CHAPTER I.

E-text prepared by Ted Garvin, Graeme Mackreth, and the Project Gutenberg

Online Distributed Proofreading Team

NARRATIVE OF SERVICES IN THE LIBERATION OF CHILI, PERU, AND BRAZIL,

FROM SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE DOMINATION

by

THOMAS, EARL OF DUNDONALD, G.C.B.

Admiral of the Red; Rear-Admiral of the Fleet, etc. etc.

VOL. I

London:

James Ridgway, No 169, Piccadilly

MDCCCLIX

TO THE MOST NOBLE THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE, K.G. ETC. ETC.

My Lord,

I am proud to have been honoured with your Lordship's permission to

dedicate to you the following narrative of historical events, respecting

which the public has not previously been placed in a position to form a

correct judgment. Your Lordship's generous acquiescence enables me to

discharge a double debt: First--of thanks to one whose high political

character this country will ever warmly cherish;--Secondly--of deep-felt

gratitude for the countenance and efficient aid experienced from your

Lordship at a period when party faction made me the object of bitter

resentment; the injustice of which could in no way be better

demonstrated, than by the fact that--in the midst of unmerited obloquy,

it was my high privilege to preserve your Lordship's friendship and

esteem.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's obliged and faithful Servant,

DUNDONALD.

CONTENTS.

PREFACE

CHAPTER I.

Invitation to take command of Chilian Navy--Arrival at Valparaiso--First

expedition to Peru--Attack on Spanish shipping at Callao--Departure for

Huacho--Capture of Spanish convoys of money--Paita taken--Return to

Valparaiso to reorganise the squadron--Offer to give up my share of

prize money to the Republic--This offer declined by the Supreme

Director--Popular congratulations--Attempt on Lady Cochrane's life.

CHAPTER II.

Second expedition to Peru--Disappointment at not being provided with

troops--Failure of rockets--Departure for Arica--Capture of

Pisco--Capture of Spanish ships at Puna--Determine to make an attempt on

Valdivia--Arrival off that port, and capture of Spanish brig of war

_Potrillo_--Troops obtained from Conception--Flag-ship nearly

wrecked--Attack on forts, and conquest of Valdivia.

CHAPTER III.

Departure for Chiloe--Preparations of the enemy--Capture of Fort

Corona--Failure at Fort Aguy, and subsequent retreat--Return to

Valdivia--Capture of Osorio--Return to Valparaiso--Enthusiastic

reception--Chagrin of the ministry--Importance of conquest of Valdivia

in a political point of view--Promotion of officers under

arrest--Employment of Indians by the Spaniards--Career of

Benavides--Mutinous spirit of the seamen in consequence of their

captures being appropriated by Government--Resignation of my

commission--Refusal thereof--Renewed offer of an estate--This again

declined--Seamen obtain their wages--Private purchase of an

estate--Government gives notice of taking it--Appointment of flag

captain against my wishes--Annoyance given to me by Minister of

Marine--Renewed resignation of the command--Officers of the squadron

resign in a body--Government begs of me to retain the command--My

consent--General San Martin--The Senate--Zenteno--Corruption of parties

in the Administration.

CHAPTER IV.

Obstacles to equipping the squadron--Sailing of the liberating

expedition--Debarcation at Pisco--Long inaction of the army--General San

Martin removes to Ancon--Capture of the Esmeralda--Exchange of

prisoners--Acknowledgment of the service by General San Martin--Lady

Cochrane's visit to Mendoza.

CHAPTER V.

San Martin's violation, of truth--Removal of blockade--Spanish

depression--Troops dying of fever--San Martin's designs on

Guayaquil--Mutinous conduct of officers--Refusal to obey

orders--Deposition of Viceroy--San Martin gives me troops--Jealousy of

San Martin--Attack on Arica--Capture of Tacna--Capture of

Moquega--Refusal of more men--an armistice ratified--Distress of

Lima--Dissatisfaction of the army--Lady Cochrane in action--Devotion of

seamen.

CHAPTER VI.

Return to Callao--Lima abandoned--Hesitation of General San Martin to

occupy the City--Loss of the _San Martin_--Excesses of the

Spaniards--Proclamation of independence--San Martin assumes autocratic

power under the title of Protector--My remonstrance--His reply--Mutinous

state of the squadron from neglect.

CHAPTER VII.

Tampering with Chilian officers--The Archbishop of Lima--His

expulsion--Negociation for surrender of the Forts--This

counteracted--San Martin's bombastic Proclamations--His refusal to

encounter the enemy--The Spaniards relieve Callao--Delusive

proclamation--The unblushing falsehood--Spaniards carry off the

treasure--Discontent of the squadron.

CHAPTER VIII.

Prolonged destitution of squadron--The men mutiny in a body--The

seamen's letters--San Martin sends away the public treasure--My seizure

of it--Private property restored--San Martin's accusations against

me--The squadron paid wages--Attempt on the officers' fidelity--I am

asked to desert from Chili--Ordered to quit on refusal--Monteagudo's

letter--My reply--Justification of seizing the treasure--- No other

course possible.

CHAPTER IX.

Arrival at Guayaquil--Address to Guayaquilenos--Injurious

monopolies--Ministerial folly--Departure from Guayaquil--Arrival in

Mexico--Anchor at Acapulco--Mock Ambassadors--Plot against me--Return to

Guayaquil--Venganza taken possession of--Agreement with Junta--General

La Mar--Orders to withhold supplies--Abominable cruelty--Courtly

splendour--Destruction of a division of the Army--Dissatisfaction of

officers--Renewed overtures from San Martin--Their refusal by

me--Warning to the Chilian Government.

CHAPTER X.

Return to Valparaiso--Thanks of the Government--Reasons for

satisfaction--Illegitimate trade--Turned to good account--Denunciation

of Officers deserted--Investigation of accounts--San Martin's charges

against me--My refutation--Government refuses its publication--Cruelty

to Spanish prisoners--Retirement to Quintero--Political fruits of our

success--Destitute condition of squadron--Infamous attempt to promote

dissatisfaction therein--Object of this course--Steps taken to defeat

it--Disavowed by the Minister--Sympathy of officers--Attempt to get rid

of Gen. Freire--Its eventual result--Letter of the Captains.

