FRANK: I am sure that these utterances were not made in the way it is
put here.
DR. SEIDL: But you do not want to say that you have never spoken to that
man?
FRANK: I cannot remember it at all.
DR. SEIDL: Then, I come to the next question.
FRANK: Moreover, what actually happened seems to me to be more important
than what was said at the time.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that your actions as Governor General, and
undoubtedly also many excesses by the police and the SD, were due to the
guerrilla activities?
FRANK: Guerrilla activities? It can be said that it was the resistance
movement, which started from the very first day and was supported by our
enemies, which presented the most difficult problem I had to cope with
during all these years. For this resistance movement perpetually
supplied the police and the SS with pretexts and excuses for all those
measures which, from the viewpoint of an orderly administration, were
very regrettable. In fact, the resistance movement—I will not call it
guerrilla activity, because if a people has been conquered during a war
and organizes an active resistance movement, that is something
definitely to be respected—but the methods of the resistance movement
went far beyond the limits of an heroic revolt. German women and
children were slaughtered under the most atrocious circumstances. German
officials were shot; trains were derailed; dairies were destroyed; and
all measures taken to bring about the recovery of the country were
systematically undermined.
And it is against the background of these incidents, which occurred day
after day, incessantly, during practically the entire period of my
activity, that the events in that country must be considered. That is
all I have to say to that.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, in the year 1944 a revolt broke out in Warsaw under
the leadership of General Bor. What part did the administration of the
Government General have, and what part did you have in putting down that
revolt?
FRANK: That revolt broke out, when the Soviet Russian Army had advanced
to within about 30 kilometers of Warsaw on the eastern bank of the
Vistula. It was a sort of combined operation; and, as it seems to me,
also a national Polish action, as the Poles at the last moment wanted to
carry out the liberation of their capital themselves and did not want to
owe it to the Soviet Russians. They probably were thinking of how, in
Paris, at the last moment the resistance movement, even before the
Allies had approached, had accomplished the liberation of the city.
The operation was a strictly military one. As Senior Commander of the
German troops used to quell the revolt, I believe, they appointed SS
General Von dem Bach-Zelewski. The civil administration, therefore, did
not have any part in the fighting. The part played by the civil
administration began only after the capitulation of General Bor, when
the most atrocious orders for vengeance came from the Reich.
A letter came to my desk one day in which Hitler demanded the
deportation of the entire population of Warsaw into German concentration
camps. It took a struggle of 3 weeks, from which I emerged victorious,
to avert that act of insanity and to succeed in having the fleeing
population of Warsaw, which had had no part in the revolt, distributed
throughout the Government General.
During that revolt, unfortunately, the city of Warsaw was very seriously
damaged. All that had taken years to rebuild was burned down in a few
weeks. However, State Secretary Bühler, in order to save time, will
probably be in a better position to give us more details.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you are also accused of having suppressed the
cultural life of the population of the Government General, especially as
regards the theater, broadcasting, films. What have you to say about
that?
FRANK: The Government General presented the same picture as every
occupied country. We do not have to look far from this courtroom to see
what cultural life is like in an occupied country.
We had broadcasting in the Polish language under German supervision. We
had a Polish press which was supervised by Germans, and we had a Polish
school system, that is, elementary schools and high schools, in which at
the end, 80,000 teachers taught in the service of the Government
General. As far as it was possible Polish theaters were reopened in the
large cities, and where German theaters were established we made sure
that there was also a Polish theater at the same time. After the
proclamation of the so-called total war in August 1944, the absurd
situation arose in which the German theater in Kraków was closed,
because all German theaters were closed at that time, whereas the Polish
theaters remained open.
I myself selected composers and virtuosos from a group of the most well
known musicians of Poland I found there in 1939 and founded the
Philharmonic Orchestra of the Government General. This was in being
until the end, and played an important part in the cultural life of
Poland. I established a Chopin Museum in Kraków, and from all over
Europe I collected relics of Chopin. I believe that is sufficient on
this point.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you deny, therefore, having taken any measures which
aimed at exterminating Polish and Ukrainian culture.
FRANK: Culture cannot be exterminated. Any measures taken with that
intention would be sheer nonsense.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that as far as it was in your power you did
everything to avoid epidemics and to improve the health of the
population?
FRANK: That State Secretary Bühler will be able to confirm in detail. I
can say that everything humanly possible was done.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution, under Number USSR-223, has
submitted an excerpt from the diary, which deals with the report about a
police conference of 30 May 1940, and we find here in Pages 33 to 38 the
following...
