“I did not mention this consideration as to the parts of Germany
which were separated from her”—and I am speaking of the losses
suffered by Germany—“in order that we might draw the conclusion
of warlike intentions; my entire position and my work are
marshaled to the objective of bringing about peace in Europe
through peaceful and sensible considerations and measures.”
THE PRESIDENT: Will you please give me the PS numbers and the exhibit
numbers of those two speeches?
DR. DIX: I cannot at this moment, Your Lordship, I am sorry, but I will
try to get them and submit them in writing. The last is the speech at
Frankfurt, and the others...
THE PRESIDENT: That is quite all right. You will let us know in writing,
will you?
DR. DIX: Yes, indeed.
SCHACHT: Perhaps if it is permitted I might refer to two other sentences
from my article which was published in _Foreign Affairs_, the well-known
American magazine, in the year 1937. I have the German translation
before me, which says, in the introduction, and I quote:
“I am making these introductory remarks in order to clarify the
situation. The colonial problem today, as in the past, is for
Germany not a question of imperialism or militarism, but still
surely and simply a question of economic existence.”
Perhaps I might refer to the point that very influential Americans were
in constant accord with this view. I have a statement made by the
collaborator of President Wilson, Colonel House, who made the well-known
distinction between the “haves” and “have nots,” and who was especially
influential in advocating consideration for German colonial interests.
Perhaps I can dispense with the quotation.
DR. DIX: In this connection I should like to point to the document
submitted by the Prosecution, Document L-111, Exhibit USA-630. This
document is concerned with the conversation which you had with the
American Ambassador Davies, and in which you are accused of having
indirectly threatened a breach of peace.
SCHACHT: I have already set forth just now that I constantly said that
Europe cannot have peaceful development if there are no means of
livelihood for the completely overpopulated Central Europe, and I
believe conditions at present show how absolutely right I was—just what
an impossibility it is to feed these masses of people within Europe. And
beyond that I had a keen interest in diverting Hitler’s quite misguided
ideas from Eastern Europe and therefore was constantly at pains to
direct his attention to the colonial problem so that I could turn his
thought from the mad ideas of expansionism in the East. I recall that in
1932, shortly before he assumed office, I had a conversation with him in
which for the first time I approached him on these facts and
particularly told him what utter nonsense it would be to think of an
expansion in the East.
Then, constantly, in the subsequent years, again and again, I spoke
about the colonial problem, until at the last in the summer of 1936 I
had the possibility of pursuing my ideas and Hitler gave me the mission,
which I had suggested to him, of going to Paris to discuss with the
French Government the possibility of a satisfactory solution of the
question of colonies for Germany. This actually happened in the summer
of 1936. And for the satisfaction of myself and all other friends of
peace, I might say that the Government of Léon Blum, which was in office
at the time, showed gratifying appreciation of this solution for
Europe’s food and economic problems, and for their part stated that they
were ready to deal with the colonial problem with the aim of perhaps
returning one or two colonies to Germany. Léon Blum then undertook, in
agreement with me, to inform the British Government about these
conversations in order to secure their consent or to bring up a
discussion of this problem within the British Government. That actually
did take place, but the British Government hesitated for months before
they finally could decide on any position in this matter and so the
discussion dragged on up to the initial months of the Spanish civil war
and was eclipsed and supplanted by the problems of the Spanish civil
war, so that a continuation of the discussion on this colonial problem
never came about.
At that time, in January of 1937, when the American Ambassador to
Moscow, Ambassador Joseph Davies, visited me at Berlin, I was rather
irritated by the slowness with which the British Government was meeting
these suggestions, and consequently I came forth with a request for
understanding and support and told Ambassador Davies about this whole
matter. I tried constantly and repeatedly to gain the understanding
support of representatives of the American Government. I tried again and
again to advise these gentlemen about domestic conditions and
developments within Germany, to tell them as much as was possible and
compatible with German interests and to keep them informed. That applies
to Ambassador Davies, Ambassador Dodd, Ambassador Bullitt when he was in
Berlin, and so on.
This conversation with Ambassador Davies is referred to in the document
which the Prosecution has submitted, Document L-111, and which is taken
from the book which Ambassador Davies wrote about his mission in Moscow,
and we will perhaps come back to this book later.
As the gist of my conversation with Davies I would like to quote just
one sentence again, which I must again quote in English, since I have
only the English book at my disposal.
“Schacht earnestly urged that some such feasible plan could be
developed if discussions could be opened; and that, if
successful, would relieve the European war menace, relieve
peoples of enormous expenditures for armaments, restore free
flow of international commerce, give outlet to thrift and
natural abilities of his countrymen and change their present
desperation into future hope.”
DR. DIX: In this connection the affidavit of Fuller plays an important
part, that is Exhibit USA-629, and Document EC-450. According to this
affidavit, you allegedly declared to Fuller that if Germany could not
get colonies through negotiations she would take them. Please define
your position as to this statement.
