BOOK II

VESPASIAN AND THE EAST

Meanwhile, on the other side of Europe, Fortune was already sowing 1

the seeds of a dynasty, the varying fortunes of which were destined to

bring at one time happiness to the country and success to its rulers,

at another misery to the country and to the rulers destruction.[201]

Before Galba's fall Titus Vespasianus had been dispatched by his

father from Judaea to Rome.[202] The ostensible reason of his journey

was to show respect to the new emperor, and to solicit some post for

which his years now fitted him.[203] However, the popular passion for

invention suggested that he had been summoned to be adopted. This

rumour was based on the fact that Galba was old and childless: the

public never wearies of appointing successors until the choice is

made. The character of Titus gave still more colour to it. He seemed

capable of filling any position. His appearance lacked neither charm

nor dignity. Vespasian's successes also and the utterances of certain

oracles further endorsed the rumour, to say nothing of the chance

occurrences which pass for omens where the wish is father to the

thought. It was at Corinth in Achaia that Titus received the news of

Galba's murder, and was assured by people in the town that Vitellius

had declared war. In great perplexity he summoned a few of his friends

and discussed all the possibilities of the situation. If he continued

his journey to Rome he would earn no gratitude for compliments

addressed to another sovereign,[204] and would be held as a hostage

either for Vitellius or for Otho: on the other hand, if he returned to

Judaea he would inevitably offend the victor. However, the struggle

was still undecided, and the father's adherence to the successful

party would excuse the conduct of the son. Or if Vespasian himself

assumed sovereignty, they would have to plan war and forget all about

giving offence.

Such considerations held him balanced between hope and fear; but 2

ultimately hope prevailed. Some people believed that his longing to

get back to Queen Berenice[205] fired him to return. True, the young

man's fancy was attracted by Berenice, but he did not allow this to

interfere with business. Still his youth was a time of gay

self-indulgence, and he showed more restraint in his own reign than in

his father's. Accordingly he sailed along the coasts of Greece and

Asia Minor, and, skirting the seas which lay upon his left, reached

the islands of Rhodes and Cyprus, whence he made a bolder crossing to

Syria.[206] On his way he conceived a desire to visit the temple of

Venus at Paphos,[207] which is famous among all the inhabitants and

visitors. It may not be tedious to give here a short account of the

origin of this worship, the ritual of the cult, and the

shape--unparalleled elsewhere--in which the goddess is depicted.

According to an old tradition the temple was founded by King 3

Aerias, and some people maintain that the goddess bears the same name.

A more modern version states that the temple was consecrated by

Cinyras,[208] on the spot where the goddess landed when the sea gave

her birth. The method of divination,[209] however, according to this

account, was imported from elsewhere by the Cilician Tamiras, and an

arrangement was made that the descendants of both families should

preside over the rites. Later, however, it seemed wrong that the royal

line should have no prerogative, so the descendants of the

foreigner[210] resigned the practice of the art which they had

themselves introduced, and now the priest whom you consult is always

of the line of Cinyras. They accept any victim that is offered, but

males are preferred. They put most faith in kids' entrails. Blood

must not be poured on the altar, at which they offer only prayers and

fire untainted by smoke. Although the altars stand in the open air

they are never wetted by rain. The goddess is not represented in human

form; the idol is a sort of circular pyramid,[211] rising from a broad

base to a small round top, like a turning-post. The reason of this is

unknown.

Titus inspected the temple treasures and the offerings made by 4

various kings, and other curiosities which the Greek passion for

archaeology attributes to a dim antiquity. He then consulted the

oracle first about his voyage. Learning that the sea was calm, and

that no obstacles stood in his way, he sacrificed a large number of

victims, and put covert questions about his own fortunes. The priest,

whose name was Sostratus, seeing that the entrails were uniformly

favourable, and that the goddess assented to Titus' ambitious schemes,

returned at the moment a brief and ordinary reply, but afterwards

sought a private interview and revealed the future to him. So Titus

returned to his father with heightened hopes, and amid the general

anxiety of the provinces and their armies his arrival spread boundless

confidence of success.

Vespasian had already broken the back of the Jewish war.[212] Only the

siege of Jerusalem remained. That this proved a difficult and

laborious task was due rather to the high situation of the town and

the stubborn superstition of its inhabitants than to any adequate

provision enabling them to endure the hardships of the siege.

Vespasian had, as we have already stated,[213] three legions well

tried in war. Four others were under Mucianus' command.[213] Although

these had never seen war, yet their envy of the neighbouring army's

fame had banished sloth. Indeed, as the former were hardened by work

and danger, so the latter owed their ardour to their unbroken

inaction, and their shame at having no share in the war.[214] Both

generals had, besides auxiliary infantry and cavalry, foreign

fleets[215] and allied princes,[216] and a fame that rested on widely

differing claims. Vespasian was an indefatigable campaigner. He 5

headed the column, chose the camping-ground, never ceasing by night or

day to use strategy, and, if need be, the sword to thwart the enemy.

He eat what he could get, and dressed almost like a common soldier.

Indeed, save for his avarice, he matched the generals of old days.

Mucianus, on the other hand, was distinguished by his wealth and

luxury, and his general superiority to the standards of a private

person. He was the better speaker, and a skilful administrator and

statesman. Their combined qualities would have made a fine emperor,

if one could have blended their virtues and omitted their vices.

Governing as they did the neighbouring provinces of Judaea and Syria,

jealousy at first led to quarrels. However, on the death of Nero, they

forgot their dislike and joined hands. It was their friends who first

brought them together, and subsequently Titus became the chief bond of

union and for the common good suppressed their ignoble jealousy. Both

by nature and training he had charm to fascinate even such a man as

Mucianus. The tribunes and centurions and the common soldiers were

attracted, each according to his character, either by Titus'

meritorious industry or by his gay indulgence in pleasure.

Before the arrival of Titus both armies had sworn allegiance to 6

Otho. News travels fast in such cases, but civil war is a slow and

serious undertaking, and the East, after its long repose, was now for

the first time beginning to arm for it. In earlier times all the

fiercest civil wars broke out in Italy or Cisalpine Gaul among the

forces of the West. Pompey, Cassius, Brutus, and Antony all courted

disaster by carrying the war oversea. Syria and Judaea often heard of

Caesars, but seldom saw one. There were no mutinies among the

soldiers. They merely made demonstrations against Parthia with varying

success. Even in the last civil war[217] the peace of these provinces

had been untroubled by the general confusion. Later they were loyal to

Galba. But when they heard that Otho and Vitellius were engaged in a

wicked contest for the possession of the Roman world, the troops

began to chafe at the thought that the prizes of empire should fall to

others, while their own lot was mere compulsory submission. They began

to take stock of their strength. Syria and Judaea had seven legions on

the spot with a vast force of auxiliaries. Next came Egypt with two

legions:[218] beyond lay Cappadocia and Pontus, and all the forts

along the Armenian frontier. Asia and the remaining provinces were

rich and thickly populated. As for the islands, their girdle of sea

was safe from the enemy and aided the prosecution of the war.

The generals were well aware of the soldiers' feelings, but decided 7

to await the issue between Vitellius and Otho. 'In civil war,' they

reckoned, 'there are no sure ties to unite victor and vanquished. It

matters little which survives: even good generals are corrupted by

success: as for Otho and Vitellius, their troops are quarrelsome,

lazy, and luxurious, and they are both the victims of their own vices.

One will fall on the field and the other succumb to his success.' So

Vespasian and Mucianus postponed their attack for the present. They

were themselves recent converts to the project of war, which the

others[219] had long fostered from various motives. The better sort

were animated by patriotism, many by mere love of plunder, some by the

uncertainty of their own fortunes. Thus, though their motives

differed, all, good and bad alike, agreed in their eager desire for

war.

About this time Achaia and Asia were thrown into 8 a groundless panic

by a rumour that 'Nero was at hand'. The accounts of his death being

many and various, people were all the more inclined to allege and to

believe that he was still alive. We shall mention in the course of

this work the attempts and the fate of the other pretenders.[220] This

time it was a slave from Pontus, or, according to other traditions, a

freedman from Italy. His skill as a singer and harpist, combined with

his facial resemblance to Nero, gave him some credentials for

imposture. He bribed some penniless and vagabond deserters by dazzling

promises to join him, and they all set out to sea. A storm drove them

on to the island of Cythnus,[221] where he found some troops homeward

bound on leave from the East. Some of these he enrolled, killing all

who resisted, and then proceeded to plunder the local merchants and

arm all the sturdiest of the slaves. Finding a centurion named Sisenna

carrying home a pair of silver hands[222] as a token of alliance from

the army in Syria to the Household Guards, he tried by various devices

to seduce him, until Sisenna took fright and escaped secretly from the

island in fear of violence. Thus the panic spread. The great name of

Nero attracted many who pined for revolution and hated the existing

state of things. The rumours waxed daily, until a chance dispelled

them. Galba had entrusted the government of Galatia and 9

Pamphylia[223] to Calpurnius Asprenas, who had been granted an escort

of two triremes from the fleet at Misenum. It so happened that with

these he touched at Cythnus. The rebels lost no time in appealing to

the ship's captains in the name of Nero. The pretender, assuming an

air of melancholy, appealed to 'the loyalty of his former soldiers',

and begged them to establish him in Syria or Egypt. The captains

either from sympathy or guile alleged that they must talk to their

men, and would come back when they had prepared all their minds.