FRANK: [_Interposing._] Unless the Court orders it, it is not necessary
to read that.
DR. SEIDL: No, I only want to read one sentence, which refers to the
Kraków professors. Apparently, if the diary is correct, you said...
FRANK: [_Interposing._] May I say something about the Kraków professors
right away?
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
FRANK: On 7 November 1939 I came to Kraków. On 5 November 1939 before my
arrival, the SS and the police, as I found out later, called the Kraków
professors to a meeting. They thereupon arrested the men, among them
dignified old professors, and took them to some concentration camp. I
believe it was Oranienburg. I found that report when I arrived and
against everything which may be found there in my diary, I want to
emphasize here under oath that I did not cease in my attempts to get
every one of the professors released whom I could reach, in March 1940.
That is all I have to say to this.
DR. SEIDL: The same police meeting of 30 May 1940 also dealt with the
so-called “AB Action,” that is, with the Extraordinary Pacification
Action. Before I put to you the question which is concerned with it, I
would like to read to you two entries in the diary. One is dated 16 May
1940, and here, after describing that extraordinary tension then
existing, you stated the following: That, first of all, an action for
pacification would have to be started, and then you said:
“Any arbitrary actions must be avoided; in all cases the
safeguarding of the authority of the Führer and of the Reich has
to be kept in the foreground.”—I omit several sentences and
quote the end—“The action is timed for 15 June.”
On 12 July a conference took place with the Ministerialrat Wille, who
was the chief of the Department of Justice, and there you said in your
own words:
“Regarding the question as to what should happen to the
political criminals who had been arrested during the AB Action,
there is to be a conference with State Secretary Bühler,
Obergruppenführer Krüger, Brigadeführer Streckenbach and
Ministerialrat Wille.”
End of quotation.
What actually happened during that AB Action?
FRANK: I cannot say any more or any less than what is contained in the
diary. The situation was extremely tense. Month after month attempted
assassinations increased. The encouragement and support given by the
rest of the world to the resistance movement to undermine all our
efforts to pacify the country had succeeded to an alarming degree, and
this led to this general pacification action, not only in the Government
General, but also in other areas, and which I believe was ordered by the
Führer himself.
My efforts were directed to limiting it as to extent and method, and in
this I was successful. Moreover I should like to point out that I also
made it clear that I intended to exercise the right of reprieve in each
individual case; for that purpose I wanted the police and SS verdicts of
death by shooting to be submitted to a reprieve committee which I had
formed in that connection. I believe that can be seen from the diary
also.
DR. SEIDL: Probably the witness Bühler knows something about it.
FRANK: Nevertheless, I would like to say that the method used at that
time was a tremendous mistake.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, have you at any time recognized the principle
introduced by the SD and SS of the liability of kin?
FRANK: No, on the contrary. When I received the first reports about it,
I complained in writing to Reich Minister Lammers about that peculiar
development of the law.
DR. SEIDL: The first SS and Police Leader East was Obergruppenführer
Krüger. When was this SS leader recalled and how did it come about?
FRANK: The relations between him and myself became quite impossible. He
wanted a peculiar kind of SS and police regime, and that state of
affairs could be solved only in one way—either he or I had to go. I
think that at the last moment, by the intervention of Kaltenbrunner, if
I remember correctly, and of Bach-Zelewski, this remarkable fellow was
removed.
DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution once mentioned that it was more a personal
struggle for power. But is it more correct to say that there were
differences of opinion on basic questions?
FRANK: Of course it was a struggle for power. I wanted to establish a
power in the sense of my memoranda to the Führer, and therefore I had to
fight the power of violence, and here personal viewpoints separated
altogether.
DR. SEIDL: The successor of SS Obergruppenführer Krüger was SS
Obergruppenführer Koppe. Was his basic attitude different?
FRANK: Yes. I had that impression; and I am thinking of him particularly
when I say that even in the SS there were many decent men who also had a
sense of what was right.
DR. SEIDL: Were there Polish and Ukrainian Police in the Government
General?
FRANK: Yes, there were 25,000 men of the Polish security, criminal, and
uniformed police, and about 5,000 men of the Ukrainian police. They also
were under the German police chief.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now come to one of the most important questions.
In 1942, in Berlin, Vienna, Heidelberg, and Munich, you made speeches
before large audiences. What was the purpose of these speeches, and what
were the consequences for you?
