IN DIPLOMACY
_The Treaty of Ghent_
On May 9, 1813, the ship Neptune sailed from New Castle on the Delaware,
having on board Albert Gallatin and James A. Bayard, ministers of the
United States, with their four secretaries, of whom were Mr. Gallatin's
son James, and George M. Dallas, son of his old Pennsylvania friend.
They were accompanied to sea by a revenue cutter. Off Cape Henlopen they
were overhauled by the British frigate on the station, and their
passport was countersigned by the English captain. On June 20 they
reached the mouth of the river Gotha. Here the vessel lay at quarantine
for forty-eight hours, during which the gentlemen paid a flying visit to
Gottenburg. At dusk, on the 24th, the Neptune anchored in Copenhagen
inner roads, the scene of Nelson's attack in 1801. Mr. Gallatin's brief
memoranda of his voyage contain some crisp expressions. He found
"despotism and no oppression. Poverty and no discontent. Civility and no
servile obsequiousness amongst the people. Decency and sobriety."
St. Petersburg was reached on July 21. Here Gallatin and Bayard found
John Quincy Adams, then minister to Russia. He was one of the three
commissioners appointed to treat for peace under the mediation which the
Emperor Alexander had offered to the United States. Bayard and Adams
were Federalists. To the moderate counsels of the former Jefferson owed
his peaceable election. Gallatin and Adams had the advantage of thorough
acquaintance with European politics. To Gallatin the study of history
was a passion. He was familiar with the facts and traditions of
diplomacy. He knew the purpose, the tenor, and the result of every
treaty made for centuries between the great powers; even their dates
were at ready command in his wonderful memory. But, excepting the few
Frenchmen of distinction who in the exile which political revulsions
imposed upon them had crossed the sea, he had no acquaintance with
Europeans of high position, and none whatever with the diplomatic
personnel of European courts. In this Adams was more fortunate. Educated
abroad, while his father was minister to the court of St. James, he was
from youth familiar with courts and their ways. To be the son of a
president of the United States was no small matter at that day. The
conjunction of these two men was rare. One of European birth and trained
to American politics, the other of American birth and brought up in the
atmosphere of European diplomacy. In their natural characteristics they
were the opposite of one another. Adams was impetuous, overbearing,
impatient of contradiction or opposition. Gallatin was calm,
self-controlled, persistent; not jealous of his opinions, but ready to
yield or abandon his own methods, if those of others promised better
success; never blinded by passion or prejudice, but holding the end
always in view. That end was peace; "peace at all times desirable," as
Mr. Gallatin said a few days before his departure on his mission, but
much more so, 'because of the incapacity shown in the conduct of the
war, its inefficiency when compared with its expense, and the open
hostility to it of a large number of the American people.' In the face
of the disasters which had befallen the country Mr. Gallatin must have
felt some qualms of conscience for his persistent opposition to the
military and naval establishments. Their reorganization had place in his
desire for peace. He said, May 5, 1813: "Taught by experience, we will
apply a part of our resources to such naval preparations and
organization of the public force as will, within less than five years,
place us in a commanding situation." With the particulars of the dispute
between the two countries he was perfectly familiar. His report prepared
in 1808 for Mr. Campbell, chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, covered the whole ground of the American argument.
At the outset there seemed good ground for hope of an early agreement.
European politics were at a critical point, and England naturally
wished to husband her resources for a sudden emergency. The mediation of
Russia Mr. Gallatin considered a salve to the pride of England. This
reasoning seemed sound enough, but it had not taken account of one
important element: the jealousy of England of any outside interference
between herself and her ancient dependencies. Mr. Gallatin did not hold
English diplomacy in very high regard. Late in life he said that the
history of the relations of England and France was a story of the
triumphs of English arms and of French diplomacy; that England was
always victorious, but France had as often negotiated her out of the
fruits of success. True as this remark was in general, it cannot be said
of the policy of England in American affairs. She pushed to the utmost
her exclusion of France from the American continent when the States were
colonies, and now that they were free and independent she would listen
to no foreign intervention. Neither in peace nor war should any third
government stand between the two nations. This was and ever has been the
true policy of Great Britain, and that it was not lost sight of in the
heat of war is to the credit of her diplomacy. The offer of Russia to
mediate was not welcome, and was set aside by Lord Castlereagh in a note
of discouragement. There was no ground for the commissioners to stand
upon; moreover the emperor and Count Nesselrode were absent from St.
Petersburg, Count Romanzoff being left in charge of the foreign
relations. The offer of mediation had originated with him. His policy
was to curb the maritime power of England, and to secure in the
negotiation a modification at least of the offensive practice of Great
Britain in her assumed police of the sea.
The war was in fact a legacy of the necessarily incomplete diplomacy of
Washington's administration and the Jay treaty. The determining cause
was the enforcement of the right of search and the impressment of seamen
from American vessels; a practice at variance with the rights and the
law of nations. Monroe, Madison's secretary of state, urged the clear
and distinct forbearance of this British practice as the one object to
be obtained. An article in the treaty giving security in that respect
was by Gallatin, as well as by Monroe, considered a _sine qua non_
condition; while Mr. Bayard viewed an informal arrangement as equally
efficient and more practicable than a solemn article. But there was no
doubt of Bayard's determination to reach the result prescribed in their
instructions.
Mr. Gallatin's first act after setting foot on European shores was to
write to Baring Brothers & Co. at London. This he did from Gottenburg,
requesting a passport for the Neptune, which the commission proposed to
retain at St. Petersburg until their return. At the same time he
intimated that he wished the British government to be informed of the
object of the mission. For the expenses of the commission the
ambassadors had authority to draw on the Barings. The reply of Mr.
Alexander Baring must at once have opened Mr. Gallatin's eyes to the
futility of the errand of the commissioners. His words clearly state the
British grounds of objection: "The mediation of Russia was offered, not
sought,--it was fairly and frankly accepted,--I do not see how America
could with any consistency refuse it; but to the eyes of a European
politician it was clear that such an interference could produce no
practical benefit. The only question now seriously at issue between us
is one purely of a domestic nature in each country respectively; no
foreign government can fairly judge of it." Pointing out the difficulty
of establishing any distinction between the great masses of the
seafaring population of Great Britain and America, he finds that no
other country can judge of the various positions of great delicacy and
importance which spring from such a state of things; and says: "This is
not the way for Great Britain and America really to settle their
disputes; intelligent persons of the two countries might devise mutual
securities and concessions which perhaps neither country would offer in
the presence of a third party. It is a sort of family quarrel where
foreign interference can only do harm and irritate at any time, but more
especially in the present state of Europe, when attempts would be made
to make a tool of America." These, he said he had good reason to know,
were the sentiments of the British cabinet on the question of place of
negotiation and foreign mediation. He also informed Mr. Gallatin that
the mediation of Russia had been refused, and that the British
government would express its desire to treat separately and directly
either at London or Gottenburg. He warned Mr. Gallatin that an opinion
prevailed in the British public that the United States were engaged to
France by a secret political connection, which belief, though perhaps
not shared by the government, would lead it to consider the persevering
of the American commission upon bringing the insulated question before
the powers of the Continent as a touchstone of their sincerity. He hoped
that the American commissioners would come at once in contact with the
British ministers, and pointed out the hesitation that every minister
would feel at giving instructions on a matter so delicate as that
"involving the rights and duties of sovereign and subject." He then
declared that there was in England a strong desire for peace and for
ending a contest in which the "two countries could only tease and weaken
each other without any practical result," and at a time when England
desired to carry her resources into the "more important field of
European contest." He then gave Castlereagh's assurance, that the
cartel-ship, the Neptune, should be respected, and expressed his own
personal hope that he should ere long be gratified by seeing it bring,
with the commissioners, the hope of peace to the shores of England.
