London: John Murray, Albemarle Street.
_Stanford’s Geographical Establishment, London._
]
[Illustration: BATTLEFIELD OF PLATAEA
London: John Murray, Albemarle Street.
_Stanford’s Geographical Establishment, London._
]
Footnotes.
[1] See note at the end of the Preface.
[2] It would be misleading to claim any exact accuracy for the
chronology of this period. All that can be said is that the dates
given are nearly correct. It is, therefore, undesirable to use the
preposition “in” when the preposition “about” represents in reality the
extent of our knowledge.
[3] Herodotus, speaking probably of the earlier part of the reign,
mentions twenty. The Behistun inscription enumerates twenty-three; the
inscription of Naksh-i-Rustem twenty-eight.
[4] Any date after 511 is highly improbable, because in that year
Hippias was driven out of Athens and retired to Sigeum. Had the
expedition taken place after his arrival there, it is almost certain
that he would have accompanied Darius. Other considerations tend in the
same direction.
[5] Herodotus says seven hundred thousand men and six hundred ships.
This would imply that somewhat more than the ordinary general levy of
the Empire was called out for the expedition. The numbers are almost
certainly exaggerated.
The number of ships, viz. six hundred, as stated by Herodotus, is
somewhat suspicious. The Persian fleet at Ladé is stated to have been
six hundred (H. vi. 9). At Marathon it is the same (vi. 95). These
may be mere vague calculations without any real foundation; it may
be that six hundred was the ordinary official number of vessels that
belonged to the Persian war fleet, and that Herodotus has assumed that
on each of these occasions the whole fleet was employed. In the present
instance, he does not mention any save the Greek contingents. It is
extremely unlikely that the Greeks could furnish six hundred vessels.
They could only raise three-fifths of that number at the time of the
battle of Ladé. Still, Herodotus knows so little about the present
expedition, that his omission to mention other contingents, if not a
mere oversight, may be due to the want of information.
♠ “at Lade” replaced with “at Ladé”
[6] As it is important to note the exact nature of the traceable
evidence on which Herodotus bases the various details he gives of the
campaign, it may be pointed out in the present case that he states
that Darius set up pillars with bilingual inscriptions at the point
of crossing, and that the Byzantians removed them to their city, and
used them for the altar of the temple of Artemis Orthosia. One stone,
covered with Assyrian letters, was left in the temple of Dionysus.
This is apparently the statement of one who has seen them there; and
the sentence which follows, in which Herodotus gives his own view as to
the position of the bridge, tends to confirm this impression.
Those who have seen the terrific current off Seraglio Point at
Constantinople will understand that the bridge could hardly have been
constructed opposite Kalchedon.
Herodotus’ residence at Samos would enable him to obtain some sort of
information with regard to the work of a Samian architect. He must
have seen, too, the picture of the bridge, with the accompanying
inscription, dedicated by Mandrocles, the engineer, in the temple of
Hera.
[7] Probably further up, since there are great marshes on the north
side of the river near the mouths of the Sereth and Pruth. It is more
probable that it was between Tchernavoda and the great bend to the
Delta.
[8] An examination of the map will show that this point, though its
exact identification has not yet been satisfactorily ascertained, must
have been on or close to the direct route from Byzantion northwards.
[9] It may seem strange to suppose for one moment that the words could
apply to those cities whose subjection to Persia is certainly _implied_
in the earlier part of the account of the Scythian expedition. It must
be remembered, however, that Herodotus never mentions the circumstances
or even the fact of their previous reduction.
[10] I take it that the Lake Prasias of Herodotus is to be identified
with the lower of the two lakes of the Strymon, and not with the Upper,
as in Kiepert’s recent Atlas.
[11] Οὐκ ... ἀρχὴν Translation very uncertain, _vide_ Liddell & Scott’s
Lexicon. _May_ mean “not originally,” or even “not at all.”
[12] I would refer those who wish to examine it in detail to the
excellent notes on the subject in Macan’s “Herodotus,” vol. i p. 162,
_ff_.
[13] Macan, _ad loc. cit._
[14] Manuscript text ἄνεως or ἄνεος gives no sense. Restorations
proposed ἄνεσις or ἀνανέωσις. _Vide_ Macan, note, vol. i. p. 170.
[15] In attempting to write the history of the revolt, I have been
immensely aided and considerably influenced by the acute analysis of
that section of Herodotus’ history which is contained in Mr. Macan’s
edition of H. iv., v., vi. I have not in all cases, as will be seen,
adopted his conclusions in detail. The very excellence of Mr. Macan’s
work renders it all but impossible to avoid plagiarism in matter if not
in actual words. But if I am guilty, I am guilty of the sincerest form
of flattery.
[16] Cf. H. v. 96, _ad fin_. and 97, where Herodotus clearly _implies_
that the demand had been made no long time before Aristagoras arrived
at Athens, which was, of course, after the events at Naxos, and after
the die of revolt had been cast.
[17] As Macan points out, the story was in all probability a celebrated
story of the period; and “the man with the tattooed head” played the
same part in Greek legend as “the man with the iron mask” in that of
later days.
[18] _Vide_ Macan, “Herod.”
[19] Cf. H. v. 49. Ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιοι λέγουσι.
[20] The detail of the “guides” is improbable. The road the expedition
followed was the high road from Ephesus to Sardes.
[21] The ἐβοήθεον τοῖσι Λυδοῖσι in H. v. 102 is a somewhat remarkable
expression. It might have been thought that it was Artaphernes, cooped
up in the citadel of Sardes, who would be first in the thoughts of the
Persian commanders. Did the Lydians still remember against the Greek
the betrayal of Crœsus? Or had Persia been favouring the Lydian against
the Greek trade, and so forwarded the conspiracy of revolt? It appears
as if we have a faint trace of one of those numerous lost motives of
the history of the fifth century.
[22] The προπυνθανόμενοι indicates that they had early information of
the attack. It cannot, however, have reached them prior to the landing
near Ephesus, for Artaphernes was caught unprepared, and it cannot
be supposed that he received later intelligence than the commanders
farther inland.
[23] Another possible cause may have been a change in the preponderance
of political parties at Athens during this year.
[24] Cf. opening words of v. 103.
[25] Mr. Macan attributes the spread of the revolt from Cyprus to
Byzantion to the autumn of 498 (vol. ii. p. 69). I do not understand
his reasons for so doing. Herodotus (v. 103) seems to cite the
expedition to Byzantion as an example of the energy which the Ionians
threw into the revolt in spite of the refusal of the Athenians to give
further aid, a refusal which must be attributed to the winter of 498–97.
[26] I am fully aware of the significance of the words ὡς καὶ τοὺς
Ἴωνας ἐπύθετο ἀπεστάναι. But I would suggest that, reading them with
their context, they point to the beginning of a plot of revolt, rather
than to its actual outbreak.
[27] Mr. Macan proposes an Athenian origin for this tale of the events
at Susa. Yet the Athenians were not likely to suggest to the world that
they had brought on Greece all the trouble of the period of the great
war. Herodotus may have simply reproduced, with additions by himself, a
pan-Hellenic version of a famous tale.
[28] Herodotus applies the name to a promontory, but Strabo, 682, says
that the Keys are two islands off the east coast of Cyprus.
[29] To show the utter confusion of Herodotus’ narrative in this
respect, it is only necessary to point out that he implies that
Daurises immediately (v. 116) after the battle near Ephesus proceeded
to reduce part of the Hellespontine district, which, if his previous
account of the course affairs is to be credited (v. 103) did not revolt
until months after the battle. Moreover, Daurises (v. 117) wins rapid
successes in this region, and then is recalled by the revolt in Caria,
which cannot have been brought about (v. 103), at the most moderate
calculation, within six months of the battle near Ephesus.
[30] My view, stated briefly, is that the events recounted in H. v.
116, _ff_., cannot be earlier than 496.
[31] Ταύτας μὲν ἐπ᾽ ἡμέρῃ ἑκάστῃ αἵρεε.
[32] Not the celebrated stream of the Marsyas legend.
[33] Herodotus mentions Pixodaros of Kindys, a son of Mausolos, as
proposer of the first of those alternative plans. The connection of
the name Mausolos with Halikarnassos a century later, 377–353 (_vide_
Macan), suggests the possibility that this man had also a connection
with Herodotus’ native town, and that the story, like those tales of
Artemisia in the narrative of the campaign of 480, is a part of the
historian’s work which can be definitely assigned to a Halikarnassian
source.
[34] H. v. 120, Μιλήσιοι τε καὶ οἱ τούτων σύμμαχοι cannot mean a
Pan-Ionian force. The nearness of Labraunda seems to have encouraged
the Milesians and their nearest neighbours to venture on an attempt to
save Caria. The other Ionians, in all probability, had their attention
occupied by a Persian army sufficiently large to make it necessary for
them to stay and guard their homes.
[35] On the manifest improbability of Hecatæus having proposed anything
of the kind, _vide_ Macan, vol. i., note on p. 267.
[36] Ἐπιστάμενος seems to be used emphatically.
[37] I think it best to postpone the discussion of the evidence on this
point until, taken in its chronological order, it is complete.
[38] The taking of Miletus is evidently assumed by Herodotus to have
occurred in the same campaigning season as the battle of Ladé. There is
no trace of a winter intervening between the battle and its capture.
Cf. H. vi. 18.
[39] Ἀγνωμοσύνῃ τε διεχρέωντο.
[40] Chapter 17.
[41] The existence of such a tale in Herodotus suggests the possibility
that his anti-Ionian bias was founded on something more than
Halikarnassian or Dorian prejudice; that it was, indeed, largely based
upon the colouring given to the story of the revolt by those sections
of the populations of the Ionian towns who were dissatisfied with the
way in which the operations were carried on, or whose conduct had been
such as to excite the criticism of those insurgents who had shown a
more persistent courage.
[42] Cf. Οὐκ ἔχω ἀτρεκέως συγγράψαι; ἀλλήλους γὰρ καταιτιῶνται.
[43] “In column,” probably a detail in accordance with Herodotus’
previous statement as to the “manœuvre of cutting the line;” in
fact, a conjecture of the historian’s own. The Chians are described
as “διεκπλέοντες” in the course of the battle. Had Dionysios of
Phokæa, then, so convinced them of the value of this manœuvre that
they practised it, in spite of the fact that they had forty marines on
board each vessel, _i.e._ were prepared for a wholly different form of
tactics?
[44] As Macan and others point out, this dedication was probably made
after Mykale.
[45] H. vi. 23, 24.
[46] The emphatic mention of these Lesbians in this passage has
suggested the idea that this attack on Chios was an act of spite on the
part of the Æolian Lesbians against the Ionian Chians.
Those who maintain this view seem to leave out of account two difficult
questions which it must raise:—
(1) What conceivable object can the Lesbians have had—
(_a_) In making such an attack for such a motive;
(_b_) In running the great risk it involved at a time when the
victorious Phœnician fleet was within a few hours’ sail of
Chios?
(2) Taking Herodotus’ tale as it stands, who are the Ionians (Chap,
xxviii., _ad init._) who accompany Histiæus and the Æolians in their
attack on Thasos, if they are not from Chios?
[47] _Vide_ Kiepert’s most recent map of Asia Minor.
