“Among that portion of the working classes which is not
communistically inclined, this is scarcely denied; at the same
time it is pointed out that the attitude of Germany towards the
Poles is not any better.”
Please note the next sentence:
“It is said that there are concentration camps at Auschwitz and
Maidanek where likewise the mass murder of Poles is carried out
systematically.”
How can one reconcile this part of your report which mentions Auschwitz
and Maidanek, where mass murder took place, with your statement that you
heard of Maidanek only at the end of 1944. Well, your report is dated
June 1943; you mentioned there both Maidanek and Auschwitz.
FRANK: With reference to Maidanek we were talking about the
extermination of Jews. The extermination of Jews in Maidanek became
known to me during the summer of 1944. Up to now the word “Maidanek” has
always been mentioned in connection with extermination of Jews.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, we are to understand—I refer to
the text submitted to you—that in May 1943 you heard of the mass murder
of Poles in Maidanek, and in 1944 you heard of the mass murder of Jews?
FRANK: I beg your pardon? I heard about the extermination of the Jews at
Maidanek in 1944 from the official documents in the foreign press.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And you heard of the mass killings of the Poles
in 1943?
FRANK: That is contained in my memorandum, and I protest: these are the
facts as I put them before the Führer.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will ask that another document be shown to
you. Do you know this document, are you acquainted with it?
FRANK: It is a decree dated 2 October 1943. I assume that the wording
agrees with the text of the original decree.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, it is in full agreement with the original
text. In any case your defense counsel can follow the text and will be
able to verify it. I have to ask you one question. What do you think of
this law signed by you?
FRANK: Yes, it is here.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You were President of the Reich Academy of Law.
From the standpoint of the most elementary standards of law, what do you
think of this law signed by you?
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the number of it?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is Exhibit USSR-335, Mr. President.
FRANK: This is the general wording for a court-martial decree. It
provides that the proceedings should take place in the presence of a
judge, that a document should be drawn up, and that the proceedings
should be recorded in writing. Apart from that I had the power to give
pardons, so that every sentence had to be submitted to me.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to tell us how this court for
court-martial proceedings was composed, who the members of this court
were. Would you please pay attention to Paragraph 3, Point 1 of
Paragraph 3?
FRANK: The Security Police, yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You were telling us of your hostile attitude to
the SD. Why then did you give the SD the right to exert oppression on
the Polish population?
FRANK: Because that was the only way in which I could exert any
influence on the sentences. If I had not published this decree, there
would have been no possibility of control; and the Police would simply
have acted at random.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You spoke of the right of reprieve which was
entrusted to you. Would you please note Paragraph 6 of this law. I
remind you that a verdict of a summary court-martial by the SD was to be
put into effect immediately according to the text. I remind you again
that there was only one possible verdict: “death.” How could you change
it if the condemned person was to be shot or hanged immediately after
the verdict?
FRANK: The sentence would nevertheless have to come before me.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, but a sentence had to be carried out
immediately.
FRANK: Those were the general instructions which I had issued in
connection with the power given me to grant reprieves, and the committee
which dealt with reprieves was constantly sitting. Files were sent in...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Since you have spoken of the right to reprieve,
I will put to you another question. Do you remember the AB Action?
FRANK: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you remember that this action signified the
execution of thousands of Polish intellectuals?
FRANK: No.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then what did it signify?
FRANK: It came within the framework of the general action of appeasement
and it was my plan to eliminate, by means of a properly regulated
procedure, arbitrary actions on the part of the Police. This was the
meaning of that action.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I do not understand very well what you mean. How
did you treat persons who were subject to the AB Action? What happened
to them?
FRANK: This meeting really only dealt with the question of arrests.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you what happened to them later?
FRANK: They were arrested and taken into protective custody.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And then?
FRANK: Then they were subjected to the proceedings which had been
established. At least, that is what I intended.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was this left to the Police exclusively?
FRANK: The Police were in charge.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In other words, the Police took over the
extermination of these people after they had been arrested, is that so?
FRANK: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, then tell us, please, why you did not
exercise your power of reprieve while they were carrying out this
inhuman action?
FRANK: I did make use of it.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will put before you your statement, dated 30
May 1940. You certainly remember this meeting with the Police on 30 May
1940, when you gave final instructions to the police before carrying out
this action?
FRANK: No.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated the following:
“Any attempt on the part of the legal authorities to intervene
in the AB Action, undertaken with the help of the Police, should
be considered as treason to the State and to German interests.”
Do you remember this statement?
FRANK: I do not remember it, but you must take into account all the
circumstances which spread over several weeks. You must consider the
statement in its entirety and not seize upon one single sentence. This
concerns a development which went on for weeks and months, in the course
of which the reprieve committee was established by me for the first
time. That was my way of protesting against arbitrary actions and of
introducing legal justice in all these proceedings. That is a
development extending over many weeks, which you cannot, in my opinion,
summarize in one sentence.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am speaking of words which in my opinion can
have only one meaning for a jurist. You wrote:
“The reprieve committee which is part of my office is not
concerned with these matters. The AB Action will be carried out
exclusively by Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger and his
organization. This is a purely internal action for quieting the
country which is necessary and lies outside the scope of a
normal legal trial.”
That is to say you renounced your right of pardon?
FRANK: At that particular moment; but if you follow the further
development of the AB Action during the following weeks you will see
that this never became effective. That was an intention, a bad
intention, which, thank God, I gave up in time. Perhaps my defense
counsel will be able to say a few words on the subject later.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One single question interests me. Did you
renounce your right of pardon while carrying out this operation or not?
FRANK: No.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well then, how can you account for your words,
this one sentence: “The reprieve committee is not concerned with these
matters.”?
How should we interpret these words?
FRANK: This is not a decree; it is not the final ruling on the matter.
It is a remark which was made on the spur of the moment and was then
negotiated on for days. But one must recognize the final stage of the
development, and not merely the various motives as they came up during
the development.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, I understand that very well, Defendant. But
I would like to ask you, was this statement made during a conference
with the Police and did you instruct the Police in that matter?
FRANK: Not during that meeting. I assume it came up in some other
connection. Here we discussed only this one action. After all, I also
had to talk to State Secretary Bühler.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, all right. While discussing the AB Action
with the Police you stated that the results of this action would not
concern the reprieve committee which was subordinated to you, is that
right?
FRANK: That sentence is contained in the diary. It is not, however, the
final result, but rather an intermediate stage.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps I can recall to you another sentence, in
order that you may judge the results of this action. Perhaps you can
recall this part which I will put to you. You stated the following:
“We need not bring these elements into German concentration
camps, for in that case we would only have difficulties and an
unnecessary correspondence with their families. We must simply
liquidate matters in the country, and in the simplest way.”
What you mean is that this would simply be a question of liquidation in
the simplest form, is that not so?
FRANK: That is a terrible word. But, thank God, it did not take place in
this way.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, but these persons were executed. What do
you mean by saying that this was not carried out? Obviously this was
carried out, for the persons were executed.
FRANK: When they were sentenced they were killed, if the right to pardon
them was not exercised.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And they were condemned without application of
the right of pardon?
FRANK: I do not believe so.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Unfortunately these people are no more, and
therefore obviously they were executed.
FRANK: Which people?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Those who were arrested under the AB Action. I
will remind you of another excerpt connected with this AB Action. If you
did not agree with the Police with regard to certain police actions it
would be difficult to explain the celebrations in connection with the
departure of Brigadeführer SS Streckenbach when he left for Berlin. Does
this not mean that you were at least on friendly terms with the Police?
FRANK: In connection with political relations many words of praise are
spoken which are not in keeping with the truth. You know that as well as
any other person.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will allow myself to remind you of only one
passage of your speech addressed to the Brigadeführer Streckenbach, one
sentence only. You said:
“What you, Brigadeführer Streckenbach, and your people, have
done in the Government General must not be forgotten; and you
need not be ashamed of it.”
That testifies, does it not, to quite a different attitude toward
Streckenbach and his people?
FRANK: And it was not forgotten either.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no further questions to put to the
defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Does that conclude the cross-examination?
MR. DODD: I have only one or two questions, if Your Honor pleases.
[_Turning to the defendant._] In the course of your examination I
understood you to say that you had never gathered to yourself any of the
art treasures of the Government General. By that I do not suppose you to
mean that you did not have them collected and registered; you did have
them collected and registered, isn’t that so?
FRANK: Art treasures in the Government General were officially collected
and registered. The book has been submitted here in Court.
MR. DODD: Yes. And you told the Tribunal that before you got there one
Dürer collection had already been seized—before you took over your
duties.
FRANK: May I ask you to understand that as follows:
These were the Dürers which were removed in Lvov before the civilian
administration was set up there. Herr Mühlmann went to Lvov at the time
and took them from the library. I had never been in Lvov before that.
These pictures were then taken directly to the Führer headquarters or to
Reich Marshal Göring, I am not sure which.
MR. DODD: They were collected for Göring, that is what I am driving at.
Is that not a fact?
FRANK: State Secretary Mühlmann, when I asked him, told me that he came
on orders of the Reich Marshal and that he had taken them away on orders
of the Reich Marshal.
MR. DODD: And were there not some other art objects that were collected
by the Reich Marshal, and also by the Defendant Rosenberg, at the time
you told the Tribunal you were too busy with war tasks to get involved
in that sort of thing?
FRANK: I know of nothing of that sort in the Government General. The
Einsatzstab Rosenberg had no jurisdiction in the Government General; and
apart from the collection of the composer Elsner and a Jewish library
from Lublin I had no official obligation to demand the return of any art
treasures from Rosenberg.
MR. DODD: But there were some art treasures in your possession when you
were captured by the American forces.
FRANK: Yes. They were not in my possession. I was safeguarding them but
not for myself. They were also not in my immediate safekeeping; rather I
had taken them along with me from burning Silesia. They could not be
safeguarded any other way. They were art treasures which are so widely
known that they are Numbers 1 to 10 in the list in the book—no one
could have appropriated them. You cannot steal a “Mona Lisa.”
MR. DODD: Well, I merely wanted to clear that up. I knew you had said on
interrogation there were some in your possession. I am not trying to
imply you were holding them for yourself, if you were not. However, I
think you have made that clear.
