coast must have spent a winter of anxious expectation as to what would
happen when the Persian reinforcements arrived. The Ionian fleet had
in the autumn brought back news of the disastrous failure of the
revolt in Cyprus; and from that time it was a question where the next
blow would fall, and how it could best be parried. The danger of the
situation arose from the fact that by the end of the year 497 the
opportunity for a vigorous offensive on land in the west had, for the
time being, vanished. The absence of the Ionian fleet in Cyprus in the
late summer of that year would prevent any combined movement of the
insurgents at a time when the available fighting strength of Persia in
the satrapy of Sardes can hardly have been sufficient to cope with the
force which might have been collected had the fleet been there. The
Ionian towns, the moral and geographical centre of the revolt, had for
the moment staked their all on success in Cyprus, and had despatched
thither their fleet, the sole means by which the concentration
necessary for a formidable combined movement could be brought about. So
the revolted were reduced to a passive state of expectancy, confined to
a defensive, which, inasmuch as Persia held the inner line in Western
Asia Minor, was most disadvantageous to them from a strategical point
of view. The Persian council of war saw this weakness. The revolted
regions could be taken in detail.
The plan adopted seems to have been to deal with the Hellespont, the
Ionian towns, and Caria, as three areas of operations, and to take
a vigorous offensive in one region at a time, while threatening the
other two with a number of troops sufficient to prevent their sending
any substantial help to the region attacked. With the reduction of
one region, the troops which had been employed in it would be largely
available for the second attack.
The Hellespont, certainly the weakest of the three, was first invaded
and reduced, while Ionia and Caria were merely threatened. This
accomplished, a twofold force was directed against Caria, while Ionia
was watched; and, finally, the combined armies fell upon the land which
formed the heart, the life-centre of the revolt.
The first step in this design seems to have succeeded. The second
proved a harder task.
◆H. v. 118.◆
Forewarned, and therefore forearmed, the Carians collected their
forces at a place called “the White Pillars,” near a river named
Marsyas,[32] a tributary of the Mæander, with the intention of meeting
the Persian invasion at that point. Arrived there, a discussion arose
among the commanders as to whether it would be better to fight with
the river at their backs, and so animate their men with the courage of
despair, or to retire somewhat from the river and make the Persians,
as the assailants, take up a position which, in case of their defeat,
would be infinitely disastrous to them.[33]
The second of these alternatives was wisely chosen. There must have
been many experienced soldiers in the Carian army who would be well
aware of the error which the first proposal involved. The fact that it
was made, and the stated reason for its being made, suggests, however,
the difficulty under which the insurgents laboured, in that they had to
meet the Persian levies with armies which must have been composed for
the most part of untrained men. The period of subjection to Persia was
now half a century old, and, during that time, the subject population
must have been afforded the minimum of opportunity for anything
resembling military training. Persia did _not_ call out levies except
under stress of necessity; and it is quite certain that she would never
have allowed any subject race to practise its people in arms.
◆H. v. 119.◆
The battle on the Marsyas was fiercely contested. No details of it are
given, except that the Carians were finally overpowered by numbers, and
sustained a loss of 10,000 men, whereas the Persian loss was only 2000.
The fugitives took refuge in the temple and sacred precinct of Zeus
Stratios at Labraunda, ◆Strabo, 659.◆ a village on the mountain pass
between Alabanda and Mylassa, about seven miles from the latter.
They seem to have regarded their position as a desperate one; for they
are reported to have debated the question of leaving Asia altogether.
This place was, however, near Miletus, and the Milesians and their
allies, presumably Greeks from the smaller towns near Miletus,[34]
◆H. v. 120.◆ sent help to the Carians. This put new heart into them.
Instead of capitulating or deserting their post, they resisted the
Persian attack, only, however, to sustain a defeat worse than that at
the Marsyas river, a disaster in which their Milesian allies suffered
severely.
◆H. v. 121.◆
“But after this disaster the Carians recovered and fought once more,”
says Herodotus. When it is remembered that their first defeat had
reduced these Carians to a state bordering on despair, and that their
second defeat is expressly said to have been still more serious
than their first, this statement is difficult to understand. It may
reasonably be suggested that, if the account of the previous operations
be the whole truth, it is incomprehensible that the Carians should have
had time to recover from such disasters before the Persians followed
up their successes. The question may even arise whether Herodotus is
relating the events of the same campaign as that in which the two
defeats took place. It is impossible to pretend that the available
evidence is in any way conclusive on this point. The only detail which
tends to throw light upon the question is a geographical one. By
the time that the events next recorded took place, the Persians had
certainly advanced beyond Labraunda; and this fact would tend to the
conclusion that they did actually occur in the same campaign. Herodotus
recounts them as follows:—
#HELLESPONT AND IONIA.#
◆H. v. 121.◆
“The Carians, on hearing that the Persians were about to march against
their cities, laid an ambush on the road in Pedasos, into which the
Persians fell by night and were destroyed, both they and their
generals, Daurises, Amorges, and Sisimakes. With them perished also
Myrsos the son of Gyges. The commander of this ambush was Herakleides,
the son of Ibanollis, a Mylassian.”
The scene of this terrible defeat is on the road which would be taken
by an army advancing from Labraunda southward into Caria.
What had really happened can only be a subject for conjecture. The
Persians must have suffered so severely in the battles on the Marsyas
and at Labraunda, that further advance was delayed until reinforcements
could come up. During this delay the Carians rallied, and then
inflicted on the invaders the most crushing defeat of the whole war.
◆H. v. 122.◆
In this campaigning season of the year 496, the operations in the
Hellespont region which Daurises had left in an all but complete
stage, were continued by Hymeës, who had been campaigning in the
Mysian district. But little can have remained for him to do. His army
accomplished the task, though he himself died before it was actually
completed.
◆H. v. 123.◆
A little light is also thrown upon the doings of the army which, under
the command of Artaphernes and Otanes, had occupied the attention of
the Ionians during the campaign in Caria. It captured the towns of
Klazomenæ and Kyme.
The outlook towards the close of the summer, before the great Persian
defeat in Caria took place, must have been a gloomy one for the
insurgents. Cyprus was lost. The prospects of the revolt in Caria
seemed desperate. The Hellespont region had been reduced, though that
of the Bosphorus was as yet untouched; and even two of the Greek coast
towns of the Ægean had fallen.
◆H. v. 124.◆
It is not strange if Aristagoras began to despair of the future.
Herodotus is consistent in placing his conduct in the very worst light:
he was a coward at heart: he had thrown Ionia into confusion: he had
stirred up a mighty business; and now he planned flight.
