interested.
Not only was Germany allowed to go on rearming but the Naval Agreement
with Great Britain did, in fact, give Germany the legal right to rearm
contrary to the Versailles Treaty. Military missions were sent to
Germany to look at this rearmament, and German military displays were
visited and everything else was done, but nothing at all was done to
stop Germany’s rearmament.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If the Tribunal please, I cannot see the point of
all this detail. We have conceded that rearmament here, except as it was
involved with aggressive purposes, is immaterial. As I said in the
opening, the United States does not care to try here the issues of
European politics, nor are they submitted to this Tribunal for decision.
The sole question here is the Indictment, charging arming with the
purpose of aggression.
I do not want to interfere with the defendant giving any facts that bear
on his aggressive intentions, but the details of negotiations, of
European politics and charges and countercharges between governments, it
seems to me, lies way back of any inquiry that we could possibly make,
and the details of this matter seem to me not helpful to the solution of
the issues here, and I think was ruled out by the Tribunal in the case
of Göring, if I am not mistaken.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Dix, it all seems to be a matter of argument,
and argument isn’t really the subject of evidence.
DR. DIX: I do not believe so, Your Lordship. What Mr. Justice Jackson
said is quite correct. Schacht is accused of having assisted in bringing
about an aggressive war, but this assistance of his is supposed to have
consisted in the financing which he carried out.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Dix, and do try to make it as short as
possible.
DR. DIX: I think you had come to the end of that question anyway.
May I refer in this connection to one of the motives for Dr. Schacht’s
assistance in rearmament. It was his hope to renew the debate on
disarmament. May I draw your attention to Exhibit Number Schacht-36,
Page 141 of the German text, and Page 149 of the English text? It is an
affidavit from Dr. Schacht’s son-in-law, Dr. Von Scherpenberg. On Page 2
of that affidavit you will find the following brief paragraph which I
propose to read; in fact, I can confine myself to one sentence:
“He”—that is to say, Schacht—“considered rearmament within
certain limits to be the only means for the re-establishing of
the disturbed equilibrium and the only means of inducing the
other European powers to participate in a limitation of
armaments which, in opposition to the Versailles Treaty, they
had sought to avoid.”
That is a statement of Scherpenberg regarding conversations which
Schacht had had at that time. It is, therefore, not an _ex post facto_
opinion; it is the report of a conversation which he, Scherpenberg, had
with his father-in-law Schacht at that time. That is just an additional
remark I wanted to make.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You have spoken about the rearmament on
the part of the other states, particularly Czechoslovakia and Poland,
but can you tell us whether at the time you knew of or heard any exact
details regarding the state of armament of those two states?
SCHACHT: I know only that it was known about Russia that in 1935 she
announced that her peacetime army should be increased to 960,000 men.
Then I knew that in Czechoslovakia, for instance, the installation of
airdromes was one of the leading tasks of rearmament. We knew that Great
Britain’s Navy was to be stepped up.
DR. DIX: Did you later on completely abandon your idea of general
disarmament?
SCHACHT: To the contrary, I used every opportunity, in particular during
conversations with men from abroad, to say that the aim should always be
disarmament, that, of course, rearmament would always mean an economic
burden for us, which we considered a most unpleasant state of affairs.
I remember a conversation which I had with the American Ambassador
Davies. His report of this conversation is incorporated in an exhibit
that has been submitted to the Tribunal. It is an entry in a diary which
is repeated in his book, _Mission to Moscow_, and it is dated as early
as 20 June 1937, Berlin. He is writing about the fact that among other
things he and I had talked about disarmament problems, and I need only
quote one sentence. I do not have the number of the document, Your
Lordship, but it has been submitted to the Tribunal.
DR. DIX: It is Exhibit Schacht-18, German Page 43, English Page 49.
SCHACHT: Since I have only the English text, I shall read from it.
Davies writes:
“When I outlined the President’s (Roosevelt) suggestion of
limitation of armament to defensive weapons only, such as a man
could carry on his shoulder, he (means Schacht) almost jumped
out of his seat with enthusiasm.”
It becomes clear, therefore, from Ambassador Davies’ remark that I was
most enthusiastic about this renewed attempt and the possibility of an
imminent step towards disarmament as proposed by President Roosevelt.
In this same book, Davies reports a few days later on 26 June 1937 about
the conversation he had with me, in a letter addressed to the President
of the United States. I quote only one very brief paragraph—in English
again:
“I then stated to him (that is, Schacht) that the President in
conversation with me had analyzed the European situation and had
considered that a solution might be found in an agreement among
the European nations to a reduction of armaments to a purely
defensive military basis and this through the elimination of
aircraft, tanks, and heavy equipment, and the limitation of
armaments to such weapons only as a man could carry on his back,
with an agreement among the nations for adequate policing of the
plan by a neutral state. Schacht literally jumped at the idea.
He said: ‘That’s absolutely the solution.’ He said that in its
simplicity it had the earmarks of great genius. His enthusiasm
was extraordinary.”
DR. DIX: To what extent did you want rearmament?
SCHACHT: Not beyond equality with every single one of our neighbor
states.
DR. DIX: And did Hitler talk to you of far-reaching intentions, or did
you hear of any?
SCHACHT: At no time did he tell them to me, nor did I hear from anyone
else, whether he had made remarks about further intentions.
DR. DIX: Were you informed about the extent, the type and speed of
rearmament?
SCHACHT: No, I was never told about that.
DR. DIX: Had you set yourself a limit regarding this financing or were
you prepared to advance any amount of money?
SCHACHT: I was certainly, by no means, ready to advance any unlimited
amount of money, particularly as these were not contributions; they were
credits which had to be repaid. The limits for these credits were
twofold. One was that the Reichsbank was independent of the State
finance administration, and the supreme authority of the State as far as
the granting of the credits was concerned. The Board of Directors of the
Reichsbank could pass a resolution that credits were to be given, or
were not to be given, or that credits were to be stopped, if they
considered it right, and as I was perfectly certain of the policy of the
Board of Directors of the Reichsbank—all of these gentlemen agreed with
me perfectly on financial and banking policy—this was the first
possibility of applying a brake, if I considered it necessary.
The second safeguard—limit was contained in the agreement which the
Minister of Finance, the Government, and of course Hitler had made—the
mefo bills, of which these credits consisted, were to be paid back when
they expired. They were repayable after 5 years, and I have already said
that if the repayments had been made, funds for rearmament would
naturally have had to decrease. Therein lay the second possibility of
limiting the rearmament.
DR. DIX: Will you please give now to the Tribunal the figures which you
were dealing with at the time?
SCHACHT: We went up to...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We have no desire to enter into controversy about
the figures of financing rearmament. It seems that the detail of dollars
and cents or Reichsmarks is unimportant to this, and terribly involved.
We aren’t trying whether it cost too much or too little; the purpose of
this rearmament is the only question we have in mind. I don’t see that
the statistics of cost have anything to do with it.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, we would like to know what figures the accused
and you are talking about.
DR. DIX: The amounts that Schacht as President of the Reichsbank was
ready to grant for the rearmament program; that, no doubt, is relevant,
because if those amounts remained within such limits as might possibly
be considered adequate for defensive rearmaments in case of emergency,
then, of course, the extent of that financial assistance is a very
important piece of evidence regarding the intentions which Schacht was
pursuing at the time. That is the very thing that, in the case of
Schacht, Mr. Justice Jackson considers relevant, namely, whether he
helped prepare for an aggressive war. If he were considering only the
possibility of a defensive war in his financing and placed only sums at
the disposal of the rearmament program which would never have allowed an
aggressive war, then that would refute the accusation raised by the
Prosecution against the defendant, and I think that the relevance of
that question cannot be doubted.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that if the Defendant Schacht placed at
the disposal of the Reich, say, 100 millions, or whatever the figure is,
it would be defensive, and if he placed 150 millions, it would be not
defensive, or what? Is it simply the amount?
DR. DIX: No, I want to say that if, as will be proved, he only wanted to
give 9 and later on gave hesitatingly and unwillingly 12 millions for
the purpose, then that contribution can never have been aimed at an
aggressive war.
THE PRESIDENT: It is simply the amount?
DR. DIX: Yes, only the size of the amount.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that can be stated very shortly, but as for details
of finance...
DR. DIX: I am also of the opinion that we have talked about it too long.
I was only going to ask, “What amount did you give?” and then the
objection was raised, and thus the discussion was drawn out. May I put
the question?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Well, then, what amount did you
intend to grant?
SCHACHT: Naturally as little as possible; however, what I contributed is
what is decisive. I placed at their disposal—to give one figure and to
be very brief—until 31 March 1938, credits amounting to a total of
12,000,000,000 Reichsmark. I have discussed that with one of the
interrogators of the British Prosecution, who asked me about the
subject, and I replied that that was about one-third of the amount which
was spent on rearmament. After that, without the Reichsbank, beginning
with 1 April 1938, the figure stated in that budget year for rearmament
was 11,000,000,000, and in the subsequent year, 20,500,000,000, and of
that not a pfennig came from the Reichsbank.
DR. DIX: That was after your resignation, was it not?
SCHACHT: That was after I had stopped credits.
For the record I should like to say that I think I made a mistake
before. I said millions instead of milliards, but I think it is obvious
what I meant. I wanted only to correct it.
DR. DIX: Now, then, Dr. Schacht, the Prosecution have stated that on 19
February 1935 the Ministry of Finance received authority to borrow
unlimited amounts of money if Hitler ordered them to do so.
SCHACHT: Here, again, the prosecutor did not see things in the proper
light. The President of the Reichsbank is not responsible for the
actions of the Reich Minister of Finance. I think the President of the
Federal Reserve Bank in New York can hardly be held responsible for the
things done by the Secretary of the Treasury in Washington.
DR. DIX: You have also been accused that the debt of the Reich increased
three times during the time while you were President of the Reichsbank.
SCHACHT: I might just as well be accused of being responsible for the
fact that the birth rate in Germany rose sharply during the time I was
President of the Reichsbank. I want to emphasize the fact that I had
nothing to do with either.
DR. DIX: You were not responsible for the same reason.
SCHACHT: No, of course I am not responsible for that.
DR. DIX: And presumably the same applies to the point made by the
Prosecution that you allegedly drafted a new finance program in 1938?
SCHACHT: On the contrary, I refused to do anything else for the
financing of rearmament; the finance program was drafted by a state
secretary in the Reich Finance Ministry, and it looked like it.
DR. DIX: One of your economic policies, during the time you were
Minister of Economy, and which you have been accused of as being a
preparation for war, was the so-called “New Plan” (Neue Plan). What was
that?
SCHACHT: May I first of all say that the New Plan had nothing at all to
do with rearmament. Germany, after the Treaty of Versailles, had fallen
into a state of distress, economically speaking and especially export...
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, if the Tribunal is of the opinion that the New
Plan has nothing to do with the rearmament and preparations for war—I
think the Prosecution are of the opposite opinion—then, of course, the
question is irrelevant, and I will drop it. I am only putting it because
the New Plan has been used in the argumentation of the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: If you say, and the defendant has just said that the New
Plan had nothing to do with rearmament, I think you might leave it for
cross-examination and you can raise it again in re-examination if it is
cross-examined.
DR. DIX [_Turning to the defendant_]: In that case I shall not ask you
about the barter agreements, either. I shall leave it to the Prosecution
to bring it out during the cross-examination. I cannot see what it has
to do with the preparation for war.
Now, you have already stated that you strove to remove the Versailles
Treaty by means of peaceful negotiations, or at least, to modify it. In
the opinion which you held at that time did any such means for a
peaceful modification of the Versailles Treaty still exist?
SCHACHT: In my opinion, there were no means other than peaceful ones.