However, they faithfully made a full report to Asprenas, on whose

instructions they boarded the ship and killed the impostor, whoever he

was. The man's eyes and hair and ferocious look were so remarkable

that the body was carried into Asia and thence to Rome.

FOOTNOTES:

[201] The Flavian dynasty. Vespasian and Titus brought the

happiness, Domitian the misery.

[202] Cp. i. 10.

[203] He was 30.

[204] i.e. to Galba.

[205] She was the granddaughter of Herod the Great, and lived

with her brother, Herod Agrippa (cp. chap. 81), ruler of

Peraea. They heard St. Paul at Caesarea. She had married first

her uncle, Herod Agrippa, prince of Chalcis; then Polemo II,

king of Pontus, whom she left. She was known to have visited

Titus in Rome, and he was said to have promised her marriage.

[206] i.e. across the open sea.

[207] In Cyprus.

[208] Another mythical king of Cyprus. Hesychius calls him a

son of Apollo, and Ovid makes him the father of Adonis.

[209] From the flight and cries of birds.

[210] i.e. the Tamiradae.

[211] i.e. a conical stone.

[212] Cp. v. 10.

[213] See i. 10 and 76.

[214] Reading _inexperti belli rubor_ (Andresen).

[215] Of Pontus, Syria, and Egypt.

[216] Antiochus of Commagene (between Syria and Cappadocia),

Agrippa of Peraea (east of Jordan), and Sohaemus of Sophene

(on the Upper Euphrates, round the sources of the Tigris). See

chap. 81.

[217] Which dethroned Nero.

[218] III Cyrenaica, XXII Deiotariana.

[219] Titus and their officers and friends.

[220] These accounts are lost. There was one such attempt

under Domitian and another under Titus. The Christians

expected him to re-appear as Antichrist.

[221] Thermia.

[222] See i. 54.

[223] These with Lycia at this date formed a single imperial

province.

THE TRIAL OF ANNIUS FAUSTUS

In a country so divided and tossed by frequent change of rulers 10

between liberty and licence even small events caused serious

disturbance. It happened that Vibius Crispus,[224] a man whose wealth,

influence, and ability had won him a reputation that was great rather

than good, had impeached before the senate a man of equestrian rank,

called Annius Faustus, who had been a professional informer under

Nero. The senate had recently in Galba's principate passed a

resolution authorizing the prosecution of informers. This resolution

had been variously applied from time to time, and interpreted

rigorously or leniently according as the defendant was helpless or

influential. But it still retained some terrors. Crispus, moreover,

had exerted all his powers to secure the conviction of the man who had

informed against his brother.[225] He had, in fact, induced a large

proportion of the senate to demand that Faustus should be sent to

execution undefended and unheard. However, with others, the defendant

gained a great advantage from his prosecutor's undue influence. 'We

must give him time,' they argued, 'the charges must be published:

however hateful the criminal his case must be properly heard.' At

first this advice prevailed. The trial was postponed for a few days.

At length came the conviction of Faustus, which aroused in the country

less satisfaction than his vile character warranted. People recalled

the fact that Crispus himself had turned informer with pecuniary

profit. It was not the penalty but the prosecutor that was unpopular.

FOOTNOTES:

[224] A close friend of Vespasian, who was supposed to ply the

trade of informer (cp. iv. 41 and 43).

[225] Vibius Secundus, banished for extortion in Mauretania.

OTHO'S MEASURES OF DEFENCE

Meanwhile the war opened successfully for Otho. At his order the 11

armies of Dalmatia and Pannonia started from their base. They

comprised four legions,[226] each of which had sent forward

detachments two thousand strong. The rest followed at a short

interval: the Seventh legion raised by Galba,[227] the Eleventh and

Thirteenth, both composed of veteran troops, and the Fourteenth, which

had won great distinction by crushing the rebellion in Britain.[228]

Nero had further increased their glory by choosing them for special

service,[229] which accounts for their lasting loyalty to Nero and

their keen support of Otho. But the stronger their numbers the greater

their self-confidence and the slower their march. The cavalry and

auxiliaries preceded the main body of the legions. From Rome itself

came no mean force, five regiments of Guards with some detachments of

cavalry and the First legion.[230] To these were added an irregular

force of 2,000 gladiators,[231] a shameful assistance of which during

the civil wars even strict generals availed themselves. Annius Gallus

was placed in command of these forces with Vestricius Spurinna,[232]

and they were sent forward to hold the line of the Po. Their first

plans had failed, Caecina, whom Otho had hoped to hold within the

Gallic provinces, having already crossed the Alps.[233] Under Otho's

personal command marched picked detachments of his Body Guard and the

rest of the Household troops, together with reservists of the Guard

and a large force of marines.[234] He let no luxury either delay or

disgrace his march. In an iron breast-plate he marched on foot at the

head of his troops, looking rough and dishevelled, quite unlike his

reputation.

Fortune smiled on his first efforts. By sea his fleet held most of 12

the Italian coast right up to the foot of the Maritime Alps. To secure

these mountains and attack the province of Narbonese Gaul he had

placed in command Suedius Clemens, Antonius Novellus, and Aemilius

Pacensis.[235] Pacensis, however, was made a prisoner by his mutinous

troops: Novellus had no authority: Clemens' command rested on

popularity, and he was as greedy of battle as he was criminally blind

to insubordination. No one could have imagined they were in Italy, on

the soil of their native land. As though on foreign shores and among

an enemy's towns, they burnt, ravaged, plundered, with results all the

more horrible since no precautions had been taken against danger. The

fields were full, the houses open. The inhabitants came to meet them

with their wives and children, and were lured by the security of

peace into all the horrors of war. The Governor of the Maritime

Alps[236] at that time was Marius Maturus. He summoned the

inhabitants, whose fighting strength was ample, and proposed to resist

at the frontier the Othonians' invasion of the province. But at the

first engagement the mountaineers were cut down and dispersed. They

had assembled in random haste; they knew nothing of military service

or discipline, nothing of the glory of victory or the disgrace of

flight.

Enraged by this engagement, Otho's troops visited their 13

indignation on the town of Albintimilium.[237] The battle had brought

them no booty, for the peasants were poor and their armour worthless,

and being swift of foot, with a good knowledge of the country, they

had escaped capture. However, the soldiers sated their greed at the

expense of the innocent town. A Ligurian woman afforded a fine example

of courage which made their conduct the more odious. She had concealed

her son, and when the soldiers, who believed that she had hidden some

money as well, demanded from her under torture where she was keeping

him concealed, she pointed to her belly and replied, 'He is in

hiding.' No subsequent tortures nor even death itself could bring her

to change that brave and noble answer.

Panic-stricken couriers brought to Fabius Valens the news that 14

Otho's fleet was threatening the province of Narbonese Gaul, which had

sworn allegiance to Vitellius. Representatives from the Roman colonies

also arrived beseeching his aid. He dispatched two cohorts of the

Tungri[238] and four troops of horse, together with the entire cavalry

regiment of the Treviri.[239] This force was put under the command of

Julius Classicus,[240] and part of it was detained in the colony of

Forum Julii,[241] since if the whole force marched inland and the

sea-board were left unprotected Otho's fleet would swoop down at once.

Twelve troops of cavalry and a picked body of auxiliaries marched

against the enemy: these were reinforced by a Ligurian cohort which

had long garrisoned this district, and a draft of five hundred

Pannonian recruits who had not yet joined their legion.[242] The

engagement began promptly. Their line was so arranged that some of the

marines, reinforced by the peasants, held the rising ground by the

sea, while the Guards filled the level space between the hills and the

shore. The fleet, acting in conjunction with the land force, was ready

to play its part in the battle, and extended a threatening front

facing the coast. The Vitellians, weaker in infantry, put their trust

in their horse. The mountaineers[243] were posted on the neighbouring

heights, and the auxiliaries massed in close order behind the cavalry.

The Treviran cavalry rashly charged the enemy, and meeting Otho's

guards in front were simultaneously assailed in the flank by the

peasants, flinging stones. This they could do well enough; and,

drafted among the regulars, they all, bold and timid alike, showed the

same courage in the hour of victory. Panic struck the defeated

Vitellians when the fleet began to harass their rear. They were now

surrounded, and would have been entirely destroyed had not darkness

arrested the victors and sheltered their flight. But though beaten 15

the Vitellians were not cowed. Calling up reinforcements, they

suddenly attacked while the unsuspecting enemy were taking their ease

after the victory. They killed the pickets, broke into the camp and

terrified the sailors. In time the panic subsided. The Othonians

seized a hill, defended their position, and eventually assumed the

offensive. The slaughter was frightful. The officers commanding the

Tungri, after a long defence of their position, fell beneath a shower

of weapons. The victory also cost the Othonians heavy loss, for the

enemy's cavalry rallied and cut off all who rashly ventured too far in

pursuit. So they agreed to a sort of armistice. As a safeguard against

sudden raids either by the fleet on the one side or the cavalry on the

other, the Vitellians retired to Antipolis,[244] a town of the

Narbonese province, and the Othonians to Albingaunum[245] in the

interior of Liguria.