FRANK: The speeches can be read. It was the last effort that I made to
bring home to Hitler, by means of the tremendous response of the German
people, the truth that the rule of law was immortal. I stated at that
time that a Reich without law and without humanity could not last long,
and more in that vein. After I had been under police surveillance for
several days in Munich, I was relieved of all my Party offices. As this
was a matter of German domestic politics under the sovereignty of the
German Reich, I refrain from making any more statements about it here.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that after this you tendered your resignation?
And what was the answer?
FRANK: I was, so to speak, in a permanent state of resigning, and I
received the same answer: that for reasons connected with foreign policy
I could not be released.
DR. SEIDL: I originally intended to read to you from your diary a number
of quotations which the Prosecution has submitted; but in view of the
fact that the Prosecution may do that in the course of the
cross-examination, I forego it in order to save time. I have no more
questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel wish to
ask any questions?
Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
CHIEF COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE L. N. SMIRNOV (Assistant Prosecutor for the
U.S.S.R.): Defendant, I should like to know what precisely was your
legal status and what exactly was the position you occupied in the
system of the fascist state. Please answer me: When were you promoted to
the post of Governor of occupied Poland? To whom were you directly
subordinated?
FRANK: The date is 26 October 1939. At least on that day the directive
concerning the Governor General became effective.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You will remember that by Hitler’s order of 12
October 1939 you were directly subordinated to Hitler, were you not?
FRANK: I did not get the first part. What was it, please?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you remember Hitler’s order concerning your
appointment as Governor General of Poland? This order was dated 12
October 1939.
FRANK: That was in no way effective, because the decree came into force
on 26 October 1939, and you can find it in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_.
Before that I was Chief of Administration with the military commander
Von Rundstedt. I have explained that already.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: By this order of Hitler you were directly
subordinated to him. Do you remember? Paragraph 3, Sub-paragraph 1, of
this order.
FRANK: The chiefs of administration in the occupied territories were all
immediately under the Führer. I may say in elucidation that Paragraph 3
states, “The Governor General is immediately subordinate to me.”
But Paragraph 9 of this decree states, “This decree becomes valid as
soon as I have withdrawn from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army the
task of carrying out the military administration.” And this withdrawal,
that is, the coming into force of this decree took place on 26 October.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I fully agree with you, and we have information
to that effect in the book which you evidently remember. It is Book 5.
You do remember this book of the Government General?
FRANK: It is of course in the decree.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, when this order came into force, to whom
were you directly subordinate?
FRANK: What shall I read here? There are several entries here. What is
your wish? To what do you wish me to answer?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It states that this order came into force on the
26 October. Well, when this order actually became valid, to whom were
you subordinated? Was there, or was there not, any further order issued
by Hitler?
FRANK: There is only one basic decree about the Governor General. That
is this one.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Quite correct. There were no further
instructions?
FRANK: Oh yes, there are some, for instance...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I understand that, but there was no other decree
determining the system of administration, was there?
FRANK: May I say that you can find it best on Page A-100 in your book,
and there you have the decree of the Führer verbatim.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Quite right.
FRANK: And it says also in Paragraph 9, “This decree shall come into
effect...” and so on, and that date was the 26th of October.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, that is quite correct. That means that
after 26 October you, as Governor General for occupied Poland, were
directly subordinate to Hitler?
FRANK: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then perhaps you may remember when, and by whom,
you were entrusted with the execution, in occupied Poland, of the Four
Year Plan?
FRANK: By Göring.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means that you were Göring’s
plenipotentiary for the execution of the Four Year Plan in Poland, were
you not?
FRANK: The story of that mission is very briefly told. The activities of
several plenipotentiaries of the Four Year Plan in the Government
General were such that I was greatly concerned about it. Therefore, I
approached the Reich Marshal and asked him to appoint me trustee for the
Four Year Plan. That was later—in January...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, it was in December.
FRANK: Yes, it was later, according to this decree.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This means that as from the beginning of
December 1939 you were Göring’s plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan?
FRANK: Göring’s? I was the plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Now perhaps you can remember that in October
1939 the first decree regarding the organization of administration in
the Government General was promulgated?
FRANK: Yes. That is here, is it not?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you recall Paragraph 3 of that decree.
FRANK: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It says that “The sphere of action of the State
Secretary for Security will be determined by the Governor General in
agreement with the Reichsführer SS and”—this is the passage which
interests me—“the Chief of the German Police.”
Does that not coincide with Paragraph 3 insofar as from the first day of
your appointment as Governor General you undertook the control of the
Police and SS, and, consequently, the responsibility for their actions?
FRANK: No. I definitely answer that question with “no,” but I would like
to make an explanation....
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What interests me, Defendant; is how could that
be explained otherwise?
