+------------+-------------+------------+-------------+-----_England and Napoleon (1801-1815)

+------------+-------------+------------+-------------+-------------+

| 25,789 3 | 63 | January | 35 | 53 8½ |

| 19,253 5 | 60 | February | 32 | 52 1¼ |

| 22,465 2 | 61 | March | 35 | 50 8¼ |

| 22,813 1 | 62 | April | 30 | 51 8¾ |

| 17,198 0 | 59 | May | 32 | 51 8¾ |

| 18,877 8 | 58 | June | 32 | 51 1¾ |

| 30,517 4 | 70 | July | 32 | 54 11¼ |

| 50,437 2 | 80 | August | 37 | 64 2¼ |

| 45,199 3 | 85 | September | 42 | 70 6¼ |

| 64,684 7 | 93 | October | 42 | 73 5 |

| 69,001 1 | 132 | November | 50 | 88 11¼ |

| 51,933 3 | 135 | December | 62 | 104 3¼ |

+------------+-------------+------------+-------------+-------------+

Total, 438,170 quarters, 3 bushels. Average per quarter, 70s. 8½d.

FLOUR.

+--------------+-------------+------------+-------------+--------------+

+--------------+-------------+------------+-------------+--------------+

| | Shillings. | | s. d. | s. d. |

| 71,797 | 55 | January | 36 6 | 49 1½ |

| 61,191 | 50 | February | 37 | 44 9½ |

| 73,366 | 50 | March | 30 | 44 10¾ |

| 60,904 | 50 | April | 38 | 44 9¼ |

| 48,641 | 50 | May | 39 | 44 9¼ |

| 69,795 | 50 | June | 37 | 44 10¼ |

| 86,321 | 60 | July | 37 | 49 4¼ |

| 67,421 | 75 | August | 45 | 63 2 |

| 40,586 | 75 | September | 50 | 63 11¾ |

| 84,443 | 84 | October | 56 | 71 4¾ |

| 49,954 | 105 | November | 65 | 87 8½ |

| 59,110 | 105 | December | 80 | 98 3½ |

+--------------+-------------+------------+-------------+--------------+

Total, 773,529 sacks. Average, per sack, 58s. 1d.

BREAD.

_Price of the Quartern Loaf, Wheaten, per Week._

NOTE.--The Assize is set on Tuesday in every week, and takes place on

the Thursday following; therefore the under is dated on Thursday.

d. d. d. d.

January 5 9¼|April 5 8½|July 5 8½|October 4 12

“ 12 9¼| “ 12 8½| “ 12 8¾| “ 11 12¼

“ 19 9¼| “ 19 8½| “ 19 9¼| “ 18 12¼

“ 26 9 | “ 26 8¼| “ 26 9¼| “ 25 12¾

February 2 9 |May 3 8¼|August 2 9¾|Novem. 1 1¼

“ 9 8½| “ 10 8½| “ 9 10 | “ 8 13½

“ 16 8½| “ 17 8½| “ 16 10¾| “ 15 14½

“ 23 8½| “ 24 8½| “ 23 12 | “ 22 16

March 1 8½| “ 31 8½| “ 30 12 | “ 29 16½

“ 8 8½|June 7 8½|Septem. 6 11¼|Decem. 6 16½

“ 15 8½| “ 14 8½| “ 13 11 | “ 13 16¾

“ 22 8½| “ 21 8½| “ 20 11½| “ 20 16½

“ 29 8½| “ 28 8½| “ 27 11½| “ 27 16¼

ENGLAND AND THE MEDITERRANEAN.

I. PITT ON MALTA (1805).

=Source.=--Stanhope’s _Life of Pitt_, 1862. Vol. iv., p. 306.

_Mr. Pitt to M. Novosiltzoff_ (_Extract_).

DOWNING STREET,

_June 7, 1805_.

I certainly have always felt that, as long as the execution of the

Treaty of Amiens was in question, this country had no right to look to

any object [touching Malta] but that of endeavouring to secure for it,

if possible, a real and secure independence according to the spirit of

that treaty. But a fresh war, produced by the conduct of France, having

once cancelled that treaty, I cannot consider this country as bound by

any intentions it has professed with a view to the execution of the

treaty; and on general grounds of moderation and justice, I cannot think

this country called upon to offer such an addition to all the other

sacrifices of acquisitions made during the war, especially in return for

concessions on the part of France which can afford no adequate security

for Europe.