The desire to modify the Versailles Treaty by means of a new war was a
crime.
DR. DIX: Well. But now you are being accused that the alleged
preparations for war, which really were a countermeasure to the general
rearmament although not a preparation for an aggressive war, were
nevertheless a rearmament, and as such, were an infringement of the
Treaty of Versailles. I assume that you, at the time, decided to help
finance that rearmament only after giving the problem due legal and
moral considerations. What, exactly, were these considerations?
SCHACHT: I think I have already answered that question in detail. I need
add nothing else.
DR. DIX: Very well. Insofar as you know, was this attitude of yours, the
attitude of a pacifist and of someone who was definitely opposed to the
extension of living space in Europe, known abroad?
SCHACHT: As long as I have been President of the Reichsbank, that is to
say from March 1933—and I am, of course, only talking about the Hitler
regime—my friends and acquaintances abroad were fully informed about my
attitude and views. I had a great many friends and acquaintances abroad,
not only because of my profession but also outside of that and
particularly in Basel, Switzerland, where we had our monthly meeting at
the International Bank, with all the presidents of the issuing banks of
all the great and certain neutral countries, and I always took occasion
at all these meetings to describe quite clearly the situation in Germany
to these gentlemen.
Perhaps I may at this point refer to the so-called conducting of foreign
conferences or conversations. If one is not allowed to talk to
foreigners any more, then one cannot, of course, reach an understanding
with them. Those silly admonitions, that one had to avoid contact with
foreigners, seem entirely uncalled for to me, and if the witness
Gisevius deemed it necessary the other day to protect his dead comrades,
who were my comrades too, from being accused of committing high treason,
then I should like to say that I consider it quite unnecessary. Never at
any time did any member of our group betray any German interests. To the
contrary, he fought for the interests of Germany, and to prove that, I
should like to give you a good example:
After we had occupied Paris, the files of the Quai d’Orsay were
confiscated and were carefully screened by officials from the German
Foreign Office. I need not assure you that they were primarily looking
for proof whether there were not any so-called defeatists circles in
Germany which had unmasked themselves somewhere abroad. All the files of
the Quai d’Orsay referring to my person and, of course, there were
records of many discussions which I had had with Frenchmen, were
examined by the Foreign Office officials at that time, without my
knowing it.
One day—I think it probably happened in the course of 1941—I received
a letter from a German professor who had participated in this search
carried out by the Foreign Office. I shall mention the name so that, if
necessary, he can testify. He is a Professor of Finance and National
Economy, Professor Stückenbeck of Erlangen, and he wrote me that at this
investigation...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal cannot see any point in this, so far as this
Trial is concerned. In any event, if the defendant says that he did not,
in any way, give away the interests of Germany, surely that is
sufficient. We do not need all the details about it. What it has got to
do with this Trial, I do not know.
DR. DIX: I think, Your Lordship, that that was not the point of the
statement. What he wants to say is that reliable men abroad knew him and
were acquainted with the fact that he was certainly a man of peace and
not a man who prepared aggressive wars, and that applies even to the
period of rearmament.
THE PRESIDENT: But he said that 5 minutes ago.
DR. DIX: I do not think the question of Professor Stückenbeck is so
important, but it certainly seems pertinent to me what Ambassador Davies
said about his conversation with the then Foreign Commissar of the
Soviet Republic, Litvinov. This is contained in Exhibit Schacht-18 of my
document book. It is Page 43 of the German text, and Page 49 of the
English text. May I read one paragraph, and then ask Dr. Schacht briefly
whether that statement of Ambassador Davies corresponds to his
recollection? It is Davies’ report, an extract from his book _Mission to
Moscow_. A report is there to the Secretary of State in the United
States. The passage is on Pages 108 and 109.
“Pursuant to an appointment made, I called upon Commissar for
Foreign Affairs Litvinov to present my respects before departure
for the United States.
“I then stated that the European situation in its elementals
looked simple and that it was difficult to understand why the
statesmanship of Europe could not provide that England, France,
Germany, Italy, and Russia should agree to preserve the
territorial integrity of Europe and through trade agreements
provide Germany with raw materials, thereby giving the assurance
that she could live, which would relieve the peoples of Europe
and the world of these terrific burdens of armament and of the
fear of catastrophic war. The prompt rejoinder was: ‘Do you
think Hitler would ever agree to anything like that?’ I said
that I did not know, but that it was my opinion that there was a
very substantial body of influential and responsible men in
Germany that such an idea would appeal to. Litvinov replied that
he thought that might be so; that Schacht was of that type; he
did not think they could prevail against Hitler and the
political and military forces dominant in Germany.”
And now I ask you, do you remember that conversation with Davies?
SCHACHT: I think there must be a mistake. I did not speak to Davies
about this, I spoke to Litvinov. This is a report of Davies to the
Secretary of State, about which I did not know.
DR. DIX: Yes, you are perfectly right.
It has been repeatedly emphasized by the Prosecution that your knowledge
of Hitler’s intentions of war resulted also from your being
Plenipotentiary for War Economy and a member of the Reich Defense
Counsel. Göring has made a detailed statement on it. Have you anything
new to add to Göring’s statement?
SCHACHT: I think the witness Lammers has also talked about it. I should
like merely to confirm that the first Reich Defense Counsel of 1935 was
nothing other than the legalization of a committee which existed before
1933, made up of ministerial officials who were supposed to deal with
economic measures as well as administrative measures, which might have
to be taken in the event of a threat of war against Germany.
DR. DIX: How often did you have a meeting especially with the Minister
of War and the Plenipotentiary for Administration?
SCHACHT: This famous triumvirate, this Three Man College described by
one of the prosecutors as the cornerstone of war policy, never met at
all, and it is no wonder that we lost the war, if that was the
cornerstone.
DR. DIX: The Prosecution have also referred to the report of the
Ministry of War regarding the task of the Reich Defense Counsel of 1934.
It is Document Number EC-128, Exhibit Number USA-623. Have you anything
in particular to add to that?
SCHACHT: Yes, I should like to have permission to quote one very brief
paragraph. I see there are only two sentences. This report contains the
following statement:
Referring to the experiences of World War I, that is 1914 to 1918, and I
quote—I shall have to do it in English since I have only the English, I
quote:
“At that time we were able to extend our bases for raw materials
and production toward the West: Longwy, Briey, Tourcoing,
Roubaix, Antwerp (textiles), and toward the East, Lodz, and
Southeast (ore mines in Serbia and Turkey, mineral oils in
Romania). Today we have to reckon with the possibility of being
thrown back in our own country and even of being deprived
thereby of most valuable industrial and raw material in the West
and in the East.”
I think that if anyone wanting to prepare an aggressive war had
calculated in September 1934 that one would have to protect oneself
against the possibility of such a situation arising, that this is the
best proof that there can be no question of an aggressive war at all.
DR. DIX: In that connection, under the heading of “peaceful efforts,”
can you perhaps also tell the Tribunal what your peaceful efforts were,
to have the reparations clauses of the Versailles Treaty modified or
even abolished?
SCHACHT: From the very first moment, after the reparations were
determined in 1921 or so, I fought against this nonsense with the
argument that the carrying out of those reparations would throw the
entire world into economic chaos. One cannot, during one generation, pay
120,000,000,000 Reichsmark or about 2,000,000,000 Reichsmark yearly, as
at that time...
DR. DIX: We would like to make it brief. Will you please talk only about
your peaceful efforts and not about national economy?
SCHACHT: All right, I will not talk about national economy.
I fought against it and, as time went by, I did succeed in convincing
the people of almost all the countries that this was sheer nonsense.
Therefore in July of 1932, if I am not mistaken, the then Reich
Chancellor Papen was in a position to affix his signature to an
agreement at Lausanne, which reduced reparations, _de jure_, to a
pending sum of 3,000,000,000, and which, _de facto_, canceled
reparations altogether.
DR. DIX: Did you then continue your definitely peaceful efforts in other
fields? You have already touched upon the negotiations in Paris
regarding the colonial question. I wonder if you have anything to add to
that in this connection?
SCHACHT: I do not remember at the moment how far I had gone at the time,
but I think I reported on the negotiations in detail, so I need not
repeat.
DR. DIX: George Messersmith, the often-mentioned former Consul General
of the United States in Berlin, states in his affidavit Document Number
EC-451, Exhibit Number USA-626, to which the Prosecution have referred,
that he is of the opinion that the National Socialist regime could not
have been in a position to stay in power and build up its war machine if
it had not been for your activity. At the end of the case for the
Prosecution, the Prosecution present that thesis of Messersmith.
Therefore I should like you to make a statement on this subject.
SCHACHT: I do not know whether that completely unsubstantiated private
opinion of Mr. Messersmith has any value as evidence. Nevertheless, I
should like to contradict it by means of a few figures. I had stated
earlier that until 31 March 1938, the Reichsbank had given
12,000,000,000; that is to say, during the first fiscal year, about
2,250,000,000, and during the subsequent 3 years, 3,250,000,000 per
annum. During those years—the Codefendant Keitel was asked about that
when he was examined here—the armament expenditures, as Keitel said,
amounted to the following:
In the fiscal year 1935-1936—5,000,000,000.
In the fiscal year 1936-1937—7,000,000,000.
In the following fiscal year—9,000,000,000.
And at that stage the assistance from the Reichsbank ceased. In spite of
that, during the following year and without any assistance from the
Reichsbank, the expenditure for armament increased to 11,000,000,000,
and in the following year it climbed to 20,500,000,000.
It appears, therefore, that even without the financial genius of Herr
Schacht, they managed to raise the funds. Just how they did so is
another question.
DR. DIX: I duly put these figures to the Defendant Keitel. I do not
think that the Tribunal had the document at the time. It is now
available and has the Exhibit Number Schacht-7. It is Page 15 of the
German text and Page 21 of the English text. Herr Keitel could, of
course, only refer to the first column, that is to say, total
expenditure; but there is a second and a third column, in this account,
and these two are calculations made by Schacht, calculations regarding
what was raised with the help and without the help of the Reichsbank.
I do not intend to go through it in detail now. I should merely like to
have your permission to ask Dr. Schacht whether the figures calculated
by him, in Columns 2 and 3 of the document, were calculated correctly.
SCHACHT: I have these figures in the document before me. The figures are
absolutely correct and again I want to declare that they show that,
during the first year after the Reichsbank had discontinued its
assistance, no less than 5,125,000,000 more were spent without the
assistance of the Reichsbank, that is to say, a total of 11,000,000,000.
DR. DIX: Up to now you have stated to the Tribunal that you were active
against a dangerous and extensive rearmament and you showed that by
tying up the money bag. Did you oppose excessive rearmament in any other
way, for instance, by giving lectures and such?
SCHACHT: Many times I spoke not only before economists and professors
who were my main auditors, but I often spoke upon invitation of the
Minister of War and the head of the Army Academy before high-ranking
officers. In all these lectures I continually referred to the financial
and economic limitations to which German rearmament was subject and I
warned against excessive rearmament.
DR. DIX: When did you first gather the impression that the extent of
German rearmament was excessive and exaggerated?
SCHACHT: It is very difficult to give you a date. Beginning in 1935, I
made continuous attempts to slow down the speed of rearmament. On one
occasion Hitler had said—just a moment, I have it here—that until the
spring of 1936 the same speed would have to be maintained. I adhered to
that as much as possible, although, beginning with the second half of
1935, I continuously applied the brake. But after 1935 I told myself
that, since the Führer himself had said it, after the spring of 1936 the
same speed would no longer be necessary. This can be seen from Document
1301-PS in which these statements of mine are quoted, statements which I
communicated to the so-called “small Ministerial Council” (kleiner
Ministerrat). Göring contradicted me during that meeting, but I of
course maintain the things which I said at the time.
