There was a branch of the Reichsbank in Amswalde in the Province of
Brandenburg. The name of the manager of that branch office was one day
posted up in one of the public _Stürmer_ boxes in his town, and termed a
traitor to the people because his wife had bought 50 pfennings worth of
ribbon or the like in a Jewish store. I at once approached the competent
official at Amswalde and demanded the immediate removal of the placard
and an immediate correction to the effect that the man was no traitor to
the people. That was refused; whereupon, without asking anyone, I closed
the Reichsbank branch at Amswalde. It took a number of weeks until, in
the end, the Oberpräsident, who was of course also a Nazi boss, came to
me and asked me to reopen the branch office. I told him, “As soon as
they repudiate that affair publicly I shall reopen the branch office at
Amswalde.” It took only a few days before the Oberpräsident and
Gauleiter of Brandenburg, Grube, had the announcement made public in the
Amswalde newspaper, in large print, and so I reopened the branch office
in Amswalde. That is one example.
The second example has been mentioned briefly; I just want to sum it up
once more because its effect was penetrating.
On the occasion of a Christmas celebration for the office messengers of
the Reichsbank I referred to the pogrom of 9 November 1938, and I told
the boys, in the presence of many—parents, Party leaders, and Party
members—that I hoped they had nothing to do with these things, which
should make every decent German blush with shame. But if they did they
should leave the Reichsbank at once, because in an institution such as
the Reichsbank, which was built up on good faith, there was no place for
people who did not respect the property and life of others.
DR. DIX: May I interrupt you, Dr. Schacht, and point out to the Tribunal
that in Document Number Schacht-34, which has been submitted and is an
affidavit of Dr. Schniewind, on Page 118 of the German text and on Page
126 of the English text the same incident which Dr. Schacht has just
related is mentioned. May I quote quite briefly:
“It is known that at the Christmas celebration of the Reichsbank
in December of 1938 he”—that is Schacht—“said the following in
his address to the young office boys:
“‘A few weeks ago things occurred in our fatherland which are a
disgrace to civilization and which must turn every decent
German’s face red with shame. I only hope that none of you
office boys participated in them, because for such an individual
there is no place in the Reichsbank.’”
[_Turning to the defendant._] Excuse me. Please continue. You wanted to
add something?
SCHACHT: When in August of 1934 I took over the Reich Ministry of
Economics, of course I first put the question to Hitler: “How are the
Jews in our national economy to be treated?” Hitler told me then,
literally, “The Jews can be active in domestic economy in the same way
as before.”
That was the directive that Hitler had promised to me, and during all
the time when I was in charge of the Ministry of Economics I acted
accordingly.
However, I have to add that every few weeks there was a quarrel on some
Jewish question with some Gauleiter or other Party official. Also, I
could not protect Jews against physical mistreatment and the like,
because that came under the competence of the Public Prosecutor and not
mine; but in the economic field I helped all Jews who approached me to
obtain their rights, and in every individual case, I prevailed upon
Hitler and succeeded against the Gauleiters and Party officials,
sometimes even threatening to resign.
I believe that it is notable that the pogrom of November 1938 could only
have taken place after I had resigned from my office. Had I still been
in office, then that pogrom doubtlessly would not have occurred.
DR. DIX: The witness Gisevius has already testified that in the course
of developments from 1933 on, fundamental changes took place in your
judgment of Adolf Hitler. I ask you now, because this is a very decisive
question, to give the Tribunal a detailed description of your real
attitude and your judgment of Adolf Hitler in the course of the
years—as exhaustively, but also as briefly, as possible.
SCHACHT: In former statements which I have made here, I have spoken of
Hitler as a semi-educated man. I still maintain that. He did not have
sufficient school education, but he read an enormous amount later, and
acquired a wide knowledge. He juggled with that knowledge in a masterly
manner in all debates, discussions, and speeches.
No doubt he was a man of genius in certain respects. He had sudden ideas
of which nobody else had thought and which were at times useful in
solving great difficulties, sometimes with astounding simplicity,
sometimes, however, with equally astounding brutality.
He was a mass psychologist of really diabolical genius. While I myself
and several others—for instance, General Von Witzleben told me so
once—while we were never captivated in personal conversations, still he
had a very peculiar influence on other people, and particularly he was
able—in spite of his screeching and occasionally breaking voice—to
stir up the utmost overwhelming enthusiasm of large masses in a filled
auditorium.
I believe that originally he was not filled only with evil desires;
originally, no doubt, he believed he was aiming at good, but gradually
he himself fell victim to the same spell which he exercised over the
masses; because whoever ventures to seduce the masses is finally led and
seduced by them, and so this reciprocal relation between leader and
those led, in my opinion, contributed to ensnaring him in the evil ways
of mass instincts, which every political leader should avoid.
One more thing was to be admired in Hitler. He was a man of unbending
energy, of a will power which overcame all obstacles, and in my estimate
only those two characteristics—mass psychology and his energy and will
power—explain that Hitler was able to rally up to 40 percent, and later
almost 50 percent, of the German people behind him.
What else shall I say?
DR. DIX: Well, I was mainly concerned with bringing up the subject of
your own change of opinion. You have said that the break in your
attitude toward Hitler was caused by the Fritsch incident. You are the
best witness who can give us an explanation not of Hitler’s but of your
own development and your changing attitude towards Hitler.
SCHACHT: Excuse me. I think there is a basic error here. It appears from
this as if I had been a convinced adherent of Hitler at some time. I was
never that. On the contrary, out of concern for my people and my
country, after Hitler gained power, I endeavored with all my strength to
direct that power into an orderly channel, and to keep it within bounds.