The fame of this naval victory kept Corsica and Sardinia and the 16

adjacent islands faithful to Otho's cause. However, Decumus Pacarius,

the procurator,[246] nearly ruined Corsica by an act of indiscretion,

which in a war of such dimensions could not possibly have affected the

issue, and only ended in his own destruction. He hated Otho and

determined to aid Vitellius with all the forces of Corsica; a useless

assistance, even if it had been forthcoming. He summoned the chief men

of the island and disclosed his project. Claudius Pyrrhicus, who

commanded the Liburnian cruisers[247] stationed there, and a Roman

knight named Quintius Certus ventured to oppose him. He ordered their

execution. This overawed the others who were present. So they swore

allegiance to Vitellius, as did also the general mass of ignorant

people, who blindly shared a fear they did not feel. However, when

Pacarius began to enlist them and to harass his undisciplined men with

military duties, their loathing for the unwonted labour set them

thinking of their weakness. 'They lived in an island: Vitellius'

legions were in Germany, a long way off: Otho's fleet had already

sacked and plundered districts that had even horse and foot to protect

them.' The revulsion was sudden, but did not issue in overt

resistance. They chose a suitable moment for their treachery. Waiting

till Pacarius' visitors[248] were gone, they murdered him, stripped

and helpless, in his bath, and killed his comrades too. The heads they

bore themselves to Otho, like enemies' scalps. Neither did Otho reward

nor Vitellius punish them. In the general confusion their deed was

overshadowed by more heinous crimes.

We have already described[249] how 'Silius' Horse' had admitted the 17

war into the heart of Italy. No one there either supported Otho or

preferred Vitellius. But prolonged peace had broken their spirits to

utter servility. They were an easy prey to the first comer and cared

little who was the better man. All the fields and cities between the

Alps and the Po, the most fertile district in Italy, were held by the

Vitellian forces, the cohorts sent forward by Caecina[249] having

already arrived. One of the Pannonian cohorts had been captured at

Cremona: a hundred cavalry and a thousand marines had been cut off

between Placentia and Ticinum.[250] After this success the river and

its steep banks were no barrier to the Vitellian troops: indeed the

Batavians and other Germans found the Po a positive temptation.

Crossing suddenly opposite Placentia, they captured a handful of

scouts and created such a panic that the others in terror spread the

false report that Caecina's whole army was upon them.

Spurinna, who was holding Placentia, had made up his mind that 18

Caecina had not yet arrived, and that, if he should, his troops must

be kept within their lines: he could not pit three cohorts of guards

with one detachment a thousand strong,[251] and a few cavalry, against

Caecina's veteran army. But his men were unruly and ignorant of

war.[252] Seizing the standards and colours[253] they broke out,

threatening to kill the general who tried to check them and paying no

heed to their superior officers. They even clamoured that Otho was

being betrayed, and Caecina had been summoned.[254] Spurinna yielded

unwillingly to their folly, at first under compulsion, later with a

show of sympathy. He was anxious to gain weight for his advice,

should the mutiny cool.

At nightfall, with the Po in sight, Spurinna decided to entrench 19

his camp.[255] The unaccustomed hard work soon blunted the enthusiasm

of his town-bred troops. The older men began to curse their credulity,

and to point out the fearful danger to their small force of being

surrounded by Caecina's army in the open country. Soon a more sober

spirit pervaded the camp. The tribunes and centurions mingled with the

men, and every one talked with admiration of Spurinna's foresight in

selecting a powerful and wealthy colony as a strong base for their

operations. Finally Spurinna himself rather explained his plans than

reproached their faults, and, leaving patrols behind, succeeded

eventually in leading the rest of the men back to Placentia in a

quieter and more submissive frame of mind. There the walls were

repaired, outworks built, and the turrets increased in height and

number, while Spurinna provided not only for arms and ammunition but

also for obedience and discipline. This was all his party lacked, for

their courage was unimpeachable.

Caecina, on the other hand, seemed to have left his cruelty and 20

profligacy on the other side of the Alps. He marched through Italy

with a well-disciplined force. The people in the country-towns and

colonies took offence at his costume as showing arrogance. While they

wore the plain toga, Caecina addressed them attired in a

parti-coloured plaid and trousers.[256] Moreover, his wife Salonina

rode on a fine horse with purple trappings, and though this did no one

any harm, they grumbled and seemed hurt. It is an ineradicable human

trait to turn critical eyes on new-found fortune, and to insist upon

moderation most of all in those who used to be our equals. Crossing

the Po, Caecina tried to undermine the loyalty of the Othonians by

negotiations and promises. They retaliated with the same weapons, and

when they had finished bandying empty and fine-sounding phrases about

Peace and Union, Caecina devoted all his attention and plans to an

assault on Placentia in terrific force. He knew that his future

reputation rested on the issue of his first engagements.[257]

But the first day's work savoured more of impatience than of a 21

veteran army's methods. The men ventured under the walls without cover

or precaution, drunk and overfed. Meanwhile the amphitheatre, a fine

building outside the walls, was burnt down. It was set on fire either

by the attacking force hurling torches and heated shot and

fire-brands, or by the besieged in returning their fire. The common

people of the town harboured a suspicion that fuel for the fire had

been surreptitiously introduced from one of the neighbouring colonies,

and that the motive was jealousy, since no building in Italy could

hold so many people. However it happened, they thought little of it,

while worse disasters threatened: safety assured, they bewailed it as

the worst calamity they could have suffered. To return, however, to

Caecina: he was repulsed with heavy losses, and the night was spent in

preparations. The Vitellians provided mantlets, fascines, and

penthouses,[258] to protect the assailants while undermining the

walls: the Othonians procured stakes and huge masses of stone or lead

or brass, to break through the enemy's formation and crush them to

pieces. Both parties were actuated by feelings of pride and ambition.

Various encouragements were used, one side praising the strength of

the legions and the German army, the other the reputation of the

Guards and the City Garrison. The Vitellians decried their enemy as

lazy effeminates demoralized by the circus and the theatre: to which

they replied that the Vitellians were a pack of foreigners and

barbarians. Meanwhile, Otho and Vitellius were held up to praise or

blame, insult providing the more fruitful stimulus.

Hardly had day dawned before the walls of Placentia bristled with 22

defenders, and the fields glittered with the soldiers' armour. The

Vitellian legions[259] advancing in close order with their auxiliaries

in scattered bands assailed the higher portions of the walls with

stones and arrows: where the walls were in disrepair or crumbling from

age they came close up to them. The Othonians above, poising and

aiming their weapons with surer effect, rained them down on the

Germans, who came rashly charging under the walls with the wild songs

and scanty dress of their country, brandishing their shields over

their heads. Meanwhile, the legionaries under cover of their mantlets

and fascines set to work to undermine the walls, build up a mound, and

assail the gates, while Otho's Guards rolled on to them with terrific

crashes huge millstones, which they had arranged for this purpose

along the walls. Of those beneath, some were crushed by the stones;

others, wounded by darts, were left mangled and bleeding to death.

Panic redoubled the slaughter, and the rain of missiles came all the

fiercer from the walls. At last they sacrificed the honour of their

party and beat a retreat. Caecina, ashamed of his rash attempt at

assault, was afraid of looking ridiculous and useless if he sat still

in the same camp. So he crossed the Po and made for Cremona. As he

was retiring, Turullius Cerialis with a large force of marines, and

Julius Briganticus[260] with a few cavalry, came over to his side. The

latter, a Batavian born, had held a cavalry command: the former was a

senior centurion, who was known to Caecina, as he had served in that

capacity in Germany.

Spurinna, learning the enemy's route, informed Annius Gallus[261] 23

by letter of all that had happened, the defence of Placentia and

Caecina's plans. Gallus was leading the First legion to the relief of

Placentia, for he doubted the ability of the weak force of Guards to

resist a long siege and the full strength of the German army. Hearing

that Caecina was defeated and making for Cremona, he halted at

Bedriacum, though he found it hard to restrain the ardour of his

troops, whose zeal for battle nearly broke into mutiny. The village of

Bedriacum lies between Verona and Cremona,[262] and two Roman

disasters have now given it a sinister notoriety.

In the same week Martius Macer[263] gained a victory in the

neighbourhood of Cremona. With great enterprise he had transported his

gladiators across the Po, and suddenly flung them on to the opposite

bank. There they routed the Vitellian auxiliaries and killed all who

offered resistance, the rest taking flight to Cremona. But Macer

checked their victorious ardour, for fear that the enemy might be

reinforced and reverse the fortune of the battle. This aroused

suspicion among the Othonians, who put a bad construction on all that

their generals did. All the least courageous and most impudent of the

troops vied incessantly with each other in bringing various charges

against Annius Gallus, Suetonius Paulinus, and Marius Celsus, for the

two latter had also been placed in command by Otho.[264] The most

energetic in promoting mutiny and dissension were Galba's murderers,

who, maddened by their feelings of fear and of guilt, created endless

disorder, sometimes talking open sedition, sometimes sending anonymous

letters to Otho. As he always believed men of the meaner sort and

distrusted patriots, he now wavered nervously, being always irresolute

in success and firmer in the face of danger. He therefore sent for his

brother Titianus[265] and gave him the chief command.