THE PRESIDENT: Let him make his explanation.
Defendant, you may make your explanation.
FRANK: I want to make a very short statement. There is an old legal
principle which says that nobody can transfer more rights to anybody
else than he has himself. What I have stated here was the ideal which I
had before me and how it should have been. Everybody has to admit that
it is natural and logical that the police should be subordinate to the
Chief of Administration. The Führer, who alone could have decided, did
not make that decree. I did not have the power nor the authority to put
into effect this decree which I had so carefully formulated.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then do I understand you to say that this
Paragraph 3 was an ideal which you strove to attain, but which you were
never able to attain?
FRANK: I beg your pardon, but I could not understand that question. A
little slower please, and may I have the translation into German a
little slower?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Shall I repeat the question?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I asked you a question; does this mean that the
statement can be interpreted as follows: Paragraph 3 of this decree was
an ideal which you persistently strove to attain, which you openly
professed, but which you were never able to attain? Would that be
correct?
FRANK: Which I could not attain; and that can be seen by the fact that
later it was found necessary to appoint a special State Secretary for
Security in a last effort to find a way out of the difficulty.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will recall that in April 1942,
special negotiations took place between you and Himmler. Did these
negotiations take place in April 1942?
FRANK: Yes; certainly. I do not know on what you base your question. I
cannot tell you the date offhand, but it was always my endeavor...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: To confirm these facts, I can turn to your
diary. Perhaps you will recall that as a result of these negotiations an
understanding was reached between you and Himmler.
FRANK: Yes, an understanding was reached.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In order to refresh your memory on the subject I
shall ask that the corresponding volume of your diary be handed to you,
so that you may have the text before you.
FRANK: Yes, I am ready.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would refer you to Paragraph 2 of this
agreement. It states:
THE PRESIDENT: Where can we find this? Is it under the date 21 April
1942?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes; that is quite right; 21 April 1942.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we have got it.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is Document Number USSR-223. It has been
translated into English, and I shall hand it over immediately.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we have it now; we were only trying to find the
place.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is on Page 18 of the English text.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Go on.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would ask you to recall the contents. It says:
“The Higher SS and Police Leader (the State Secretary) is directly
subordinate to the Governor General, and, if he is absent, then to his
Deputy.”
Does this not mean that Himmler, so to speak, agreed with your ideal in
the sense that the Police should be subordinate to you?
FRANK: Certainly. On that day I was satisfied; but a few days later the
whole thing was changed. I can only say that these efforts on my part
were continued, but unfortunately it was never possible to put them into
effect.
You will find here in Paragraph 3, if you care to go on, that the
Reichsführer SS, according to the expected decree by the Führer, could
give orders to the State Secretary. So, you see, Himmler here had
reserved the right to give orders to Krüger direct. And then comes the
matter of the agreement...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is true, but in that case I must ask you to
refer to another part of the document...
FRANK: May I say in this connection that this agreement was never put
into effect, but that this decree was published in the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_ in the form of a Führer decree. Unfortunately, I do
not know the date of that; but you can find the decree about the
regulation of security matters in the Government General, and that is
the only authoritative statement. Here, also, reference is made to the
“expected decree by the Führer,” and that agreement was just a draft of
what was to appear in the Führer decree.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, I was just proceeding to that subject. You
agree that this decision was practically a verbatim decree of the
Führer?
FRANK: I cannot say that offhand. If you will be good enough to give me
the words of the Führer decree, I will be able to tell you about that.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes.
[_Turning to the President._] Incidentally this decree appears in your
document book, Mr. President.
FRANK: I haven’t the document. It seems to me that the most essential
parts of that agreement have been taken and put into this decree, with a
few changes. However, the book has been taken away from me and I cannot
compare it.
THE PRESIDENT: The book will be submitted to you now.
[_The book was submitted to the defendant._]
FRANK: Very important changes have been made, unfortunately.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would request you to turn to Paragraph 3 of
Hitler’s decree, dated 7 May 1942. It is stated here that the State
Secretary for Security is directly subordinate to the Governor General.
And does this not confirm the fact that the police of the Government
General were, nevertheless, directly subordinate to you? That is
Paragraph 3 of the decree.
FRANK: I would like to say that that is not so. The police were not
subordinate to me, even by reason of that decree—only the State
Secretary for Security. It does not say here that the police are
subordinate to the Governor General, only the State Secretary for
Security is subordinate to him. If you read Paragraph 4, then you come
to the difficulties again. Adolf Hitler’s decree was drawn up in my
absence, of course. I was not consulted by Hitler, otherwise 1 would
have protested, but in any case it was found impracticable.