FRANK: I should like to remark in this connection, since I attach
particular importance to the point, that these art treasures with which
we are concerned could be safeguarded only in this way. Otherwise they
would have been lost.
MR. DODD: Very well. I have one other matter I would like to clear up
and I will not be long.
I understood you also to say this morning that you had struggled for
some time to effect the release of the Kraków professors who were seized
and sent to Oranienburg soon after the occupation of Poland. Now, of
course, you are probably familiar with what you said about it yourself
in your diary, are you?
FRANK: Yes, I said so this morning. Quite apart from what is said in the
diary, what I said this morning is the truth. You must never forget that
I had to speak among a circle of deadly enemies, people who reported
every word I said to the Führer and Himmler.
MR. DODD: Well, of course, you recall that you suggested that they
should have been retained in Poland, and liquidated or imprisoned there.
FRANK: Never—not even if you confront me with this statement. I never
did that. On the contrary, I received the professors from Kraków and
talked to them quietly. Of all that happened I regretted that most of
all.
MR. DODD: Perhaps you do not understand me. I am talking about what you
wrote in your own diary about these professors, and I shall be glad to
read it to you and make it available to you if you care to contest it.
You are not denying that you said they should either be returned for
liquidation in Poland, or imprisoned in Poland, are you? You do not deny
that?
FRANK: I have just told you that I did say all that merely to hoodwink
my enemies; in reality I liberated the professors. Nothing more happened
to them after that.
MR. DODD: All right.
Were you also talking for special purposes when you gave General Krüger,
the SS and Higher Police official, that fond farewell?
FRANK: The same applies also in this case. Permit me to say, sir, that I
admit without reservation what can be admitted; but I have also sworn to
add nothing. No one can admit any more than I have done by handing over
these diaries. What I am asking is that you do not ask me to add
anything to that.
MR. DODD: No, I am not asking you to add anything to it; rather, I was
trying to clear it up, because you’ve made a rather difficult situation,
perhaps, for yourself and for others. You see, if we cannot believe what
you wrote in your diary, I don’t know how you can ask us to believe what
you say here. You were writing those things yourself, and at the time
you wrote them I assume you didn’t expect that you would be confronted
with them.
THE PRESIDENT: Does he not mean that this was a record of a speech that
he has made?
MR. DODD: In his diary, yes. It is recorded in his diary.
THE PRESIDENT: When he said, “I did that to hoodwink my enemies”?
MR. DODD: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I presume that that particular record is a record of some
speech that he made.
MR. DODD: It is. It is entered in the diary.
FRANK: May I say something about that. It wasn’t that I put myself in a
difficult position; rather the changing course of the war made the
situation difficult for every administrative official.
MR. DODD: Finally, do you recall an entry in your diary in which you
stated that you had a long hour and a half talk with the Führer and that
you had...
FRANK: When was the last conference, please?
MR. DODD: Well, this entry is on Monday, the 17th of March 1941. It’s in
your diary.
FRANK: That was probably one of the very few conferences; whether I was
alone with him, I don’t know.
MR. DODD: ...in which you said you and the Führer had come to a complete
agreement and that he approved all the measures, including all the
decrees, especially also the entire organization of the country. Would
you stand by that today?
FRANK: No, but I might say the following: The Führer’s approval was
always very spontaneously given, but one always had to wait a long while
for it to be realized.
MR. DODD: Was that one of the times you complained to him, as you told
us this morning?
FRANK: I constantly complained. As you know, I offered to resign on 14
occasions.
MR. DODD: Yes, I know; but on this occasion did you make many complaints
and did you have the approval of the Führer, or did he turn down your
complaints on this occasion of the 17th of March, 1941?
FRANK: The Führer took a very simple way out at the time by saying,
“You’ll have to settle that with Himmler.”
MR. DODD: Well, that isn’t really an answer. You’ve entered in your
diary that you talked it out with him and that he approved everything,
and you make no mention in your diary of any disappointment over the
filing of a complaint. Surely, this wasn’t a speech that you were
recording in your diary; it seems to be a factual entry on your
conversations with the Führer. And my question is simply, do you now
admit that that was the situation, or are you saying that it was a false
entry?
FRANK: I beg your pardon, I didn’t say that I made false entries. I
never said that, and I’m not going to argue about words. I am merely
saying that you must judge the words according to the entire context. If
I emphasized in the presence of officials that the Führer received me
and agreed to my measures, then I did that to back up my own authority.
I couldn’t do that without the Führer’s agreement. What my thoughts
were, is not made clear from this. I should like to emphasize that I’m
not arguing about words and have not asked to do that.
MR. DODD: Very well, I don’t care to press it any further.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, do you wish to re-examine?
DR. SEIDL: Witness, the first question put to you by the Soviet
Prosecutor was whether you were the chief of the NSDAP in the Government
General, and you answered “yes.” Did the Party have any decisive
influence in the Government General on political and administrative
life?
FRANK: No. The Party as an organization in that sphere was, of course,
only nominally under my jurisdiction, for all the Party officials were
appointed by Bormann without my being consulted. There is no special
Führer decree for the spheres of activity of the NSDAP in the occupied
territories, in which it says that these spheres of activity are
directly under Reichsleiter Bormann’s jurisdiction.
DR. SEIDL: Did your activity in that sphere of the NSDAP in the
territory of the Government General have anything at all to do with any
Security Police affairs?
FRANK: No, the Party was much too small to play any important part; it
had no state function.
DR. SEIDL: The next question: The Soviet Prosecution showed you Document
USSR-335. It is the Decree on Drumhead Courts-Martial of 1943. It states
in Paragraph 6: “Drumhead court-martial sentences are to be carried out
at once.” Is it correct if I say that no formal legal appeal against
these sentences was possible, but that a pardon was entirely admissible?
FRANK: Certainly; but, nevertheless, I must say that this decree is
impossible.
DR. SEIDL: What conditions in the Government General occasioned the
issuing of this decree of 2 October 1943? I am thinking in particular of
the security situation.
FRANK: Looking back from the more peaceful conditions of the present
time, I cannot think of any reason which might have made such a demand
possible; but if one recalls the events of war, and the universal
conflagration, it seems to have been a measure of desperation.
DR. SEIDL: I now come back to the AB Action. Is it true that in 1939 a
court-martial decree was issued providing for considerably greater legal
guarantees than that of 1943?
FRANK: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that people arrested in the AB Action were, on
the strength of this court-martial decree, sentenced or acquitted?
FRANK: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Is it also true that all sentences of these courts were, as
you saw fit, to be passed on to the competent reprieve committee under
State Secretary Bühler?
FRANK: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: The prosecutor of the United States has laid it to your
charge that in Neuhaus, where you were arrested after the collapse of
the German Armed Forces, various art treasures were found, not in your
house, but in the office of the Governor General. Is it true that you
sent State Secretary Dr. Bühler with a letter to Reich Minister Dr.
Lammers, and that this letter contained a list of these art treasures?
FRANK: Yes, not only that, I at once called the attention of the head of
the Pinakothek in Munich to the fact that these pictures were there and
that they should at once be safeguarded against bombing. He also looked
at the pictures and then they were put in a bombproof cellar. I am glad
I did so, for who knows what might otherwise have happened to these
valuable objects.
DR. SEIDL: And now one last question. The Prosecution has submitted
Document 661-PS. This document also has a USSR exhibit number, which I
don’t know at the moment. This is a document which has been made to have
a bearing on the activities of the Academy for German Law, of which you
were president. The document has the heading “Legal Formation of
Germany’s Polish Policy on Racial-Political Lines”; the legal part
serves as a tect for the Committee on the Law of Nationalities in the
Academy for German Law. I’m having this document submitted to you.
Please, will you tell me whether you’ve ever had this document in your
hands before?
FRANK: From whom does it come?
DR. SEIDL: That is the extraordinary part; it has the Exhibit Number
USA-300.
FRANK: Does it state anywhere who drew it up or something of the sort?
DR. SEIDL: The document has no author; nor does it show on whose order
it was compiled.
FRANK: I can say merely that I’ve never seen the document; that I never
gave an order for it to be drawn up; so I can say really nothing about
it.
DR. SEIDL: It states here that it was found in the Ministry of Justice
in Kassel. Was there a Ministry of Justice in Kassel in 1940?
FRANK: A Ministry of Justice in Kassel?
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
FRANK: That has not been in existence since 1866.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to his seat.
DR. SEIDL: In that case, with the permission of the Tribunal, I shall
call witness Dr. Bilfinger.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: This document which you produced as USSR-223, which are
extracts from Defendant Frank’s diary; are you offering that in
evidence? Apparently some entries from Frank’s diary have already been
offered in evidence; others have not. Are you wishing to offer this in
evidence?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This document has already been submitted in
evidence under two numbers; the first number is 2233-PS, which was
submitted by the American Prosecution, and the second is Exhibit
USSR-223, and was already submitted by us on 15 February, 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Have these entries which you have in this document
been submitted under USSR-223? You see, the PS number does not
necessarily mean that the documents have been offered in evidence. The
PS numbers were applied to documents before they were offered in
evidence; but the USSR-223 does imply that it has been offered in
evidence.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This document has already been presented in
evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, what the Tribunal wants to know is
whether you wish to offer this USSR-223 in evidence, because unless it
was read before it hasn’t been offered in evidence, or it hasn’t gone
into the record.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: We already read an excerpt on 15 February, and
it is, therefore, already read into the record.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I retire, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[_The witness Bilfinger took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you stand up, please, and will you tell us your full
name?
RUDOLF BILFINGER (Witness): Rudolf Bilfinger.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, since when were you active in the Reich Security
Main Office (RSHA), and in what position?
BILFINGER: From the end of 1937 until the beginning of 1943 I was
government councillor in the RSHA, and later senior government
councillor and expert on legal questions, and legal questions in
connection with the police.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on two occasions and at different times
you were head of the “Administration and Law” department attached to the
commander of the Security Police and SD in Kraków?
BILFINGER: Yes. In the autumn of 1940 and in 1944 I was head of the
department “Administration and Law” attached to the commander of the
Security Police and SD in Kraków.
DR. SEIDL: What were the tasks you had to fulfil at different times in
the Government General—in broad outline.
