IN THE CABINET
The general principles which Mr. Jefferson proposed to apply in his
conduct of the government were not principles of organization but of
administration. The establishments devised by Hamilton, in accordance
with or in development of the provisions of the Constitution, were
organic. The new policy was essentially restrictive and economic. The
military and naval establishments were to be kept at their lowest
possible limit. The Treasury Department was to be conducted on strictly
business principles. The debt was to be reduced and finally paid by a
fixed annual appropriation. The revenue was to be raised by imposts on
importation and tonnage, and by direct taxation, if necessary. The
public land system was to be developed. A scheme of internal
improvements by land and water highways was to be devised. All these
purposes except the last had been declared by the opposition during the
last part of Washington's second term and during Adams's presidency, and
had been lucidly expounded by Madison, Gallatin, Giles, Nicholas, and
others of the Republican leaders. On all these subjects Mr. Gallatin
was in accord with his chief. Only upon the bank question were they at
issue. Mr. Jefferson detested or feared the aristocracy of money, while
Gallatin, with a clearer insight into commercial and financial
questions, recognized that in a young country where capital was limited,
and specie in still greater disproportion to the increasing demands of
trade, a well-ordered, well-managed money institution was an enormous
advantage, if not an imperative necessity to the government and the
people.
Peace was necessary to the success of this general policy of internal
progress, but peace was not to be had for the asking. It was not till
half a century later that the power of the western continent as a
food-producing country was fully felt by Europe, and peace with the
United States became almost a condition of existence to millions in the
old world, while this country became independent, in fact as in name, to
the fullest meaning of the word. Peace was not menaced during
Jefferson's first administration, for the Federalists had left no legacy
of diplomatic discord to embarrass their successors. The divisions of
opinion were on home affairs. The Republican party was the first
opposition which had reached power since the formation of the
government. The Federalists had not hesitated to confine the patronage
of the executive to men of their own way of thinking. The Republicans
had attacked that principle. There were men even in the ranks of
Jefferson's administration who scouted the idea that the President of
the United States could become "the President of a party." But practice
and principle are not always in accord, even in administrations of
sentimental purity, and the pressure for office was as great in 1800 as
it has ever since been on the arrival of a new party to power. Beyond
all other departments of government, the Treasury depends for its proper
service upon business capacity and a knowledge of the principles of
accounting and office routine. Mr. Gallatin was well aware of the
difficulties his predecessors had encountered in finding and retaining
competent examining and auditing clerks. As there was no reason to
suppose that all this talent was to be found in the ranks of the
Republican party, and his common sense pointed out the folly of limiting
the market of supply, he early (July 25, 1801) prepared a circular to
collectors, in which he informed them "that the door of office was no
longer to be shut against any man because of his political opinions, but
that integrity and capacity suitable to the station were to be the only
qualifications required; and further, the President, considering freedom
of opinion or freedom of suffrage at public elections imprescriptible
rights of citizens, would regard any exercise of official influence to
sustain or control the same rights in others as injurious to the public
administration and practically destructive of the fundamental principles
of a republican Constitution." But Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison
opposed this simple declaration of a principle which has since been the
base of every attempt at reform in the civil service. Mr. Jefferson
answered that after one half of the subordinates were exchanged, talents
and worth might alone be inquired into in the case of new vacancies.
This was a miserable shuffling policy which defeated itself. For a
Federalist to retain office when such a discrimination was applied was
of itself a degradation. Mr. Jefferson here threw away and forever lost
the power to establish the true system, and fixed the curse of patronage
upon American administration. The true principle may be stated in the
form of an axiom. Administrations should rely for continuation upon
measures, not on patronage. Gallatin yielded with reluctance to the
spirit of persecution which he did not hesitate to say disgraced the
Republican cause, and sank them to a level with their predecessors.
Notwithstanding his aversion, he was compelled to follow the policy of
the cabinet. Its first result was to divide the Republican party, and to
alienate Burr, whose recommendation of Matthew L. Davis for the naval
office at New York was disregarded. Had the new administration declined
to make removals except for cause, such a dispute would have been
avoided. As it was, the friends of Burr considered the refusal as a
declaration of war. Appointments became immediately a part of the
machinery of Republican administration, as it had been part of that of
their predecessors, and each was carefully weighed and considered in
its reference to party quite as much as to public service.