SCHACHT: In a German drama an intriguer is being instructed by a tyrant
to bring a man of honor to ruin, and he says in reply, “Just give me one
word said by this man, and I will hang him thereby.” I believe, My Lord
Justices, that in this courtroom there is not a single person who at one
time or another in his life has not said a rather unfortunate word. And
how much easier is it when he is speaking in a foreign language of which
he is not completely master.
Mr. Fuller is known to me as a respectable business man, and this
discussion which he has here reproduced is indubitably done according to
the best of his knowledge. He himself rightly says that even had he
tried to put down the exact words he could not guarantee that each and
every word has been said. But if I did say these words, then it seems
only that I said we Germans must have colonies and we shall have them.
Whether I said, “We shall take them,” or “We shall get them,” that, of
course, it is impossible for me to say with certainty today after a
period of 10 years.
The representative of the Prosecution also thought the expression, “We
will take them,” a little colorless in effect and therefore I believe he
just added a trifle, for he said twice in his presentation of the
charges that I had said, “We will take these colonies by force,” and on
a second occasion he even said, “We will take these colonies by force of
arms.” But “force” or “force of arms” are not mentioned in the whole of
Fuller’s affidavit. And if I had used that word or even used it only by
implication, Mr. Fuller would have had to say with reason: “So you want
to take colonies by force; how do you expect to do that?” It would have
been utter nonsense to assert that Germany would ever have been able to
take overseas colonies by force. She lacked—and always will
lack—domination of the seas, which is necessary for this.
Fuller did not take exception to my manner of expression and in his
conversation he immediately continued—and I quote:
“You mentioned a little while ago that necessary raw materials
could not be obtained, owing to German lack of foreign exchange.
Would stabilization help you?”
Therefore, rather than to become excited about the fact that I wanted to
take colonies by force—something which I never said and which is
contrary to my views, as I have already stated—he immediately goes on
to foreign exchange and to stabilization.
DR. DIX: The prosecutor asserts further that you were interested in the
conquest of neighboring territory in Europe.
SCHACHT: This matter is not quite so harmless as the previous mistake of
the Prosecution. In a previous interrogation, I was accused as follows,
and the prosecutor, in presenting his charges here, referred to the
fact—I quote the prosecutor:
“On 16 April, on the occasion of the Paris conference on
reparation payments, Schacht said, ‘Germany in general can pay
only if the Corridor and Upper Silesia are returned to
Germany.’”
This is the interrogation of 24 August 1945. According to the verbatim
record of the interrogation, I answered:
“It may be that I said such a thing.”
Of course, as far as the wording of a statement, which I had made 10 to
15 years before, I did not recall it. But I did remember that in
connection with the Corridor and Upper Silesia I had made a remark, and
since I had to assume that if the Prosecution submitted this record to
me it would be an accurate stenographic record, for that reason I did
not dispute this remark which I had allegedly made and said that it
might be that I said something to that effect. The Prosecution takes a
“maybe” and out of that reconstructed the following sentence:
“This quotation was read to Schacht, and he said it was
correct.”
This assertion by the Prosecution is therefore wrong. I said, “It may be
that I said something to that effect,” but I did not say that this
statement that was submitted to me was correct.
Then, fortunately, in my imprisonment here, I succeeded in getting hold
of my book, a book which I wrote about the termination of reparation
payments, which was published in 1931 and in which I luckily put down
the text of my statement about the matter we are dealing with now. I
have the exact text, and I would like to say that this book has been
submitted in evidence, and from this text appears what I said verbatim:
“Regarding the problem of German food and food supplies, it is
especially important that import of foodstuffs has been
decreased”—I beg your pardon—“that import will be
decreased.”—I am sorry again. I cannot read this—“that the
import of foodstuffs will be decreased and partially made up
through home production. Therefore, we cannot let the fact be
overlooked that important agricultural surplus territories in
the eastern part of Germany have been lost by cession and that a
large territory which was almost exclusively agrarian has been
separated from the Reich. Therefore the economic welfare of this
territory, East Prussia, is decreasing steadily and the Reich
Government must support and subsidize it. Constantly, therefore,
suitable measures should be taken to eliminate these injurious
conditions, which are hindering considerably Germany’s ability
to pay.”
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, this is from our document book, Document
Schacht-16, German Page 38, English Page 44.
SCHACHT: This quotation absolutely does not agree with the statement
submitted to me in the interrogation, and in no way can we draw the
conclusion in consequence that I was in favor of a return of these
areas. What I demanded was that the separation of these areas be taken
into consideration when Germany’s ability to pay and the payments were
determined. When the prosecutor in his speech added: “I would like to
point out that this is the same area over which the war started in
September 1939,” I believe it is an insinuation which characterizes the
prosecutor, rather than me, against whom it was intended.