CHAPTER XI.

Negociations with Bolivar--Exile of Monteagudo--Complaints of the

Limeños--Extravagance of the Government--Exculpation of San

Martin--Effects of popular dissension--Disagreement of Bolivar and San

Martin--Vote of Peruvian Congress--Extraordinary neglect of the Chilian

Squadron--San Martin's arrival at Valparaiso--I demand his

trial--Countenance of the Supreme Director--Squadron at length paid

wages--Revolt of Conception--General Freire apprises me of it--Freire

asks for my support--His letter not replied to--San Martin's influence.

CHAPTER XII.

The squadron taken from me--I accept invitation from Brazil--Letter to

the Supreme Director--San Martin quits Chili--His prudence--Opinion of

his Aide-de Camp--Ministerial neglect--Permission to quit Chili--Letter

to General Freire--For the first time made public--Letter to the

Captains and Officers--To the Chilian people--To the foreign

merchants--To the President of Peru--San Martin actuated by

revenge--This shewn from his letters.

CHAPTER XIII.

Freire marches on Valparaiso--Elected Supreme Director--He begs of me to

return--My reply--Subsequent letter to General Freire.

CHAPTER XIV.

Injustice to the squadron--Inconsistency of this--Estate taken from

me--My losses by litigation--Endeavours to enforce my claims--Petty

excuses for evading them--I am charged with expenses of the Army--And

with costs for making legal captures--My conduct approved at the time---

Ministerial approbation--Paltry compensation at length given--Ministerial

corruption--Proved by San Martin--Cause of official animosity to

me--Conclusion.

APPENDIX.

PREFACE.

The first of these volumes forms a history of the consolidation of

Chilian independence, and of the subsequent liberation of Peru--through

the instrumentality of the Chilian squadron under my command; a service

which called forth from the Governments and people of the liberated

states the warmest expressions of gratitude to the naval service

collectively, and to myself personally, as having planned and conducted

the operations whereby these results were attained.

It records also the strangely inconsistent fact that--beyond these marks

of national approbation--neither Chili nor Peru ever awarded to the

squadron or myself any more substantial reward--though, in a pecuniary

sense, deeply indebted to us; for, during the greater portion of the war

of independence, the subsistence of the crews, and the repairs and

equipment of the Chilian squadron were solely provided for by our own

exertions, without cost to the Government; since, in addition to the

capture of Spanish ships-of-war and merchant vessels--money, provisions,

and stores to a great extent fell into our hands; all of which--though

our own stipulated right--were voluntarily devoted to state exigencies,

in the full conviction that, at the expiration of the war, the value of

our sacrifices would, as a point of national honour, be returned to us

by Chili. As regards Peru, our still unpaid for captures of ships-of-war

formed her first naval force, for which the only requital has been, a

vote of her first National Assembly--almost its inaugural act--ascribing

to me the double praise of her liberation from the Spanish yoke, and of

her subsequent deliverance from an intolerable military tyranny.

The volume contains another point, which forms a yet stranger sequel to

my services on the Western shores of South America. After the expiration

of thirty years, Chili granted me the absurdly inadequate sum of £.6,000

_in full of all my claims!_ And this, with the knowledge that, after my

return to England I was involved in litigation on account of the legal

seizure of vessels under the orders of her former Government--by which

I was subjected to a loss, directly and indirectly, of _more than three

times the amount_. The Chilian portion of this history, therefore,

resolves itself into the fact, that not only did I reap no reward

whatever, for the liberation of Chili and Peru, but that the

independence of both countries was achieved _at a heavy pecuniary

sacrifice to myself!_ in compensation for which, as well as for my

recognised services--Chili has thought its national honour sufficiently

vindicated by allotting me _one-third of my losses only_, without other

compensation of any kind! I regret to add, that my necessities at the

time, arising for the most part from the pecuniary difficulties to which

I had been subjected on Chilian account, compelled me to accept the

amount tendered.

The second volume is of a character somewhat similar. It narrates the

circumstances under which--by promises the most inviting, and

stipulations the most binding--I was induced to accept the command, or

rather organization of the first Brazilian navy. It details the complete

expulsion of all Portuguese armaments, naval and military, from the

Eastern shores of the South American Continent, by the squadron alone,

wholly unaided by military co-operation; in the course of which arduous

service, ships of war, merchant vessels, and valuable property to the

extent of several millions of dollars were captured under the Imperial

order, and their value--in spite of previous stipulations--_refused to

the captors_, on the falsely assumed ground that the provinces liberated

were Brazilian--though a Brazilian military force had been recently

beaten in an attempt to expel the Portuguese--and though these provinces

were, at the period of my assuming the command, in the uninterrupted

occupation of the very Portuguese fleets and armies afterwards expelled,

it was falsely pretended that the property captured was not enemy's

property--though expressly described as such in numerous Imperial

decrees--and more especially by the instructions given to me by His

Imperial Majesty to seize or destroy it wherever found.

It was, in short, subsequently decided by a Court of Admiralty--for the

most part composed of Portuguese members, acting under the influence of

a Portuguese faction in the Administration--that neither myself nor the

squadron were entitled to the prizes made--though most inconsistently,

the same tribunal condemned the ships of war taken--as "_droits_" to the

crown--for which, compensation was awarded to the squadron by His

Imperial Majesty, but never paid by the ministers to whom the order was

directed.

Not to anticipate the contents of the volume devoted to Brazilian

affairs. It being found after the expulsion of the enemy, that the

stipulations made with myself were too binding to be easily set aside,

several futile attempts were made to evade them, but this being found

impossible, the unworthy expedient was resorted to of summarily

dismissing me from the service, after the establishment of peace with

Portugal--an event entirely consequent on my individual services. By

this expedient--of the rectitude or otherwise of which the reader will

be able to judge from the documentary evidence laid before him--I was

got rid of without compensation for my claims, which for thirty years

were altogether repudiated; but, at the expiration of that period, fully

recognised as _having been due from the beginning!_ The Brazilian

Government, however, satisfied its own sense of justice by awarding me

less than _one-half the simple interest of the amount stipulated in my

patents_; thus retaining the whole of the principal admitted to be due.