Already looking forward to the next presidential election, Gallatin was
anxious for an agreement upon Jefferson's successor, and even before the
meeting of the first Congress of his term he advised the President on
this point, and he also proposed the division of every State into
election districts by a general constitutional provision.
Jefferson submitted the draft of his annual messages to the head of each
department, and invited their comments. Gallatin was minute in his
observations, and it is interesting to note the peculiar precision and
caution of his character in the nice criticisms of language and style,
sometimes declaratory, sometimes non-committal, but always and obviously
reasonable, and often presenting a brief argument for the change
proposed. In these days of woman's rights it is curious to read "Th. J.
to Mr. Gallatin. The appointment of a woman to office is an innovation
for which the public is not prepared, nor am I."
Gallatin suggested a weekly general conference of the President and the
secretaries at what is now styled a cabinet meeting, and private
conferences of the President with each of the secretaries once or twice
a week on certain days and at fixed hours. The business to come before
the House was also to be considered, and the policy to be pursued
determined upon. Unfortunately in this case again Jeffersonian theory
did not accord with Jeffersonian practice. Even erratic Randolph
complained of the want of system at these cabinet meetings, where each
was at liberty to do and say as he chose; a severe trial, this, to
Gallatin. In 1845 Mr. Gallatin wrote to Edward Coles that it was "quite
unusual to submit to the cabinet the manner in which the land or naval
forces authorized by Congress, and for which appropriations had been
made, should be employed," and added that on no occasion, in or out of
cabinet, was he ever consulted on those subjects prior to the year 1812.
In the difficulty which arose with the Barbary powers Mr. Gallatin
earnestly urged the payment of an annuity to Tripoli, if necessary for
peace. He considered it a mere matter of calculation whether the
purchase of peace was not cheaper than the expense of a war. This policy
was to be continued for eight years, at the end of which he hoped that a
different tone might be assumed. In a note on the message of 1802,
Gallatin expressed the hope to Jefferson that his administration would
"afford but few materials for historians." He would never sacrifice
permanent prosperity to temporary glitter.
Mr. Gallatin's counsel was sought, and his opinion deferred to, on
subjects which did not fall directly within the scope of administration.
Even on questions of fundamental constitutional law his judgment was not
inferior to that of Madison himself. In one notable instance he differed
from Mr. Lincoln, the attorney-general, whom he held in high esteem as
a good lawyer, a fine scholar, "a man of great discretion and sound
judgment." This was in 1803, when the acquisition of East Louisiana and
West Florida was a cabinet question. Mr. Lincoln considered that there
was a difference between a power to acquire territory for the United
States and the power to extend by treaty the territory of the United
States, and held that the first was unconstitutional. Mr. Gallatin held
that the United States as a nation have an inherent right to acquire
territory, and that, when acquisition is by treaty, the same constituted
authorities in whom the treaty power is vested have a constitutional
right to sanction the acquisition, and that when the territory has been
acquired Congress has the power either of admitting into the Union as a
new State or of annexing to a State, with the consent of that State, or
of making regulations for the government of the territory. Mr. Jefferson
concurred in this opinion, while at the same time he thought it safer
not to permit the enlargement of the Union except by amendment of the
Constitution. Mr. Gallatin's view was practically applied in the cases
named, and later in the annexation of Texas, although he disapproved of
the latter as contrary to good faith and the law of nations. He advised
Jefferson, also, not to lay the treaty by which Louisiana was acquired
before the House until after its ratification by the Senate, taking the
ground that until then it was not a treaty, and urging that great care
should be taken to do nothing which might be represented as containing
any idea of encroachment on the rights of the Senate. He personally
interested himself in the arrangements for taking possession of New
Orleans, and, considering the expense as trifling compared with the
object, urged the dispatch of an imposing force of not less than fifteen
thousand men, which would add to the opinion entertained abroad of our
power, resources, and energy; five thousand of these to be active
troops; ten thousand an enrolled reserve. The acquisition of Louisiana
was the grand popular feature of the foreign policy of the first term of
Jefferson's administration. The internal management left much to be
desired.