The possession of Malta appears to be of the most essential importance

to great and valuable interests of our own, and to our means of

connexion and co-operation with other Powers. Some naval station in the

Mediterranean is absolutely indispensable; but none can be found so

desirable and secure as Malta. Notwithstanding this sentiment, however,

if the arrangement proposed respecting Malta could secure by negotiation

an arrangement really satisfactory on the Continent, and particularly

adequate barriers both for Italy and for Holland, and if we could obtain

the only substitute for Malta which we think could at all answer the

purpose (namely, Minorca), we are ready to overcome our difficulties on

this point; but on any other ground the sacrifice is one to which we

cannot feel ourselves justified to consent. It has, therefore, been

impossible to ratify that part of the 10th article which relates to this

subject, and which was referred hither for decision. We have also found

ourselves under the painful necessity of protesting against any step

which can lead to making our established principles of maritime law the

subject of any revision or discussion. We have endeavoured to explain

frankly and without reserve the motives which guide us on both points.

They are, to our own minds, convincing and conclusive.

II. NELSON ON SARDINIA (1805).

=Source.=--Stanhope’s _Life of Pitt_, 1862. Vol. iv., p. 328.

_Lord Nelson to Mr. Pitt._

GORDON’S HOTEL, 6 A.M.,

_Aug. 29, 1805_.

SIR

I cannot rest until the importance of Sardinia, in every point of view,

is taken into consideration. If my letters to the different Secretaries

of State cannot be found, I can bring them with me. My belief is, that

if France possesses Sardinia, which she may do any moment she pleases,

our commerce must suffer most severely, if possible to be carried on.

Many and most important reasons could be given why the French must not

be suffered to possess Sardinia; but your time is too precious to read

more words than is necessary; therefore I have only stated two strong

points to call your attention to the subject. I am sure our fleet would

find a difficulty, if not impossibility, in keeping any station off

Toulon, for want of that island to supply cattle, water, and

refreshments, in the present state of the Mediterranean; and that we can

have no certainty of commerce at any time, but what France chooses to

allow us, to either Italy or the Levant.

I am, &c.,

NELSON AND BRONTE.

THE BLOW THAT KILLED PITT (1805).

“How I leave my country!” (Pitt’s last words).

=Source.=--T. Holland Rose: _Pitt and Napoleon_. London: G. Bell and Sons.

Pp. 312, 332, 333.

(_a_) _Pitt to Lord Harrowby._

DOWNING STREET,

_October 30, 1805_.

I enclose you a very gloomy account from one of our Dutch

correspondents,[5] from which however I am inclined to deduct as he

proposes at least one half. And though the remainder would be bad enough

in itself, I see nothing in the consequences at all alarming, if Austria

has the courage to pursue the only policy which is safe under such

circumstances. Allowing for the great loss the French must evidently

have sustained, they must probably require some interval before they can

move to the Inn, and that march must be from 100 to 150 miles. If the

Austrians and Russians on the Inn were to be 100,000 men by the 20th of

this month, the further reinforcements they must probably receive from

the Tirol and Salzburg, from such part of the Ulm army as may find its

way to them, and from the Austrian reserves, must enable them to make a

stout and probably an effectual resistance in that position. And they

have still to expect a second army of 50,000 Russians in no long time,

and, I should hope, 40,000 more of the reserve originally intended by

Russia to have been kept on the frontier of Lithuania, but which might

surely now be converted into an active force. Add to this that if

Bonaparte advances to the Inn, he will be at least 300 miles from his

frontier, just about the time the Prussian force will be collected at

Bayreuth, and his allies probably advancing from Saxony and Hesse, the

first of which places seems not more than 80 miles, the second 150 and

the third 200 miles from points that would cut off all communication

with Mentz, Manheim, and Strasburg. I am only unreasonable enough to

desire that the Prussian army may move for this object within five days

from your arrival, and everything may yet take a decisive turn in our

favour before Christmas. We are flattering ourselves that as the wind is

nearly due north, you may be able to sail, but I take the chance of this

finding you still at Yarmouth.

(_b_) _Canning to Pitt._

SOUTH HILL,

_January 4, 1806_.

If Sturges had not written to me yesterday, and I had only my newspapers

of this morning to trust to, I should have made out a very good

consolatory case from the materials which they furnish. But they are not

altogether sufficient to counteract the impression of Sturges’s first

intelligence; and I must therefore refer to you for more substantial and

certain consolation.