[48] Artaphernes there, and therefore campaigning season probably over.
[49] Like many other geographical names of ancient and modern times,
this was used in both a wider and a narrower sense. It is applied by
Herodotus in some passages to the whole region from the Pontus to the
Hellespont; in others to the immediate neighbourhood of the Hellespont.
It is used here in the wider sense.
[50] The practical difficulties of the history are rendered all the
greater by the uncertainty of the interpretation of the text in the
opening of H. vi. 40.
[51] The all but complete absence of any details of Miltiades’ life
between the time of the Scythian expedition and the end of the Ionian
Revolt seems to me to support the view that there is very little
_documentary_ evidence underlying Herodotus’ history, save that of
inscriptions and of other official documents, demonstrable instances
of whose use are rare. Had the historian made large use of private
memoirs, supposing such existed, it is unlikely that he would have
omitted to have recourse to the records of the Philaid family.
[52] The significance of this last assertion is very striking. The
reference is to the Ionian towns especially, which, on the indication
of purely general evidence, might be supposed to have been tributary to
Athens at the time to which Herodotus refers.
The question raised belongs obviously to a period much later than 479
B.C., and must be left for discussion in a work dealing with the period
between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.
Meanwhile I would refer English students of Greek history to the long
note on the subject in Macan, “Herod.” iv., v., vi., vol. i. p. 302.
[53] _E.g._. Strattis of Chios., H. viii. 132.
[54] Cf. H. vi. 43.
[55] The employment of Mardonios on this political business, in a case
in which Artaphernes might have been expected to be the agent for the
carrying out of this particular act of policy, suggests that Darius
had in his mind considerations similar to those which are described by
Tacitus as having influenced the Roman Government in the settlement
of Britain after the revolt of the Iceni: “Missus igitur Petronius
Turpilianus tanquam exorabilior et delictis hostium novus, eoque
pœnitentiæ mitior” (Tac. Agric. xvi.).
[56] It has sometimes been assumed that this was, on the part of
Athens, a direct recognition of Sparta, not merely as the chief power
in Greece, but as exercising some sort of control over Athens itself.
The assumption is possible, but not necessary.
[57] The second part of the objection seems inconsistent with
Herodotus’ own statement, v. 75, that a law had been made some years
before in Sparta to the effect that the two kings might not both
accompany a military expedition. It is, however, possible that this law
applied merely to the command of the army in time of war (_cf_. the
circumstances under which it was made), and that when other important
Government business abroad was on hand, the custom of the Spartan
constitution provided that both kings should take part in it, that each
might act as a check upon the other. It is evident in this instance
that Kleomenes was not in a position to enforce his demands, and even
on the second occasion there is no suggestion of armed interference.
[58] It is not a part of the design of this chapter to discuss in
detail either (_a_) the various palpably unhistorical references to
incidents of the campaign made by the orators of the fourth century, as
well as by later classical authors;
or (_b_) the numerous and varied reconstructions of the history of the
time which have been attempted by modern writers.
The policy thus adopted with regard to the latter is not due to want of
respect, but to want of space. Any full discussion of these theories
would make a book in itself.
They are very fully explained and discussed in—
(1) Busolt’s “Griechische Geschichte;”
(2) Macan, Herod. iv.–vi, vol. 2, Appendix 10,
(3) Hauvette’s “Hérodote;”
and to these I would refer any student who wishes to survey the whole
field of possible and impossible theory.
I owe much to these able summaries of critical discussion, as well as
to other papers which I have read at different times in various German
periodicals.
A very valuable article on the constructive side of the history of the
campaign is that by Mr. J. A. R. Munro, in the _Journal of Hellenic
Studies_, vol. xix., Part II., 1899.
With respect to the ancient authorities, the majority of modern critics
seem to be in agreement that the amount of reliable evidence outside
Herodotus is very small.
The topographical details observable at the present day which have a
bearing on the history of the actual fight are few, though important.
[59] It must at the same time be pointed out that the statement is not
above suspicion in certain respects. Herodotus says, for instance,
that “many of the continentals” and “all the islanders” gave earth and
water. ◆_Cf_. H. vi. 96.◆ Did Naxos give “earth and water”? It is a
very remarkable exception. Who were these “continentals”? Of all the
states only one is mentioned by name—Ægina. Did Ægina really Medize
at this time, or was it merely that Athens feared she might do so, or
might, at any rate, take the opportunity afforded by a Persian attack
to pay off old scores?
[60] The same number as on the Scythian expedition, and at Ladé; and
therefore not on this account very reliable.
[61] Cf. H. vi. 94: Ἐσβαλόμενοι δὲ τοὺς ἵππους ἐς ταύτας [τὰς
ἱππαγωγοὺς νέας] Καὶ τὸν πεζὸν στρατὸν ἐσβιβάσαντες ἐς τὰς νέας, ἔπλεον
ἑξακοσίῃσι τριήρεσι ἐς τὴν Ἰωνίην.
[62] Various exaggerated estimates of these numbers are given in later
historians. Modern authorities have formed estimates varying from
30,000 to 50,000.
6400 Persians fell at Marathon, when the Persian centre must have
been almost wiped out, but when not more than half the Persian army
was engaged in the battle. This would suggest 20,000 as the number
of Persians at Marathon, and about 40,000 as the number of the whole
expedition.
[63] Thuc. ii. 8 is, of course, irreconcilable with this statement. I
do not propose to discuss a question which really does not admit of
any certain solution. There is, of course, a mistake somewhere, but we
cannot pretend at the present day to say where it lies. For discussion,
_vide_ Macan, vol. i. p. 353.
[64] The tale, or, at any rate, certain elements of it, manifestly
originate in a source at Chalkis.
[65] I adopt Stein’s suggestion that κατέργοντες is used
intransitively, as being the most probable of the suggestions which
have been made with regard to the translation or amendment of this
doubtful passage.
[66] _Vide_ “Zur Topographie von Marathon” in the Mittheilungen des
Deutschen Archæologischen Instituts, i. pp. 67–94 (1876).
[67] H. vi. 124: ἀνεδέχθη μὲν γὰρ ἀσπίς· καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι ἄλλως
εἰπεῖν, ἐγένετο γάρ· ὃς μέντοι ἦν ὁ ἀναδέξας, οὐκ ἔχω προσωτέρω εἰπεῖν
τούτων.
[68] Sparta, doubtless, would not act with the Alkmæonidæ.
[69] As represented in some histories of Greece.
[70] As the object of this chapter is not to refute the theories
of others, but to examine and explain the evidence bearing on the
campaign, I do not propose to point out defects in theories which
differ from my own. I am most nearly in agreement with Mr. J. A. R.
Munro. I had formed my opinions on the main questions of the campaign
before I read his article, but it has supplied me with arguments of an
important character which certainly had not occurred to me before I
read it.
[71] In the accepted text of Herodotus the name is Pheidippides, which
is almost certainly a textual error.
[72] These chronological details are important, as they enable us to
construct a diary of events, which is not without its significance in
the narrative of the truce.
[73] It is impossible to say how far this excuse for delay was genuine.
[74] The Persian dead are still unburied when the Spartans visit the
field. ◆H. vi. 120.◆ They leave Sparta on the 15th, and arrive at
Athens on the 17th. A period of several days intervened between the
arrival of the Athenians at Marathon and the battle.
Plutarch (De Herod. Malign. 26) asserts that the battle took place on
the 6th of Boedromion. He accuses Herodotus of suppressing the fact
that the Athenians held a festal procession in honour of the battle on
the 6th of this month.
It is true that the festival did take place on this date; but the day
was chosen, not because it was the date of the battle, but because it
was the festival of Artemis Agrotera, to whom a vow had been made in
case of success, probably before the army started from Athens.
[75] Cf. (Arist.) Athen. Polit. 22.
[76] The original passage in which this is mentioned is the scholion
on Aristophanes, Knights, 778: ἐν Μαραθῶνι: τόπος τῆς Ἀττικῆς εἰς ὃν
ἐνώρμησαν Δᾶτις καὶ Ἀρτάβαζος Μηδικοὶ σατράπαι, etc.
Suidas, a very late author in the 10th and 11th centuries of our
era, reproduces the information, drawing it evidently from the
above-mentioned source.
[77] The fact that the Persians were in battle array seems to
invalidate the theory which has been put forward, that the Persians,
when the Greeks rushed upon them, were marching towards the lower road,
with intent to reach Athens that way. If that had been so, it is not
possible to imagine that the battle could have been the set battle
which it appears to have been according to Herodotus’ description.
His description of the main incidents of the fight seems the most
absolutely reliable part of his narrative.
[78] In the late author Suidas there is a note which gives a positive
support to this negative fact of Herodotus’ silence. He says that the
expression χωρίς ἱππεῖς had become a proverbial expression, originating
from the fact that when Datis invaded Attica, the Ionians who were with
him informed the Athenians that the cavalry were away, and so Miltiades
attacked and won the victory.
[79] The total loss of the Persians is given by Herodotus at 6400.
This is not likely to be an understatement in that 6400 must have been
included the greater part of the Persian centre, which seems to have
been all but annihilated, if the circumstances of the battle be taken
into consideration. It is thus against probability that more than
20,000 Persian troops took part in the engagement.
The comparative smallness of the Persian numbers is further indicated
by the words which tradition attributed to Miltiades. He is said in
the course of his appeal to Kallimachos (ch. 109) to have spoken
confidently of success in case the Greeks took the offensive. There
is no reason to insist on such words having been actually used by
Miltiades. The important historical point is that in the tradition
of the battle which Herodotus followed such language was attributed
to him, language which could not conceivably have been used had the
Persians very greatly outnumbered the Greeks.
[80] Numbers varying from 100,000 to 500,000 are given by various later
authors.
[81] Cornelius Nepos, Justin, Suidas, give estimates of from 9000 to
10,000 Athenians, and 1000 Platæans. Herodotus (ix. 28, 29) gives the
Athenian numbers at Platæa as 8000 hoplites and 8000 light-armed, and
this at a time when many citizens were serving on the fleet at Mykale.
The number 10,000 at Marathon is probably an understatement, though not
one of a gross character.
[82] The Persian position is indicated by three circumstances:—
(1) The position of the “Soros,” which would presumably be situated
where the majority of the Athenians must have fallen, _i.e._ in the
centre of the line; and where, too, the decisive blow of the battle was
struck.
(2) The fact, expressly mentioned by Herodotus, that the Greek centre
was (Chap. 113) driven inland (ἐς τὴν μεσόγαιαν).
(3) The fact that (Chap. 115) the barbarians who escaped seem to have
reached their ships without difficulty.
Hauvette, in assuming the Persians to have been in a position close
to the Charadra, parallel to it, and south of it, ignores these three
points, and places the Persians in about the most disadvantageous
position they could have chosen in the whole plain.
[83] This seems the most probable translation of the word δρόμῳ. Apart
from the physical impossibility of a heavy-armed infantryman advancing
a space of nearly one mile “at a run,” or “at the double,” the word
δρόμῳ seems to be used in a technical sense, taken, as it were, from
the Greek infantry “drill-book” of Herodotus’ own time, implying a pace
faster than that denominated by the technical word βάδην. (For βάδην,
_vide_ Xen. Hell. v. 4. 53, etc.) There cannot be any certainty on this
point, because we know so little of Greek infantry drill at this period.