After that I constantly tried to make the Minister of War do something
to slow down the speed of rearmament, if only in the interest of general
economy, since I wanted to see the economic system working for the
export trade. Proof for the fact of just how much I urged the Minister
of War is contained in my letter dated 24 December 1935, which I wrote
him when I saw the period desired by Hitler coming to an end, and when I
was already applying the brake. It has also been presented by the
Prosecution as Document Number EC-293. In the English version of the
document it is on Page 25.
I beg to be allowed to quote very briefly—all my quotations are very
brief—from that document. I wrote a letter to the Reich Minister of
War, and I quote:
“I gather from your letter dated 29 November”—and then come the
reference numbers—“that increased demands by the Armed Forces
for copper and lead are to be expected, which will amount to
practically double the present consumption. These are only
current demands, whereas the equally urgent provisions for the
future are not contained in the figures. You are expecting me to
obtain the necessary foreign currency for these demands, and to
that I respectfully reply that under the existing circumstances
I see no possibility of doing so.”
In other words, Blomberg is asking that I should buy raw materials with
foreign currency, and I am stating quite clearly that I do not see any
possibility of doing so.
The document goes on to say—and this is the sentence regarding the
limit up to 1 April. I quote:
“In all the conferences held with the Führer and Reich
Chancellor up to now, as well as with the leading military
departments, I have expressed my conviction that it would be
possible to supply the necessary foreign currencies and raw
materials for the existing degree of rearmament until 1 April
1936. Despite the fact that, due to our cultural and agrarian
policies which are being repudiated all over the world, this has
been made extremely difficult for me and continues to be
difficult, I still hope that my original plan may be carried
out.”
That is to say, that I thought this proposed program could be carried
out up to 1 April, but not over and beyond that.
DR. DIX: It is a fact that Minister of Transportation, Dorpmüller, was
trying to raise credits for railway purposes. What was your attitude as
President of the Reichsbank towards this?
SCHACHT: During a conference between the Führer, Dorpmüller, and myself,
at which the Führer strongly supported Dorpmüller’s demands, I turned
that credit down straightway, and he did not get it.
DR. DIX: The meeting of 27 May 1936 of the so-called “small Ministerial
Council,” presided over by Göring, has been discussed here. The
Prosecution contend that intentions of aggressive war became apparent
from that meeting. Did you have any knowledge of that meeting?
SCHACHT: What was the date, please?
DR. DIX: 27 May 1936.
SCHACHT: No. I was present during that conference and I see nothing in
the entire document pointing to an aggressive war. I have studied the
document very carefully.
DR. DIX: It has furthermore been stated against you what is contained in
the report of Ambassador Bullitt, Document Number L-151, Exhibit USA-70,
dated 23 November 1937. You have heard, of course, that the Prosecution
are also drawing the conclusion from that report that there were
aggressive intentions on Hitler’s part. Will you please make a statement
about that?
SCHACHT: I see nothing in the entire report to the effect that Hitler
was about to start an aggressive war. I was simply talking about
Hitler’s intentions to bring about an Anschluss of Austria, if possible,
and to give the Sudeten Germans autonomy if possible. Neither of those
two actions would be aggressive war, and apart from that, Mr. Bullitt
says the following with reference to me in his report about this
conversation. I quote: “Schacht then went on to speak of the absolute
necessity for doing something to produce peace in Europe....”
DR. DIX: The memorandum of this conversation is also contained in my
document book as Exhibit Number Schacht-22. It is on Page 64 of the
English text and Page 57 of the German text.
We shall now have to deal in greater detail with your alleged knowledge
of Hitler’s intentions to start war. First of all, speaking generally,
did Hitler ever, as far as you know...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I asked Dr. Dix if he would object if
the Tribunal would allow me, since he is passing to a new point, to
mention the question of the Raeder documents. I had a discussion with
Dr. Siemers. There are still some outstanding points, and we should be
grateful if the Tribunal would hear us this afternoon, if possible,
because the translating division is waiting for the Raeder documents to
get on with their translations.
THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think it will take, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not more than a half hour, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: If the translation department are waiting, perhaps we had
better do it at 2 o’clock.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: If it is only going to take a half hour. It isn’t likely,
I suppose, to take more than that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t think it will take more than that.
THE PRESIDENT: We will do that at 2 o’clock, and now we will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please Your Lordship, the Tribunal should
have in front of them a statement of our objections to certain of the
documents, arranged in six groups. Attached to that sheet they will find
an English summary of the documents, presenting shortly the contents of
each one of them. My Lord, with regard to the first group, might I make
two erasures from our objection to Number 19, which has been allowed in
the case of Schacht, and if I understand Dr. Siemers correctly he
doesn’t press for Number 76.
Now, My Lord, the others in that group:
Number 9 is a series of quotations from Lersner’s book on _Versailles_.
Number 10, the quotation from a book by the German left-wing publicist,
Thomas Mann.
Number 17 is the _Failure of a Mission_, by Nevile Henderson.
Number 45 is a quotation from a book of Mr. Churchill’s.
Number 47 is the report on a complaint to Lord Halifax about an article
in _News Chronicle_ criticizing Hitler.
My Lord, Number 66 is rather different. If the Tribunal would be good
enough to look at it, it is a report by a German lawyer, Dr. Mosier I
think his name should be, who is an authority on international law,
dealing with the Norway action. Dr. Siemers has been, of course,
absolutely frank with me and he said that it would be convenient to him
to have this, which is really a legal argument, embodied in his document
book. Of course, that is not really the purpose of these document books;
but, of course, it is a matter for the Tribunal, and we felt we had to
draw attention to it.
Then, My Lord, Number 76 comes out.
Numbers 93 to 96 are quotations from Soviet newspapers.
Number 101 is a quotation from Havas, the French News Agency.
Numbers 102 to 107 are minor orders relating to the Low Countries which,
the Prosecution submit, have no evidential value.
Then in the second group, there are a number of documents which, the
Prosecution submit, are not relevant to any of the issues in the case.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you didn’t deal with Number 109, did you?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord, it is on the second line.
That is another legal argument, the effect of the war on the legal
position of Iceland, which is a quotation from the _British Journal of
Information in Public Law and International La_w.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the second group, the Prosecution
submit, is irrelevant.
Number 22 is a Belgian decree of 1937 dealing with the possible
evacuation of the civil population in time of war.
Number 39 is a French document of the Middle East.
Numbers 63 and 64 are two speeches, one by Mr. Emery and another by Mr.
Churchill, dealing with the position in Greece at the end of 1940, some
two months after the beginning of the Italian campaign against Greece.
Number 71 is an undated directive with regard to the study of routes in
Belgium, which doesn’t seem to us to have any evidential importance.
Number 76 comes out as the _Altmark_.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 76 came out?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is the _Altmark_. It is the
same one that is in Number 71. I am sorry, My Lord, it should have been
marked out.
Number 99 is the minutes of the ninth meeting of the combined Cabinet
Council on the 27th of April 1940, and it deals with a suggestion of M.
Reynaud with regard to the Swedish ore mines. As it was long after the
Norway campaign and it was never, of course, acted upon in Norway, it
seems to us to have no relevance for this Trial.
Numbers 102 to 107 I have dealt with under one. They have certain very
small unimportant memoranda relating to the Low Countries.
Number 112 is a French document in which Paul Reynaud quotes a statement
from Mr. Churchill that he will fight on to the end, which again doesn’t
seem of much importance in 1946.
Now, My Lord, the next group are documents which were rejected by the
Tribunal when applied for by the Defendant Ribbentrop. The first two
deal with British rearmament and the others with the Balkans and Greece.
The Tribunal will probably remember the group which they did reject in
the Ribbentrop application; and the fourth group are other documents of
the same series as those rejected by the Tribunal in the case of the
Defendant Von Ribbentrop. The fifth group are really objectionable on
the _tu quoque_ basis. I think they are entirely French documents which
deal with proposals in a very tentative stage and which were arranged,
but never followed out, with regard to the destruction of oil fields or
the blocking of the Danube in the Middle East. My Lord, they are
documents dated in the spring of 1940 and, as I say, they deal with the
most tentative stages and were never put into operation. The plans were
never in operation.
The sixth group are documents dealing with Norway, which were captured
after the occupation of France. As I understand Dr. Siemers’ argument,
it is not suggested that these documents were within the knowledge of
the defendants at the time that they carried out the aggression against
Norway; but it is stated that they had other information. Of course, as
to their own information, we have not made any objection at all; and
that these documents might be argued to be corroborative of their
agents’ reports. Actually, as is shown by Document Number 83, to which
we make no objection, they also deal with tentative proposals which were
not put into effect and were not proceeded with; but in the submission
of the Prosecution, the important matter must be what was within the
knowledge of the defendants before the 9th of April 1940; and it is
irrelevant to go into a large number of other documents which are only
arguably consistent with the information which the defendants stated
they had.
My Lord, I tried to deal with them very shortly because I made a promise
to the Tribunal on the time, but I hope that I have indicated very
clearly what our objections were.
DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Your Honors, it is
extremely difficult to define my position with reference to so many
documents, especially since I know that these documents have not yet
been translated and that the contents, in the main, are therefore not
known to those concerned. Therefore, I might point out that there is a
certain danger in treating documents in this way. In part they are basic
elements of my defense.
Therefore, I should like to state now that in dealing with these
documents I shall be compelled, in order to give the reasons for the
relevancy of this evidence, to point out those passages which I shall
not need to read separately into the record, for as soon as the document
book is ready they will be known to the Tribunal and can be read there.
I shall follow the order as outlined by Sir David. First of all, the
first group, Document Numbers 9 and 10. The note submitted by Sir David
to the Tribunal points out that the submission of these documents
conflicts with the ruling given by the Tribunal on 29 March. In reply I
should like to point out that this opinion of the Prosecution is an
error. The ruling of the Tribunal said that no documents might be
submitted concerning the injustice of the Versailles Treaty and the
pressure arising from it. These documents do not concern the injustice
and the pressure; rather they serve to give a few examples of the
subjective attitude of a man like Noske, who was a Social Democrat and
certainly did not want to conduct any wars of aggression. A few other
statements in Numbers 9 and 10 show the thought of the Government and
the ruling class at that time in regard to defensive measures and the
fear that in case of an attack on the part of Poland, for instance, the
German Armed Forces might be too weak. These are facts pure and simple;
and I give you my express assurance that I shall not quote any sentences
which might introduce a polemic. Moreover, I need this mainly as a basis
for my final pleading.
Number 17 is a very brief excerpt from the book by Henderson, _Failure
of a Mission_, written in 1940. I believe there are no objections to my
quoting about 15 lines, if I wish to use them in my final pleading in
order to show that Henderson, who knew Germany well, still believed in
1940 that he had to recognize certain positive good points in the regime
at that time; and I believe that the conclusion is justified that one
cannot expect that a German military commander should be more sceptical
than the British Ambassador at that time.
Then we turn to Document Number 45. It is true this document is taken
from a book by Churchill; but it deals with a fact which I should like
to prove, the fact that already many years before World War I there
existed a British Committee for Defense. In the table of contents which
Sir David has submitted, the word “Reichsverteidigungsausschuss” is
used, and I therefore conclude that this is a mistake on the part of the
Prosecution who took it to mean a German Reich Defense Committee; that
is not correct. This document shows how it came about that the
Prosecution wrongly overestimated the importance of the German Reich
Defense Committee, as the Prosecution naturally compared it with the
British Committee for Defense, which went very much further in its
activities.