Meanwhile Mr. Gallatin was engaged in explaining the American case to
Romanzoff by conversation and by a written statement of the facts in
the form of an unofficial note to the emperor. On August 10 word was
received from the Emperor Alexander authorizing the renewal of the offer
of mediation; and shortly after a letter from General Moreau, written to
Mr. Gallatin from the imperial headquarters at Hrushova, assured him of
his sympathy and assistance. His relations with Gallatin were of long
standing and of an intimate nature. Moreau, after a long residence in
America, to which he was warmly attached, had lately crossed the ocean
and tendered his able sword to the coalition against Bonaparte. He
informed Gallatin that one of the British ministers had said to him in
Germany that England would not treat of her maritime rights under any
mediation. He feared that American vanity would hardly consent to treat
directly with Great Britain, and foresaw that the political adversaries
of Madison and Gallatin would blame the precipitation of the United
States government in sending over the envoys before the adhesion of
England to the proposed arbitration was secured. He assured Gallatin of
the interest of the Emperor Alexander in the Americans.
On August 24 Count Romanzoff read to the envoys his dispatch to Count
Lieven, the Russian minister at London, renewing the offer of mediation.
The commissioners considering their authority as limited to treating
under the mediation of Russia, Mr. Gallatin wrote to Monroe, inclosing
a copy of Baring's letter, which he looked upon as an informal
communication of the views of the British government, and asked for
contingent powers and instructions. These they could not expect to
receive before February. Gallatin replied to Mr. Baring that no
information of the refusal of Great Britain to the mediation had been
received, but, even if it had, the commission was not authorized to
negotiate in any other manner. They were, however, competent to treat of
commerce without mediation. He declined to discuss the objection of
Great Britain to the mediation of Russia, confining himself to an
expression of ignorance in America of any such feeling on the part of
the British ministry, and of the confidence placed in the personal
character of the emperor, which was considered a sufficient pledge of
impartiality; while the selection of a sovereign at war with France was
clear evidence that America neither had nor wished to have any political
connection with that power. That he himself believed an arrangement to
be practicable, he said to Mr. Baring, was evident from the fact that he
had given up his political existence, and separated himself from his
family. His opinion was, that while neither nation would be induced to
abandon its rights or pretensions in the matter of impressment, an
arrangement might be made by way of experiment which would reserve to
both their respective abstract rights, real or assumed.
To Moreau he wrote stating his hope that, notwithstanding the first
objections of Great Britain, the mediation of the emperor would be
accepted, and he asked the general for his personal interposition to
this end. France and England he held to be equally at fault in the great
European contest; the one usurping and oppressing the land, the other
dominating and tyrannizing the sea. They alone, said he, have gained, if
not happiness, at least power. Russia, he was firmly persuaded, was the
only power at heart friendly to America. History has shown the sagacity
of this judgment. This letter was never answered. Moreau was at death's
door.
Early in October Mr. Dallas was sent to London to open relations with
the British ministry. His presence there would save two months at least
in each correspondence which involved communication between Washington,
London, and St. Petersburg. Count Romanzoff gave the necessary letter of
introduction to Count Lieven. Gallatin's instructions to the young
secretary were explicit as to the caution he should exercise in a
country where he could consider himself as only on sufferance. Hardly
were these preliminaries concluded, and Dallas had not started on his
journey, when Mr. Gallatin received word from America that the Senate
had refused to confirm him in his position as commissioner. Mr. Gallatin
had not resigned his position of secretary of the treasury. The Senate
refused to sanction the cumulative appointment.
Stripped of his official character, he now felt himself at liberty to
follow his own inclination. His first impulse was to go to London, where
he was sure that Baring's friendship would open to him a means of
usefulness in the matter on which he was engaged. The death of Moreau
cut off the medium of approach to the emperor. This event was of no
consequence, however, in the negotiation, as the emperor had been
positively informed in July that England would not countenance even the
appearance of foreign intervention in her dispute with America. But as
yet no official information of his rejection had been received by Mr.
Gallatin, nor did any reach him until March. Without it he could not
well leave St. Petersburg. Meanwhile a diplomatic imbroglio, caused by
the failure of the emperor to inform Romanzoff of Castlereagh's second
refusal to accept the offer of mediation, embarrassed the commission all
winter. Nor yet were they aware that the British minister, driven to the
wall by the second offer of the emperor, had made proposals to Monroe to
treat directly with the United States government. The British note with
this offer was written on November 4. Mr. Gallatin was apprised of it by
Mr. Dallas in January, 1814. Mr. Baring urged him, if he should return
to America during the winter, to take his way through England, as good
effects might result from even a passing visit. Gallatin was then, as he
expressed it, "chained for the winter to St. Petersburg," nor had he
any way of reaching home, except by a cartel from a British port.
No word coming from the emperor, the envoys concluded to withdraw from
St. Petersburg. Before leaving, Mr. Gallatin addressed a letter of
thanks to Count Romanzoff, and requested him to communicate any
information he might receive from the emperor. It was supposed that the
offer of England to treat directly with America might be inclosed in
Castlereagh's letter of refusal to accept Russian mediation. On January
25, 1814, Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard left St. Petersburg and traveled
by land to Amsterdam, which they reached after a tedious journey on
March 4. The captain of the Neptune was ordered to bring his vessel to a
port of Holland. At Amsterdam, where the envoys remained four weeks,
they learned that Mr. Madison had at once accepted Castlereagh's offer
and appointed a new commission, consisting of Messrs. Adams, Bayard,
Henry Clay, and Jonathan Russell. Mr. Gallatin was not included, as he
was supposed to be on his way home to resume his post in the Treasury
Department, the duties of which had been performed in his absence by Mr.
Jones, the secretary of the navy. When correct information did reach Mr.
Madison, on February 8, he immediately added Mr. Gallatin to the
commission, and appointed Mr. G. W. Campbell to be secretary of the
treasury. Thus it happened that Mr. Gallatin, whom Mr. Madison intended
for the head of the commission, was the last named of those who
conducted the negotiations.
[Illustration: J. A. Bayard]
On April 1, 1814, Mr. Gallatin concluded to pass through England on his
return, and leaving orders for the Neptune on its arrival to proceed to
Falmouth, he took the packet to Harwich, whither he requested Mr. Baring
to send him the requisite passports to enable him to reach London with
his suite without delay.
In company with Mr. Bayard, Mr. Gallatin reached the English capital on
April 9, 1814. There they heard some days later of the arrival of
Messrs. Clay and Russell at Gottenburg. The situation of Great Britain
had greatly changed. Intoxicated with the success of their arms and the
abdication of Napoleon, the English people were quite ready to undertake
the punishment of the United States, while the release of a large body
of trained troops in France, Italy, Holland, and Portugal enabled the
ministry immediately to throw a large force into Canada for the summer
campaign. In the British cabinet a belief was said to be entertained
that a continuance of the war would bring about a separation of the
American Union, and perhaps a return of New England to the mother
country. In this emergency Gallatin availed himself of the opportunity
which presented itself of addressing Lafayette in sending to that
officer the patents for the Louisiana land granted to him by the
American government, and urged the use of his influence to promote an
accommodation between England and the United States.
To Clay he wrote on April 22, proposing that the place of negotiation be
changed from "that corner" Gottenburg, either to London, or some neutral
place more accessible to the friendly interference of those among the
European powers upon which they must greatly rely. The Emperor Alexander
was expected in London, and Castlereagh, who had recently returned from
France where he had been in direct intercourse with him, was understood
to be of all the cabinet the best disposed to the United States. From
Clay Gallatin heard in reply that the British _chargé d'affaires_ at
Stockholm had already asked the sanction of the Swedish government to
the negotiation at Gottenburg. While Clay was unwilling to go to London
he gave his consent to carry on the negotiations in Holland, if the
arrangement could be made in such a manner as to avoid any ill feeling
at the Swedish court by the change from Gottenburg. In May Gallatin and
Bayard asked of Monroe, who was then secretary of state, authority for
the commissioners to remove the negotiation to any place which their
judgment should prefer. In May, also, the British government was
officially notified by the American commissioners of their appointment.
