SECOND EXPEDITION TO PERU--DISAPPOINTMENT AT NOT BEING PROVIDED WITH
TROOPS--FAILURE OF ROCKETS--DEPARTURE FOR ARICA--CAPTURE OF
PISCO--CAPTURE OF SPANISH SHIPS AT PUNA--DETERMINE TO MAKE AN ATTEMPT ON
VALDIVIA--ARRIVAL OFF THAT PORT, AND CAPTURE OF SPANISH BRIG OF WAR
POTRILLO--TROOPS OBTAINED FROM CONCEPTION--FLAG-SHIP NEARLY
WRECKED--ATTACK ON FORTS, AND CONQUEST OF VALDIVIA.
On the 12th of September, 1819, I again sailed for the Peruvian coast,
with Admiral Blanco as second in command. The squadron consisted of the
_O'Higgins, San Martin, Lautaro, Independencia_, and _Puyrredon_, the
_Galvarino_ and _Araucano_ not being in readiness. Two vessels
accompanied the squadron, to be afterwards fitted up as fire-ships.
The Government was exceedingly anxious that some decisive blow should be
at once struck. With the exception of the rockets, the squadron was in
little better condition than before, a loan having failed, whilst 4,000
dollars only were subscribed by the merchants. The crews for the most
part consisted of _cholos_, or native peasants, whom it was difficult to
shape into good seamen, though they fought gallantly when well led. The
officers were nearly all English or North American, this being a
redeeming feature, but very few of them possessed the tact to bring up
the men to anything like a seaman-like standard; a by no means easy
task however, as a considerable portion of those embarked did duty both
as marines and seamen.
I begged of the Government to supply me with 1,000 troops, asserting
that even with that number of men it would be possible to take the
castles of Callao, and destroy the whole of the Spanish shipping in the
harbour. I was assured that this force had been provided, and was in
readiness to embark at Coquimbo, where, on my arrival on the 16th, in
place of 1,000 troops I found only 90!--and these in so ragged a
condition, that a subscription of 400 dollars was raised by the
inhabitants, and given to Major Miller to buy clothing for them.
I was so much annoyed at this, as to be on the point of returning to
Valparaiso to throw up my commission; but, reflecting that the squadron
was in possession of rockets, and that the Government might even yet
forward a military force, I made up my mind to proceed, and on the 29th
the squadron again came to an anchor in Callao roads.
The two following days were occupied in making rocket rafts, and in
getting ready life-preservers for the men, in case of their falling from
the rafts. On the 1st of October the _Galvarino, Puyrredon_, and
_Araucano_, stood into the bay to reconnoitre, and sustained a heavy
fire from the shore, upon which I ordered the _Independencia_ to their
aid; but that vessel was brought to an anchor when at the distance of
several miles from them. On the same day Lieutenant-Colonel Charles, a
most able and gallant officer, reconnoitred in a boat, and made trial
of some rockets, upon which he reported unfavourably.
In this affair the mast of the _Araucano_ was struck by a round shot,
and severely damaged--the circumstance being merely mentioned to shew
the state in which the squadron was equipped; the only means of
repairing the damage being by fishing the mast with an anchor-stock
taken from the _Lautaro_, whilst an axe had to be borrowed for the
purpose from the flag-ship!
On the 2nd, the _Araucano_ again went in, accompanied by a squadron of
boats under the command of Captain Guise, and fired several rockets, but
with no perceptible effect--the Spaniards having unrigged their ships;
the brig sustained considerable damage from the firing of the forts and
shipping.
After dark, an attack by rockets and shells was arranged, the
_Galvarino_ taking in tow a mortar raft, under the command of Major
Miller, and placing it, under a heavy fire, within half a mile of the
enemy's batteries. The _Puyrredon_ followed with another raft, carrying
the shells and magazine; the _Araucano_ took charge of a rocket-raft,
under Captain Hind, whilst the _Independencia_ towed in a second
rocket-raft, under Lieut-Colonel Charles, the rest of the squadron
remaining at anchor.