DR. DIX: As part of the circumstantial evidence, that is, the indirect
evidence for the will to aggression, with which you are charged, the
Prosecution includes your wish—your alleged wish—for the Anschluss of
Austria. Will you please take your position as to this accusation?
SCHACHT: From 1919 I considered the Anschluss of Austria inevitable and,
in the national sense, that is, spiritually and culturally, it was
welcome. But that economically the Anschluss of Austria would not be for
Germany so much an aggrandizement as a liability. I always knew. But the
wish of the Austrian people to belong, to be incorporated into
Germany—I took that wish as my own and said that if here there are six
and a half million people who spontaneously in 1919 and later in
innumerable demonstrations expressed their wish of being incorporated
into the brotherhood of Greater Germany, that was an event to which no
German could be opposed, but in the interest of Austria must hail with
gladness. In that sense I always favored and respected the wish of
Austria to belong to the Reich and wanted it carried through as soon as
external political conditions permitted it.
DR. DIX: My attention has just been called to the fact that you are
still speaking too fast and that the interpretation is lagging behind a
little bit. Will you please speak a little more slowly.
What was your opinion as to the incorporation of the Sudetenland into
Germany?
SCHACHT: Concerning the incorporation of the Sudetenland, I never
thought of any such thing. Of course, Czechoslovakia was a European
problem, and it was regrettable that in that state, which had five and a
half million Czechs, two and a half million Slovaks and about three and
a half million Germans, the German element had no means of expression.
But just because the Czechoslovakian problem was not a purely
German-Czech but also a Slovak-Czech problem, I sought a solution of
this problem in such a way and wished it to be in such a way that
Czechoslovakia should constitute a federated state, similar perhaps to
Switzerland, divided into three different, culturally separate, but
politically unified areas, which would be a guarantee for the unity of a
German-Czech-Slovak state.
DR. DIX: What was your opinion and attitude to the problem of war; by
that I mean, as far as philosophical, ideological, and practical
considerations are concerned?
SCHACHT: I always considered war as one of the most devastating things
to which mankind is exposed and on basic principles throughout my entire
life I was a pacifist.
DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, during your meditative and thoughtful life you
have certainly considered the fundamental and profound differences
between legitimate and ethically based soldiership and militarism in its
various degenerate forms. What did you mean by the latter and what was
your attitude toward it, that is, militarism?
SCHACHT: Of course I saw the necessity of a country’s defense in case of
war or threats, and I stood for that theory. In that sense I was always
in favor of a Wehrmacht, but the profession of a soldier I consider to
be full of deprivations and characterized by willingness and readiness
to sacrifice, not because perhaps during a war the soldier has to give
up his life—that is the duty of every citizen of military age—but
because his whole aim and aspiration must be directed to the end that
never must the craft which he has learned be exercised. A soldier, a
career officer, who is not intrinsically a pacifist, has really in my
opinion missed his calling. Consequently, I was always an opponent of
every military digression and excess. I was always against militarism,
but I consider that soldiership conscious of its responsibility is the
highest calling which a citizen can pursue.
DR. DIX: Now, George Messersmith, as you know, the Consul General of the
United States at Berlin at one time, says in one of his various
affidavits produced by the Prosecution that you had told him, and
repeatedly told him, about Nazi intents of aggression. Will you please
state your position in that regard?
SCHACHT: First of all, I would like to remark that of course I never
made a statement of that sort, neither to Mr. George Messersmith nor to
anyone else. As far as these three affidavits of Mr. Messersmith, which
were submitted by the Prosecution, are concerned, I would like to make a
further statement.
Mr. Messersmith asserts that he had frequent contact and numerous
private conversations with me, and I would like to state here now that,
according to my exact memory, I saw Mr. George Messersmith perhaps two
or three times in my entire life. Mr. George Messersmith represents
himself as having had numerous contacts and many private conversations
with me, and he asserts further that his official capacity brought him
in contact with me as President of the Reichsbank and as Minister of
Economics.
I do not recall once having received Mr. Messersmith in my office. Mr.
George Messersmith takes these two or three discussions and proceeds to
characterize me. He calls me cynical, ambitious, egotistic, vain,
two-faced. I am, unfortunately, not in a position to give an equally
comprehensive picture of the character of Mr. Messersmith. But I must
definitely dispute his trustworthiness.
And as a first reason for this I should like to quote a general remark
by Mr. Messersmith. In his affidavit of 30 August 1945, Document
2385-PS, Mr. George Messersmith says, and I quote: “When the Nazi Party
took over Germany, it represented only a small part of the German
population.”
Contrary to that, I say that before the Nazi Party took over Germany it
occupied about forty percent of all Reichstag seats. That percentage Mr.