Therefore, there was no question of a break with Hitler. A break could
only be spoken of had I been closely connected with him before. At heart
I was never closely connected with Hitler, but to all appearances I
worked in the Cabinet and I did so because he was after all in power,
and I considered it my duty to put myself at the disposal of my people
and my country for their good.
DR. DIX: All right, but at what time, by what conditions, by what
realization were you influenced to begin that activity which the witness
Gisevius has described?
SCHACHT: My serious criticism of Hitler’s doings started already at the
time of the so-called Röhm Putsch on 30 June 1934. I should like to
point out first that these things occurred quite unexpectedly and took
me by surprise, because I had not at all anticipated them. At that time
I had told Hitler, “How could you have these people just simply killed
off? Under all circumstances there should have been at least a summary
trial of some sort.” Hitler swallowed these remarks and merely mumbled
something about “revolutionary necessity,” but he did not really
contradict me.
Then in the course of the second half of the year 1934 and the first
half of the year 1935 I noticed that I had been under a misconception
when I believed that Hitler did not approve of what might be considered
revolutionary and disorderly Party excesses, and that he was really
willing to restore a respectable atmosphere. Hitler did nothing to put a
stop to the excesses of individual Party members or Party groups. Very
likely the idea which recently—or I believe today—was mentioned by a
witness was always in his mind: let the SA have its fling for once. That
is to say, for the masses of the Party he sanctioned, as a means of
recreation, so to speak, behavior which is absolutely incompatible with
good order in the State. In the course of the following months my
suspicions were confirmed and increased, and then for the first time, in
May 1935, I took occasion to bring these matters up with him quite
openly. I do not know if you want me to discuss these things now, but I
am ready to tell about them.
DR. DIX: I consider it important that the Tribunal should hear from you
how your original attitude towards Hitler, which you have just
described, changed, and you became a conspirator against him.
SCHACHT: Well, the decisive change in my attitude came about by reason
of the Fritsch incident, at the very moment when I had to
recognize—and, of course, that did not come with lightning speed, but
in the course of weeks and months it crystallized—that Hitler aimed at
war, or at least was not prepared to do everything to avoid a war. At
that moment I told myself that this was a tremendous danger which was
raising its head, and that violence could be crushed only by violence.
Any opportunity of political propaganda within the German people was of
course out of the question. There was no freedom of assembly. There was
no freedom of speech. There was no freedom of writing. There was no
possibility of discussing things even in a small group. From beginning
to end one was spied upon, and every word which was said among more than
two persons was spoken at the peril of one’s life. There was only one
possibility in the face of that terror, which was beyond democratic
reform and which barred every national criticism. That was to meet this
situation with violence.
Then I came to the conclusion that in the face of Hitler’s terror only a
_coup d’état_, a Putsch, and finally an attempt at assassination was
possible.
DR. DIX: And is Gisevius right in saying that the _peripeteia_, the
decisive turning point in your attitude resulted from your impressions
and experiences in the so-called Fritsch crisis?
SCHACHT: Aside from the inherent falsehood which appeared in all actions
and measures of the Party men, the Fritsch crisis provided the absolute
assurance that a basic change was occurring in the conduct of political
affairs, for within about 10 days Blomberg was removed, Fritsch was
removed, Neurath was removed, and Hitler not only appointed so
unsuitable a person as Ribbentrop to be Foreign Minister, but also in
his speech in the Reichstag soon afterwards announced that from now on
rearmament had to be increased even more. Consequently the Fritsch
crisis was the decisive turning point in my attitude, and from then on I
knew that every further peaceful attempt at controlling the torrent
would fail and that only violent means could meet it.
DR. DIX: For an estimate of the Fritsch crisis may I quote now from the
document which I already wanted to produce on the occasion of the
interrogation of Gisevius but could not because the document was not
then available to the Prosecution. The same view about the Fritsch
crisis which Gisevius and now Dr. Schacht have put here was also
expressed abroad by an intelligent officer with political foresight. May
I point to Exhibit Number 15 of my document book (Document Number
Schacht-15)? That is Page 41 of the English text, and 35 of the German
text. It is a biennial report of the Chief of Staff of the United States
Army to the Secretary of War for the period of 1 July 1943 to 30 June
1945. I quote one sentence from it:
“The history of the German High Command from 1938 on is one of
constant conflict of personalities, in which military judgment
was increasingly subordinated to Hitler’s personal dictates. The
first clash occurred in 1938 and resulted in the removal of Von
Blomberg, Von Fritsch, and Beck and of the last effective
conservative influence on German foreign policy.”
So here also that turning point has been clearly understood. And in
summary I would like to ask this question of Dr. Schacht.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Were you only disappointed by Hitler, or
did you consider yourself deceived by Hitler at that time? Will you
answer that?
SCHACHT: The answer is that I have never felt disappointed by Hitler,
because I had not expected more of him than my appraisal of his
personality allowed me. But I certainly consider myself deceived,
swindled, and cheated by him to the highest degree, because whatever he
had previously promised to the German people and thereby to me, he did
not keep afterwards.
