THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES
_August 1917_
_Reference Map No. 3._
At 5 a.m. on July 22 the Battalion left Bailleulval, marching to
Mondicourt station, where we breakfasted and entrained for Belgium.
After seven weary hours in the train we reached a village called
Godewaersvelde (pronounced by the men “God help us”), and detrained.
Hopes had been entertained that we might be allowed to pass the night
here, but instead we were given a four hours’ march to Houtkerque,
eventually arriving there at 12.30 a.m. It had been a long day, and we
were thankful to get into the very meagre accommodation that had been
allotted to us, though before doing so most of us felt compelled to
inform the billeting officer exactly how meagre we thought it. There
never was, and perhaps never will be, a more thankless job than
billeting, or one which bred unpopularity so certainly. The most
suitable officer was found to be a senior one, capable of being
intensely rude to anyone who showed signs of impoliteness to him.
Preparations for the coming battle reached their zenith during the week
at Houtkerque. In consequence of an order that every officer and N.C.O.
was to be in possession of a map of the battle area which would show at
a glance the objectives and contours, mapping became a disease, and the
most hideous productions in the way of colour schemes resulted.
It was laid down that the 2nd in Command, two company commanders, the
assistant adjutant, two company sergeant-majors, with a proportion of
platoon commanders and other ranks, should not be taken into action, but
left at Houtkerque, in order that the Battalion might be reorganised
quickly in the event of heavy casualties. This personnel was accordingly
left behind when, at midnight on July 30/31, we moved to St.
Jans-ter-Biezen, which lay just east of Poperinghe. No sooner had we
reached the camp here at 4 a.m. than all the guns of the two attacking
armies opened fire, and the Third Battle of Ypres had begun.
An intense desire for news of the attack filled the whole of that day.
The weather was dull and cloudy, and towards evening rain fell, which
continued unceasingly throughout the night. Official communiqués from
General Headquarters informed us that the first three objectives had
been gained, but, although it was not so stated, we inferred that our
casualties had been heavy. This was confirmed when, on the following
day, we were ordered to send one company (C) up to the line to assist
the 39th Division in bringing in their wounded.
The rain continued in torrents during the whole of that day and the
next, and the prospect of the operations being successful and working to
plan grew dimmer and dimmer.
Reports from the line of conditions which prevailed there were
depressing in the extreme. The whole area had become a quagmire, and the
task of moving up guns an impossibility. Never had such appalling
weather made its appearance at such an unfortunate time.
A continuance of the operations was therefore postponed until such time
as the guns could be shifted and the movement of troops became possible.
The enemy meanwhile was presented with a priceless opportunity of
reorganising, bringing up reinforcements, and making new positions
preparatory to our next onslaught. He was, moreover, being driven back
on to comparatively clean ground, while our armies were moving forward
on to ground which had been shelled by our own guns for months past, and
where roads no longer existed. For three days we watched the pouring
rain and cursed the British Army’s luck.
On August 4 the Battalion moved through Poperinghe to a spot known as
Dambre Camp, which lay about a mile north of Vlamertinghe. After a day’s
reconnaissance of the line, the Battalion relieved the 1/1st
Hertfordshire Regiment and a battalion of the Cheshire Regiment in
support. These two battalions had suffered heavily in the attack and
were dead-beat.
We found the conditions which prevailed even worse than the reports had
led us to believe, for in addition to the sea of mud, which made
movement almost impossible, enemy shelling was constant. Communication
with companies was difficult in the extreme, as telephone wires were cut
by shelling almost as soon as they were laid. At night, orderlies had a
really terrible task, often under heavy shell-fire, to find the
Headquarters of the Battalion and various companies. We were most
fortunate to possess men so extraordinarily efficient for this ordeal,
and it is safe to say that no body of men in the Battalion deserve more
credit and praise for their magnificent work in the Ypres fighting than
these runners. It was invariably of the most vital nature, including not
only the carrying of important messages, but also the guiding of reliefs
and ration parties. Rations, which had to be brought up to the line on
pack animals (ponies and mules), were the cause of constant anxiety, and
no one who has not accompanied those animals on a pitch-dark night,
across open country pitted with shell-holes and with mud nearly to the
knees, knows what difficulties the pack leaders experienced. Only too
often an animal was killed on the way up, and its load had to be taken
off and reloaded on to another, in the dark, with no possibility of
showing a light.
