THE IONIAN REVOLT.
The mist which hangs over the history of the last decade of the sixth
century lifts somewhat when the historian enters upon the narrative
of the first ten years of the fifth; but it does not wholly vanish.
Striking incidents occur indeed within the range of vision; but it is
evident that beyond that range many events took place which had much
influence on the history of the time; and the causes of the known lie
largely in the region of the unknown.
It is impossible to accept the accounts which Herodotus gives of the
Ionian revolt or of the Marathonian campaign as a full history of
either of those events. There are wide gaps in both narratives; and
much that is recorded is wholly unaccounted for by anything in the
rest of the story, or is, in some cases, wholly inconsistent with
other facts which are mentioned. In tracing the course of events
the modern inquirer is in the position of an astronomer who, having
observed aberrations in the course of a far-off planet which cannot be
accounted for by any known causes, seeks in the dim distance beyond for
the disturbing influence. There, alas! the parallel between the two
inquirers ceases, inasmuch as mathematical formulæ have not yet been
made applicable to human action.
The imperfect character of the information which Herodotus furnishes
with regard to the story of the great Revolt is so evident that the
historian himself must have been conscious of it. The peculiarity of
his narrative was therefore due in all probability to some simple
reason; either, it may be, to the difficulties which met him in his
search for reliable information, and to his disinclination to insert in
his history anything which he personally regarded as unreliable; or
to a determination to deal with only the most prominent and striking
incidents of a part of history which was, after all, merely a preface
to the great tale which he had set himself to tell—the story of the war
in Europe in the years 480 B.C. and 479 B.C.
It is possible that both causes had their effect on his narrative.
But if any judgment can be formed from data furnished by the general
characteristics of the history as a whole, the first of these two
suggested causes is the more credible. If, as is manifestly the case,
he experienced the greatest difficulty in arriving at the truth
concerning events which were comparatively recent at the time at
which he wrote, and which had been of a nature such as to attract the
attention of the whole world of his day, it is by no means surprising
if he experienced much greater difficulty in getting at the facts
concerning what occurred at an earlier date, and about events which,
though striking, were infinitely less remarkable than those of the
period which immediately followed them.
The defects in the story of the Ionian revolt,[15] to whatever cause
they be due, are in the main of three kinds:—
(1) Omissions;
(2) Lack of chronological data;
(3) Anti-Ionian bias.
The main chronological difficulty is to attribute the events recorded
to the years in which they actually took place. ◆H. vi. 18.◆ The only
fact obtainable from Herodotus is that the outbreak took place in the
sixth year before the capture of Miletus. It is possible to calculate
with satisfactory certainty that the latter event took place in 494
B.C.; and therefore the revolt must have broken out in 499.
#THE AFFAIR OF NAXOS.#
The actual outbreak of the rising was brought about in a somewhat
indirect way by an event or series of events which appear in Herodotus’
narrative as wholly independent of what had happened in the previous
years. It may, however, be seen that these events could hardly have
taken place had they not promised an issue such as would have been in
accord with the tentative policy which Artaphernes had been following
for some time past in his relations with European Greece.
He had already on two occasions shown a wish to interfere in the
internal affairs of Athens. On both occasions he had made demands
which aimed at the establishment of an area of Persian influence west
of the Ægean; but on both occasions also he had omitted to back up
those demands by even the display of force, unless,—which is, indeed,
possible,—the demand for the reinstatement of Hippias was made at the
time that the Persian expedition was preparing to start for Naxos, if
not on its way thither.[16]
The affair at Naxos, which afforded Artaphernes the prospect of being
able to forward his policy towards Greece, arose from circumstances
which were but too common in Greek communities. The island was at
the time the most opulent in the Ægean. When Samos lost its position
as the easternmost land of the free Greeks on the great trade route
which followed the line of islands which all but bridge the middle
of that sea, ◆H. v. 28.◆ much of its trade must have passed to the
most important of the islands which now became the outworks of Greek
liberty. Prosperity did not bring peace in its train. Political
dissension was rife; and certain of the wealthier inhabitants were
driven out from the island, and sought refuge at Miletus.