Another possible explanation of the passage may be that Herodotus has
ascribed to the whole length of the advance a form of movement which
was only adopted when the Greeks came within range of missiles.
[84] Cf. Paus. i 15. 3, where he is describing the picture: Τὸ δὲ ἔσω
τῆς μάχης φεύγοντές εἰσιν οἱ βάρβαροι καὶ ἐς τὸ ἕλος ὠθοῦντες ἀλλήλους.
Those who met this fate must presumably have belonged to the Persian
centre, who would be cut off from the ships by the closing in of the
Greek flanks.
[85] Cf. Paus. i. 32. 3: Καὶ ἕτερος [τάφος] Πλαταιεῦσι Βοιωτῶν καὶ
δούλοις. ἐμαχέσαντο γὰρ καὶ δοῦλοι τότε πρῶτον.
[86] _Ephoros_ [Fragm. 107, Fragm. Histor. Græc.] attributes the
raising of the siege to the fact that the Athenian fleet imagined that
a signal implied that the Persian fleet was still at the neighbouring
island of Mykonos.
He thus seems to assume that the Parian expedition followed
_immediately_ upon Marathon.
It cannot be said that the vague direct evidence on the question
determines this point. It is, however, in the highest degree unlikely
that the expedition was undertaken in the same year as Marathon; and
the detail with regard to the Persian ships seems to have been inserted
in the story either by Ephoros or his original authority,
either (_a_) in order to rationalize a story in which the motive was
inadequate,
or (_b_) because the version followed was one favourable to Miltiades.
Despite his chronological vagueness, Herodotus (vi. 132) clearly
_implies_ an interval between Marathon and the Parian expedition, in
which Miltiades’ reputation stood very high.
[87] In some histories of Greece, discredit is cast upon Herodotus’
assertion that the preparation for the great invasion was begun in the
last years of Darius. In the absence of evidence, this denial of the
stated fact must rest on the basis of general probability.
In reference to this point I would urge that the most noticeable
feature of Darius’ policy towards the west is its extreme tenacity
of purpose. His plans had met with the severest checks in the course
of their operation, yet he and his brother Artaphernes had persisted
in their designs of conquest and acquisition in Europe, whenever
circumstances rendered military and political interference possible.
[88] This is attributed in some Greek histories to the discovery of the
treason of the Alkmæonidæ. So far from being caused by that, it took
place in spite of it.
[89] Cf. Clinton, “Fasti Hellenici,” 11^3, 26.
The archon’s name recorded for Ol. 71, 4, is Themistocles. His identity
with the great Themistocles is highly probable, though not certain.
Dionysius of Halikarnassos says that Themistocles was archon in the
official year, 493–492.
[90] This point will be more fully discussed in dealing with the
charges of corruption brought against Themistocles in Herodotus’
history of the war.
[91] Cf. Plut. Them. 4. ἔπραξε δὲ ταῦτα Μιλτιάδου κρατήσας
ἀντιλέγοντος. ὡς ἱστορεῖ Στμσίμβροτος. Stesimbrotos is a fifth century
writer.
[92] _E.g._ Delbrück attributes to Xerxes an army of from 65,000 to
75,000 combatants.
[93] Herodotus (vii. 60) reckons the land army at 1,700,000, and the
total effective at 2,641,610 (vii. 185). He (vii. 186) says that this
number must be doubled in order to arrive at the full total of the
expedition.
[94] Herodotus probably arrived at these numbers from information
picked up from various towns all round the Ægean, furnished by persons
who had witnessed the passage of the army, or had heard of it from
others who had been eye-witnesses. The enormous exaggerations of
estimate made by eye-witnesses in estimating the numbers of a crowd
of quite moderate dimensions, may easily account for the impossible
numbers stated to and by Herodotus.
[95] Those who state a much smaller number than this do not take into
account the Oriental reliance on numbers, an Eastern characteristic
which the Persian, unless he is much traduced, fully shared.
I hesitate to express any conjecture as to the possible maximum of the
land force on this occasion. No evidence on this point can be said to
exist.
[96] The description of the route adopted renders it improbable that
this body of troops included much more than the local levies of Western
Asia. Sardes was the real place of rendezvous, though it is possible
that some of the contingents did not join the main force until it
arrived at Abydos.
[97] Calculations show that the only eclipses about this time visible
at Sardes occurred on October 2, 480 (mentioned H. ix. 10), and
February 16, 478.
[98] Herodotus says on the _left_. It is obvious that he has confused
his point of view, and is speaking from that of a traveller voyaging in
a ship up the coast.
[99] The physical difficulties of the interior of the Balkan
peninsula, together with the practical question of commissariat,
render it probable that Herodotus is mistaken as to the nature of this
inland march, and of the troops which undertook it. The main body of
the army must almost certainly have pursued the coast road, which was
easy, supplied with depôts of stores, and in touch with the fleet. The
divisions which went inland were probably large detachments sent to
inspire awe in the breasts of the inland tribes, so as to discourage
them from any attempt to cut the line of communications.
[100] _Vide_ also p. 207.
[101] The expedition to Thessaly must have been in the spring of 480.
The Thessalian deputies came to the Isthmus “as soon as they were
informed that the Persian was about to cross over into Europe” (H. vii.
172). Xerxes spent the winter of 481–480 at Sardes, and started thence
“at the beginning of the spring” (H. vii. 37).
[102] _The Expedition to Tempe in Diodorus._—The account of the Tempe
expedition as given by Diodorus differs in certain most important
particulars from the brief narrative in Herodotus. It is possible
that the manifest absurdity of the chronology in the historian’s work
has created an undue prejudice against him as a source of evidence, a
tendency increased by the second-hand nature of his information. It
seems to me, however, that this latter characteristic constitutes a
very strong reason for treating his information with respect. There is
no reason why a bad historian should be a bad copyist; and whatever the
man himself may have been, the writers from whose work he plagiarized
so freely may in some cases have been most reliable witnesses. The
passage on Tempe is in Bk. XI. ch. ii. 13, and it may be well to note
the points in which he agrees with, and in which he differs from, the
account in Herodotus.
Diodorus. Herodotus.
1. The Greeks sent ten thousand Gives the same number—ten
hoplites to Thessaly to seize the thousand.
passes to Tempe.
2. On hearing of the size of the Mentions this as the
Persian force. _reported_ cause of
_withdrawal_ from Tempe.
3. Synetos was leader of the Evænetos.
Lacedæmonians.
4. Themistocles leader of the Same.
Athenians.
5. Ambassadors sent by the No mention.
Lacedæmonians to the other States,
asking them to send forces to join in
the defence of the passes.
6. They were eager to include the No mention.
whole of the Greek States in the
defending forces, and to get them
to take part in the war against the
Persians.
7. They left Tempe because the Believes the real reason for
majority of the Thessalians and the departure to have been the
other Greeks in that neighbourhood discovery that there were
gave earth and water to Xerxes’ other passes by which Tempe
envoys. could be turned.
8. Ænianians, Dolopians, Malians, |
Perrhæbians, Magnetes, medize while |
army still at Tempe. | Makes no distinction between
| the time at which these two
9. Achæans (Phthiotis), Locri, | sets of States medized.
(Opuntian), Thessalians, Bœotians, |
after the departure of Greek force |
from Tempe. |
It is quite plain that the account of Diodorus is not borrowed from
Herodotus, nor does it show traces of having had, either in whole or
even in part, a common source. In certain respects it is the more
probable tale of the two. For example, the comparative smallness of
the numbers sent is explained by the fact that the Lacedæmonians and
Athenians hoped that the other Greeks would send contingents. Again,
the size of the Persian force is given as a reason for going to Tempe,
while Herodotus gives it as a reason for leaving the same, though he is
inclined to reject the tale. It is inconceivable that the Greeks should
at this time have been totally ignorant of the magnitude of the Persian
force. Diodorus’ tale admits of the common-sense explanation that,
having made up their minds to defend the North, they thought it best
to choose a place where the Persian superiority in numbers would be of
as little advantage as possible, though it was mainly for political
purposes that so advanced a position was taken up.
In speaking of the medization of the States or clans, he evidently
uses Θέτταλοι in Chapter II. in a general sense of the population of
the region of Thessaly, whereas in Chapter III. he uses it of the
Thessalians, properly so-called. There is nothing in Herodotus which
contradicts Diodorus’ account of the medization. Both accounts may be
true, though that of Diodorus is the fuller one. There is one point in
it which is peculiarly supported by what Herodotus says. The Aleuadæ
medized; but the mass of their subjects disapproved of this policy,
and called in the Southern Greeks. The great Thessalian lords were
lords of the plain rather than of the mountain. It was consequently
the population of the plain which was opposed to their policy. It is
therefore a remarkable fact that the tribes of the Thessalian region,
which Diodorus mentions as having medized in the first instance, are
those of the bordering mountain region; whereas those of the great
plain remained true to the Greek cause until the withdrawal of the army
from Tempe left them exposed to the overwhelming flood of the invasion.
[103] Diodorus gives his name as Synetos.
[104] The Thessalian appeal to the Congress at the Isthmus to send a
force to Tempe is made to the προβόυλοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος, but the expression
used by Herodotus in vii. 145 and 172, οἱ περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ἕλλήνες τὰ
ἀμείνω φρονέοντες, has almost an official ring about it.
[105] Cf. language used by the Greek embassy to Gelo at Syracuse (H.
vii. 157).
[106] It has been asserted that this passage from Diodorus is drawn
from the passage of Ephorus, of which the fragment is a survival. It
would seem to me that the essential difference between the two points
to a difference of origin, and that they are two pieces of evidence on
the question, and not one.
_Note on the Sequence of Events in Relation to the Negotiations with
Gelo._
It would, perhaps, be a mistake to lay too much stress on the
indications of date in Herodotus with reference to the somewhat crowded
incidents of this time. The actual dates cannot be settled, though
it is possible to arrive at some idea of Herodotus’ views as to the
sequence of events.
(_a_.) The Greek spies were sent to Asia at the time when Xerxes’ army
was collected at Sardes (vii. 146).
(_b_.) The embassies to Gelo, Argos, etc., were sent after the despatch
of the spies (vii. 146, _ad init._, 148, _ad init_.).
(_c_.) Gelo, _after_ the departure of the joint embassy (vii. 163), and
when he heard that Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont (_ibid_.), sent
the treasure-ships to Delphi.
(_d_.) _Before_ he sent these vessels he knew that he had to expect a
Carthaginian attack (vii. 165, _ad fin_.).
The evidence is inconclusive. We lack the means of deciding the
sequence of the departure of the embassy and of the acquisition of the
information with regard to the coming of the Carthaginian expedition.
[107] Bergk, “Pœtæ Lyrici Græci,” Ed. 4, v. iii. p. 485: Πολλὴν δὲ
παρασχεῖν σύμμαχον Ἕλλησιν χεῖρ᾿ ἐς ἐλευθερίην.
[108] _Vide_ Note at end of chapter.