As a preface to a story of a selfish attempt on the part of
Aristagoras to provide for his own safety, regardless of the fate of
his fellow-conspirators, such bitter condemnation of the man would have
been justified. But the tale which follows is singularly inconsistent
with the preface. So far from stealing away from Miletus, and seeking
to save his own life alone, he called the conspirators together, and,
in view of the desperate position of the revolt, he pointed out to
them that it would be well to secure some place of retreat, in case
they were driven forth from Miletus, by establishing a colony either
in Sardinia or at Myrkinos, “which Histiæus had proceeded to fortify
after receiving it as a gift from Darius.” Hecatæus is reported to
have opposed the plan, and to have suggested the futile alternative of
fortifying the small island of Leros, off Miletus, and of using it as
a base for the recovery of that town.[35] The majority of the meeting
voted in favour of Aristagoras’ design. Accordingly, leaving Miletus
in charge of a prominent citizen named Pythagoras, Aristagoras sailed
for Myrkinos, presumably late in the year 496, taking with him all
who volunteered to go. They all perished in an attack on a Thracian
town, whose name Herodotus does not mention, but which seems, ◆Th. iv.
102.◆ from what Thucydides says, to have been on the site of the later
Amphipolis.
Herodotus’ story of this last scene in Aristagoras’ life cannot be
said to support the bitter language of the judgment passed on him. He
went out to secure a refuge for his fellow citizens, and died in so
doing. He never returned, because he could not return. Had he remained
indefinitely at Myrkinos; had he looked on while his native city and
the men who had joined him in the great venture were destroyed, without
making one effort to return and take part in the last struggle for life
and liberty, he might with justice have been branded with the cowardice
of desertion. Herodotus’ account of the man and all that he did, fails,
when examined, to support the picture of his character which the
historian has drawn.
#HISTIÆUS AND ARTAPHERNES.#
◆H. vi. 1.◆
It was about the time of Aristagoras’ death that Histiæus, having
come down from Susa, arrived at Sardes. There he met the satrap
Artaphernes. The brief account of their meeting given by Herodotus is a
dramatic scene.
“On his arrival from Susa, Artaphernes, the satrap of Sardes, asked
him what he supposed to be the reason for the Ionian revolt. He said
he did not know, and that he was surprised at what had happened,
pretending that he was wholly ignorant of the causes[36] of what was
taking place. Artaphernes, however, seeing through his dissimulation,
and knowing the truth about the revolt, said, ‘Histiæus, the truth
about these matters is this: You stitched this sandal, and Aristagoras
put it on.’ Thus Artaphernes spoke about the revolt.”
It has been assumed by modern historians of Greece that Artaphernes’
language is a direct reference to the man with the tattooed head. The
assumption involves, however, certain difficulties.
Unless Artaphernes’ information with regard to the part played by
Histiæus was a recent acquisition at the time at which the latter
arrived at Sardes, it is incomprehensible that Histiæus should ever
have been allowed to leave Susa. The great Persian officials would
certainly not conceal such information from Darius. They loathed
Histiæus, and would have been but too glad to do him a bad turn.
Furthermore, Darius himself had taken the precaution of removing
Histiæus to Susa for reasons which would have seemed as nothing
compared with an allegation that he had been a prime mover in the great
revolt.
The “truth about the revolt” which Artaphernes knew in so far as
Histiæus was concerned, can have amounted to little more than the
suspicion that, at the time when he was fortifying Myrkinos, he had had
designs against the peace of the empire. The remarkable persistence
with which Histiæus and Aristagoras pursued their designs upon Myrkinos
suggests that behind the direct design lay a larger one, which is only
incidentally mentioned by Herodotus.[37]
Whatever may have been the grounds for Artaphernes’ suspicions,
Histiæus saw clearly that it would be dangerous to remain at Sardes,
and so fled by night to the sea, ◆H. vi. 2.◆ “having deceived King
Darius: for he, having undertaken to subdue Sardinia, the greatest of
islands, sought to assume the leadership of the Ionians in the war
with Darius.” He went to Chios first, where he was imprisoned upon
suspicion of being engaged in evil designs at Darius’ instigation. “But
the Chians, learning the whole story, that he was an enemy to the king,
released him.”
It is a strange tale this tale of Histiæus. He had certainly been
playing a double game for years past, but it is very difficult to say
what the two sides of the game actually were. His reception by the
Chians shows that some of the insurgents, at any rate, were unaware
that he had played any part in bringing about the revolt. He had,
moreover, been able to persuade Darius of his honesty of purpose.
Probably his purpose was dishonest to both sides, and what he aimed at
was the leadership of the Asiatic Greeks, which should, if he could
make it so, be independent of Persia. Failing that, he was prepared
to serve the king as an Ionian satrap, but not as an underling of
Artaphernes, or any other Persian governor. The great Persian officials
were, accordingly, his irreconcilable opponents.
◆H. v. 23, _ad fin._◆
The words reported in the tale of his conversation with Darius at Susa
show that the author of that story had some reason for suggesting that
Histiæus had long been privy to a conspiracy of revolt. ◆H. v. 106.◆
His action at Myrkinos had been interpreted by Megabazos as aiming at
the setting up of a great power hostile to Persian interests. May not
all this mean that this man, a schemer to his very fingers’ ends, had,
before he was taken up to Susa, planned the conspiracy which ended
in the revolt, and that his original design had been to overturn the
Persian power in Asia with the aid of the Thracian tribes, who were
at the time of his settlement in Myrkinos smarting under the recent
attempt of Darius to subjugate them,—an attempt which had certainly
not turned out a success? #THE SITUATION IN B.C. 495# Is it not this
which Megabazos hinted at but could not prove to Darius? Is it not
of these plans of twelve years before that Histiæus spoke to the Chians,
and so persuaded them to release him? Had not Aristagoras been, in a
sense, an heir to these designs in virtue of that strange testament
tattooed on the head of the slave? But was that testament of so late a
date as Herodotus supposed?
It was either late in 496 or early in 495 that Histiæus came down to
the coast. The revolt had not, indeed, prospered, but it was far from
crushed. Aristagoras had gone to Myrkinos, if not to Hades. He had
left Miletus, in all probability, before the great Persian disaster on
the Pedasos road. That disaster, in which the greatest of the armies,
if not the major part of the whole Persian force in Western Asia, had
been wiped out of existence, now put a wholly different complexion upon
affairs; and the satraps seem to have found themselves once more, in
495, in the position in which they had been in 497,—able to maintain
the existing status, but without the means necessary for taking further
offensive, for the time being. Hence the gap in this part of Herodotus’
story of the war. There is nothing recorded, because there was nothing
remarkable to record. The side which had suffered most severely in the
last round of the great fight had managed at the last moment to get in
a smashing blow; and during the next round both sides were too weak to
attempt a vigorous attack.