While his general views were exalted, and his principles would stand the
nicest examination in their application, Mr. Jefferson was not fortunate
in his choice of methods or men. It is not enough for an administration
to be pure; it should be above suspicion. This his was not. Time has not
washed out the stain of his intimacy with William Duane, the editor of
the infamous "Aurora." Citizen Duane, as he styled himself in the first
days of the administration, quarreled with Gallatin because he would not
apply the official guillotine, and thereafter pursued him with
uncompromising hostility. Of favoritism in appointments Mr. Gallatin
could not be accused. During his twelve years in the Treasury he
procured places for but two friends; one was given an obscure clerkship
in the department; the other, John Badollet, was made register in the
land office at Vincennes, against whom Gallatin said in the application
for appointment which he reluctantly made, there was but one objection,
"that of being his personal and college friend."
The dispositions for the sale of lands in the western territory, the
extinguishment of titles, and the surveys fell under Mr. Gallatin's
general supervision, and were the objects of his particular care. So
also was the establishment of the authority of the United States in the
Louisiana territory. In the course of these arrangements he was brought
into contact with Mr. Pierre Chôteau of St. Louis, who controlled the
Indian trade of a vast territory. The foundation of an intimate
acquaintance was then laid. The influence of this remarkable man over
the Western Indians and the extent of his trading operations with them
was great, and has never since been equaled. About this period Mr. John
Jacob Astor informed the government that he had an opportunity, of which
he intended to take advantage, to purchase one half of the interest of
the Canadian Fur Company, which, notwithstanding the treaty of 1794,
engrossed the trade by way of Michilimackinac with our own Indians.
Before that period this lucrative traffic had been exclusively in
British hands, and the hostility of the Indian tribes rendered any
interference in it by Americans dangerous to life and property, and
their participation since had been merely nominal. Jefferson's cabinet
received the proposal with satisfaction, but, in their strict
interpretation of the Constitution, could find no way of giving any aid
to the scheme beyond the _official_ promise of protection, which it fell
to Mr. Gallatin to draft. Mr. Jefferson wrote to Mr. Astor a letter to
the same effect. Mr. Astor, however, was not deterred from his
enterprise, but, under the charter of the American Fur Company granted
by the State of New York, extended his project to the Indians west of
the Rocky Mountains, and made of it an immense business, employing
several vessels at the mouth of the Columbia River and a large land
party beyond the Rocky Mountains. He finally founded the establishment
of Astoria. This settlement fell into the hands of the British during
the war of 1812. Mr. Astor sought to persuade the American government to
permit him to renew the establishment at its close, only asking a flag
and a lieutenant's command, but Mr. Madison would not commit himself to
the plan.
Among Mr. Jefferson's pet schemes was that of a substitution of gunboats
for fortifications, and for supporting the authority of the laws within
harbors. The mind of Mr. Jefferson had no doubt been favorably disposed
to this mode of offensive defense by the experience of Lafayette at
Annapolis, in his southern expedition in the spring of 1781, when his
entire flotilla, ammunition of war, and even the city of Annapolis,
were saved from destruction by two improvised gunboats, which, armed
with mortars and hot shot, drove the British blockading vessels out of
the harbor. Jefferson first suggested the scheme in his annual message
of 1804, and Gallatin did not interfere; but when, in 1807, the
President insisted, in a special message, on the building of two hundred
vessels of this class, Mr. Gallatin objected, because of the expense in
construction and maintenance, and secondly, of their infallible decay.
Mr. Jefferson persisted, and Mr. Gallatin's judgment was vindicated by
the result. Two years later, of one hundred and seventy-six gunboats
constructed, only twenty-four were in actual service. In his letter of
criticism, Mr. Gallatin gave as his opinion, that "it would be an
economical measure for every naval nation to burn their navy at the end
of a war and to build a new one when again at war, if it was not that
time was necessary to build ships of war." The principle was the same as
to gunboats, and the objection of time necessary for building did not
exist.
This year he also laid before the President a memorandum of preparatory
measures for defense against Great Britain, from whom an attack was
expected by land and sea, and a second plan for offensive operations on
the northern frontier, which is complete in its geographical and
topographical information, and its estimate of resources in men,
material, and money. At the same time he urged upon Mr. Jefferson to
moderate the tone of his message, so as not to widen the breach by
hurting the pride of Great Britain.
In connection with the land system, Mr. Jefferson favored, and Mr.