The preceding remarks form a _synopsis_ of my career on both sides of

the continent of South America; the narrative, where dispute might

arise, being carefully founded on, and in all cases accompanied by

documentary evidence, which admits neither dispute nor contradiction.

The trifling amount awarded by Chili, would probably not have been

granted at all, but for the earnest remonstrance of Lord Palmerston,

warmly seconded by the efforts of the Hon. Mr. Jerningham, British

Minister to the Chilian Republic, by whose joint exertions the

Government was induced to admit--that national honour was involved in

fulfilling national obligations; though an infinitesimal view of either

the one or the other was certainly taken when awarding me the

insignificant sum previously mentioned.

In Brazil the case was somewhat different. It is to His present Imperial

Majesty, Don Pedro II. that I owe any investigation of my claims, by the

appointment of a Commission (_Secçoes_), which reported that they ought

never to have been withheld, as being my stipulated right. But even the

limited amount awarded in consequence of this decision, was on the point

of being further diminished one half by its projected payment in a

depreciated currency--and, had it not been for the intervention of Lord

Clarendon, and of the Hon. Mr. Scarlett, British Minister at Rio de

Janeiro, of whose zealous exertions in my favour I cannot speak too

warmly--this further injustice would have been perpetrated without the

knowledge or sanction of His present Imperial Majesty.

It may be asked, why--with the clear documentary evidence in my

possession--and now adduced--I have for so many years endured an amount

of obloquy and injustice, which might at any time have been set aside by

its publication? The reply is obvious. The withholding of my claims by

the Governments of both sides the South American Continent, and the

ruinous expense to which I was put on account of Chili, entailed upon me

many years of pecuniary difficulty. To have told even the

truth--unbacked as I then was, by the British Government--would have

been to have all my claims set at defiance, so that compulsory

discretion was a sufficient reason for my silence. It was long before I

could induce a British Minister to satisfy himself of the rectitude of

my conduct--the soundness of my claims--or the dishonesty of those who,

believing me to be powerless, laughed at reiterated demands for my

stipulated rights. Yet more I have never sought from those to whom I

gave liberty and dominion.

There is, however, a reason for the present publication, of which I have

never lost sight. Amidst all the injustice which it has been my lot to

sustain, I have ever determined--for the sake of my family--to whom my

character is an heir-loom--that no obloquy shall follow me to the grave,

for none have I merited. On the day these volumes see the light, this

resolution will be partially fulfilled. On that day I shall have

completed the eighty-third year of a career strangely chequered, yet not

undistinguished; and, therefore, the opinions of either Chilians or

Brazilians are now of small moment to me in comparison with a reputation

which has been demmed worthy of belonging to history. None of the

present ruling powers in either Chili or Brazil can possibly be offended

with me for giving a guardedly temperate documentary narrative of what

must hereafter form the basis of their national annals. I do not for a

moment contemplate that men of enlightened views such as now direct the

affairs of both countries have either part or sympathy with

self-interested adventurers who in popular revolutions too often rise to

the surface, and for a time make confusion worse confounded; till

replaced--as a matter of course, no less than by necessity--by men of

greater grasp of mind and more exalted aspirations.

But this is as it maybe--my reputation as a British seaman is to me of

the highest moment, and it shall not be sullied after my death by the

aspersions of those who wilfully revenged the thwarting of their

anti-Imperial designs, by imputations which can alone enter into the

minds of men devoid of generous impulses and therefore incapable of

appreciating higher motives. I have not followed their example, but

where it is necessary to bring forward such persons--they will be viewed

through the medium of their own documents, which are incontestible and

irresistible, and which would as easily convict me of untruth as they

convict my maligners of practices unworthy the honour of a nation.

To my own countrymen these volumes can scarcely be matter of

indifference; though, perhaps, few reflect that the numerous fleets of

British merchantmen which now frequent both shores of South America, are

the consequence of the deliverance of these vast territories from an

exclusive colonial yoke. It is true that England had previously formed a

treaty with Portugal, permitting English vessels to trade to her South

American Colonies, but such was the influence of Portuguese merchants

with the local governments, that it was nearly inoperative; so that,

practically, the Portuguese were in the exclusive possession of that

commerce which my expulsion of the fleet and army of the mother country

unreservedly threw open to British enterprise. The same, even in a

higher degree, may be said with regard to Chili and Peru.

Yet, scarcely had my mission to Chili become known, than the influence

of Spain induced the British Ministry to pass a "Foreign Enlistment

Act," the penal clauses of which were evidently aimed at me, for

having entered into the service of unacknowledged governments without

permission--though I had shortly before been most unjustly driven from

the service of my native country.

In blind animosity towards me, my former English persecutors failed to

perceive the advantage to British commerce, of freeing both sides of

South America from lingering war and internal dissension. An amusing

instance of this occurred on my return to England. Having occasion to

wait upon the then Attorney-General relative to a patent which I had in

hand, he brusquely inquired "_whether I was not afraid to appear before

him?_" On my replying that "I was not aware of having reason to fear

appearing in the presence of any man," he told me the question had been

officially put to him, whether I could be punished under the "Foreign

Enlistment Act," for the part I had taken in the liberation of Chili,

Peru, and Brazil? To this I replied, that "if Government was indiscreet

enough further to persecute me for having thrown open to British

commerce the largest field for enterprise of modern times, they could

take what steps they chose, for that I, having accepted service in South

America before the passing of the Act, was not afraid of the

consequences of having infringed its provisions." It is almost needless

to say that no such prosecution was instituted, though the will was

good, despite the national benefits conferred.

I will not enter farther into the subject in a preface to volumes which

themselves form only a summary of events in which I was a principal

actor, but at the same time, one, which I hope will prove satisfactory

and decisive. It would have been easy to have dilated the narrative, but

my object is solely to leave behind me a faithful record of events which

must one day become history, and there is no history like documentary

history.