He promised equal rights for all citizens, but his adherents, regardless
of their capabilities, enjoyed privileges before all other citizens. He
promised to put the Jews under the same protection which foreigners
enjoyed, yet he deprived them of every legal protection. He had promised
to fight against political lies, but together with his Minister Goebbels
he cultivated nothing but political lies and political fraud. He
promised the German people to maintain the principles of positive
Christianity yet he tolerated and sponsored measures by which
institutions of the Church were abused, reviled, and damaged. Also, in
the foreign political field he always spoke against a war on two
fronts—and then later undertook it himself. He despised and disregarded
all laws of the Weimar Republic, to which he had taken the oath when he
became Chancellor. He mobilized the Gestapo against personal liberty. He
gagged and bound all free exchange of ideas and information. He pardoned
criminals and enlisted them in his service. He did everything to break
his promises. He lied to and deceived the world, Germany, and me.
DR. DIX: Let us return to the period of the seizure of power. In
November 1932, you stated publicly that Hitler would become Reich
Chancellor. What caused you to make that statement?
SCHACHT: That statement was caused by the fact that Hitler in the July
elections of 1932 obtained 40 percent of all seats in the Reichstag for
his Party. That is an election result which, if I am informed correctly,
had never occurred since 1871, when the Reichstag was founded; and to
me, as a democrat and a follower of democratic parliamentary government,
it was quite inevitable that that man was now to be entrusted with
forming a cabinet. I do not know of any alternative at the time. There
was only one other possibility, one alternative, and that was a military
rule. But the Cabinet of Von Papen already had had some special
presidential authority and still could not maintain itself in the face
of the Reichstag; and when Herr Schleicher attempted to establish a
military regime without the participation of the Nazis, he failed after
just a few weeks, because he found himself confronted with the
alternative either of starting a civil war or of resigning.
Hindenburg and at first Schleicher as well—although at the last moment
he acted differently—were always of the opinion that the Armed Forces
could not face a civil war, and Hindenburg was certainly not ready to
tolerate a civil war. But very unwillingly he saw himself forced by
necessity to put the reins of government into the hands of the man who,
thanks to his own propaganda and the incapability of all preceding
governments, thanks also to the inconsiderate policy of the foreign
countries toward Germany, had won the majority of German votes.
DR. DIX: You know that the Prosecution accuses you of having assisted
Hitler and the Nazi regime to power. I therefore want to ask you now
whether between the July elections 1932, and the day when Hitler became
Chancellor—that is the 30th of January, 1933—you spoke publicly for
Hitler.
SCHACHT: I want to state first that Hitler’s power was an accomplished
fact in July 1932, when he secured 230 Reichstag seats. Everything else
that followed must be viewed as a consequence of that Reichstag
election. During that entire period—with the exception of the one
interview you mentioned, in which I said that according to democratic
principles Hitler must become Reich Chancellor—I can say that I did not
write or publicly speak a single word for Hitler.
DR. DIX: Did you, during the time when the reorganization of the Reich
Cabinet was discussed, speak to Hindenburg on behalf of Hitler’s
Chancellorship?
SCHACHT: I have never in consultations with any of the competent
gentlemen, be it Hindenburg, Meissner, or anyone else, contributed
towards exerting any influence in favor of Hitler, nor did I participate
in any way in the nomination of Hitler to be Reich Chancellor.
DR. DIX: The prosecutor accuses you in that connection of putting the
prestige of your name at the disposal of Hitler in November 1932, and he
refers to a statement made by Goebbels in the latter’s book, _From the
Kaiserhof to the Reich Chancellery_. What can you say about that?
SCHACHT: I would never have expected that this apostle of truth,
Goebbels, would once more be mobilized against me here, but it is not my
fault if Herr Goebbels made a mistake.
DR. DIX: The prosecutor also states that you provided the funds for
Hitler in the Reichstag elections of 5 March; that is said to have
happened in an industrial meeting on which there is an affidavit by the
industrialist Von Schnitzler, Document Number EC-439, Exhibit USA-618.
What do you have to say about that? It is our Number 3 of our document
book, Page 11 of the English copy.
SCHACHT: In February of 1933, at the time when Hitler was already Reich
Chancellor and the elections of 5 March were to furnish a basis for the
shape of the new government, Hitler asked me whether, at the occasion of
a meeting which Göring was to call and which would have the purpose of
raising funds for the elections, I would be good enough to take the role
of his banker. I had no reason for refusing to do that. The meeting took
place on 26 February.
And now the prosecutor has made it appear that during that meeting I had
solicited election funds. The Prosecution themselves, however, have
presented a document, D-203, which apparently is meant to be a record of
the election speech made by Hitler on that evening...
DR. DIX: May I interrupt you and point out to the Tribunal that it is
our Exhibit Number Schacht-2, on Page 9 of the English text. Excuse me.
Please, will you kindly go on.
SCHACHT: D-203. That document closes with the following sentence:
“Göring then passed very cleverly to the necessity that other
circles not taking part in this political battle should at least
make the financial sacrifices required.”
Therefore from that report which was submitted by the Prosecution, it
can be seen very clearly that not I but Göring pleaded for funds. I only
administered these funds later, and, in the affidavit by Schnitzler,
Document EC-439, Page 11, the Prosecution have carefully left out these
decisive passages which do not accuse, but exonerate me. I quote the two
sentences, therefore, as follows—I am sorry, I have to quote in English
because I have only the English text in front of me:
“At the meeting Dr. Schacht proposed raising an election fund of
as far as I remember three million Reichsmarks. The fund was to
be distributed between the two ‘allies’ according to their
relative strength at the time. Dr. Stein suggested that the
Deutsche Volkspartei should be included, which suggestion, if I
remember rightly, was accepted. The amounts which the individual
firms were to contribute were not discussed.”