Great expectations were formed, as well by myself as the whole squadron,
as to the effect to be produced by these destructive missiles, but they
were doomed to disappointment, the rockets turning out utterly useless.
Some, in consequence of the badness of the solder used, bursting from
the expansive force of the charge before they left the raft, and setting
fire to others--Captain Hind's raft being blown up from this cause, thus
rendering it useless, besides severely burning him and thirteen men:
others took a wrong direction in consequence of the sticks not having
been formed of proper wood, whilst the greater portion would not ignite
at all from a cause which was only discovered when too late. It has been
stated in the last chapter that the filling of the tubes was, from
motives of parsimony, entrusted to Spanish prisoners, who, as was found
on examination, had embraced every opportunity of inserting handfulls of
sand, sawdust, and even manure, at intervals in the tubes, thus impeding
the progress of combustion, whilst in the majority of instances they had
so thoroughly mixed the neutralizing matter with the ingredients
supplied, that the charge would not ignite at all, the result being
complete failure in the object of the expedition. It was impossible to
blame the Spanish prisoners in the Chilian arsenal for their loyalty,
but to me their ingenuity was a bitter ground for disappointment, as
with useless rockets we were no better off than in the first expedition;
nor indeed so well off, for in the interval the Spaniards had so
strengthened their booms at the anchorage, as to render it impossible
for the ships to get at them--whilst, by constant practice, their fire
had acquired a precision which our crews could not equal.
The only damage effected was by Major Miller's mortar, the shells
sinking a gun-boat, and doing some execution in the forts and amongst
the shipping. As daylight appeared, I ordered the whole of the rafts to
be towed off, there being no further use in their remaining exposed to
the heavy fire of the batteries. As it was, our loss was trifling, only
about twenty being killed and wounded; but amongst these I had to regret
the death of a promising young officer, Lieut. Bealey, who was cut in
two by a round shot.
The failure of the rockets was very unfairly attributed by the Chilian
Government to Mr. Goldsack, whereas the fault lay in itself for having
neither supplied him with proper workmen nor materials. From the
scarcity and high, price of spelter, he had also been compelled to make
use of an inferior solder for the tubes, and thus the saving of a few
hundred dollars frustrated the success of a great object. The
consequence to poor Goldsack was utter ruin, though of his capability
there could be no question, he having for many years been one of the
principal assistants of Sir W. Congreve at Woolwich.
By the 5th, one of the explosion vessels was completed, and I resolved
to try her effect on the booms and shipping, for which purpose she was
placed in charge of Lieut. Morgell, who carried her in gallant style
towards the enemy's shipping, but the wind falling calm, she became a
target for their really excellent practice, and was in a short time
riddled through and through. As the Spaniards began to fire red-hot
shot, Lieut. Morgell was compelled to abandon her, first setting fire
to the train, then turning her adrift, thus causing her to explode,
though at a distance which did no damage to the enemy.
Whilst this was going on, a strange sail was reported off the bay, and
the _Araucano_ went in chase, Captain Crosbie returning the next morning
with the intelligence that she was a frigate. Upon this, the squadron
got under weigh, in pursuit, when she made all sail, and as I did not
deem it expedient to quit the bay of Callao, the chase was given up, and
we returned in the evening to our former anchorage. It was afterwards
learned that she was the _Prueba_, of 50 guns, just arrived from Cadiz;
whence she had convoyed another ship, with a cargo valued at half a
million of dollars; this ship contriving to slip into Callao during the
short absence of the squadron in pursuit of the frigate, so that we lost
both prizes.
It was useless to remain any longer at Callao, as my instructions
peremptorily commanded me not to approach with the ships within range of
the enemy's batteries, nor to make any attempt on their squadron, except
with the rockets and fire-ships. I was moreover ordered to return within
a given time to Valparaiso, these restrictions being insisted on by the
Minister of Marine, ostensibly from what he considered my temerity in
having attacked the forts and shipping at Callao on the first
expedition--but really, from his own narrow-minded jealousy, that I, a
foreigner, should effect anything which might give me undue prominence
in the estimation of the Chilian people.
