THE GERMAN RETIREMENT
_March to July 1917_
The excitement caused by the news of the enemy’s retirement may well be
imagined. The very idea of marching into his trenches without being
fired at seemed almost too good to be true, and the possibilities opened
up by the thought of marching for miles behind them appeared
incalculable. One was very apt to forget during those first few days
that the retirement was being carried out “according to plan,” which
meant that we could not pursue bald-headed the moment that we received
news.
[Illustration:
REPRODUCTION OF A FRENCH POSTCARD OF PÉRONNE AFTER GERMAN EVACUATION
IN MARCH 1917. (WITH CRUDE TRANSLATION!)
]
It was not, in fact, until March 20 that we received orders to move to
billets at Péronne, which town had been entered by the 143rd Infantry
Brigade on the previous day. The march through “No Man’s Land,” Biaches,
and over the pontoon bridge, just finished by the Royal Engineers at
Bazincourt, was one of exceptional interest. The area had been
completely cleared of all stores by the enemy before his departure, and
the most that one saw, in the way of material left behind, was a few
coils of barbed wire. Péronne presented the most awful of pictures,
being completely wrecked and a large portion of it still burning. An
earthquake could not have produced a more appalling effect or a scene of
greater chaos. House fronts in many cases had been blown completely out
and had fallen right across the street, so that one looked from the
street straight into the rooms of the houses. These rooms were bare of
all furniture, every stick of which had been either carried away by the
enemy or sent to Berlin as souvenirs. Everywhere lay huge masses of
rubble and paper, and the work of tidying up appeared to be well-nigh
hopeless. The only two buildings which remained more or less intact were
the Town Hall and the Castle, and these we guessed must be mined.
Battalion Headquarters were, however, billeted in the Castle for that
night, and the remainder of the Battalion in cellars on the north-west
side of the square. These cellars were selected, not from any idea of
possible bombardment, but because they provided the only shelter left,
and there was less fear of a wall falling on one there than above
ground.
At 6.30 a.m. on March 21, B, C and D Companies moved off to relieve the
1/8th Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment in the outpost line, which
then lay some three miles east of the town and embraced Doingt, Doingt
Woods and Courcelles Wood, from a point about 500 yards south of Bussu
to the Cologne River. In the afternoon, Battalion Headquarters and A
Company moved up from Péronne, the former taking up quarters in Doingt.
In the evening, a flying column, known as “Ward’s Column,” and composed,
roughly speaking, of one Infantry Brigade, drawn from elements of all
Brigades in the Division, moved forward through the outpost line to
Cartigny.
The line, which we took over on the 21st, remained the Divisional line
of resistance until the 26th, though places well forward were occupied
and held by us during this period. With the exception of a few Uhlans
who were at times visible in the distance, no enemy was seen, and we
were given a great opportunity of practising, in real earnest and yet
without molestation, open warfare, which was a complete novelty to us.
Mounted officers were enabled to visit their outposts on horseback, and
the free and open life, after trench warfare, was thoroughly
appreciated. On the evening of March 26 we moved forward to Tincourt,
taking over billets there from the 1/4th Battalion Oxford and Bucks
Light Infantry. This village had not been completely demolished like the
others, chiefly because it had been used by the enemy as a dumping
ground for civilians, who had been collected there from all farms and
villages in the neighbourhood. Our excitement at finding them was great,
as they were the first we had seen.
The following day, March 27, the Battalion took over the outpost line,
which now ran from Roisel (captured by 1/4th Battalion Oxford and Bucks
Light Infantry) to Villers-Faucon (exclusive), Battalion Headquarters
being at Hamel. At 5.30 in the afternoon, the 5th Cavalry Division
attacked and captured Villers-Faucon. At 7 p.m. that part of the line
covering Roisel was handed over to the 2/4th Battalion Lincolnshire
Regiment (59th Division), and B Company were dispatched to
Villers-Faucon to assist the cavalry, who, in taking this village, had
met with considerable opposition from the enemy rearguards, and suffered
a number of casualties from their machine guns.
The following day the enemy shelled the village pretty heavily with 77
mm’s, and 5·9’s, and after dark the cavalry were withdrawn, being
relieved by C Company. There can have been few darker or wetter nights
than this one. Telephone lines were cut, and communication forward
entirely broke down, owing to the difficulty of finding Company
Headquarters in the dense darkness. Strong patrols were sent forward at
dawn to ascertain whether the enemy were still holding St. Emilie, and
they were found to be there in considerable numbers.