BILFINGER: In 1940 I had the task of taking over from the Government
General a number of branches of the police administration and working in
that connection under the Higher SS and Police Leader.
DR. SEIDL: What was the legal position of the Higher SS and Police
Leader, and what was his relation to the Governor General? Did the
Higher SS and Police Leader receive his instructions concerning the
Security Police and the SD from the Governor General? Or did he receive
them direct from the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the Police, that is,
Himmler?
BILFINGER: The Higher SS and Police Leader from the very beginning
received his instructions direct from the Reichsführer SS, Himmler.
DR. SEIDL: Is it furthermore true that the commander of the Security
Police and of the SD in the Government General also received direct
orders and instructions from Amt IV, the Gestapo, and from Amt V, the
Criminal Police in the RSHA?
BILFINGER: Yes, the commander of the Security Police received many
orders direct from the various departments of the RSHA, particularly
from departments IV and V.
DR. SEIDL: Did the institution of the State Secretariat for Security,
which occurred in 1942, bring about a change in the legal position of
the Governor General with reference to measures of the Security Police
and the SD?
BILFINGER: The appointment of a State Secretary as such did not alter
the legal position of the Governor General or of the State Secretary.
New spheres of activity were merely added to the State Secretariat for
Security.
DR. SEIDL: Do you know of a decree of Reichsführer SS and Chief of the
German Police, Himmler, in the year 1939, and what were its contents?
BILFINGER: I knew of a decree, probably dated 1939, dealing with the
appointment of the Higher SS and Police Leader, which ruled that the
Higher SS and Police Leader would receive his instructions direct from
Himmler.
DR. SEIDL: The institution of the State Secretariat dated from 7 May
1942 and was based on a Führer decree. The application of this decree
called forth another decree dated 3 June 1942, which dealt with the
transfer of official business to the State Secretary for Security. Do
you know the contents of that decree?
BILFINGER: The essential contents of the decrees which you have
mentioned are known to me.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on the basis of this decree the entire
Political Police and the Criminal Police, as had been the case before,
were again subordinated to the State Secretary for Security within the
framework of the Security Police?
BILFINGER: These two branches from the very beginning were under the
Higher SS and Police Leader, and later on under the State Secretary for
Security. To this extent the decree did not bring about a change, but
was merely a confirmation.
DR. SEIDL: Is it known to you that in Appendix B of that decree there
are 26 paragraphs in which all the branches of the Security Police are
transferred to the Higher SS and Police Chief as State Secretary for
Security?
BILFINGER: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Do you know that in this decree, in Appendix B, Jewish
matters are also mentioned specifically?
BILFINGER: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Do you know that in Paragraph 21 of Appendix B it is ruled:
“The special fields of the Security Police: Representation of
the Government General at conferences and meetings, particularly
with the central offices of the Reich, which deal with the
above-mentioned special fields.”?
BILFINGER: I know that as far as the sense is concerned, such a ruling
was contained therein. Whether Paragraph 21 or another paragraph was
worded this way I don’t remember.
DR. SEIDL: Is it also true that on the basis of this decree the last
remains of the administrative police were removed from the
administration of the Government General and handed over to the State
Secretary for Security, who was directly under Himmler.
BILFINGER: That was the intention and the purpose of this decree. But,
contrary to the wording of that decree, only a few branches were taken
away from the administration; concerning the remainder a fight ensued
later. The result was, however, that all branches of the police
administration were taken away.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the administration of the Government General
have anything to do with the establishment and administration of
concentration camps?
BILFINGER: To the best of my knowledge, no.
DR. SEIDL: You were with the Chief of the Security Police and SD in
Kraków. When did you yourself hear of concentration camps at Maidanek,
Treblinka, and Lublin for the first time?
BILFINGER: May I correct you, I was attached to the Commander of
Security Police.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, the Commander of the Security Police.
BILFINGER: I heard of Maidanek for the first time when Lublin and
Maidanek were occupied by the Russians; and through propaganda I heard
for the first time what the name Maidanek meant, when the then Governor
General Frank ordered an investigation regarding events in Maidanek and
responsibility for these events.
DR. SEIDL: According to your own observation, generally speaking, what
were the relations like between the Governor General and the SS
Obergruppenführer Krüger, and what were the reasons for those relations?
BILFINGER: Relations between them were very bad from the beginning. The
reasons were partly questions of organization and of the use of the
Police, and partly essential differences of opinion.
DR. SEIDL: What do you mean by essential differences of opinion? Do you
mean different opinions regarding the treatment of the Polish
population?
BILFINGER: I can still recollect one example which concerned the
confirmation of police court-martial sentences by Governor General
Frank. In opposition to Krüger’s opinion, he either failed to confirm a
number of sentences or else mitigated them considerably. In this
connection I remember such differences of opinion.
DR. SEIDL: Were these sentences which were passed in connection with the
so-called AB Action?
BILFINGER: I know nothing of an AB Action.
DR. SEIDL: You came to the Government General later, did you?
BILFINGER: I came to the Government General in August 1940.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions for this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask questions?
DR. RUDOLF MERKEL (Counsel for Gestapo): May I put a few questions to
the witness?
Witness, the Prosecution states that the State Police was a circle of
persons formed in accordance with a common plan, and that membership in
it was voluntary. Since you had an especially high position in the RSHA,
I ask you to tell me briefly what you know about these questions?
BILFINGER: Of the members of the Secret State Police only a small part
were volunteers. The former officials, the officials of the former
political department of the headquarters of the Commissioner of the
Police, constituted the nucleus of the membership of the Secret State
Police. The various local police head offices were created from these
former political departments of the central police headquarters, and at
the same time practically all the officials from these former political
departments were taken over. In Berlin, for example, it was Department
I-A of the central police headquarters.
Apart from that, administrative officials were transferred from other
administrative authorities to the Secret State Police, or were detailed
to go here. As time went on people from other administrations and
offices were forced to transfer to the Secret State Police. Thus, for
instance, the entire frontier customs service was transferred to the
Secret State Police in 1944 by order of the Führer. At about the same
time the whole of the intelligence service was transferred.
In the course of the war numerous members of the Waffen-SS who were no
longer eligible for active military service were detailed to the Secret
State Police. In addition many people who originally had had nothing to
do with police work were drafted as emergency members to the Secret
State Police.
DR. MERKEL: If I summarize it by saying that the Secret State Police was
a Reich authority and that the German civil service law applied to its
employees, is that correct?
BILFINGER: Yes.
DR. MERKEL: Was it possible for the officials to resign from the Secret
State Police easily?
BILFINGER: It was extremely difficult and, in fact, impossible to resign
from the Secret State Police. One could resign only in very special
circumstances.
DR. MERKEL: It has been stated here with reference to the composition of
the Secret State Police personnel that there was the following
proportion: executive officers about 20 percent; administrative
officials about 20 percent; and technical personnel approximately 60
percent. Are these figures about right?
BILFINGER: I have no general information about the composition of the
personnel; but for certain offices about which I knew more these figures
would probably apply.
DR. MERKEL: Under whose jurisdiction were the concentration camps in
Germany and in the occupied countries?
BILFINGER: The concentration camps were under the jurisdiction of the
Economic Administration Main Office under SS Gruppenführer Pohl.
DR. MERKEL: Did the Secret State Police have anything to do with the
administration of the concentration camps?
BILFINGER: No. It maybe that at the beginning certain concentration
camps here and there were administered directly by the Secret State
Police for a short period. That was probably the case in individual
instances. But in principle even at that time, and later on without
exception, the concentration camps were administered by the Economic
Administration Main Office.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know at all who gave orders for the liquidations
which took place in the concentration camps?
BILFINGER: No, I know nothing about that.
DR. MERKEL: Can you say anything about the grounds for protective
custody? On the strength of what legal rulings was protective custody
decreed after 1933?
BILFINGER: Protective custody was based on the Decree of the Reich
President for the Protection of the People and the State, of February
1933, in which a number of the basic rights of the Weimar Constitution
were rescinded.
DR. MERKEL: Was there later a decree by the Minister of the Interior
which dealt with protective custody, at the end of 1936 or the beginning
of 1937?
BILFINGER: Yes, at that time the Protective Custody Law was drawn up.
The legal basis as such remained in force. At that time power to decree
protective custody was confined to the Secret State Police. Before that
a number of other offices, rightly or wrongly, had decreed protective
custody. To prevent this, protective custody was then confined to the
Secret State Police.
DR. MERKEL: Is it correct that for some time you were in France. In what
capacity were you there?
BILFINGER: In the late summer and autumn of 1943 I was commander of the
Security Police in France, in Toulouse.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything about an order from the RSHA, or from
the commander of the Sipo for France, or from individual district
commanders, to the effect that ill-treatment or torture was to be
applied when prisoners were interrogated?
BILFINGER: No, I do not know of such orders.
DR. MERKEL: Then how do you explain the ill-treatment and atrocities
which actually took place in connection with interrogations, proof of
which has been given by the Prosecution?
BILFINGER: It is possible that ill-treatment did occur; in a number of
cases this either took place in spite of its being forbidden, or else it
was committed by members of other German offices in France which did not
belong to the Security Police.
DR. MERKEL: Did you, while you were active in France, hear of any such
ill-treatment either officially or by hearsay?
BILFINGER: I never heard of any such ill-treatment at the hands of
members of the German police or the German Armed Forces. I heard only of
cases of ill-treatment carried out by groups consisting of Frenchmen who
were being employed by some German authority.
DR. MERKEL: Were there so-called Gestapo prisons in France?
BILFINGER: No, the Security Police in France did not have prisons of
their own. They handed over their prisoners to the detention camps of
the German Armed Forces.
DR. MERKEL: One last question: The Prosecution has given proof of a
large number of crimes against humanity and war crimes which were
committed with the participation of the Security Police. Can one say
that these crimes were perfectly obvious and were known to all members
of the Secret State Police, or were these crimes known only to a small
circle of persons who had been ordered directly to carry out the
measures concerned? Do you know anything about that?
BILFINGER: I didn’t quite understand the question from the beginning.
Were you referring to France or to the Security Police in general?
DR. MERKEL: I was referring to the Security Police in general.