I had, however, other reasons for quitting Callao. The newly-arrived
Spanish frigate _Prueba_, was at large, and as I had reason to believe,
was sheltering at Guayaquil, from which port I made up my mind to
dislodge her. The Government had not sent any of the promised supplies
for the squadron, which was running short of provisions, so that it was
necessary to resort to my former practice of compelling the Spaniards to
furnish them; whilst as no troops had been supplied, it was clear that
there had never been an intention of sending any; the assurance of the
Minister of Marine that they were waiting for me at Coquimbo being only
a _ruse_ on his part to get me to sea without a military force.
We now received intelligence that the _Prueba_ had been accompanied from
Spain by two line of battle ships, and that these were daily expected at
Arica, whither I proceeded in quest of them, but was disappointed in not
finding them. It was subsequently learned, that although they had sailed
from Cadiz, in company with the _Prueba_, they never reached the
Pacific, one of them, the _Europe_, being pronounced unseaworthy on
crossing the line; and the other, the _Elmo_, foundering on the passage
round Cape Horn!
On the 5th of November, three hundred and fifty troops--now brought by
the experience and zeal of Lieut.-Col. Charles into a tolerably
soldier-like condition--were distributed on board the _Lautaro,
Galvarino_, and the remaining fire-ship, and were despatched to Pisco,
under the command of Captain Guise, for supplies to be taken from the
Spaniards, the troops being under the orders of Lieut.-Col. Charles, and
the marines under the direction of Major Miller.
As it was not improbable that the expected Spanish ships would make for
Callao, whilst it was more than probable that the _Prueha_ would again
attempt to run in, I therefore proceeded towards that port, and on the
8th anchored at San Lorenzo, the United States frigate _Macedonia_ being
also at anchor there. The presence of the latter put the Spaniards on
their mettle, for shortly after our arrival, they made a show of sending
twenty-seven gun-boats to attack us, not however, venturing to get their
frigates under weigh. Preparations being made on our part to cut off the
gun-boats, they quickly retreated, to the no small amusement of the
North Americans, for whose edification the spectacle had been exhibited.
I was not mistaken in the expectation that the _Prueba_ might again
attempt to take shelter under the forts of Callao. On her appearance, we
immediately gave chase, but she once more escaped in the night. On my
return, I fell in with, and captured her boat, which had been sent
ashore with despatches to the Viceroy, and from the information gained
from the crew, I now felt certain that she would take refuge in
Guayaquil, whither I determined to follow her.
Before doing so in the narrative, the success of the expedition
despatched to Pisco must be mentioned. It was the intention of the
officers commanding to land in the night, and thus take the garrison by
surprise; but this plan was frustrated by the wind dying away, so that
the landing could not be effected till broad daylight, when the
garrison, supported by field artillery and cavalry, were prepared to
receive them. Nothing daunted, the patriot troops landed without firing
a shot, through the fire of the guns, whilst the Spanish infantry from
house tops, and the church tower, thinned their ranks at every step. At
length it came to the bayonet, for which the Spaniards did not wait, but
rushed into the square of the town, after having mortally wounded the
brave Col. Charles. Major Miller instantly followed, when their last
volley in the square, before flying in all directions, brought down him
also, with three bullets in his body, so that his life was despaired of.
The ships remained for four days, during which they obtained all they
wanted; but 200,000 gallons of spirits, placed on the beach for
shipment, was destroyed by order of Captain Guise, in consequence of his
not being able to control the men, who, from the facility of obtaining
liquor, were becoming unmanageable.
On the 16th, the _Galvarino_ and _Lautaro_ rejoined me at Santa, which
place had previously been taken possession of by the marines left on
board the flag-ship. On the 21st, I despatched the _San Martin,
Independencia,_ and _Araucano_ to Valparaiso, together with a transport
filled with sick--an epidemic of a destructive nature having broken out
on board the squadron. This disease, which carried off many men, had
been introduced on board by the Minister of Marine's army of ninety men,
shipped at Coquimbo.