Number 47 is evidence to show that when the German Embassy pointed out
that an extremely scathing article on Hitler had appeared in the paper
_News Chronicle_, Lord Halifax pointed out in reply that it was not
possible for him to exert any influence on the newspaper. I should
merely like to compare this with the fact that the Prosecution made it
appear as though Raeder had had something to do with the regrettable
article in the _Völkischer Beobachter_: “Churchill sank the _Athenia_.”
Raeder was no more connected with that article than Lord Halifax with
the article in the _News Chronicle_ and was unfortunately even more
powerless, as far as this article was concerned, than the British
Government.
Number 66 deals with the opinion given by Dr. Mosier, a specialist on
international law, an opinion on the Norway action in very compressed
form, as the Tribunal will surely admit. The Tribunal will also concede
that in my defense of the Norway action I must speak at length about the
underlying principles of international law. The underlying principles of
international law are not an altogether simple matter. I have nothing
against presenting this myself in all necessary detail. I was merely
guided by the thought that the Tribunal have asked again and again that
we save time. I believe that we can save considerable time if this
statement of opinion is granted me, so that I shall not have to cite
numerous excerpts and authors in detail in order to show the exact legal
justification. I could then perhaps deal with the legal questions in
half an hour, whereas without this statement of opinion it is utterly
impossible for me to treat such a problem in half an hour. If the
Prosecution do not object to more time being taken up, then I do not
object if the document is denied me. I will merely have to take the
consequences.
Number 76 has meanwhile been crossed out, that is, it is granted me by
the Prosecution.
Numbers 93 to 96 are excerpts on statements of the official Moscow
papers, _Isvestia_ and _Pravda_. These statements prove that, at least
at that time, Soviet opinion regarding the legality of the German action
in Norway coincided with the German opinion of that time. If the
Tribunal think that these very brief quotations should not be admitted
as documents, I would not be too insistent, since at this point in the
proceedings I shall in any case be compelled to discuss it. The Tribunal
will remember that at that time Germany and Russia were friends, and
Soviet opinion on a purely legal problem should, at any rate, be
considered as having a certain significance.
Then, Number 101; I beg your pardon, Sir David, but if I am not mistaken
Dr. Braun said an hour and a half ago that Number 101 is to be rejected.
Very well, then, Numbers 101 to 107. The action against Norway, as I
have already said, involved a problem of international law. It involves
the problem of whether one country may violate the neutrality of another
country when it can be proved that another belligerent nation likewise
intends to violate the neutrality of the afore-mentioned neutral state.
When presenting my evidence I shall show that Grossadmiral Raeder, in
the autumn of 1939, received all sorts of reports to the effect that the
Allies were planning to take under their own protection the territorial
waters of Norway, that is, to land in Norway, in order to have Norwegian
bases. When I deal with the Norway documents, I shall return to this
point. I should like to say at this point that it is necessary to
explain and to prove that the legal attitude taken by the Allies to the
question of the possible violation of the neutrality of a country was in
the years 1939 and 1940 entirely the same as the attitude of the
Defendant Raeder in the case of Norway at the same time.
Therefore it is necessary not only to deal with Norway; but also to show
that this was a basic conception, which can readily be proved by
reference to parallel cases on the strength of these documents. These
parallel cases deal in the first place with the plans of the Allies with
respect to the Balkans, and secondly with the plans of the Allies with
respect to the Caucasian oil fields.
Your Honors, it is by no means my intention, as Sir David has suggested,
to use these documents from the _tu quoque_ point of view, from the
point of view that the defendant has done something, which the Allies
have also done or wanted to do. I am concerned only with a judgment of
the Defendant Raeder’s actions from the legal point of view. One can
understand such actions only when the entire matter is brought to light.
It is my opinion—and in addition to this I should like to refer to the
statement of Dr. Mosier’s opinion, Exhibit Raeder-66—that this cannot
be made the subject of an accusation.
We are concerned, Your Honors, with the right of self-preservation as
recognized in principle by international law. In this connection I
should like...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we don’t want to go into these matters in
great detail, you know, at this stage. If you state what your reasons
are in support and state them shortly, we shall be able to consider the
matter.
DR. SIEMERS: I am very sorry that I have to go into these details, but
if through the objection of the Prosecution the principles...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not wish to hear you in detail. I have
said that the Tribunal do not wish to hear you in detail.
DR. SIEMERS: I merely ask that the Tribunal take into consideration the
fact that this concerns the principle of international law laid down by
Kellogg himself in 1928, namely, the right of self-preservation, or “the
right of self-defense.” For that reason 1 should like to adduce these
documents showing that just as the Allies acted quite correctly
according to this principle, so also did the Defendant Raeder.
Document Number 22 is next. I have given various statements of principle
which apply to a large number of the remaining documents, so that I can
refer to the statements I have already made. These statements also apply
to Documents Numbers 22 and 39.
As far as Documents Numbers 63 and 64 are concerned, I should like to
point out that these documents deal with Greece; and not only these two,
but also a later group of perhaps 10 or 12 documents, with which I
should like to deal very briefly.
As far as Greece is concerned, the situation is as follows:
I must admit that I was more than surprised that the Prosecution
objected to these documents, about 14 in all. In Document Number C-12,
Exhibit Number GB-226, the Prosecution accuse Raeder of having decreed
on 30 December 1939; and I quote, “Greek merchantmen in the prohibited
area declared by the United States and England are to be treated as
enemy ships.” The accusation would be justified, if Greece had not
behaved in such a manner that Raeder had to resort to this order.
If the documents concerning Greece which show that Greece did not
strictly keep to her neutrality are struck out, then I cannot bring any
counterevidence. I do not believe that it is the intention of the
Prosecution to restrict my presentation of evidence in this way.
These are all documents which date back to this time and which show that
Greece put her merchantmen at the disposal of England who was at war
with Germany. Therefore they could be treated as enemy ships.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like to say that I should have told the
Tribunal I would make no objection to Documents Numbers 53 and 54,
because they do deal with the chartering of Greek steamers by the
British Government.
THE PRESIDENT: But you made no objection to them; you didn’t object to
Numbers 53 or 54.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted to make clear that I don’t object to
them.
THE PRESIDENT: There is no objection on the paper. What you are dealing
with, Dr. Siemers, is 63 and 64, not 53 and 54?
Oh, I beg your pardon, I see it further on. Yes, I see; will you please
strike that out.
DR. SIEMERS: There is no objection to Numbers 53 and 54?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no objection. My Lord, my friend was dealing
with the Greek fleet.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; I beg your pardon, I misheard.
DR. SIEMERS: The same things, as I have already stated regarding
Documents Numbers 101 to 107, apply also to Document Number 71.
Number 99 belongs really to Group 6, to the Norwegian documents; and I
should like to refer to these collectively and then refer again later to
Number 99. All these documents concern Norway, that is, the planning by
the Allies with respect to Norway. These documents deal positively with
the planning of the landing in Narvik, the landing in Stavanger, the
landing in Bergen, and the absolute necessity of having Norwegian bases.
The documents mention that Germany should not be allowed to continue
getting ore supplies from Sweden. They also deal in some measure with
Finland. There are likewise documents which support the same plan after
the Finnish-Russian war had already been concluded.
I should like to quote from these documents to prove their relevancy.
Since the Tribunal has told me that I cannot do that, I ask that these
brief references be considered sufficient. The facts contained in these
documents agree, point for point, with those reports which Grossadmiral
Raeder received from September 1939 until March 1940 from the
Intelligence Service of the German Wehrmacht headed by Admiral Canaris.
These plans agree with the information which Raeder received during the
same 6 months through the Naval Attaché in Oslo, Korvettenkapitän
Schreiber, and with the information which he received in a letter from
Admiral Carls at the end of September 1939.
The information from these three sources caused the Defendant Raeder to
point out the great danger involved were Norway to fall into the hands
of the Allies, which would mean that Germany had lost the war. It is,
therefore, a purely strategic consideration. The occupation of Norway
did not, as contended by the British Prosecution, have anything to do
with the prestige or desire for conquest but was concerned solely with
these positive pieces of information.
I must therefore prove, first of all, that the Defendant Raeder did
receive this information and, secondly, that these reports were
objective.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, you are dealing with Document Number 99, are
you not?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, 99, and all of Group 6.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t know what you mean by Group 6; 99 is in Group B.
DR. SIEMERS: The group under the letter “F,” which Sir David called
Group 6, the last on the page.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection of the Prosecution to that document was
that it was a document of the 27th of April 1940, at a time after
Germany had invaded Norway. You haven’t said anything about that.
DR. SIEMERS: I wanted to avoid dealing with each document singly,
because I believe that these can be treated generally. However, in this
specific case...
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t want you to deal with each document separately. I
thought you were dealing with Document Number 99. If you can deal with
them in groups, by all means do so. However, you are taking up a great
deal of the Tribunal’s time.
DR. SIEMERS: This Document Number 99 is the Minutes of the Ninth Meeting
of the Supreme Council, that is, the military operational staff of
England and France, on 27 April. The heading shows beyond doubt that it
was after the occupation of Norway. However, that is only a formal
objection. The contents of the document show that at this session the
participants discussed the happenings during the period before the
occupation, and the most important leaders of the Allies took part in
this meeting. Chamberlain, Halifax, Churchill, Sir Samuel Hoare, Sir
Alexander Cadogan, _et cetera_ and, on the French side Reynaud,
Daladier, Gamelin, and Darlan were present; and these gentlemen
discussed the previous plans which, I admit, had misfired because of the
German occupation of Norway. But they did discuss about how necessary it
was that the iron-ore deposits in Sweden should fall into the hands of
the Allies and what was to be done now to prevent Germany’s getting this
ore and how the destruction of these iron-ore deposits could be brought
about. I believe, therefore, that though this happened at a later date,
the train of thought I have presented is of significance.
Then we turn to Document Number 100. This deals with the session of the
French War Committee of 9 April 1940, which concerns the same problem:
what the Allies had planned and what could be planned now that the
report had just come in about the action on the part of Germany.
Documents Numbers 102 to 107 have already been dealt with. For Document
Number 110 the same statements apply as for Documents 101 to 107.
Document Number 112 is a document which shows that Churchill, as early
as May 1940, expected active intervention on the part of America. I
wanted to present this in connection with the accusation raised against
the Defendant Raeder, that in the spring of 1941 he was instrumental in
bringing about a war against the United States by way of Japan. For me
this document is not nearly so important as those basic documents which
I have referred to at greater length. Therefore, I leave this completely
to the discretion of the Prosecution or the Tribunal.
The next group consists of documents which were turned down in the case
of Ribbentrop. I should like to point out that I did not have the
opportunity in the Ribbentrop case to define my position as to the
justification and relevancy of these documents. Therefore I consider it
insufficient simply to state that these documents were refused in the
case of Ribbentrop, that the charges against Ribbentrop...
THE PRESIDENT: We have already carefully considered the arguments and
have decided those documents were inadmissible.
DR. SIEMERS: I believed that the decision applied only to the Ribbentrop
case, since no other point of view was discussed during those
proceedings, namely, that of the charges raised against Raeder in which
connection it is expressly said in Document C-152 that Raeder brought
about the occupation of the whole of Greece. That is an accusation that
was not made against Ribbentrop but only against Raeder. How can I
refute this accusation if these documents are denied me?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal know the documents and know the
charges against Raeder, and they don’t desire to hear any further
argument on it. They will consider the matter.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg the pardon of the Tribunal. Under these circumstances
I am compelled to see whether all these documents were covered in
Ribbentrop’s case. My notes, as I told the Prosecution this morning, do
not agree with the statements of the Prosecution. Perhaps after the
session, if I am unable to do so at the moment, I might point out
whether or not the documents are identical.