In one respect the circumstances were favourable to Histiæus. They
afforded him time for intrigue. If Herodotus’ story is to be believed,
he had to face the bitter reproaches of the Ionians at Chios for
having brought about the revolt. It is doubtless the case that the
Ionians were dispirited at the way in which matters had gone in the
last campaign; but, apart from the inconsistency of this attitude of
the Chians with their previous treatment of Histiæus, the story serves
to point the moral of the hopelessness of the revolt, and, so doing,
is not above suspicion. Histiæus is related to have defended himself
by saying that he sent the message because he had discovered that
Darius entertained a design of removing the Ionians to Phœnicia and
the Phœnicians to Ionia. The intense rivalry between these two
great commercial peoples may well have rendered such an allegation a
commonplace with agitators on the Asiatic side of the Ægean; but there
is no reason for supposing that it had any foundation in fact.
Histiæus now proceeded with his schemes. He was evidently convinced
that the revolt could not succeed without external support of some
kind. Upon Thrace he could not now reckon, since the news that
Aristagoras had embroiled himself with the Thracians on the Strymon
must have reached him by that time. ◆H. vi. 4.◆ He had, however,
discovered that there was at Sardes a Persian party hostile to
Artaphernes, with which he had previously conferred “about revolt.”
With it he now sought to establish communications. He was unfortunate
in his messenger—a certain Hermippos of Atarneus,—who carried the
letters straight to Artaphernes. The latter directed him to take them
to those to whom they were sent, and to bring back the answers. As
might be expected, the recipients were executed.
So the plan miscarried.
Histiæus now persuaded the Chians to convey him to his old seat of
tyranny, Miletus. Its citizens, who, says Herodotus, had been glad to
get rid of Aristagoras, were not in a mood to receive him. He made an
ineffectual attempt to force an entrance into the town, and was wounded
in so doing. He accordingly returned to Chios and tried to persuade the
Chians to give him ships,—on what excuse or for what purpose is not
stated. As they refused, he went across to Mytilene and persuaded the
Lesbians to give him eight triremes. With these he went to Byzantion,
and, “settling there, they proceeded to seize vessels sailing out of
the Pontus, except such as professed to be ready to obey Histiæus.”
Before making any attempt to explain the policy pursued by Histiæus
and the Mytilenians at Byzantion, it is necessary to arrive at some
conclusion as to when he and his allies went thither. Except for the
narrative of the adventures of Histiæus, the history of the fourth year
of the revolt (495) appears to be a blank. #HISTIÆUS AT BYZANTION.# No
event seems to have occurred of a sufficiently striking nature
to find a place in a record such as Herodotus set himself to write.
For the time matters seem to have been at a standstill in so far as
large operations are concerned. Either side had sufficient strength to
keep the other in check, but neither was strong enough to inflict a
serious blow. The war continued; but it was, doubtless, of a desultory
character, unmarked by decisive success or failure. The Persians were
waiting for reinforcements; the insurgents were too exhausted to do
aught but wait for the renewal of the real struggle.
The great defeat in Caria seems, indeed, to have taken place in the
autumn of 496; and it may therefore appear strange that a power like
Persia should not have been able to supply the losses in time, at any
rate, to strike a decisive blow before the next campaigning season
ended. Had the losses been of an ordinary character, such would, no
doubt, have been the case; but the reparation of a great defeat in
those days of slow communications, and in a monarchy which did not
keep a large standing army, was essentially a work of time. It was
necessary to communicate with Susa. Susa had to communicate with the
provinces from which the new levies had to be drawn. The levies had to
be collected and drilled, and then had to be despatched on their long,
long march to the Western satrapies. It is not strange, if more than a
year elapsed before Persia was ready, after the campaign in Caria, to
resume a real offensive in the west.
If this be so, the exploits of Histiæus constitute the sole record
of events for the year 495, and his departure to Byzantion may be
attributed to the late summer or to the autumn of that year.
What was his design in going to Byzantion? It has been assumed that he
went there to commit the acts of piracy to which Herodotus is supposed
to refer. But is it certain that this is the only interpretation which
can be put upon Herodotus’ language? Even if it is, is it possible to
credit such a story?
Were the Mytilenians in the slightest degree likely to allow their
ships to be used for the mere purpose of plundering their allies,
for to them a large number of the vessels engaged in the Pontus trade
must have belonged? Was it for this that Histiæus had come down to the
coast?
But Herodotus’ language is inconsistent with this interpretation
of Histiæus’ acts. He is described as treating the passing vessels
in different ways, according as they did or did not “obey” him. No
explanation is given of what this means, but it does not seem possible
to interpret it as a reference to piracy.
Was he bringing pressure to bear on the Greek cities of the Asian
coast,—such as, for instance, Ephesus,—which were beginning to waver in
their determination, by interfering with their trade at an important
point? The Mytilenians might have supported him in this. They might,
too, have supported him in a design to make the revolt more active
in these parts, for it is a noteworthy fact that Byzantion is not
recorded to have taken any active part in it. Was Byzantion wavering?
Did it require watching? Its loss would have been a serious blow, for
it would have meant the loss of the command of that route on which the
insurgents must have been peculiarly dependent for food supplies, amid
the destruction, stress, and turmoil of the war.
◆H. vi. 6.◆
At the time of Histiæus’ departure, the Ionians were living in
expectation of the renewal of the attack upon them. By the autumn of
495, reinforcements from the east must have begun to arrive at Sardes.
But the attack does not seem to follow in that year, in so far as any
calculation can be made from the known date of the subsequent fall of
Miletus.[38] It appears to have been in the early spring of 494 that
the Persians collected all their available troops for an attack on
Miletus, “considering the other cities to be of less account.” So much
for the Greek cities. But what of Caria? #THE FATE OF CARIA?# That land
practically disappears from the story of the revolt, after dealing
Persia the severest blow she suffered during all the years of it.
◆H. vi. 25.◆
Herodotus does not tell the tale of its reduction. All that he says is
that, “after the fall of Miletus [in 494], the Persians immediately
got possession of Caria, some of the cities surrendering voluntarily,
others being brought to submission by force.”
But the absence of any record of Carian participation in the revolt
during the long period intervening between the Persian defeat near
Pedasos and the fall of Miletus, suggests the suspicion that these
“voluntary surrenders” are not in all cases attributable to the time
following the fall of that city.
◆H. vi. 20.◆
The people of that very town Pedasos are, in the settlement of affairs
made after the capture of Miletus, granted by the Persians a portion
of the late Milesian territory. It would seem as if Caria, partially,
at any rate, made terms with her old masters; as if Artaphernes made
a successful trial of diplomacy in the critical time which succeeded
the great defeat, and detached Caria from the cause of the insurgents
by offering her a share in the spoils of her allies. This hypothesis
explains, at any rate, two features in the history of this time which
would otherwise be inexplicable, namely, the apparent non-participation
of Caria in the years following the Persian defeat, and the unexpected
grant made by the Persians to a Carian city.
Whatever may be the truth with regard to Caria, it is plain that she
was a negligible quantity at the time when the great attack on Miletus
was planned.
The attack was to be of a twofold character, by sea as well as land.