It must not be imagined that our own artillery were quiet during these
times—far from it. The majority of the guns were in position alongside a
road or track, known as “Admiral’s Road,” which ran, roughly speaking,
through the old “No Man’s Land.” Their positions were necessarily much
exposed, and consequently received the enemy’s earnest attention at
frequent intervals throughout the day and night. This, however, did not
prevent them from throwing back quite as much “stuff” as was hurled at
us, and although conditions underfoot were easier behind the German
lines, the enemy opposite us must have had a very thin time of it. His
nervousness was most apparent at dawn and dusk, when he would often send
up his S.O.S. signal for no good reason and put down an intense barrage.
On several occasions our own gunners replied heatedly, thinking that an
attack was on foot, and a terrific artillery duel would ensue, all owing
to a misapprehension.
It was in this area too that we first made our acquaintance with the
German concrete blockhouse. The large majority of these constructions
had stood the test of the bombardment which preceded our original
attack, and they now provided a few headquarters with good cover; but
the insides of these blockhouses were in most cases too filthy for
words, and several of them were half filled with stagnant water. Cover,
however, was cover, and to get it one was prepared to put up with a good
deal.
[Illustration:
CHEDDAR VILLA, ST. JULIEN.
]
On August 7 the Battalion relieved the 5th Gloucester Regiment in the
front line, on the western outskirts of St. Julien (Map No. 3). A and B
Companies held this outpost line, while C Company was in support round
Canopus Trench, and D Company in reserve in California Drive and
Falkenhayn Redoubt. Battalion Headquarters was at Vanheule Farm, which
now consisted only of a flooded blockhouse. D Company Headquarters, with
one platoon and the Regimental Aid Post, occupied Cheddar Villa, which
was a superior blockhouse to Vanheule, except that the Germans, when
they built it, had made a particularly large entrance which, now that it
was in our hands, was completely exposed to enemy shells. The
accommodation being very limited, the platoon were, on the first night,
packed closely inside the opening trying to get a little sleep. The very
first shell which landed near the blockhouse arrived straight through
the opening and burst in the midst of the slumbering platoon. The effect
was appalling—many were killed, and of those who were not killed,
several lost limbs, many their legs. Happily the Medical Officer
(Captain L. E. Hughes) was unhurt, and, as usual on such occasions,
excelled himself in the relief he gave and the amount of work he
accomplished in the next few hours.
We were relieved on the following night by the 1/5th Battalion Royal
Warwickshire Regiment, and moved back to Dambre Camp. The march from the
line was exceedingly unpleasant, for the Battalion was literally chased
out by shells of the 5·9 variety.
Considering that no active operations had taken place, and that the
Battalion had only been twenty-four hours in the front line, with
forty-eight hours in reserve, our casualties for the tour, amounting to
two officers and sixty-seven other ranks, were certainly heavy, and they
give a fair idea of the daily wastage due to shelling.
The weather had again turned wet, and, although it was known that the
attack was to be resumed at the earliest favourable opportunity, it was
not until the 13th that we got definite orders. From these, it
transpired that the attack was to be carried on along the whole front of
the Second and Fifth Armies, and that the XVIIIth Corps was to employ
the 11th and 48th Divisions. The objective, so far as the 145th Infantry
Brigade was concerned, was the high ground overlooking the valley of the
Stroombeek; the order of battle of this Brigade was the 1/5th Battalion
Gloucestershire Regiment on the right, the 1st Bucks Battalion in the
centre, the 1/4th Battalion Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry on the left,
with the 1/4th Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment in Brigade reserve.