Meanwhile success attended the generalship of Paulinus and 24

Celsus.[266] Caecina was tortured by his constant failure and the

waning reputation of his army. Repulsed from Placentia, he had lately

seen his auxiliaries defeated, and his patrols constantly worsted in

skirmishes more frequent than memorable. Now that Fabius Valens was

close at hand, he determined not to let all the glory of the war fall

to him, and hastened with more zeal than prudence to retrieve his

reputation. About twelve miles[267] distant from Cremona, at a place

called _Twin Brethren_,[268] he carefully concealed the bravest of his

auxiliaries in a wood overlooking the road. The cavalry were ordered

to ride forward down the road and provoke an engagement. They were

then to feign flight and lure the pursuers on in hot haste until they

fell into the ambush. This plan was betrayed to Otho's generals.

Paulinus took charge of the infantry, Celsus of the horse. A

detachment of the Thirteenth legion,[269] four auxiliary cohorts of

foot, and five hundred cavalry were stationed on the left flank. Three

cohorts of the Guards in column occupied the raised high-road.[270] On

the right flank marched the First legion, two auxiliary cohorts of

foot, and five hundred cavalry. Besides these they moved out a

thousand cavalry--Guards and auxiliaries--as a reserve to crown their

success, or assist them in difficulties.

Before they came to close quarters, the Vitellians began to 25

retire. Celsus, forewarned of the ruse, halted his men. Whereupon the

Vitellians impatiently rose from their ambush and, while Celsus slowly

retired, followed him further and further until they plunged headlong

into an ambush themselves. The auxiliaries were on their flanks; the

legions faced them in front; and the cavalry by a sudden manoeuvre had

closed in on their rear. However, Suetonius Paulinus did not

immediately give the signal for his infantry to charge. He was by

nature dilatory, and preferred cautiously reasoned measures to

accidental success. He kept on issuing orders about filling up the

ditches, clearing the fields and extending the line, convinced that it

was soon enough to play for victory when he had taken every precaution

against defeat. This delay gave the Vitellians time to take refuge in

the vineyards, where the interlaced vine-stems made it hard to follow.

Adjoining these was a little wood, from under cover of which they

ventured another sally and killed the foremost of the Guards' cavalry.

There Prince Epiphanes[271] was wounded, while making vigorous efforts

to rally Otho's forces.

At this point Otho's infantry charged, crushed the opposing line, 26

and even routed the troops who were hurrying up in support. For

Caecina had brought up his reinforcements not all at once but in

separate detachments. These, arriving in scattered units, and never in

sufficient force, only added to the confusion, since the panic of the

rout infected them as well. Mutiny, too, broke out in the camp,

because the troops were not all taken into battle. Julius Gratus, the

camp-prefect, was put in irons on a charge of plotting with his

brother, who was fighting on Otho's side. It was known that the

Othonians had arrested the brother, Julius Fronto, on the same charge.

For the rest, such was the universal panic among pursuers and pursued,

on the field and in the camp, that it was commonly said on both sides

that, if Suetonius Paulinus had not sounded the retreat, Caecina's

whole army might have been destroyed. Paulinus maintained that he

avoided any excessive strain of work or marching, for fear of exposing

his exhausted troops to a counter-attack from the Vitellians in the

camp, who were still fresh for battle: besides, he had no reserves to

fall back on in case of defeat. A few approved of the general's

strategy, but the common opinion was adverse.[272]

FOOTNOTES:

[226] See note 3.

[227] The legion brought from Spain, mentioned in i. 6.

[228] The revolt of Boadicea crushed by Suetonius Paulinus;

described by Tacitus in his life of Agricola and in Book XIV

of the _Annals_.

[229] i.e. for his projected war against the Albanians (cp. i.

6). Probably they stopped in Dalmatia on hearing of Nero's

fall.

[230] The quondam marines (cp. i. 6, 9, &c.).

[231] They were commanded by Martius Macer (see chaps. 23, 35. &c.).

[232] The defender of Placentia. He earned further laurels

under Trajan in Germany. He was a friend of Tacitus and the

younger Pliny, and is suspected of writing some bad verse.

[233] Early in March (cp. i. 70).

[234] Not regularly formed into a legion: those to whom 'he

held out hopes of honourable service' (cp. i. 87).

[235] Cp. i. 87.

[236] The mountainous district north of the Italian frontier

on the Var.

[237] Ventimiglia, the modern frontier town between France and

Italy on the Riviera.

[238] A Gallic tribe living round Tongres and Spa.

[239] Living round Trier.

[240] Afterwards one of the leaders in the rebellion on the

Rhine (cp. iv. 55).

[241] Fréjus.

[242] i.e. either the VII Galbian or XIII Gemina, both of

which were on Otho's side.

[243] i.e. the Ligurian cohort, mentioned above.

[244] Antibes.

[245] Albenga.

[246] Sardinia and Corsica were an imperial province A.D.

6-67. Then Nero gave it back to the senate to compensate for

his declaration of the independence of Achaia. Vespasian once

more transferred it to imperial government. If _procurator_ is

correct here, Pacarius must have been a subordinate imperial

functionary in a senatorial province. As the province changed

hands so often and was so soon after this placed under

imperial control, it is possible that Tacitus made a mistake

and that Pacarius was an ex-praetor. Those who feel that

Tacitus is unlikely to have made this error, and that Pacarius

can hardly have been anything but governor, adopt the

suggestion that Corsica did not share the fate of Sardinia in

A.D. 67, but remained under the control of an imperial

procurator. There is no clear evidence of this, but under

Diocletian Corsica was certainly separate.

[247] These cruisers were of a peculiarly light build, called

after the Liburni, an Illyrian tribe, who fought for Octavian

in the battle of Actium. He introduced similar craft into the

Roman navy. They were very fast, and worked with a triangular,

instead of the usual square sail.

[248] i.e. his Corsican and Roman clients.

[249] i. 70.

[250] Piacenza and Pavia.

[251] i.e. one of the two detachments sent forward by the

armies of Dalmatia and Pannonia (cp. chap. 11).

[252] Otho's Praetorian Guards were the weakest point in his army.

[253] Cp. i. 36 note 61.

[254] i.e. that Spurinna was in league with Caecina, and meant

to hand them over to him.

[255] He was making 'a reconnaissance in force westwards along

the river bank to discover, if he could, the strength and

intentions of the enemy' (B.W. Henderson, _Civil War_, &c.).

But Mr. E.G. Hardy points out that, as he had only 4,000 men

and Caecina's 30,000 were in the immediate neighbourhood, this

would have been foolish. It seems better to believe Tacitus'

suggestion that his insubordinate troops forced Spurinna to

march out.

[256] Considered Gallic and effeminate.

[257] Mr. Henderson (_Civil War_, &c.) argues that it was

imperative for Caecina to take the fortress at Placentia,

since it threatened his sole line of communication with

Valens' column. Tacitus, as usual, gives a practical rather

than a strategic motive. His interests are purely human.

[258] Familiar devices for sheltering troops against missiles

from a town wall. They were generally made of hurdles covered

with raw hides. The _vinea_ was a shelter on poles, so named

from its resemblance to a pergola of vines.

[259] In i. 61 only legion XXI is mentioned. But Caecina may

have formed the detachments into another legion.

[260] Civilis' nephew and bitter enemy. See iv. 70, v. 21.

[261] Spurinna's colleague in the command of the advanced

guard from Rome. He was now probably at Mantua.

[262] At the meeting of two high roads leading to Cremona, the

one from Hostilia and the other from Mantua. It was near here

that Vitellius defeated Otho, and here that his power fell

before Vespasian (cp. iii. 15 f.).

[263] See note 231.

[264] This was stated in i. 87. The reminder is inserted

because they were not mentioned with Gallus in ii. 11--unless,

indeed, Mr. Onions is right in suggesting that _quoque_ is an

error for _duces_.

[265] He had left him in charge of Rome. See i. 90.

[266] We learn in chap. 33 that Gallus was disabled and took

no part in this engagement: hence the omission of his name.

[267] About 10½ English miles.

[268] Locus Castorum.

[269] See chap. 11.

[270] The Via Postumia, built up on a causeway high above the

fields on either side.

[271] Son of Antiochus, king of Commagene (see note 216). He

was in Rome probably as a hostage, and accompanied Otho.

[272] An eminent critic has called Tacitus' account of this

battle an 'historical nightmare', but those who do not suffer

from a surfeit of military knowledge may find that it lies

easy upon them. It is written for the plain man with an eye

for situations and an ear for phrases.

THE DECISIVE STRUGGLE

This reverse reduced the Vitellians not to despair but to 27

discipline. Not only was this the case in Caecina's camp, who blamed

his men as being readier for mutiny than for battle, but the troops

under Fabius Valens, who had now reached Ticinum,[273] lost their

contempt for the enemy, conceived a desire to retrieve their glory,

and offered their general a more respectful and steady obedience.