The naval forces of Persia had already suffered two severe defeats in
the course of the war. On these two occasions the Phœnicians had proved
inferior to the Ionians on the sea. ◆H. vi. 6.◆ But the fleet in the
present instance was drawn not merely from Phœnicia, but also from
Cilicia and Egypt, and even from that Cyprus which, but two short years
before, had fought as an ally of the Ionians. Both sides regarded this
great effort as the crisis of the struggle.
Delegates from the Ionian towns met at the pan-Ionian sanctuary
of Poseidon near Mykale, to concert measures to meet the great attack.
Their decision was a somewhat remarkable one. They determined to
confine the operations on land to the defence of the actual walls of
Miletus, which should be conducted by the Milesians themselves; but to
mobilize the whole of their available navy and to station it at Ladé, a
small island off the town of Miletus.
It was a great misfortune to the Ionian cause at this time that the
war operations of the League were not directed by one man of ability.
There may have been able men in the pan-Ionian Council; but in war such
a Council is apt to err on the side of caution, and to adopt a purely
defensive attitude, when the offensive would be the best defence. The
main features of the situation are sufficiently clear.
The real Ionian base was on the sea; the Persian on the land. Each
side, in order to strike a decisive blow at the other, must strike on
that element on which the other was strong. This Persia did; and this
the Ionian Greeks failed to do in this campaign. The simple result was
that the Persian stood to win, the Ionian to lose.
The story of Ladé is one of the very few sections of the history of the
revolt in which Herodotus attempts anything of the nature of a detailed
narrative. It bears all the traces of a compilation from various
sources. It opens with a list of the fleet, giving not merely the
numbers of the contingents, but also the battle array. Chronologically
this latter feature is manifestly out of place, inasmuch as the battle
was fought some time after the gathering of the fleet.
The story of the events in Ladé itself prior to the battle is
noticeable for two elements which can hardly be attributed to the same
source. The despicable Ionian tyrant is made to appear more despicable;
and the Ionian insurgents are presented in a most unfavourable light.
#FLEET AT LADÉ.#
The list of ships contributed by the various States is as follows:—
Miletus 80
Priene 12
Myus 3
Teos 17
Chios 100
Erythræ 8
Phokæa 3
Lesbos 70
Samos 60
---
353
The Persian fleet is said to have numbered 600.
The absence of Ephesus from the Greek list is noticeable. There are
other absentees of less note. If the contingent of Miletus, the object
of attack, be omitted, the number of ships supplied by the states on
the mainland amounts to only 43.
The smallness of this number is so remarkable that it cannot be passed
over without comment. One of two things must have occurred. Either some
of the Ionian towns had been reduced since 496, and the story of their
reduction is part of the lost records of 495; or the resistance was
weakening, and the Greek cities were withdrawing one by one from the
struggle, after making their own terms with the Persian. Of the two
conjectures, the latter is, perhaps, the more probable, as it would in
a way justify the impression of pusillanimity which Herodotus gives to
the revolt, an impression which, though on the whole unjustifiable,
must have rested on some partial basis. The tradition of the last act
in the great tragedy, as preserved in these renegade cities, was sure
to be sinister; and from them, or some one of them, Herodotus may
have drawn information which contributed to the formation of his own
opinions.
The magnitude of the Ionian fleet which gathered at Ladé is in
itself sufficient evidence of the determination of the insurgents to
concentrate their effort on the sea. The Persian fleet was more than
half again as numerous; but it had already suffered two severe defeats
off Pamphylia and off Cyprus, and it showed a manifest inclination
to avoid a conflict. Herodotus does not mention the station which it
took up; but it was presumably somewhere near Miletus, because some
of the ex-tyrants of the Greek cities who were aboard entered, at
the instigation of the Persians, into communication with their
late subjects, with intent to detach some of the contingents from the
formidable armada. For the moment these intrigues met with no success.
◆H. vi. 10.◆
Herodotus is evidently of opinion that even this resistance to a
proposal of treachery was an instance of the wrong-headedness[39] which
the Ionians displayed throughout the revolt.
It is very difficult to form a judgment as to the amount of historical
truth which is contained in the tale of the events which intervened
between this time and the actual battle. It is manifestly told with the
intention of presenting the Ionians in the worst possible light. This
people, which had already in the course of the revolt inflicted two
defeats by sea upon the Persians, is now represented as having neither
the power nor the will to practise the tactics of a sea-fight.
◆H. vi. 11.◆
After the fleet had gathered at Ladé the Ionians held meetings on
land, at which the situation was discussed. Among others who spoke was
Dionysios, who commanded the small Phokæan contingent.
“Our affairs,” he said, “are balanced on a razor’s edge, Ionians, as
to whether we are to be free men or slaves—more than that, runaway
slaves. Therefore, if you will now have the will to bear hardships,
toil for the moment will be yours, but you will be able to overcome
the foe and enjoy freedom. If, however, you continue to display a lack
of fortitude and of discipline, I have no hope for you that you will
not pay to the king the penalty of revolt. Give ear to my advice, and
place yourselves in my hands. I promise you, if the gods deal fairly
by us, either that the enemy will not give us battle, or that, if they
do, will be badly beaten.”
To this advice the Ionians listened, and placed themselves for the time
being at his disposal. He accordingly practised them in manœuvres every
day, and especially in the manœuvre of cutting the line, and kept them
busy from morning to night. This they endured for seven days. After
that they refused to carry out the orders of this “vagabond Phokæan,
who provided only three ships.” #CONDEMNATION OF THE IONIANS.#
The language attributed to them is that of men who, accustomed to
lead a life of luxury, find themselves in a situation of self-imposed
hardship, which they have not the courage to face. After five years of
resistance to the greatest power of their time, they are damned as mere
“boulevardiers” on the battle-field, “men who had no experience of such
hardships,” lacking the very elements of courageous perseverance. The
condemnation does not fall on the population of those cities which are
not represented in this last great struggle for Ionian freedom, but on
those who fought to the bitter end. The extraordinary feature of the
whole matter is that Herodotus should have allowed such a tale to stand
side by side with his narrative of the battle, in which it appears that
part of the Ionian fleet fought with the most desperate courage.
The “Dionysios” story throws considerable light on the nature of the
sources for Herodotus’ history of the revolt. The personal references
to Dionysios may, like the subsequent reference to him,[40] be suggested
by information as to his exploits obtained by the author in some Greek
city of Italy. But the intent of the whole story is manifest. It
provides an excuse for the conduct of those Samians who deserted in the
battle, to the tale of which it serves as a preface. It is not merely
a story of Samian origin, but a version to which currency was given by
certain persons in Samos, who found it necessary to invent some defence
for an act of cowardice for which the facts themselves provided no
excuse.[41]
The introduction into the story of what is almost certainly an
anachronism, the manœuvre of “cutting the line,” is, however, a graphic
touch of the historian’s own, suggested to him, like the reference to
Kythera in the Persian debate after Thermopylæ, by the incidents
of the Peloponnesian war.