BILFINGER: No ill-treatment or torture of any kind was permitted; and,
as far as I know, nothing of the kind did happen, still less was it
known generally or to a larger circle of persons. I knew nothing about
it.
DR. MERKEL: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? Is there
nothing you wish to ask arising from Dr. Merkel’s cross-examination, Dr.
Seidl?
DR. SEIDL: I have only one more question to ask the witness.
Witness, in Paragraph 4 of the decree of 23 June 1942 the following
ruling is made, and I quote:
“The SS and Police Leaders in the districts are directly
subordinate to the governors of the districts, just as the State
Secretary for Security is subordinate to the Governor General.”
Thus it does not say that the entire police organization is subordinate,
but only the police leaders.
Now I ask you whether orders which had been issued by the commanders of
the Security Police and the SD were forwarded to the governors or were
sent directly to the district chiefs of the Security Police and the SD?
BILFINGER: These orders were always sent directly from the commander to
the district chiefs of the Security Police and the SD. The commander
could give no instructions to the governors.
DR. SEIDL: If I understand you correctly you mean that the Security
Police and the SD had their own official channels which had absolutely
nothing to do with the administrative construction of the Government
General.
BILFINGER: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions for the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. SEIDL: With the permission of the Tribunal, I call as the next
witness the former Governor of Kraków, Dr. Kurt von Burgsdorff.
[_The witness Von Burgsdorff took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
KURT VON BURGSDORFF (Witness): Kurt von Burgsdorff.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:
“I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure
truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Government General was divided into five
districts at the head of each of which there was a governor; is that
correct?
VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: From 1 December 1943 until the occupation of your district by
Soviet troops you were governor of the district Kraków?
VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. To use the correct official term, I was...
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Mr.
President, the defense counsel has put the question of the “occupation”
of this region by Soviet troops. I energetically protest against such
terminology and consider it a hostile move.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I have just been told that perhaps a mistake
in the translation has crept in. All I intended to say was that, in the
course of the year 1944, the area of which this witness was governor was
occupied by the Soviet troops in the course of military action. I do not
know what the Soviet prosecutor is protesting against; it is at any rate
far from my intention to make any hostile statement here.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the point was, it was not an occupation; it was a
liberation by the Russian Army.
DR. SEIDL: Of course; I did not want to say any more than that the
German troops were driven out of this area by the Soviet troops.
Witness, will you please continue with your answer?
VON BURGSDORFF: I was entrusted with exercising the duties of a
governor—that is the correct official expression. Until a few months
ago I was still an officer of the Wehrmacht, and during my entire
activity in Kraków I remained an officer of the Wehrmacht.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, according to your observations, what basically was
the attitude of the Governor General toward the Polish and Ukrainian
people?
VON BURGSDORFF: I want to emphasize that I can answer only for the year
1944. At that time the attitude of the Governor General was that he
wished to live in peace with the people.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that already in 1942 the Governor General had
given the governors the opportunity of setting up administrative
committees, comprised of Poles and Ukrainians, attached to the district
chiefs?
VON BURGSDORFF: There was a governmental decree to this effect. Whether
that was in 1942 or not I do not know.
DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself make use of the authorization contained
therein, and did you establish such administrative committees?
VON BURGSDORFF: In the district of Kraków I had such a committee
established at once for every district chief.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, according to your observations what was the food
situation like in the Government General, and particularly in your
district?
VON BURGSDORFF: It was not unsatisfactory; but I must add that the
reason for that was that, in addition to the rations, the Polish
population had an extensive black market.
DR. SEIDL: According to your observations what was the attitude of the
Governor General on the question of the mobilization of labor?
VON BURGSDORFF: He did not wish any workers sent outside the Government
General, because he was interested in retaining the necessary manpower
within the country.
DR. SEIDL: Was the Church persecuted by the Governor General in the
Government General; and what basically was the attitude of the Governor
General to this question, according to your observations?
VON BURGSDORFF: Again I can answer only for my district and for the year
1944. There was no persecution of the Church; on the contrary, the
relations with churches of all denominations were good in my district.
On my travels I always received the clergy, and I never heard any
complaint.
DR. SEIDL: Did you have any personal experience with the Governor
General with regard to this question?
VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. In the middle of January 1944 I was appointed
District Standortführer by the Governor General, who at the same time
was the Party Leader in the Government General; that is, I was appointed
to a Party office for the district of Kraków. I pointed out to him, as I
had pointed out to the Minister of the Interior, Himmler, before, that I
was a convinced church-going Christian. The Governor General replied
that he was in no way perturbed by that and that he knew of no provision
in the Party program which prohibited it.
DR. SEIDL: What, according to your observations, were the relations like
between the Governor General and the administration of the Government
General on the one side, and the Security Police and the SD on the other
side?
VON BURGSDORFF: Doubtlessly underneath they were bad, because the Police
always ended by doing only what it wanted and did not concern itself
with the administration. For that reason in the country districts also
there was real friction between the administration offices and the
Police.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that when you took office, or shortly after,
the Governor General issued several instructions referring to the
Police? I quote from the diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank, the entry of
4 January 1944:
“The Governor General then gave some instructions to Dr. Von
Burgsdorff with reference to his new activities. His task will
be to inform himself, as a matter of principle, of all decisive
factors in the district. Above all the Governor should direct
his efforts to opposing energetically any encroachments by the
Police.”
VON BURGSDORFF: Today I no longer remember that conversation of 4
January 1944, but it may have taken place. However, I do remember that
after I took office, at the end of November 1943, I went to see the
Governor General once more and told him that I had heard that the
relations with the Police were not good and were scarcely tolerable for
the administration. He replied that he was doing what he could in order,
as I might put it, to bring the Police to reason. It was on the basis of
this statement by the Governor General that I definitely decided to
remain in the Government General. I had, as is known, told the Reich
Minister of the Interior that I was unwilling to go there.
DR. SEIDL: In your capacity as Governor did you have any authority to
issue commands to the Security Police and the SD in your district?
VON BURGSDORFF: None whatsoever.
DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself ever see a police directive?
VON BURGSDORFF: Never. With the Police, orders are passed down
vertically, that is, directly from the Higher SS and Police Leader to
the SS and Police Leader respectively—and that is probably the usual
way—from the chief of the Security Police to the unit commander of the
Security Police.
DR. SEIDL: In your activity as Governor did you have anything to do with
the administration of concentration camps?
VON BURGSDORFF: Never.
DR. SEIDL: Do you know who administered the concentration camps?
VON BURGSDORFF: No, not from my own experience; but I have heard that
there was some central office in Berlin under the Reichsführer SS.
DR. SEIDL: When did you hear for the first time of the Maidanek
concentration camp?
VON BURGSDORFF: From you, about a fortnight ago.
DR. SEIDL: You want to tell the Tribunal under oath...
VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: ...that you, although you were Governor of Kraków in the
occupied Polish territory, did not learn about that until during your
captivity?
VON BURGSDORFF: Yes, I am firmly convinced that I heard about this
concentration camp from you for the first time.
DR. SEIDL: When did you for the first time hear of the Treblinka
concentration camp?
VON BURGSDORFF: Also from you on the same occasion.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Governor General is accused by the Prosecution
of issuing a summary court-martial decree in the year 1943. What at that
time was the security situation in the Government General?
VON BURGSDORFF: Again I can judge only for the year 1944. As the German
troops came back from the East, it became worse and worse, so that in my
district it became increasingly difficult to carry out any kind of
administration.
DR. SEIDL: According to your observations what was the economic
situation like in the agricultural and industrial sectors of your
district, and is the statement justified that, allowing for wartime
conditions, the administration of the Government General had done
everything to promote economy?
VON BURGSDORFF: Economy in my district was at full force in 1944 both in
industry and in agriculture. Some industries had been transferred from
the Reich to the Government General; and, as far as agriculture was
concerned, the administration imported large quantities of fertilizers
and seeds and the like. Horse breeding was also greatly promoted in my
district.
DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Dr. Frank is accused of not having done
everything that was necessary with regard to public health and sanitary
conditions. What can you say about this point?
VON BURGSDORFF: I can say that in my district—again speaking of
1944—hospitals were improved and new ones installed. A great deal was
done, especially in the fighting of epidemics. Typhus, dysentery, and
typhoid were greatly reduced by inoculation.
DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Frank is also accused of having neglected
higher education. Do you know anything about the conditions in the
Government General in regard to this?
VON BURGSDORFF: When I came into the Government General there was no
longer any higher education at all. On the basis of other experiences I
suggested immediately that Polish universities be opened again. I
contacted the president of the main department for education, who told
me that the government was already entertaining such plans. In every one
of my monthly reports I pointed out the necessity for Polish
universities, because within a short time, or more correctly in a few
years’ time, there would be a shortage of technicians, doctors, and
veterinaries.
DR. SEIDL: Now, one last question. There was a so-called sphere of
activity of the NSDAP in the Government General; you were the District
Standortführer in the Government General?
VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, what, according to your observations, were the
relations between the Governor General and the Head of the Party
Chancellery, Bormann?
VON BURGSDORFF: I believe I can say without exaggeration that they were
extremely bad. As District Standortführer I combined this office with
that of District Governor and witnessed the last great struggle of the
Governor General against Bormann. The Governor General held the view,
and in this he was justified, that it was wrong to combine the Party
office with the government office. He was afraid there would be too much
interference not only by the Police but also by the Party, and he wanted
to prevent that. Bormann, on the other hand, wanted to establish the
predominance of the Party over the State in the Government General as
well. That led to the most serious conflict.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions for the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other Defense Counsel wish to ask any other
questions?
DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath):
Witness, you were at one time Under State Secretary in the Government of
the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia? When was that?
VON BURGSDORFF: From the end of March 1939 until the middle of March
1942.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And to whom were you directly subordinate as Under
State Secretary? The State Secretary Frank or the Reich Protector?
VON BURGSDORFF: State Secretary Frank.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: How did you come to know about the activities of
Von Neurath as Reich Protector?
VON BURGSDORFF: From conferences with him and personal conversations.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What kind of work did you have to do as Under
State Secretary?