Lord Bathurst answered with an assurance that commissioners would be
forthwith appointed for Great Britain, and with a proposal of Ghent as
the place for negotiation. This was at once acceded to.
Meanwhile Mr. Crawford, the United States minister at Paris, was
endeavoring, at the instance of Mr. Gallatin, to secure the friendly
interposition of the Emperor Alexander, not as a mediator, but as a
common friend and in the interest of peace to the civilized world.
Crawford was unable to obtain an audience of the emperor, or even an
interview with Count Nesselrode, but Lafayette took up the cause with
his hearty zeal for everything that concerned the United States, and, in
a long interview with the emperor at the house of Madame de Staël,
submitted to him the view taken by the United States of the controversy,
and obtained from him his promise to exert his personal influence with
the British government on his arrival at London. Baron von Humboldt, the
Prussian minister at Paris, who had been influenced by British
misrepresentation, was also won over by Lafayette, and now tendered his
services to Mr. Gallatin in any way in which he might be made useful.
Lafayette's letter was brought by Humboldt in person. Gallatin and
Humboldt had met in 1804, when the great traveler passed through
Washington on his return from Peru and Mexico.
The Treaty of Paris having been signed, Lord Castlereagh reached London
early in June, and the emperor arrived a few days later. Mr. Gallatin
had an audience of the emperor on June 17, and on the 19th submitted an
official statement of the American case and an appeal for the
interposition of his imperial majesty, "the liberator and pacifier of
Europe." From the interview Mr. Gallatin learned that the emperor had
made three attempts in the interest of peace, but that he had no hope
that his representations had been of any service. England would not
admit a third party to interfere, and he thought that, with respect to
the conditions of peace, the difficulty would be with England and not
with America.
On June 13 Gallatin warned Monroe of the preparations England was making
which would enable her to land fifteen to twenty thousand men on the
Atlantic coast; that the capture of Washington and New York would most
gratify the British people, and that no help need be expected from the
countries of Europe, all which were profoundly desirous of peace.
The ministry informing Mr. Gallatin that the British commissioners would
start for Ghent on July 1, he improved the interval by a visit to Paris.
He left London, where he had passed nearly three months in the uncertain
preliminaries of negotiation, and after a few days in the French capital
reached Ghent on July 6. The British commissioners only appeared on
August 6. They were Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn, and William Adams, all
second-rate men, but for this reason suited to the part they had to
play. After the overturn of Napoleon the British cabinet had no desire
for peace, or at least not until they had secured by war some material
advantages in the United States, which a treaty would confirm. The
business of their representatives at Ghent was to make exorbitant
demands of the Americans and delay negotiations pending the military
operations in progress.
In June Gallatin was satisfied of the general hostile spirit of Great
Britain and of its wish to inflict serious injury on the United States.
He notified Monroe of his opinion and warned him that the most favorable
terms to be expected were the _status ante bellum_, and not certainly
that, unless the American people were united and the country able to
stand the shock of the campaign. Mr. Madison's administration had
already humbled itself to an abandonment, or at least to an adjournment,
of the principle to establish which they had resorted to arms. But in
the first stages of the negotiation it was clear that the British
cabinet had more serious and dangerous objects in view, and looked
beyond aggression and temporary injury to permanent objects. At the
first meeting on August 8, the British commissioners demanded, as a
preliminary to any negotiation, that the United States should set apart
to the Indian tribes the entire territory of the Northwest to be held by
them forever in sovereignty under the guaranty of Great Britain. The
absurdity of such a demand is sufficient evidence that it was never
seriously entertained. There could have been no idea that the military
power of Great Britain was able to enforce, or that the United States
would abjectly submit to, such a mutilation of its territory and such a
limitation of its expansion. Behind this cover Mr. Gallatin
instinctively detected the real design of the cabinet to be the conquest
of New Orleans and the mouths of the Mississippi. If to the territory
thus acquired that of Florida should be added by cession from Spain,
which could hardly refuse any compensation asked of her by Great Britain
in return for the liberation of the Peninsula, a second British dominion
would be set up on the American continent. These views Gallatin
communicated to Monroe in a private dispatch of August 20, 1814, by the
hands of Mr. Dallas. To the _sine qua non_ of the British commissioners
no answer was made by the Americans. The negotiation was abruptly
suspended, and only by informal conversation was Mr. Goulburn given to
understand that reference had been had to America for instructions. Mr.
Gallatin was of opinion that the negotiations were at an end, and in his
despair of peace took consolation in the belief that the insolence of
the demand would unite America from Maine to Georgia in defense of her
rights, of her territory, and indeed of her independence. The American
commissioners made no secret of their belief that their mission was
closed. Two of the secretaries started from Ghent on a continental tour,
and notice was given to the landlord of the house where the
commissioners resided of their intention to quit it on October 1. On
August 2, while matters were still at this deadlock, Lord Castlereagh
passed through Ghent on his way to the Congress at Vienna. Goulburn was
ordered to change his tone and Lord Liverpool was advised to moderate
his demands; to use Castlereagh's words, to "a letting down of the
question." Lord Liverpool replied on September 2, that he had already
given Goulburn to understand that the commission had taken a very
erroneous view of British policy. In this communication he betrays the
hope, which the cabinet had entertained, of the outcome of American
dissensions, by his expression of the opinion that if the negotiation
had broken off on the notes already presented by the British commission,
or the answer that the Americans were disposed to make, the war would
have become popular in America.
Lord Bathurst reopened the negotiations, but his modification was of
tone rather than of matter. The surrender of the control of the Lakes to
Great Britain, and of the Northwest Territory to the Indians, was still
adhered to. The reply of the American commissioners was drawn chiefly by
Mr. Gallatin. It absolutely rejected the proposals respecting the
boundary and the military flag on the Lakes, and refused even to refer
them to the American government, but offered to pursue the negotiation
on the other points. To Monroe Mr. Gallatin explained his reason for
assenting to discuss the Indian article, and therein his colleagues
concurred with him, to be: that they had little hope of peace, but
thought it desirable, if there were to be a breach, that it should be on
other grounds than that of Indian pacification. The reply of the
commission on this point, also drafted by Mr. Gallatin, was sent in on
September 26. It merely guaranteed the Indians in all their old rights,
privileges, and possessions.
The destruction of the public buildings at Washington by the British
troops, known in London on October 1, caused a great sensation in
England. As Gallatin said in a letter to Madame de Staël, it was "an act
of vandalism to which no parallel could be found in the twenty years of
European war from the frontiers of Russia to Paris, and from those of
Denmark to Naples." "Was it (he asked), because, with the exception of a
few cathedrals, England had no public buildings comparable to them, or
was it to console the London mob for their disappointment that Paris was
neither pillaged nor burned?" It can hardly be doubted that the flames
which consumed the American capital lighted the way to peace. The
atrocity of war was again brought vividly to the view of nations whose
sole yearning was for peace. Far from discouraging the American
commissioners, it fortified their resolution. They knew that it would
unite the people of the States as one man. It in no way disturbed
Gallatin's confidence either in the present or future of his adopted
country. To those who asked his opinion of the securities of the United
States, he said: "If I have not wholly misunderstood America, its
resources and its political morality, I am not wrong in the belief that
its public funds are more secure than those of all European powers."
In spite of the protests of Mr. Goulburn, who felt the ground on which
he stood daily less stable, and in his letters to his chief was
unsparing in his denunciations, Lord Liverpool accepted the proposed
settlement of the Indian question. Nothing remained but to incorporate
in a treaty form the points agreed upon. Lord Bathurst, who seems
throughout the negotiation to have forgotten the old adage, that "fine
words butter no parsnips," and with true British blindness never to have
appreciated how thoroughly he was overmatched by Mr. Gallatin, submitted
a preliminary notification that the British terms would be based on the
principle of _uti possidetis_, which involved a rectification of the
boundaries on the Canadian frontier. To this the Americans returned a
peremptory refusal. They would not go one step farther except on the
basis of the _status quo ante bellum_. Lord Liverpool considered this as
conclusive. A vigorous prosecution of the war was resolved upon by the
cabinet. Only for reasons of expediency was a show of negotiation still
kept up.