It can be seen from this that the election fund was not collected only
for the Nazi Party, but for the Nazi Party and the national group which
was its ally and to which, for instance, also Herr Von Papen and
Hugenberg belonged, and which during that very meeting was extended to
comprise a third group, the German People’s Party. It was, therefore, a
collective fund for those parties who went into the election campaign
together, and not just a Nazi fund.
DR. DIX: The Prosecution have mentioned those laws which were decreed
after the seizure of power, and which introduced and then established
the totalitarian rule of the Nazis and of Hitler. We have to consider
the question of your personal responsibility as a later member of the
cabinet and I must discuss these laws with you in detail; for the
present I just want to remind you of them generally: First, the Enabling
Act; then the law about the prohibition of parties and the establishment
of one Party; the law about the unity of Party and State; the law
decreeing the expropriation of the SPD and the trade unions; the law
about civil service associations; the law about the legal limitation of
professions for Jews; the law instituting the Peoples’ Court; the law
legalizing the murders of 30 June 1934; and the law about the merger of
the offices of the Reich Chancellor and the Reich President in the
person of Hitler. How do you, as a member of the Cabinet, define your
personal responsibility with respect to these laws?
SCHACHT: When all these laws were issued I was not a Cabinet member. I
had no vote in the Cabinet. I had a vote in the Cabinet only after 1
August 1934, at which time the last disastrous law, the merger of the
offices of Reich Chancellor and Reich President was decreed. I did not
participate in the discussions preceding this law, nor did I vote on it.
I had absolutely no part in any of these laws.
DR. DIX: I do not know whether I mentioned it, but I want to protect you
against a misunderstanding. This does not apply to the merger of the
offices of the Reich President in the person of Hitler, after
Hindenburg’s death?
SCHACHT: Of course, I did not take part in that either.
DR. DIX: And why not?
SCHACHT: Because I was not then in the Cabinet. I received my official
nomination as Minister on 3 or 4 August. I did not take part in the
deliberations on that law. I did not vote for it, and did not sign it.
DR. DIX: But in the Indictment it is stated that you were a member of
the Reichstag. Then as a member of the Reichstag you would have voted
for these laws, inasmuch as, actually, after 1933 only unanimous votes
were cast in the Reichstag?
SCHACHT: Yes. Unfortunately, there is much in the trial brief which is
not correct. During my entire life I was never a member of the
Reichstag. One look into the _Reichstag Handbook_ could have enlightened
the Prosecution that also during that time I was not a member of the
Reichstag.
I had nothing to do with all these laws either as member of the Cabinet
or of the Reichstag, because I had been neither during that time.
DR. DIX: Did Adolf Hitler actually take an oath to the Weimar
Constitution?
SCHACHT: Of course Hitler took an oath to the Weimar Constitution when
he became Reich Chancellor, to Reich President Von Hindenburg. In taking
that oath he swore not only to respect the constitution but also to
observe and fulfill all laws unless they were lawfully changed.
DR. DIX: Was the Weimar Constitution ever formally repealed?
SCHACHT: No, the Weimar Constitution has never been repealed.
DR. DIX: In your view was the Leadership Principle established anywhere
legally or constitutionally?
SCHACHT: The Leadership Principle was not established by a single law,
and the subsequent attempt to reduce the responsibility of the
individual ministers—and that affects me, too—by saying that it had
become prescriptive law, is not correct. The responsibility of the
ministers continued to exist, my own also, and was kept down only by the
terror and the violent threats of Hitler.
DR. DIX: The questions whether the Enabling Act referred to the Führer
or to the Cabinet; whether the first Cabinet after 1933 was a National
Socialist one or a combination of the parties of the right; and the
question of the development of Hitler into an autocratic dictator, all
these I have already put to the witness Lammers. I do not wish to repeat
them, but do you have to add anything new to what Lammers has testified?
SCHACHT: I made only two notes. In Hitler’s Reichstag speech on 23 March
1933 he said, “It is the sincere desire of the National
Government...”—not the National Socialist, as it is always referred to
later, but the National Government.
And the second point: In the proclamation to the Wehrmacht which Defense
Minister Von Blomberg issued on 1 February 1933 this sentence occurs:
“I assume this office with the firm determination to maintain
the Reichswehr, in accordance with the testament of my
predecessors, as a power factor of the State, above Party
politics.”
This and other factors already mentioned convinced me that the Cabinet
would be a national coalition cabinet, whereas Hitler, by his rule of
terror and violence, formed a pure Nazi dictatorship out of it.
DR. DIX: The quotation mentioned by Schacht is in our document book,
Document Number Schacht-4, Page 14 of the English text. Now, when you
became Minister of Economics...
THE PRESIDENT: It is 5 o’clock; the Tribunal will adjourn.
DR. DIX: Mr. President, may I ask a question? Do we continue tomorrow,
because tomorrow is the first of May, and there is some uncertainty
whether there will be a session tomorrow or not?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal will go on tomorrow.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 1 May 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH DAY
Wednesday, 1 May 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Before we go on with the case of the Defendant Schacht,
the Tribunal wishes to announce its decision on the applications by Dr.
Sauter on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach: The first application to
which any objection was taken related to the group of documents Numbers
30, 31, 45, 68, 73, 101, 124, and 133. That application with respect to
that group of documents is denied.
The next matter was an application in respect of Number 118(a). That
application is granted and the document is to be translated.
The next was Number 121 and in that case the application is denied. As
regard to witnesses, Dr. Sauter withdrew his application for the witness
Marsalek.