1. If the Emperor of Russia has not given up the game personally; and if

he is still in a situation to communicate with the Emperor of Germany, I

have hopes that his influence may yet induce the E. of G. to break the

armistice, before it has led to peace. It is obviously (upon the map)

the interest of Austria to do so.

2. My second hope is from the co-operation of Prussia, but that (which

was my only hope yesterday) is a good deal weakened by the resolution

which Sturges announced to me of the Russian army retreating through

Hungary. Thro’ Hungary! _Into_ Hungary with a view to the first object,

I can understand. But a retreat commenced thro’ Hungary at the same

moment with the offer to Berlin of the use of Russian armies is more

perplexing than encouraging.

3. If the very worst happens that is now threatened--if Austria does

make a separate peace, and is abolished as a Power, and if Prussia lies

down and licks Bonaparte’s feet, and is forgiven and gets Hanover

assigned to her for her submission--still, with Russia unpledged to

peace and committed in war, we are better off than we were before the

Coalition took place. We must then, I think, set about making a new

treaty with Russia with a view to joint negotiation _hereafter_. But

still this is not the hopeless state of things in which (when we were

looking at the possibility of it three months ago) we thought we should

have nothing to do but to return an answer to Bonaparte’s neglected

letter of January last. Nothing like it.

“One of the greatest comforts that you could send me would be the

intelligence that you are going on well and getting stout. I did not

very much like the late accounts of you.... I take for granted you do

not mean to attend the funeral.”[6]

* * * * *

NOTE.--The last fatal news of Austerlitz was received by Pitt on January

13, 1806, and he died ten days afterwards, on January 23.

ROUTINE ON A BRITISH MAN-OF-WAR--THE REVENGE (1805).

=Source.=--Clowes’ _Royal Navy,_ 1900. Vol. v., p. 21.

“Our crew were divided into two watches, starboard and larboard. When

one was on deck the other was below: for instance, the starboard watch

would come on at eight o’clock at night, which was called eight bells;

at half-past is called one bell, and so on; every half-hour is a bell,

as the hour-glass is turned, and the messenger sent to strike the bell,

which is generally affixed near the fore-hatchway.[7] It now becomes the

duty of the officer on deck to see that the log-line is run out, to

ascertain how many knots the ship goes an hour, which is entered in the

log-book, with any other occurrence which may take place during the

watch. At twelve o’clock, or eight bells in the first watch, the

Boatswain’s Mate calls out lustily, ‘Larboard watch, a-hoy.’ This is

called the middle watch, and when on deck, the other watch go below to

their hammocks, till eight bells, which is four o’clock in the morning.

They then come on deck again, pull off their shoes and stockings, turn

up their trousers to above their knees, and commence ‘holy-stoning’ the

deck, as it is termed (for Jack is sometimes a little impious in the way

of his sayings). Here the men suffer from being obliged to kneel down on

the wetted deck, and a gravelly sort of sand strewed over it. To perform

this work they kneel with their bare knees, rubbing the deck with a

stone and the sand, the grit of which is often very injurious. In this

manner the watch continues till about four bells, or six o’clock; they

then begin to wash and swab the decks till seven bells, and at eight

bells the Boatswain’s Mate pipes to breakfast. This meal usually

consists of burgoo, made of coarse oatmeal and water; others will have

Scotch coffee, which is burnt bread boil’d in some water, and sweetened

with sugar. This is generally cooked in a hook-pot in the galley, where

there is a range. Nearly all the crew have one of these pots, a spoon,

and a knife; for these things are indispensable; there are also basins,

plates, etc., which are kept in each mess, which generally consists of

eight persons, whose berth is between two of the guns on the lower deck,

where there is a board placed, which swings with the rolling of the

ship, and answers for a table.... At half-past eight o’clock, or one

bell in the forenoon watch, the larboard watch goes on deck, and the

starboard remains below. Here again the ‘holy-stones,’ or ‘hand-bibles,’

as they are called by the crew, are used, and sometimes iron scrapers.

After the lower deck has been wetted with swabs, these scrapers are used

to take the rough dirt off. Whilst this is going on, the cooks from each

mess are employed in cleaning the utensils and preparing for dinner; at

the same time the watch are working the ship, and doing what is wanting

to be done on deck.