[109] Livy, xxxvi. 15—“Hoc jugum (Œta) ab Leucate et man ad occidentem
verso per Ætoliam ad alterum mare orienti objectum tendens ea aspreta
rupesque interjectas habet, ut non modo exercitus sed ne expediti
quidem facile ullas ad transitum calles inveniant;” and again (Livy,
xxxvi. 17), Acilius Glabrio, speaking of Thermopylæ, “Quippe portæ sunt
hæ, et _unus_ inter duo maria clausis omnibus velut naturalis transitus
est.”
[110] There is considerable mule traffic through it at the present day.
[111] It would, I reckon, be possible for a traveller to go from one
plain to the other by this route without attaining a height much over a
thousand feet.
[112] It may be well to adduce one or two striking instances of this,
apart from the one at present under consideration:—
1. Circ. 350 B.C., Thermopylæ was the great obstacle to Philip’s
advance south. His energies were centred in getting hold of the pass.
He never attempted an assault upon it, but finally got hold of it by
bribing Phalæcus, the Phocian condottiere. He then left a garrison at
Nicæa near Thermopylæ (Dem. ad Ep. Phil. 4). There must have been some
supreme objection from a military point of view to the Asopos pass,
since Philip, who can hardly be suspected of military incapacity,
never tried to turn Thermopylæ by using it. He was not pressed for
time. He patiently allowed years to elapse before he got hold of
Thermopylæ. Thermopylæ was all-valuable to him, and, what is more
striking, absolutely necessary, in his opinion, for an advance
southwards. (_Vide_ Hogarth, “Philip and Alexander”).
2. In 279 B.C. (Pausanias, x. 20) Brennus, with more than 150,000
Gauls, invaded Greece. The object of the expedition was plunder and
nothing else. If he could have got past Thermopylæ that object would
have been attained. With such numbers he could have done what he
liked, especially if, after getting through the Asopos defile, he had,
before going south, turned Thermopylæ by way of Hyampolis and forced
the Greeks to evacuate that pass. Pausanias, who seems to have ample
information as to the details of this Celtic raid, gives the following
list of the defending force:—
Bœotians, 10,000 infantry, 500 cavalry; Phocians, 3000 infantry, 500
cavalry; Megareans, 4000 infantry; Ætolians, 7000 infantry, with
numerous light armed, and cavalry; Athenians, 1000 infantry, 500
cavalry, with numerous triremes; Mercenaries from Macedonia and Asia,
1000 infantry.
The total cannot have been far short of 25,000 men.
The force was so large that the commanders were enabled not merely to
provide for the defence of the pass itself, but were also able to send
out cavalry and light armed to dispute the passage of the Spercheios,
a move which Brennus, who was, as Pausanias remarks, “not altogether
wanting in understanding, nor, for a barbarian, without a certain
amount of experience in devising stratagems,” frustrated by sending a
number of his men across the bar at the river mouth. On this the Greek
advanced guard retreated to the pass. Brennus then had bridges thrown
across the river, and attacked Heraklea. The Heraklea of that date was
probably situated on the mountain immediately west of the mouth of the
Asopos ravine, on a site now known as Sideroporto. He did not take the
place; and Pausanias adds in reference to this, that Heraklea was to
him “a matter of lesser moment: he considered the main point to be to
drive out of the pass those who were in occupation of it, and to make
good his passage into Greece south of Thermopylæ.”
It is of course manifest that such a passage as the Asopos ravine
would be easily defensible, and the Herakleots may have blocked it.
There is no question that, had it been passable, Brennus might have
used it. The striking fact is that he did not use it, but spent his
strength on a terrific failure at Thermopylæ.
3. In 224 (_vide_ Polyb. xi. 52) Antigonus, wishing to get to the
Isthmus, marched with his army by way of Eubœa. “He took this route,”
says Polybius, “because the Ætolians, after trying other expedients
for preventing Antigonus bringing this aid, now forbade his marching
south of Thermopylæ with an army, threatening that, if he did, they
would offer armed opposition to his passage.”
It is to be noted that, as at the time of Brennus’ assault, the
defenders of the pass were also in possession of Heraklea.
4. In B.C. 208 (_vide_ Polyb. x. 41) the Ætolians, seeking to prevent
the passage of Philip of Macedon southwards to aid his allies, “secure
the pass of Thermopylæ with trenches and stockades and a formidable
garrison, satisfied that they would then shut out Philip, and entirely
prevent him from coming to the assistance of his allies south of the
pass.”
In this case also (_vide_ chap. 42) the Ætolians were in possession of
Heraklea.
5. In a passage already quoted, Livy (xxxvi. 15) is most emphatic in
his statement that the only practicable military route by Œta is that
through Thermopylæ. He is describing the attack of the Romans under
Acilius Glabrio upon the troops of Antiochus who were defending the
pass, and it is again reported that the allies of the defenders were
in possession of Heraklea.
We are now in possession of practically all the data which can
be obtained from the ancient historians with regard to the exact
significance of the Asopos ravine, and the route through it. It must
of course be borne in mind that the information of the historian Livy
with regard to the topography of the Thermopylæ region was second-hand;
but yet, in spite of that, there is a certain consistency about the
evidence which enables us to form highly probable conclusions with
regard to the exact value of this factor in the strategical geography
of the region.
It seems to me to have been a recognized principle in later times that
an effective defence of Œta included the occupation of Heraklea as well
as of Thermopylæ, and the only conceivable reason for the existence of
such a view is that Heraklea commanded the passage of the Asopos ravine.
The site of the Heraklea of this period is to be sought, I venture to
think, at the place called Sideroporto, where there are large remains
of a strongly fortified town. It is high on the slope of Œta, in an
exceedingly inaccessible position, in the angle, as it were, between
the Asopos ravine and the line of the Trachinian cliffs.
A local tradition, probably of recent date, and due, like so many
traditions of modern Greece, to the visit of some inquirer whom the
natives regarded as an authority, attaches the name of Heraklea to
certain ruins which stand on the summit of a remarkable flat-topped
mountain in the valley at the head of the Asopos ravine, to which
reference has been already made, between the plains of Malis and Doris.
It is infinitely more probable, however, that this was the stronghold
of those Œteans whom Thucydides mentions.
The site is more than two hours distant from the nearest point of the
Malian plain, at the outlet of the Asopos ravine.
[113] Cp. H. vii. 175, _ad fin_.
[114] It has been criticized in modern times on strategical principles
(_e.g._ by Delbrück), for which a universality of truth has been
claimed. It is said that, given two adversaries of equal strength,
that one places himself at a disadvantage who attempts to defend the
passage of a range of mountains. It is manifest that the assailant
can concentrate his efforts on the forcing of one passage, whereas
the defender has to distribute his defence among all the practicable
passages of the chain. In the particular case of Mount Œta it is urged
that there was, besides Thermopylæ, at least one practicable passage,
and this is stated to have followed the modern road from Malis into
Doris; which passes over the low part of the chain immediately east of
the Asopos ravine.
Could it be proved that such a road ever existed the general criticism
would be sound. As a fact, all but demonstrable proof exists that no
such road, practicable from a military point of view, ever did exist
in ancient times. Leave out of the calculation the Greek of 480 and
the Gaul of 279—although in the case of the latter, if Pausanias’
evidence be worth anything, the Malians showed a very pardonable desire
to expedite his departure from the region, and would have been most
anxious to show Brennus such a road, had it existed—and merely take
into consideration the Greek, the Macedonian, and the Roman of later
times. For years and years these peoples were fighting in every part of
North-East Greece. They knew its topography by heart. The land became
the veriest strategic chessboard that ever existed in ancient warfare,
on which every move could be calculated to a nicety. And yet Thermopylæ
remained the same—that square on the board where king and consul could
alike be checked. Could it have been so had such a path existed?
It has already been seen that the holding of Heraklea was regarded as a
necessary factor in the defence of Thermopylæ. That Heraklea was almost
certainly situated at Sideroporto, commanding the Asopos ravine indeed,
but cut off by that very ravine—a mere crack several miles long and
nine hundred feet deep—from the line taken by this imaginary road; that
is to say, Heraklea would have been absolutely useless for its defence.
If it existed, why then did neither Greek, Macedonian, nor Roman use
it? Why did Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander, shirk the
attack on a pass which he could so easily have avoided?
It has already been said that the Greeks have made a new road along
that line. It is an excellent piece of work, but so great is the climb
to the summit of the pass that a two-horse carriage takes three hours
to accomplish it. The gradient of the hill-side can best be imagined
when it is stated that after climbing for an hour and a quarter along
this road, the traveller finds himself within less than half a mile
of the point from which the climb began, and the greater part of that
half-mile is vertical.
In criticizing ancient warfare a tendency is but too frequently
displayed to ignore the main factor of all warfare—the human element.
In criticizing Greek warfare in particular, it is, moreover, too often
the case that the critic is either unaware of, or has never realized,
the nature of the country with which he is dealing. An ordinary Greek
hill-side, though it appears easy of passage when viewed from even a
short distance, presents difficulties which can hardly be paralleled
in any other country in Europe. Thick, low, strong bush, much of it
thorny, covers it just to a sufficient depth to hide the thickly sown,
razor-edged rocks beneath. Human nature as represented by the Greek
hoplite in his heavy armour could not face it, and progress over it
even for a light-armed man is very slow and very exhausting. The
strategy and tactics of war are bounded by the difficult rather than
by the impossible. There can be no question that the passage over this
part of the range of Œta can never have been practicable to anything
more than the merest skeleton of a flying column, and could not
possibly have been ♠negotiated by any force sufficiently large to affect
the defence of Thermopylæ by any turning movement, or sufficiently well
provided with provisions to accomplish the long circuit which such a
turning movement would have demanded.
♠ “negociated” replaced with “negotiated”
There is one more striking proof that such a road did not exist in 480.
Had it existed it must have crossed that path of the Anopæa by which
Hydarnes and his men turned the pass. If so, why did he make the long
circuit by the Asopos ravine, when a shorter way was practicable?
[115] Cf. the mistake made as to the defensive nature of the position
at Tempe; also, the ignorance of the existence of the path of the
Anopæa at Thermopylæ.
[116] The expedition to Thessaly was made while Xerxes was at Abydos,
certainly not later than April, 480. The departure of Leonidas for
Thermopylæ took place a little before the Carnean festival, about the
beginning of the month of August.
[117] Diodorus’ account of the circumstances preceding the battle is
manifestly an imaginary tale of indeterminate origin concocted after
the event.
[118] This seems to indicate that the Persian camp was altogether
outside the west gate, and not any part of it in the plain of Anthele.
[119] This shows clearly that the wall was not, as some have supposed,
on the low ground at the pass of the middle gate, but on the neck of
the first mound (_vide_ note on Topography of Thermopylæ). Had it been
on the low ground, the scout would, from the comb of the mass of stream
_débris_ of the great ravine, have been able to see over it.
[120] These last words are, I believe, the true translation of the
expression in Herodotus. There would be little point in repeating the
fact of the river flowing through the ravine as a sort of mark of the
identity of a stream whose course the historian had recently described
with considerable detail. There is much point in the indication of what
investigation at the present day shows to have been the fact, that this
path did start from the Asopos ravine.
My own impression is that it sprang into use originally as a means
of communication between that upper valley which I have mentioned as
existing in the range of Œta, and probably also the Dorian plain, and
Thermopylæ, when a flood of the Asopos rendered the ravine impassable.