There had, indeed, been a serious outbreak of mutiny, the account of

which I may now resume from an earlier chapter,[274] where it seemed

wrong to break the narrative of Caecina's operations. The Batavian

auxiliaries, who had left the Fourteenth legion during the war against

Vindex, heard of Vitellius' rising while on their way to Britain, and,

as I have already described,[275] joined Fabius Valens in the country

of the Lingones. There they grew insolent. Whenever they passed the

tents of the Roman soldiers, they boasted loudly that they had coerced

the Fourteenth, had deprived Nero of Italy, and held the whole issue

of the war in the hollow of their hand. This insulted the soldiers and

annoyed the general; brawls and quarrels ruined good discipline.

Ultimately Valens began to suspect that their insubordination meant

treachery. Accordingly, on receiving the news that Otho's fleet 28

had defeated the Treviran cavalry[276] and the Tungri, and was now

blockading Narbonese Gaul, he determined at the same time to assist

his allies, and by a stroke of generalship to separate contingents

that were so insubordinate and, if united, so strong. He therefore

ordered the Batavians to march to the support of Narbo. Immediately

this order became generally known, the auxiliaries began to complain

and the legionaries to chafe. 'They were being deprived of their

strongest support: here were these invincible veterans promptly

withdrawn directly the enemy came in sight: if the province was more

important than the safety of Rome and the empire, why not all go

there? but if Italy was the corner-stone of their success, he ought

not as it were to amputate their strongest limb.'[277] In answer 29

to this presumptuous criticism, Valens loosed his lictors upon them

and set to work to check the mutiny. They attacked their general,

stoned him, and chased him out of the camp, shouting that he was

concealing the spoils of Gaul and the gold from Vienne,[278] the due

reward of their labours. They looted the baggage, ransacked the

general's quarters, and even rummaged in the ground with javelins and

lances. Valens, in slave's dress, took refuge with a cavalry officer.

Gradually the disorder began to die down. Alfenus Varus, the

camp-prefect, then hit upon the plan of forbidding the centurions to

go the rounds or to have the bugle sounded to summon the men to their

duties. No one had anything to do: they eyed each other in

astonishment, dismayed above all at having no one to command them. At

first by silent submission, at last with tearful prayers, they sought

pardon. Valens appeared, haggard and in tears, but above all

expectation safe and sound,--joy, sympathy, cheers! With a wild

revulsion of feeling--mobs are always extravagant--they made a ring

round him with the eagles and standards, and carried him to the

Tribunal with loud praises and congratulations. With wise moderation

he demanded no punishment, but, to disarm suspicion of his good

faith, he criticized one or two of them severely.[279] He was well

aware that in civil war the men are allowed more licence than their

officers.

While they were entrenching themselves at Ticinum they heard the 30

news of Caecina's defeat, and the mutiny nearly broke out afresh:

Valens, they thought, had treacherously delayed in order to keep them

out of the battle. They refused rest, would not wait for the general,

marched on in front of the standards, hurrying on the bearers, and by

a forced march joined Caecina. Valens had a bad name with Caecina's

army. They complained that despite their greatly inferior numbers he

had exposed them to the full force of the enemy. At the same time, for

fear of being despised as defeated cowards, they excused themselves by

exaggerating the strength of the new arrivals. In fact, though Valens'

numbers were larger, and he had almost twice as many legionaries and

auxiliaries as Caecina,[280] yet it was Caecina who enjoyed the

confidence of the men. Apart from his kindness, in which he seemed

much readier than Valens, they admired him for his youthful vigour and

commanding stature,[281] and liked him too without exactly knowing

why. So there was rivalry between the generals. Caecina mocked at

Valens for his dirty and dishonest ways:[282] Valens at Caecina's

pompous vanity. But they smothered their dislike and worked together

for a common end, writing frequent letters in which they sacrificed

all hope of pardon and heaped abuse on Otho. Otho's generals refrained

from retaliating upon Vitellius, though his character offered richer

scope. In death Otho earned a noble name and Vitellius infamy, yet 31

at this time people were more afraid of Otho's burning passions than

of Vitellius' listless luxury. The murder of Galba had made Otho

feared and hated, while no one attributed to Vitellius the outbreak of

the war. It was felt that Vitellius' gluttony was a personal disgrace:

Otho's excesses, his cruelty and his daring, spelt more danger to the

country.

Now that Caecina and Valens had joined forces, the Vitellians had no

longer any reason to avoid a decisive battle. Otho accordingly held a

council to decide whether they should prolong the war or put their

fortune to the test. Suetonius Paulinus, who was considered the 32

most experienced general of his day,[283] now felt it was due to his

reputation to deliver his views on the general conduct of the war. His

contention was that the enemy's interests were best served by haste,

Otho's by delay. He argued thus: 'The whole of Vitellius' force has

now arrived and he has few reinforcements in his rear, for the Gallic

provinces are in a ferment, and it would be fatal to abandon the Rhine

with all those hostile tribes ready to swarm across it. The troops in

Britain are busy with their own foes and cut off by the sea: the

Spanish provinces can scarcely spare any troops: the Narbonese are

seriously alarmed by their recent reverse and the inroads of our

fleet. The country across the Po is shut in by the Alps and denied all

supplies by sea,[284] and, besides, its resources have been already

exhausted by the passage of their army. Nowhere can they get supplies,

and without commissariat no army can be kept together. The German

troops are their strongest fighting arm, but their constitutions will

not be strong enough to stand the change of weather, if we protract

the war into the summer. It has often happened that a force, which

seemed irresistible at first, has dwindled to nothing through the

tedium of forced inaction.

'On the other hand, our resources are rich and reliable. We have on

our side Pannonia, Moesia, Dalmatia, and the East; the armies there

are fresh and strong; we have Italy and Rome, the Queen of the World,

and the Roman Senate and People: those titles always mean something,

though their glory may sometimes be obscured. We have large public and

private resources, and in civil war a vast quantity of money is

stronger than the sword. Our soldiers are inured to the Italian

climate or, at any rate, to heat. We are entrenched behind the

Po:[285] its cities are protected by strong walls and willing hands,

and the defence of Placentia has shown that none of them will yield to

the enemy.' Therefore Otho must remain on the defensive. In a few days

the Fourteenth legion would arrive: its fame alone was great, and the

Moesian forces[286] would be with it. He should, at any rate, postpone

his deliberations until then, and fight, if fight he must, with

augmented strength.

Marius Celsus supported Paulinus. Annius Gallus had been hurt a 33

few days before by a fall from his horse, but messengers were sent to

inquire his views, and they reported that he too agreed. Otho inclined

to a decisive engagement. His brother Titianus and Proculus, the

prefect of the Guard, with all the impatience of inexperience, stoutly

maintained that fortune and Providence, and Otho's own good genius

inspired his policy, and would inspire its performance. They had

descended to flattery by way of checking opposition. When it was

decided to take the offensive, the question arose whether Otho in

person should take part in the battle or hold himself in reserve. His

evil counsellors again carried their point. Otho was to retire to

Brixellum,[287] and, by withdrawing from the hazards of the field,

reserve himself for the supreme control of the campaign and of the

empire. To this Paulinus and Celsus offered no further opposition, for

fear of seeming to endanger the person of their prince. From this day

dates the decline of Otho's party. Not only did he take with him a

considerable force of the Guards, Body Guard, and cavalry, but the

spirit of the troops who remained behind was broken. The men trusted

no one but Otho, and Otho no one but the men. His generals were under

suspicion and their authority left in doubt.[288]

None of these arrangements failed to reach the ears of the 34

Vitellians. Desertions were frequent, as they always are in civil war,

and the scouts in their eagerness to discover the enemy's plans always

failed to conceal their own. Caecina and Valens, counting on the fatal

impatience of the enemy, remained quietly on their guard to see what

they would do: for it is always wisdom to profit by another's folly.

Feigning an intention of crossing the Po, they began to construct a

bridge, partly as a demonstration against the gladiators[289] on the

opposite bank, partly to find something for their idle troops to do.

Boats were placed at equal intervals with their heads up stream and

fastened together by strong wooden planks. They also cast anchors from

them to ensure the solidity of the bridge, but they allowed the

hawsers to drift slack, so that when the river rose the boats might

all rise with it without the line being broken. To guard the bridge a

high tower was built out on the end boat, from which they could

repulse the enemy with various artillery. Meanwhile the Othonians had

built a tower on the bank and kept up a steady shower of stones and

torches.

In midstream there was an island, to which the gladiators tried to 35

make their way in boats, but the Germans swam over and got there

first. When a good number of them had swam across, Macer manned some

Liburnian cruisers[290] and attacked them with the bravest of his

gladiators. But they fought with less courage than soldiers, and from

their unsteady boats they could not shoot so well as the others, who

had a firm footing on the bank. Swaying this way and that in their

alarm, the sailors and the marines were beginning to get in each

other's way, when the Germans actually leapt into the shallows, caught

hold of the boats by the stern, and either clambered up by the

gangways or sunk them bodily with their own hands. All this took place

before the eyes of both armies[291], and the higher rose the spirits

of the Vitellians, the greater became the indignation of the Othonians

against Macer, the author and cause of their disaster. The 36

remainder of the boats were eventually dragged off,[292] and the

battle ended in flight. The army demanded Macer's execution. He had

been actually wounded by a lance that had been flung at him, and the

soldiers were rushing on him with drawn swords when some tribunes and

centurions intervened and rescued him.