VON BURGSDORFF: I was in charge of the administration proper.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were the Police and the various SS and police
offices subordinate to you?
VON BURGSDORFF: No.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: To whom were they subordinate?
VON BURGSDORFF: To State Secretary Frank.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was State Secretary Frank’s attitude to Von
Neurath?
VON BURGSDORFF: You mean officially?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Officially, yes, of course.
VON BURGSDORFF: Herr Von Neurath tried at first to get on with Herr
Frank; but the stronger Frank’s position became, the more impossible
that was. State Secretary Frank, later Minister Frank, had behind him
the entire power of the SS and the Police, and finally Hitler also.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: From whom did Frank get his orders directly?
VON BURGSDORFF: As far as I know, from Himmler; however, I saw that on
one or two or three occasions he received direct orders from Hitler.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And that happened mostly without Von Neurath being
consulted?
VON BURGSDORFF: That I cannot say, but I assume so.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was it possible for Frank to perform his political
functions independently within his sphere of activity, or did he have to
have the approval of Herr Von Neurath?
VON BURGSDORFF: Whether he was authorized or allowed to do so, I should
not like to decide, but at any rate he did so.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were Herr Von Neurath and Herr Frank of the same
opinion concerning the policy towards the Czech people?
VON BURGSDORFF: I did not understand your question.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath agree with the policy toward
the Czech people pursued by Frank or his superior, Himmler?
VON BURGSDORFF: No.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Could he carry through his aims?
VON BURGSDORFF: He could not do anything, confronted as he was by
Himmler’s and Hitler’s immense power.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Herr Von Neurath’s own policy and
attitude?
VON BURGSDORFF: At the beginning I spoke very often about these things
to Herr Von Neurath. On the basis of the decree of 15 March he hoped and
believed he could get the Germans and Czechs in the Protectorate to live
together reasonably and peacefully.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But as Frank’s position became stronger, that
became more and more difficult?
VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you remember that in the middle of November
1939 serious disturbances broke out among the students in Prague?
VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you also remember that on the day after these
incidents Herr Von Neurath and Frank flew to Berlin?
VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you remember that Frank returned from Berlin
alone on the same day?
VON BURGSDORFF: I believe I can recall that Frank returned on the same
day, but I do not know whether he returned alone.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You don’t know whether Herr Von Neurath returned
with him?
VON BURGSDORFF: No.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything else about the incidents
connected with the students’ disturbances and what the consequences
were?
VON BURGSDORFF: They resulted, as far as I remember, in the execution of
several students and in the closing of the universities.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know whether the universities were closed
on Himmler’s order?
VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about the attitude of Herr
Von Neurath towards the Catholic and Protestant Churches?
VON BURGSDORFF: His attitude was always above reproach, and there were
no difficulties with the churches during the time that I was in the
Protectorate.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that Herr Von Neurath was in contact
with the Archbishop of Prague until the latter’s death?
VON BURGSDORFF: No, I don’t know anything about that.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything concerning whether, during
the term of office of Herr Von Neurath, with his approval or upon his
orders, art treasures of any kind, pictures, monuments, sculptures,
libraries, or the like, belonging either to the State or to private
owners, were confiscated and removed from the country?
VON BURGSDORFF: It is certain, absolutely certain, that he did not order
anything of the sort. Whether he consented in any way to this I do not
know, but I do not believe so. I remember one incident in the Malta
Palace, where some Reich office—I don’t remember today which it
was—removed art treasures. Herr Von Neurath immediately did everything
to make good this damage.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that the customs union which had been
ordered by Berlin from the very beginning between the Protectorate and
Germany was not established for a long time because of Herr Von
Neurath’s intervention?
VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. I definitely know about that. However, in the
interest of the truth, I have to add that State Secretary Frank also was
against the customs union, because, like Herr Von Neurath, he believed
that the economy of the Protectorate would be damaged by the stronger
economy of Germany.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: While Von Neurath was Reich Protector, was there
any compulsory deportation of workers?
VON BURGSDORFF: I am convinced that that did not happen. Workers were
recruited, but in an entirely regular manner. That was the case while I
was in the Protectorate.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know whether Von Neurath made travel in or
out of the Protectorate dependent on official approval?
VON BURGSDORFF: Whether or not Von Neurath did that, I do not know.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about the closing of the
secondary schools?
VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about it?
VON BURGSDORFF: I remember that the closing of the secondary schools was
a necessary consequence of the closing of the universities. There were
too many secondary schools in the Protectorate. Not all of them were
closed by any means. On the other hand technical schools were greatly
expanded and new ones established. I cannot remember anything more exact
about it.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Von Neurath’s attitude
towards the Germanization of Czechoslovakia as intended by Himmler?
VON BURGSDORFF: Yes, I remember the memorandum which Von Neurath sent to
Hitler about the whole affair. That memorandum was intended to defer
Himmler’s plans for forced Germanization. Von Neurath expressed the
view, which he had frequently mentioned to me, that in the interest of
peace in the Protectorate he did not advocate these attempts at
Germanization.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
MR. DODD: Tell us, please, when you first joined the National Socialist
Party?
VON BURGSDORFF: On 1 May 1933.
MR. DODD: And did you achieve office in any of its affiliated
organizations?
VON BURGSDORFF: I was an honorary SA Gruppenführer.
MR. DODD: Any other honors?
VON BURGSDORFF: Then for a few years, just as I had been during the
democratic regime, I was legal advisor to the administration of Saxony.
MR. DODD: Weren’t you also an Oberbannführer in the HJ, the
Hitler-Jugend?
VON BURGSDORFF: I once became Oberbannführer on the occasion of the
Reich Youth Leader’s visit to Prague. But that was purely a gesture of
courtesy, which had no consequences.
I should like to mention again, since you speak of Party offices, that,
as was said before, because of my post as Governor of Kraków I was
District Standortführer from the middle of January 1944 until the end,
that is the middle of January 1945.
MR. DODD: You also received the gold badge of the Hitler Youth, did you
not?
VON BURGSDORFF: No.
MR. DODD: Weren’t you in some way associated with Reinhard Heydrich when
you were in Prague?
VON BURGSDORFF: I was with Heydrich until the middle of 1942. Then, as
is generally known, because of the course pursued by Heydrich, I left
the Protectorate, and at 55 years of age I went into the army.
MR. DODD: What position did you occupy with relation to Heydrich?
VON BURGSDORFF: The same as under Herr Von Neurath; I was Under State
Secretary.
MR. DODD: Let me put it to you this way: You told us that you never
heard of Maidanek, the concentration camp?
VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.
MR. DODD: And you never heard of Auschwitz?
VON BURGSDORFF: Of Auschwitz, yes.
MR. DODD: Had you heard of an installation known as Lublin?
VON BURGSDORFF: Of Lublin? Not of the concentration camp but of the city
of Lublin, of course.
MR. DODD: Did you know of a concentration camp by the name of Lublin?
VON BURGSDORFF: No.
MR. DODD: You did know, I assume, of many other concentration camps by
name?
VON BURGSDORFF: Only of German camps, yes—of Dachau and Buchenwald.
MR. DODD: That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you any questions?
DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions for the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Who is your next witness?
DR. SEIDL: The next witness would be the former secretary of the
Governor General, Fräulein Kraffczyk. However, if I understood the
Tribunal correctly yesterday, this session will end at 1630 hours.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now until Tuesday morning.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 23 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND TWELFTH DAY
Tuesday, 23 April 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I shall dispense with the hearing of the
witness Struve, Chief of the Central Department for Agriculture and Food
in the Government General. With the permission of the Tribunal I am now
calling witness Dr. Joseph Bühler.
[_The witness Bühler took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
JOSEPH BÜHLER (Witness): Joseph Bühler.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, how long have you known Defendant Dr. Hans Frank;
and what were the positions in which you worked with him?
BÜHLER: I have known Herr Frank since 1 October 1930. I worked with him
in government spheres of service from the end of March 1933. I served
under him officially when he was Minister of Justice in Bavaria; later
when he was Reich Commissioner for Justice; and still later when he was
Minister. From the end of September 1939 Herr Frank employed me in an
official capacity in the Government General.
DR. SEIDL: In what capacity did you serve in the Government General at
the end?
BÜHLER: From about the second half of 1940 I was state secretary in the
government of the Government General.
DR. SEIDL: Were you yourself a member of the Party?
BÜHLER: I have been a Party member since 1 April 1933.
DR. SEIDL: Did you exercise any functions in the Party or any of the
affiliated organizations of the Party, particularly in the SA or the SS?
BÜHLER: I never held an office in the Party. I was never a member of the
SA or the SS.
DR. SEIDL: I now come to the time during which you were state secretary
to the chief of the government in the Government General. Will you
please tell me what the relations were between the Governor General on
the one side and the Higher SS and Police Leader on the other side?
BÜHLER: I might perhaps say in advance that my sphere of activity did
not touch upon police matters, matters relating to the Party, or
military matters in the Government General.
The relations of the Governor General to the Higher SS and Police
Leader, Obergruppenführer Krüger, who was allocated to him by the
Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police were, from the very
beginning, made difficult by essential differences of opinion. These
differences of opinion concerned the conception of the task and the
position of the Police in general in an orderly state system, as well as
the conception in particular of the position and tasks of the Police in
the Government General. The Governor General held the view that the
Police must be the servant and the organ of the executive of the state
and that accordingly he and the state authorities should give orders to
the Police and that this assignment of tasks involved a limitation of
the sphere of activity of the Police.
The Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger, on the other hand, held the view
that the Police in general had, of course, to fulfill tasks originating
with the executive of the state but that in fulfilling these tasks it
was not bound by the instructions of the administrative authorities,
that this was a matter of technical police questions, decisions about
which administrative authorities could not make and were not in a
position to make.
Regarding the power to give orders to the Police, it was Krüger’s view
that because of the effectiveness and unity of police activity in all
occupied territories, such power to issue orders had to rest with the
central authority in Berlin and that he and only he could issue orders.
As far as the duties of the Police were concerned, it was Krüger’s
opinion that the Governor General’s view regarding the limitation of
these duties as unfounded for the very reason that he, as Higher SS and
Police Leader, was simultaneously the deputy of the Reichsführer SS in
the latter’s capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of
German Nationality.