To those high personages who have advocated my cause with other nations,

the present volume will give satisfaction, as affording additional proof

that their advocacy rested upon no visionary basis. To the members of

the press, who have adopted the same views, this exposition will be

equally satisfactory. To all these I owe the thanks of recognising in

me, a love for that service, from which--for a time I was unjustly

expelled. It is my intention, if God spare my life, to add to these

Memoirs a narrative of my former experience in the British navy, and,

what may be of greater utility, an exposition of that which, from

jealousy and other causes no less unworthy, _I was not permitted to

effect_. To these I shall add a few remarks upon my connexion with the

liberation of Greece, developing some remarkable facts, which have as

yet escaped the notice of historians. These reminiscences of the past

will, at least, be instructive to future generations and if any remarks

of mine will conduce to the permanent greatness and security of my

country, I shall deem the residue of my life well spent in recording

them.

At my advanced age, such a task as that now partially executed, would,

perhaps, have presented insuperable difficulties, but for the assistance

rendered me by Mr. Earp, who, with great perseverance, has

unravelled--what, in the lapse of time, had become the almost

inextricable confusion of my papers. That, however, has, with his

assistance, been accomplished in such a way as to base upon original

documents every incident contained in the work--the more important of

these documents being adduced, so as to admit of neither doubt nor

question. The same course will be pursued in the forthcoming English

portion of my career, with a result, I trust, equally clear and

convincing.

DUNDONALD.

CHAPTER I.

INVITATION TO TAKE COMMAND OF CHILIAN NAVY--ARRIVAL AT VALPARAISO--FIRST

EXPEDITION TO PERU--ATTACK ON SPANISH SHIPPING AT CALLAO--DEPARTURE FOR

HUACHO--CAPTURE OF SPANISH CONVOYS OF MONEY--PAITA TAKEN--RETURN TO

VALPARAISO TO REORGANIZE THE SQUADRON--OFFER TO GIVE UP MY SHARE OF

PRIZEMONEY TO THE REPUBLIC--THIS OFFER DECLINED BY THE SUPREME

DIRECTOR--POPULAR CONGRATULATIONS--ATTEMPT ON LADY COCHRANE'S LIFE.

In the year 1817, Don Jose Alvarez, accredited agent of the government

of Chili--as yet unacknowledged by European powers--applied to me to

undertake the organization of a naval force in that country, capable of

contending against the Spaniards; who, notwithstanding the successful

revolt of the Chilenos by land, still maintained their predominance on

the waters of the Pacific.

Having at that time no professional employment, in consequence of my

unjust expulsion from the British naval service, by the machinations of

the powerful political party which I had offended--and finding that

Chili was making great efforts to create a navy, in furtherance of which

object a war steamer had been placed on the stocks in London--I accepted

the invitation, engaging to superintend her building and equipment, and

to take her to Valparaiso when completed.

Meanwhile, Alvarez received orders from his Government, that, if his

proposals had been accepted, no time must be lost in my departure, as

the position of Chili was critical, the Spaniards threatening Valparaiso

by sea, and being still in possession of the continent from Conception

to Chiloe, where they were organizing the savage Indian tribes to carry

desolation into the newly emancipated provinces. Reliable information

had also been received, that the Court of Madrid was making strenuous

efforts to recover its lost possessions by a powerful reinforcement to

its Pacific squadron, against which the Chileno ships of war, in their

present state, were not in a condition to contend.

Alvarez therefore begged me not to wait for the steamer, the completion

and equipment of which he would hasten, but at once to sail for Chili in

the _Rose_ merchantman, then on the eve of departure. Knowing that the

whole of Peru was in the hands of the Spaniards, and that they were also

in possession of Valdivia, the strongest fortified harbour to the

southward--from both of which there would be considerable difficulty in

dislodging them after the arrival of the anticipated reinforcements--I

embarked without delay; and on the 28th of November, 1818, landed at

Valparaiso, accompanied by Lady Cochrane and our two children.

Our reception, both from the authorities and the people, was

enthusiastic, the Supreme Director, General O'Higgins, coming from the

seat of Government, Santiago, to welcome us. This excellent man was the

son of an Irish gentleman of distinction in the Spanish service, who had

occupied the important position of Viceroy of Peru. The son had,

however, joined the patriots, and whilst second in command had not long

before inflicted a signal defeat upon the Spaniards in the interior; in

reward for which service the gratitude of the nation had elevated him to

the Supreme Directorate.

A variety of _fêtes_ was given at Valparaiso in honour of our arrival,

these being prolonged for so many days as to amount to a waste of time.

The same scenes were, however, re-enacted at the distant capital,

whither the Supreme Director insisted on taking us, till I had to remind

His Excellency that our purpose was rather fighting than feasting.

Nevertheless, the reception we had met impressed me with so high a sense

of Chilian hospitality, that, heartbroken as I had been by the infamous

persecution which had driven me from the British navy, I decided upon

Chili as my future home; this decision, however, being only an

exemplification of the proverb _"L'homme propose--Dieu dispose."_

The Chilian squadron had just returned from a successful cruise, the

gallant Admiral Blanco Encalada, who commanded it, having captured a

noble Spanish 50-gun frigate, the _Maria Isabel_, in the bay of

Talcahuano.

The squadron consisted of the recently captured Spanish frigate, now

named the _O'Higgins_, in honour of the Supreme Director; the _San

Martin_, 56 guns, formerly the _Cumberland_ Indiaman, which had been

bought into the service; the _Lautaro_, 44 guns, also a purchased

Indiaman; the _Galvarino_, 18 guns, recently the British sloop of war

_Hecate_; the _Chacabuco_, 20 guns; and the _Aracauno_, 16 guns; a force

which, though deficient in organization and equipment, was very

creditable to the energy of a newly emancipated people.