Messersmith calls a small part of the German population. If diplomatic
reports are everywhere as reliable as in this instance, it is small
wonder that nations do not understand each other.
I would still like to correct a specific remark by Mr. Messersmith. Mr.
Messersmith asserts, as I have quoted just a minute ago, that his duty
brought him in contact with me as Minister of Economics. In his
affidavit of 28 August, 1760-PS, Mr. Messersmith says, and I quote:
“During the wave of terrorist activity in May and June of 1934, I had
already assumed my duties as American Chargé d’Affaires in Vienna.” In
August of 1934 I became Minister of Economics, whereas, on the other
hand, Mr. Messersmith, already in May of 1934, assumed his official
duties in Vienna; but this does not prevent Mr. Messersmith from
asserting that his official duties brought him in frequent contact with
me as Minister of Economics. I believe this will suffice to gauge the
capacity of Mr. Messersmith’s memory correctly.
DR. DIX: In a similar connection, the Prosecution repeatedly referred to
the diary of the former ambassador in Berlin, Mr. Dodd, which was
published on the basis of his private notes by his children after his
death. This document has the Document Number EC-461. The Prosecution
quotes from this diary repeatedly to prove that Mr. Dodd, too,
considered you a warmonger. I know, of course, that you were a friend of
Mr. Dodd’s, a fact which is shown in his diary. Can you tell me how the
two facts can be reconciled?
SCHACHT: First of all, I might say that Ambassador Dodd was one of the
most undefiled personalities I have met, an upright character, a man of
unflinching fidelity to his convictions. He was a professor of history,
undoubtedly a good historian. He had studied at German universities. I
believe that he would turn in his grave if he could know that the notes
which he put down casually in his diary were put together by his two
children without commentary and printed without investigation.
Mr. Dodd, I am sorry to say, had one characteristic which made dealing
with him a little difficult. I think the reason for this lay in his
steadfastness of conviction, which from the first often made him appear
averse to outside influence. He found it rather hard to make himself
understood easily and fluently, and he was even less in a position to
view opinions of others in the right light. Many things that were told
him he misunderstood and saw in a wrong light.
On Page 176 in his diary, in the lower part, there is one sentence I
would like to quote to illustrate the point I am trying to make. Here he
says: “I talked fifteen minutes with Phipps”—the British Ambassador at
that time—“about the accumulated evidence of Germany’s intense war
activities.” This statement dates from the autumn of 1934 and I believe
no one is able to say that in the autumn of 1934 there was any talk of a
war activity on the part of Germany. Mr. Dodd uses the expression “war”
undoubtedly in the place of “armament”; he says “Krieg” instead of
“Aufrüstung.” In that sense, I believe he misunderstood the words.
And, as further evidence for the difficulty which one had in making the
Ambassador understand, I might say that the Foreign Office asked him
once to bring a secretary who would take notes of discussions with
representatives of the Foreign Office, so that misunderstandings could
be avoided.
I believe, therefore, that all these statements by Mr. Dodd are apt to
be misunderstood. As for myself I can only say what I have already said
about Mr. Messersmith, that of course I never talked about war
intentions.
DR. DIX: Now, in this diary it says that he was favorably disposed
towards you. Do you have any proof for this friendly attitude to you?
SCHACHT: May I perhaps refer to the correspondence with Henderson...
DR. DIX: Yes, we can deal with that later.
SCHACHT: Then I shall just confine myself to your question. Dodd was
entirely friendly to me, and I respected him deeply. I saw a sign of his
friendship in that shortly before his departure from Berlin in December
of 1937 he visited me at my home, and this incident is also dealt with
in his diary, and I would like to quote just one sentence: “I went to
Dr. Schacht’s house in Dahlem. I wished especially to see Schacht, whose
life is said to be in danger.”
In other words, Mr. Dodd had heard of an imminent attack on my life on
the part of National Socialists, and considered it important enough and
a reason for coming to my home personally in order to warn me.
A second piece of evidence of his friendship towards me can be seen from
the final visit he paid me just a few days before returning to America.
At that time he again called on me and told me urgently that I should go
to America with him, or as soon after him as possible, that I should
change my residence to America, and that I would find a pleasant welcome
there. I believe he would never have said that to me had he not felt a
certain degree of friendship for me.
DR. DIX: These are express services of friendship, and it can hardly be
assumed that the deceased Ambassador would have done you these good
services if he had considered you a warmonger and friend of the Nazis,
and especially—and I would like to say this to the High Tribunal—if
one remembers that Mr. Dodd was one of the few accredited diplomats in
Berlin who very obviously had no sympathy of any sort for the regime in
power, in fact he was wholly and fully opposed to it.