But when the cabinet took a survey of the general field they felt little
complacency in the prospect of a struggle which sooner or later must
interest the maritime powers. France, compelled by the peace of Vienna
to withdraw from what even Lafayette considered as her natural frontier,
was restive, and there was a large party in Russia who would gladly see
the emperor take up the American cause. Moreover the chancellor of the
exchequer saw before him an inevitable addition of ten millions of
pounds sterling to his budget, the only avowable reason for which was
the rectification of the Canadian frontier. In their distress the
cabinet proposed to Wellington to go to the United States with the
olive-branch and the sword, to negotiate or conquer a peace. The desire
of the cabinet to bring the war to an honorable conclusion was avowed.
But Wellington, before accepting this proposal, gave Lord Liverpool a
very frank opinion of the mistake made in exacting territorial
concessions, since the British held no territory of the United States in
other than temporary possession, and had no right to make any such
demand. Lord Liverpool was not tenacious. He was never, he wrote Lord
Bathurst, much inclined to give way to the Americans, but the cabinet
felt itself compelled to withdraw from its extreme ground. He accepted
his defeat and acknowledged it.
The Americans meanwhile arranged a draft of a treaty. The articles on
impressment and other maritime rights, absolutely rejected by the
British, were set aside. There only remained the question of the
boundaries, the fisheries, and the navigation of the Mississippi. Here
Mr. Gallatin had as much difficulty in maintaining harmony between Adams
and Clay as in obtaining a peace from Liverpool and Bathurst. Adams was
determined to save the fisheries; Clay would not hear of opening the
Mississippi to British vessels. A compromise was effected by which it
was agreed that no allusion should be made to either subject. Mr.
Gallatin terminated the dispute by adding a declaration that the
commissioners were willing to sign a treaty applying the principle of
the _status quo ante bellum_ to _all_ the subjects of difference. This
was in strict conformity with the instructions from the home government.
On November 10 the American draft was sent in. On the 25th the British
replied with a counter-draft which made no allusion to the fisheries,
but stipulated for the free navigation of the Mississippi. The Americans
replied that they would give up the navigation of the river for a
surrender of the fisheries. This proposal was at once refused by the
British. The matter was settled by an offer of the Americans to
negotiate under a distinct reservation of all American rights. All
stipulations on either subject were in the end omitted, the British
government on December 22 withdrawing the article referring to these
points. In the course of the negotiation Mr. Gallatin proposed that in
case of a future war both nations should engage never to employ the
savages as auxiliaries, but this article does not appear. To the credit
of civilization, however, the last article contained a mutual engagement
to put an end to the trade in slaves. An agreement entered into in
perfect faith, but which the jealousy of the exercise of search in any
form rendered nugatory for half a century. On Christmas day the treaty
was signed. Mr. Henry Adams[19] justly says, "Far more than
contemporaries ever supposed, or than is now imagined, the Treaty of
Ghent was the special work and the peculiar triumph of Mr. Gallatin."
His own correspondence shows how admirably he was constituted for the
nice work of diplomatic negotiation. In the self-poise which he
maintained in the most critical situations, the unerring sagacity with
which he penetrated the purposes of his adversaries, the address with
which he soothed the passions and guided the judgments of his
colleagues, it is impossible to find a single fault. If he had a fault,
says his biographer, it was that of using the razor when he would have
done better with the axe. But the axe is not a diplomatic weapon. The
simulation of temper may serve an occasional purpose, but temper itself
is a mistake; and to Mr. Gallatin's credit be it said, it was a mistake
never committed by him in the course of this long and sometimes painful
negotiation. Looking back upon its shifting scenes, it is clear that
even the pertinacity of Adams and the irascibility of Clay served to
advance the purpose of the mission. From the first to the last Mr.
Gallatin had his own way, not because it was his own way, but because it
was the best way and was so recognized by the majority of the commission
at every turn of difference. Fortunately for the interests of peace the
battle of New Orleans had not yet been fought. There seems a justice in
this final act of the war. The British attack upon the Chesapeake[20]
was committed before war had been declared. The battle of New Orleans
was fought a fortnight after the Treaty of Ghent was signed. The burning
of Washington was avenged by the most complete defeat which the British
had ever encountered in their long career of military prowess.
By his political life Mr. Gallatin acquired an American reputation; by
his management of the finances of the United States he placed himself
among the first political economists of the day; but his masterly
conduct of the Treaty of Ghent showed him the equal of the best of
European statesmen on their own peculiar ground of diplomacy. No one of
American birth has ever rivaled him in this field. Europeans recognized
his pre-eminent genius. Sismondi praised him in a public discourse.
Humboldt addressed him as his illustrious friend. Madame de Staël
expressed to him her admiration for his mind and character. Alexander
Baring gave him more than admiration, his friendship.
* * * * *
Upon the separation of the commissioners, Mr. Gallatin paid a flying
visit to Geneva. His fame, or "glory," to use the words of Humboldt,
preceded him. Of his old intimates, Serre was under the sod in a West
Indian island; Badollet was leading a quiet life at Vincennes in the
Indiana Territory, where Gallatin had obtained for him an appointment in
the land office; Dumont was in England. Of Gallatin's family few
remained. But he received the honors due to him as a Genevan who had
shed a lustre on his native city. On his way to England, where he had
made an appointment with his colleagues to attempt a commercial treaty
with Great Britain, he stopped at Paris. Here he saw Napoleon, returned
from Elba, his star in full blaze before its final extinction. Here he
heard in April (1815) of his appointment by Madison as minister to
France. His colleagues also had been honored by similar advancements.
Adams was transferred from Russia to England. Bayard was named minister
to Russia, but illness prevented his taking possession of his post.
In April, Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Clay opened negotiations with Lord
Castlereagh in London, where they were quickly joined by Adams. Lord
Castlereagh bore no malice against Mr. Gallatin for the treaty. On the
contrary, he wrote of it to Lord Liverpool as "a most auspicious and
seasonable event," and wished him joy at "being released from the
millstone of an American war." With Lord Castlereagh Mr. Gallatin
arranged in the course of the summer a convention regulating commercial
intercourse between the United States and Great Britain, the only truly
valuable part of which was that which abolished all discriminating
duties. Mr. Gallatin considered this concession as an evidence of
friendly disposition, and rightly judged that British antipathy and
prejudice were modified, and that in the future friendly relations would
be preserved and a rupture avoided. Beyond this, there was little
gained. The old irritating questions of impressment and blockade and the
exclusion of the United States from the West Indies trade remained.
In July Mr. Gallatin parted from Mr. Baring and his London friends on
his homeward journey. From New York, on September 4, he wrote Madison,
thanking him for the appointment of minister to France as an "evidence
of undiminished attachment and of public satisfaction for his services;"
but he still held his acceptance in abeyance. To Jefferson, two days
later, he had also the satisfaction to say with justice, that the
character of the United States stood as "high as ever it did on the
European continents, and higher than ever it did in Great Britain;" and
that the United States was considered "as the nation designed to check
the naval despotism of England." To Jefferson he naturally spoke of that
France from which they had drawn some of their inspirations and their
doctrines.
He thus describes the condition of the people:--
"The revolution (the political change of 1789) has not, however,
been altogether useless. There is a visible improvement in the
agriculture of the country and the situation of the peasantry. The
new generation belonging to that class, freed from the petty
despotism of nobles and priests, and made more easy in their
circumstances by the abolition of tithes, and the equalization of
taxes, have acquired an independent spirit, and are far superior to
their fathers in intellect and information; they are not
republicans and are still too much dazzled by military glory; but I
think that no monarch or ex-nobles can hereafter oppress them long
with impunity."