“About eleven o’clock, or six bells, when any of the men are in irons,

or on the black list, the boatswain or mate are ordered to call all

hands; the culprits are then brought forward by the Master-at-Arms, who

is a warrant-officer, and acts the part of Jack Ketch when required; he

likewise has the prisoners in his custody, until they are put in irons,

under any charge. All hands being now mustered, the Captain orders the

man to strip; he is then seized to a grating by the wrists and knees;

his crime is then mentioned, and the prisoner may plead; but, in

nineteen cases out of twenty, he is flogged for the most trifling

offence or neglect, such as not hearing the watch called at night, not

doing anything properly on deck or aloft which he might happen to be

sent to do, when, perhaps, he has been doing the best he could, and, at

the same time, ignorant of having done wrong, until he is pounced on,

and put in irons. So much for legal process. After punishment, the

Boatswain’s Mate pipes to dinner, it being eight bells, or twelve

o’clock; and this is the pleasantest part of the day, as at one bell the

piper is called to play ‘Nancy Dawson,’ or some other lively tune, a

well-known signal that the grog is ready to be served out. It is the

duty of the cook from each mess to fetch and serve it out to his

messmates, of which every man and boy is allowed a pint, that is, one

gill of rum and three of water, to which is added lemon acid, sweetened

with sugar. Here I must remark that the cook comes in for the

perquisites of office, by reserving to himself an extra portion of grog,

which is called the over-plus, and generally comes to the double of a

man’s allowance. Thus the cook can take upon himself to be the man of

consequence, for he has the opportunity of inviting a friend to partake

of a glass, or of paying any little debt he may have contracted. It may

not be known to everyone that it is grog which pays debts, and not

money, in a man-of-war. Notwithstanding the cook’s apparently

pre-eminent situation, yet, on some occasions, he is subject to censure

or punishment by his messmates, for not attending to the dinner

properly, or suffering the utensils of his department to be in a dirty

condition. Justice, in these cases, is awarded by packing a jury of

cooks from the different messes, for it falls to the lot of each man in

a mess to act as cook in his turn. The mode or precept by which this

jury is summoned is by hoisting a mess swab or beating a tin dish

between decks forward.... At two bells in the afternoon, or one o’clock,

the starboard watch goes on deck, and remains working the ship, pointing

the ropes, or doing any duty that may be required, until the eight bells

strike, when the Boatswain’s Mate pipes to supper. This consists of half

a pint of wine, or a pint of grog, to each man, with biscuit, and cheese

or butter. At the one bell, or half-past four, which is called one bell

in ‘the first dog-watch,’ the larboard watch comes on duty, and remains

until six o’clock, when that is relieved by the starboard watch, which

is called the ‘second dog-watch,’ which lasts till eight o’clock. To

explain this, it must be observed that these four hours, from four to

eight o’clock, are divided into two watches, with a view of making the

other watches come regular and alternate.... By this regular system of

duty, I became inured to the roughness and hardships of a sailor’s life.

I had made up my mind to be obedient, however irksome to my feelings,

and, our ship being on the Channel Station, I soon began to pick up a

knowledge of seamanship.”

NELSON’S PLAN OF ACTION FOR TRAFALGAR (1805).

=Source.=--Clowes’ _Royal Navy_, 1900. Vol. v., p. 127.

After declaring his intention of keeping the fleet in such a position of

sailing that the order of sailing should be the order of battle, Nelson

went on to say:--

“If the enemy’s fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle,

and that the two lines ... could fetch them, they will probably be

so extended that their van could not succour their rear. I should

therefore probably make the second in command’s signal to lead

through about the twelfth ship from their rear, or wherever he

could fetch, if not able to get so far advanced. My line would cut

through about their centre.... The whole impression of the British

fleet must be to overpower [from] two or three ships ahead of their

commander-in-chief--supposed to be in the centre--to the rear of

their fleet. I will suppose 20 sail of the enemy’s line to be

untouched. It must be some time before they could perform a

manœuvre to bring their force compact to attack any part of the

British fleet engaged, or to succour their own ships; which,

indeed, would be impossible without mixing with the ships

engaged.... British to be one-fourth superior to the enemy cut off.

Something must be left to chance. Nothing is sure in a sea-fight,

beyond all others. Shot will carry away the masts and yards of

friends as well as of foes; but I look with confidence to a victory

before the van of the enemy could succour their rear; and then that

the British fleet would, most of them, be ready to receive their 20

sail of the line, or to pursue them should they endeavour to make

off.... The second in command will, in all possible things, direct

the movements of his line, by keeping them as compact as the nature

of the circumstances will admit. Captains are to look to their

particular line as their rallying point; but, in case signals

cannot be seen or clearly understood, no captain can do very wrong

if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.”