I intentionally say “the few diplomats” and, Dr. Schacht, I would like
you to define your opinion on what I am saying. You will remember that
those diplomats who kept aloof from Hitler’s regime politically and
socially, such as the Dutch Minister, the magnificent grand seigneur
Limburg-Stirum, or the Minister from Finland, the true-hearted and great
Social Democrat, Wuolijoki, that most of these diplomats were recalled
by their Governments. How is it that an opponent of the Nazis like Dodd
did such open services of friendship to someone whom he considered a
friend of the Nazis? Do you agree with my opinion?
SCHACHT: Yes. I am entirely of the same opinion.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I certainly object to going into this kind of
sermonizing back and forth between the box and the bar. It seems to me
that the witness has been allowed to say everything that Mr. Dodd has
ever written and to put in his mind what he thinks Dodd meant. He has
allowed him to go to great lengths characterizing all American
representatives, but it seems to me that this is utterly off the track
and improper for this witness to give a characterization of him in
comparison with other ambassadors and other diplomatic representatives.
There is no request here for information about facts. I reiterate, we
are not accusing Dr. Schacht here because of his opinions. We are
accusing him because of very specific facts which there seems great
reluctance to get to and deal with.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you should go on, Dr. Dix, and pass from this
part of it, pass on from these documents.
DR. DIX: Perhaps I might mention very briefly that it is entirely far
from me or from Dr. Schacht to feel impelled to express here our
opinions on political or diplomatic personalities, but, on the other
hand, if the Prosecution produces affidavits or diaries of these
diplomats and uses these documents as pieces of evidence against the
defendant in this proceeding, the defendant...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you would put questions and
put them shortly, it would be much better, and we should get on much
faster.
DR. DIX: Yes. In general I have put brief questions, Your Lordship. I
only said this now, because I would like to follow the procedure
approved, I believe, by the High Tribunal, of dealing with part of the
evidence at this stage; and so I would like to bring up the reliability
of Dodd’s Diary. That is Document Schacht-43 in my document book; German
text, Page 194; English text, Page 202. Here we are concerned with the
correspondence between the publisher of Dodd’s diary and Sir Nevile
Henderson, which deals with several misstatements in the diary. I will
dispense with the rather long letter by Sir Nevile Henderson—there are
five folio pages—and will cite just a few sentences.
On Page 196 of the German text, Sir Nevile Henderson writes:
“Take, for instance, the first statement attributed to me about
Neurath. It is entirely impossible, that I, in front of
Hitler...”
and so on and so forth.
Then on the same page, in the middle of the page, next paragraph:
“And it is the same with the general discussion. It is quite
inconceivable that I should have spoken, as there recorded,
about Bismarck and the annexation of Czechoslovakia and other
countries.”
And on the same page, a little further down, next to the last paragraph,
it says:
“Nor could I possibly have said that ‘Germany must dominate the
Danube-Balkan zone.’”
And on the next page, second paragraph:
“The remark attributed to me that England and Germany ‘must
control the world’ is pure balderdash and hardly fits in with
the preceding sentence about the United States.”
Now, there are other similar passages on this and the following page,
but I do not believe it necessary for me to quote them. I request the
High Tribunal to take official notice of this document in its entirety,
and I would like to submit it as such.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Dr. Schacht, a little while ago you
mentioned a warning on the part of Ambassador Dodd with regard to a
danger which was threatening you. Was it an attack on your life?
SCHACHT: At that time—and I only heard about this in January after Mr.
Dodd told me—I was informed that the SS was planning an attack on my
person. The intent was, as the technical expression then had it, “to
remove” me. Something like that must have been in the air; otherwise, a
foreign ambassador and the circles close to me would not have known
about it.
DR. DIX: Just a little while ago you set forth how your policy rejected
the use of arms in bringing about equality of German rights and means of
livelihood. Did you try to do anything in a practical way to further
your policy of peaceful agreement with foreign countries, for example,
when you were President of the bank?
SCHACHT: My entire work as President of the Reichsbank was primarily
based on the principle of working with the banks in foreign countries as
harmoniously as possible, of pursuing a policy of mutual assistance and
support.
Secondly, I tried to enter into personal, friendly relations with the
directors of all these banks in the hope of meeting understanding for
German problems, and thus of contributing to a solution by way of
co-operation and mutual solution of these difficult problems which had
arisen in Central Europe. The word “co-operation” (Zusammenarbeit) was
the leitmotif of our circle.
DR. DIX: To turn from the directors of the banks, what about your
foreign creditors?
SCHACHT: As I already said a little while ago, from the start I was in
disfavor with all the money makers, those people who had profited from
German loans in foreign countries for I was against Germany’s being
involved in debts abroad, and I took my stand very firmly on this point.
Then later, after the misfortune which I had always predicted actually
did come to pass, after the financial crash in the year 1931, these
self-same financiers and money men blamed me for the fact that the
interest on their money was no longer being transferred to them.