Gallatin devised, an extensive plan of internal improvements. The route
of the Cumberland road from the Potomac to the Ohio was reported to
Congress in 1807; a coast survey was ordered in the same year. The first
superintendent was Hassler, a Swiss, whom Mr. Gallatin brought to the
notice of Mr. Jefferson. In 1808 a general plan of improvement was
submitted to the Senate. This included canals parallel with the
seacoast, making a continuous line of inland navigation from the Hudson
to Cape Fear; a great turnpike from Maine to Georgia; the improvement of
the Susquehanna, Potomac, James, and Santee rivers to serve the slope
from the Alleghanies to the Atlantic; of the Alleghany, Monongahela, and
Kanawha, to serve the country westward to the Mississippi, the head
waters of these rivers to be connected by four roads across the
Appalachian range; a canal at the falls of the Ohio; a connection of the
Hudson with Lake Champlain, and of the same river with Lake Ontario at
Oswego; and a canal around Niagara Falls. The entire expense he
estimated at $20,000,000, to be met by an appropriation of $2,000,000 a
year for ten years; the stock created for turnpikes and canals to be a
permanent fund for repairs and improvements.
A national university for education in the higher sciences was also
recommended by Jefferson in his message of 1806, but Mr. Gallatin had
little faith in the popularity of this scheme. After the convulsion of
1794 in Geneva, Gallatin's old college mate, D'Yvernois, conceived the
plan of transporting the entire University of Geneva to the United
States, and wrote on the subject to Jefferson and Adams; but his idea
was based on the supposition that fifteen thousand dollars' income could
be had from the United States in support of the institution, which was,
of course, at the time impracticable. Jefferson believed that these
plans of national improvement could be carried into effect only by an
amendment to the Constitution; but Mr. Gallatin, as in the bank
question, was disturbed by no such scruples, and he recommended Mr.
Jefferson to strike from his message the words "general welfare," as
questionable in their nature, and because the proposition seemed to
acknowledge that the words are susceptible of a very dangerous meaning.
To a permanent embargo act Mr. Gallatin was from the beginning opposed.
He recognized the mischief of government prohibitions, and thought that
statesmen might well hesitate before they took the hazard of regulating
the concerns of individuals. The sequel proved the correctness of this
judgment. But Mr. Jefferson could not bring his mind to any more
decisive measure, indeed, it may justly be said, to any measure
whatever. Taking advantage of Mr. Madison's election to the presidency,
he simply withdrew from the triumvirate, and, passing over the subject
in silence in his last message, he ignominiously left to Mr. Madison and
Mr. Gallatin the entire responsibility which the threatening state of
the foreign relations of the country imposed on the Republican party.
The question was now between the enforcement of the Embargo Act and war.
To take off the embargo seemed a declaration of weakness. To add to it a
non-importation clause was the only alternative. In November, 1808, Mr.
Gallatin prepared for George W. Campbell, chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the House, the declaration known as Campbell's
report, which recited, in clear, compact form, the injuries done to the
United States by Great Britain, and closed with resolutions to the
effect that the United States could not submit to the edicts of Great
Britain and France, and with a recommendation of non-intercourse and for
placing of the country in a state of defense. After long debate the
resolutions were adopted by large majorities, and the policy of
resistance was finally determined upon--resistance, not war. Thus the
United States resorted, as the colonies had resorted in 1774, to a
policy of non-importation. But the condition of the States was not that
of the colonies. Then all the colonies were commercial, and the entire
population was on the seaboard; the prohibition fell with equal weight
upon all. Now there were large interior communities whom restrictions
upon commerce would rather benefit than injure. Yet neither the Sons of
Liberty nor the non-importation associations had been able to enforce
their voluntary agreements either before or after the Congress of 1774.
If this were to be the mode of resistance, stringent measures must be
adopted to make it effective. Mr. Gallatin accordingly called upon
Congress for the necessary powers. They at once responded with the
Enforcement Act, which Mr. Gallatin proceeded to apply with
characteristic administrative vigor, and summoned Jefferson to authorize
the collectors of revenue to call the military force of the United
States to support them in the exercise of their restrictive authority.
There was to be no evasion under the systems which Hamilton devised and
Gallatin knew so well how to administer.
His annual report made to Congress on December 10 had clearly set forth
the situation, and, without recommending war, had pointed out how it
might be carried on. Macon wrote of him on December 4 to their mutual
friend, Joseph H. Nicholson, "Gallatin is decidedly for war." After his
report was sent in the situation became still more perplexing. Rumors
came of an intention to call a convention of the five New England
States, with New York, if possible, to take ground against the embargo.