And again, "Exhausted, degraded, and oppressed as France now is, I do
not despair of her ultimate success in establishing her independence and
a free form of government." But it was not till half a century later
that Gambetta, the Mirabeau of the Republic, led France to the full
possession of her material forces, and reëstablished in their original
vigor the principles of 1789. That Gallatin was not blinded by
democratic prejudices appears in the letter he wrote to Lafayette after
Napoleon's abdication, in which he said: "My attachment to the form of
government under which I was born and have ever lived never made me
desirous that it should, by way of experiment, be applied to countries
which might be better fitted for a limited monarchy."
_Minister to France_
Strange as it appears, there is no doubt that Mr. Gallatin was at this
time heartily weary of political life, and seriously contemplated a
permanent retirement to the banks of the Monongahela. He naturally
enough declined a nomination to Congress, which was tendered him by the
Philadelphia district. His tastes were not for the violence and
turbulence of the popular house.
Madison left him full time to decide whether he could arrange his
private affairs so as to accept the mission to Paris. In November he
positively declined. He considered the compensation as incompetent to
the support of a minister in the style in which he was expected to live.
His private income was at this time about twenty-five hundred dollars a
year. Monroe pressed him earnestly not to quit the public service, but
the year closed and Mr. Gallatin had not made up his mind. In the
situation of France, which he considered "would under her present
dynasty be for some years a vassal of her great rival," he did not
consider the mission important, and his private fortune was limited to a
narrow competence. "I do not wish," he wrote to Monroe, "to accumulate
any property. I will not do my family the injury of impairing the little
I have. My health is frail; they may soon lose me, and I will not leave
them dependent on the bounty of others." But being again earnestly
pressed, he on January 2, 1816, accepted the appointment. To Jefferson
he wrote that he would not conceal 'that he did not feel yet old enough
nor had philosophy enough to go into retirement and abstract himself
wholly from public affairs.'
In April, Madison notified Mr. Gallatin of Dallas's probable retirement
from the Treasury, and offered him the post if he cared to return to it.
He was perfectly aware of his supreme fitness for the direction of the
Treasury, and he declined with reluctance, because he was disturbed by
the suspension of specie payments. Remembering Madison's weakness in
1812 on the subject of the renewal of the bank charter, which Gallatin
considered necessary in the situation of the finances, he could hardly
have felt a desire to return to the cabinet in that or indeed in any
other capacity. He was perfectly conscious that as leader of the House
of Representatives, as secretary of the treasury, and as negotiator of
the Ghent treaty, he had brought into the triumvirate all its practical
statesmanship. His short career abroad had opened to him a new source of
intellectual pleasure. He had earned a right to some hours of ease.
Diplomacy at that period, when communication was uncertain and
difficult, was perforce less restricted than in these latter days, when
ambassadors are little more than foreign clerks of the State Department
without even the freedom of a chief of bureau. Gallatin felt entirely at
home, and was happy in this peculiar sphere. There was no time in his
life when he would not have gladly surrendered all political power for
the enjoyment of intellectual ease, the pursuit of science, and the
atmosphere of society of the higher order of culture in whatever field.
And Paris was then, as it is still, the centre of intellectual and
social civilization.
Jefferson rejoiced in Gallatin's appointment to France, and rightly
judged that he would be of great service there. Of Louis XVIII.,
however, Jefferson had a poor opinion. He thought him 'a fool and a
bigot, but, bating a little duplicity, honest and meaning well.'
Jefferson could give Gallatin no letters. He had 'no acquaintances left
in France; some were guillotined, some fled, some died, some are exiled,
and he knew of nobody left but Lafayette.' With Destutt de Tracy, an
intimate friend of Lafayette, Jefferson was in correspondence. Indeed,
he was engaged on the translation of Tracy's work on political economy,
the best, in Jefferson's opinion, that had ever appeared.[21]
Gallatin reached Paris with his family on July 9, 1816, and had an
interview with the Duc de Richelieu, the minister of Louis XVIII., two
days later. The conversation turned upon the sympathy for Bonaparte in
the United States, which Richelieu could not understand; but Gallatin
explained that it was not extended to him as the despot of France, but
as the most formidable enemy of England. Richelieu warned him of the
prejudices which might be aroused against the reigning family 'by
ex-kings and other emigrants of the same description' who had lately
removed to the United States. This was an allusion to Jerome, who had
fled from the throne of Westphalia to the banks of the Delaware. The
king gave Gallatin an audience on the 11th, when he presented his
credentials. His reception both by his majesty and the princes was, he
wrote to Monroe, "what is called gracious." Louis the Eighteenth was a
Bourbon to the ends of his fingers. He had the _bonhommie_ dashed with
malice which characterized the race. None could better appreciate than
he the vein of good-natured satire, the acquired tone of French society,
which was to Mr. Gallatin a natural gift. Mr. Gallatin was not only
kindly but familiarly received at court; and at the _petits soupers_,
which were the delight of the epicurean king, his majesty on more than
one occasion shelled the crawfish for the youthful daughter of the
republican ambassador. An anecdote is preserved of the king's courteous
malice. To a compliment paid Mr. Gallatin on his French, the king added,
"but I think my English is better than yours."
Gallatin's first negotiations were to obtain indemnity for the captures
under the Berlin and Milan decrees; but although the Duc de Richelieu
never for a moment hinted that the government of the Restoration was not
responsible for the acts of Napoleon, yet he stated that the mass of
injuries for which compensation was demanded by other governments was so
great that indemnity must be limited to the most flagrant cases. They
would pay for vessels burnt at sea, but would go no farther. In spite of
Mr. Gallatin's persistency no advance was made in the negotiation. A
minor matter gave him some annoyance. On July 4, 1816, at a public
dinner, the postmaster at Baltimore proposed a toast which, by its
disrespect, gave umbrage to the king. Hyde de Neuville, the French
minister to the United States, demanded the dismissal of the offender.
If our institutions and habits as well as public opinion had not
forbidden compliance with this request, the dictatorial tone of De
Neuville was sufficient bar. Richelieu could not be made to understand
the reason for the refusal, and while disclaiming any idea of using
force, said that the government would show its dissatisfaction in its
own way. This seemed to intimate an indefinite postponement of a
consideration of American demands, and would have rendered Mr.
Gallatin's further residence useless as well as unpleasant; but French
dignity got the better of what Gallatin termed, "the sickly
sentimentality which existed on the subject of personal abuse of the
king," and the insignificant incident was not allowed to interfere with
friendly intercourse.
In 1817 Mr. Gallatin was engaged not only in advising Mr. Adams at
London upon the points of a commercial treaty with Great Britain, but
also, together with Mr. William Eustis, minister to the Netherlands, in
a negotiation with that government.
The commission met at the Hague, Mr. Goldberg and Mr. Van der Kemp
representing Holland. The subjects were the treaty of 1782 between the
States-general of the Netherlands and the United States, the repeal of
discriminating duties, and the participation of the United States in the
trade with the Dutch East Indies. The basis of a treaty could not be
agreed upon, and the whole matter was referred back to the two
governments, the American commissioners recommending to the President a
repeal of duties discriminating against vessels of the Netherlands,
which would no doubt prevent future exaction of extra tonnage duties
imposed on American vessels by that government. These negotiations
occupied the late summer months. At the end of September Mr. Gallatin
was again at his post in Paris.