In pouring rain on the 29th March, the Battalion marched back to
Cartigny at dusk, on relief by the 4th Battalion Gloucestershire
Regiment. Here we became part of what had been called “Ward’s Column,”
but was now known as “Dobbin’s Column.” After four happy days with this
column the Battalion was moved to Longavesnes, relieving the 1/4th
Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment in Brigade reserve. This village,
which had been attacked and captured by the 143rd Infantry Brigade on
the 26th, was absolutely devoid of any accommodation or shelter, so
completely had it been wrecked by the enemy and our shells.
On April 5, at 2 a.m., we marched to the railway cutting between
Villers-Faucon and St. Emilie, acting as reserve to the remainder of the
Brigade, who were to capture the villages of Lempire, Ronssoy and
Basse-Boulogne (Map No. 2), attacking as follows:
1/4th Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment, south and south-east of
Ronssoy and Basse-Boulogne;
1/4th Battalion Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, south-west end of
Ronssoy;
1/5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment, the work-house, Lempire and
Basse-Boulogne.
Each of these battalions carried out the attack with three companies,
keeping one in battalion reserve. Zero was at 4.45 a.m. The operation
was completely successful, all objectives being taken, together with
over thirty prisoners and six machine guns. The German dead numbered
over 200. The prisoners, who belonged to the 237th Infantry Regiment,
stated that one platoon from each of their companies had been holding
the villages, but owing to our active patrolling the alarm had been
given at 11 o’clock that night and the support platoons had been brought
into the picquet line. They had received no orders to withdraw in case
of a heavy attack, and had been told to hold the position to the last.
All had the greatest confidence in the impregnability of the Hindenburg
Line, and, though they were obviously tired of the war, their _moral_
was not bad. They said that the Hindenburg Line near Bony had been
occupied since the 28th of last month, and that their next outpost line
ran in front of Tombois Farm and Malakoff Farm.
The Battalion moved back into Villers-Faucon for the remainder of the
day, officers being sent up to reconnoitre the new line, with a view to
relieving the 5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment that evening. The
outpost line was held by A and B Companies, the 1/4th Battalion Royal
Berkshire Regiment being on the right, and 1/6th Battalion Royal
Warwickshire Regiment on the left. C Company were in support in cellars
in Basse-Boulogne, and D Company in reserve with Battalion Headquarters
in the railway cutting, just south of the Lempire-Epehy Road. The
transport and quartermaster’s stores had at this time been moved to the
neighbourhood of Villers-Faucon.
No counter-attack developed on that night or the two succeeding ones,
during which the Battalion held that line, and companies were occupied
in consolidating the whole position, which it was decided should be the
future Divisional line of resistance.
On the evening of April 7 we were relieved by the 1/7th Battalion
Worcestershire Regiment, and marched back to cellar accommodation in
Marquaix. Work was here concentrated on roads which the enemy had done
everything in his power to make impassable. Additional parties were sent
up to the outpost line on most nights, to help the forward battalions in
the work of wiring and digging of new trenches.
[Illustration:
PÉRONNE CHURCH.
]
[Illustration:
RONSSOY SUGAR FACTORY.
]
On April 15 the Battalion took over the line again, receiving orders at
the same time that we were to attack Tombois Farm on the following
night. (See Appendix I A.)
This farm lay on the southern side of the Lempire-Vendhuille Road (Map
No. 2), midway between the two villages, and about 1,000 yards from our
nearest sentry post. At dusk on April 16, A Company (Captain N. S. Reid,
D.S.O., M.C.) took over the whole of the Battalion outpost line,
relieving B and C Companies for the attack. On our right, the 1/4th
Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment were to capture Gillemont Farm, and
on our left, the 1/5th Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment were to
attack Catelet Copse and Le Petit Priel Farm.
C Company (Captain J. B. Hales) had orders to form up just west of Sart
Farm, and to direct their attack south and south-east of Tombois.
B Company (Lieutenant M. Bowen) were to form up on the northern side of
the Lempire-Vendhuille Road, clear of Lempire, and to deliver their
attack on the west and north of the farm; D Company (Captain R.
Gregson-Ellis) to proceed in echelon behind C Company, occupying the
trench in front of the farm, until satisfied that the leading companies
had attained their objectives, when they were to go through and capture
a small ridge lying some 200 yards beyond the farm.
Zero was fixed for 11.30 p.m., April 16.
The weather conditions could not conceivably have been more unfavourable
for a night attack, over open country, with few landmarks. It was
pitch-dark, with pouring rain, and a gale blowing in the direction of
the enemy. That the attacking companies were able to find their
forming-up position in such darkness was a creditable performance; that
they should have kept direction and struck Tombois speaks very highly
for their leaders.