As these indications of dissatisfaction became manifest, and the
contingency of the employment of force at home presented itself,
Gallatin made a careful balance of the advantages and inconveniences of
embargo, non-intercourse, and letters of marque. This paper, dated
February, 1809, and entitled, "Notes on the Political Situation," no
doubt served as a brief for consultation with Madison upon his inaugural
message, it being then understood that Gallatin was to be secretary of
state. As he states one of the advantages of letters of marque to be "a
greater chance of unity at home," this measure he probably preferred.
The Senate had already, on January 4, passed a bill ordering out the
entire naval force of the country, and on the 10th the House adopted the
same bill by a vote of 64 to 59. Mr. Gallatin opposed this action
strenuously. On February 2 the House voted by a large majority to remove
the embargo on March 4. Non-intercourse with Great Britain and France
and trade everywhere else were now the conditions. This significant
expression of the feeling of Congress no doubt determined Mr. Gallatin
to suggest letters of marque. Whether he pressed them upon Mr. Madison
or not is uncertain. Meanwhile Mr. Gallatin suffered the odium of
opposition to the will of Congress, and Mr. Madison's power was broken
before he took his seat. A few Republican senators inaugurated an
opposition to their chief after the fashion of modern days, and Mr.
Madison was given to understand that Mr. Gallatin would not be confirmed
if nominated as secretary of state. Mr. Madison yielded to this
dictation, and from that day forward was, as he deserved to be,
perplexed and harassed by a petty oligarchy. Mr. John Quincy Adams, in a
note on this affair, says that, "had Mr. Gallatin been appointed
secretary of state, it is highly probable war with Great Britain would
not have taken place." But it is improbable that any step in foreign
intercourse was taken without Mr. Gallatin's knowledge and approbation.
Such are the traditions of the triumvirate.
The first term of Madison's administration was not eventful. There was
discord in the cabinet. In the Senate the "invisibles," as the faction
which supported Robert Smith, the secretary of state, was aptly termed,
rejected Madison's nominations and opposed Gallatin's financial policy
as their interests or whims prompted. Randolph said of Madison at this
time, that he was "President _de jure_ only." Besides this domestic
strife, the cabinet was engaged in futile efforts to resist the
gradually tightening cordon of British aggression. Erskine's amateur
negotiations, quickly disavowed by the British government, and the short
and impertinent mission of Jackson, who succeeded him and was dismissed
from the United States, well served Canning's policy of delay. Madison,
whose prejudices were as strongly with Englishmen and English ways as
those of Jefferson were with the men and manners of France, averse to
war and withheld also by Gallatin's persistent objections, negotiated
and procrastinated until there was little left to argue about. In
December, 1809, Macon made an effort to pass a stringent navigation act
to meet the British Orders in Council and the French decrees. The bill
passed the House but was emasculated in the Senate, the Republican cabal
voting with the Federalists to strike out the effective clauses. The act
interdicting commercial intercourse with Great Britain and France
expired in May, 1810, and was not revived. A new act was passed, which
was a virtual surrender of every point in dispute. Resistance was
abandoned, and our ships and seamen were left to the mercy of both
belligerents.
Mr. Gallatin's entire energies were bent upon strengthening the Treasury
and opposing reckless expenditures. His most grievous disappointment,
however, was in the refusal of Congress to renew the charter of the Bank
of the United States. He used every possible effort to save this
institution, which, in the condition of the country, was indispensable
to a sound currency and the maintenance of specie payment. But with the
dead weight of Mr. Madison's silence, if not indifference, the struggle
was unequal and the bank fell. The course of Mr. Madison can hardly be
excused. Political history records few examples of a more cruel
desertion of a cabinet minister by his chief. Mr. Gallatin felt it
deeply and tendered his resignation. The administration was going to
pieces by sheer incapacity. The leaders took alarm and the cabinet was
reconstructed, Monroe being called to the Department of State. But the
enemies of Mr. Gallatin still clung to his skirts, determined to drag
him to the dust. Duane attacked him in the most dangerous manner.