I now proceeded in search of the _Prueba_, with the flag-ship,
_Lautaro, Galvarino_, and _Puyrredon_. On the 27th, we entered the river
Guayaquil, and leaving the _Lautaro_ and the brigs outside, the
flag-ship crowded all sail during the night--though without a
pilot--arriving next morning at the island of Puna, under which two
large vessels were anchored, and instantly attacked, when, after a brisk
fire of twenty minutes, they struck, proving to be the _Aguila_, of 20
guns, and _Vigonia_, of 16 guns, both laden with timber, destined for
Lima. The village of Puna was also taken possession of. On rejoining the
other vessels with the prizes, they were found ready to sail, imagining
from the firing that I had fallen in with the _Prueba_, and might
possibly get the worst of the contest.
The _Prueba_ was at Guayaquil as had been anticipated, but having been
lightened of her guns and stores she had been towed up the river, where,
from the shallowness of the water, it was impossible to get at her;
whilst, as she lay under the protection of the batteries, I did not deem
it practicable to cut her out with the boats.
A circumstance here occurred which would not be worth mentioning, did it
not bear upon future matters. Captains Guise and Spry--imagining that I
should now return to Valparaiso, and that the comparative failure of the
expedition would be attributed to me, instead of to the worthless
rockets, and to my instructions not to attempt anything beyond their
use--endeavoured to get up a mutiny, by circulating a report that I did
not intend to permit the ships left outside to share in the prizes, and
had indeed left them behind for this purpose; having also permitted my
officers to plunder the prizes _ad libitum_, before leaving the
river--further declaring, that I intended to claim a double share, from
having acted in the capacity of admiral and captain.
As there was not the slightest doubt of their having sedulously
circulated these reports, with the object of entering the port of
Valparaiso with the squadron in a discontented condition, I determined
to take serious notice of their conduct. On the necessary steps being
taken, they both pledged their honour that they had not made or even
heard of such a report!
But I had no intention to return to Valparaiso, and still less to make
officers so inimical to me acquainted with my future plans.
On the 13th of December, Major Miller was so far recovered as to be
removed on board the flag-ship, after which I despatched the _Lautaro_
to Valparaiso with the two prizes, first transferring to her armament
the beautiful brass guns taken in the _Vigonia_; leaving the _Galvarino_
and _Puyrredon_ to watch the movements of the Spanish frigate.
As the reader may suppose, I was greatly annoyed at having been foiled
at Callao, from causes altogether beyond my control, for the bad
rockets, and worse faith of the Minister of Marine in not supplying me
with the promised troops, were no faults of mine. My instructions, as
has been said, were carefully drawn up to prevent my doing anything
rash--as the first trip to Callao had been represented by certain
officers under my command, who had no great relish for fighting. At the
same time the Chilian people expected impossibilities; and I had, for
some time, been revolving in my mind a plan to achieve one which should
gratify them, and allay my own wounded feelings. I had now only one
ship, so that there were no other inclinations to consult; and felt
quite sure of Major Miller's concurrence where there was any fighting to
be done, though a ball in the arm, another through the chest, passing
out at his back, and a left hand shattered for life, were not very
promising fighting incentives as far as physical force was concerned,
yet the moral courage of my gallant guest was untouched, and his
capacity to carry out my plans was greater than before, as being more
matured by sharp experience.
My design was, with the flag-ship alone, to capture by a _coup de main_
the numerous forts and garrison of Valdivia, a fortress previously
deemed impregnable, and thus to counteract the disappointment which
would ensue in Chili from our want of success before Callao. The
enterprise was a desperate one; nevertheless, I was not about to do
anything desperate, having resolved that, unless fully satisfied as to
its practicability, I would not attempt it. Rashness, though often
imputed to me, forms no part of my composition. There is a rashness
without calculation of consequences; but with that calculation,
well-founded, it is no longer rashness. And thus, now that I was
unfettered by people who did not second my operations as they ought to
have done, I made up my mind to take Valdivia, if the attempt came
within the scope of my calculations.