Soon after this, Vestricius Spurinna, on Otho's orders, brought up a

reinforcement of the Guards, leaving behind a small garrison at

Placentia, and before long, Otho sent the consul-elect, Flavius

Sabinus,[293] to take command of Macer's force. This change pleased

the soldiers, but the frequent mutinies made the generals unwilling to

assume such a perilous command.

In some of my authorities[294] I find a statement that either a 37

growing fear of war or dislike of the two emperors, whose

discreditable misconduct grew daily more notorious, led the armies to

hesitate whether they should not give up the struggle and either

themselves combine to choose an emperor or refer the choice to the

senate. This, it is suggested, was the motive of Otho's generals in

advising delay, and Paulinus in particular had high hopes, since he

was the senior ex-consul, and a distinguished general who had earned

a brilliant reputation by his operations in Britain. For my own part,

while I am ready to admit that a few people may have tacitly wished

for peace instead of civil war, or for a good and virtuous emperor

instead of two who were the worst of criminals, yet I imagine that

Paulinus was much too wise to hope that in a time of universal

corruption the people would show such moderation. Those who had

sacrificed peace in a passion for war were not likely to stop the war

from any affection for peace. Nor was it possible that armies whose

language and characteristics differed so widely should ever come to

such an agreement. As for the officers; nearly all of them were

extravagant, bankrupt, and guilty of some crime: they had not a good

enough conscience to put up with any emperor who was not as vicious as

themselves and under an obligation for their services.

The old ingrained human passion for power matured and burst into 38

prominence with the growth of the empire. With straiter resources

equality was easily preserved. But when once we had brought the world

to our feet and exterminated every rival state or king, we were left

free to covet power without fear of interruption. It was then that

strife first broke out between patricians and plebeians: at one time

arose seditious tribunes,[295] at another tyrannous consuls:[296] in

the Forum at Rome were sown the first seeds of civil war. Before long,

Marius, rising from the lowest ranks of the people, and Sulla, the

most cruel of all the nobles, crushed our liberty by force of arms and

substituted a despotism. Then came Pompey, whose aims, though less

patent, were no better than theirs. From that time onwards the one end

sought was supreme power in the state. Even at Pharsalia and Philippi

the citizen armies did not lay down their arms. How then can we

suppose that the troops of Otho and Vitellius would have willingly

stopped the war? The same anger of heaven, the same human passions,

the same criminal motives drove them into discord. True these wars

were each settled by a single battle, but that was due to the

generals' cowardice. However, my reflections on the ancient and the

modern character have carried me too far: I must now resume the thread

of our narrative.

When Otho started for Brixellum, he left his brother Titianus in 39

nominal command, though the real power lay with the prefect Proculus.

As for Celsus and Paulinus, no use was made of their experience, and

their empty titles were used as a screen for other people's blunders.

The tribunes and centurions felt themselves in an ambiguous position,

seeing the better generals sacrificed and the worst in command. The

men were full of spirit, but preferred criticizing to carrying out

their officers' orders. It was decided to advance and encamp four

miles west of Bedriacum. Though it was spring, and rivers abounded,

the men were very foolishly allowed to suffer from want of water. Here

a council of war was held, for Otho kept sending dispatches urging

haste, and the soldiers kept clamouring for their emperor to lead

them. Many demanded that the troops stationed across the Po[297]

should be brought up. It is not so easy to decide what was the best

thing they could have done as to be sure that what they did do was the

worst. They were in marching order, not fighting trim, and their 40

objective was the confluence of the Po and the Arda,[298] sixteen

miles away. Celsus and Paulinus refused to expose their troops,

fatigued by the march and under heavy kit, to the assault of an enemy

who, while still fresh after covering barely four miles, would

certainly attack them, either while they were in the disorder of a

marching column, or when they had broken up to dig trenches. However,

Titianus and Proculus, worsted in argument, appealed to their

authority: and there arrived post-haste a Numidian orderly with a

peremptory dispatch from Otho, criticizing his generals' inaction, and

ordering them to bring matters to a head. He was sick of delay and too

impatient to live on hope.

On that same day, while Caecina was busy with the bridge-building 41

operations,[299] two officers of the Guards came and demanded an

interview. He was preparing to hear and answer their proposals, when

some scouts burst in with the news that the enemy were close at hand.

The officers' conversation was thus interrupted, and it was left

uncertain whether they were broaching a hostile plot or a piece of

treachery, or some honest plan. Caecina, dismissing the officers, rode

back to the camp, where he found that Valens had given orders to sound

for battle, and the troops were already under arms. While the legions

were balloting for the order in which they were to take the field, the

cavalry rode out and charged. Strange to say, they would have been

hurtled back upon the trenches by a smaller force of Othonians, had

not the Italian legion bravely stopped them by drawing their swords

and forcing them to go back and resume the fight. The Vitellian

legions formed without any disorder, for though the enemy were close

at hand, thick plantations hid the approaching force. In the Othonian

army the generals were nervous and the men ill-disposed towards them:

their march was hindered by carts and camp-followers, and the high

road,[300] with its deep ditches on either side, was too narrow even

for a peaceful march. Some of the men formed round their standards,

others went searching for their place: on every side there was an

uproar as men ran about shouting to each other: the boldest kept

pressing on to the front, while the tide of the timid ebbed to the

rear.

Amid the confusion of this sudden panic somebody invented a story 42

that Vitellius' army had abandoned his cause, whereupon an

unwarrantable glee relaxed their efforts. It was never fully known

whether this report was spread by Vitellian scouts or whether it was

started on Otho's side, either by treachery or chance. Losing all

their thirst for battle the Othonians actually broke into a cheer. The

enemy answered with angry shouts, and most of Otho's soldiers, having

no idea what caused the cheering, feared treachery. At this point the

Vitellian line charged. They were fresh, and in good order, stronger

and more numerous. However, the Othonians, despite their disorder,

fewer numbers, and fatigue, offered a stubborn resistance. The ground

was encumbered with orchards and vineyards, and the character of the

battle varied accordingly. They fought now from a distance, now at

close quarters, and charged sometimes in detachment, sometimes in

column.[301] On the raised high-road they fought hand to hand, using

the weight of their bodies and their shields. They gave up throwing

their javelins and cut through helmet and breastplate with sword and

axe. Each man knew his foe; they were in view of the other

troops;[302] and they fought as if the whole issue of the war depended

on them.

It happened that two legions met in the open fields between the 43

high road and the Po. These were: for Vitellius the Twenty-first,

commonly called Rapax,[303] a regiment of old renown; and for Otho the

First Adiutrix,[304] which had never been in battle before, but was

full of spirit and eager to win its first laurels. Their charge

overthrew the front ranks of the Twenty-first, and they carried off

its eagle. Fired with indignation, the Twenty-first rallied and

charged the front of the enemy, killing the commanding officer,

Orfidius Benignus, and capturing many of their colours.

On the other flank the Fifth[305] drove the Thirteenth[306] off the

field. The Fourteenth[307] were surrounded by the numbers that

attacked them. Otho's generals had long ago fled. Caecina and Valens

began to bring up the reserves to the support of their men, and, as a

fresh reinforcement, there arrived Varus Alfenus[308] with his

Batavians. They had routed the gladiators[309] by confronting them and

cutting them to pieces in the river before their transports could

land, and flushed by their victory came charging in upon the flank of

the enemy.

Their centre broken, the Othonians fled in disorder, making for 44

Bedriacum. The distance was immense;[310] the road encumbered with

heaps of dead. This made the slaughter all the greater, for in civil

war captives cannot be turned to profit.[311] Suetonius Paulinus and

Licinius Proculus avoided the camp at Bedriacum by diverse routes.

Vedius Aquila, who commanded the Thirteenth legion, was so paralysed

by fear that he allowed himself to fall into the hands of the

indignant troops. It was still broad daylight when he entered the

camp. Immediately a crowd of mutinous fugitives came clamouring round

him. They spared neither abuse nor violence, assailing him as a

deserter and a traitor. They could bring no special charge against

him, but the mob always lay their own disgrace on some one else. Night

came to the aid of Titianus and Celsus, for Annius Gallus[312] had

already placed sentinels on guard and got the men under control. Using

remonstrances, prayers, and commands, he had induced them not to add

to the disaster of their defeat by murdering their own friends.

Whether the war was over, or whether they wanted to fight again, in

defeat, he told them, union was the one thing that could help them.

All the other troops[313] were crushed by the blow. The Guards

complained that they had been beaten, not by the enemy's valour, but

by sheer treachery. 'Why,' they said, 'even the Vitellians have won no

bloodless victory. We beat their cavalry and captured a standard from

one of their legions. We still have Otho left and all the troops with

him on the other side of the Po. The Moesian legions[314] are on their

way. There is a large force left at Bedriacum. These, at any rate,

have not been defeated yet. Better fall, if need be, on the field.'

Now exasperated, now depressed by these reflections, they were in a

state of blank despair, which more often aroused their anger than

their fear.