At 11.45 p.m. the enemy opened with machine-gun and rifle fire, and sent
up a great number of lights from the farm and the trenches on either
side of it. They also put down a moderate barrage well behind our
attack, mostly on the outskirts of Lempire and on Sart Farm. All
companies encountered a thick belt of wire in front of the enemy
positions, which were strongly held, C and D Companies both being held
up by this wire, which it was impossible to negotiate in face of the
heavy enemy fire. All D Company’s officers had become casualties, and at
12.30 a.m. Captain Hales decided to withdraw both companies to Sart
Farm, and reform them there for another attack.
Meanwhile B Company, on the left, had attracted rather less rifle and
machine-gun fire than the other two companies, and had succeeded in
getting through a thinner belt of wire and penetrating the enemy
trenches at a point just north of where the trench crossed the road.
In consequence of the failure of the two right companies, and in view of
the fact that at that time no news had been received at Battalion
Headquarters of the success of B Company’s attack, three platoons of the
support company (1/5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment) were ordered
to advance on the farm, one platoon each side of the road and one in
close support, in order to ascertain the situation as regards B Company
and, if necessary, to attack. They arrived at the farm to find B Company
in possession, but the enemy still holding out in the orchard south of
the farm. Our men were finding considerable difficulty in clearing the
orchard owing to the fire of the other two companies who had been held
up.
[Illustration:
MAP Nº. 2.
ATTACK ON TOMBOIS FARM
NIGHT 16/17 APRIL 1917.
]
By 3 a.m., however, both farm and orchard were clear, and a
counter-attack, launched by the enemy down the road, was successfully
broken up by B Company. C and D Companies, who had now reorganised, were
at once sent up to help in the work of consolidation, and trenches were
dug west of the road and north and east of the farm, Major A. B.
Lloyd-Baker going forward to organise this work.
News was received that the 1/4th Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment and
1/5th Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment had both failed to reach
their objectives, on account of wire and heavy enemy fire.
At daylight on April 17, the Battalion was holding three or four hundred
yards of trench on either side of the farm, with no sign of the enemy.
Strong patrols were sent out to right and left, with orders to occupy
every position possible, and by 7.30 a.m. one of these patrols,
consisting of a platoon of Gloucesters, succeeded in entering Le Petit
Priel Farm with little or no opposition. Another patrol from A Company
(holding the old line), which had been sent forward to ascertain the
left of our new line, found Catelet Copse unoccupied. This they reported
to the nearest picquet of the Warwicks, who moved up and occupied it.
It would seem that at dawn the enemy, realising that he had lost
Tombois, had decided to withdraw from the objectives which the battalion
on our left had fought hard all that night to gain.
At least thirty dead Germans were found in and around the farm, and our
captures were nine prisoners with one machine gun. Our casualties were:
_Officers._—Wounded. Capt. R. Gregson-Ellis
(died following day).
2/Lieut. J. Jack.
2/Lieut. N. S. Flint.
2/Lieut. B. C. C. Olivier.
2/Lieut. R. F. Chatham.
_Other ranks._—Killed—18.
Wounded—48.
The strengths of the attacking companies had been:
B Company—4 officers and 136 other ranks.
C Company—3 officers and 125 other ranks.
D Company—4 officers and 134 other ranks.
The following message was received from the Army Commander, General Sir
H. Rawlinson:
“Please convey to 48th Division my admiration of their success last
night. To have carried out a successful attack, on a wide front, in the
midst of such a storm, reflects the highest credit on all ranks and
especially on the leadership of subordinate commanders. My best
congratulations and thanks to all troops engaged.”
Tombois Farm, and the road running from the farm to Lempire, were
shelled throughout the day, making our occupation of the new position
and communication with the rear most unpleasant; but relief, in the
shape of the 1/5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment, arrived that
evening, and we tramped back, very wet and weary, to a camp in the
neighbourhood of St. Emilie, only to be moved again two days later to
huts and billets in Villers-Faucon.
Numerous mines, laid by the enemy in his retreat, had recently exploded
in this village, the 1/6th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment being
unfortunate enough to lose the whole of their Battalion Headquarters,
including their Commanding Officer, 2nd in Command, Adjutant,
Intelligence Officer, Medical Officer, and a Chaplain attached to them.
The mine exploded underneath a large cellar where these officers were
all sleeping together. The Commanding Officer and Adjutant were brothers
who had come out with the Division in 1915, and had become well known
and popular. The result of this mishap was an order, issued by Division,
that no officers were to live in billets in the town, and huts were
erected to house them.