The first step clearly was to reconnoitre the place, where the flag-ship
arrived on the 18th of January, 1820, under Spanish colours, and made a
signal for a pilot, who--as the Spaniards mistook the _O'Higgins_ for
the long-expected _Prueba_--promptly came off, together with a
complimentary retinue of an officer and four soldiers, all of whom were
made prisoners as soon as they came on board. The pilot was ordered to
take us into the channels leading to the forts, whilst the officer and
his men, knowing there was little chance of finding their way on shore
again, thought it most conducive to their interests to supply all the
information demanded, the result being increased confidence on my part
as to the possibility of a successful attack. Amongst other information
obtained was the expected arrival of the Spanish brig of war _Potrillo_,
with money on board for the payment of the garrison.
As we were busily employing ourselves in inspecting the channels, the
officer commanding the garrison began to suspect that our object might
not altogether be pacific, this suspicion being confirmed by the
detention of his officer. Suddenly a heavy fire was opened upon us from
the various forts, to which we did not reply, but, our reconnoissance
being now completed, withdrew beyond its reach. Having occupied two days
in reconnoitring--on the third the _Potrillo_ hove in sight; and being
also deceived by our Spanish colours was captured without a
shot--20,000 dollars and some important despatches being found on board.
As nothing could be done without troops, with which the Chilian
ministers had been careful not to supply me, I determined to sail to
Conception, where Governor Freire had a considerable force to keep in
check the savage tribes of Indians whom the Spaniards employed, under
the monster Benavides and his brother, to murder the defenceless
patriots. On the 22nd of January we anchored in Talcahuano bay, where we
found the Buenos Ayrean brig _Intrepido_ and the Chilian schooner
_Montezuma_.
Governor Freire received us with great hospitality; and after
explanation of my plans, placed two hundred and fifty men at my
disposal, under the command of a gallant Frenchman, Major Beauchef;
notwithstanding that Freire was on the eve of attacking Benavides, and
by thus weakening his division might incur the displeasure of the
Government. No time was lost in embarking the men in the three vessels,
the _Montezuma_ being taken into the service, and the Buenos Ayrean brig
volunteering to accompany us.
It was highly praiseworthy on the part of General Freire to place these
troops under my orders, inasmuch as they were destined for a service in
the praise of which, even if successful, he could not participate;
whilst, if unsuccessful, he would certainly have incurred great blame.
He knew, moreover, that the Ministry had refrained from supplying me
with regular troops; yet he not only generously contributed them, but
pledged himself not to communicate my plans to the Government; our
destination being even kept secret from the officers, who were told not
to encumber themselves with baggage, as we were only going to Tucapel,
in order to harass the enemy at Arauco, thus making it appear that we
were about to aid General Freire against Benavides, instead of his
aiding us to capture Valdivia.
But our difficulties, though we had obtained the troops, were not at an
end. The flag-ship had only two naval officers on board, one of these
being under arrest for disobedience of orders, whilst the other was
incapable of performing the duty of lieutenant; so that I had to act as
admiral, captain, and lieutenant, taking my turn in the watch--or rather
being constantly on the watch--as the only available officer was so
incompetent.
We sailed from Talcahuano on the 25th of January, when I communicated my
intentions to the military officers, who displayed great eagerness in
the cause--alone questioning their success from motives of prudence. On
explaining to them that if unexpected projects are energetically put in
execution they almost invariably succeed, in spite of odds, they
willingly entered into my plans; and Major Miller's health being now
sufficiently re-established, his value as a commander was as great as
ever.
On the night of the 29th, we were off the island of Quiriquina, in a
dead calm. From excessive fatigue in the execution of subordinate
duties, I had laid down to rest, leaving the ship in charge of the
lieutenant, who took advantage of my absence to retire also,
surrendering the watch to the care of a midshipman, who fell asleep.
Knowing our dangerous position, I had left strict orders to be called
the moment a breeze sprang up, but these orders were neglected, and a
sudden wind taking the ship unawares, the midshipman, in attempting to
bring her round, ran her upon the sharp edge of a rock, where she lay
beating, suspended, as it were, upon her keel, and had the swell
increased, she must inevitably have gone to pieces.