It is a strange tendency this, which the father of history now and
again displays, to introduce into his narrative a page or two of matter
which is conspicuously refuted by his general history. He is far too
honest to distort the story of events in accordance with his own views;
but he again and again, especially in the case of the revolt, yields
to the temptation of introducing evidence from manifestly partial and
contaminated sources, simply because it happens to agree with his own
judgment on the general course of events.
Of the origin of the story of the actual battle there can be but
little question. It is also a Samian version. But, even so, it is
not simple in its elements. The behaviour of the two sections of the
Samian contingent in the battle rendered it certain that two very
different versions of the fight would survive in Samos,—one of them
the creation of those who were faithless, and the other that of those
who were faithful to the Ionian cause. Herodotus’ account contains
features borrowed from them both. This oft-repeated characteristic
of his history is in no sense deplorable. It is essentially _the_
characteristic of his work which renders that work most valuable at the
present day, in that, by reason of it, the contemporary evidence is
preserved in the form in which he found it.
The truth with regard to the state of affairs in the Ionian fleet
before Ladé is, in all probability, that counsels were greatly divided
on the details of the course to be pursued in the battle which was
imminent. On this occasion, as on previous occasions, the lack of a
single directing mind made itself felt. There was no one in supreme
command. Even a Eurybiades, not gifted with the ability to devise a
great design, but possessed of a common-sense judgment which would have
enabled him to decide between the plans suggested by others, might have
saved the situation.
This lack of leadership, and consequent lack of unanimity is the only
excuse which can be brought forward for the doubly treacherous conduct
of the Samians. #BATTLE OF LADÉ.# Herodotus admits all the evidence
for their defence; but he does not exclude the damning evidence
against them. This is present not merely in the matter but in the
form of the history of the battle. Despite the fact that the grounds
of their apology were in accord with his own general views, he is not
wholly convinced that they constituted a valid excuse for their conduct
on the present occasion.
◆H. vi. 13.◆
“The Samian commanders,” he says, “seeing what was taking place among
the Ionians, and their lack of discipline, proceeded to accept the
proposal which Æakes, the son of Syloson, had kept sending them at
the bidding of the Persians, calling on them to desert the Ionian
league. It appeared to them also that it was impossible to overcome
the resources of the king, because they knew well that if the present
fleet were defeated another would come, five times as large.
“Seizing, then, upon this excuse, so soon as they saw that the Ionians
were unwilling to make a fight of it, they thought it to their
advantage to save their temples and their property.”
The Æakes mentioned was one of the hated Ionian tyrants whom
Aristagoras had deposed at the beginning of the revolt. Herodotus does
not comment on his connection with the matter; but it is certain that
the part which he played in it would weigh heavily against the Samian
traitors in the balance of the historian’s judgment on their act.
◆H. vi. 14.◆
In giving his account of the battle he suffers, as he himself says,
from a lack of reliable information.[42] Matter is, however, introduced
which shows plainly that he had heard at Samos a version of the story
told from a point of view directly opposed to that of the tale of
events in the previous chapters, and that this version was supported by
inscriptional evidence existent in his own day.
“When, therefore, the Phœnicians advanced to the attack, the Ionians
proceeded to put out against them with their ships in column,[43] But
when they approached one another, and joined battle, I am not able to
say with certainty which of the Ionians were cowardly or brave
in the sea-fight, for they cast the blame on one another. The Samians
are said to have set sail at this moment and to have left the line of
battle, with the exception of eleven ships, and to have gone off to
Samos, in accordance with their agreement with Æakes. The captains of
these eleven vessels remained and fought, disregarding the orders of
the commanders. The Samian commonwealth, in consequence of this act
of theirs, voted that a pillar should be set up in their honour, with
their personal and family names inscribed upon it, in that they had
been brave men: and this pillar is in the market-place.[44]
“The Lesbians, seeing those next to them in the line in flight,
followed their example; and in like manner most of the Ionians did
the same. Of those who remained in the battle, the Chians suffered
most severely, for they made a brilliant fight of it, and showed no
cowardice. They provided, as has been already said, 100 vessels, and
forty picked citizens on board each, serving as marines. Though they
saw the majority of the allies deserting, they thought it not right
to imitate their cowardice, but, left alone with a few allies, they
went on fighting, using the manœuvre of cutting the line, until, after
capturing many of the enemy’s vessels, they had lost most of their
own.”
Such of their vessels as were in a condition to do so, made off to
Chios; those which were seriously damaged were run ashore at Mykale,
whence their crews proceeded to make their way homeward by land. On
entering Ephesian territory at night, however, they chanced upon the
women celebrating the Thesmophoria, and, being mistaken for robbers,
were attacked by the Ephesians, and some of them, at least, were killed.
This last incident may admit of various explanations; and it may be
doubted whether the action of the Ephesians was wholly due to error.
The attitude of this city at this time excites suspicion.
#DIONYSIOS OF PHOKÆA.#
But the rest of the account of the battle bears the impress of
truth. Anti-Ionian or not, Herodotus cannot withhold his admiration
from those who fought to the bitter end.
One detail may be inferred from its general incidents. The ease with
which both the Samians and the other allies got away, and with which
the Chians retreated after the fight, suggests that the Greek fleet at
the beginning of the battle was north of the Persian.
Dionysius of Phokæa is the only hero of it whose name has come down in
story. That old sea-dog, the very prototype of the seamen of the days
of Elizabeth, had no mind to return to Phokæa and share the slavery of
whatever small remnant of its inhabitants had either remained in their
old home, or had returned thither from Corsica. With his three ships he
had, in the course of the fight, taken three of the enemy’s vessels;
and now he sailed off, not in any cowardly flight, but with the
determination to “singe the King of Persia’s beard” by an unexpected
raid into his home waters. To Phœnicia he went, and there fell in with
certain merchant ships, which he disabled and plundered; and then,
laden with spoil, set sail for Sicily, where he set up as a pirate
at the expense of the Carthaginian and Tyrrhenian traders of those
seas. Doubtless the Greek cities of Italy appreciated to the full so
valuable an ally in trade competition, and from them Herodotus learnt
the history of the last days of the fierce old adventurer. The world
is poorer in that further details of his life have not survived. Would
that some Sicilian writer had taken down his story from his own lips!
It might have been one of the greatest tales of adventure in literature.
There must have been many another who fought a good fight for liberty.
They had the misfortune to have their deeds recorded by men less brave
than they. But even amid the intense partiality of the history of the
time the truth shines forth that, owing to the courage which they
displayed, the story of the revolt is one of the glorious pages in the
history of the Hellenic race. The fault of those men who persevered to
the bitter end was not lack of courage, but lack of the perception that
nature had so placed them in the world that their struggle against
the great empire was from its very outset a desperate, a hopeless
venture. It is not possible to suppose that, without the energetic help
of the European Greek, the revolt could have ended otherwise than as
it did; it may even be doubted whether, even with help from beyond the
Ægean, the struggle could have been maintained against the enormous
resources of Persia, as yet unimpaired by the disasters of the great
war of 480 and 479. Even after that war, the energy and strength of
Athens could not maintain more than an uncertain hold on the cities of
the continent.