A few days after my arrival a commission was issued, conferring upon me

the title of "Vice-Admiral of Chili, Admiral and Commander in Chief of

the Naval Forces of the Republic." Admiral Blanco, with patriotic

liberality, relinquishing his position in my favour, though, from his

recent achievement, justly entitled to retain it; paying me also the

additional compliment of personally announcing to the ships' companies

the change which had been effected.

My advent was regarded by the captains of the squadron with great

jealousy, the more so, as I had brought with me from England officers

upon whom I could place implicit reliance. It so happened that two of

the Chilian commanders, Captains Guise and Spry, had shortly before

arrived from England with the _Hecate_, which had been sold out of the

British navy, and bought by them on speculation. The Buenos Ayrean

Government having declined to purchase her, they had brought her on to

Chili, where the Government took her and received her former owners into

its service. These officers, together with Captain Worcester, a North

American, got up a cabal, the object of which was to bring about a

divided command between myself and Admiral Blanco, or, as they

expressed it--"two commodores and no Cochrane." Finding that Admiral

Blanco would not listen to this, they persuaded one or two of the

inferior ministers--whose jealousy it was not difficult to excite--that

it was dangerous and discreditable to a republican Government to allow a

nobleman and a foreigner to command its navy, and still more so, to

allow him to retain his title; the object being to place Admiral Blanco

in the chief command, with myself as his second--by which arrangement,

as he had not been accustomed to manage British seamen, they expected to

control him as they pleased. Admiral Blanco, however, insisted on

reversing our positions, offering his services as second in command, in

which arrangement I gladly acquiesced. This insignificant squabble would

not be worth narrating, but for its bearing on subsequent events; as

well as enabling me to confer a pleasing testimony to the patriotic

disinterestedness of Admiral Blanco, who is still one of the brightest

ornaments of the Republic which he so eminently aided to establish.

On the 22nd of December my flag was hoisted on board the _O'Higgins_,

after which the greatest despatch was used to get the squadron ready for

sea. Anxious to avoid delay, on the 16th of January I sailed with four

ships only, the _O'Higgins, San Martin, Lautaro,_ and _Chacabuco_;

leaving Admiral Blanco to follow with the _Gaharino, Aracauno,_ and

_Puyrredon_. A mutiny having broken out on board the _Chacabuco_, it

became necessary to enter Coquimbo, where the leading mutineers were

landed, tried, and punished.

I shall here narrate an incident which occurred on our departure. Lady

Cochrane, with her children, had returned from Santiago to Valparaiso,

to take leave of me on embarkation. She had just gone ashore, and the

last gun had been fired to summon all hands on board, when, hearing a

loud _hurrah_ near the house where she resided, she went to the window,

and saw our little boy--now Lord Cochrane, but then scarcely more than

five years old--mounted on the shoulders of my flag-lieutenant, waving

his tiny cap over the heads of the people, and crying out with all his

might, _"Viva la patria!"_ the mob being in a frenzied state of

excitement.

The child had slipped out of Lady Cochrane's house with the officer,

insisting on being carried to his father; with which request the

lieutenant, nothing loth, complied. To the horror of Lady Cochrane, she

saw her boy hurried down to the beach amidst the shouts of the

multitude, and, before she could interfere, placed in a boat and rowed

off to the flag-ship, which was at the time under weigh, so that he

could not be sent ashore again; there being no alternative but to take

him with us, though without clothes--which were afterwards made for him

by the sailors--and with no other attendance save that which their rough

but kindly natures could administer.

On our way along the coast we received information that the _Antonio_

was about to sail from Callao for Cadiz, with a considerable amount of

treasure, so that, in the hope of intercepting her, we cruized just out

of sight of the port till the 21st of February. As she did not make her

appearance, preparations were made to put in execution a plan which had

been formed to attack the Spanish shipping during the Carnival, when, in

the height of that festival, less vigilance than ordinary might

reasonably be expected. We had previously ascertained that the naval

force in the harbour consisted of the frigates _Esmeralda_ and

_Venganza_, a corvette, three brigs of war, a schooner, twenty-eight

gun-boats, and six heavily-armed merchantmen; the whole being moored

close in under the batteries, which mounted upwards of 160 guns, whilst

the aggregate force of the shipping was 350 guns, as appeared from an

official account of their armament.

A direct attack with our small force seemed, therefore, a thing not at

present to be attempted; but in its place I had formed the design to cut

out the frigates during the carnival, which terminated on the 23rd.

Knowing that two North American ships of war were daily expected at

Callao, it was arranged to take in the _O'Higgins_ and _Lautaro_, under

American colours, leaving the _San Martin_ out of sight behind San

Lorenzo, and if the _ruse_ were successful, to make a feint of sending a

boat ashore with despatches, and in the meantime suddenly to dash at the

frigates, and cut them out. Unfortunately, one of those thick fogs, so

common on the Peruvian coast, arose, in which the _Lautaro_ parted

company, and did not rejoin the flag-ship for four days afterwards,

when the carnival being at an end, our plan was rendered abortive.

The fog, which in the climate of Peru often continues for a considerable

length of time, lasted till the 29th, when hearing heavy firing, and

imagining that one of the ships was engaged with the enemy, I stood with

the flag-ship into the bay; the other ships, imagining the same thing,

also steered in the direction of the firing, when the fog clearing for a

moment, we discovered each other, as well as a strange sail near us;

which, when taken possession of by the flag-ship, proved to be a Spanish

gun-boat, with a lieutenant and twenty men, who, on being made

prisoners, informed us that the firing was a salute in honour of the

Viceroy, who had that morning been on a visit of inspection to the

batteries and shipping, and was then on board the brig of war _Pezuela_,

which we saw crowding sail in the direction of the batteries.

The fog again coming on, suggested to me the possibility of a direct

attack, which, if not altogether successful, would give the Spaniards

such an idea of our determination of purpose, as would inspire them with

respect for the Chilian squadron, and might induce their ships to

refrain from the protection of their commerce; in which case a blockade

would prevent the necessity of separating our small force in chase of

them, should they evince a desire of getting to sea.