The British front line on the Brigade front lay immediately west of the
Steenbeek, whilst the Germans were holding a line consisting of
organised shell-holes and reinforced houses, along the ridge 200 yards
east of the stream.
Full orders for the Battalion attack and the artillery programme are
given in Appendix IB; it will therefore be sufficient here to say that
the Battalion was to form up for the attack west of the Steenbeek, on a
front of 500 yards immediately north of the St. Julien bridge (Map No.
3). The formation was to be: two companies in front, A (Captain G. R. F.
Knight) on the left and B (2/Lieutenant E. H. Fawcitt) on the right,
each in two waves of two platoons, with C (Captain G. V. Neave) and D
(Captain H. J. Pullman) in artillery formation behind right and left
respectively.
Tanks were to have co-operated, but, owing to the waterlogged state of
the ground, were counter-ordered at the last moment.
On the morning of August 15, the Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel L. L. C.
Reynolds, D.S.O.) marched from Dambre Camp to the canal bank. Here the
afternoon was spent, and at 9.30 p.m. we began to move to the forming-up
positions. It proved a most trying march, the greater part of the route
being over ground a mass of shell-holes full of water, the night
pitch-dark and enemy shelling heavy. There was, or had been, a
trench-board track to guide us part of the way, but this did not help
much, as in many places it had been completely blown away by shells.
With nothing else to aid us in keeping direction, it was no real wonder
that three platoons of C Company lost their way and failed to turn up in
time to take part in the initial assault. The remainder of the Battalion
reached the forming-up positions and were ready twenty minutes before
zero, which was fixed for 4.45 a.m. on August 16, 1917.
At zero minus seven minutes, the two leading companies moved forward to
cross the Steenbeek. At zero, the artillery barrage was put down 200
yards east of the stream and timed to creep forward at the rate of 100
yards every five minutes. The “going” was very bad indeed, as the ground
was a mass of shell-craters and there were but few signs of dawn
breaking. The result was that the barrage lifted off the enemy forward
position before our leading wave could get up to it. A very heavy
machine-gun fire was opened by the enemy from his concrete emplacements,
and this was quickly reinforced by considerable rifle fire from his
shell-hole positions. The fire almost entirely annihilated the leading
wave of the right company, who instantly lost two out of their three
officers. The second wave closed up and engaged the enemy with fire,
while parties worked round the flanks, but the enemy kept up a very
strong resistance, and until the leading platoons of D Company closed up
and charged with the bayonet they showed no signs of giving in. This
charge by the third wave was followed by a bout of hand-to-hand fighting
around the blockhouses on the Hillock Farm-St. Julien road, until the
garrison of one blockhouse put up their hands. After this the other
garrisons soon followed suit. This was the situation on the right about
6 a.m.
The remains of B and D Companies were then quickly reorganised and
pushed on in an attempt to overtake our barrage, which had by this time
got well ahead of them. They could only succeed in advancing some 300
yards north-east of the outskirts of St. Julien, where they were
confronted by a large sheet of water, with a blockhouse and two gunpits
on the far side held by machine guns and riflemen. Every attempt made by
these companies to get forward was stopped by a heavy cross-fire from
these positions and others on the left.
[Illustration:
THE STEENBEEK.
]
[Illustration:
THE BATTLE-FIELD NEAR ST. JULIEN, YPRES.
]
The left leading company (A) met with less resistance at first, but on
topping the slight ridge above the Steenbeek they came under a heavy
cross-fire from Hillock Farm and two old gunpits west of it, as well as
from positions away to their left, in front of the left Battalion, who
had been held up close to the Steenbeck. The leading wave reached the
gunpits with only sixteen men left. The second wave closed up, but its
left platoon was completely stopped by fire from the direction of Maison
du Hibou and Triangle Farm. The right platoon, carrying out their
orders, continued the attack with the remains of the leading wave and
succeeded in reaching their objective at Springfield at about 6.45 a.m.