But the revolt had saved Greece.
The great blow levelled against her must have fallen in the first
decade of the fifth century; and, had it done so, it would have fallen
upon a Greece but ill-prepared to meet it. The struggle would doubtless
have been a fierce one, but it would have been waged on the part of the
Greeks without the aid of that factor which was decisive in the great
struggle of ten years later—the great Athenian fleet.
The revolt had severely taxed the resources of the Empire. It took
Persia six years to suppress it, and in this time she lost two fleets
and one great army with its generals, besides the losses incurred
in successful operations. It resulted that, though she did make two
efforts in the years immediately following the revolt to gain a footing
beyond the Ægean, those efforts were not of a nature which, judged in
the light of knowledge after the event, could have attained any measure
of success. She was unable at this time to set on foot an expedition
adequate to the greatness of the undertaking.
It is impossible, on the evidence, to say that the struggle was carried
on with a unanimity of courage on the part of all the Ionian towns; but
it is plain that this aspect of the history of the time has had undue
weight in the judgment formed by Herodotus.
◆H. vi. 18.◆
The end was near. Miletus, the heart and soul of the revolt, was
besieged by sea and land. The walls were undermined, and all sorts of
siege engines were employed. #FALL OF MILETUS.# Finally, some
time in the late summer or autumn of 494, the city fell. The fate
of the population was a piteous one. The great majority of the male
inhabitants were massacred. The women and children were enslaved, and
carried captives to Susa. They and the remnant of the male population
were placed in a settlement on the Persian Gulf, near the mouth of the
river Tigris.
It is very difficult to estimate the loss which civilization has
suffered by the destruction of this great city, which had been, up to
the very time of its destruction, the foremost in the Hellenic world.
It was not merely in the front rank in Greek commerce; it was also an
intellectual centre unrivalled among the cities of the age. Whether it
could ever have developed a period of literary brilliance equal to that
of the Athens of the later part of this century, must remain a matter
of speculation. It had a long start in the intellectual race. The
wide interest of its material relations called forth a corresponding
breadth of interest in literary speculation of various kinds; and the
world would certainly have been enriched, had it possessed an Asiatic
Greek literature parallel to that of European Greece. Difference of
environment and difference of political circumstances would have
produced a literary development on different lines; and the literature
itself could not have failed to display one side of the many-sidedness
of the Greeks, which is lost to the present world, save for a few
fragments, which point to a promise of future greatness.
◆H. vi. 21.◆
At Athens the fall of the great city created more than a momentary
impression. Phrynichos composed a drama on the subject which aroused so
bitter a sense of loss in the mind of the Athenians that they punished
the dramatist by a fine of a thousand drachmas. It is possible that
self-reproach was mingled with regret. The desertion of 498 was so
sudden, and is, in certain respects, so unaccountable, that it may well
have provoked considerable feeling even in Athens itself.
Herodotus draws a contrast between the emotion of Athens and the apathy
of the Sybarites. When Sybaris was destroyed by Kroton about the year
510, the whole Milesian population had mourned the loss of their
old commercial friend.
The last twenty years had been fateful in the history of Greek
trade. Sybaris, Chalkis, and Miletus—three of the greatest names in
the history of Greek commerce—had successively fallen; and their
disappearance from the stage of the commercial world must have greatly
modified that obscure but powerful factor in Greek history. It will
be a matter for later consideration whether the disappearance of
these competitors, especially from the western trade route, had not
a powerful influence in shaping the events of the later half of the
century.
Of the individual fortunes of the rest of the Asiatic Greek cities,
Herodotus says but little. Among the Samians, the divided counsels
in their contingent at Ladé seem to have given birth to such bitter
dissensions that a section of the population which had remained loyal
to the revolt left the island and set sail for Sicily, whence an
invitation had come from the people of Zanklé, calling such Ionians as
would to settle at Kale Akte on the north coast of the island. Their
adventures are related by Herodotus.[45] It is not necessary to follow
them thither. Suffice it to say that the gross treachery of their
conduct to their would-be hosts upon their arrival there affords one of
those painful and striking examples of the co-existence in the Greek
race of great virtues and great defects.
◆H. vi. 25.◆
Æakes, the tyrant who had negotiated the treachery at Ladé, as a reward
for his services on that occasion, was reinstated in Samos by the
Phœnician fleet. The city and its temples were left untouched.
“Immediately after the capture of Miletus,” says Herodotus, “the
Persians got possession of Caria, some of the cities submitting
voluntarily, and others being reduced by force.”
The part played by Caria, as described in the narrative of the revolt,
is quite incomprehensible. What had she been doing during the time that
had intervened since the great defeat of the Persians on the Pedasos
road? #SUBJUGATION OF CARIA.# The interval cannot, upon any calculation
from the facts mentioned by Herodotus, have amounted to less than
two years. Were the Carians during all this time inactive, sullenly
awaiting their fate? Their story during these years is a lost chapter
in history.
It would seem unlikely that Herodotus could not have obtained any
information with regard to the course of events in the land immediately
bordering on the territory of his own native town. The only possible
conjecture is that his reference to the reduction of Caria as
having taken place after that of Miletus, applies to its _complete_
subjugation, and that the process had been going on for some time. It
has already been suggested that the inactivity of Caria was due partly
to its resistance having been undermined by Persian diplomacy in the
period following the great defeat; and it may be that those towns which
submitted voluntarily had been gradually detached from the insurrection
by offers of favourable terms from Artaphernes.
◆H. vi. 26.◆
Histiæus plays the chief part in the last scene of the drama of the
revolt. Whenever this mysterious man appears upon the stage he brings
mystery with him. He is still at Byzantion when the scene opens. He has
been there for at least a year. But the strange feature of the matter
is that, though he has been there so long, and though during all that
time he has been committing acts of piracy (_sic_) against the Ionian
traders, those simple-minded folk continue to send their vessels into
the inevitable trap.
◆H. vi. 26.◆
His Lesbians are still with him, presumably the crews of the eight
ships the Mytilenians had granted him. And yet while all these strange
proceedings are going on at Byzantion, and while their own people are
taking part in them, these very Mytilenians send seventy vessels to
Ladé! Byzantion was less than two days’ sail from them, and with half
that number of vessels they could have put a stop to what was going on
there, had they had the will to do so. They must have been satisfied
that Histiæus was acting in their interest; and had that consisted in
the perpetration of piratical acts against their allies, it is strange
that they should have thought it their interest to join those
allies at Ladé. They played, indeed, a coward’s part there, but not
without excuse.
The evidence, though anything but conclusive, suggests the suspicion
that Histiæus was acting in the interest of those cities who persevered
in the revolt against those other Greek cities who had made, or had
sought to make, terms with the Persian.