In June, 1818, Mr. Richard Rush, who owed his introduction into public
life to Mr. Gallatin, was appointed minister to England, Adams returning
to the United States to take the portfolio of State in President
Monroe's cabinet. Gallatin was joined to Rush, for the conduct of
negotiations with Great Britain, rendered necessary by the approaching
expiration of the commercial convention of July 3, 1815, which had been
limited to four years. The general field of disputed points was again
entered. It included the questions of impressment, the fisheries, the
boundaries, and indemnity for slaves. The commissioners were supported
by a temper of the American people different from that which prevailed
when Jay and Gallatin respectively undertook the delicate work of
negotiation in 1794 and 1814. A compromise was arrived at, which was
signed on October 20, 1818. The articles on maritime rights and
impressment were set aside. A convention was made for ten years in
regard to the fisheries, the northwest boundary, and other points, and
the commercial convention of 1815 was renewed. The English claim to the
navigation of the Mississippi was finally disposed of, and the article
concerning the West India trade was referred to the President. The
arrangement of the fishery question disturbed Mr. Gallatin, who found
himself compelled to sign an agreement which left the United States in a
worse situation in that respect than before the war of 1812. But as the
British courts would certainly uphold the construction by their
government of the treaty of 1783, our vessels, when seized, would be
condemned and a collision would immediately ensue. This, and the
critical condition of our Spanish relations, left no choice between
concession and war. A short time afterward Lord Castlereagh and the Duke
of Wellington expressed friendly dispositions, and the mooted points of
impressment and the West India trade were considered by them to be near
an arrangement. The right of British armed vessels to examine American
crews was abandoned in the convention itself.
In July, 1818, the capture of Fort St. Mark and the occupation of
Pensacola in Florida by General Jackson made some stir in the quiet
waters of our foreign diplomacy. Uncertain as to whether the act would
be disavowed or justified by the American government, Mr. Gallatin
explained to the European ministers that the forcible occupation of the
Spanish province was an act of self-defence and protection against the
Indians, but Richelieu replied that the United States "had adopted the
game laws and pursued in foreign ground what was started in its own."
Yet, to the astonishment of Mr. Gallatin, Richelieu was moderate and
friendly in language, and urged a speedy amicable arrangement of
differences with Spain, in whose affairs France took an interest, and
who had asked her good offices. But Gallatin at once rejected any idea
that the United States would join France in any mediation between Spain
and her revolted colonies. It seems rather singular that, to the
suggestion that a Spanish prince might be sent over to America as an
independent monarch, Gallatin contented himself with expressing a doubt
as to the efficacy of such a course to preserve their independence. Mr.
Adams was informed that public recognition of the independence of the
insurgent colony of Buenos Ayres would shock the feelings and prejudices
of the French ministers, but that notwithstanding this displeasure,
France would not join Spain in a war on this account. England, however,
would see such a war without regret, and privateers under Spanish
commissions would instantly be fitted out, both in France and England.
Under the existing convention with Great Britain three hundred American
vessels arrived at Liverpool in the first nine months of 1818 from the
United States and only thirty English, an advantage to the United States
which war would at once destroy. Russia also was displeased with the
recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies. At the Congress
of Aix la Chapelle various plans of mediation were proposed, but England
refusing to engage to break off all commercial relations with such of
the insurgent colonies as should reject the proposals agreed to, the
whole project was abandoned. An agreement between the five great powers
for the suppression of the slave trade was also proposed at this
Congress, but France declined to recognize the right to visit French
vessels in time of peace, and Russia making a similar declaration, this
plan also fell to the ground, and even an association against the
exactions of the Barbary powers was prevented by jealousy of the naval
preponderance of Great Britain.
While Mr. Gallatin was still actively engaged in an endeavor to put our
commercial relations with France on a satisfactory basis, and
negotiating with M. Pasquier, the new French minister for foreign
affairs, both with regard to indemnities for captures and the new
Spanish relations involved in the cession of Florida to the United
States, a serious trouble arose in which Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Adams
were at direct difference. In the spring of 1821 a French vessel, the
Apollon, was seized on the St. Mary's River, on the Spanish side, and
condemned for violation of the United States navigation laws. Mr. Adams
sustained the seizure and Mr. Gallatin did his best to defend it, on the
ground that the place where the vessel was seized was embraced in the
occupation of the United States. To Adams he wrote that the doctrine
assumed by the State Department with respect to the non-ratified treaty
with Spain was not generally admitted in Europe, and that "he thought it
equally dangerous and inconsistent with our general principles to assert
that we had a right to seize a vessel for any cause short of piracy in a
place where we did not previously claim jurisdiction." Mr. Gallatin
succeeded in satisfying M. Pasquier that the seizure was not in
violation of the law of nations or an insult to the French flag, and the
captain having instituted a suit for redress against the seizing
officers, the French minister allowed the matter to rest. Adams,
however, was indignant at having his arguments set aside. He complained
of it to Calhoun, and asked what Mr. Gallatin meant. Calhoun answered
that perhaps it was "the pride of opinion." But when Adams got to his
diary, which was the safety-valve of his ill-temper, he set a black mark
against Mr. Gallatin's name in these words: "Gallatin is a man of
first-rate talents, conscious and vain of them, and mortified in his
ambition, checked as it has been, after attaining the last step to the
summit; timid in great perils, tortuous in his paths; born in Europe,
disguising and yet betraying a superstitious prejudice of European
superiority of intellect, and holding principles pliable to
circumstances, occasionally mistaking the left for the right handed
wisdom." Against this judgment, Gallatin's estimate of Adams may be here
set down. It was expressed to his intimate friend Badollet in 1824:
"John Q. Adams is a virtuous man, whose temper, which is not the best,
might be overlooked; he has very great and miscellaneous knowledge, and
he is with his pen a powerful debater; but he wants, to a deplorable
degree, that most essential quality, a sound and correct judgment. Of
this I have had in my official connection and intercourse with him
complete and repeated proofs; and although he may be useful when
controlled and checked by others, he ought never to be trusted with a
place where, unrestrained, his errors might be fatal to the country."
Crawford complained of the difficulty he encountered in the cabinet of
softening the asperities which invariably predominated in the official
notes of the State Department while under Adams's direction, and said
that, had they been allowed to remain as originally drafted, the
government would have been "unembarrassed by diplomatic relations with
more than one power." But it must be remembered that there was no love
lost between Adams and Crawford--political rivals and not personal
friends.
The commercial negotiations, and the discussion of French pretensions
under the eighth article of the Louisiana treaty, opened with M.
Pasquier, were continued with the Vicomte de Montmorenci, who succeeded
him as minister of foreign affairs. In September, 1821, Mr. Gallatin had
communicated to Mr. Adams his intention of returning home in the spring;
but there appearing a chance of success in the negotiation of a treaty,
he wrote in February, 1822, to President Monroe that if no successor had
been appointed, he was desirous to remain some time longer. He was loath
to return without having succeeded in any one subject intrusted to his
care. Meanwhile Mr. Adams and M. de Neuville, the French minister, had
been busy in the United States. A commercial convention was signed at
Washington on June 24, 1822. Concerning this agreement Mr. Gallatin
wrote to Adams that the terms were much more favorable to France than he
had been led to presume would be acceded to, and more so than had been
hoped for by the French government. He nevertheless expressed the wish
that, as it had been signed, it should be ratified, in anticipation that
the superior activity of our ship-owners and seamen would enable America
to stand the competition.
In January, 1823, Montmorenci resigned and was succeeded by M. de
Chateaubriand. The change of ministers made no change in the French
persistence in connecting the discussion of the American claims with
that of the eighth article of the Louisiana treaty, an arrangement to
which Mr. Gallatin would not consent. As a last resort he so informed M.
de Chateaubriand, but receiving an unsatisfactory answer he concluded
that there was at that time no disposition in France to do us justice;
and as his protracted stay could be of no service to the United States,
he determined to return home in the course of the spring. In April he
received leave of absence from the President. On May 13 he had a final
conference with Chateaubriand, in which he could get no promise of any
redress, but did obtain the explicit declaration that France would in no
manner interfere in American questions.
Mr. Gallatin took passage at Havre, and arrived in New York on June 24,
1823. His political friends, especially Crawford, were eager for his
return. Crawford wished him to stand for vice-president in the coming
presidential campaign. After a short visit to Washington he went to his
home at New Geneva. The real value of perfect public service, or indeed
of any service, is only appreciated when it ceases, and friction takes
the place of smooth and noiseless order. Hardly was Mr. Gallatin settled
at Friendship Hill when a letter from President Monroe (October 15)
arrived, urging him to return to Paris, if only for the winter, or until
the crisis brought on by the rupture between France and Spain should be
over. Mr. Gallatin replied, that the deranged state of his private
affairs rendered his return to Europe extremely improbable.