It would also form a direct means of communication between the Œteans
and Locrians without passing through Trachinia.
[121] It is of course impossible to deduct the number of killed in the
previous fighting, simply because we have no information as to what
that number was.
[122] Epialtes’ calculation that the circuit of the path would be
completed about the middle of the morning must, judging from the
details given of the actual march, have been singularly correct.
[123] Leake says that the descent was not much less than the ascent
in actual distance; but that as the ground was better, and the march
performed by daylight, the time spent was shorter. Leake is certainly
in error. The place were the Phocians were surprised is recognizable
with certainty, I think, at the present day. It corresponds with what
Herodotus tells us of the incident, and it is absolutely the only place
along the whole path where the events narrated could have taken place.
When the Persians reached that point, which is probably the highest
altitude attained by the path, they would have traversed two-thirds
of the whole distance. I must say that Leake’s attempt to reconcile
his views with those of Herodotus by saying that the rest of the path
is easier than that previously traversed is quite contrary to my own
actual experience. From the summit to Drakospilia its character is that
of a track winding amid rocks through a thick fir forest. Not until you
get close to Drakospilia does the country really open up.
[124] They advanced, that is to say, to a position somewhere near the
modern baths.
[125] They had fought, that is, on the low ground at the foot of
Kallidromos immediately to the west of the mound.
[126] The statement that they already knew that they must be taken in
the rear is in accord with Herodotus’ idea of what took place. It is,
however, probable that they heard early from Alpenoi, to which some of
their sick had been sent, of the fact that the other division of their
army had not succeeded in stopping, or, possibly, had not attempted to
stop Hydarnes.
[127] The pillar at Sparta, with their names inscribed upon it,
remained standing in Pausanias’ time (iii. 14, 1).
[128] The position was well designed for a last desperate stand. The
rear was protected by the small but deep valley between the first and
second mound. It is noticeable that they did not attempt to defend the
wall. It may seem strange that they should not have done this. The
position of the wall, however, running along the neck of land joining
the hillock and the slope at Kallidromos, would expose its defenders
to an attack from the rear. The Greeks evidently retreated from their
position near the modern baths; through the narrows between that and
the hillock; and up to the west slope of the latter, passing the wall
at the summit of the slope on to the mound itself.
[129] The parallel diary of events as it appears in Herodotus is as
follows:—
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Day.| Thermopylæ. | Artemisium.
----+------------------------------+----------------------------------
| Persian army leaves Therma. |
| |
12 | | Persian fleet leaves Therma
| | and reaches Magnesian coast.
| |
13 | | Storm begins in morning.
| |
14 | Army reaches Malis. | Storm continues.
| |
15 | | Storm continues.
| |
16 | | Storm ceases. Fleet moves to
| | Aphetæ. Despatch of 200 vessels
| | round Eubœa. First sea fight.
| |
17 | | Second sea fight after the
| | arrival of 53 Athenian ships.
| |
18 | First attack on Thermopylæ. | Third sea fight. News of disaster
| | at Thermopylæ in the evening.
| |
19 | Second attack on Thermopylæ. |
| |
20 | Disaster at Thermopylæ. |
---+------------------------------+----------------------------------
[130] Herodotus does not give any indication as to the time at which
the Greeks received news of the disaster. It is necessary therefore
to make certain calculations as to the earliest possible moment at
which the news can have reached them. As far as can be seen from the
narrative, the ten Persian scouting vessels started from Therma on the
same day as the main body of the fleet, but probably at an earlier
hour. It must have been well on in the morning before they came upon
the Greek vessels off the mouth of the Peneius, which is fifty miles
from Therma. The only conceivable means by which news of the engagement
could have reached Skiathos, some seventy miles south of this point, is
by the appearance of those ten vessels with the captured Greek ships
in their company. That being the case, the Greek fleet at Artemisium
cannot have received the news before the evening of the day.
[131] The ancient Mekistos.
[132] It is more probable that it was under the shelter of the great
cliffs of Mount Kandili, in the neighbourhood of the modern Limni.
There is a sandy shore for many miles at the foot of those cliffs, upon
which vessels might be conveniently drawn up.
[133] A nine-knot steamer takes about seven hours from Chalkis
to Stylida, which is about the same distance as from Chalkis to
Artemisium. There is no question that a trireme could maintain a
high rate of speed for hours together. Nor is there reason to doubt
Herodotus’ statement that the voyage of the Persian fleet from Therma
to the Sepiad strand took but one day, a distance, that is to say, of
one hundred and twenty miles in fourteen hours of daylight, over eight
miles an hour—even supposing that such a large number of vessels could
put out and put in in the dark. The probability is, however, that the
fleet never went to Chalkis at all; or, if it did, that it moved up the
Euripus after receiving the news of the disaster to the Persian fleet,
so as to be ready to go to Artemisium without delay so soon as the
storm ceased.
[134] The strong bias which Herodotus displays in his references to
Themistocles is of itself sufficient to render the tale of bribery
open to suspicion. Furthermore, the sum mentioned, thirty talents, is
an extraordinarily large sum for the people of North Eubœa to raise at
short notice.
[135] Diod. xi. 12, mentions this, but gives the number of the squadron
as three hundred.
[136] Diodorus gives no exact indication of the time of despatch,
though he mentions it immediately after describing the arrival at
Aphetæ.
[137] Same day as first engagement (_vide_ note over page).
[138] If any calculation can be made from this very defective chapter
of Herodotus’ history, this day must have been the eighteenth day. ◆H.
viii 14, 15.◆The three combats at Artemisium are represented as having
taken place on successive days. The last took place on the day of the
disaster at Thermopylæ, _i.e._ the twentieth day. Therefore the first
took place on the eighteenth, ◆H. viii. 9.◆ and it is represented as
having taken place on the evening of the day on which the council of
war was held.
[139] This view is supported by Herodotus’ account of what took place
next day. The storm in which the Persian flying squadron is wrecked
takes place on the evening of the eighteenth day. When the storm
ceased we do not know. But it is certain that the fifty-three Attic
vessels must have ridden it out at Chalkis, and that they, after it
was over, made the long voyage from Chalkis to Artemisium, where they
found the Greek fleet. The storm must have been a brief one; and if,
as Herodotus says, there had been a definite resolution on the part of
the Greek commanders to move south in the early hours of the morning
of the nineteenth day, no reason is apparent why it should not have
been carried out. The real design of the Greeks was probably to make an
attempt to beat the divided Persian fleet in detail.
[140] Though Herodotus is aware of a connection between the positions
at Thermopylæ and Artemisium, there is nothing whatever in his account
which suggests that he understood how necessary the connection was
for the maintenance of the pass. Had he appreciated this, he would
hardly have treated as serious history such parts of the Artemisium
tradition of his time as asserted that the responsible Greek commanders
ever entertained the idea of such action as must have inevitably
sacrificed the lives of the defenders of the pass. He has given the
irresponsible gossip and criticism of the Peloponnesian section of
the fleet the appearance of responsible and authoritative design, and
has served up the whole with copious Attic sauce. There is, however,
no reason for supposing that the historian was in any way guilty of
historical dishonesty. He simply did not possess that knowledge of
military affairs which would have enabled him to see the flaws in the
evidence which came to his hand; and this negative defect was further
complicated by what was, from the point of view of strict history, the
positive one of accepting anything in the tradition of the war which
would bring into relief the patriotic services of Athens. If we tone
down the intensely Attic colouring in Herodotus’ account of Artemisium,
that is to say, such passages as are designed to bring into relief
the difficulty of keeping the fleet at its station, we have, in all
probability, a good historical account, in so far as it goes, of this
part of the campaign of 480.
[141] The manœuvre of the διέκπλους seems one of the most simple
things in the world when it has been discovered. Yet in modern times
it took the English sailors more than a century of hard fighting to
find out its effectiveness. Thucydides, who knows what he is talking
about in naval matters, certainly conveys the impression that it was an
invention of his own time, or, at any rate, that it had, as a manœuvre,
been gradually evolved within the period of the Pentekontaëtia. And
yet, here we have it at Artemisium! Nay, more than that, fourteen
years earlier, according to Herodotus, Dionysios of Phokæa was trying
to teach it to those unappreciative Ionians at Ladé. It is probable
that both in this passage and in the one relating to Ladé, Herodotus
is guilty of an anachronism in attributing that manœuvre to the naval
warfare of the first quarter of the fifth century. The term was
probably much in men’s mouths at the time which he wrote, and, in his
ignorance of naval matters, he assumed that the ruling idea in the
sea tactics of his own day might be safely attributed to the previous
generation. Compare also H. viii. 11 with Thuc. ii. 83, _ad fin_.
[142] There is an undesigned consistency between the two accounts of
the effects of the storm in North and South Eubœa respectively. A
glance at the map will show that, (1) in the North, the driving of the
wreckage towards the shores of Aphetæ; (2) in the South, the driving of
the 200 vessels upon the Hollows of Eubœa, both indicate a storm from
the South or S.S.W.
[143] It seems to have taken some thirty hours to round Skiathos, and
voyage down the east coast of Eubœa.
[144] The identity of these bays with Τά Κοίλα has been called in
question in modern times. If this passage in Herodotus were the only
evidence we possessed, the question of their position would manifestly
be a very open one. All that Herodotus’ language seems to indicate
is that they were a well-known feature in the geography of South
Eubœa. Had they not been so, we should have expected so painstaking a
topographer to have given some indications of their actual position.
His silence, and the inference to be drawn from it, is not without
significance. The Hollows would hardly have been a well-known feature
had they been east of the South Cape, away from the line of sea
traffic; whereas on the west shore they would be in full view of all
vessels using the frequented passage of the Euripus. I think, too, that
any one who has seen that coast of Eubœa, either from Attica, or when
passing up the channel, cannot but have been struck with the depth of
the colour which the retiring coast-line of these bays gives to the
Eubœan landscape thus viewed. Their recesses give that appearance of
“hollowness” from which the ancient name must have been derived. We are
not, however, dependent on Herodotus alone for indications as to their
locality. _Vide_ Liv. 31, 47; Strabo, 445; Valer Max. 1, 8, 10.
[145] It is exceedingly unlikely that the Persian squadron would have
been able to force the narrows at Chalkis, if, as was almost certainly
the case, the fifty-three Attic vessels were ready to defend it. But
had they put in at Eretria and blocked the channel south, the position
of the main Greek fleet, in case of anything resembling a reverse at
Artemisium, would have been very precarious.
[146] The fact that they were able to single out a special contingent
for attack confirms, by implication, Diodorus’ statement as to the
scattered nature of the anchorage at Aphetæ.
[147] The effect of the engagement on the minds of the Greeks is
mentioned in language which is almost, word for word, a repetition of
that which he has used on a previous occasion. He says, Δρησμὸν δὴ
ἐβούλευον ἔσω ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα.—H. viii. 18. Cf. the expression in viii. 4.
[148] In speaking of Doris, Herodotus says: Ή δὲ χώρη αὕτη ἐστὶ
μητρόπολις Δωριέων τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ. That the land had a Dorian
population in the fifth century B.C. is undoubtedly the case; but
its claim to be metropolis of the Dorians of the south was in all
probability set up by the Spartan authorities, as affording a
convenient pretext for interference in Greek affairs north of Isthmus.