Paragraph 4 says that the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police
gave direct instructions to the State Secretary for Security in the
field of security and for the preservation of German nationality. If you
compare the original agreement with this, as contained in the diary, you
will find that in one of the most important fields the Führer had
changed his mind, that is, concerning the Commissioner for the
Preservation of German Nationality. This title embraces the Jewish
question and the question of colonization.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It appears to me, Defendant, that you have only
taken into consideration one aspect of this question, and that you have
given a rather one-sided interpretation of the excerpt quoted. May I
recall to your memory Paragraph 4 of this decree which, in Sub-paragraph
2, reads as follows:
“The State Secretary”—this means Krüger—“must receive the consent of
the Governor General before carrying out the directives of the
Reichsführer SS and the German Police.”
And now permit me to turn to Paragraph 5 of this self-same decree of
Hitler’s which states that “in cases of divergencies of opinion between
the Governor General and the Reichsführer of the SS and the German
Police, my decision is to be obtained through the Reich Minister and the
Head of the Reich Chancellery.” In this connection I would ask you, does
not this paragraph testify to the very considerable rights granted by
you to the leaders of the police and the SS in the Government General
and to your own responsibility for the activities of these
organizations?
FRANK: The wording of the decree testifies to it, but the actual
development was quite the contrary. I believe that we will come to that
in detail. I maintain therefore that this attempt to gain some influence
over the police and the SS also failed.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then may I ask whose attempt it was? In this
case it is evidently an attempt by Hitler for he signed this decree.
Krüger was evidently more powerful than Hitler?
FRANK: That question is not quite clear to me. You mean that Krüger went
against the decree of the Führer? Of course he did, but that has nothing
to do with power. That was considered by Himmler as a tremendous
concession made to me. I want to refer to a memorandum of the summer of
1942, I think, shortly after the decree of the Führer came into force.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have the following question to ask you: Is it
possible that you...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell us, Defendant, who was the actual leader of
the National Socialist Party in the Government General?
FRANK: I hear nothing at all.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you...
FRANK: I hear nothing at all.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have the following question to put to you:
After 6 May 1940 in the Government General...
FRANK: 6 May?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, 6 May 1940, after the Nazi organization had
been completed in the Government General, who was appointed its leader?
FRANK: I was.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thus the leadership of the administration of the
National Socialist Party and of the Police was concentrated in your
hands. Therefore you are responsible for the administration, the Police,
and the political life of the Government General.
FRANK: Before I answer that question, I must protest when you say that I
had control of the Police.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I believe that that is the only way one could
interpret the Führer’s orders and the other documents which I have put
to you.
FRANK: No doubt, if one disregards the actual facts and the realities of
the situation.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, then, let us pass on to another group of
questions. You heard of the existence of Maidanek only in 1944, isn’t
that so?
FRANK: In 1944 the name Maidanek was brought to my knowledge officially
for the first time by the Press Chief Gassner.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will now ask that you be shown a document
which was presented by your defense counsel, which was compiled by you,
and which is a report addressed to Hitler, dated June 1943. I will read
into the record one excerpt, and I wish to remind you that this is dated
19 June 1943:
“As a proof of the mistrust shown to the German leadership, I
enclose a characteristic excerpt from the report of the Chief of
the Security Police and SD in the Government General...”
FRANK: Just a moment. The wrong passage has been shown me. I have the
passage here on Page 35 of the German text, and it is differently
worded.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Have you found the place now?
FRANK: Yes. But you started with a different sentence. The sentence here
starts “A considerable part of the Polish intelligentsia...”
THE PRESIDENT: Which page is it?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Page 35 of the German text, last paragraph.
FRANK: It starts here with the words “A considerable part...”
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: All right. Then I will continue:
“As a proof of the degree of the mistrust shown to the German
leadership I enclose”—these are your own words, this passage
comes somewhat higher up in the quotation—“a characteristic
excerpt from the report of the Chief of the Security Police and
SD in the Government General for the period from 1 to 31 May
1943, concerning the possibilities of propaganda resulting from
Katyn.”
FRANK: That is not here. Would you be good enough to show me the
passage? Now, what you are presenting here is not in my text.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, it is there; it comes somewhat earlier in
your text.
FRANK: I think it has been omitted from my text.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I begin now at that part which you find lower
down at the bottom. Follow the text:
“A large part of the Polish intelligentsia, however, as before,
will not allow itself to be influenced by the news from Katyn
and holds against the Germans alleged similar cruelties,
especially in Auschwitz.”