Goethe says in his "Elective Affinities" that we cannot escape the
atmosphere we breathe. The natural atmosphere of Mr. Gallatin was public
life. In November, 1825, Mr. Clay, Adams's secretary of state, offered,
and, meeting a refusal, pressed upon Mr. Gallatin the post of
representative of the United States at the proposed Congress of American
Republics at Panama. Mr. Clay was right in considering it the most
important mission ever sent from the United States, and had Mr. Gallatin
accepted it, relations with these interesting countries might have been
improved to an immeasurable degree of happiness to them, and of benefit
to both continents. But his family would not hear of his exposure in the
fatal climate of the American Isthmus. Moreover, he pleaded his
ignorance of the Spanish language as a sufficient excuse for declining
the mission,--an example which has not been followed in later days.
_Minister to England_
In the spring of 1826 Mr. Rufus King, who had taken the place of Mr.
Rush at London, that gentleman having been called to the Treasury by
President Adams, fell ill, and requested the assistance of an
extraordinary envoy. Mr. Gallatin accepted the mission. Before his
nomination reached the Senate Mr. King's resignation was received and
accepted. President Adams wishing to intrust Mr. Gallatin alone with
the pending negotiations, and unwilling to make the two nominations of
minister and envoy, proposed to Mr. Gallatin to take the post of
minister, with powers to negotiate, and liberty to return when the
negotiations should be finished. Personal expenses at London were so
great that the post of resident minister was ruinous. Mr. Adams promised
Mr. Gallatin _carte blanche_ as to his instructions. But instead of
latitude and discretionary power he received at New York voluminous
directions which he engaged faithfully to execute, while regretting that
they had not been made known to him sooner. Nevertheless, in the three
days which intervened before his sailing, he wrote to Mr. Clay a lucid
statement of the points in issue, and mentioned the modifications he
desired. The points were: 1. The northeastern boundary. Upon this he was
only authorized to obtain a reference of the subject to a direct
negotiation at Washington. He asked consent, in case it should be
desirable, to open a negotiation on this point at London. Should Great
Britain refuse to open a negotiation at either place, or to agree to a
joint statement, then he was not to be bound to propose an immediate
reference to a third power. 2. The boundary west of the Stony Mountains.
The instructions limited British continuance on settlements south of the
49th parallel to five years. Mr. Gallatin thought this insufficient, and
proposed fifteen years. 3. The St. Lawrence navigation, and the
intercourse with Canada, as to which he suggested alternate plans. 4.
Colonial trade, on which he asked precise instructions as to what was
desired. To the President he complained of his instructions as 'of the
most peremptory nature, leaving no discretion on unimportant points, and
making of him a mere machine,' and he requested that it be officially
announced to him 'that the instructions were intended to guide but not
absolutely to bind him.' He was not afraid of incurring responsibility
where discretion was allowed, but he would not do it in the face of
strict and positive injunctions. Mr. Gallatin sailed from New York with
his wife and daughter July 1, 1826. Mr. William Beach Lawrence, then a
youth, accompanied him as his secretary. They reached London on August
7.
Canning was then at the head of the foreign office, and the temper of
the ministry was not that of Castlereagh and Wellington. Mr. Gallatin
did not like French diplomacy, nor did he admire that of England. He
wrote to his son: 'Some of the French statesmen occasionally say what is
not true; here (in London) they conceal the truth.' But while in
diplomacy he found strength and the opinion of that strength to be the
only weapons, he felt satisfaction that the country could support its
rights and pretensions by assuming a different attitude. In the course
of the negotiations Mr. Gallatin learned that one of the king's
ministers had complained of the tone of United States diplomacy towards
England, and had added, that it was time to show that it was felt and
resented. No such fault could attach to the correspondence of Mr. Rush
and Mr. King, or to that of Mr. Clay, which Mr. Addington had found
quite acceptable; but it was ascribed to Mr. Adams's instructions to Mr.
Rush, printed by order of the Senate. Mr. Gallatin later discovered that
the offensive remarks were in Baylies's report on the territory west of
the Stony Mountains. Mr. Gallatin explained the independence of the
House committees in the United States, but as a diplomatist he felt the
need of a concert between the executive and the committees of Congress
in all that concerns foreign relations. Government, after all, is a
complex science.
The simple directness with which Mr. Gallatin dealt with Lord Liverpool
could not serve with a man of Canning's disposition. Mr. Gallatin did
not fail to bring to bear the pressure of a possible change in the
relations of the United States and Great Britain, which might arise from
the war which seemed imminent between that power and Spain. The new
questions of Cuba, and the old habit of impressment, might at once bring
the United States into collision with England. But the war did not take
place, and the close of the year found the negotiations not far
advanced. Only the convention of 1815 would no doubt be renewed. He
asked for further instructions on that subject, the joint occupancy of
western territory, and impressments, all of which he hoped to arrange
in the spring and summer, and return home. Mr. Lawrence he found to be a
secretary more capable in the current business of the legation than any
of his predecessors. Mr. Gallatin could safely leave him there as
_chargé d'affaires_.
In December, Chateaubriand used in the House of Peers the words which
Mr. Gallatin had said to him, 'that England could not take Cuba without
making war on the United States, and that she knew it.' Mr. Gallatin so
informed Adams, and added, that France would no doubt agree, as
Chateaubriand would have agreed, to a tripartite instrument if England
were of the same opinion.
In March, 1827, Adams warned Gallatin that the sudden and unexpected
determination of Great Britain to break off all negotiation concerning
the colonial trade, and the contemporaneous interdiction of the vessels
of the United States from all British ports in the West Indies, had put
a new face on matters. A renewal of the convention of 1818 would
probably be agreed to by the Senate, but no concession in the form of a
treaty would be acceptable. His words were emphatic. "One inch of ground
yielded on the northwest coast,--one step backward from the claim to the
navigation of the St. Lawrence,--one hair's breadth of compromise upon
the article of impressment would be certain to meet the reprobation of
the Senate." In this temper of parties, Adams added, "All we can hope to
accomplish will be to adjourn controversies which we cannot adjust, and
say to Britain as the Abbé Bernis said to Cardinal Fleuri: 'Monseigneur,
j'attendrai.'"
But changes now occurred in the British ministry: Lord Liverpool died in
February, 1827--Mr. Canning in the following August. Lord Goderich
became prime minister. The new administration returned from Canning's
eccentric course to the old and quiet path. The commercial convention of
1815 was renewed indefinitely, each party being at liberty to abrogate
it at twelve months' notice. The joint occupancy of the Oregon
Territory, agreed to in 1818, was continued in a similar manner. On
September 29 a convention was signed, referring the northeast boundary
to the arbitration of a friendly sovereign. Mr. Gallatin believed that,
had Canning lived, he would have opened a negotiation on the subject of
impressment. Huskisson considered that 'the right, even if well founded,
was one the exercise of which was intolerable, but that this was not the
time to take up the subject.' The new British administration did not
dare to encounter the clamor of the navy, the opposition of the Tories,
and the pride of the nation on this question.