There ruled at this time in Miletus Aristagoras, a cousin and
son-in-law of that Histiæus whom Darius had taken up to Susa. To him
the exiles applied for assistance. He told them that he could not
unaided supply them with a force powerful enough to cope with the eight
thousand hoplites which Naxos could put into the field, but that he
would get help from Artaphernes. ◆H. v. 31.◆ To Artaphernes at Sardes
he accordingly went. The great satrap required but little persuasion to
induce him to enter upon an undertaking so promising for the fulfilment
of his designs upon Greece; for Aristagoras held out the prospect of
the acquisition not merely of Naxos, but of the other Cyclades and of
the great island of Eubœa.
The circumstances seemed favourable for the establishment of a base
which would immediately threaten the European shore.
Aristagoras had asked for one hundred ships; and, for some reason which
is not satisfactorily accounted for in the story, had offered to defray
the expenses of the expedition.
So thoroughly did Artaphernes approve of the plan that, in order
to ensure its success, he offered to furnish double the number of
ships for which Aristagoras had asked, provided Darius assented to
the proposed expedition. It is evident that the custom, if not the
constitution, of the empire under Darius did not permit even a great
satrap like Artaphernes, who was the king’s own brother, to call out a
force of considerable magnitude without leave from the king himself.
◆H. v. 31.◆ Artaphernes further promised that the ships should be ready
in the coming spring, which shows that Aristagoras’ visit to Sardes
must have been made in the first year of the fifth century, probably in
the winter of 500 B.C.
Aristagoras returned to Miletus elated at his diplomatic success.
A few months must have elapsed ere Artaphernes received a despatch from
Susa approving of his proposal. The assent of Darius is important, as
showing that the king was quite willing to resume his designs on Greece
when fair opportunity offered.
The true tale of what followed is one of the many unsolved riddles of
this period. As told by Herodotus, it runs as follows:—
#FAILURE AT NAXOS.#
Artaphernes prepared a fleet of two hundred triremes, together with
a considerable force of Persians and other allies, and appointed
Megabates, a member of the Achæmenid family, and cousin of Darius,
to the command. This armament he despatched to Miletus to pick up
Aristagoras together with the Ionian contingent and the Naxian exiles.
Thence the expedition sailed to Kaukasa in Chios, with the pretended
object of operating in the Hellespontine district,—a pretence which
would not have been very effective had the operations of Otanes left it
in a wholly satisfactory state of subjection. It was at Kaukasa that
the design of the expedition was fated to be wrecked. Megabates, going
his rounds, found a Myndian vessel without any guards set, and punished
the Greek captain by causing him to be tied with his head through
one of the oar-holes. On this being reported to Aristagoras, he made
protest to Megabates; but as this had no effect, he himself released
the man. A quarrel ensued between the two commanders, the result of
which was that Megabates sent a ship and gave warning to the Naxians
of the coming expedition. The latter prepared in all haste to meet the
danger, and successfully resisted a four months’ siege. The attempt
turned out a complete failure, and Aristagoras found himself in the
position of guarantor of the expenses, without the means of meeting the
guarantee. Such is the tale in Herodotus.
It is necessary to pursue the story somewhat further before any attempt
can be made to hazard a conjecture as to the true explanation of some
of the incidents in this narrative.
Aristagoras had brought his affairs into a very critical position. He
had quarrelled with Megabates, and had made himself surety for a debt
to Artaphernes which he had no prospect of being able to pay. He had,
indeed, reason to fear that he would lose his tyranny of Miletus.
◆H. v. 35.◆
“Fearing these two things, he proceeded to plan a revolt. For it so
fell out that the man with the tattooed head[17] arrived at this time
from Histiæus at Susa, suggesting to Aristagoras that he should
revolt from the king. For Histiæus when wishing to suggest this revolt
to Aristagoras, had, in consequence of the roads being watched, no
other way of so doing except by shaving the head of the most faithful
of his slaves and tattooing the message upon it. As soon as the hair
had grown again he sent him off to Miletus, merely bidding him when
he came to Miletus to ask Aristagoras to cut off his hair and look at
his head. The tattoo marks, as I have already said, indicated revolt.