Accordingly, still maintaining our disguise under American colours, the

_O'Higgins_ and _Lautaro_ stood towards the batteries, narrowly escaping

going ashore in the fog. The Viceroy having no doubt witnessed the

capture of the gun-boat, had, however, provided for our reception, the

garrison being at their guns, and the crews of the ships of war at their

quarters. Notwithstanding the great odds, I determined to persist in an

attack, as our withdrawing without firing a shot, would produce an

effect upon the minds of the Spaniards the reverse of that intended;

having sufficient experience in war to know that moral effect, even if

the result of a degree of temerity, will not unfrequently supply the

place of superior force.

The wind falling light, I did not venture on laying the flag-ship and

the _Lautaro_ alongside the Spanish frigates, as at first intended, but

anchored with springs on our cables, abreast of the shipping, which was

arranged in a half-moon of two lines, the rear rank being judiciously

disposed so as to cover the intervals of the ships in the front line. A

dead calm succeeding, we were for two hours exposed to a heavy fire from

the batteries, in addition to that from the two frigates, the brigs

_Pezuela_ and _Maypeu_, and seven or eight gun-boats; nevertheless, the

northern angle of one of the principal forts was silenced by our fire.

A breeze springing up, we weighed anchor, standing to and fro in front

of the batteries, and returning their fire; when Captain Guise, who

commanded the _Lautaro_, being severely wounded, that ship sheered off,

and never again came within range. As from want of wind, or doubt of the

result, neither the _San Martin_ nor _Chacabuco_ had ever got within

fire, the flag-ship was thus left alone to continue the action; but as

this, from want of co-operation on the part of the other ships, was

useless, I was reluctantly compelled to relinquish the attack, and

withdrew to the island of San Lorenzo, about three miles distant from

the forts; the Spaniards, though nearly quadruple our numbers, exclusive

of their gun-boats, not venturing to follow us.

The annexed was the Spanish naval force present: _Frigates_.--Esmeralda,

44 guns; Venganza, 42 guns; Sebastiana, 28 guns.

_Brigs_.--Maypeu, 18 guns; Pezuela, 22 guns; Potrilla, 18 guns; and one,

name unknown, 18 guns.

_Schooner_, name unknown, one long 24, and 20 culverins.

_Armed Merchantmen_.--Resolution, 36 guns; Cleopatra, 28 guns; La Focha,

20 guns; Guarmey, 18 guns; Fernando, 26 guns; San Antonio, 18 guns.

Total, fourteen vessels, of which ten were ready for sea; and

twenty-seven gun-boats.

In this action my little boy had a narrow escape. As the story has been

told by several Chilian writers somewhat incorrectly, I will

recapitulate the circumstances.

When the firing commenced, I had placed the boy in my after-cabin,

locking the door upon him; but not liking the restriction, he contrived

to get through the quarter gallery window, and joined me on deck,

refusing to go down again. As I could not attend to him, he was

permitted to remain, and, in a miniature midshipman's uniform, which the

seamen had made for him, was busying himself in handing powder to the

gunners.

Whilst thus employed, a round shot took off the head of a marine close

to him, scattering the unlucky man's brains in his face. Instantly

recovering his self-possession, to my great relief, for believing him

killed, I was spell-bound with agony, he ran up to me exclaiming, "I am

not hurt, papa: the shot did not touch me; Jack says, the ball is not

made that can kill mamma's boy." I ordered him to be carried below; but,

resisting with all his might, he was permitted to remain on deck during

the action.

Our loss in this affair was trifling, considering that we were under the

fire of more than two hundred guns; but the ships were so placed that

the enemy's frigates lay between us and the fortress, so that the shot

of the latter only told upon our rigging, which was considerably

damaged.

The action having been commenced in a fog, the Spaniards imagined that

all the Chilian vessels were engaged, and were not a little surprised,

as it again cleared, to find that their own frigate, the quondam _Maria

Isabella_, was their only opponent. So much were they dispirited by this

discovery, that as soon as possible after the close of the contest,

their ships of war were dismantled, the top masts and spars being formed

into a double boom across the anchorage so as to prevent approach. The

Spaniards were also previously unaware of my being in command of the

Chilian squadron, but on becoming acquainted with this fact, bestowed

upon me the not very complimentary title of "El Diablo," by which I was

afterwards known amongst them. The title might have been rendered more

appropriate, had my efforts been better seconded by the other vessels.

On the following day, having repaired damages, the flag-ship and

_Lautaro_ again went in and commenced a destructive fire upon the

Spanish gun-boats, the neutral vessels in the harbour removing out of

the line of shot. As the gun-boats withdrew to a position closer under

the batteries, where we could make little impression upon them without

getting severely punished by the fire of the fortress, we contented

ourselves with the demonstration made.

On the 2nd of March, I despatched Capt. Foster with the gun-boat

captured from the Spaniards, and the launches of the _O'Higgins_ and

_Lautaro_--to take possession of the island of San Lorenzo, when an

unworthy instance of Spanish cruelty presented itself in the spectacle

of thirty-seven Chilian soldiers taken prisoners eight years before. The

unhappy men had ever since been forced to work in chains under the

supervision of a military guard--now prisoners in turn; their sleeping

place during the whole of this period being a filthy shed, in which they

were every night chained by one leg to an iron bar. The joy of the poor

fellows at their deliverance, after all hope had fled, can scarcely be

conceived.

From the liberated patriots and the Spanish prisoners, I learned that in

Lima there were a number of Chilian officers and seamen taken on board

the _Maypeu_, whose condition was even more deplorable than their own,

the fetters on their legs having worn their ancles to the bone, whilst

their commander, by a refinement of cruelty, had for more than a year

been lying under sentence of death as a rebel. Upon this, I sent a flag

of truce to the viceroy, Don Joaquim de la Pezuela, requesting him to

permit the prisoners to return to their families, in exchange for the

Spanish prisoners on board the squadron, and others in Chili--where

there were great numbers, who were comparatively well treated. The

Viceroy denied the charge of ill-treatment--asserted his right, if he

thought proper, to regard his prisoners as pirates; retorting that after

the battle of Maypeu, General San Martin had treated the Spanish

Commissioner as a spy, and had repeatedly threatened him with death. The

exchange of prisoners was uncourteously refused, the Viceroy concluding

his reply with an expression of surprise that a British nobleman should

command the maritime forces of a Government "unacknowledged by all the

Powers of the globe." To this latter observation, I considered it

incumbent upon me to reply that "a British nobleman was a free man, and

therefore had a right to adopt any country which was endeavouring to

re-establish the rights of aggrieved humanity; and that I had hence

adopted the cause of Chili, with the same freedom of judgment that I had

previously exercised when refusing the offer of an Admiral's rank in

Spain, made to me not long before, by the Spanish Ambassador in London;"

this offer having been made by the Duke de San Carlos, in the name of

Ferdinand the Seventh.