We were forty miles from the mainland, the brig and schooner being both
out of sight. The first impulse both of officers and crew was to abandon
the ship, but as we had six hundred men on board, whilst not more than a
hundred and fifty could have entered the boats, this would have been but
a scramble for life. Pointing out to the men that those who escaped
could only reach the coast of Arauco, where they would meet nothing but
torture and inevitable death at the hands of the Indians, I with some
difficulty got them to adopt the alternative of attempting to save the
ship.
The first sounding gave five feet water in the hold, and the pumps were
entirely out of order. Our carpenter, who was only one by name, was
incompetent to repair them; but having myself some skill in carpentry I
took off my coat, and by midnight got them into working order, the water
meanwhile gaining on us, though the whole crew were engaged in bailing
it out with buckets.
To our great delight the leak did not increase, upon which I got out
the stream anchor, and commenced heaving off the ship, the officers
clamouring first to ascertain the extent of the leak. This I expressly
forbade, as calculated to damp the energy of the men, whilst as we now
gained on the leak, there was no doubt the ship would swim as far as
Valdivia, which was the chief point to be regarded, the capture of the
fortress being my object, after which the ship might be repaired at
leisure. As there was no lack of physical force on board, she was at
length floated; but the powder magazine having been under water, the
ammunition of every kind--except a little upon deck and in the cartouch
boxes of the troops--was rendered unserviceable; though about this I
cared little, as it involved the necessity of using the bayonet in our
anticipated attack, and to facing this weapon the Spaniards had, in
every case, evinced a rooted aversion.
Before making the land to the southward of Punta Galera, the troops in
the _O'Higgins_ as well as the marines, were, in a high sea, removed
into the _Intrepido_ and _Montezuma_, to which I shifted my flag,
ordering the _O'Higgins_ to stand off and on out of sight of land, to
avoid creating suspicion. We then made for the harbour, intending to
land the same evening and take the Spaniards by surprise, but, as it
fell calm, this plan was frustrated.
The fortifications of Valdivia are placed on both sides of a channel
three quarters of a mile in width, and command the entrance, anchorage,
and river leading to the town, crossing their fire in all directions so
effectually, that with proper caution on the part of the garrison no
ship could enter without suffering severely, while she would be equally
exposed at anchor. The principal forts on the western shore are placed
in the following order:--El Ingles, San Carlos, Amargos, Chorocomayo
Alto, and Corral Castle. Those on the eastern side are Niebla, directly
opposite Amargos, and Piojo; whilst on the island of Manzanera is a
strong fort mounted with guns of large calibre, commanding the whole
range of the entrance channel. These forts, with a few others, amounted
in the whole to fifteen, and in the hands of a skilful garrison would
render the place almost impregnable, the shores on which they stand
being almost inaccesible by reason of the surf, with the exception of a
small landing place at the Aguada del Ingles.
It was to this landing-place that we first directed our attention,
anchoring the brig and schooner off the guns of Fort Ingles, on the
afternoon of Feb. 3rd, amidst a swell which rendered immediate
disembarkation impracticable. The troops were carefully kept below; and
to avert the suspicion of the Spaniards, we had trumped up a story of
our having just arrived from Cadiz, and being in want of a pilot: upon
which they told us to send a boat for one. To this we replied, that our
boats had been washed away in the passage round Cape Horn. Not being
quite satisfied, they began to assemble troops at the landing-place,
firing alarm guns, and rapidly bringing up the garrisons of the western
forts to Fort Ingles, but not molesting us.
Unfortunately for the credit of the story about the loss of the boats,
which were at the time carefully concealed under the lee of the vessels,
one drifted astern, so that our object became apparent, and the guns of
Fort Ingles, under which we lay, forthwith opened upon us, the first
shots passing through the sides of the _Intrepido_, and killing two men,
so that it became necessary to land in spite of the swell. We had only
two launches and a gig, into which I entered to direct the operation,
Major Miller, with forty-four marines, pushing off in the first launch,
under the fire of the party at the landing place, by which the coxswain
being wounded, the Major had to take the helm, and whilst doing this,
received a ball through his hat, grazing the crown of his head. Ordering
a few only of his party to fire, the whole leaped ashore at the landing
place, driving the Spaniards, before them at the point of the bayonet.