It is probable that this corner of Greece, of which the Malian plain
was the centre, contained patches of various peoples which had in
different ages traversed the peninsula, or which had been driven into
its mountain fastnesses by the passage of invaders:—Dorians, Œtæans,
Trachinians, etc., were probably such remains of larger tribes.
[149] Herodotus seems from his language to assume (viii. 31) that
the whole army had come south by the Dorian route. That is, either a
mistake; or, more probably, the impression his language gives is due to
a mere omission. Few details are given of any part of the route of the
army.
[150] The position at Delphi, from a military point of view, is by no
means weak, provided Amphissa be occupied, and the great pass from the
north be thus closed. Under those circumstances, unless the assailant
is in a position to land troops at the head of the Krissæan gulf, the
only line of attack is along this easily defensible path from the
west. It is imaginable that Xerxes, knowing it to be an open town,
under-estimated the difficulty of its capture.
[151] Pogon is an almost land-locked harbour between the island of
Kalauria and the mainland.
[152] A Comparison of the Lists of Vessels at Artemisium and Salamis
respectively.
T. = trireme; P. = pentekonters.
------------------------------+----------------------+--------------
| Artemisium. | Salamis.
| |
Athenians (some Platæans in | {127 T. |
crews at Artemisium) | 53 T. later} 180 T. | 180 T.
Corinthians | 40 T. | 40 T.
Megareans | 20 T. | 20 T.
Chalkidians in Athenian ships | 20 T. | 20 T.
Æginetans | 18 T. | 30 T.
Sikyonians | 12 T. | 15 T.
Lacedæmonians | 10 T. | 16 T.
Epidaurians | 8 T. | 10 T.
Eretrians | 7 T. | 7 T.
Trœzenians | 5 T. | 5 T.
Styreans | 2 T. | 2 T.
Keians | 2 T.; 2 P. | 2 T.; 2 P.
Opuntian Locrians | 7 P. | —
Hermionians | — | 3 T.
Ambrakiots | — | 7 T.
Leukadians | — | 3 T.
Naxians | — | 4 T.
Kythnians | — | 1 T.; 1 P.
Krotonians | — | 1 T.
Malians | — | 2 P.
Siphnians | — | 1 P.
Seriphians | — | 1 P.
+--------------------- +--------------
| 324 T.; 9 P. | 366 T.; 7 P.
------------------------------+----------------------+--------------
Æschylus gives 310 as the number of the Greek fleet. Valuable as is
the testimony of the poet with regard to those incidents in the battle
which he observed as an eye-witness, his evidence on the dry question
of numbers is not likely to be exact.
[153] She did, indeed, send sixty vessels, to observe, so said the
patriot Greeks, how the war went, but not with any intention of taking
part therein. The Corcyræans’ own excuse for their non-participation
was that their fleet had been unable to round Malea.
[154] The mistake may be that of a manuscript copyist; but such
mistakes are so common in the text of Herodotus, that they afford
strong ground for supposing that the historian was, like the men of
his time, inaccurate in numerical calculations. The mistake may be
in the detailed list. ◆Paus. ii. 29. 5.◆ Pausanias implies that the
Æginetan contingent was superior in numbers to that of the Corinthian,
that is to say, more than forty. If the number were forty-two, the
total given by Herodotus would be correct; and it is noticeable in this
reference that he himself, in speaking of the number of ships which
Ægina supplied, ◆H. viii. 46.◆ says: “Of the islanders the Æginetans
supplied thirty; they had indeed other ships manned; but with these
they were guarding their own country; but with the thirty best sailers
they fought at Salamis.”
[155] By Professor J. W. Bury.
[156] Macan, Herod, iv., v., vi., “Athens and Ægina.”
[157] _Note on the Reference to Siris in Themistocles’ Speech._—The
reference to Siris inevitably suggests that this reported passage in
Themistocles’ speech is an invention of later date arising from the
colonization of Thurii in or about 443. The rapid growth of Athenian
trade in the earlier part of the fifth century, and its peculiar
development along the western route, render it possible, however, that
an idea of settlement on or near the deserted city of Sybaris may have
been long anterior to the actual settlement, and may have been mooted
even before 480. If Plutarch is to be believed, Themistocles had direct
relations with Corcyra, and gave the name of Sybaris to one, and the
name of Italia to the other of his daughters (Plut. Them. 32).
[158] H. viii. 74. τέλος δὲ ἐξερράγη ἐς τὸ μέσον. Cf. also Diod. xi.
16, _ad fin_.
[159] This Council of War must have been held on the morning of the day
preceding the battle. It lasted, in all probability, several hours,
and, if so, this would indicate the afternoon as the time at which
Xerxes received the message of Themistocles. On this point, then, the
indications in the narrative of Æschylus and Herodotus are in agreement.
[160] Plut. Them. also mentions the same name; but the testimony is
probably dependent on that of Herodotus.
[161] There is a curious triangular concord at this point in the
history.
Diodorus says that the Egyptian contingent was sent to block the strait
towards the Megarid (xi. 17).
Plutarch says 200 vessels were sent to close the passage round Salamis
(Them. 12).
Herodotus mentions that the Egyptian contingent numbered 200 (vii. 89).
[162] This would account for the fact implied by Æsch. Pers. 400: the
two fleets when they started their movement were not in sight of one
another, though, very shortly after the movement began, the Persian
fleet was visible to the Greeks. The latter would first catch sight of
it after it rounded the Kynosura promontory and the island.
[163] Cf. Arist. 8, where the revocation is said to have taken place
τρίτῳ ἔτει after the sentence.
[164] Cf. Stein’s brief note on the translation of the words στὰς ἐπὶ
τὸ συνέδριον in H. viii. 79.
[165] In so far as I know, this last very important point was first
raised by Prof. J. B. Bury in an article in the _Classical Review_ on
“Aristides at Salamis.”
[166] This is Professor Bury’s suggestion. It is open to the objection
that Herodotus expressly mentions the arrival of this vessel (H.
viii. 83) _immediately_ before the battle began. But this objection
is not by any means insuperable. It is much more probable, under the
circumstances, that Herodotus made a mistake as to the time of its
arrival, than that it managed at the time he mentions to force its way
through the blockading fleets at either end of the strait.
[167] It would seem as if it were a description of this movement, taken
from his notes on, or sources of information for, the details of the
battle, which Herodotus has used by mistake in describing the movement
of the Persian fleet during the night. He has, of course, intensely
confused the original description by reading into it what he knew to be
the object of that night-movement—the surrounding of the Greek fleet
by blocking the issues both to east and west of it; but, eliminating
this motive from his description, it is possible to see that in its
original form it must have resembled very closely the description of
the advance of the Persian fleet which has been drawn from the details
which Æschylus and Diodorus give.
H. viii. 76. “The west wing put out and made a circling movement
towards Salamis.” It has been already pointed out that by “west wing”
Herodotus evidently means, not the west wing in the original formation,
but the west wing when the fleet had completed the movement, and had
taken up the position which he imagined it to have assumed when the
movement was complete. This “west wing” would be the east wing in the
original position. That it cannot have been the original west wing has
been pointed out in a previous note.
If this correction be made, Herodotus’ language in describing this
movement is peculiarly applicable to the movement of that part of
the Persian fleet which entered the strait by the channel east of
Psyttaleia—ἀνῆγον κυκλούμενοι πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμῖνα; and the applicability
becomes still more striking in view of the evidence, which will be
given later, that this wing of the Persian fleet got in advance of the
other.
The left wing, which would use the channel west of Psyttaleia, is
equally referred to in the words: “Those about Keos and Kynosura put
out in order,” to which he adds, in accordance with his knowledge
that part of the object of the night-movement was the blocking of the
straits, “And they occupied the whole strait as far as Munychia with
their ships.”
[168] This phenomenon of the morning wind is very common in the Greek
seas. It will be remembered that Phormio based his tactics in his first
battle with the Corinthian fleet just outside the Corinthian gulf on
its occurrence. I have experienced it there; and on the three occasions
on which I have been through the Strait of Salamis, once in the summer
of 1895, and twice in the summer of 1899, I have experienced it on each
occasion. It began in all three cases quite suddenly, a little before
seven in the morning, blowing from the west, right down that part of
the strait south of Ægaleos. It was extremely violent while it lasted,
though it did not raise a dangerous sea. To the inexperienced it gave
the impression that it meant the beginning of a very windy day. On two
occasions it ceased about 8.30, on the other, shortly after nine, and
the dead calm by which it had been preceded ensued once more.
[169] As is shown by the presence of an Attic vessel opposite the
Persian left, where her ships must almost certainly have been.
[170] Cf. Æsch. Pers. 724,—Ναυτικὸς στρατὸς κακωθεὶς πεζὸν ὤλεσε
στρατόν. Thuc. i. 73, 5.—Νικωθεις γὰρ ταῖς ναυσίν ὡς οὐκέτι αὐτῷ ὁμοίας
οὔσης της δυνάμεως κατὰ τάχος τῷ πλέονι τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀπεχώρησεν.
[171] Modern historians have taken this account of the intended or
attempted construction of the mole too seriously. It has been pointed
out, for instance, that the only point in the strait east of the bay of
Eleusis at which it could possibly be carried out, is at the narrows
where the island of St. George contracts the width of the channel, and
that it is impossible that, under the circumstances as they stood,
Xerxes should have been able to bring vessels to that part of the
strait. But Herodotus never attempts to give the impression that the
operation was ever undertaken seriously; he makes it plain, indeed,
that it was not. If that were so, and it was merely designed to give
the Greeks a wrong impression, it did not in the least matter whether
it was made at a possible or impossible point. Ktesias, Pers. 26, and
Strabo, 395, say that the mole was begun before the battle. This would
imply that a serious attempt was made to construct it. The notorious
unreliability of Ktesias, and the lateness of Strabo’s evidence, render
this account of the matter unworthy of consideration.
[172] H. viii. 103. Λέγουσα γὰρ ἐπετύγχανε τὰ πὲρ᾿ αὐτὸς ἐνόεε.
[173] Οὐδεμία συμφορὴ μεγάλη ἔσται σεό τε περιεόντος καὶ ἐκείνων τῶν
πρηγμάτων περὶ οἶκον τὸν σόν.
[174] It has been suggested that the real intention was to induce the
Ionians to revolt. The behaviour of this contingent in the recent
battle was not calculated to encourage such a plan, conceived within a
few days of the actual fight.
[175] Ἐπείτε οὐκ ἐπαύετο λέγων ταῦτα ὁ Τιμόδημος, etc.
[176] May it not be suggested that some archæologist acquainted with
the extant remains of Phœnician Carthage might confer a distinct
service on history by examining the structures at Agrigentum which date
from this period? The workman as well as the designer must have set his
mark there.
[177] It has already been remarked that his description of Thermopylæ
is that of a traveller coming from the north—“from Achaia”—as he
himself says.
[178] Herodotus himself (ix. 8) takes this view of the matter. He
implies that the Spartans did not care whether the Athenians medized
or not after the wall was completed. It is quite out of the question,
however, to suppose that the Spartans could have regarded with
equanimity the possible transference of the Athenian fleet to the
Persian side. They had the experience of Artemisium and Salamis to
guide them.