Many, however, were seen to fall as they passed Hillock Farm, and very
few could actually have reached Springfield. After the first rush by
this gallant party, every effort was made to reach the place and afford
them assistance, but each attempt met with failure and many casualties,
and at 9 a.m. the enemy were seen to rush the house, three or four of
our men being afterwards led away.
At 7 a.m. Battalion Headquarters was established in a blockhouse on the
west side of the Hillock Farm-St. Julien road, and made itself
responsible for that road, whilst the other troops that remained were
sent to reinforce the more forward position on the right. In the
meantime the 5th Gloucesters on the right had got about 300 yards west
of the Steenbeek, where they too were finally held up.
Soon after 8 a.m. the enemy were seen coming over the ridge north of
Springfield in considerable numbers and collecting in a trench below it.
As by this time we had no communication with the artillery, this massing
by the enemy continued, whilst our companies were hastily reorganised
for defence, and three Vickers guns brought into suitable positions. One
platoon of the 1/4th Royal Berks was also got up and placed so as to
protect our left flank, which was quite in the air.
At 9 a.m. three thick waves of the enemy were seen to move down towards
Triangle Farm, where they got under cover. At 10 a.m. the enemy
counter-attacked us heavily from this farm and from each side of it. The
fire from our machine guns, Lewis guns and rifles was, however, too much
for them, for after a short time they commenced to retire over the ridge
by which they had come.
Sniping and machine-gun fire were brisk throughout the day, and we had
several casualties, mostly in the neighbourhood of Hillock Farm, where
our men had little cover and the slightest movement was visible to the
enemy.
At 7.30 p.m., as it was getting dusk, about a hundred Germans attempted
to rush the gunpits we were holding on the left, but they were stopped
and suffered heavily. No further counter-attack occurred until 9.30
p.m., when the enemy again launched a surprise attack from the direction
of Triangle Farm, and succeeded on this occasion in driving in our posts
very slightly round Hillock Farm.
Reconnoitring patrols, sent out during the night, reported the enemy to
be holding the line of the Springfield road.
Owing to enemy sniping, it had been found quite impossible to collect
the wounded during the day, and a great amount of searching and clearing
had to be done that night. Enemy dead lay along the Hillock Farm road in
large numbers, the majority having been bayoneted.
The captures by the Battalion were:
80 prisoners (mostly 7th Bavarian Infantry Regiment).
1 field gun.
3 machine guns.
Large quantities of equipment and medical stores were also taken.
The attack proved that our barrage had no effect whatever on the
garrisons of concrete blockhouses, and that for future operations it was
essential that these houses should be dealt with by the “heavies” prior
to any assault.
For such a comparatively small advance, it had been a costly attack,
but, as our flanks even now were largely in the air, it is difficult to
see how we could have maintained positions farther forward, had we been
able to reach them.
Our casualties were:
_Officers._—Killed. Capt. G. V. Neave.
Capt. G. R. F. Knight.
Wounded. Lieut. F. D. Ollard.
2/Lieut. F. M. Passmore.
2/Lieut. G. A. Johnston.
2/Lieut. E. H. Fawcitt.
2/Lieut. R. E. Norman.
2/Lieut. A. T. Moyle.
2/Lieut. F. C. Marshall.
_Other Ranks._—Killed—54.
Wounded—193.
Missing—35 (14 afterwards reported prisoners of war).
2/Lieutenant G. A. Johnston showed remarkable gallantry during this
action, in which he was very seriously wounded.
The Battalion was relieved the following evening by the 6th Battalion
Royal Warwickshire Regiment, and as a result of this action the
following congratulatory messages were received:
“_To the General Officer Commanding 145th Infantry Brigade._ August 19,
1917.
“In case the exigencies of the service prevent me visiting your
battalions to-day, please tell them that I appreciate very much the
stubborn and determined fighting spirit shown by you, and your officers
and men, in the battle on the 16th. Although the fortunes of war, in the
form of concrete shelters and an unexpectedly strong preliminary
position, prevented us from gaining more than a portion of the
objectives we want, we made a very valuable improvement to our position
for future progress. Besides the capture of over 100 prisoners, very
severe loss was inflicted on the Germans, one small field gun and
several machine guns were captured.