The second launch now pushed off from the Intrepido, and, in this way,
in less than an hour, three hundred men had made good their footing on
shore.
The most difficult task--the capture of the forts--was to come; the only
way in which the first, Fort Ingles, could be approached being by a
precipitous path, along which the men could only pass in single file;
the fort itself being inaccessible except by a ladder, which the enemy,
after being routed by Major Miller, had drawn up.
As soon as it was dark, a picked party, under the guidance of one of
the Spanish prisoners, silently advanced to the attack, expecting to
fall in with a body of the enemy outside the fort, but all having
re-entered, our men were unopposed.
This party having taken up its position, the main body moved forward,
cheering and firing in the air, to intimate to the Spaniards that their
chief reliance was on the bayonet. The enemy, meanwhile, kept up an
incessant fire of artillery and musketry in the direction of the shouts,
but without effect, as no aim could be taken in the dark. Whilst the
patriots were thus noisily advancing, a gallant young officer, Ensign
Vidal--who had previously distinguished himself at Santa--got under the
inland flank of the fort, and with a few men, contrived unperceived to
tear up some pallisades, by which a bridge was made across the ditch,
whereby he and his small party entered, and formed noiselessly under
cover of some branches of trees which overhung it, the garrison
directing their whole attention to the shouting patriots in an opposite
direction.
A volley from Vidal's party convinced the Spaniards that they had been
taken in flank. Without waiting to ascertain the number of those who had
outflanked them, they instantly took to flight, filling with a like
panic a column of three hundred men, drawn up behind the fort. The
Chilians, who were now well up, bayoneted them by dozens, in their
efforts to gain the other forts, which were opened to receive them; the
patriots thus entering at the same time, and driving them from fort to
fort into the Castle of Corral, together with two hundred more, who had
abandoned some guns advantageously placed on a height at Fort
Chorocomayo. The Corral was stormed with equal rapidity, a number of the
enemy escaping in boats to Valdivia, others plunging into the forest;
whilst upwards of a hundred, besides officers, fell into our hands, the
like number being found bayoneted on the following morning. Our loss was
seven men killed, and nineteen wounded.
The Spaniards had, no doubt, regarded their position as impregnable,
which, considering its difficulty of access and almost natural
impenetrability, it ought to have been, if properly defended. They had
only found out their error when too late, thus justifying my former
remark to the military officers, that an attack where least expected is
almost invariably crowned with success. Much less had the Spaniards
calculated on a night attack, the most favourable of all to the
attacking party, as necessitating unity of action--and the least
favourable of all to the party attacked, as inspiring doubt and panic,
almost certain to end in irresolution and defeat. The garrison consisted
of the Cantabria regiment of the line, numbering about eight hundred,
with whom was associated a militia of upwards of a thousand.
On the 5th, the _Intrepido_ and _Montezuma_, which had been left at the
Aguada Inglesa, entered the harbour, being fired at in their passage by
Fort Niebla on the eastern shore. On their coming to an anchor at the
Corral, two hundred men were again embarked to attack Forts Niebla,
Carbonero, and Piojo. The _O'Higgins_ now appearing in sight off the
mouth of the harbour, the Spaniards abandoned the forts on the eastern
side, no doubt judging that as the western forts had been captured
without the aid of the frigate, they had--now that she had arrived--no
chance of successfully defending them; the patriot troops were therefore
disembarked at Fort Niebla till the tide served to take them to the town
of Valdivia.
In crossing the harbour, the _Intrepido_, from want of precaution in
taking soundings, grounded on a bank in the channel, where, bilged by
the surf, she finally became a wreck. Nor was the _O'Higgins_ in a much
better condition, as, from the injury sustained at Quiriquina, it became
necessary to put her ashore on a mud bank, as the sole means of saving
her from going down in deep water, so that the only vessel left was the
little schooner _Montezuma_.