Therefore in those circles I did not gain any friends, but among serious
bankers and large banking institutions which were interested in constant
and regulated business with Germany, I believe I made no enemies,
because all measures which I later had to take in order to protect the
German currency and to maintain Germany’s foreign trade, all these
measures I always discussed jointly with the representatives of foreign
creditors. Approximately every six months we met, and I always gave them
a detailed account of German conditions. They were permitted to look
into the books of the Reichsbank. They could examine and interrogate the
officials of the Reichsbank and they always confirmed that I told them
everything in the most frank and open manner. So that I may say that I
worked in a fair and friendly way also with these men.
DR. DIX: And how did your policy of peaceful agreement affect foreign
trade, export, credit, and so forth?
SCHACHT: I believe that after the happenings that have now taken place
it is today even clearer than before that Germany cannot and could not
live without foreign trade, and that the maintenance of export trade
must be the basis for the future existence of the German nation.
Consequently, I did everything in order to maintain German foreign
trade. I can cite a few specific examples to supplement the general
principles. I tried, for example, to do business with China in order
that we might export to China. I was ready to give China credit and did.
I hailed the fact that the Soviet Union kept up an extensive flow of
trade with us, and I always advocated expanding and stabilizing this
foreign trade in the case of Russia as well as China. About the ability
and readiness to pay and the promptness of payment of the opposite
parties I never had any doubts.
THE PRESIDENT: He is going into unnecessary detail in support of the
allegation that he tried to maintain export trade. We do not surely need
details.
DR. DIX: As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, this exposition is of
great significance and relevance. It shows Schacht contrary and in
opposition to the policy carried out by Hitler. Hitler was hostile to
the Soviet Union and this hostility is counterbalanced by open
friendliness on the part of and in the person of the Minister of
Economics. If I want to prove that Schacht was pioneer of a policy of
understanding between nations, even in phases where Hitler carried on a
peaceful battle, so to speak, with another country, such as the war of
propaganda against the Soviet Union, then, in my opinion, this point is
very important for Schacht’s fundamental attitude—on one side war and
on the other understanding. This is of absolute relevance.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has made the allegation. It is for the
Prosecution to dispute it in cross-examination and if they do, then the
details might become material in re-examination.
DR. DIX: I believe the question has been answered, and now I shall turn
to an entirely new phase of questioning.
Since it is typical of his desire for understanding and his direct basic
opposition to the policy of Hitler, I would like to refer to Document
Number Schacht-34, which is an affidavit, of Schniewind, the banker and
Swedish Consul General at Munich. This is Exhibit 34, Page 114, of the
English translation, and I would like to quote a short paragraph on Page
112 of the German text, which confirms Dr. Schacht’s remarks.
Schniewind, who was a high official in the Ministry of Economics, says
here:
“My department dealt with the Reich guarantees for deliveries to
Russia, and thus I was in position to know that Schacht
considered Hitler wrong in fighting Russia. Through much effort,
he obtained Hitler’s permission to send extensive supplies,
especially machines to Russia. Frequently I gained the
impression that Herr Schacht favored these deliveries because,
while instrumental in giving employment, they did not benefit
rearmament. Herr Schacht on several public occasions pointed out
with satisfaction that trade shipments to Russia were proceeding
promptly and smoothly.”
There are just a few more minutes before the customary recess, Your
Honor, and before we take our recess, I ask that I be permitted to reply
shortly to Your Lordship’s remarks of a few minutes ago. The defendant
must conduct what is, to a certain degree, a very difficult defense. The
Prosecution very simply argued: “You helped to finance rearmament and
this rearmament in the final analysis ended in war and not only a war
but a war of aggression; therefore, you as a defendant are either a
conspirator or an accomplice, and that is a war crime.”
As far as this argument is concerned, it must in my opinion be open to
the defendant, first—and we shall deal with that later—to point out
that rearmament as such by no means constitutes a desire for aggressive
war; and secondly, to show that his acts actually indicate the exact
opposite, namely, his desire for concord and peace; and for these
fundamental reasons, I do beg the Tribunal not to cut me short in this
evidence but rather to give me the time to carry it through in detail.
This explains my desire to set forth Schacht’s policy toward the Soviet
Union, a policy in which he was in direct opposition to Hitler, to bring
it forth in its entirety, and also my wish to show that he worked for
agreement on all levels—with directors of banks and credit
furnishers—that is, he advocated a policy of give and take rather than
one of unilateral terrorizing and strife.
Gentlemen of the Bench, it is chiefly on a psychological plane on which
I have to conduct the defense; that is a very sensitive and delicate
field, and I again ask that my task may not be made more difficult.