Having accomplished all that was practicable, completed all the current
business, and leaving the British government in a better temper than he
found it, Mr. Gallatin returned to the United States, reaching New York
on November 29, 1827. Nothing remained in foreign relations in respect
to which Mr. Gallatin felt that he could be of much use except the
northeast boundary. In a letter of congratulation to Mr. Gallatin on his
arrival, President Adams made ample amends for all his harsh judgments,
expressed or withheld. The three conventions were entirely satisfactory
to him. Of the negotiation he said, in words as graceful as warm, "I
shall feel most sensibly the loss of your presence at London, and can
form no more earnest wish than that your successor may acquire the same
influence of reason and good temper which you did exercise, and that it
may be applied with as salutary effect to the future discussions between
the two governments." During his visit to London Mr. Gallatin was
overwhelmed with civilities. Canning was courteous to a degree, and
rarely a day passed that the American ambassador had not to choose
between half a dozen invitations to dinner. At the house of the Russian
minister, the Count de Lieven, he was always welcome, and the Countess
de Lieven, the autocrat of foreign society in London, without whose pass
no stranger could cross the sacred threshold of Almack's, was his fast
friend. To each circle he carried that which each most prized. Whether
the conversation turned upon government or science, the dry figures of
finance, or the more genial topic of diplomatic intrigue, Mr. Gallatin
was its easy master, and his words never fell on inattentive ears.
With this mission to London Mr. Gallatin's diplomatic service closed. He
would have accepted the French mission in 1834, and so informed Van
Buren, but General Jackson, who was President, had his own plans, and
'ran his machine' without consulting other than his own prejudices or
whims. But although Mr. Gallatin was no longer in the field of
diplomacy, his counsels were eagerly sought. The northeastern boundary
was a troublesome question, indeed in the new phases of American
politics an imminent danger. The extension of the commercial relations
of Great Britain and the United States rendered it imperative that no
point of dispute should remain which could be determined. For two years
after his return from England, Mr. Gallatin was employed in the
preparation of an argument to be laid before the king of the
Netherlands, who had been selected as the arbiter between the United
States and Great Britain on the boundary. The king undertook to press a
conventional line, which the United States, not being bound to accept,
refused. In 1839 Mr. Gallatin prepared, and put before the world, a
statement of the facts in the case. This, revised, together with the
speech of Mr. Webster, a copy of the Jay treaty, and eight maps, he
published at his own expense in 1840.
At this time conflicts on the Maine frontier brought the subject up in a
manner not to be ignored. Popular feeling was at high pitch. In this
condition of affairs Alexander Baring, who had been raised to the
peerage as Lord Ashburton, was sent to America on a mission of
friendship and peace. As a young man he had listened to the debate on
Jay's treaty in 1795. He was now to be received by Webster in Washington
in the same spirit in which Grenville received Jay in London, when it
was mutually understood that they should discuss the matter as friends
and not as diplomatists, and leave their articles as records of
agreement, not as compromises of discord. Gallatin eagerly awaited the
arrival of his old friend, and was grievously disappointed when contrary
winds blew the frigate which carried him to Annapolis. Letters were
immediately exchanged; Lord Ashburton engaging before he left the
country to find Gallatin out, and, as he said, to "_draw a little wisdom
from the best well_." After the treaty was signed, Lord Ashburton went
from Washington to New York, and the old friends met once more: Mr.
Gallatin was in his 82d year, but in the full possession of his
faculties; Lord Ashburton in his 68th year: a memorable meeting of two
great men, whose lives had much in common; the one the foremost banker
of England, the other the matchless financier of America; and to this
sufficient honor was added for each the singular merit of having
negotiated for his country the most important treaty in its relation to
the other since the separation of 1783,--Mr. Gallatin, the Treaty of
Ghent, which gave peace to America; Lord Ashburton, that treaty which
is known by his name and which secured peace to Great Britain.
In 1846 Mr. Gallatin rendered his last diplomatic service by the
publication of a pamphlet on the Oregon question, which was then as
threatening as that of the northeastern boundary had been. This
admirable exposition, which put before the people as well as the
negotiators the precise merits of the controversy, powerfully
contributed to the ultimate peaceful settlement.
Still once more Mr. Gallatin threw his authoritative words into the
scale of justice. His last appearance in public had been when he
presided on April 24, 1844, at a meeting in New York city to protest
against the annexation of Texas. He then held that the resolution of the
House declaring the treaty of annexation between the United States of
America and the Republic of Texas to be the fundamental law of union
between them, without and against the consent of the Senate, was a
direct and undisguised usurpation of power and a violation of the
Constitution. In the storm of opposition he lifted his feeble voice in
condemnation of the violation of treaties, and the disregard of the
sacred obligations of mankind. "I am highly gratified," were his final
words, "I am highly gratified that the last public act of a long life
should have been that of bearing testimony against this outrageous
attempt. It is indeed a consolation that my almost extinguished voice
has been on this occasion raised in defense of liberty, of justice, and
of our country." Of the war with Mexico, he was wont to say, "that it
was the only blot upon the escutcheon of the United States." Aged as he
was, he would not rest until he had made his last appeal for peace with
Mexico. He also prepared supplementary essays on war expenses: the first
of these was published in 1847, the second in 1848. For months all his
faculties, all his feelings were absorbed in this one subject. These
pamphlets were widely circulated by the friends of peace. The venerable
sage had the comfort of knowing that his words were not in vain. Peace
with Mexico was signed on February 2, 1848.
* * * * *
Mr. Gallatin was no believer in the doctrine of 'manifest destiny,'--the
policy of bringing all North America into the occupation of a race
speaking the same language, and under a single government. On February
16, 1848, before news of the signature of the treaty at Guadalupe
Hidalgo, by Mr. Trist, the American negotiator, was known in New York,
Mr. Gallatin condemned this idea in a remarkable passage, in a letter to
Garrett Davis:--
"What shall be said of the notion of an empire extending from the
Atlantic to the Pacific and from the North Pole to the Equator? Of
the destiny of the Anglo-Saxon race, of its universal monarchy over
the whole of North America? Now, I will ask, which is the portion
of the globe that has attained the highest degree of civilization
and even of power--Asia, with its vast empires of Turkey, India,
and China, or Europe divided into near twenty independent
sovereignties? Other powerful causes have undoubtedly largely
contributed to that result; but this, the great division into ten
or twelve distinct languages, must not be neglected. But all these
allegations of superiority of race and destiny neither require nor
deserve any answer. They are but pretences under which to disguise
ambition, cupidity, or silly vanity."
The justice of these reflections was assuredly borne out by the
experience of history, but manifest destiny takes no account of past
lessons.
Before these lines of Mr. Gallatin were penned, on January 19, 1848,
gold was discovered in California. The announcement startled the world
and opened a new era, not only to Europe, but to mankind. Extending the
metallic basis, which no man better than Mr. Gallatin recognized and
held to be the true solvent of money transactions, it postponed for a
half century the inevitable conflict between capital and labor, the
first outbreaks of which in Europe had been with difficulty suppressed,
when the news of good tidings gave promise of unexpected relief. Credit
revived, new enterprises of colossal magnitude were undertaken, and the
demand for labor quickly exceeded the supply. Emigration to America rose
to incredible proportions. Had Mr. Gallatin lived, he would have found
new elements to be weighed in his nice balance of probabilities. He
would no longer, as in 1839, have been compelled to say that "specie is
a foreign product," but would have given to us inestimable advice as to
the proper use to be made of the vast sums taken out from our own soil.
He would have been also brought to face the ethnologic problem of a
continent inhabited by a single race, not Anglo-Saxon, nor Teutonic, nor
yet Latin, but a composite race in which all these will be merged and
blended; a new American race which, springing from a broader surface,
shall rise to higher summits of intellectual power and, with a greater
variety of natural qualities, achieve excellence in more numerous ways.
This vision was denied to Mr. Gallatin. He died at the threshold of the
new era--of the golden age. A half century has not passed since his
death, and the United States has taken from her soil a value of over
three thousand millions of dollars, in gold and silver (gold two
thousand millions, silver one thousand millions), more than two thirds
of the total amount estimated by Mr. Gallatin as the store of Europe in
1839; and has also added to her population, by immigration alone, ten
millions of people, of whom but a small proportion are of the
Anglo-Saxon race.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 19: _Life of Albert Gallatin_, p. 546.]
[Footnote 20: The frigate Chesapeake was captured by the British
man-of-war Leopard in June, 1807.]
[Footnote 21: A translation of this work, _Economie Politique_, was
published under Jefferson's supervision in 1818.]