[179] It is sometimes assumed from H. vii. 229, that the usual quota
was one helot to each hoplite; but a more probable interpretation of
that passage is that the reference is to the personal armed servant
who accompanied each hoplite to war, and that it cannot be deduced
therefrom that the body of these formed the whole number of the helots
present on an ordinary occasion.
Modern criticism of the impossibility of despatching so large a force
unknown to the Athenian embassy is not convincing. We do not know the
place at which it gathered. It is extremely likely that a large number
of helots were drawn from Messenia, and joined the army at Orestheion,
where the great route from Messenia meets the route from Sparta by way
of the valley of the Eurotas.
[180] His departure from the Isthmus is ascribed by Herodotus to the
fact that when he was sacrificing ἐπὶ τῷ Πέρσῃ an eclipse of the sun
took place. This eclipse has been calculated to have occurred on the
2nd of October, 480. If so, it would be about the time of the Persian
retreat from Attica after Salamis, and Stein’s conjecture that the
sacrifice had something to do with a plan to harass the Persian
retreat, has a certain amount of probability in its favour.
[181] If Sparta had been careless as to whether Athens medized or not,
she might, probably would, have despatched troops to the Isthmus at an
earlier date. But if she was waiting until pressure of circumstances
forced Athens to adopt Peloponnesian views as to the line of defence,
then the delay is accounted for. Had her army been at the Isthmus
when Mardonius advanced into Bœotia, the Athenians would certainly
have called upon it to carry out the agreement, and march to the
northward of Kithæron. In that case the Spartan government would have
been obliged either to comply, or, by a refusal, to show in the most
unmistakeable manner possible the war policy which it intended to adopt.
[182] I was, I confess, surprised to find in August, 1899, that,
in spite of the excellent road to Megara from Bœotia by the way of
Eleusis, the track on the old line of the Platæa-Megara road is still
largely used.
[183] A road has been constructed through it in recent years, running
from Kriekouki on the Bœotian side to Villa on the south of the range.
[184] I am inclined to think that the site of Skolos is that which
Leake, and others following him, have identified with Erythræ. Paus.
ix. 4, 3, says that if before crossing the Asopos river on the road
from Platæa to Thebes, you turned off down the stream, and went about
forty stades, _i.e._ four and three-quarter miles, you came to the
ruins of Skolos. This would place it not far east of the road from
Thebes to Dryoskephalæ. He speaks of Skolos in another passage as a
village of Parasopia beneath Kithæron, a rugged place, and δυσοικητός.
That seems to preclude the idea of its being near the river, which
traverses alluvial lands at this part of its course. The ruins
identified by Leake as Erythræ cannot belong to that town if the
testimony of Herodotus and Pausanias is accurately worded. This point
will be discussed in a later note. In actual fact, however, the exact
site of Skolos is very difficult to determine. My main reason for
suggesting that it stood where Leake places Erythræ is that those ruins
are the only ruins in the neighbourhood indicated by Pausanias, and are
certainly not the ruins of Erythræ.
[185] It is necessary to pursue so obvious a line of argument, because,
for some incomprehensible reason, modern historians have thought it
right to judge of the plans of these able Persian commanders as though
they were dictated by no higher considerations than such as might occur
to an untutored savage.
[186] The weakness of this line in case of attack from the north was
conclusively shown twenty years later in the manœuvres which led to the
battle of Tanagra.
[187] It is almost certain that an ancient road from Eleusis followed
the eminently natural line taken by the modern road from Eleusis to
Eleutheræ. There was also, in all probability, a route from Athens to
Eleutheræ which did not enter Eleusis at all, but, branching from the
Sacred Way near the Rheitoi after traversing the low pass through Mount
Ægaleos, went up the Thriasian plain and joined the road from Eleusis
among the low hills of Western Attica.
[188] These ridges will be found numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, in the
accompanying map.
[189] Marked A 6 in the map.
[190] Called in the map, for purposes of distinction, the Asopos ridge,
the Long ridge, and the Plateau.
[191] Those of the streams marked A 4 and A 5 on the map.
[192] During my stay at Kriekouki, in December ’92–January ’93, the
rainfall was at times extraordinarily heavy. Nevertheless, I had not on
any occasion the slightest difficulty in crossing any of the streams,
and it was not even necessary to get wet in so doing. On one occasion
also I happened to be following the line of one of the watercourses
leading to the Œroë amid a downpour of rain such as we rarely see in
England, which had been going on with more or less continuity for the
previous fourteen hours; and yet, as I descended the brook towards the
plain the water became less and less until, on the plain, there was no
water running in the stream bed.
[193] Pausanias knew the roads through these two passes.
(1) Platæa-Athens road.
He says (xi. 1, 6) that Neokles, the Bœotarch, in his surprise of
Platæa in the year 374, led the Thebans οὐ τὴν εὐθεῖαν ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβῶν
τὴν πεδιάδα, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ Ὑσιὰς ἦγε πρὸς Ἐλευθερῶν τε καὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς.
There will be occasion to show that Hysiæ was in all probability a
small place, on a site just outside the southernmost end of the village
of Kriekouki. It was therefore at the eastern side of the opening
of the valley through which the road from Platæa to Athens passed.
The remains of that ancient road are, however, at the other side of
the valley opening; and, therefore, Hysiæ was not upon it. Probably,
however, down the valley came a track which is still used, and which,
after passing through the village of Kriekouki, goes due north to
Thebes in a line parallel to the main road from Dryoskephalæ. This
would be the road which Pausanias here mention. It would, in entering
the valley to the pass, go close to this site of Hysiæ. Of the identity
of this site it will be necessary to speak in a later note.
In 379, after the revolution in Thebes (X. H. v. 4, 14), the Spartans
despatched Kleombrotos with a force to Bœotia. As Chabrias, with
Athenian peltasts, was guarding “the road through Eleutheræ,” he went,
κατὰ τὴν εἰς Πλαταιὰς φέρουσαν.
This is almost certainly the Platæa-Athens pass. Kleombrotos probably
did not discover that the Dryoskephalæ pass was guarded until he got
to Eleutheræ. After doing so he turned to the left and made his way
through the Platæa-Athens pass, exterminating a small body of troops
which attempted to defend it.
(2) The Platæa-Megara road.
Pausanias (ix. 2, 3) says, Τοῖς δὲ ἐκ Μεγάρων ἰοῦσι πηγή τέ ἐστιν ἐν
δεξιᾷ καὶ προελθοῦσιν ὀλίγον πέτρα· καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν μὲν Ἀκταίωνος κοίτην.
In the previous sentence he has expressly spoken of the road from
Eleutheræ to Platæa. The Megara road is therefore a different road. The
κοὶτη Ἀκταίωνος can, I think, be determined with sufficient certainty
at the present day. It is on the top of a low cliff, probably the πέτρα
mentioned, overhanging the sources of the stream O 3. Near the foot of
the cliff is an ancient well, known in Leake’s time as the Vergutiani
Spring.
[194] Ἐπὶ τῆς ὑπωρέης τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος.
[195] The site of Erythræ.
Colonel Leake identified it with certain ruins which are found at
the foot of the mountain slope several miles east of the road from
Dryoskephalæ to Thebes. The available evidence seems to me to be
strongly against this view.
(1) The traditional site is where I have placed it, though I am afraid
that but little stress can be laid on traditions in modern Greece.
(2) Its comparatively frequent mention by Greek writers seems to
indicate that, though a small place, its position was of some
importance. If Leake’s view be correct this cannot have been the case.
If it were where I believe it to have been, it would be at the northern
exit of one of the most important passes in Greece. There is an ancient
φρουρίον on the bastion of Kithæron to the east of the site. Its
remains are so scanty, however, that they do not afford any clue as to
its date.
(3) There are remains of ancient buildings on the site. There are
also remains of an ancient well, besides which is a heap of stones,
from which two stones were obtained a few years ago with inscriptions
showing them to have belonged to a temple of Eleusinian Demeter.
Pausanias mentions so many temples in the neighbourhood dedicated
to that deity, that the discovery contributes but little to the
identification of the site. I was informed at Kriekouki last year
(August, 1899) that those particular stones were known to have been
originally discovered on another site. As neither my informant nor any
one else could tell me whence, why, or by whom they were removed, I did
not place much credence in the report.
(4) Pausanias says (ix. 2, 1), Γῆς δὲ τῆς Πλαταιίδος ἐν τῶ Κιθαιρῶνι
ὀλίγον τῆς εὐθείας ἐκτραπεῖσιν ἐς δεξιὰν Ὑσιῶν καὶ Ἐρυθρῶν ἐρείπιά ἐστι;
and further on (ix. 2, 2), he says, referring to the road of which he
is speaking: αὕτη μὲν (_i.e._ ὅδος) ἀπ’ Ἐλευθερῶν ἐς Πλάταιαν ἄγει.
The road referred to is of course the Athens-Platæa road, on which he
is travelling towards Platæa. Can any one suppose that Pausanias would
have used the expression quoted, especially the word ὀλίγον, had the
ruins of Erythræ, as Leake conjectured, lain some three and a half
miles away from the nearest point of this road, and hidden from it,
moreover, by the great projecting bastion of Kithæron, which is shown
at the south-east corner of the accompanying map?
Leake quotes Thucydides (iii. 24), who says that the two hundred and
twelve fugitives from Platæa first took the Thebes road in order to put
their pursuers off the scent, and then turning, ᾔεσαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὄρος
φέρουσαν ὁδόν ἐς Ἐρύθρας καὶ Ὑσιάς, καὶ λαβόμενοι τῶν ὀρῶν διαφεύγουσιν
ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας. Meanwhile the pursuers were searching the road along the
ὐπωρέη. This last road would lead the pursuers near the site where I
conjecture Hysiæ to have stood, and the objection may be raised that it
is unlikely that the fugitives would have gone to a place close to the
road along which they could see the pursuers were searching for them.
It is, however, to be remarked that Thucydides does _not_ say that they
went to either Erythræ or Hysiæ. Had he intended to imply this he would
have mentioned those places in their proper order, Hysiæ first and
Erythræ second. Whenever he refers to the actual _course_ taken by a
body of men, or by a fleet, he invariably mentions the places _touched
at_ or _arrived at_ in their geographical order. _Vide_ Th. ii. 48, 1;
ii. 56, 5; ii. 69, 1; iv. 5, 2; vii. 2, 2; vii. 31, 2.
The passage seems perfectly comprehensible and in accord with the
hypothesis which I put forward with respect to the positions of Hysiæ
and Erythræ. These fugitives, turning from the Platæa-Thebes road,
took the track which in modern times leads from Pyrgos to Kriekouki,
and which in ancient times would be the road from Thespiæ to Hysiæ,
Erythræ, and the passes. They did not go _to_ but _towards_ those
places, making in reality for those high rugged bastions to the
north-east of the pass of Dryoskephalæ.
But, after all, Pausanias’ words in the passage quoted dispose
effectively of Colonel Leake’s site. He would not have described a
place twenty-five stades away from the road as a _short_ distance to
the right of it.
(5) Herodotus (ix. 15) speaks of the Persian camp as ἀρξάμενον ἀπὸ
Ἐρυθρέων παρὰ Ὑσιάς, κατέτεινε δὲ ἐς τὴν Πλαταίιδα γῆν. These words
merely show that Erythræ was east of Hysiæ.