Should the enemy wait in line of battle--as he actually did at

Trafalgar--to receive an attack from windward--

“the divisions of the British fleet will be brought nearly within

gunshot of the enemy’s centre. The signal will most probably then

be made for the ... lines to bear up together; to set all their

sails, even their steering sails, in order to get as quickly as

possible to the enemy’s line, and to cut through, beginning at the

twelfth ship from the enemy’s rear. Some ships may not get through

their exact place, but they will always be at hand to assist their

friends. If any are thrown round the rear of the enemy, they will

effectually complete the business of 12 sail of the enemy. Should

the enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large, still the 12

ships composing, in the first position, the enemy’s rear are to be

the object of attack of the lee line, unless otherwise directed by

the Commander-in-Chief, which is scarcely to be expected, as the

entire management of the lee line, after the intentions of the

Commander-in-Chief are signified, is intended to be left to the

judgment of the admiral commanding that line. The remainder of the

enemy’s fleet ... are to be left to the management of the

Commander-in-Chief, who will endeavour to take care that the

movements of the second in command are as little interrupted as

possible.”[8]

TRAFALGAR (1805).

=Source.=--Southey: _Life of Nelson_ (1813).

Villeneuve was a skilful seaman, worthy of serving a better master and a

better cause. His plan of defence was as well conceived, and as

original, as the plan of attack. He formed the fleet in a double line,

every alternate ship being about a cable’s length to windward of her

second ahead and astern. Nelson, certain of a triumphant issue to the

day, asked Blackwood what he should consider as a victory. That officer

answered, that considering the handsome way in which battle was offered

by the enemy, their apparent determination for a fair trial of strength,

and the situation of the land, he thought it would be a glorious result

if fourteen were captured. He replied, “I shall not be satisfied with

anything short of twenty.” Soon afterwards he asked him if he did not

think there was a signal wanting. Captain Blackwood made answer, that he

thought the whole fleet seemed very clearly to understand what they

were about. These words were scarcely spoken before that signal was

made, which will be remembered as long as the language, or even the

memory of England shall endure--Nelson’s last signal--“ENGLAND EXPECTS

THAT EVERY MAN WILL DO HIS DUTY!” It was received throughout the fleet

with a shout of answering acclamation, made sublime by the spirit which

it breathed, and the feeling which it expressed. “Now,” said Lord

Nelson, “I can do no more. We must trust to the great Disposer of all

events, and the justice of our cause. I thank God for this great

opportunity of doing my duty.”

He wore that day, as usual, his Admiral’s frock-coat, bearing on the

left breast four stars of the different orders with which he was

invested. Ornaments which rendered him so conspicuous a mark for the

enemy, were beheld with ominous apprehensions by his officers. It was

known that there were riflemen on board the French ships; and it could

not be doubted but that his life would be particularly aimed at. They

communicated their fears to each other, and the Surgeon, Mr. Beatty,

spoke to the Chaplain, Dr. Scott, and to Mr. Scott, the public

Secretary, desiring that some person would entreat him to change his

dress, or cover the stars: but they knew that such a request would

highly displease him. “In honour I gained them,” he had said, when such

a thing had been hinted to him formerly, “and in honour I will die with

them.” Mr. Beatty, however, would not have been deterred by any fear of

exciting his displeasure, from speaking to him himself upon a subject in

which the weal of England, as well as the life of Nelson, was concerned,

but he was ordered from the deck before he could find an opportunity.

This was a point upon which Nelson’s officers knew that it was hopeless

to remonstrate or reason with him; but both Blackwood, and his own

Captain, Hardy, represented to him how advantageous to the fleet it

would be for him to keep out of action as long as possible; and he

consented at last to let the _Leviathan_ and the _Téméraire_, which were

sailing abreast of the _Victory_, be ordered to pass ahead. Yet even

here the last infirmity of this noble mind was indulged; for these

ships could not pass ahead if the _Victory_ continued to carry all her

sail, and so far was Nelson from shortening sail, that it was evident he

took pleasure in pressing on, and rendering it impossible for them to

obey his own orders. A long swell was setting into the Bay of Cadiz. Our

ships, crowding all sail, moved majestically before it, with light winds

from the south-west. The sun shone on the sails of the enemy, and their

well-formed line, with their numerous three-deckers, made an appearance

which any other assailants would have thought formidable; but the

British sailors only admired the beauty and the splendour of the

spectacle; and, in full confidence of winning what they saw, remarked to

each other what a fine sight yonder ships would make at Spithead!