On the 6th, the troops were again embarked to pursue the flying garrison
up the river, when we received a flag of truce informing us that the
enemy had abandoned the town, after plundering the private houses and
magazines; and, together with the Governor, Colonel Montoya, had fled in
the direction of Chiloe. From the disorders which were committed by the
Spaniards, previous to their retreat, the town was in great
consternation, many of the inhabitants having also fled; a proclamation
issued by me, to the effect that no one should be molested in person or
property, had, however, the effect of inducing them to return; and an
additional order immediately to choose for themselves a Governor, at
once restored peace and tranquillity--the disposition of the people
being for the most part good, whilst any leaning which might have
existed in favour of Spanish rule was dissipated by the excesses which,
previous to their flight, the royalist troops had committed.
The fortifications were so numerous, that at first it was my intention
to destroy them and embark the artillery, as the Spaniards who had
escaped to Chiloe--where another Spanish regiment was stationed--might
return after my departure and recover them, the force which could be
spared to garrison them being insignificant when distributed amongst
fifteen forts. On further reflection, I could not make up my mind to
destroy fortresses, the erection of which had cost upwards of a million
of dollars, and which Chili would find it difficult to replace; and
therefore determined on leaving them intact, with their artillery and
ammunition, intending, before my return to Valparaiso, to render the
rout of the Spaniards who had escaped, yet more complete.
The booty which fell into our hands, exclusive of the value of the forts
and public buildings, was considerable, Valdivia being the chief
military depot in the southern part of the continent. Amongst the
military stores, were upwards of 1,000 cwt. of gunpowder, 10,000 cannon
shot, of which 2,500 were brass, 170,000 musket cartridges, a large
quantity of small arms, 128 guns, of which 53 were brass, and the
remainder iron; the ship _Dolores_, afterwards sold at Valparaiso for
20,000 dollars, with public stores, also sold for the like value; and
plate, of which General Sanchez had previously stripped the churches of
Conception, valued at 16,000 dollars.
From correspondence found in the archives of Valdivia, it was clear that
Quintanilla, the Governor of Chiloe, had serious apprehensions of a
revolt at San Carlos, so that, in place of returning to Valparaiso, I
resolved to see what could be effected there. The loss of the
_Intrepido_ was a serious drawback to our means of transporting troops,
and the flag-ship would no longer float; as, however, we had possession
of the _Dolores_, it was resolved to crowd into her and the _Montezuma_
all the troops that could be spared, leaving Major Beauchef the whole of
those brought from Conception.
Meanwhile, I despatched a _piragua_ to Valparaiso with the intelligence
of our success; the unexpected news, as was afterwards learned, creating
such an amount of popular enthusiasm as had never before been witnessed
in Chili. The most amusing part of the affair was, that by the time my
despatches announcing our victory reached Vaparaiso, the other ships of
the squadron had also arrived, when Captain Guise and his officers had
attributed our rocket failure at Callao to my want of skill in their
use; the inference desired, being my want of capability to command a
squadron. Not a word of blame was then attributed to poor Goldsack, who
had superintended their manufacture, as indeed none was deserved, though
the blame afterwards attributed to him ended as before stated in his
ruin.
To this alleged want of professional skill on my part, Zenteno had
drawn up an elaborate accusation against me of disobedience to orders,
in not having returned, according to my instructions; the whole _clique_
felicitating themselves on my dismissal with disgrace. Even the people
did not know what judgment to form, as all materials for forming an
opinion were kept from them, whilst every pretence tending to my
discredit was carefully made known. On news of the victory, all this was
immediately hushed up--the ministers, to retrieve their own credit,
joined in the popular enthusiasm, which it would have been unavailing to
thwart--and poor Goldsack was overwhelmed with reproach for the failure
of his rockets, though the whole blame rested with the Government in
having employed Spanish prisoners as his workmen.