It is really a fact that in Ribbentrop’s case these documents were not
presented in their entirety and that the Tribunal therefore does not
know them in their entirety. Whether Dr. Horn had marked exactly the
same passages as I wish to use, I am not able to say as far as each
individual document is concerned. I know only that in the large majority
of cases Dr. Horn did not present the entire document because he was
presenting it only from the point of view of the Ribbentrop case.
THE PRESIDENT: Presumably you have submitted your extracts to the
Prosecution. The Prosecution tell us that those extracts are the same
ones that were rejected in Ribbentrop’s case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we have only a list of those documents
so far. We haven’t seen the extracts.
[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Prosecution
conferred._]
My Lord, I am sorry. I spoke too quickly. We have seen the extracts in
German and we haven’t had them translated. We have done the best we
could in German.
THE PRESIDENT: 24 and 25, at any rate, are both speeches in English.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, some of them are. I am sorry, My
Lord; these are. Your Lordship is quite right.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, as I understand it, Dr. Siemers says that
these are not the same passages of evidence, or suggested evidence, as
were rejected in Ribbentrop’s case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I did not do the actual checking
myself, but Major Barrington, who checked the Ribbentrop documents, went
through these and compared the two, and he gave me that which forms the
basis of our note. That is the position. I can’t tell Your Lordship that
I have actually checked these myself.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers is telling us that that is untrue?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As I understood Dr. Siemers, he was saying that
he didn’t know whether they were the same extracts...
DR. SIEMERS: May I just make one remark in connection with that, please?
I am not quite certain that I can say in each specific case which
extracts were contained in the Ribbentrop case, but they are not the
same. I know for certain that they are not the same because in order to
relieve the work of the Translation Division I compared the numbers and
in the few cases in which they were the same I told the Translation
Division that these documents were identical so that they would not be
translated a second time. But I am sorry to say that a large number of
the documents were not the same, as they were asked for by Dr. Horn and
Ribbentrop from a completely different point of view.
I might also point out that the numbers under Group D which are
enumerated here as Ribbentrop Documents Numbers 29, 51, 56, 57, 60, 61,
62, although I made every effort to find them, could not be found in the
Ribbentrop Document Book. And the list does not show which numbers they
should be in the Ribbentrop Document Book.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is not suggested. What is said is
that they are in the same series which deals with the same subject—that
is, the question of Greece and the Balkans—as those documents which the
Tribunal ruled out in the case of Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, I think the best course would be for
you to go through these documents this afternoon under the heading “C”
and find out whether they are the same ones rejected in Ribbentrop’s
case; and if they are not, indicate exactly in what they differ from the
documents rejected in Ribbentrop’s case, so as to show they have some
relevance to your case; and we shall expect to have that by 5 o’clock.
Now will you go on with the others?
DR. SIEMERS: May I perhaps make one remark about what Sir David said
regarding group “D”? They were not objected to because they have already
been mentioned in Ribbentrop’s case; but only because they deal with the
same subject matter, that is true. The same subject matter, namely,
Greece, is dealt with; and I can only reply that the Prosecution have
charged the Defendant Raeder in Document C-152 with having aimed at, and
brought about, the occupation of the whole of Greece. The facts
concerning this statement of three lines I can present only if I am
allowed some documents referring to Greece and only if these are not
refused on the grounds that the documents concerning Greece were turned
down quite generally in Ribbentrop’s case.
Now, I come to group “E” which begins with Document 26. The same
statements apply which I have already set forth in regard to Documents
Numbers 101 to 107. The attacks planned by the Allies on the oil regions
in neutral Romania and in the neutral Caucasus—as I should like to
remark in parenthesis—have already been dealt with in these
proceedings. The Tribunal will remember that I asked Göring during his
examination about entries in Jodl’s diary pertaining to this question
and he has given information about the reports received by Germany, on
Pages 6031 and 6033 of the transcript of 18 March (Volume IX, Pages
402-404). This testimony too concerns only the subjective side, that is,
what was known by Germany. I must prove that the objective side, the
fact that this had actually been planned, agrees exactly with the
subjective side, that is, with these reports. These documents, Numbers
26, 30 to 32, 36, 37, 39, 40 to 44, are to prove that. Then comes Number
99 which has already been dealt with, which seems to be here in
duplicate; Number 101, and Number 110 which also seem to be duplicates.
I turn now to Group 6, which is supposed to be irrelevant, dealing with
the attack on Norway. I have already, on principle, set forth my reasons
and I beg the Tribunal not to deny me these documents under any
circumstances. If I am not granted these documents, I shall simply not
be in a position to present evidence in a reasonable manner without
telling everything myself. I can present proof in regard to a question
of such importance only if documents are granted me just as they are
granted the Prosecution. But if all the documents, practically all the
documents concerning this question are refused, then I do not know how I
am to treat such a question. And I believe that the Tribunal will wish
to assist me in this matter.
I am requesting this especially for the following reasons: When I gave
my reasons for wanting to present this particular evidence, I asked that
those files of the British Admiralty be brought in, which dealt with the
preparations and planning regarding Scandinavia, that is, Norway. Sir
David did not object at that time but said he would have to consult the
British Admiralty. The Tribunal decided accordingly and granted my
application. In the meantime the British Admiralty has answered, and I
assume that Sir David will agree to my reading the answer which has been
put at my disposal. This answer is as follows—it concerns, if I may say
that in advance...
THE PRESIDENT: We have had the answer, I think, have we not? We have had
the answer and transmitted it to you.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. From this reply it can be seen that
the files will not be submitted, that I cannot get the necessary
approval. It can also be seen that certain facts which will be important
for my presentation of evidence will be admitted by the British
Admiralty; but in reality I am not in a position to prove anything by
means of documents. Since I am unable to make use of this evidence, I
ask at least to be allowed the other means of presenting evidence, that
is, the documents contained in the German White Books. These are
documents recognized as being correct. In all cases they are facsimiles.
They can be carefully examined and I believe...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we are dealing with your application for
particular documents. We are not dealing with any general argument or
general criticism that you have to make. We are only hearing you in
answer to certain objections on behalf of the British Prosecution.
DR: SIEMERS: Your Honor, unless I am very much mistaken—in which case
you will pleas correct me—Sir David, with a few exceptions, defined his
position regarding these documents under “F”—this is a large number,
from 59 to 91 with some omissions—as a whole and not his position
regarding each individual document. But I have to say the same thing to
practically each document and asked only that I be granted those
documents as a whole, for I cannot make headway without these
documents...
THE PRESIDENT: You were not referring to these documents. You were
referring to the fact that the British Admiralty was not prepared to
disclose its files to you. It has nothing to do with these documents at
all.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe I have been misunderstood, Your Honors. I have
already stated very clearly why I need these documents for my
presentation of evidence regarding the Norway action. Beyond that I said
merely that if these documents are not granted me, then I cannot present
any evidence. I am deprived of it. I asked the Tribunal merely to take
into consideration the fact that the documents from London, which I had
originally counted on, are not at my disposal. And I do not know why
this request, which I am submitting to the Tribunal and which is only in
explanation of my previous statements, is being taken amiss by the
Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you have to say?
DR. SIEMERS: I have now finished, Your Honors. It is not at all my
intention to read all these documents or to spend too much time on them.
I believe that if I am granted these documents, the presentation of
evidence will be much easier, for these are groups of documents which
show the chronological development of certain plans; and if I have the
5th, 6th or 7th document, then I need not read each one. But if I am
granted just one document, I will be put in an extremely difficult
position and will have to speak in greater detail than I would if I
could simply refer to these documents.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider it.
Now, Dr. Dix.
DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Now, we come to the whole
question of your alleged knowledge of the direct war objectives of
Hitler. You have already mentioned in a general way that Hitler never
spoke about war to you. Have you anything to add to this?
SCHACHT: No.
DR. DIX: You also touched upon the question of the sincerity of his
peaceful assurances and his disarmament proposals. Have you anything to
add to that?
SCHACHT: No, at the beginning I believed that.
DR. DIX: And did the various members of the Cabinet ever speak to you
about warlike intentions?
SCHACHT: Never did I hear anything from any of my fellow colleagues in
the Reich Cabinet which could lead me to believe that anyone had the
intention of going to war or would welcome it if Germany were to start a
war.
DR. DIX: Now, we turn to your own attitude towards the war. You already
indicated your general attitude when you spoke about your philosophy as
a pacifist. I believe, therefore, that it is more expedient if I read
from my document book the opinion of a third person, one who knows you
very well, the former member of the Reichsbank Directorate, Huelse. It
is the Schacht Document 37-C, Page 160 of the German text, and 168 of
the English text. It is an affidavit. And there, beginning with
Paragraph 2, Huelse says:
“I recall several chance talks with Dr. Schacht during the years
1935 to 1939 about war and rearmament. In these talks he always
expressed his aversion to any war and any warlike conduct. He
held the firm opinion that even to the conqueror war brings only
disadvantages and that a new European war would, on the whole,
be a crime against culture and humanity. He hoped for a long
period of peace for Germany, as she needed it more than other
countries in order to improve and stabilize her unstable
economic situation.
“To my knowledge, until the beginning of 1938, Dr. Schacht at
meetings of the Reichsbank Board of Directors and in private
conversations on the subject of armament always spoke only of
defense measures. I believe I can recall that he told me in the
middle of 1938 that Hitler’s provocative action against Austria
and the Sudeten country was worse than thoughtless from the
military point of view.
“He said that Germany had undertaken only a defensive armament,
which would prove absolutely inadequate as a defense in case of
attack by one of the big powers, a possibility with which Hitler
had to reckon. He said that he had never heard that the
Wehrmacht was in any way designed or armed for an aggressive
war.
“When the war did break out and spread more and more, he said
repeatedly that he had greatly erred in his judgment of Hitler’s
personality; he had hoped for a long time that Hitler would
develop into a real statesman who, after the experience of the
World War I, would avoid any war.”
You have already touched upon the question of an annexation of Austria
and given your general opinion. I ask you now to make a concrete
statement about the Anschluss after it had actually taken place and
especially about the manner in which this Anschluss was carried out.
SCHACHT: That this Anschluss would come at some time we Germans all
knew. As for the various political negotiations which took place between
Hitler, Schuschnigg and others, I naturally was as little informed as
were the other Cabinet Ministers, with the probable exception of Göring
and Ribbentrop and perhaps one or two more. The actual Anschluss in
March was a complete surprise to us, not the fact but the date. A great
surprise and we, at any rate my acquaintances and I myself, were
completely surprised.
DR. DIX: How did you judge the manner, the nature and development of
this Anschluss?
SCHACHT: I believe that much can be said about the manner. What we heard
subsequently and what I have learned in these proceedings is certainly
not very gratifying, but I believe that it would have had very little
practical influence on the Anschluss itself and the course of events.
The whole thing was more of a demonstration to the outside world,
similar perhaps to the marching into the Rhineland; but it had no great
effect in my opinion on the course of the negotiations. I am speaking
now of the marching in of the troops. This march was more or less a
festive reception.
DR. DIX: The Prosecution have pointed out that in March 1938 you
regulated the relation of the schilling to the mark for the event of a
possible Anschluss, and by this the Prosecution obviously want to prove
that you had previous knowledge of this action. Will you tell us your
position as to this?