Probably no man in America has ever been abused, vilified, maligned with
such deliberate persistency as was Gallatin in the "Aurora" from the
beginning of 1811 until the cabinet crisis, when Mr. Madison was
compelled to choose between Smith and himself. Day after day leaders
were devoted to personal assault upon him and to indirect insinuations
of his superiority to Madison, by which the artful editor sought to
arouse the jealousy of the President. The "Atlas at the side of the
President," the "Great Treasury Law Giver," the "First Lord of the
Treasury," the "Dagon of the Philistines," were favorite epithets. He
was charged by turns with betraying cabinet secrets to Randolph, with
amateur negotiation with Erskine, and with subserviency to British gold
in the support of the Bank of the United States. Here is an instance of
Duane's style: "We can say with perfect conviction that, if Mr. Madison
suffer this man to lord it over him, Mr. Gallatin will drag him down,
for no honest man in the country can support an administration of which
he is a member with consistency or a pure conscience." It was charged
upon Gallatin that his friends considered him as the real, while Madison
was the nominal, president. More than this, he was accused of
embezzlement and enormous speculations in the public lands. Gallatin's
party pride must have been strong indeed to have induced him to stay an
hour in an administration which granted its favors to the author of such
assaults upon one of its chosen leaders.
Jefferson wrote to Mr. Wirt in May following, that, because of the bank,
endeavors were made to drive from the administration (of Mr. Madison)
the ablest man, except the President, who ever was in it, and to beat
down the President himself because he was unwilling to part with such a
counselor.
Monroe was appointed secretary of state in Smith's place in April, 1811.
Other changes followed in the cabinet, but brought little relief to Mr.
Gallatin. Financial affairs now occupied his entire attention; on the
one hand was a diminishing treasury; on the other an expenditure
reckless in itself and beyond the demands of the administration. Without
the sympathy of either the Senate or House, Mr. Gallatin's position
became daily more irksome, until at last he abandoned all attempt to
control the drift of party policy, took the war party at their word, and
sent in to the House a war budget.
Unfortunately for the country, the Republican party knew neither how to
prepare for war, nor how to keep the peace. Mr. Madison had none of the
qualifications of a war President; neither executive ability, decision
of character, nor yet that more important faculty, knowledge of men. In
his attachment to Mr. Madison and in loyalty to what remained of the
once proud triumvirate of talent and power, Mr. Gallatin supplied the
deficiencies of his fellows as best he could, until an offer of
mediation between the United States and Great Britain on the part of the
emperor of Russia presented an opportunity for honorable withdrawal and
service in another and perhaps more congenial field. In March, 1813, the
Russian minister, in a note to the secretary of state, tendered this
offer. Mr. Gallatin had completed his financial arrangements for the
year, and requested Mr. Madison to send him abroad on this mission.
Unwilling to take the risk of new appointments, the President acceded to
this proposal, and gave him leave of absence from his post in the
Treasury. Mr. Gallatin did not anticipate a long absence, and felt, as
he said to his old friend Badollet, that he could nowhere be more
usefully employed than in this negotiation. Certainly he could have no
regret in leaving a cabinet which had so little regard to his own
feelings and so little political decency as to confer the appointment of
adjutant-general in the United States army on his malignant assailant,
William Duane of the "Aurora."
Mr. Gallatin's mission, followed by the resignation of his post in the
cabinet, finally dissolved the political triumvirate, but not the
personal friendship of the men. Numerous attempts were made to alienate
both Jefferson and Madison from Gallatin while he held the portfolio of
the Treasury, but one and all they signally and ignominiously failed.
For Mr. Jefferson Mr. Gallatin had a regard near akin to reverence. A
portrait of the venerable sage was always on his study table. When about
setting out for France in 1816 he tendered his services to his old chief
and wrote to him that 'in every country and in all times he should never
cease to feel gratitude, respect, and attachment for him.' Jefferson
fully reciprocated this regard. From Monticello he wrote to Gallatin in
1823: "A visit from you to this place would indeed be a day of jubilee,
but your age and distance forbid the hope. Be this as it will, I shall
love you forever, and rejoice in your rejoicings and sympathize in your
ails. God bless and have you ever in His holy keeping." Nor does Mr.
Gallatin seem to have allowed any feeling of disappointment or
dissatisfaction at Mr. Madison's weakness to disturb their kindly
relations. Their letters close with the reciprocal assurance of
affection as well as of esteem.