On the 24th and 25th April the 144th Infantry Brigade made further
attempts to capture Gillemont Farm, and these eventually proved
successful. With this exception, no further active operations were
undertaken by the Division in this area, and at the end of the month the
Division was relieved, the Battalion marching back via Hamel to billets
at Mons-en-Chaussée. Here we had ten days’ strenuous training, though as
usual this was partly interfered with by large working parties, which
had to be provided about every other day for road-mending and filling up
craters.
Those officers who were unable to ride—and there were at this time quite
a number—will not have forgotten their first experiences on a horse in
the fields behind this village. The Commanding Officer had been working
up a “hate” for a considerable time against these unlucky individuals,
and as he determined to be himself the riding master, the blow fell with
full force. The result, however, was splendid, and a month later all
officers in the Battalion were able to ride after a fashion.
Our ration strength at this time had fallen to 570 other ranks, and
though we were hoping to receive reinforcements here, none arrived. Our
officers numbered twenty-five, but many of them were always attending
courses, of which a large number were held continuously.
On May 11 the Battalion started on the first of a series of daily
marches up to a part of the line which we had not yet visited. These
marches, which took us through Flamicourt (one night), Cléry, Maurepas
(one night), Combles, Sailly-Saillisel, and Le Transloy (one night),
were of exceptional interest, embracing as they did such a large part of
the old Somme battle-fields. The roads had been entirely remade by the
British Army and were excellent, but with this exception the whole
country was one great stretch of shell-craters. Over all these acres and
acres of ground there was hardly a yard into which a shell had not
fallen. The sites of the villages through which we passed were marked
only by heaps of rubble, with a few charred tree-trunks standing like
weary sentinels over them. A smell of dead pervaded the whole
atmosphere.
On the night of May 14 we relieved the 7th Battalion South Staffordshire
Regiment, 33rd Infantry Brigade, 11th Division, in the line between
Hermies and Demicourt, the 143rd Brigade taking over the line on our
left and the 1/4th Royal Berkshire Regiment on our right.
The Division spent nearly two months in this sector, the 143rd Brigade
and 144th Brigade relieving each other on the left, and the 145th
Brigade carrying out its own reliefs on the right. As regards the
latter, two battalions held the line, a third was in support round the
village of Beaumetz, while the fourth battalion was in reserve in Vélu
Wood. The line held by the Bucks Battalion ran for the most part just in
front of the village of Hermies, and consisted of a series of
disconnected strong posts, separated from the enemy trenches by fifty
yards on the right and some 300 yards on the left. The Germans were
occupying the Hindenburg Line, their front trenches running mostly along
the eastern side of the Canal du Nord, just in front of the village of
Havrincourt, while opposite our left their line ran forward so as to
include a large spoil-heap. This mound formed a magnificent stronghold
for them and was a source of continual annoyance to us, harbouring as it
did several machine-gun nests with splendid observation over our lines.
Our right post, well known as R3, was situated on either side of the
Hermies-Havrincourt road, behind an old prisoners’ cage which had been
erected by the Germans before their retirement. Parties were at work
nearly every night during the whole of our period in this area, digging
trenches through and around this cage, to the intense displeasure of the
platoon commander in charge of the post, who always had the most
harrowing tales to tell in the evening of the hell which the garrison
had endured in R3 during the day! The post certainly caught the bulk of
the enemy trench-mortar and grenade fire, largely because of the close
proximity of the two front trenches, which were practically separated
only by the canal.
Artillery fire on points behind the lines was active on both sides, the
chief targets for the enemy being the villages of Hermies, Demicourt and
Beaumetz.
Aeroplane bombing, chiefly by night, was becoming increasingly popular
with the enemy, and one bomb, which fell on the quarters of a field
ambulance in Beaumetz, caused a number of casualties.
Our machine-gunners contracted a habit of pouring thousands of rounds of
small-arms ammunition into enemy country each night, hoping no doubt to
inconvenience the enemy infantry to an even greater extent than our own!
Only one operation, and this a small one, was undertaken by the
Battalion during its tenure of these trenches. It had become apparent at
the beginning of June that the enemy had established a night post
amongst a cluster of bushes on our bank of the canal. The sniping from
this post caused us considerable annoyance and some casualties to our
working parties. It was therefore decided to capture it, and to dig a
trench along the bank of the canal with a communicator running back to
our present post. Two platoons of B Company (Captain M. Bowen, M.C.)
were detailed to make the attack, forming up on a line parallel to the
canal bank, each platoon being in two lines at fifteen yards’ distance
and on a frontage of fifty yards. Zero was fixed for midnight June 7/8,
at which time a barrage from one section of field guns was placed on the
enemy trenches. At zero plus five this barrage lifted, and the
assaulting platoons charged with the bayonet. The enemy opened rifle
fire before the assault, but was most effectually silenced by a Lewis
gun posted on the right bank for the purpose of providing covering fire.