The Vitellian army halted at the fifth mile-stone on the road from 45

Bedriacum. Their generals would not venture to storm the camp that

same day, and hoped the enemy would consent to surrender. However,

although they were in fighting trim, and had no implements for digging

trenches, they felt safe with their arms and the pride of victory. On

the next day there was no doubt about the wishes of the Othonians.

Even those who showed most spirit had now changed their minds. So they

sent a deputation. The Vitellian generals had no hesitation in

granting terms. However, they detained the deputation for a short

time, which caused some qualms to those who did not know whether it

had been successful. At length the envoys returned, and the gates of

the camp were opened. Then both victors and vanquished burst into

tears, and with a sort of sorrowful satisfaction cursed their fate of

civil war. There in one tent were men of both armies, nursing a

wounded brother or some other relative. Their hopes of recompense were

doubtful: all that was certain was bereavement and grief, for no one

was so fortunate as to mourn no loss. They searched for the body of

the fallen officer, Orfidius, and burnt it with due solemnity. Of the

other dead, some were buried by their relatives, the rest were left

lying on the ground.

Otho[315] was awaiting news of the battle with perfect confidence 46

and firm resolve. First came a disquieting rumour. Soon fugitives from

the field revealed the ruin of his cause. But the soldiers in their

zeal did not wait to hear their emperor speak. 'Keep a good heart,'

they said, 'you still have fresh forces left, and, as for us, we are

ready to risk everything and suffer everything.' Nor was this

flattery. In a wild passion of enthusiasm they urged him to march to

the field and restore the fortunes of his party. Those who were near

him clasped his knees, while those who stood further off stretched out

their arms to him.[316] The most eager of all was Plotius Firmus, the

Prefect of the Guard, who besought Otho again and again not to desert

a supremely faithful army, men who had done him such great service. He

told him that it showed more courage to bear misfortune than to give

in: that men of vigour and courage cling to their hopes even in the

face of disaster: it is only cowards who let their terror hurry them

into despair. Amid all these appeals the soldiers now cheered, now

groaned, according as Otho's expression showed signs of yielding or

seemed to harden. Nor were these feelings confined to Otho's own

Guards. The first arrivals from Moesia assured him that the spirit of

the advancing force was just as firm, and that they had already

entered Aquileia.[317] There is no room for doubt that it was still

possible to revive this cruel and pitiable war, so full of uncertainty

to both parties.[318]

Otho himself disliked the policy of fighting. 'Am I,' he said, 'to 47

expose all your splendid courage and devotion to further risks? That

would be too great a price to pay for my life. Your high hopes of

succeeding, if I were minded to live, will only swell the glory of my

death. We have learnt to know each other, Fortune and I. Do not reckon

the length of my reign. Self-control is all the harder when a man

knows that his fortune cannot last. It was Vitellius who began the

civil war. He originated the policy of fighting for the throne. But

one battle is enough. This is the precedent that I will set. Let

posterity judge me by it. I do not grudge Vitellius his brother, or

wife, or children. I want neither revenge nor consolation. Others may

have held the sceptre longer, but no one can ever have laid it down so

bravely. Am I the man to allow the flower of Rome in all these famous

armies to be mown down once again and lost to the country? Let me take

with me the consciousness that you would have died for me. But you

must stay and live. No more delay. I must no longer interfere with

your chance of pardon, nor you with my resolve. It is a sort of

cowardice to go on talking about the end. Here is your best proof of

my determination: I complain of no one. To blame gods or men is his

alone who fain would keep his life.'

After some such speech as this he urged them courteously to hurry 48

away and not to exasperate the victor by their hesitation. To each

man's age and position he paid due regard, using his authority with

the young and persuasion with his elders, while his quiet looks and

firm speech helped to control their ill-timed tears. He gave orders

for boats and carriages to be provided for their departure. All

petitions and letters containing any compliments to himself, or marked

insults to Vitellius, he destroyed, and distributed his money

carefully, not like a man at the point of death. He then actually

tried to comfort the sorrowful fears of his nephew, Salvius

Cocceianus,[319] by praising his attachment and chiding his alarm. 'Do

you imagine,' he said, 'that Vitellius will be so hard-hearted as not

to show me some gratitude for saving his whole household? By promptly

putting an end to myself, I deserve to earn some mercy for my family.

For it is not in blank despair, but with my army clamouring for

battle, that I determine to save my country from the last calamities.

I have won enough fame for myself and ennoblement for my posterity;

for, after the line of the Julians, Claudians, Servians,[320] I have

been the first to bring the principate into a new family. So rouse

yourself and go on with your life. Never forget that Otho was your

uncle, yet keep your remembrance within bounds.'

After this he made them all retire and rested for a while. But his 49

last reflections were interrupted by a sudden disturbance and the news

of a mutinous outbreak among the troops. They were threatening to kill

all those who were leaving, and turned with especial violence against

Verginius,[321] whose house was in a state of siege. Otho rebuked the

ringleaders and returned, consenting to receive the adieux of those

who were going, until it was time for them to depart in safety. As the

day deepened into evening he quenched his thirst with a drink of iced

water. Two daggers were brought to him and, after trying them both, he

put one under his pillow. Being assured on inquiry that his friends

had started, he spent a peaceful night, not, it is said, without

sleep. At break of day[322] he fell upon his dagger. Hearing his dying

groan, his slaves and freedmen entered with Plotius Firmus, the

Prefect of the Guards, and found a single wound in his breast. The

funeral was hurried forward out of respect for his own earnest

entreaties, for he had been afraid his head might be cut off and

subjected to outrage. The Guard carried the body, sounding his praises

with tears in their eyes, and covering his hands and wounded breast

with kisses. Some of the soldiers killed themselves beside the pyre,

not because they had harmed Vitellius or feared reprisals, but from

love of their emperor, and to follow his noble example. Similar

suicides became common afterwards at Bedriacum and Placentia, and in

other encampments.[323] An inconspicuous tomb was built for Otho, as

being less likely to be disturbed: and thus he ended his life in his

thirty-seventh year.

Otho came originally from the borough of Ferentium.[324] His 50

father had been consul and his grandfather praetor. His mother's

family was inferior, but not without distinction.[325] His boyhood and

youth were such as we have seen. By his two great acts,[326] one most

criminal and the other heroic, he earned in equal measure the praise

and the reprobation of posterity. It would certainly be beneath the

dignity of my task to collect fabulous rumours for the amusement of my

readers, but there are certain popular traditions which I cannot

venture to contradict. On the day of the battle of Bedriacum,

according to the account of the local peasants, a strange bird

appeared in a much-frequented grove near Regium Lepidum.[327] There it

sat, unterrified and unmoved, either by the crowds of people or by the

birds which fluttered round it, until the moment at which Otho killed

himself. Then it vanished. A calculation of the time showed that the

prodigy's appearance and disappearance coincided with the beginning of

the battle[328] and Otho's death.

At his funeral the rage and grief of the soldiers broke out into 51

another mutiny. This time there was no one to control them. They

turned to Verginius and begged him with threats now to accept the

principate, now to head a deputation to Caecina and Valens. However,

Verginius escaped them, slipping out by the back door of his house

just as they broke in at the front. Rubrius Gallus carried a petition

from the Guards at Brixellum, and obtained immediate pardon.

Simultaneously Flavius Sabinus surrendered to the victor the troops

under his command.[329]

FOOTNOTES:

[273] Pavia.

[274] i. 66.

[275] i. 59 and 64.

[276] See chap. 14.

[277] It is Tacitus who has mixed the metaphors.

[278] See i. 66.

[279] i.e. he pretended that not all but only a few were to

blame (cp. i. 84).

[280] Valens had by now Legion V, I Italica, detachments from

I, XV, XVI, and Taurus' Horse: Caecina had Legion XXI and

detachments from IV and VII.

[281] Cp. i. 53.

[282] Cp. i. 66.

[283] He had made his name in a Moorish war (A.D. 42), when he

had penetrated as far as Mount Atlas, and increased his

reputation by suppressing the rebellion of Boadicea when he

was governor of Britain (A.D. 59).

[284] Otho held the fleets.

[285] He means that they would be, if they took his advice and

retired across the Po to the south bank.

[286] According to the rumours quoted in chap. 46 they were

already at Aquileia, near Venice, but Suetonius, whose father

was at this time a tribune in the Thirteenth, says that they

heard of Otho's death before arriving at Aquileia.

[287] Brescello.

[288] No one knew for certain who was in command. We are told

in chap. 39 that he left Titianus in nominal command, though

the real authority lay with Proculus.

[289] Macer's, see chap. 23.

[290] See note 247.

[291] i.e. of Macer's gladiators on one bank and the

detachment employed by Caecina for bridge-building, &c., on

the other. The main armies were Otho's at Bedriacum and

Vitellius' at Cremona.

[292] i.e. from the Germans who were trying to board or sink them.

[293] See i. 77.

[294] Plutarch, in his Life of Otho, after quoting the view of

the emperor's secretary, Secundus, that Otho was over-strained

and desperate, goes on to give the explanation of 'others'.

This agrees exactly with the story given here. Plutarch and

Tacitus are apparently quoting from the same authority,

unknown to us, perhaps Cluvius Rufus.

[295] e.g. the brothers Gracchus, Saturninus, and Drusus.