As far as the relation of the Police to the question of Polish policy
was concerned, it was Krüger’s view that, in connection with work in
non-German territory, police considerations would have to play a
predominant role and that with police methods everything could be
achieved and everything could be prevented. This overestimation of the
Police led, for instance, to the fact that, during later arguments
between the Police and the administration regarding their respective
spheres of work, matters concerning non-German groups were listed among
the competences of the Police.
DR. SEIDL: Do you know that as early as 1939 Reichsführer SS Himmler
issued a restricted decree, according to which the handling of all
police matters was his own concern or the concern of his Higher SS and
Police Leader?
BÜHLER: That this was the case became clear to me from the actions taken
by the Police. I did not see a decree to this effect, but I can state
this much: The Police in the Government General acted exactly as in the
directives which I have described before.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, in 1942, by decree of the Führer, a State
Secretariat for Security was instituted. At whose instigation was this
instituted and what was the position taken by the Governor General in
that connection?
BÜHLER: This decree was preceded by a frightful campaign of hatred
against the person of the Governor General. The institution of the State
Secretariat for Security was considered by the Police a step, an
important step, in the fight for the removal of the Governor General.
The matters specified in that decree, or at least the majority of them,
were not being transferred to the Police now for the first time, but the
actual state of affairs was—the actual course of events had already
been—in conformity to the contents of this decree before it was issued.
DR. SEIDL: In the decree implementing this Führer decree and dated 3
June 1942 all the police spheres of activities which were to be
transferred to the State Secretary were given in two lists; in an
Appendix A, the tasks of the Regular Police; and in an Appendix B, the
tasks of the Security Police. Were these police matters at that time
transferred completely to the State Secretary and thus to the police
sector?
BÜHLER: The administration did not like giving up these matters; so
where the Police had not already got hold of them, they were given up
only with reluctance.
DR. SEIDL: You are thinking first of all of the spheres of the so-called
administrative police, health police, _et cetera_, are you not?
BÜHLER: Yes, that is to say, the police in charge of communications,
health, food, and such matters.
DR. SEIDL: If I have understood your statements correctly, you mean that
the entire police system, Security Police as well as SD and Regular
Police, was directed by the central office, either by Himmler himself or
by the Reich Security Main Office through the Higher SS and Police
Leader?
BÜHLER: In general according to my observations, it was possible for the
Security Police to receive orders direct from Berlin without their going
through Krüger.
DR. SEIDL: And now another question: Is it correct that resettlements
were carried out in the Government General, by Reichsführer SS Himmler
in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German
Nationality?
BÜHLER: Resettlements, in the opinion of the Governor General, even if
carried out decently, always caused unrest among the population. We had
no use for that in the Government General. Also, these resettlements
always caused a falling off of agricultural production. For these
reasons, the Governor General and the Government of the Government
General did not, as a matter of principle, carry out resettlements
during the war. To the extent that such resettlements were carried out,
it was done exclusively by the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation
of German Nationality.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General, because of this
arbitrary resettlement policy, repeatedly had serious arguments with
Himmler, Krüger, and SS Gruppenführer Globocznik?
BÜHLER: That is correct. The intention of preventing such resettlements
always led to arguments and friction between the Higher SS and Police
Leader and the Governor General.
DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Dr. Frank is accused by the Prosecution of the
seizure and confiscation of industrial and private property. What
basically was the attitude of the Governor General to such questions?
BÜHLER: The legal provisions in this sphere of the law originated with
the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. Confiscation of private property
and possessions in the annexed Eastern territories and in the Government
General was subject to the same regulations.
The decree of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan provided for the
creation of a trust office—the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost—with its
central administration in Berlin. The Governor General did not want to
have the affairs of the Government General administered in Berlin, and
therefore he opposed the administration of property in the Government
General being entrusted to the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost. Without
interference by the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, he established his
own rules for confiscations in the Government General and his own trust
office. That trust office was headed by an experienced higher official
from the Ministry of Economy of Saxony.
DR. SEIDL: What happened to the factories and works which were situated
in the Government General and were formerly the property of the Polish
State?
BÜHLER: Factories, as far as they were included in the armament program,
were taken over by the military sector, that is to say, by the Inspector
for Armaments, who was subordinate to the OKW and later to Minister
Speer. Factories outside the armament sector, which had belonged to the
former Polish State, the Governor General tried to consolidate into a
stock company and to administer them separately as property of the
Government General. The chief shareholder in this company was the
Treasury of the Government General.
DR. SEIDL: That is to say, these factories were administered entirely
separately by the Reich Treasury?
BÜHLER: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted an extract from Frank’s diary in
evidence under Number USA-281 (Document Number 2233(d)-PS.) This is a
discussion of Jewish problems. In this connection Frank said, among
other things:
“My attitude towards the Jews is based on the expectation that
they will disappear; they must go away. I have started
negotiations for deporting them to the East. This question will
be discussed at a large meeting in Berlin in January, to which I
shall send State Secretary Dr. Bühler. This conference is to
take place at the Reich Security Main Office in the office of SS
Obergruppenführer Heydrich. In any case Jewish emigration on a
large scale will begin.”
I ask you now, did the Governor General send you to Berlin for that
conference; and if so, what was the subject of the conference?
BÜHLER: Yes, I was sent to the conference and the subject of the
conference was the Jewish problem. I might say in advance that from the
beginning Jewish questions in the Government General were considered as
coming under the jurisdiction of the Higher SS and Police Leader and
handled accordingly. The handling of Jewish matters by the state
administration was supervised and merely tolerated by the Police.
During the years 1940 and 1941 incredible numbers of people, mostly
Jews, were brought into the Government General in spite of the
objections and protests of the Governor General and his administration.
This completely unexpected, unprepared for, and undesired bringing in of
the Jewish population from other territories put the administration of
the Government General in an extremely difficult position.
Accommodating these masses, feeding them, and caring for their
health—combating epidemics for instance—almost, or rather, definitely
overtaxed the capacity of the territory. Particularly threatening was
the spread of typhus, not only in the ghettos but also among the Polish
population and the Germans in the Government General. It appeared as if
that epidemic would spread even to the Reich and to the Eastern Front.
At that moment Heydrich’s invitation to the Governor General was
received. The conference was originally supposed to take place in
November 1941, but it was frequently postponed and it may have taken
place in February 1942.
Because of the special problems of the Government General I had asked
Heydrich for a personal interview and he received me. On that occasion,
among many other things, I described in particular the catastrophic
conditions which had resulted from the arbitrary bringing of Jews into
the Government General. He replied that for this very reason he had
invited the Governor General to the conference. The Reichsführer SS, so
he said, had received an order from the Führer to round up all the Jews
of Europe and to settle them in the Northeast of Europe, in Russia. I
asked him whether this meant that the further arrival of Jews in the
Government General would cease, and whether the hundreds of thousands of
Jews who had been brought into the Government General without the
permission of the Governor General would be moved out again. Heydrich
promised me both these things. Heydrich said furthermore that the Führer
had given an order that Theresienstadt, a town in the Protectorate,
would become a reservation in which old and sick Jews, and weak Jews who
could not stand the strains of resettlement, were to be accommodated in
the future. This information left me definitely convinced that the
resettlement of the Jews, if not for the sake of the Jews, then for the
sake of the reputation and prestige of the German people, would be
carried out in a humane fashion. The removal of the Jews from the
Government General was subsequently carried out exclusively by the
Police.
I might add that Heydrich demanded, particularly for himself, his
office, and its branches, the exclusive and uninterrupted competence and
control in this matter.
DR. SEIDL: What concentration camps in the Government General did you
know about during your activity as State Secretary?
BÜHLER: The publications in the press during the summer of 1944 called
my attention to the Maidanek camp for the first time. I did not know
that this camp, not far from Lublin, was a concentration camp. It had
been installed as an economic establishment of the Reichsführer SS, in
1941 I think. Governor Zörner came to visit me at that time and he told
me that he had objected to the establishment of this camp when he talked
to Globocznik, as it would endanger the power supply of the city of
Lublin; and there were objections, too, on the part of the Police with
regard to the danger of epidemics. I informed the Governor General of
this and he in turn sent for Globocznik. Globocznik stated to the
Governor General that certain workshops for the needs of the Waffen-SS
at the front had been erected on that site by him. He mentioned
workshops for dressing furs but he also mentioned a timber yard which
was located there.
In these workshops for dressing furs, as I heard, fur articles from the
collection of furs were altered for use at the front. At any rate,
Globocznik stated that he had installed these workshops in compliance
with Himmler’s command.
The Governor General prohibited the erection of any further
installations until all questions were settled with the police in charge
of building and blueprints had been submitted to the state offices, in
other words until all rules had been complied with, which apply to the
construction of buildings. Globocznik never submitted these blueprints.
With regard to the events inside the camp, no concrete information ever
reached the outside. It surprised the Governor General just as much as
it surprised me when the world press released the news about Maidanek.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution has submitted a document, Number
437-PS, Exhibit USA-610, which is a memorandum from the Governor General
to the Führer, dated 19 June 1943. I think you yourself drafted that
memorandum. On Page 35 a report of the commander of the Security Police
is mentioned and quoted verbatim in part. This report of the Security
Police mentions also the name of Maidanek.
Did you at that time realize that this Maidanek was identical or
probably identical with that camp near Lublin?
BÜHLER: No. I assumed that, like Auschwitz, it was a camp outside the
territory of the Government General, because the Governor General had
repeatedly told the Police and the Higher SS and Police Leader that he
did not wish to have concentration camps in the Government General.
DR. SEIDL: Under whose jurisdiction was the administration of
concentration camps in the Government General?
BÜHLER: I don’t know because I did not know of the existence of the
camps. In August, on the occasion of a visit to the reception camp at
Pruszkow, I heard about the administration of concentration camps in
general. At that time I brought instructions from Himmler to the camp
commandant, according to which transport of the inhabitants of Warsaw
who had been removed from the city to concentration camps was to cease
forthwith.
DR. SEIDL: Was that after the uprising in Warsaw?
BÜHLER: It was during it; it must have been on or about 18 or 19 August
1944. The camp commandant, whose name I have forgotten, told me at the
time that he did not know about that order, and that he could receive
instructions only from the Chief of Concentration Camps.