SCHACHT: The fact to which the Prosecution refer is a communication from
a Lieutenant Colonel Wiedemann. March 11, at about 3 o’clock in the
afternoon—I believe I remember that but I cannot say whether it was by
telephone or in person—someone, it may have been Lieutenant Colonel
Wiedemann, inquired of me how the purchasing power for the troops in
Austria was to be regulated if German troops should march into Austria,
purely as a matter of currency policy, and whether it was necessary to
have any regulation prescribed. I told him that of course everything had
to be paid for, everything that the troops might buy there, and that the
rate of exchange; if they paid in schillings and not in marks, would be
1 mark to 2 schillings. That was the rate which obtained at the time,
which remained fairly steady and was the recognized ratio of the
schilling to the mark. The fact that in the afternoon of the 11th I was
approached about this matter is the best proof that I had no previous
knowledge of these matters.
DR. DIX: The Prosecution further consider it an accusation against you
that in your speech to the Austrian National Bank after the marching in
of the troops, you used decidedly National Socialist phraseology and
thus welcomed the Anschluss.
Perhaps we can use this opportunity to save time and reply to the
accusation made repeatedly by the Prosecution that in speeches,
petitions, _et cetera_, you sometimes thought fit to adopt a tone, of
which it could perhaps be said that it exuded National Socialist ideas.
That has been used as circumstantial evidence against you. Will you
please define your position to those arguments and give your reasons for
this attitude of yours?
SCHACHT: If I did so in the first years, I did so only in order to
remind Party circles and the people of the original program of the
National Socialist Party, to which the actual attitude of the Party
members and functionaries stood in direct contrast. I always tried to
show that the principles which I upheld in many political matters agreed
completely with the principles of the National Socialist program as they
were stated in the Party program, namely, equal rights for all, the
dignity of the individual, esteem for the church, and so forth.
In the later years I also repeatedly used National Socialist
phraseology, because from the time of my speech at Königsberg, the
contrast between my views and Hitler’s views regarding the Party was
entirely clear. And gradually within the Party I got the reputation of
being an enemy of the Party, a man whose views were contrary to those of
the Party. From that moment on not only the possibility of my
co-operation, but also my very existence was endangered; and in such
moments, when I saw my activity, my freedom, and my life seriously
threatened by the Party I utilized these moments to show by means of an
emphatically National Socialist phraseology that I was working entirely
within the framework of the traditional policies and that my activity
was in agreement with these policies—in order to protect myself against
these attacks.
DR. DIX: In other words, recalling the testimony of the witness Gisevius
about a remark of Goerdeler’s, you used Talleyrand methods in this case?
SCHACHT: I am not entirely familiar with Talleyrand’s methods, but at
any rate I did camouflage myself.
DR. DIX: In this connection I should like to read a passage from the
affidavit of Schniewind which has been quoted repeatedly. It is Schacht
Number 34. I have often indicated this page. It is Page 118 of the
German, Page 126 of the English text. Schniewind says:
“If Schacht on the other hand occasionally made statements, oral
or written, which could be construed as signifying that he went
a long way in identifying himself with the Hitler regime, these
statements were naturally known to us; but what Schacht thought
in reality was known to almost every official in the Reichsbank
and in the Reich Ministry of Economics, above all, of course, to
his closest colleagues.
“On many occasions we asked Dr. Schacht if he had not gone too
far in these statements. He always replied that he was under
such heavy fire from the Party and the SS that he could
camouflage himself only with strong slogans and sly statements.”
I might explain that Schniewind was a high official in the Reich
Ministry of Economics, and worked directly under Schacht and with him.
The Prosecution have also referred to an affidavit by Tilly to the
effect that you admitted that you thought Hitler capable of aggressive
intentions. Will you make a statement about that?
SCHACHT: That affidavit of the British Major Tilly is entirely correct.
I told Major Tilly during the preliminary interrogation that in 1938,
during the events of the Fritsch affair and afterwards, I had become
convinced that Hitler at any rate would not avoid a war at all costs and
that possibly he even sought to bring about a war. Looking back I
pondered over a number of statements by Hitler and asked myself the
reason why Hitler, in the course of the years, had reached the point
where he might not avoid a war. And I told Major Tilly that the only
reason which I could think of was that looking back I had the impression
that Hitler had fallen into the role which necessarily falls to each and
every dictator who does not want to relinquish his power in time,
namely, that of having to supply his people with some sort of victor’s
glory—that that was probably the development of Hitler’s thought.
DR. DIX: That is the same explanation as given by Prince Metternich
about Napoleon?
You have already remarked parenthetically that you first became
suspicious during the Fritsch affair. The witness Gisevius has described
the Fritsch affair to the Tribunal in detail. We do not wish to repeat
anything. Therefore, I am asking you only to state in regard to the
Fritsch affair anything you might have to say to supplement or to amend
Gisevius’ testimony. If that is to take a long time—which I cannot
judge—then I might suggest to the Tribunal that we have the recess now,
if the Tribunal so desires.
SCHACHT: I have just a brief remark to make.
DR. DIX: A brief remark. Then answer the question briefly.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if he can do it briefly, we had better have it now.
SCHACHT: It is just a single remark that I should like to add. The
account given by Gisevius of the development of the Fritsch affair is,
according to my knowledge and my own experience, completely correct in
every detail. I have nothing to add to that. I can only confirm it. On
the other hand, I should like to refer to a speech of Hitler’s on 20
February 1938 in the Reichstag which contains a remark which even at
that time aroused my attention. He said—and I quote this speech from
Die Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, of which all copies were available
here:
“The changes in the Reich Cabinet and in the military
administration on 4 February”—that is, changes which were made
following the Fritsch and Blomberg affair—“were for the purpose
of achieving within the shortest time that intensification of
our military means of power, which the general conditions of the
present time indicate as advisable.”
This remark also confirmed my opinion that the change from a peaceful to
a military policy on Hitler’s part was becoming obvious; I did not wish
to omit reference to this remark which completes the account given by
Gisevius.
DR. DIX: This is Exhibit Number Schacht-28 of our document book, Page 81
of the English text, Page 74 of the German text. There this passage is
quoted.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Several meetings have been
discussed here during which Hitler is said to have spoken directly or
indirectly about his war intentions. Did you participate in any such
meetings?
SCHACHT: No, not in a single one.
DR. DIX: You disagreed, as you have stated, with Hitler and the Party on
many issues. Did you express this disagreement or did you conform to
Hitler’s instructions at all times? Can you in particular make
statements about your critical attitude, for instance, to the Jewish
question, the Church question, the Gestapo question, the Free Mason
question, _et cetera_?
SCHACHT: I might say in advance that Hitler never gave me any order or
any instructions which would have been in opposition to my inner views
and that I also never did anything which was in opposition to my inner
convictions. From the very beginning I did not conceal my convictions
concerning all these questions which you have mentioned, not only when
speaking to my circle of friends and to larger Party circles, but also
in addressing the public, and even when speaking to Hitler personally. I
have already stated here that as early as the Party purge of 30 June
1934 I called Hitler’s attention to the fact that his actions were
illegal.
I refer, furthermore, to a document of which unfortunately only half has
been presented by the Prosecution. It is a written report which I
personally submitted to Hitler on 3 May 1935. I remember the date very
well because it happened during a trial run of the Lloyd Steamer
_Scharnhorst_, at which both Hitler and I were present.
On that day I handed him two inter-related memoranda which together
formed a unit. In the one half I made it clear that I wanted to stop the
unrestrained and constant collections of money by various Party
organizations because it seemed to me that the money ought not to be
used for Party purposes, particularly Party installations, Party
buildings, and the like, but that we urgently needed this money for
State expenses which had to be paid and which of course included the
rearmament question as well.
The second half of this report dealt with cultural questions. The
Defense and I have tried for months to get this second half of the
document from the Prosecution, since they had submitted the first half
of the document here as evidence. It has not been possible to obtain
that second half. I must therefore confine myself to communicating the
contents.
I want to say in advance that, of course, I could only bring forward
such charges in regard to the mistaken cultural and legal policy of the
Party and of Hitler when reasons originating in my own department gave
me the excuse to submit these things to Hitler. I stated that very
serious harm was being done to my foreign trade policy by the arbitrary
and inhuman cultural and legal policy which was being carried out by
Hitler. I pointed in particular to the hostile attitude towards the
churches and the illegal treatment of the Jews and, furthermore, to the
absolute illegality and despotism of the whole Gestapo regime. I
remember in that connection that I referred to the British Habeas Corpus
Act, which for centuries protected the rights of the individual; and I
stated word for word that I considered this Gestapo despotism to be
something which would make us despised by the whole world.
Hitler read both parts of this memorandum while still on board the
_Scharnhorst_. As soon as he had read it he called me and tried to calm
me down by making statements similar to those which he had already made
to me in July 1934, when he told me these were still the transitional
symptoms of a revolutionary development and that as time went on this
would be set right again and disappear.
The events of July 1934 had taught me a lesson, however, and
consequently I was not satisfied with this explanation. A few weeks
afterwards, on 18 August 1935, I used the occasion of my visit to the
Eastern Fair Königsberg to mention these very things in the speech which
I had to make there; and here I gave clear expression to the same
objections which I had made to Hitler aboard the _Scharnhorst_ at the
beginning of May.
I did not talk only about the Church question, the Jewish question, and
the question of despotism; I talked also about the Free Masons; and I
shall quote just a few sentences from that speech (Exhibit Number
Schacht-25), with the permission of the Tribunal. They are very short. I
am speaking about people, and I now quote...
DR. DIX: Just one moment. I want to tell the Tribunal that this is the
Königsberg speech, which I submitted to the Tribunal this morning as a
document.
SCHACHT: I am talking about people and I now quote:
“...people who under cover of darkness heroically smear window
panes, who brand as a traitor every German who trades in a
Jewish store, who declare every former Free Mason to be a
scoundrel, and who in the fight against priests and ministers
who talk politics from the pulpit, cannot themselves distinguish
between religion and misuse of the pulpit.”
End of quotation, and then another sentence. I quote:
“In accordance with the present legislation and in accordance
with the various declarations made by the Führer’s Deputy, the
Reich Minister of the Interior, and the Reich Minister for
Public Enlightenment and Propaganda (not to mention the Ministry
of Economics), Jewish businesses are permitted to carry on their
business activities as heretofore.”
End of quotation, and then, in the last sentences, I quote:
“No one in Germany is without rights. According to Point 4 of
the National Socialist Party program the Jew can be neither a
citizen nor a fellow German. But Point 5 of the Party program
provides legislation for him too; that means, he must not be
subjected to arbitrary action but to the law.”
I assumed the same attitude on every other further occasion that offered
itself.
DR. DIX: One moment, Dr. Schacht; did the regime tolerate this speech?
SCHACHT: It is a good thing that you remind me of that; because in the
course of the Gisevius testimony the same question was discussed with
reference to the Marburg speech of Herr Von Papen. Since up to then my
speeches were not subject to censorship—of course I would not have
allowed that—this speech was broadcast by mistake, so to speak, over
the Deutschlandsender. In that way the speech was brought to the notice
of Propaganda Minister Goebbels, and at once he issued an order
prohibiting the publication of the speech in the newspapers. As a
result, although the speech was broadcast by the Deutschlandsender it
did not appear in any newspaper. But as, fortunately, the Reichsbank had
its own printing press which was of course not subject to censorship, I
had the speech printed in the Reichsbank printing press; and 250,000
copies of it were distributed to the 400 branches of the Reichsbank
throughout the country, and in that manner it became known to the entire
population.
DR. DIX: You were going to continue, were you not?
SCHACHT: I wanted to go on and say that on every future opportunity
which I could find I always returned to these points. I should like to
touch upon only two more things in this connection.
This morning I referred to these things in connection with the letter
written by me on 24 December 1935 to the Reich Minister of War, which is
Document Number EC-293. I should merely like to add and point out the
words, which I shall now quote:
“The economic and legal policy for the treatment of the Jews,
the anti-Church activities of certain Party organizations, and
the legal despotism associated with the Gestapo are detrimental
to our armament program...”