His proceedings after he had received the news of the fall of Miletus
are less obscure in motive than his doings at Byzantion. His position
in the Hellespontine region had certainly developed in the course of
the year during which he had been there.
He left his affairs in charge of a certain Bisaltes of Abydos. His
first objective was Chios. Thither accordingly these “beggars of the
sea,” commanded by this broken adventurer, made their way. Driven to
desperation, he and they had made up their minds to one great final
effort to save whatever could be saved. It would seem, too, that
Histiæus had a plan by which he thought this might be accomplished.
The only possible explanation of his conduct, on the extant evidence,
is that he once more turned his thoughts to Thrace, and sought to
establish on the Strymon a rallying-point for the irreconcilables among
the insurgents. He sought to resume in a modified form a design he had
been forced to lay aside nearly twenty years before.
But it may be urged: If this was so, why did he direct his first
efforts against Chios?
Did he go to Chios with any hostile intent at all? Were the hostilities
there forced upon him by the deep distrust of him which the Chians
entertained? The evident and well-founded contempt of Histiæus, which
Herodotus felt on general grounds, has influenced his tale of what
happened at Chios. He deplores alike the fate and folly of these
Chians—their fate, in that suffering was added to their sufferings;
their folly, in that they had brought these sufferings upon themselves
by joining in the revolt, and by persevering in it to the bitter end.
#HISTIÆUS AND CHIOS.#
Yet even so, his story shows that Histiæus’ action with regard to them
was capable of at least two interpretations:
◆H. vi. 26.◆
“Affairs in the Hellespont he committed to the charge of Bisaltes, the
son of Apollophanes, of Abydos, while he himself, accompanied by the
Lesbians, sailed to Chios,[46] and engaged with a Chian garrison which
would not admit him, at a place in the Chian territory called the
Hollows.”
This seems to imply that he had expected the Chian garrison to receive
him.
“Of these he killed many, and, from a base at Polichne, in Chian
territory, he with the Lesbians, got the mastery of the rest of the
Chians, who were in evil plight after the naval battle.”
Apart from the fact, already noticed, that Histiæus seems to have
expected a peaceable occupation of Chios, it is remarkable that there
is no mention of any bloodshed, save in the case of attack of the one
garrison.
The colouring which is given to events by the tale of the organized
attack on Chios from a base at Polichne, is evident. The whole intent
of it is to represent the expedition of Histiæus as hostile to the
Chians, and to emphasize the despicable behaviour of the various
sections of the insurgents to one another when their fortunes had
become desperate. Æolian attacks Ionian, and Ionian resists Æolian. And
yet, in spite of this, Ionian joins Æolian in that attack on Thasos
which immediately succeeds this period of alleged hostility.
But the story is not merely inconsistent with itself; it is hopelessly
inconsistent with such circumstances of the time as may be gathered
from Herodotus’ own evidence.
What conceivable object had Histiæus and these Lesbians in
attacking Chios at a time when its reconquest by the Phœnician fleet
could not be long deferred? Histiæus may or may not have been a
scheming knave, but there is no reason to suppose that he was a witless
man, unable to gauge the impossibility of maintaining Chios, or any of
the islands on the Asian coast, after the disaster at Ladé.
Then why did he go to Chios? The answer to this question is dependent
on the answer to a further question: Why, after occupying Chios, did he
immediately attack Thasos?
Only one explanation of his conduct seems consistent with the
circumstances of the time. The days of the revolt were numbered. A
terrible retribution was to be apprehended. There must have been
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of refugees on the Ionian coast of Asia,
seeking for some shelter from the coming storm; and whither would
they turn? To the islands first, as being safer than the mainland,
with intent to secure time for escape over seas. Chios was the refuge
to which these refugees would look in the first instance. Samos was
anxious only for itself. Lesbos was farther from the centre of things.
Chios was the natural rallying-point.
It was under these circumstances that Histiæus turned to Chios first
after leaving the Hellespontine district. His action need not be
attributed to philanthropic motives. It was at Chios that he would find
any number of desperate recruits, ready for any venture on which he
might propose to lead them; and he had such a venture planned in his
mind.
His past experiences with the Chians had been unfortunate. But he had
in the past managed to persuade them of his good faith towards the
revolt; and why should he not be able to do so now?
The Chians were unprepared for his coming, and his landing was
resisted. He accordingly withdrew to Polichne. This place lay near
Klazomenæ,[47] and commanded from the land side the peninsula off
which Chios lies. #HISTIÆUS AT THASOS.# Herodotus says that
he used the place as a base of operations against the Chians. The
improbability of his having, at this juncture of affairs adopted an
attitude of hostility towards the Chians, and, above all, of his having
deliberately entered upon operations against them at a time when
the arrival of the Phœnician fleet might be expected, is so great,
that it is impossible to accept the statement as a reliable record
of events. Later tradition may well have interpreted his proceedings
at Polichne in the light of the unfortunate incident with the Chian
garrison. Whether depressed or not by the defeat at Ladé, it is beyond
imagination that this powerful island-state should have succumbed to an
attack from such a force as Histiæus could have brought with him. It
is infinitely more probable that he withdrew to Polichne in order to
be able to explain his attitude to the Chians before further collision
took place, and that he did persuade them of the _bona fides_ of his
intentions.
His next proceedings throw considerable light upon those intentions.
◆H. vi. 28.◆ Having got the Chians to his side, he proceeded to attack
the Island of Thasos, taking with him “many of the Ionians and Æolians.”
There can be no doubt as to the general reasons which prompted this
attack. Thasos had considerable possessions on the lower Strymon.
The particular reasons may be matter for conjecture. It is, at least,
conceivable that the Thasians had the strongest objection to the
establishment of a new power in a region in which they had so much
at stake, in the shape of those gold-mines which brought them such
enormous wealth; and that Histiæus found it necessary to subdue them,
before he tried to carry out his plans on the continent.
Had the Thasians participated directly or indirectly in the disaster
which befell Aristagoras?
Be this as it may, Histiæus was only carrying out in a new form, and
under conditions more favourable to himself, a policy he had attempted
to initiate years before, the initiation of which had caused his
removal to Susa. He was now backed up by a number of desperate men,
ready for any venture which might save them from the hands of the
Persian. But time was all-important. The Phœnician fleet was at the
moment engaged in the reduction of such Carian towns as still resisted;
but its arrival in the North Ægean could not be long deferred.
It was, no doubt, owing to the resistance of Thasos that the plan
miscarried. While he was besieging the place, news arrived that the
Phœnician fleet was moving northward. This being so, it was quite
certain that the Æolians in his force would insist on an attempt being
made to rescue the Lesbians, if not Lesbos. So to Lesbos Histiæus went.
◆H. vi. 28.◆
He arrived there only to find that the food supplies of the island,
exhausted probably by the influx of refugees, were insufficient to
support his army. So he crossed over with it to the mainland, making
Atarneus his base, and intending to operate from it and seize the
harvest-produce of its neighbourhood, and of the valley of the Kaïkos
river.