In connection with the other applications, the Tribunal grants the
application that Uiberreither should be called as a witness.
That is all.
DR. DIX: Yesterday, much to my regret, I neglected after an answer given
by Dr. Schacht to my question as to whether he was disappointed by
Hitler or whether he considered himself deceived by him, to read a
passage from a document which deals with the same point. I am referring
to a document which has been submitted to the High Tribunal and which
has been quoted several times—Exhibit Schacht-34, Page 114 of the
English text of the document book. This passage may be found on Page 124
of the English document book and reads as follows:
“Dr. Schacht, even in the years 1935-36, as may have been seen
from numerous statements, had fallen into the role of a man, who
in good faith had put his strength and ability at Hitler’s
disposal but who now felt himself betrayed.
“Of the many statements made by Schacht, I quote only one which
Schacht made at the occasion of a supper with my wife and myself
in the summer of 1938. When Dr. Schacht made his appearance, it
was evident that he was in a state of inner excitement and
during the supper, he suddenly gave vent to his feelings, when,
in deep agitation he almost shouted at my wife, ‘My dear lady,
we have fallen into the hands of criminals—how could I ever
have suspected that?’”
This is the affidavit made out by Schniewind.
Yesterday I mentioned three documents: namely, a speech made by Schacht
on “Geography and Statistics” at Frankfurt-am-Main on 9 December 1936,
then an article Schacht had written on the colonial problem and a speech
given at Königsberg by Schacht.
I wish to submit these documents: The speech on “Geography and
Statistics” at Frankfurt is the Document Schacht-19, Page 48, English
Page 54. The theme on the colonial question is Exhibit Schacht-21,
German version Page 53 and English version Page 59. The speech at
Königsberg is Exhibit Schacht-25 of my document book, German version on
Page 44 and English version Page 73.
Dr. Schacht, we stopped in the middle of 1934, shortly before you
entered the Ministry of Economics, and when you became Minister of
Economics, you were familiar with the happenings of 30 June 1934 and
their legalization by the Cabinet. Did you not have any misgivings to
enter the Cabinet or what reasons prompted you to put aside these
misgivings?
SCHACHT: As far as my personal composure and comfort would have been
concerned, it would have been very simple not to assume office and to
resign. Of course, I asked myself what help that would be for the future
development of German politics if I did refuse office. We were already
at a stage in which any public and open opposition and criticism against
the Hitler regime had been made impossible. Meetings could not be held,
societies could not be established, every press statement was subject to
censorship, and all political opposition, without which no government
can thrive, had been prevented by Hitler through his policy of terror.
There was only one possible way to exercise criticism and even form an
opposition which could prevent bad and faulty measures being taken by
the Government. And this opposition could solely be formed in the
Government itself. Thus convinced, I entered the Government and I hoped
in the course of the years to find a certain amount of support and
backing among the German people. There was still a large mass of
spiritual leaders, professors, scientists, and teachers, whom I did not
expect simply to acquiesce to a regime of coercion. There were also many
industrialists, leaders of economy, who I did not assume would bow to a
policy of coercion incompatible with free economy. I expected a certain
support from all these circles, support which would make it possible for
me to have a moderating, controlling influence in the Government.
Therefore, I entered Hitler’s Cabinet, not with enthusiastic assent, but
because it was necessary to keep on working for the German people and
exercise a moderating influence within the Government.
DR. DIX: In the course of time was no opposition ever developed within
the Party?
SCHACHT: In answering that question, I would like to say that within the
Party, of course, the decent elements were by far in majority; the
greater part of the population had joined the Party because of a healthy
instinct and with good intentions driven by the need in which the German
nation found itself.
I would like to say about the SS, for instance, that in the beginning
numbers of decent people joined the SS because Himmler gave the SS the
appearance of fighting for a life of ideals. I would like to call your
attention to a book written by an SS man which appeared at that time
under the significant title, _Schafft anständige Kerle_ (_Let’s Make
Decent Men_).
But, in the course of time, Hitler knew how to gather around him all bad
elements, within the Party and its organization, and to chain tightly
all those elements to himself, because he understood how to exploit
shrewdly any mistake, slip-up, or misdemeanor on their part. Yesterday I
talked about drunkenness as a constituent part of Nazi ideology; I did
not do that with the purpose of degrading anyone personally. I did it
for another quite definite reason.
In the course of further developments, I observed that even many Party
members who had fallen into this net of Hitler and who occupied more or
less leading positions, gradually became afraid because of the
consequences of the injustices and the evil deeds to which they were
instigated by the regime. I had the definite feeling that these people
resorted to alcohol and various narcotics in order to flee from their
own conscience, and that it was only this flight from their own
conscience that permitted them to act the way they did. Otherwise, there
would be no explanation for the large number of suicides that took place
at the end of the Nazi regime.
DR. DIX: You know that you are accused of being a participant in a
conspiracy which had as its object an illegal violation of the peace.
Did you at any time have secret discussions, or secret orders, or secret
directives, which worked toward this objective?
SCHACHT: I may say that I myself never received any order or fulfilled
any wish which might have been contrary to the conception of right.
Never did Hitler request anything from me which he knew I would surely
not carry out because it did not agree with my moral point of view. But
neither did I ever notice or observe that one of my fellow ministers or
one of the other leading men who did not belong to Hitler’s inner
circle—of course, I could not control that circle—or anyone else whom
I met in official contacts, showed in any way that there was an intent
to commit a war crime; on the contrary, we were always very glad when
Hitler came off with one of his big speeches in which he assured, not
only the entire world, but above all the German people that he was
thinking of nothing except peace and peaceful work. The fact that Hitler
deceived the world and the German people, and many of his co-workers, is
one of the things that I mentioned yesterday.