This fact was confirmed by an _Unteroffizier_ taken prisoner, who
declared that the Lewis-gun fire forced them to take shelter behind the
bank, and that the next thing they knew was that the English were on top
of them. After the assaulting platoons got in there ensued a bombing
fight which lasted for a few minutes, but the enemy soon gave in. No
attempt at a counter-attack was made, but rifle grenades were fired from
the opposite bank at intervals throughout the remainder of the night.
The report of this operation was afterwards issued for circulation
throughout the IVth Corps, with the following minute added:
“_To 20th Division, 48th Division, Corps Mounted Troops, Corps Schools._
“The Corps Commander considers this report should be circulated down to
company and battery commanders, as it is a good example of the
co-operation of all arms and of covering fire. The action of the Lewis
guns in driving the enemy to take cover and thus letting our troops get
in is especially good.”
Our casualties were two killed and nine wounded. Eleven prisoners were
taken by us and several of the enemy killed. The prisoners belonged to
the 41st Infantry Regiment and stated that the previous artillery
activity had led the picquet to expect an attack, and they had been
ordered to maintain the greatest vigilance. They believed that the post
in question was to have been finally withdrawn the following day as
being tactically unsound. The average _moral_ and physique of these men
was second-rate, and they declared that the longing for peace in all
classes was intense, the more so as it was firmly believed that the war
would end in a draw. One of these prisoners was of special interest, as
he had been on the Russian front in March, where he said there had been
much fraternising between Germans and Russians, to such an extent indeed
that whenever artillery shoots were planned each side warned the other
of the danger zone to be avoided.
Another prisoner, who was a N.C.O., stated that the cage which has been
mentioned above was called by them “Russenlager” (Russian Camp), because
Russian prisoners used to be interned there within the danger zone, as
an act of retaliation on the practice attributed to the English and
French of requiring German prisoners to work within the range of German
artillery.
On July 3 the Division was withdrawn from the line, the Battalion being
relieved by the 4th Battalion Royal Fusiliers, 9th Brigade, 3rd
Division. After a halt for one night at Vélu, we marched the two
following days via Bihucourt, Achiet-le-Grand, Adinfer and Ransart to
Bailleulval, where the most strenuous training was undertaken. Rumours
of an offensive to be started by the British Army in the Ypres area had
for some time been persistent, and it became increasingly evident during
the first few days of our stay in this village that the Battalion was
earmarked to take part in it.
Seconds in Command of battalions were detailed to attend a course at the
XVIIIth Corps School, with a view to learning the general scheme of the
operations and the rôles that the various Divisions in the Corps were to
play in them. Points which required further training were brought out,
but the special feature of the preparation was that every man should not
only know his own job thoroughly but also be made acquainted with the
jobs of all units near him, and not be “in the dark,” as had been
largely the case on previous occasions. In other words, secrecy was to
be to a great extent sacrificed with the hope of gaining greater
efficiency.
Various changes were made in the headquarter staffs of battalions in the
Brigade, and we had most regretfully to part with Major A. B.
Lloyd-Baker, who was transferred to the 1/4th Battalion Oxford and Bucks
Light Infantry as 2nd in Command, Captain P. A. Hall, M.C., being
promoted to fill his place as our own 2nd in Command.
Two drafts were received on July 12 and 15, one of 196 other ranks and
the other of 43 other ranks, which brought the Battalion ration strength
up to about twenty-five officers and 920 other ranks. Two most
instructive and interesting lectures were delivered by Major Hall, on
his return from the Corps School, to all officers and N.C.O.’s, and in
these he was able to state definitely the proposed objectives of the
48th Division.
The Second and Fifth Armies were to attack along the whole of their
fronts. Our XVIIIth Corps was in the Fifth Army, and included the 11th,
39th, 48th, and 51st Divisions. So far as this Corps was concerned, the
initial attack was to be made by the 39th Division on the right and the
51st Division on the left, with the 48th Division in reserve on the
right and 11th Division in reserve on the left.
The Corps front ran roughly from Wieltje to the Ypres-Staden railway.
The final objective on the first day was to include Pilkem Ridge on the
left and St. Julien on the right, from which line the other two
Divisions (11th and 48th) were to continue the attack, immediately guns
could be got forward.
Every arrangement appeared to be so thoroughly thought out that it
seemed impossible that the attack could be anything but a complete
success, the results of which would eventually give us back the whole
Belgian coast and, with any luck, finish the war.