♠ “Kaikos” replaced with “Kaïkos”
Here he was attacked by a large Persian army under Harpagos. A large
part of his force was destroyed, and Histiæus himself was captured.
◆H. vi. 29.◆
“In the battle between the Greeks and Persians at Malene in the
country at Atarneus, the Greeks resisted for a long time, but the
cavalry being afterwards launched against them fell upon the Greeks.
From that moment the attack became simply a cavalry affair. On the
Greeks being put to flight, Histiæus, hoping that he would not perish
at the hands of the king owing to his present transgression, conceived
such a desire for life, that when in his flight he was overtaken by
a Persian, and being overtaken was about to be stabbed to death by
him, using the Persian language, he declared himself to be Histiæus
the Milesian. If he had, when he was captured, been taken forthwith
to King Darius, my belief is that he would have suffered no harm, but
that the king would have freely forgiven him.”
But so it was not to be. The great Persian officials had no intention
of giving their old enemy a chance of his life. When Harpagos brought
him to Sardes, Artaphernes had him executed and sent his head up to
Susa. #HISTIÆUS.# Greek tradition represented Darius to have treated
the poor remains with honour, as being those of a man who had been
a great benefactor to the Persians and their king.
Histiæus has come down in story as the arch-villain of his time. He was
the most contemptible member of a hated class, as the men thought who
created the story of his life, and as Herodotus, who implicitly copied
the picture which they drew of him, thought also.
He cannot be accounted fortunate in his biographer. The shadows of the
picture are so deep that the true lineaments of the man cannot now be
clearly discerned. But he who tries to play a double part, and fails
in the attempt, as Histiæus did, is not likely to occupy an honourable
place in history. He seems to have been of great and selfish ambition,
without the capacity to form a judgment as to the means requisite to
carry it out, and without any scruple as to the means he did adopt. He
figures consequently as a scheming but somewhat futile villain. He had
made up his mind that his main endeavour must be to win the confidence
of Darius, and that, if he won this, he could afford to ignore the
great officials. He forgot how far a cry it was from Susa to Sardes. He
wished at all costs to rule the Asiatic Greek—independent of Persia,
if he could; under Persia, if he could not; but not under any satrap
at Sardes or elsewhere. His plan, well conceived, but prematurely
executed, of gaining a _point d’appui_ in Thrace, gave away the whole
design at its very inception. There followed years of exile at Susa.
He returned to the coast to find the revolt undecided. He had, or
thought he had, two alternative cards to play: either to help in the
suppression of the revolt, and to make Darius believe that he had been
mainly instrumental in its suppression, or to take the lead in the
rising. But Artaphernes forced his hand, and he had no alternative but
to play his second card. It might have been effective, had he been
allowed to bide his time; but the premature display of it spoiled his
whole game,—in fact, the Greeks would have none of him.
And in the last scene of all, at Chios, Thasos, and Lesbos, his curse
is still upon him. He again miscalculated the means necessary to
effect his design in the limited time within which it could possibly
be successful. His cleverness was greater than his ability. He
possessed the finesse of a schemer, but lacked the practical reason of
the man of action.
His capture must be attributed to the spring of the year 493,
inasmuch as his army was engaged in reaping the spring crops in the
neighbourhood of Atarneus at the time at which it was attacked by
Harpagos.
The rest of the tale of the revolt is soon told.
The Persian fleet, having wintered at Miletus, proceeded in the spring
of 493 to reduce the island states. Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos fell
into their hands. Herodotus reports that they “netted” these islands,
that is to say, swept them from end to end with a line of men with
joined hands stretching from sea to sea. If the story be in any sense
literally true, it probably means that the Persians were anxious to get
hold of prominent refugees. Nothing is said as to what they did with
those they captured.
◆H. vi. 32.◆
Presumably the reduction of the continental cities was proceeding at
this same time. If the list of ships at Ladé be any criterion, it would
seem as if but few of them remained to be reduced. Those that did
remain were treated with severity. Children of both sexes were carried
away up country, and the cities with their temples were burnt to the
ground.
This was the end of the revolt in Asia.
The operations which followed in Europe, though aiming at the
subjugation of revolted districts, have a more intimate historical
connection with their sequel than with the tale of the revolt itself.
CHRONOLOGY OF THE REVOLT.
500–499
W. Aristagoras proposes the Naxos scheme to Artaphernes.
Artaphernes communicates the proposal to Darius.
Sp. Gathering of Ionian fleet and of the expedition
generally.
#CHRONOLOGY OF THE REVOLT.#
S. Siege of Naxos.
A. Failure of siege.
Meeting of Greek conspirators.
Deposition of tyrants.
499–498
W. Aristagoras at Sparta and Athens.
Sp. Athenian and Eretrian vessels arrive on Asian coast.
Pæonians return to Europe.
Artaphernes besieges Miletus.
Phœnician fleet defeated by Ionians off Pamphylia.
Expedition against Sardes.
S. Greeks at Sardes. Artaphernes besieged in citadel.
S. or A.
Withdrawal of Greeks from Sardes, and battle of Ephesus.
A. Athenian fleet returns home.
Onesilos plotting revolt of Cyprus.
Darius hears of burning of Sardes.
498–497
W. Aristagoras appeals to Athens for continued assistance.
Ionians engaged in energetic preparations.
Deposition of Gorgos of Salamis.
Sp. Ionian fleet brings about revolt in Hellespontine
district.
Beginning of siege of Amathus.
Sp. or S.
Revolt of Caria.
S. Ionian fleet called to Cyprus.
Battle by land and sea in Cyprus.
A. Ionian fleet returns to Ægean.
497–496
W. Capture of Soli by Persians, and end of revolt in Cyprus.
Persian troops employed in Cyprus forwarded to Sardes.
Sp. Hymeës operating in the Propontis region.
Campaign of Daurises in the Hellespont region.
S. Campaign in Caria.
Battles of Marsyas and Labraunda.
Campaign of Hymeës in the region of the Troad.
Aristagoras departs for Myrkinos.
S. or A.
Continuation of campaign in Caria.
Great Persian defeat at Pedasos.
A. Death of Aristagoras at Myrkinos.
496–495
W. Histiæus arrives at Sardes.[48]
Sp. Histiæus at Chios.
Sp. or S.
Histiæus’ attempt on Miletus.
A. Histiæus goes to Byzantion.
Persian reinforcements arriving in Asia Minor.
Some Carian and Ionian cities begin to make terms with
the Persian.
494
Sp. Miletus attacked.
Sp. or S.
Battle of Ladé.
S. Capture of Miletus.
A. Reduction of Caria.
Histiæus at Chios and Thasos.
494–493
W. Persian fleet at Miletus.
Sp. Histiæus’ death.
Reduction of the islands and of the towns on the mainland.