(6) Perhaps one of the strongest pieces of evidence is Herodotus’
statement that the first Greek position was “at Erythræ.” Is it
conceivable that the Greek force, especially in its then state of
feeling with regard to the Persians, would be likely, after issuing
from the pass of Dryoskephalæ, to turn east along Kithæron, leave the
pass open, and take up a position with their backs to a part of the
range through which there was no passage of retreat?
(7) We are told later that their reason for moving to their second
position was the question of water-supply. This accords with the
present state of the locality about the traditional Erythræ. The
streams in that neighbourhood have but little water in them in the dry
season.
(8) The ground in this neighbourhood accords peculiarly with the
description given by Herodotus of the first engagement.
[196] Marked ridges 1, 2, 3, 4, in the map.
[197] These positions will be found marked upon the accompanying map.
It is necessary, however, to explain the evidence on which they are
determined.
[198] The details of the contingents given by Herodotus are:—
Lacedæmonians—
Spartans 5000
Periœki 5000
Helots 35,000
Tegeans 1500
Corinthians 5000
Potidæans 300
Orchomenians (Arcadia) 600
Sikyonians 3000
Epidaurians 800
Trœzenians 1000
Lepreans 200
Mykenæans and Tirynthians 400
Phliasians 1000
Hermionians 300
Eretrians and Styreans 600
Chalkidians 400
Ambrakiots 500
Leukadians and Anaktorians 800
Paleans from Kephallenia 200
Æginetans 500
Megareans 3000
Platæans 600
Athenians 8000
Miscellaneous light-armed troops 34,500
======
Total 108,200
[199] _I.e._ A 1. In the days before scientific survey there was
frequently the utmost confusion with regard to the application of names
to the head streams of main rivers. This generally took the form of
applying the name of the main stream to several of its feeders. The
tendency of the local population was to apply the well-known name to
that upper tributary which was in their immediate neighbourhood, and
was therefore best known to them. Examples of this are frequent in
England; the upper waters of the Thames are a case in point. In early
sketch maps it will be found that the name Thames is applied with the
utmost diversity to the head streams of the river, and even a tributary
so far down as the Evenlode is sometimes given the name of the main
river. This is, I fancy, what has taken place with regard to the
Asopos. The Platæans, with whom Herodotus must have come in contact in
the course of his visit to the region, called this stream, A 1, by the
name of the main river, and consequently “Asopos” in Herodotus is to be
understood to mean this stream up to its junction with the stream which
comes from the west, rising not far from Leuktra, and, after that, to
refer to what is really the main river. From Platæa itself the course
of this stream is plainly traceable in the plain, running along the
western base of the Asopos ridge. The stream coming from Leuktra is
not visible, and it is quite conceivable that Herodotus never had any
definite knowledge of its existence. In Leake’s time (_vide_ his sketch
map) the inhabitants of Kriekouki seem to have called the stream, A
6, Asopos. It is not so called at the present day. My own impression
is, however, that Herodotus, although he heard the Platæans speak of A
1 as the Asopos, may in one passage refer to the stream from Leuktra
with a special attribute: τὸν Ἀσωπὸν τὸν ταύτῃ ῥέοντα (♠H. ix. 31). A
sentence previously, at the end of ♥Chapter 30, he has a reference to
the Asopos without any qualification, οὗτοι μὲν νὺν ταχθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ
Ἀσωπῷ ἐστρατοπεδἐυοντο, and this reference is undoubtedly to A 1, which
is to him, as other references in his narrative show, the upper Asopos
“ordinarily so called.”
♠ “H. ix. 26” replaced with “H. ix. 31”
♥ “Chapter 25” replaced with “Chapter 30”
[200] H. ix. 31, _ad init._, πυθόμενοι τοὺς Ἕλληνας εἶναι ἐν Πλαταιῇσι.
[201] Cf. especially the mention of the Asopos and its context in
Chapter 40.
[202] It will be remarked that Artabazos’ statement on this point is in
direct conflict with that reported by Herodotus to have been made at
the same time by Alexander of Macedon to the Greeks.
[203] It appears later (Chap. 46, _ad init._) that it was to the
Athenian generals alone that Alexander’s story was in the first
instance imparted. That tends to confirm, what the lie of the ground
would suggest, that the Greek left was nearer the Asopos than the right
wing.
[204] This is one of the most important passages in Herodotus’
description of the battle. It indicates more clearly than has been
hitherto indicated, the position of the Greeks in their second position.
In the first place, if we remember that the Lacedæmonians were on the
Greek right, it will be seen that it forms a very strong argument in
favour of the identification of Gargaphia which has been adopted.
Had it been at Apotripi it would certainly have been near the Greek
centre. It also shows the obliquity of the Greek line with respect to
the course of the Asopos; in other words, that it was, as might be
expected, extended along the Asopos ridge.
[205] This is shown still more clearly in the account of the withdrawal
from this position.
[206] The three developments of the Greek second position may be summed
up as follows:—
1. The Greek right was near the spring of Gargaphia, not on the Asopos
ridge, while the left was near the Heroön of Androkrates.
2. After a forward movement of the whole line, the right took up
position on the Asopos ridge, while the line extended along the course
of that ridge, until the left was actually on the Asopos.
3. The left, when its position on the plain became untenable, took to
the higher ground of the north extension of the Asopos ridge.
[207] It would seem as if this determination were not come to at the
morning council. Their idea at that time appears to have been to move
during the night, in case the enemy did not renew their attack. As the
attack was renewed, the movement was deferred until the following night.
[208] The members of the American school at Athens who excavated parts
of the site of Platæa some years ago were inclined to believe that at
the time of the battle the town stood on the higher or southern end of
the bastion which is now strewn with the traces of the successive towns
which have occupied the site; and that it did not extend northward
to the point where the bastion sinks more or less abruptly into the
plain. They also believed that they discovered the foundations of the
temple of Hera on this north extension of the bastion. I am disposed
to think that their conjecture as to the position of the contemporary
town is correct, though the question is not of sufficient importance
with respect to this particular passage in Greek history to render
it desirable or necessary to quote the mass of evidence on which the
opinion is founded. The position of the temple of Hera as determined by
them agrees with the brief mention of it in this passage of Herodotus.
[209] Herodotus, in words already quoted, says that it was the
intention of the Greeks, on moving to the “Island,” to detach a part
of the army to relieve the attendants who were blocked in the pass.
This is certainly the Dryoskephalæ or the Platæa-Athens pass, probably
the latter, which they were attempting to use as an alternative way,
after the fearful disaster which had befallen the former provision
train in the exit of the Dryoskephalæ pass. Herodotus shows, too,
that this relief was urgently required, since the Greek army was
running short of provisions; for, although the Platæa-Megara pass must
have been open, it is of such a character as to render it impossible
that the commissariat for a force of 100,000 men could be adequately
maintained through its channel. It is therefore in the very highest
degree probable that an attempt, at any rate, was made to carry out
this part of the arrangement between the generals. Now, the Spartan
force on the right of the Greek line would be, in so far as position
was concerned, that portion of the Greek army on which this duty would
naturally devolve. The mission of this force for the relief of the pass
was one of extreme danger and difficulty, and it would be natural that
the service should devolve on that part of the army which enjoyed the
highest military reputation. It was, I venture to think, while carrying
out this movement that the Spartans became involved in that series of
events which led to the last catastrophe in the great tragedy.
[210] Thucydides (i. 20) denies that such a division or regiment
existed in the Spartan army.
[211] Even in the Spartan army indiscipline was apt to make its
appearance without the existence of such a substantial motive as in the
present instance. Cf. the insubordination of the Spartan officers at
the battle of Mantinea in 418 B.C. (Thuc. v. 72).
[212] That they never reached the rocky ὑπωρέη is plain from the
incidents of the battle that followed.
[213] Of A 4 and A 5.
[214] The ὑπωρέη of Herodotus.
[215] Cf. the tale H. ix. 58.
[216] Δρόμῳ διαβάντας τὸν Ἀσωπὸν (H. ix. 59).
[217] It will be seen, when the details of the Athenian retreat come to
be examined, how noticeably this detail accords with the account which
Herodotus gives of that retreat.
[218] Some modern commentators have regarded this detail mentioned by
Herodotus as a convincing proof of the Athenian bias in his narrative.
To me it seems eminently natural, after the experience of the previous
days, that Pausanias or any other commander should have summoned help
under the circumstances. I shall, moreover, have occasion to show that
the Athenians did undoubtedly diverge from their march to the Island in
the direction in which the Spartan battle with the Persians took place.
[219] It is clear from Herodotus’ subsequent account of the proceedings
of the Greek centre that this battle took place out of sight of that
part of the army which had retired to Platæa.
[220] H. ix. 62: Ἤδη ἐγίνετο ἡ μάχη ἰσχυρὴ παρ’ αὐτὸ τὸ Δημήτριον.
[221] This incidental detail mentioned by Herodotus peculiarly supports
the view that the temple must have stood on the site of the church of
St. Demetrion.
[222] This is clearly shown in Herodotus’ narrative. He distinctly
speaks of the Athenians as having at the beginning of the movement
“turned down towards the plain” (H. ix. 56, κάτω τραφθέντες ἐς τὸ
πεδίον); and in a still more remarkable passage he says that, when
Mardonius led his Persians across the Asopos in pursuit of the Greeks,
“he did not see the Athenians, who had turned down towards the plain,
by reason of the (intervening) hills” (H. ix. 59). The hills mentioned
are evidently the northern extension of the Asopos ridge.
[223] A 1 in the map.
[224] Ridge 5.
[225] Thus far διὰ τῆς ὑπωρέης (H. ix. 69).
[226] _I.e._ ridges 3 and 2; cf. H. ix. 69, διὰ ... τῶν κολωνῶν.
[227] Ridge 5.
[228] I confess I cannot understand the argument of those who regard
Herodotus’ account of Platæa as being tainted throughout with a lying
Athenian tradition. In so far as the narrative provides evidence of its
source or sources, there is at least as much matter in it which may be
attributed to Spartan as to Athenian origin.
[229] The Asopos ridge, the Long ridge, and the Plateau.
[230] The treatment meted out to the Æginetans in the narrative of
Platæa, as contrasted with the account which Herodotus gives of their
conduct at Salamis, points to the very various character of the sources
from which he drew his history. This part of the Platæan narrative is
undoubtedly drawn from a tradition highly coloured by the relations
which existed between Athens and Ægina twenty years after Platæa was
fought.
[231] Xen. Anab. iii. 2, 27. The striking words are μὴ τὰ ζεύγη ἡμῶν
στρατηγῇ.
[232] I have had occasion to speak of the Thermopylæ narrative under
various aspects in relation to the sources from which it is derived.
To prevent any misconception, I should like to sum up briefly my
conclusions.
(1) The whole “motivation” of the story is derived from a version of
official origin at Sparta.
(2) The incidents of the actual fighting may be derived partly from a
Spartan source, probably of an unofficial character. The description of
some of them, however, rests on ♠information picked up by Herodotus at
Thermopylæ itself from natives of the region.
♠ “infornation” replaced with “information”
[233] For these two points cf. H. vii. 152.
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