DR. SEIDL: Do you know whether the Governor General himself ever sent a
Pole, a Ukrainian, or a Jew to a concentration camp?
BÜHLER: Nothing like that ever happened, when I was present.
DR. SEIDL: Is it true that a large number of Jewish workmen who were
working in the castle at Kraków were taken away by the Security Police
against the wishes of the Governor General and during his absence?
BÜHLER: This Jewish workers’ colony is known to me because I lived in
that castle. I also know that the Governor General always took care of
the maintenance of this colony. And the chief of the Chancellery of the
Government General, Ministerial Counsellor Keit, once told me that this
group of Jewish workers had been taken away by force by the Police
during the absence of the Governor General.
DR. SEIDL: I now come to the so-called AB Action, this extraordinary
pacification action. What were the circumstances which occasioned this
action?
BÜHLER: It may have been about the middle of May 1940 when one morning I
was called from the government building, where I performed my official
work, to visit the Governor General in the castle. I think I remember
that Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart had also been called. There we met the
Governor General together with some officials of the Police. The
Governor General stated that, in the opinion of the Police, an extreme
act of pacification was necessary. The security situation at that time,
as far as I remember, was this: Certain remnants of the Polish armed
forces were still roaming about in deserted forest regions, causing
unrest among the population, and probably giving military training to
young Poles. At that time, that is May 1940, the Polish people had
recovered from the shock which they had suffered at the sudden defeat in
1939; and they began openly, with little caution and without experience,
to start a resistance movement everywhere. This picture I remember
clearly because of the statement given by the Police on that or some
other occasion.
DR. SEIDL: May I interrupt you and quote from Frank’s diary, an entry of
16 May 1940. I quote:
“The general war situation forces us to regard the security
situation in the Government General very seriously. From a
number of symptoms and actions one can draw the conclusion that
a large organized wave of resistance among the Poles is present
in the country awaiting the outbreak of greater and violent
events. Thousands of Poles are reported to have been organized
secretly and to have been armed, and are being incited to carry
out acts of violence of all sorts.”
Then the Governor General quoted some recent examples, as, for instance,
an uprising in certain villages under the leadership of Major Huballa in
the district of Radom; the murder of families of German blood in
Józefów; the murder of the mayor of Grasienta, _et cetera_.
“Illegal pamphlets, inciting to rebellion, are being distributed
and even posted up everywhere; and there can therefore be no
doubt that the security situation is extremely serious.”
Did the Governor General express himself in that manner at the time?
BÜHLER: When I took part in that meeting, the Governor General spoke
about the situation for some time, but the details I cannot recollect.
DR. SEIDL: What happened after that?
BÜHLER: I had only one impression. In the previous months the Governor
General had succeeded, by taking great pains, in imposing on the Police
a procedure for courts-martial which had to be observed in making
arrests and dealing with suspicious persons. Furthermore, the Police had
to concede that the Governor General could refer the sentences of a
summary court-martial to a reprieve commission and that the execution of
sentences could take place only after the sentences had been confirmed
by the Governor General. The statements of the Governor General during
this conference in the middle of May 1940 made me fear that the Police
might see in these statements the possibility for evading the
court-martial and reprieve procedure imposed on them. For that reason I
asked the Governor General for permission to speak after he had finished
his statement. The Governor General cut me short at first and stated
that he wanted to dictate something to the secretary in a hurry, which
the latter was then to dictate to a stenotypist at once and then put it
into its final version. Thereupon the Governor General dictated some
authorization, or order, or some such document; and with absolute
certainty I remember that after he had finished dictating, the secretary
and I think, quite definitely, Brigadeführer Streckenbach, the Commander
of the Regular Police, left the room. I am saying this in advance
because it explains the fact that everything that happened afterwards
has not been recorded in the minutes. The secretary was no longer
present in the room. I expressed my fears, saying that these
requirements laid down for court-martial procedure should be observed
under all circumstances. I am not claiming any particular merit in this
connection, because if I had not done it then this objection would have
been raised, I am convinced, by Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart, or the
Governor General himself would have realized the danger which his
statements might have caused in this respect. At any rate, in reply to
my objection, and without any debate, the Governor General stated at
once that arrests and shootings could take place only in accordance with
the court-martial procedure, and that sentences of the summary
courts-martial would have to be examined by the reprieve commission.
In the ensuing period these instructions were followed. I assume that it
is certain that the reprieve commission received all sentences
pronounced by these courts-martial and dealt with them.
DR. SEIDL: Another entry in Frank’s diary, 12 July 1940, leads one to
the conclusion that at first these leaders of the resistance movement
concerned were merely arrested. I quote a statement of the Governor
General:
“Regarding the question what is to be done with the political
criminals caught in connection with the AB Action, a discussion
is to take place in the near future with State Secretary Dr.
Bühler, Obergruppenführer Krüger, Brigadeführer Streckenbach,
and Ministerial Counsellor Wille.”
Who was Ministerial Counsellor Wille, and what task did he have in that
connection?
BÜHLER: I might say in advance that there is a gap in my memory which
makes it impossible for me to say for certain when the Governor General
told Brigadeführer Streckenbach that in all cases he would have to
observe court-martial procedure and respect the reprieve commission. On
the other hand, I think I can remember for certain that at the time this
discussion took place between Krüger, Streckenbach, Wille, and me,
arrests only had taken place and no executions. Ministerial Counsellor
Wille was the head of the Department of Justice in the Government and
was the competent official for all matters concerning reprieves. The
Governor General wanted these matters dealt with by a legally trained,
experienced man.
During the conference with Krüger, Streckenbach, and Wille it had been
ruled that the persons who had been arrested up to that time were to be
subjected to court-martial procedure and that sentences had to be dealt
with by the reprieve commission. The Police were not exactly
enthusiastic about this. I remember that Krüger told me privately after
the conference that the Governor General was a jack-in-the-box with whom
one couldn’t work, and that in the future he would go his own way.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal thinks that this has been gone
into in too great detail.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, I am coming to the end of my questions.
Witness, during a Police meeting in 1940 on 30 May, the Defendant Dr.
Frank mentioned among other things the following: “The difficulties we
had had with the Kraków professors were terrible. If we had handled the
matter here, it would have taken a different course.” Who arrested these
professors, and to what extent was the Governor General concerned with
this matter?
BÜHLER: On 7 or 8 November 1939, when the Governor General arrived in
Kraków to begin his activities, all professors of the University of
Kraków were arrested by the Security Police without his knowledge and
taken away to concentration camps in the Reich. Among them were
acquaintances of the Governor General, with whom shortly before he had
had social and academic connections through the Academy for German Law.
The Governor General used his influence on Obergruppenführer Krüger
persistently and uninterruptedly until he achieved the release of the
majority of these professors from concentration camps.
This statement of his, which contradicts this, was made, in my opinion,
for the purpose of placating the Police, for the Police did not like
releasing these professors.
DR. SEIDL: What basically was the attitude of the Governor General
concerning mobilization of labor?
BÜHLER: The Governor General and the Government of the Government
General were always attempting to get as many Polish workers for the
Reich as possible. It was clear to us, however, that the employment of
force in recruiting workers might bring about temporary advantages but
that recruitment of workers in that way would not promise much success
in the long run. The Governor General gave me instructions, therefore,
to conduct extensive and intensive propaganda in favor of employment in
the Reich and to oppose all use of force in the recruitment of workers.
On the other hand the Governor General wanted to make his recruitment of
workers for the Reich successful by demanding decent treatment for
Polish workers in the Reich. He negotiated for many years with the Reich
Commissioner for the Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, and
improvements were in fact achieved. The Governor General was especially
opposed to the identifying of Jews and Poles by distinguishing marks in
the Reich. I remember a letter from Reich Commissioner Sauckel in which
he informed the Governor General that he had made every effort to insure
the same treatment for Polish workers as for other foreign workers, but
that his efforts were no longer crowned by success whenever the
influence of the Reichsführer SS opposed them.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now come to another point. Under Number USA-275
the Prosecution has submitted Document 1061-PS, which is a report of
Brigadeführer Stroop on the destruction of the ghetto in Warsaw. Were
you, or the Governor General, informed beforehand about the measures
planned by the Security Police?
BÜHLER: I certainly was not. As to the Governor General, I do not know
that he was informed about any such plans.
DR. SEIDL: What did you learn afterwards about the events at the ghetto
in Warsaw in 1943?
BÜHLER: I heard what practically everybody heard—that an uprising had
broken out in the ghetto which had long been prepared; that the Jews had
used the building materials given them for the purpose of air-raid
protection to set up defense works; and that during the uprising violent
resistance was encountered by the German troops.
DR. SEIDL: I now come to the Warsaw uprising of 1944. To what extent did
the administration of the Government General participate in the quelling
of that revolt?
BÜHLER: As our comrades in Warsaw were encircled by the
insurrectionists, we asked the Governor General to apply to the Führer
for assistance to bring about a speedy quelling of the Warsaw revolt.
Apart from that the administration assisted in the welfare of the
population in connection with the evacuation in the battle zone of the
quarters that were to be destroyed. But the administration did not
exercise any authority here.
DR. SEIDL: On 4 November 1945 you made an affidavit. The affidavit bears
the number 2476-PS. I shall now read to you that affidavit, which is
very brief, and I shall ask you to tell me whether the contents are
correct. I quote:
“In the course of the quelling of the Warsaw revolt in August
1944, approximately 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw (a
Polish estimate) were taken away to German concentration camps.
As a result of a _démarche_ made by the Governor General, Dr.
Frank, to the office of Reichsführer SS Himmler, the latter
prohibited further deportations. The Governor General tried to
secure the release of the 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw
who had already been taken to concentration camps in the Reich.
The Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, Obergruppenführer
Kaltenbrunner, refused this request, made in writing as well as
orally on the occasion of a visit of mine to Berlin in September
or October 1944, on the grounds that these inhabitants of Warsaw
were being used in the secret manufacture of armaments in the
Reich and that therefore a general release was out of the
question. However, he would be willing to consider individual
applications favorably. Individual applications for release from
concentration camps were granted by Kaltenbrunner during the
subsequent months.