Our means being clearly inadequate to any decisive attack on the Spanish

ships of war, I resolved to try the effect of an explosion vessel, and

accordingly established a laboratory on the island of San Lorenzo, under

the superintendence of Major Miller, the Commandant of Marines. Whilst

engaged in this duty, that able and gallant officer was so severely

burned by an accidental explosion, as to render his further services on

this occasion unavailable.

On the 22nd of March--our preparations being completed--we again stood

towards the batteries, the flag-ship going close in under the combined

fire of the forts and shipping, in order to divert the attention of the

enemy from the explosion vessel, which was set adrift in the direction

of the frigates, but, unfortunately, when within musket shot of them,

she was struck by a round shot and foundered, causing complete failure

in our object. The _San Martin_ and the _Lautaro_ keeping far astern,

there was no alternative but to withdraw from further attack, leaving

the explosion vessel to her fate.

As other attempts, with our want of means, would answer no better

purpose than useless demonstration, and as the ships were now destitute

of water and provisions, we were obliged to fall back upon Huacho,

leaving the _Chacabuco_ to watch the movements of the enemy.

The inhabitants of Huacho, who were well disposed to co-operate in any

effort for the emancipation of Peru, afforded us every assistance in

provisioning and watering the ships, for which the commandant, Cevallos,

shot two influential persons who had been foremost in aiding us, and

severely punished others; at the same time seizing our water casks, and

sending me an insolent letter of defiance, on which a party of seamen

and marines was landed and put the garrison to flight; the officer

commanding the party however withdrew from pursuit at hearing salutes

fired on the arrival of Admiral Blanco with the _Galvarino_ and

_Puyrredon_, mistaking this for an engagement with a newly-arrived

enemy. The whole of the Government property found in the Spanish

custom-house was captured.

The people of Huacho having volunteered information that a quantity of

specie belonging to the Philippine Company had been placed for safety on

board a vessel in the river Barrança, she was forthwith overhauled, and

the treasure transferred to the flag-ship.

Leaving Admiral Blanco at Huacho with the _San Martin_ and _Puyrredon_,

on the 4th of April we sailed for Supe, with the _O'Higgins_ and

_Galvarino_, having previously ascertained that a sum of money destined

for the payment of Spanish troops was on its way from Lima to Guambucho;

on the following day a party of marines being landed at Patavilca,

captured the treasure, amounting to 70,000 dollars, together with a

quantity of military stores. On the 7th, having received further

information that the Philippine Company had placed other treasure on

board the French brig, _Gazelle_, at Guambucho, we sailed for that

place, and, on the 10th, the seamen of the _O'Higgins_ examined her, and

brought off an additional sum of 60,000 dollars.

The secret of our obtaining possession of these and other convoys of

Spanish money along the coast, was, that I paid the inhabitants highly

for information relative to their transmission, and was thus enabled to

seize the treasure even in the interior of the country. As the Chilian

Ministry subsequently refused to allow me "secret service money," these,

disbursements were actually made at my own expense.

It was also my object to make friends of the Peruvian people, by

adopting towards them a conciliatory course, and by strict care that

none but Spanish property should be taken, whilst their own was in all

cases respected. Confidence was thus inspired, and the universal

dissatisfaction with Spanish colonial rule speedily became changed into

an earnest desire to be freed from it. Had it not been for this good

understanding with the inhabitants, I should scarcely have ventured to

detach marines and seamen for operations at a distance into the country,

as was subsequently the case; the people giving me the most reliable

information of every movement of the enemy.

On the 13th, we arrived at Paita, where the Spaniards had established a

garrison. A party of marines and seamen was again landed, on which the

enemy fled from the fort, and a quantity of brass ordnance, spirits, and

military stores, was captured.

Contrary to strict orders, some marines stole a number of valuable

church ornaments, but on the complaint of the authorities I caused them

to be restored, punishing the offenders, and at the same time presenting

the priests with a thousand dollars to repair the damage done in their

churches; this act, though far from conciliating the priests--who

dreaded Chilian success--adding greatly to our popularity amongst the

inhabitants, which was my object in bestowing the amount. Our thus

refraining from plunder was almost beyond the comprehension of a people

who had bitter experience of Spanish rapacity, whilst the undisciplined

Chilenos, who formed the greater portion of the squadron, as little

comprehended why their plundering propensities should be restrained.

On the 5th of May, I proceeded with the flag-ship alone to reconnoitre

Callao, having learned that the _Chacabuco_ and _Puyrredon_ had been

chased off the port by the Spanish frigates. Finding that these were

again moored under shelter of the batteries, we returned to Supe,

convinced that our previous visit to Callao had proved sufficient to

deter them from putting to sea for the protection of their own coasts;

this, indeed, forming my chief reason for having persisted in attacks

which, with our small force, could answer no other purpose; but this

alone was an advantage gained, as it enabled us to communicate freely

with the inhabitants on the coast, and to ascertain their sentiments,

which--from our forbearance, no less than command of the sea--were

almost uniformly in favour of co-operation with Chili for their

emancipation.

Both at Lima and on the coast, the best effect was produced by the

circulation of the following proclamation:--

"Compatriots! The repeated echoes of liberty in South America

have been heard with pleasure in every part of enlightened Europe,

more especially in Great Britain, where I, unable to resist the

desire of joining in such a cause, determined to take part in it.