The same attitude can also be seen from the minutes of the so-called
“small Ministerial Council” for 12 May 1936, which have been submitted
in evidence by the Prosecution. It says in these minutes, and I quote:
“Dr. Schacht emphasized openly again and again that a cultural and legal
policy must be pursued which does not interfere with economy.”
I want to remark in this connection that, of course, as Minister of
Economics I always linked my arguments with the work of the departments
under the Minister of Economics. And, as a last example, one of many
others which I cannot mention today, there is the speech on the occasion
of a celebration for the apprentices at the Berlin Chamber of Artisans
on 11 May 1937 which is Exhibit Number Schacht-30. On that occasion I
said the following, and I quote:
“No community and, above all, no state can flourish which is not
based on legality, order, and discipline.”
And a second sentence, I quote:
“For that reason you must not only respect the right and the
law, but you must also act against injustice and unlawful
actions everywhere, wherever you find them.”
And because I made known my attitude not only to a close circle but also
to a wider public by using every opportunity to voice my views
frankly—because of this, a few weeks ago in this court, the Chief of
the RSHA, Department III, Security Service, the witness Ohlendorf, in
reply to a question, described me as an enemy of the Party, at least
since the year 1937-1938. I believe that the Chief of the Security
Service, the inland department, should know since he had the task of
combating political opponents inside Germany.
DR. DIX: May I point out that the statements made during the meeting of
the small Ministerial Council on 12 May 1936 are contained in my
document book, Exhibit Schacht-20, Page 57 of the English text, Page 51
of the German text and Schacht’s speech to the Chamber of Industry and
Commerce on 12 May 1937...
SCHACHT: [_Interrupting._] You mean Chamber of Artisans.
DR. DIX: I shall refer to that later when I have the proper document;
and I now continue.
We have talked about your participation at the Party rallies, and I
should merely like to ask you in addition: Did you participate in any
other Party functions?
SCHACHT: I do not remember that I ever participated in any other
functions of the Party.
DR. DIX: The Indictment charges you, in substance, with using your
personal influence and your close connections with the Führer for the
aims as set forth. Did you, as far as you know and can judge from your
experience, have any influence on the Führer?
SCHACHT: Unfortunately, I never had any influence on the Führer’s
actions and decisions. I had influence only insofar as he did not dare
to interfere with me in my special financial and economic policies. But
this lack of influence of all members of Hitler’s entourage has already
been mentioned by various witnesses and so much has been said about it
that I think I need not take up the Tribunal’s time with any further
statements on that subject.
DR. DIX: What you have just said applies in the main to the question of
the influence of the Reich Cabinet, the last meetings of the Reich
Cabinet, and so forth. Various witnesses have made statements on that
subject. Have you anything new to add?
SCHACHT: I can merely add that on the whole the Reich Cabinet did not
have the slightest influence on Hitler, and that from November 1937
on—this has been stated repeatedly—there were no more meetings or
consultations of the Cabinet. The Reich Cabinet was an uncorrelated
group of politically powerless departmental ministers without the proper
professional qualifications.
DR. DIX: I should like to add that the number of the speech to the
Chamber of Artisans is Exhibit Number 30, Page 89 of the English text
and Page 82 of the German text.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What was the situation regarding
rearmament? Whose will was decisive and authoritative as regards the
extent of rearmament?
SCHACHT: I am without any basis for judgment as far as that is
concerned. But I have no doubt that Hitler’s will, here too, was the
sole decisive and authoritative factor.
DR. DIX: That is to say, you had no influence other than that of the
credit-giver?
SCHACHT: Within my Ministry, insofar as I administered this Ministry, I
did nothing for which I would not assume responsibility myself.
DR. DIX: Did you speak to prominent foreigners about your lack of
influence on Hitler?
SCHACHT: In this connection I recall a conversation with Ambassador
Bullitt in November 1937. This conversation with Ambassador Bullitt has
already been mentioned in some other connection, and Ambassador
Bullitt’s memorandum has been presented in evidence to the Tribunal by
the Prosecution. I merely refer to the sentence which refers to me, and
I quote:
“He”—that is to say Schacht—“prefaced his remarks by saying
that he himself today was ‘completely without influence on that
man’”—meaning Hitler. “He seemed to regard himself as
politically dead and to have small respect for ‘that man.’”
That was said in November 1937. But if I am permitted to add to this, I
want to point out that my foreign friends were kept constantly informed
about my position and my entire activity as regards the directing of
public affairs in Germany, as I have already mentioned once before. This
will be seen on later occasions when various instances are mentioned.
DR. DIX: This morning I submitted Exhibit Number Schacht-22, Page 64 of
the English text.
[_Turning to the defendant._] And now a few special questions regarding
your position as Minister of Economics. You have already made statements
regarding the obtaining of foreign raw materials, that is, you have
quoted appropriate passages. Could these not be substituted by home
products in your opinion?
SCHACHT: A portion of such raw materials could certainly be replaced by
home products. We had learned in the meantime how to produce a large
number of new materials which we did not know about before...
DR. DIX: Please be brief.
SCHACHT: ...to produce them synthetically. But a considerable part could
not be replaced in that way and could be obtained only through foreign
trade.
DR. DIX: And what was your attitude towards the question of
self-sufficiency?
SCHACHT: As far as self-sufficiency was concerned I believe that, if at
a reasonable cost, without undue expenditure, which would have meant a
waste of German public funds and German manpower, certain synthetic
materials could be produced in Germany, then one should do so, but that
apart from this the maintenance of foreign trade was an absolute
necessity for economic reasons, and that it was even more necessary for
reasons of international cultural relations so that nations might live
together. I always regarded the isolation of nations as a great
misfortune, just as I have always regarded commerce as the best means of
bringing about international understanding.
DR. DIX: Who was the exponent in the Reich Cabinet of the
self-sufficiency principle?
SCHACHT: As far as I know, the whole idea of self-sufficiency, which was
then formulated in the Four Year Plan, originated with Hitler alone;
after Göring was commissioned with the direction of the Four Year Plan,
then Göring too, of course, represented that line of thought.
DR. DIX: Did you express your contradictory views to Göring and Hitler?
SCHACHT: I think it is clear from the record that I did so at every
opportunity.
DR. DIX: One incidental question: You will remember that Göring
exclaimed, “I should like to know where the ‘No men’ are.”
I want to ask you now, do you claim this honorary title of “No man” for
yourself? I remind you particularly of your letter of November 1942.
SCHACHT: On every occasion when I was no longer in a position to do what
my inner conviction demanded, I said, “No.” I was not content to be
silent in the face of the many misdeeds committed by the Party. In every
case I expressed my disapproval of these things, personally, officially,
and publicly. I said “No” to all those things. I blocked credits. I
opposed an excessive rearmament. I talked against the war and I took
steps to prevent the war. I do not know to whom else this honorary title
of “No man” might apply if not to me.
DR. DIX: Did you not swear an oath of allegiance to Hitler?
SCHACHT: I did not swear an oath of allegiance to a certain Herr Hitler.
I swore allegiance to Adolf Hitler as the head of the State of the
German people, just as I did not swear allegiance to the Kaiser or to
President Ebert or to President Hindenburg, except in their capacity as
head of the State; in the same way I did not swear an oath to Adolf
Hitler. The oath of allegiance which I did swear to the head of the
German State does not apply to the person of the head of the State; it
applies to what he represents, the German nation. Perhaps I might add
something in this connection. I would never keep an oath of allegiance
to a perjurer and Hitler has turned out to be a hundredfold perjurer.
DR. DIX: Göring has made extremely detailed explanations regarding the
Four Year Plan, its origin, its preparation, technical opposition by
you, and the consequences you took because of this opposition. Therefore
we can be brief and deal only with new material, if you have something
new to say. Have you anything to add to Göring’s statements or do you
disagree on points which you remember or about views held?
SCHACHT: I gather from Göring’s statements that he has described
conditions perfectly correctly and I myself have nothing at all to add
unless you have something special in mind.
DR. DIX: According to your impressions and the experience you had, when
did Hitler realize that you were an obstacle in the way of a speedy and
extensive rearmament? Did he acknowledge your economic arguments? Was he
satisfied with your policy or not?
SCHACHT: At that time, in 1936, when the Four Year Plan was introduced
in September I could not tell what Hitler’s inner attitude to me was in
regard to these questions of economic policy. I might say that it was
clear that after my speech at Königsberg in August 1935 he mistrusted
me. But his attitude to my activities in the field of economic policy
was something which I was not yet sure of in 1936. The fact that I had
not in any way participated in the preparation of the Four Year Plan but
heard about it quite by surprise during the Party Rally and that, quite
unexpectedly, Hermann Göring and not the Minister of Economics was
appointed head of the Four Year Plan, as I heard for the first time at
the Party Rally in September 1936—these facts naturally made it clear
to me that Hitler, as far as economic policy with reference to the
entire rearmament program was concerned, did not have that degree of
confidence in me which he thought necessary. Subsequently, here in this
prison, my fellow Defendant Speer showed me a memorandum which he
received from Hitler on the occasion of his taking over the post of
Minister and which, curiously enough, deals in great detail with the
Four Year Plan and my activities, and is dated August 1936. In August
1936 Hitler himself dictated this memorandum which has been shown to me
in prison by my fellow Defendant Speer, and I assume that if I read a
number of brief quotations from it with the permission of...
DR. DIX: I just want to give an explanation to the Tribunal. We received
the original of this memorandum about three weeks ago from the Camp
Commander of the Camp Dustbin through the kind mediation of the
Prosecution. We then handed it in for translation so that we might
submit it now. But the translation has not yet been completed. I shall
submit the entire memorandum under a new exhibit number when I receive
it.
THE PRESIDENT: Has any application been made in respect to it?
DR. DIX: No application has been made as yet. I wanted...
THE PRESIDENT: Which memorandum? Who drew it up?
DR. DIX: It is a Hitler memorandum of the year 1936, of which there
exist three copies; and one of them was in the Camp Dustbin. This copy
arrived here a fortnight or three weeks ago after we had discussed our
document books with the Prosecution. I intended to submit the
translation of the Hitler memorandum today and at the same time to ask
that this be admitted in evidence, but unfortunately I am not in a
position to do so because the translation is not yet ready. My
colleague, Professor Kraus, was in fact told that it has been mislaid.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, let the defendant go on, and you can submit the
document in evidence and a translation afterwards.
DR. DIX: Very well. The defendant has a copy and he will quote the most
important, very brief passages.
SCHACHT: I shall quote very brief passages. Hitler says in this
memorandum, among other things, and I quote:
“It is, above all, not the task of State economic institutions
to rack their brains about methods of production. This does not
concern the Ministry of Economics at all.”
The Ministry of Economics was under me, and this is therefore a reproach
for me.
A further quotation:
“It is furthermore essential that German iron production be
increased to the utmost. The objection that we are not in a
position to produce the same cheap raw iron from German ore,
which has only 26 percent of iron content, as from the 45
percent Swedish ores, is unimportant... The objection that in
this case all the German smelting works would have to be
reconstructed is also irrelevant; and, in any case, this is none
of the business of the Ministry of Economics.”
As is apparent from the statement, I had explained that from 26 percent
ore one could produce steel only at costs twice or three times those at
which one could produce steel from 45 percent ore. And I explained
further that, in order to use 26 percent ore, one would have to have
completely different plants from those using 45 percent ore. Herr Hitler
states that this is none of the business of the Ministry of Economics,
and that, of course, means Herr Schacht.
There is one last, very brief quotation. I quote:
“I want to emphasize in this connection that in these tasks I
see the only possible economic mobilization and not in the
curbing of the armament industry...”