Then, when the witnesses are called, I for my part will most likely
dispense with every witness except one, and I beg that you show me some
consideration. Does Your Lordship consider it time for a recess?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Dr. Dix. I thought that the Tribunal has
shown you every consideration, and we will now certainly have a recess.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, what was your attitude toward the Leadership
Principle? Did you not realize the danger of giving a blank check, the
danger of losing your own capacity of responsibility? You have heard
that Sir David considers the Leadership Principle in itself to be
criminal.
SCHACHT: As to whether the Leadership Principle is criminal or not,
opinions throughout history have been much divided. If we look back
through Roman history we see that from time to time in dire periods of
distress a leader was selected to whom everyone else was subordinate.
And if I read _Failure of a Mission_ by Henderson there, too, I find
sentences in which he says:
“People in England sometimes forget and fail to realize that
even dictators can be, up to a point, necessary for a period and
even extremely beneficial for a nation.”
Another passage from the same book says:
“Dictatorships are not always evil.”
In other words, it depends on just what is attributed to a Führer, how
much confidence one has in a Führer, and for how long a time. Of course,
it is a sheer impossibility for someone to assume the leadership of a
country without giving the nation from time to time an opportunity of
saying whether it still wants to keep him as Führer or not. The election
of Hitler as Führer was in itself no political mistake; in my opinion
one could have introduced quite a number of precautionary limitations
with a view to averting the danger you have mentioned. I regret to say
that that was not done, and that was a great mistake. But perhaps one
was entitled to rely on the fact that from time to time a referendum, a
plebiscite, a new expression of the will of the people would take place
by which the Führer could have been corrected, because a leader who
cannot be corrected becomes a menace. I recognized that danger very
well, I was afraid of it, and I attempted to meet it. May I say one more
thing? Limitless Party propaganda attempted to introduce the idea of a
Führer as a lasting principle into politics. That of course is utter
nonsense, and I took the opportunity—I always took such opportunity
whenever it was possible—of expressing my dissenting opinions publicly.
I took the opportunity in an address to the Academy of German Law, of
which not only Nazis but lawyers of all groups were members, and in that
speech I lectured about the Leadership Principle in economics. And I
expressed myself ironically and satirically, as unfortunately is my
wont, and said that it was not necessary to have a leader in every
stocking factory, that in fact, this principle was not a principle at
all, but an exceptional rule which had to be handled very carefully.
DR. DIX: I know that, because I was present on the occasion of that
address. What did you think about the ideology of the master race
(Herrenvolk)?
SCHACHT: I have always considered it a very unhappy precedent to speak
of a “chosen people,” or of “God’s own country,” or of things like that.
As a convinced adherent to the Christian faith I believe in Christian
charity, which bids me extend love to all men without regard to race or
faith. I would like to mention also that the silly talk about the master
race, which some Party leaders made their own, was held up to constant
ridicule by the German public. That was not surprising, because most of
the leaders of the Hitler Party were not exactly ideal types of the
Nordic race. And in that connection, when these things were discussed
among the German population, little Goebbels was referred to as “Der
Schrumpfgermane”—the shrivelled Teuton.
Only one thing—I have to say this to be just—did most of the leaders
of the Party have in common with the old Teutons—and that was drinking;
excessive drinking was a main part of the Nazi ideology.
DR. DIX: What did you think of the so-called National Socialist
Weltanschauung?
SCHACHT: Weltanschauung in my opinion is a summation of all those moral
principles which enable me to acquire a clear judgment on all aspects of
life. Therefore it is a matter of course that a Weltanschauung cannot
take root in the tangible world, but must rise above it; it is something
metaphysical, that is to say, it is based on faith, on religion. A
Weltanschauung which is not rooted in religion is in my opinion no
Weltanschauung at all. Consequently I reject the National Socialist
Weltanschauung which was not rooted in religion.
DR. DIX: In the trial brief against you it is expressly stated that
there are no charges against you with regard to the Jewish question.
Nevertheless I am putting to you a few questions on this topic, because
the trial brief by its very words takes from you what in the Jewish
question it conceded you; that is to say, the trial brief accuses you
repeatedly of Nazi ideology, in which strict observance of anti-Semitism
is integral.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I simply cannot be bound by silence after this
flagrant misstatement of our position made in conjunction with this
witness’ testimony. It is not true that we make no charges against Dr.
Schacht with reference to the Jews. What is true is that we say that he
was not in complete sympathy with that aspect of the Nazi program which
involved a wholesale extermination of the Jews, and he was for that
reason attacked from time to time. It is further conceded that he gave
aid and comfort to individual Jews, but we do charge that he believed
the Jews of Germany should be stripped of their rights as citizens, and
that he aided and participated in their persecution. And I do not like
to have our position misstated and then be met with a claim of estoppel
by silence.
DR. DIX: I have to thank you, Mr. Justice Jackson, for your clarifying
statement, and it is now all the more necessary that I put in questions
to Dr. Schacht, but at this moment I want to point out...