The Republic of Chili has confided to me the command of her naval

forces. To these must the dominion of the Pacific be consigned.

By their co-operation must your chains be broken. Doubt not but

that the day is at hand on which, with the annihilation of despotism

and your now degraded condition, you will rise to the rank of a free

nation, to which your geographical position and the course of events

naturally call you."

"But it is your duty to co-operate in preparing for this success,

and to remove obstacles, under the assurance that you will receive

the most efficacious assistance from the government of Chili, and

your true friend, COCHRANE."

This proclamation was accompanied by another from the Chilian

government, declaratory of the sincerity of its intentions, so that

these combined caused us to be everywhere received as liberators.

On the 8th, we returned to Supe, and having learned that a Spanish force

was in the vicinity, a detachment of marines and seamen was, after dark,

pushed through a heavy surf, and landed, in the hope of taking them by

surprise. But the enemy was on the alert, and on the following morning

our little party fell into an ambuscade, which would have proved

serious, had not Major Miller, who commanded the marines, promptly

formed his men, who, attacking in turn, soon put the enemy to flight at

the point of the bayonet, capturing their colours, and the greater

portion of their arms. On the 13th, a detachment of Spanish troops

arrived from Lima under Major Camba, who, notwithstanding his

superiority of numbers, did not venture to attack our small party, which

withdrew to the ships with a number of cattle taken from the Spaniards;

Camba writing to the Viceroy so effective a description of his having

"driven the enemy into the sea," that he was immediately promoted.

Not to enter into further details of our visits to other parts of the

coast, where similar captures of provisions and military stores, &c.

were effected--it being my practice to compel the Spaniards to supply

all the wants of the squadron, nothing being ever taken from the natives

without payment,--I resolved--as our means were clearly incommensurate

with our main object--to return to Valparaiso, for the purpose of

organizing a more effective force, and on the 16th of June reached that

port, where we found Admiral Blanco with the _San Martin_ and

_Chacabuco_, he having been obliged to raise the blockade of Callao for

want of provisions; a step with which the Government was highly

displeased, though with more reason to blame its own negligence or want

of foresight in not providing them. Admiral Blanco was nevertheless put

under arrest, but a court of inquiry being held, he was honourably

acquitted.

The objects of the first expedition had been fully accomplished, viz. to

reconnoitre, with a view to future operations, when the squadron should

be rendered efficient; but more especially to ascertain the

inclinations of the Peruvians with regard to their desire for

emancipation--a point of the first importance to Chili, as being obliged

to be constantly on the alert for her own newly-acquired liberties, so

long as the Spaniards were in undisturbed possession of Peru. To the

accomplishment of these objects had been superadded the restriction of

the Spanish naval force to the shelter of the forts, the defeat of their

military forces wherever encountered, and the capture of no

inconsiderable amount of treasure.

It had, however, become evident to me that the passive system of defence

which the Spaniards adopted in Callao, would render it a difficult

matter to get at them without more effective means than the guns of the

ships, which were greatly inferior in number to those of the enemy's

fortress and shipping combined, whilst their experience in the use of

artillery was greater than that of our crews. The Supreme Director

having paid a visit to the squadron--on the 21st of June I addressed to

him a letter, stating my apprehension that the finances of the

Government might be limited, and that I would gladly give up to the

exigencies of the Republic the whole of my share of prize-money taken

during our recent cruize, provided it were applied to the manufacture of

rockets. This offer was declined, with a compliment from the Supreme

Director, on the advantage already gained, by compelling the Spaniards

ignominiously to shut "themselves up in their port, in spite of their

numerical superiority."

Complimentary addresses from the Chilian people were also presented to

me in profusion, and a public panegyric was pronounced at the National

Institute of the capital, upon the service rendered; but as this was

only a recapitulation of what has been already narrated--conveyed in

flowery rhetorical phrases--in the use of which the Occidentals are

almost as expert, and often as exaggerated, as are the Orientals--I

shall refrain from giving it. Suffice it to say, that the people were

not a little delighted with the plain facts, that whereas only a few

months before theirs had been the blockaded port, they were now able to

beard the enemy in his stronghold, till then believed--both by

Spaniards and Chilians--to be inviolable; and that, with only four ships

on our part, the Spanish Viceroy had been shut up in his capital, and

his convoys, both by sea and land, intercepted, whilst his ships of war

did not venture to emerge from their shelter under the batteries of

Callao.

The manufacture of rockets was now carried on in earnest, under the

superintendence of Mr. Goldsack, an eminent engineer, who had been

engaged in England for the purpose. From a mistaken notion of parsimony,

the labour of constructing and filling them was allotted to a number of

Spanish prisoners, with what result will appear in the sequel.

In these and other preparations two months were consumed, in the course

of which another vessel--an American built corvette--was added to the

squadron, and named by the Supreme Director the _Independencia_.

During my absence Lady Cochrane chiefly resided at Valparaiso, where

she diligently employed herself in promoting objects essential to the

welfare of the squadron; after a time removing to a delightful country

house at Quillota, where her life was endangered by a ruffian in the

interest of the Spanish faction.

This man, having gained admission to her private apartment, threatened

her with instant death if she would not divulge the secret orders which

had been given to me. On her declaring firmly that she would not divulge

anything, a struggle took place for a paper which she picked off a

table; and before her attendants could come to her assistance she

received a severe cut from a stiletto. The assassin was seized,

condemned, and ordered for execution, without the last offices of the

Catholic religion.

In the dead of the night preceding the day fixed for his execution, Lady

Cochrane was awoke by loud lamentations beneath her window. On sending

to ascertain the cause, the wretched wife of the criminal was found

imploring her Ladyship's intercession that her husband should not be

deprived of the benefits of confession and absolution. Forgiving the

atrocity of the act, Lady Cochrane, on the following morning used all

her influence with the authorities, not for this alone, but to save the

man's life, and at length wrung from them a reluctant consent to commute

his punishment to banishment for life.

Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chili, Peru and Brazil, from Spanish and Portuguese Domination, Volume 1 · 第 1 / 14 章