DR. DIX: Did you at any time—of course, I mean outside of your normal
oath of office—take any oath or bind yourself in any other way to the
Party or another National Socialist organization?
SCHACHT: Not a single oath and not a single obligation beyond my oath of
office to the head of the State.
DR. DIX: Did you have close private relations with leading National
Socialists, for example, with Hitler or Göring?
SCHACHT: I assume you mean a close friendly or social contact?
DR. DIX: Yes.
SCHACHT: I never had relations of that sort with Hitler. He repeatedly
urged me in the first years to come to the luncheons at the Reich
Chancellery where he was lunching with closer friends. I tried to do
that twice. I attended twice at various intervals, and I must say that
not only the level of the discussion at the luncheon and the abject
humility shown to Hitler repulsed me but I also did not like the whole
crowd, and I never went back again.
I never called on Hitler personally in a private matter. Of course,
naturally, I attended the large public functions which all the
ministers, the Diplomatic Corps and high officials, _et cetera_,
attended, but I never had any intimate, social, or other close contact
with him. That applies to the other gentlemen as well.
As a matter of course, in the first months of our acquaintance we
visited each other on occasion, but all so-called social gatherings
which still took place in the first period had a more or less official
character. Close private relations simply did not exist.
DR. DIX: And does this answer apply to all the other leading National
Socialists as well?
SCHACHT: All of them.
DR. DIX: When, for instance, did you speak for the last time with the
following persons? Let us start first with Bormann.
SCHACHT: I gather from the use of the word “first” that you are going to
mention others also.
DR. DIX: Yes, Himmler, Hess, Ley, and Ribbentrop.
SCHACHT: In that case I would like to make a few preliminary remarks: At
the close of the French campaign, when Hitler returned triumphant and
victorious from Paris, all of us—the ministers and the Reichsleiter and
the other dignitaries of the Party as I assume, and state secretaries,
and so forth—received an invitation from the Reich Chancellery to be
present at the Anhalter Railway Station to greet Hitler on his arrival.
Since I was in Berlin at the time, it was impossible for me to refuse
this invitation. It was 1940, the conflict between Hitler and myself had
been going on for some time, and it would have been a veritable affront
if I had stayed at home. Consequently, I went to the station and saw a
very large number of Party dignitaries, ministers and so forth, but, of
course, I do not remember any more just who all these people were.
DR. DIX: I beg your pardon for interrupting you. I have a rather poor
memory for films and especially for newsreels, but I believe that that
reception was shown in a newsreel and I believe that you were just about
the only civilian who was present among those people.
SCHACHT: I personally did not see that film, but my friends told me
about it. They mentioned especially that among all the gold braid, I was
the only civilian in street clothes there. Of course, it could be
ascertained from the film who was present at the time.
I mentioned this reception, for it might be possible that I said “Good
morning” to many people and inquired about their health and so forth,
and I also recall that I arrived at the station with the Codefendant
Rosenberg in the same car, because there were always two people to a
car. I did not attend the reception which followed at the Reich
Chancellery. Rosenberg did go but I said, “No, I would rather not go. I
am going home.”
DR. DIX: Then, I may assume that you probably saw the leading men, Hess,
Ley, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Frick, Frank, Schirach, Speer, Sauckel,
Seyss-Inquart, Kaltenbrunner, _et cetera_, then for the last time?
SCHACHT: It is possible that all these gentlemen were there, but I did
not speak at length with any of them except Hitler himself.
DR. DIX: Did you speak with Hitler at that time?
SCHACHT: Hitler addressed me, and that was one of the strangest scenes
of my life. We were all standing in line and Hitler passed everyone by
rather quickly. When he saw me, he came up to me with a triumphant smile
and extended his hand in a cordial manner, something which I had not
seen from him for a long time, and he said to me, “Now, Herr Schacht,
what do you have to say now?” Then, of course, he expected me to
congratulate him or express my admiration or a similar sentiment, and to
admit that my prognostication about the war and about the disaster of
the war was wrong, for he knew my attitude about the war quite exactly.
It was extremely hard for me to avoid such an answer and I searched my
mind for something else to say, finally replying: “I can only say to
you, ‘God protect you.’” That was the only significant conversation
which I had that day. I believed the best way to have kept my distance
was through just such a completely neutral and inconsequential remark.
DR. DIX: Well...
SCHACHT: But perhaps you would like me to refer to the individual
gentlemen, and I can tell you with this exception just when I spoke to
these gentlemen for the last time.
DR. DIX: Himmler?
SCHACHT: Himmler, I would judge that perhaps I talked to him last in
1936.
DR. DIX: Hess?
SCHACHT: Hess—of course I am not referring to the conversations here in
the prison. I had not spoken with Hess for years before the beginning of
the war.
DR. DIX: Ley?
SCHACHT: Ley, I had not seen him since the beginning of the war.
DR. DIX: Ribbentrop?
SCHACHT: I saw Ribbentrop last after my being thrown out of the
Reichsbank, because I had to talk with him about the imminent journey to
India, and that must have been, I would judge, February 1939. I have not
talked with him since.
DR. DIX: Rosenberg?
SCHACHT: Rosenberg, always aside from this reception of Hitler’s,
perhaps not since 1936.
DR. DIX: Frick?