That statement, too, is directed, of course, against my policy.
DR. DIX: We have now reached the stage of tension of technical
differences between you and Göring, the tension between you and Hitler
regarding your functions as Minister of Economics. What were your
thoughts at the time about resigning from your office as Minister of
Economics? Was it possible for you to resign? Please do not repeat
anything that Lammers and other witnesses have already told us about the
impossibility of resigning. Please talk only about your own special case
and what you yourself did.
SCHACHT: First of all, I tried to continue my own economic policy, in
spite of the fact that Göring as head of the Four Year Plan tried, of
course, as time went on to take over as many of the tasks concerned with
economic policy as possible. But the very moment Göring encroached on my
rights as Minister of Economics I used it as an opportunity to force my
release from the Ministry of Economics. That was at the beginning of
August 1937.
At the time I told Hitler very briefly the reason, namely, that if I was
to assume responsibility for economic policy, then I would also have to
be in command. But if I was not in command, then I did not wish to
assume responsibility. The fight for my resignation, fought by me at
times with very drastic measures, lasted approximately two and a half
months until eventually Hitler had to decide to grant me the desired
release in order to prevent the conflict from becoming known to the
public more than it already was.
DR. DIX: When you say “drastic measures” do you mean your so-called
sit-down strike?
In this connection I want to submit to the Tribunal Exhibit Number
Schacht-40 of my document book, an affidavit from another former
colleague of Dr. Schacht in the Reich Ministry of Economics,
Kammerdirektor Dr. Asmus. On Page 180 of the English version of this
long affidavit there is a brief passage. I quote:
“When this was found to be unsuccessful”—it means his
fight—“and when developments continued along the course which
he considered wrong, he”—Schacht—“in the autumn of 1937, long
before the beginning of the war, acted as an upright man and
applied for release from his office as Reich Minister of
Economics and thereby from his co-responsibility.
“He was obviously not able to resign his office in the normal
way, because for reasons of prestige the Party required the use
of his name. Therefore, in the autumn of 1937, he simply
remained away from the Ministry of Economics for several weeks.
He started this sit-down strike, as it was humorously called in
the Ministry, and went in his official capacity only to the
Reichsbank...”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, is it necessary to trouble the Tribunal with all
this detail? There is no dispute that he did resign, and the only thing
that he has got to explain is why he continued to be a Minister. The
Prosecution have given evidence about his resignation and about the
conflict between him and the Defendant Göring. What is the good of going
into all the detail of it, as to this sit-down strike and that sort of
thing? That doesn’t interest the Tribunal.
DR. DIX: He did not remain a Minister at that time. He resigned as
Minister.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought he had remained a Minister until 1943.
DR. DIX: Minister without Portfolio, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn’t say Minister with Portfolio, I said Minister.
DR. DIX: Yes, but there is a difference, but I shall come to that later.
I understood you to mean an active Minister, but I shall not go into
that now. It was a misunderstanding. Anyway, I have already finished
that. I was merely trying to show how difficult it was to resign.
[_Turning to the defendant._] We now come to the manner in which you
were released. Have you anything to add to the statements made by
Lammers in this connection or not?
SCHACHT: I think we should inform the Tribunal of one matter about which
I also learned here in prison from my fellow Defendant Speer. He
overheard the argument between Hitler and myself on the occasion of that
decisive conference in which I managed to push through my resignation.
If the Tribunal allow, I shall read it very briefly. There are two or
three sentences. Herr Speer informed me of the following: “I was on the
terrace of Berghof on the Obersalzberg, and I was waiting to submit my
building plans. In the summer of 1937 when Schacht came to the
Berghof...”
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: [_Interposing._] Speer is present in the room. For
one defendant to testify as to a conversation with another defendant is
a very convenient way of getting testimony without access to
cross-examination, but it seems to me that it is a highly objectionable
method. I object to this on the ground that it has no probative value to
testify to a conversation of this character when the Defendant Speer is
in the courtroom and can be sworn and can give his testimony. He sits
here and is available.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the subject of the conversation?
DR. DIX: The subject of this conversation is a matter which concerns the
Defendant Schacht. It is a statement of Hitler regarding Schacht; it is
not a matter which concerns the Defendant Speer. Therefore I consider it
expedient for him, since it is a matter which concerns Schacht, to be
able to make a statement about it. I would, of course, consider it more
appropriate that he should not read something which Speer has written to
him, but that he should give his own account of what happened between
Hitler and Schacht and merely say, “I heard that from Speer.” That
appears to be better than...
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Dix, you may give that.
DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Will you please not read, then,
but tell of this incident and say you got it from Speer?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is even more objectionable to me than to have
a written statement from Speer. If we are to have Speer’s testimony, it
at least should be Speer’s and not a repetition of a conversation
between the two defendants. If Speer has made a written statement, it
can be submitted to us in the ordinary course.
This is the second document that we have not had the privilege of seeing
before it has been used here; and it seems to me that if this is a
document signed by Speer—which I don’t understand it to be—if it is,
that is one thing. We can then see it and perhaps it can be used. If it
is a conversation, I should prefer Speer’s version.
DR. DIX: May I add something? The question of procedure is not of basic
importance for me here. In that case it can be discussed when Speer is
examined. However, I do not know whether Speer is going to be called;
probably he will be. Actually it would be better for us to hear it now,
but I leave it to the Tribunal to decide. It is not a question of great
importance to me.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will allow the evidence.
DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Well then, without reading,
please describe the incident.
SCHACHT: The gentlemen on the terrace, among them Speer, heard this
discussion, which was conducted in very loud tones. At the end of the
discussion Hitler came out on the terrace and...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. [_There was a brief pause in the
proceedings._] Very well, Dr. Dix, go on.
SCHACHT: Hitler came out on the terrace after this conference and said
to those present, among them Speer, that he had had a very serious
argument with Schacht, that he could not work with Schacht, and that
Schacht was upsetting his financial plans.
DR. DIX: Well then, after you had left your position as Minister of
Economics you were still left authority as Reichsbank President. Were
you approached by Hitler or the Minister of Finance in your capacity as
President of the Reichsbank and asked for credit?
SCHACHT: After the Reichsbank had discontinued giving credits, on 31
March 1938, the Reich Minister of Finance of course received more urgent
demands for money and toward the end of that year he found himself in
the awkward situation of not being able to pay even the salaries of the
civil servants from the treasury. He came to me and asked me to grant
him a special credit. According to its charter and laws the Reichsbank
was entitled and to a certain extent obliged, but actually only
entitled, to advance to the Reich up to 400 million marks per annum. The
Reich Minister of Finance had received these 400 million marks and he
was asking, over and above that, for further credits; the Reichsbank
refused to give him these credits. The Reich Minister of Finance had to
go to the private banks and all the large banks together gave him a
credit of a few hundred million marks. However, the Reichsbank did not
participate in this credit.
DR. DIX: If you as President of the Reichsbank turned down those
credits, then it seems there was nothing for it but to print more notes.
Did Hitler or anyone else suggest to you that the note printing presses
should be set in motion?
SCHACHT: After the events of November 1938 I paid one more visit to
London, in December, to attend a conference regarding the financing of
the Jewish emigration from Germany in an orderly manner—a thing which I
myself had suggested. On that occasion I also talked with Prime Minister
Chamberlain. On 2 January 1939 I arrived at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden
to report to Hitler about these matters. On that occasion we, of course,
also got to talk about the financial needs of the Reich. I still refused
to give credit to the Reich, and pointed out the very difficult
financial situation which called for, or should have called for, a
reduction of State expenditure and thus of armament expenditure.
In particular, I pointed out that at the beginning of December the first
instalment of the so-called Jewish fine—which had been imposed on the
Jews after the murder of Herr Vorn Rath in Paris and which had been
collected to the extent of 250 million marks at the beginning of
December—that this first instalment of 250 million marks had not been
received entirely in the form of cash, but that the Reich Minister of
Finance had had to agree to accept a considerable part of it “in kind,”
as the English say, because it was not possible to make liquid the cash
necessary for this payment. Hitler replied: “But we can circulate notes
on the basis of these goods. I have looked into the question of our
future financial policy very carefully and when I get back to Berlin in
a few days I shall discuss my plans with you and the Minister of
Finance.”
I saw at once that it was Hitler’s intention to resort to the printing
of notes to meet this expenditure with or without the necessary cover,
but at any rate against certain securities. The danger of inflation was
now definitely imminent. And since I realized at once that this was the
point where I and the Reichsbank had to say “stop,” I replied to him,
“Very well, in that case I will get the Reichsbank to submit a
memorandum to you, setting out the attitude of the Reichsbank to this
problem and which can be used at the joint meeting with the Finance
Minister.”
After that I went back to Berlin and informed my colleagues in the
Reichsbank Directorate. We saw, to our personal satisfaction, that here
was an opportunity for us to divorce ourselves definitely from that type
of policy.
The memorandum dated 7 January which the Reichsbank Directorate then
submitted to Hitler has, I think, also been submitted as evidence by the
Prosecution.
In order to explain the statements which the Reichsbank Directorate made
to Hitler in this decisive moment regarding further State expenditure
and especially armament expenditure, I ask permission to read only two
very brief sentences from this memorandum. It says, and I quote:
“Unrestrained public expenditure constitutes a definite threat
to our currency. The unlimited growth of government expenditure
defies any attempts to draw up a regulated budget. It brings
State finances to the verge of ruin despite a tremendous
increase in taxes, and it undermines the currency and the
issuing bank.”
Then there is another sentence, and I quote:
“...if during the two great foreign political actions in Austria
and the Sudetenland an increase in public expenditure was
necessary, the fact that after the termination of these two
foreign political actions a reduction of expenditure is not
noticeable and that everything seems rather to indicate that a
further increase of expenditure is planned, makes it now our
absolute duty to point out what the consequences will be for our
currency.
“The undersigned Directors of the Reichsbank are sufficiently
conscious of the fact that in their co-operation they have
gladly devoted all their energy to the great aims that have been
set, but that a halt must now be called.”
DR. DIX: This memorandum has already been submitted by the Prosecution
under the Document Number EC-369, but it is being submitted again as
Exhibit Schacht-24 in our document book, Page 70 of the English text,
and Page 63 of the German text.
I shall have to put various questions to Dr. Schacht on that memorandum,
but I think that perhaps there is not time now and that I should do so
tomorrow.
THE PRESIDENT: If you must, Dr. Dix; but do you think that is very
important? At any rate, you had better do it tomorrow, if you are going
to do it at all.
DR. DIX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, can you inform us whether those extracts are
the same as the extracts which were refused in the case of the Defendant
Ribbentrop?
DR. SIEMERS: I have made a comparison, and I can hand it to the Tribunal
in writing. Some documents are the same, some do not tally, and some are
missing. I have done that in writing.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 2 May 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH DAY
Thursday, 2 May 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal would like to know exactly what
your letter means, which they received from you, relating to the
following documents which the letter says have been withdrawn. What I
want to know is, does it mean that they are not to be translated? Let me
read you the numbers: 18, 19, 48, 53, 76, 80, 81, 82, 86, and 101. Now,
does your letter mean that those documents are not to be translated?
DR. SIEMERS: No, Your Lordship; that means that the British Delegation
informed me yesterday morning that the objections against those
documents on the part of the British Delegation are withdrawn.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
DR. SIEMERS: I had written the letter on 30 April, in the afternoon,
after I had had a conversation with Sir David. The following morning I
was informed...
THE PRESIDENT: We won’t bother with that. You say that their objections
no longer exist. If they agree to that, well and good.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, apparently there seems to have been
some misunderstanding about three of them, Numbers 80, 101, and 76. The
others were not objected to.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.