“Contrary to the Polish estimate, the number of persons taken
from Warsaw to concentration camps in the Reich was estimated to
be small by Kaltenbrunner. I myself reported to my office
Kaltenbrunner’s statement regarding the number of internees, and
after a renewed investigation I found that the above-mentioned
figure of 50,000 to 60,000 was correct. These were the people
who had been taken to concentration camps in Germany.”
I now ask you, are the contents of this affidavit, made before an
American officer, correct?
BÜHLER: I can supplement it.
THE PRESIDENT: Before he supplements it, is it in evidence? Has it yet
been put in evidence?
DR. SEIDL: It has the number 2476-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: That doesn’t prove it has been put in evidence. Has it
been put in evidence? Dr. Seidl, you know quite well what “put in
evidence” means. Has it been put in evidence? Has it got a USA exhibit
number?
DR. SEIDL: No, it has not a USA exhibit number.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you are offering it in evidence, are you?
DR. SEIDL: I don’t want to submit it formally in evidence; but I do want
to ask the witness about the contents of this affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: But it is a document, and if you are putting it to the
witness, you must put it in evidence and you must give it an exhibit
number. You cannot put documents to the witness and not put them in
evidence.
DR. SEIDL: In that case I submit this document as Document Number
Frank-1.
I now ask you, Witness, whether the contents of this affidavit are
correct, and, if so, whether you can supplement this affidavit.
BÜHLER: Yes, I should like to supplement it briefly. It is possible that
I went to see Kaltenbrunner twice about that question—not only
once—and after Kaltenbrunner had refused to release these people the
second time, on the strength of my experiences with the camp commandant
in Camp Pruszkow, I had the impression that it was not in
Kaltenbrunner’s power to order such a release. He didn’t talk to me
about that.
DR. SEIDL: But from his statements you had the impression that perhaps
he too did not have the power to release those people?
BÜHLER: During those conferences I had brought up questions about the
Polish policy, and from these conferences I had the impression that I
might gain Kaltenbrunner’s interest in a reasonable Polish policy and
win him over as an ally in negotiations with Himmler. At any rate,
talking to me, he condemned the methods of force used by Krüger. I
gathered from these statements that Kaltenbrunner did not want to see
methods of force employed against the Poles and that he would have
helped me if he could.
DR. SEIDL: The Soviet Prosecution has submitted a document bearing the
Exhibit Number USSR-128 (Document Number 3305-PS). It is a teleprinted
message from the intelligence office of the Higher SS and Police Leader
East addressed to the Governor General and signed by Dr. Fischer, then
Governor of Warsaw. Under Figure 2 it reads as follows:
“Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach has been given the new task of
pacifying Warsaw, that is to say, of laying Warsaw level with
the ground during the war, except where military considerations
of its value as a fortress are involved. Before the destruction,
all raw materials, all textiles, and all furniture will be
removed from Warsaw. The main task will fall to the civil
administration.
“I herewith inform you that this new Führer decree regarding the
razing of Warsaw is of the greatest significance for the further
new policy regarding the Poles.”
As far as you can recollect, how did the Governor General receive and
view that telegram? And to what extent was his basic attitude altered on
the strength of that message?
BÜHLER: This telegram referred to instructions which Obergruppenführer
Von dem Bach had received from the Reichsführer SS. The administration
in the Government General did not welcome the destruction of Warsaw. On
the contrary, I remember that, together with the Governor General, ways
which might be used to avoid the destruction of Warsaw were discussed.
Just what was really tried I cannot recollect. It may be that further
steps were not taken because of the impossibility of achieving anything.
DR. SEIDL: I now turn to another subject.
THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors, before I continue the
interrogation of the witness Dr. Bühler, I should like to inform you
that I forego the interrogation of the witness Helene Kraffczyk; so this
witness will be the last one.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Defendant Dr. Frank has been accused by the
Prosecution of not having done everything within his power to ensure the
feeding of the population of the Government General. What can you say
about that?
BÜHLER: The decisive reason, the real cause, why the population in the
Government General could not be supplied as efficiently and as
satisfactorily as in Germany was the lack of co-operation on the part of
the Polish population in the measures taken by the Germans to bring
about a just and equal distribution of food quotas. This lack of
co-operation was caused by patriotic considerations, the aversion to
German domination, and the continuous, effective propaganda from the
outside. I do not believe that there was a single country in Europe
where so much was pillaged, stolen, and diverted to the black market,
where so much was destroyed and so much damage was done in order to
sabotage the food program, as in the Government General.
To give one example: All the dairy machinery, which had been provided
with great pains, and the chain of dairies, which had been organized
with difficulty, were destroyed again and again so that a more or less
comprehensive control of milk and fat supplies could not be carried out.
I estimate that the fat sold on the free market and the black market in
the Government General was several times the quantity of that controlled
and distributed officially.
Another decisive reason may be seen in the fact that the Government
General had been carved out of a hitherto self-contained governmental
and economic structure and that no consideration had been given
effecting a proper economic balance.
The large centers of consumption in the Government General, that is to
say, the cities such as Warsaw, Kraków, later Lvov, and also the
industrial area in the center of Poland, had previously received their
supplies to a very large extent directly from the country through the
standing market. In these areas of the Government General there was a
lack of granaries; a lack of refrigerators; there was no systematic
chain of dairies; and storehouses of all kinds were lacking—all
necessary for the directing or controlling of a supply economy by the
state.
The Government General had to construct all these things step by step,
and therefore the supplying of the population was proportionately
difficult. It was not intended to supply the population fully right
away; the supplies were to be improved gradually. I always saw to it
that the directives issued for combating the black market allowed
margins for the acquisition of foodstuffs and that the inhabitants of
the cities were given the opportunity of contacting the producers. In
1942 the rations were to have been increased; then an order came from
the Delegate for the Four Year Plan that rations were not to be
increased and that certain quotas of foodstuffs were to be allocated to
the Reich. Most of these foodstuffs were not taken out of the area, but
were consumed by the Armed Forces on the spot. The Governor General
fought continually against the authorities of the Four Year Plan, in
order to achieve an increase and an improvement in the food supplies for
the Polish population. That struggle was not without success. In many
cases it was possible to increase the rations considerably, especially
those of the workers in armament industries, and other privileged groups
of the working population.
To sum up I should like to say that it was not easy for the population
of the Government General to get its daily food requirements. On the
other hand there were no famines and no hunger epidemics in the
Government General. A Polish and Ukrainian auxiliary committee, which
had delegations in all districts of the Government General, saw to the
supply of foodstuffs for those parts of the population which were in
greatest need. I used my influence to have this committee supplied with
the largest possible amount of foodstuffs, so that it should be able to
pursue its welfare work successfully, and it is known to me that that
committee took special care of the children of large cities.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, what were the measures that the Governor General
took to safeguard art treasures in the areas under his administration?
BÜHLER: With a decree of 16 December 1939 the Reichsführer SS, in his
capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German
Nationality, had already ordered, without informing the Governor
General, that all art treasures of the Government General were to be
confiscated and transported to the Reich. The Government General was
successful in preventing this transport to a great extent.
Then a man arrived in the Government General from the Delegate for the
Four Year Plan, State Secretary Mühlmann, who claimed to have plenary
authority from the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. I asked to see that
authorization. It was signed, not by Göring himself, but by somebody in
his circle, Gritzbach. He was entrusted with the task of safeguarding
the art treasures of the Government General in the interests of the
Reich. In order to bring this commissioner—provided as he was with
plenary authority from the Reich—into line with the Government General,
the Governor General entrusted to him, in addition, the task of
collecting together the art treasures of the Government General. He
collected these art treasures and also had catalogues printed; and I
know, from conferences which took place with the Governor General, that
the Governor always attached the greatest importance to having these art
treasures kept within the area of the Government General.
DR. SEIDL: The prosecution, under Number USA-378, that is Document
1709-PS, submitted a report about the investigation of the entire
activity of the Special Commissioner for the Collection and Safeguarding
of Art and Cultural Treasures in the Government General. On Page 6 of
that report it reads, and I quote:
“Reason for investigation: Order of the State Secretary of the
Government of the Government General of 30 June 1942 to
investigate the entire activity of the Special Commissioner
appointed for the collection and safeguarding of art and
cultural treasures in the Government General, according to the
decree of the Governor General of 16 December 1939.”
I ask you now what caused you in 1942 to give this order for
investigation, and did the report lead to serious charges?
BÜHLER: The investigation was found necessary because of the possibility
of a collision of duties, in the case of State Secretary Mühlmann,
between the order given by the Reich and the order given by the Governor
General. I had also heard that some museum pieces had not been properly
taken care of. The investigation showed that State Secretary Mühlmann
could not be blamed in any way.
DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has submitted another document, 3042-PS,
Exhibit USA-375. It is an affidavit by Dr. Mühlmann, and I quote:
“I was the Special Commissioner of the Governor General of
Poland, Hans Frank, for the safeguarding of art treasures in the
Government General, from October 1939 to September 1943. Göring
in his capacity as chairman of the Reich Defense Council had
commissioned me with this duty.
“I confirm that it was the official policy of the Governor
General, Hans Frank, to take into safekeeping all important art
treasures which belonged to Polish public institutions, private
collections, and the Church. I confirm that the art treasures
mentioned were actually confiscated; and it is clear to me that
in case of a German victory they would not have remained in
Poland, but would have been used to complement German art
collections.”
I ask you now: Is it correct that the Governor General from the very
beginning considered all art treasures which had been safeguarded the
property of the Government General?
BÜHLER: Insofar as they were state property, yes; insofar as they were
private property, they were temporarily confiscated and safeguarded; but
the Governor General never thought of transferring them to the Reich. If
he had wanted to do that, he could have taken advantage of the war
situation itself in order to send these art treasures to Germany. But
where the witness obtained his information, as contained in the last
sentence of his affidavit, I do not know.
DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted a document, L-37, under Exhibit
Number USA-506. It is a letter of 19 July 1944 from the commander of the
Security Police and SD of the district of Radom, to the branch office of
Tomassov. There it says, among other things, and I quote:
“The Higher SS and Police Leader East issued the following order
on 28 June 1944:”