[296] e.g. Appius Claudius and L. Opimius, of whom Plutarch

says that in suppressing C. Gracchus he used his consular

authority like that of a dictator.

[297] At Brixellum.

[298] About seven miles below Cremona. The Medicean MS. has

Adua, but as the mouth of the Adua is seven miles west of

Cremona and Bedriacum twenty-two miles east of Cremona, the

figures given do not suit. For Tacitus says that they marched

first four miles and then sixteen. Mr. Henderson proposes to

solve the difficulty by reading _quartum decimum_ for

_quartum_ in chap. 39. But his reasons are purely _a priori_.

If the confluence was that of the _Arda_ with the Po, Tacitus'

_quartum_ is still unsatisfactory, but the distances given in

Plutarch's Life of Otho would suit the facts. He makes the

first march a little over six miles. From the camp then

pitched to the mouth of the Arda would be by road about

sixteen miles. Thus Tacitus' first figure may be a slight

underestimate and his second figure correct. The second day's

march, according to Plutarch, was rather more than twelve

miles, so we may suppose that the armies met about four miles

short of the confluence, which was the Othonians' objective.

This suits Paulinus' suggestion a few lines lower that the

Vitellians need only march four miles to catch them in

marching column. The whole question is fully discussed by Mr.

Henderson (op. cit.) and by Mr. E.G. Hardy in the _Journal of

Philology_, vol. xxxi, no. 61.

[299] See 34 and 35.

[300] Via Postumia.

[301] The word here used, _cuneus_ (a wedge), should mean

strictly a V-shaped formation, which the troops also called

'pig's-head'. But it is also used more generally of any

attacking column advancing to pierce the enemy's line, or

indeed of any body of men in close order.

[302] Because they were on the raised Postumian road.

[303] i.e. The Irresistibles.

[304] The quondam marines (cp. i. 6, &c.).

[305] From Lower Germany (cp. i. 55 and 61).

[306] From Pannonia (cp. chap. 24).

[307] Only a detachment of the Fourteenth was present at this

battle, as is explained below, chap. 66.

[308] The camp-prefect (chap. 29). The Batavians are the

detachment which had left the Fourteenth (chap. 27).

[309] This is not an allusion to the fight described in chap.

35. The gladiators, now under Sabinus (ch. 36) seem to have

suffered a second defeat.

[310] The fixing of this distance rests on the doubtful

figures in chap. 39. In any case it must have been between

fourteen and twenty miles.

[311] Plutarch in describing this rout makes the same rather

cynical comment. Dio puts the total loss on both sides at

40,000.

[312] He had remained behind in camp (cp. chap. 33).

[313] i.e. other than the Guards.

[314] See chap. 32.

[315] At Brixellum.

[316] Plutarch adds a picturesque detail: 'One of the common

soldiers held up his sword and saying, "See, Caesar, we are

all prepared to do _this_ for you," he stabbed himself.'

[317] See note 286.

[318] According to Plutarch, Otho's generals, Celsus, Gallus,

and Titianus, capitulated at once and admitted Caecina to the

camp. Tacitus would doubtless have condemned Plutarch's story

for its lack of tragic pathos. The facts, however, are against

Tacitus. Now that his main force had capitulated at Bedriacum,

Otho had no sufficient army to fight with, since the

Vitellians lay between him and his Danube army at Aquileia.

[319] Titianus' son. He was eventually executed by Domitian

for keeping Otho's birthday.

[320] _Servius_ Sulpicius Galba.

[321] The conqueror of Vindex, now consul-elect (cp. i. 77).

[322] April 17.

[323] Cp. note 316.

[324] Ferento in Etruria.

[325] Albia Terentia was the daughter of a knight who had not

risen to office.

[326] Galba's murder and his own suicide.

[327] Reggio.

[328] Accepting Meiser's suggestion _cum initio pugnae et cum

Othonis exitu_.

VITELLIUS' PRINCIPATE

Now that the war was everywhere ended, a large number of senators, 52

who had quitted Rome with Otho and been left behind at Mutina,[330]

found themselves in a critical position. When the news of the defeat

reached Mutina, the soldiers paid no heed to what they took for a

baseless rumour, and, believing the senators to be hostile to Otho,

they treasured up their conversation and put the worst interpretation

on their looks and behaviour. In time they broke into abusive

reproaches, seeking a pretext for starting a general massacre, while

the senators suffered at the same time from another source of alarm,

for they were afraid of seeming to be slow in welcoming the victory of

the now predominant Vitellian party. Terrified at their double danger,

they held a meeting. For no one dared to form any policy for himself;

each felt safer in sharing his guilt with others. The town-council of

Mutina, too, kept adding to their anxiety by offering them arms and

money, styling them with ill-timed respect 'Conscript Fathers'. A 53

remarkable quarrel arose at this meeting. Licinius Caecina attacked

Eprius Marcellus[331] for the ambiguity of his language. Not that the

others disclosed their sentiments, but Caecina, who was still a

nobody, recently raised to the senate, sought to distinguish himself

by quarrelling with some one of importance, and selected Marcellus,

because the memory of his career as an informer made him an object of

loathing. They were parted by the prudent intervention of their

betters, and all then retired to Bononia,[332] intending to continue

the discussion there, and hoping for more news in the meantime. At

Bononia they dispatched men along the roads in every direction to

question all new-comers. From one of Otho's freedmen they inquired why

he had come away, and were told he was carrying his master's last

instructions: the man said that when he had left, Otho was still

indeed alive, but had renounced the pleasures of life and was devoting

all his thoughts to posterity. This filled them with admiration. They

felt ashamed to ask any more questions--and declared unanimously for

Vitellius.

Vitellius' brother Lucius was present at their discussion, and now 54

displayed his willingness to receive their flattery, but one of Nero's

freedmen, called Coenus, suddenly startled them all by inventing the

atrocious falsehood that the Fourteenth legion had joined forces with

the troops at Brixellum, and that their sudden arrival had turned the

fortune of the day: the victorious army had been cut to pieces. He

hoped by inventing this good news to regain some authority for Otho's

passports,[333] which were beginning to be disregarded. He did,

indeed, thus insure for himself a quick journey to Rome, but was

executed by order of Vitellius a few days later. However, the senate's

danger was augmented because the soldiers believed the news. Their

fears were the more acute, because it looked as if their departure

from Mutina was an official move of the Council of State, which thus

seemed to have deserted the party. So they refrained from holding any

more meetings, and each shifted for himself, until a letter arrived

from Fabius Valens which quieted their fears. Besides, the news of

Otho's death travelled all the more quickly because it excited

admiration.

At Rome, however, there was no sign of panic. The festival of 55

Ceres[334] was celebrated by the usual crowds. When it was reported in

the theatre on reliable authority that Otho had renounced his

claim,[335] and that Flavius Sabinus,[336] the City Prefect, had made

all the troops in Rome swear allegiance to Vitellius, the audience

cheered Vitellius. The populace decked all the busts of Galba with

laurel-leaves and flowers, and carried them round from temple to

temple. The garlands were eventually piled up into a sort of tomb near

Lake Curtius,[337] on the spot which Galba had stained with his

life-blood. In the senate the distinctions devised during the long

reigns of other emperors were all conferred on Vitellius at once.[338]

To these was added a vote of thanks and congratulation to the German

army, and a deputation was dispatched to express the senate's

satisfaction. Letters were read which Fabius Valens had addressed to

the consuls in very moderate terms. But Caecina's moderation was still

more gratifying: he had not written at all.[339]

However, Italy found peace a more ghastly burden than the war. 56

Vitellius' soldiers scattered through all the boroughs and colonial

towns, indulging in plunder, violence, and rape. Impelled by their

greed or the promise of payment, they cared nothing for right and

wrong: kept their hands off nothing sacred or profane. Even civilians

put on uniform and seized the opportunity to murder their enemies. The

soldiers themselves, knowing the countryside well, marked down the

richest fields and wealthiest houses for plunder, determined to murder

any one who offered resistance. Their generals were too much in their

debt to venture any opposition. Of the two Caecina showed less greed

and more ambition. Valens had earned a bad name by his own ill-gotten

gains, and was therefore bound to shut his eyes to others'

shortcomings.[340] The resources of Italy had long been exhausted; all

these thousands of infantry and cavalry, all this violence and damage

and outrage was almost more than the country could bear.

Meanwhile Vitellius knew nothing of his victory. With the 57

remainder of his German army he continued to advance as though the war

had just begun. A few of the veterans were left in winter quarters,

and troops were hurriedly enlisted in the Gallic provinces, to fill up

the vacancies in what were now mere skeleton legions.[341] Leaving

Hordeonius Flaccus to guard the line of the Rhine, Vitellius advanced

with a picked detachment from the army in Britain, eight thousand

strong. After a few days' march he received news of the victory of

Bedriacum and the collapse of the war on the death of Otho. He

summoned a meeting and heaped praise on the courage of the troops.

When the army demanded that he should confer equestrian rank on his

freedman Asiaticus, he checked their shameful flattery. Then with

characteristic instability he granted at a private banquet what he had

refused in public. This Asiaticus, who was thus decorated with the

gold ring, was an infamous menial who rose by his vices.[342]