SCHACHT: I perhaps saw Frick last in the year 1938.
DR. DIX: Schirach?
SCHACHT: I did not even know Schirach.
DR. DIX: Speer?
SCHACHT: I talked with Speer for the last time—and I can tell you this
exactly—when I went to the World Exposition in Paris in the year 1937.
DR. DIX: Of course, you are always referring to the time before you were
taken prisoner?
SCHACHT: Yes, of course, naturally here I have...
DR. DIX: Sauckel?
SCHACHT: Not since the beginning of the war.
DR. DIX: Seyss-Inquart?
SCHACHT: Seyss-Inquart, I would judge that I spoke to him for the last
time in 1936, when I visited a colleague in the National Bank in
Austria.
DR. DIX: Kaltenbrunner?
SCHACHT: I saw Kaltenbrunner for the first time here at the prison.
DR. DIX: We will refer to Hitler later. Frank is still missing.
SCHACHT: I saw Frank last perhaps 1937 or 1938.
DR. DIX: Most likely at the occasion of the speech you mentioned
yesterday?
SCHACHT: Yes, possibly also afterwards at an official reception, but I
do not believe that I saw him after 1938.
DR. DIX: Now, how about the leading men of the Wehrmacht, Keitel, for
instance?
SCHACHT: I never had any contact with Keitel. I perhaps saw him at some
social gathering, but never after 1938.
DR. DIX: Jodl?
SCHACHT: I made Herr Jodl’s acquaintance here in the prison.
DR. DIX: Dönitz?
SCHACHT: I met Dönitz for the first time here in the prison.
DR. DIX: Raeder?
SCHACHT: Herr Raeder, I believe I have known him for quite some time. In
the beginning we exchanged occasional visits within the family, visits
of a semiofficial character but always on a friendly basis; however, I
believe that I have also not seen him or talked to him since 1938.
DR. DIX: Brauchitsch?
SCHACHT: I have not talked with Brauchitsch since 1939, or since 1938,
since the Fritsch affair.
DR. DIX: How about Halder?
SCHACHT: As you know, I saw Halder in connection with the Putsch in the
fall of 1938 but not after that.
DR. DIX: How often did you see Hitler after your dismissal as President
of the Reichsbank?
SCHACHT: After my dismissal as President of the Reichsbank?
DR. DIX: Since January 1939.
SCHACHT: I saw him once more in January 1939 because I had to discuss my
future activity, _et cetera_, with him. And on that occasion he asked
me—he knew that I had long wished to take an extensive journey—that I
might avail myself of this opportunity to take this journey now, so
there would not be so much talk about my leaving the Reichsbank. Then we
agreed on the trip to India. On that occasion I also saw Göring for the
last time. And then—after my return in August, I did not see him
again—then the war came, during the course of which I saw him twice.
Shall I tell you about those two occasions?
DR. DIX: Yes.
SCHACHT: I saw him once in February 1940. At that time various American
magazines and periodicals had requested me to write articles on
Germany’s interpretation of the situation, her desires, and her position
in general. I had the inclination to do this, but because we were at
war, I naturally could not do so without first informing the Foreign
Minister. The Foreign Minister advised me that he had nothing against my
writing an article for an American periodical, but that before sending
off this article, he wanted to have the article submitted for
censorship. Of course that did not appeal to me—I had not even thought
of that—and, consequently, I did not write this article.
However, there were further inquiries from America and I said to myself,
“It is not sufficient for me to talk with the Foreign Minister, I must
go to Hitler in this matter.” So, with that aim, I called on Hitler, who
received me very soon after my request, and I told him at that time,
among other things, just what my experience with Herr Von Ribbentrop had
been, and I further told him that I thought it might be quite expedient
to write these articles; and that it seemed vital to me to have
constantly someone in America, who by means of the press, _et cetera_,
could enlighten public opinion as to Germany and her interests.
Hitler was favorably impressed with this suggestion of mine and said to
me, “I shall discuss this matter with the Foreign Minister.”
Consequently, this entire matter came to naught.
Then, later, through the good offices of my Codefendant, Funk, who
probably had a discussion at that time with Ribbentrop about this
matter, I tried to get at least an answer from Ribbentrop. This answer,
given to Funk, was to the effect that it was still too early for a step
of that sort. And that was my visit in 1940. Then I saw Hitler again in
February of 1941...
DR. DIX: Pardon my interruption. So that we can avoid all
misunderstandings, if Hitler had given you permission that you could
have gone to America, just what would your activities have been? Tell us
very briefly. I want no misunderstanding.
SCHACHT: First of all, I had not proposed going myself; I rather made a
general suggestion. But, naturally, I would have been very glad to go to
America for I saw a possibility...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think it is material to know what
he would have done if something had happened which did not happen.
DR. DIX: I just wanted to preclude any misunderstanding. I said that
misunderstandings—Well let us drop the subject.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Then, let us go on to your second visit.
SCHACHT: In 1941, in February, I called on Hitler once more because of a
private affair. The year before my wife had died and now I intended to
remarry. As Minister without Portfolio, which I still was, I naturally
had to inform the Reich Chancellor and head of the State of my intention
and I called on him for that reason. There was no political discussion
on this occasion. As I was going to the door, he asked me, “At one time
you had the intention, or you advised me, that someone should go to
America. It is probably too late for that, now.” I replied immediately,
“Of course, it is too late for that now.” And that was the only remark
of a political nature made. The conversation dealt mainly with my
marriage, and since then I did not see Hitler any more.