THE PRESIDENT: Please put it then.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, it is not only a question, but it is a problem,
and I should like to ask the Prosecution to clarify it now, because it
still needs clarification even after the statement of Mr. Justice
Jackson. If the Tribunal do not think that this is the opportune time I
can bring it up later. I believe, however, that it would be right to
bring it up how.
As I see it, there is a contradiction in the Indictment, and I would
like it clarified, so that we shall not be at cross-purposes in our
final speeches.
I can put it quite briefly. It is the question of whether Dr. Schacht is
accused also of Crimes against Humanity, that is, not only the crime of
conspiracy concerning the war of aggression, but also the typical crimes
against humanity, for on this point the individual passages, both of the
Indictment and of the Prosecution speech in which the charges were
presented, are at variance. I wanted to take the liberty of pointing out
the contradictory passages and to ask the Prosecution to be kind enough
to state conclusively at some future occasion whether Schacht is accused
also on Count Three and Four of the Indictment. In presenting the
charges the Prosecution stated, and that indicates that the Prosecution
will limit itself to Counts One and Two:
“Our evidence against the Defendant Schacht is limited to the
planning and preparation of aggressive war and his participation
in the conspiracy for aggressive war.”
Similar statements are on Page 3 of the trial brief. Also, in Appendix A
of the Indictment the charges against Schacht are limited to Counts One
and Two. However, on Page 1 of the Indictment we find the following:
“...accuse as guilty...of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and
Crimes against Humanity, and of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to
commit those Crimes....”
And then all the defendants are listed, including the Defendant Hjalmar
Schacht.
On Page 17 of the German text of the Indictment we read:
“On the basis of the facts previously stated, the
defendants”—that is, all the defendants—“are guilty.”
That is, all the defendants are guilty of Counts One, Two, Three, Four.
It also states, on Page 18 of the Indictment:
“All defendants committed, from 1 September 1939 to 8 May 1945,
War Crimes in Germany and in countries and territories occupied
by German troops after 1 September 1939 and in Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Italy, and on the high seas.”
On Page 46 it reads:
“During several years before the 8th of May 1945, all defendants
committed Crimes against Humanity in Germany”
—and so forth.
Therefore, some parts of the oral presentation and of the Indictment
show that the Prosecution limits its charges against Schacht to Counts
One and Two, but other passages express beyond doubt that he is also
accused of Crimes against Humanity.
I think it would be helpful—it need not be done immediately, but I
wanted as a precaution to express it now—if at the proper time the
Prosecution would state to what extent the charges apply to Schacht.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, it will take only one moment to answer
that, and I think the cross-examination—the examination should not
proceed under any misapprehension.
At all times, and in all documents that I am aware of, the Defendant
Schacht has been accused of being guilty of Count One.
Count One, as the statement of the offense, states:
“The Common Plan or Conspiracy embraced the commission of Crimes
against Peace in that the defendants planned, prepared, and
initiated wars of aggression... In the development and course of
the Common Plan it came to embrace the commission of War Crimes,
in that it contemplated, and the defendants determined upon, and
carried out ruthless war...”
And that included also Crimes against Humanity.
Our contention is that, while the Defendant Schacht himself was not in
the field perpetrating these individual atrocities, he is answerable for
every offense committed by any of the defendants or their
co-conspirators up to the time that he openly broke with this outfit
with which he became associated.
That is our contention and Dr. Dix should conduct his examination on the
assumption that every charge is a charge against Schacht up to the time
that he openly, and on record so that somebody knew it, became separated
from the company with which he chose to travel.
DR. DIX: It is probably my fault, but I still cannot see clearly. First,
I do not know what date the Prosecution means when it admits that
Schacht openly broke with the regime. I must, during my examination...
THE PRESIDENT: I think you must make up your own mind as to what time it
was, the time at which he openly broke.
Are you not able to hear?
DR. DIX: I have to make up my mind now?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think you had better go on with the evidence.
DR. DIX: All right. I can refer to the subject again later.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Well then, please do not make any
statements of principle concerning the Jewish question, but tell the
Tribunal, and give a few examples, of what your attitude was on the
Jewish question.
SCHACHT: The Jewish question came up quite early, when, in 1933, a New
York banker, the late James Meier, announced his intention to visit me.
I went to Hitler at that time and told him, “Mr. James Meier, one of the
most respected New York bankers and a great benefactor of his old home
country, Germany, will come to visit me, and I intend to give a dinner
in his honor. I assume that you have no objection.” He immediately said,
in a very definite and pronounced manner, “Herr Schacht, you can do
everything.” I assumed that he gave me absolute freedom to keep in
contact with my Jewish friends, which I did. The dinner actually took
place.
I only mention this because it was the first time the Jewish question
was brought up between us. At every occasion I took a definite position
on the Jewish question—and wherever possible, publicly—I have always
looked for that opportunity.