“It is not the mere capture of positions which is going to bring us the
final victory, but the determined fighting, in spite of all
difficulties, like that of the Bucks Battalion, which shows the enemy
that he is beaten and cannot hope to beat us and must give in.
“I have the fullest confidence in your Brigade, and know that they will
continue to fight with the same spirit with which they have always done,
in spite of difficulties.—(_Signed_) R. FANSHAWE, _Major-General_.”
“_To General Sir H. de la P. Gough, K.C.V.O., K.C.B., Commanding Fifth
Army._
“I wish to congratulate you personally, as well as the commanders,
staffs and troops under your command, most warmly, on the successes
gained by the Fifth Army yesterday, under conditions of great difficulty
and in the face of the most determined opposition.
“The bad weather, which delayed the continuance of our offensive,
enabled the enemy to bring up and concentrate considerable forces in
reserve, and to make careful preparations to meet our attack yesterday.
In spite of this, the determination and gallantry of the troops under
your command succeeded in striking another of the successful blows, the
cumulative effects of which are shattering the enemy’s power of
resistance and will ultimately lead to his complete defeat.—(_Signed_)
D. HAIG, _Field-Marshal_.”
Eight days’ rest in Dambre Camp was allowed us, before we again moved up
to the line to take part in further operations. This time it was the
turn of the 143rd and 144th Brigades to attack, the former on the right,
the latter on the left, their objective being the red line shown on Map
No. 3.
[Illustration:
MAP Nº. 3.
THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES
JULY TO OCTOBER 1917.
]
The 145th Brigade was to be in reserve until zero plus five hours, when
it was to move through the leading brigades, and capture the line of
farms included by the dotted blue line (Map No. 3). So far as this
Brigade was concerned, the 1/4th Royal Berks and 1/4th Oxford and Bucks
Light Infantry were to leave the canal bank at zero, move across country
to assembly positions about the green line, and be ready to carry out
the attack on the dotted blue line at zero plus five hours. The 1/5th
Gloucesters and the Bucks Battalion were to leave the canal bank at zero
plus three hours, and move to the assembly positions vacated by the
other two battalions.
Zero was fixed for 1.55 p.m. August 27, 1917. At 4.55 p.m. the head of
the Battalion, marching by platoons, passed the canal bank. There
appeared to be every prospect of a thoroughly disagreeable march, as
shells are never so plentiful as during the few hours succeeding an
attack, but we were most fortunate, for the Steenbeek was reached with
hardly a casualty. The ground, however, between that stream and the
Triangle Farm-St. Julien road was being very heavily shelled. This
caused us casualties, but they were few compared with the immense number
of shells falling around us. This was largely due to the state of the
ground, which, whilst so deep in mud as to make progress almost
impossible for us, minimised the resistance to the bursting shells and
so diminished the force of their explosion.
Heavy rain had fallen throughout the previous night, with the result
that the battle area was nothing more or less than a sea of mud. Many
who were wounded and fell got sucked in, and were not discovered till
long afterwards, often when it was too late.
The situation on our arrival was most obscure, but it was evident that
very little, if any, progress had been made by the two leading brigades.
It had been a case of pulling one foot out of the mud and putting the
other in, whilst the enemy took full advantage of the weary process and
shot hard at good and slowly moving targets. Rifles, bombs and Lewis
guns became coated with muddy slime, which quickly put them out of
action. Apart from this, the way was perilous in the extreme. Under such
conditions the task set was impossible of achievement, and further
progress was out of the question. The only real gain was the capture of
Springfield by the 1/8th Battalion Worcestershire Regiment.
The night, passed in the neighbourhood of Maison du Hibou, was intensely
dark; the evacuation of wounded presented even greater difficulties than
on the 16th, and at least eight men to a stretcher were found to be
necessary.
The following day, August 28, the whole Division was relieved in the
line, the Bucks Battalion handing over to the 2/7th Battalion London
Regiment.