DR. DIX: And now your relations with Göring?
SCHACHT: I did not see Göring either since 1939.
DR. DIX: Now, I am turning to a point which has been repeatedly stressed
by the Prosecution, that is, the propaganda value of your participation
at Party rallies, and I would like to remind you of what Mr. Justice
Jackson has already mentioned in his opening statement. I am translating
from the English because I have no German text:
“Does anyone believe that Hjalmar Schacht, seated in the first
row at the Nazi Party Rally of 1935 and wearing the Party
emblem, was only included in the film for the purpose of making
an artistic effect? This great thinker, in lending his name to
this threadbare undertaking, gave it respectability in the eyes
of every hesitating German.”
Will you please state your opinion on this?
SCHACHT: First of all, I would like to make a few minor corrections. In
1935 I did not have a Party emblem. Secondly, Germans who were
hesitating were no longer of any importance in 1935, for Hitler’s
domination had been firmly established by 1935. There were only those
people who were turning away from Hitler but none who were still coming
to him. And then, I must really consider it as a compliment that I am
called a figure of importance, a great thinker, and so forth; but I
believe that the reasons for my being and working in the Hitler Cabinet
have been set forth by me in sufficient detail, so that I need not go
into that any more.
The fact that in the first years especially I could not very well absent
myself from the Party rallies is understandable, I believe, for they
were Hitler’s principal display of show and ostentation for the outside
world, and not only did his ministers participate in the Party rallies
but also a great many other representative guests.
May I add just a few more words?
I stayed away from the later Party rallies. For example, the Party Rally
of 1935 mentioned by the Chief Prosecutor. That was the Party rally—and
this is why I happen to remember it—at which the Nuremberg Laws against
the Jews were proclaimed, and at the time I was not even in Nuremberg.
I attended the Party Rally in 1933 and in 1934. I am not certain whether
I attended it in 1936 or 1937. I rather believe that I attended in 1936.
I was decidedly missing at the later rallies and the last visit that I
made at the Party Rally, which I have just mentioned, I attended only on
“Wehrmacht Day.”
DR. DIX: At these Party Rallies were the prominent foreigners—you
already mentioned that. Was the Diplomatic Corps represented by the
chiefs of the diplomatic missions?
SCHACHT: I believe that with the exception of the Soviet Ambassador, in
the course of years all other leading diplomats attended the Party
Rally, and I must say, in large numbers, with great ostentation and
seated in the first rows.
DR. DIX: How did you explain that? The Diplomatic Corps only really
takes part in functions of State and this was a purely Party matter? How
was this participation explained?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think this is objectionable. If it please the
Tribunal, I am in a position to object, because I am not embarrassed by
it, if there is any embarrassment, but for this witness to explain the
conduct of the ambassadors of other countries seems utterly beyond
probative value. His opinion of what the ambassadors were doing, why
they attended a Party rally which he was lending his name to, doesn’t
seem to me has any probative value. The fact that they attended I don’t
object to, but it seems to me that for him to probe, unless he has some
fact—and I want to make clear I don’t object to any facts that this
witness knows, and I haven’t objected to most of his opinions which we
have been getting at great length. But I think for him to characterize
the action of foreign representatives is going beyond the pale of
relevant and material evidence.
SCHACHT: May I make just one remark in reply?
THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better pass on, Dr. Dix.
DR. DIX: Yes, of course. However, I would ask to be given the permission
to answer Mr. Justice Jackson briefly, not because I want to be
stubborn, but I believe that if I answer now I can avoid later
discussions and can save time thereby. I did not ask the defendant for
his opinion. Of course Mr. Justice Jackson is right in saying that he is
not here to give opinions about the customs of the Diplomatic Corps; but
I asked him about a fact: How this participation on the part of the
Diplomatic Corps, which is significant, was explained at that time. I
consider this relevant, as will be seen more than once in the course of
my questioning, and that is why I am saying it now, that throughout his
and his political friends’ oppositional activities, it is of prime
importance to know who gave them moral, spiritual, or any other support,
and who did not support them. And thereby, of course, the outward
demeanor of the official representatives of foreign countries during the
whole period is of tremendous importance, with regard to the capacity of
this opposition group to act. One can support such a group; one can be
neutral to it, or one can also combat it from abroad. That is the only
reason why I put my question, and I deem myself obligated to consider
this angle of the problem also in the future.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I don’t think Mr. Justice Jackson’s objection
was to the fact that the diplomatic representatives were there but to
comment upon the reasons why they were there. If all you want to prove
is the fact that they were there, then I don’t think Mr. Justice Jackson
was objecting to that. What the defendant was going on to give, was his
opinion of why the diplomatic representatives were there.
DR. DIX: I believe I do not need to make a further reply. He has already
said that he does not wish to give an explanation, but if Your Lordship
will permit me, I shall continue.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Around that time, you certainly came into
contact with prominent foreigners both officially and privately. What
position did they take towards the trend of events at the time the
National Socialists consolidated their power? And how did their attitude
influence your own attitude and activity?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal! I dislike to interrupt
with objections, but I can’t see how it exonerates or aids this
defendant, that prominent foreigners may have been deceived by a regime
for which he was furnishing the window dressings with his own name and
prestige. Undoubtedly there were foreigners, I am willing to stipulate
there were foreigners, like Dahlerus, who were deceived by this set-up
of which he was a prominent and slightly respectable part. But it does
seem to me that if we are going to go into the attitude of foreigners
who are not indicted here or accused that we approach endless questions.