Histiæus did this because he looked on his retention at Susa as a
great misfortune. If a revolt took place he had every hope that he
would be sent down to the sea, but he reckoned that if no disturbance
took place at Miletus he would never get there. Such was the intent of
Histiæus in sending the message. ◆H. v. 36.◆ But for Aristagoras it
came about that all these things befel at the same time. He therefore
proceeded to consult the conspirators, laying before them his own
views and the message which had come from Histiæus.”
There are certain strange inconsistencies in this tale.
Megabates, though in command of the expedition, though responsible to
Darius and Artaphernes for its success, is represented as wrecking
what appears to have been a well-devised plan by giving information
to the unsuspecting objects of attack. Yet he is neither disgraced
nor discredited. His alleged treachery might have been concealed; his
failure was, however, patent.
Again, it is quite clear that it is the intention of Herodotus to
ascribe the outbreak of the revolt to this failure at Naxos; the
insurrection is set on foot by Aristagoras merely for the sake of
rescuing himself from a position of great embarrassment. And yet, when
he proceeds in all haste to plan revolt, he finds fellow conspirators
already in existence. It is impossible to suppose that any long
interval can have elapsed between the return from Naxos and the first
act of the revolt, for that took place on the fleet which had just
returned from the attack on the island. The conspiracy cannot have been
of recent origin.
There can be little doubt that Herodotus’ incidental reference to the
“conspirators” or “insurgents” indicates that the plan of revolt had
been made before,—it may be, long before,—the expedition to Naxos.
#THE ORIGIN OF THE REVOLT.#
It is evident from the account of the Scythian expedition, and of the
campaigns which followed it, that something had taken place in it which
had for the time being seriously shaken the Persian position in West
Asia; in other words, that Herodotus is not wrong in his general view
of it as a disaster to the Persian arms.
The Greek cities of the coast would watch with the closest interest the
development of events. It would be a hostile vigilance; and with such
a race as the Greeks the step from hostile vigilance to conspiracy is
a short one. For the successful accomplishment of any design, however,
against a power so great as Persia, combination was necessary, and
any attempt at practical combination between the cities, except under
unusually favourable circumstances, must wreck the design by disclosing
it prematurely to the satrap at Sardes. It was the gathering of the
Ionian fleet for the attack on Naxos which offered the opportunity,
the favourable circumstances, for which they had waited. The affair
at Naxos was rightly regarded by Herodotus as the immediate efficient
cause of the revolt.
It now remains to consider the part which Aristagoras played in the
matter. In so doing it is necessary to draw a strong distinction
between the facts which Herodotus states and his interpretation of
them. It is also necessary to compare the facts which he records in one
connection with those which he records in another.
Taking his account as it stands, it seems clear that Aristagoras was
in the conspiracy before he entered upon the Naxian expedition. It is
inconceivable that the astute Greek conspirator would have admitted
into his confidence a man who held the position of tyrant in the
Persian interest in one of the Greek cities, and who had just been
engaged in an attack on the liberty of the free Greeks, unless that man
had been beforehand thoroughly involved in the conspiracy.
It is also difficult to imagine that Aristagoras would have ventured
on a journey to European Greece with a view to getting help thence in
the same year in which the expedition to Naxos had taken place, had
he not had some valid defence to offer for the part he had played in
an affair which cannot but have caused the most serious alarm in
Greece.
It is possible to explain away either of those difficulties taken
separately; but taken together they constitute a very serious question,
which the student of history must face if he is to arrive at an
understanding of the story of these years. The evidence on which the
account of Herodotus is to be tested is that which he himself supplies.
The critical question is whether Aristagoras in urging upon Artaphernes
the expedition against Naxos did not merely aim at bringing about the
mobilization and concentration of the Ionian fleet,—to provide, in
other words, the only possible means for that combination between the
Greek cities which was absolutely necessary for the success of the
revolt.
What had Aristagoras to hope for from success at Naxos?
The fate of his predecessor, Histiæus, must have shown him clearly that
the Persian authorities had no intention whatever of allowing even the
most faithful and most favoured Greek tyrant to acquire a position
of real power on the coast. He could, then, hardly hope for further
extension of rule. Had he one particle of interest in the expedition
except in so far as it afforded the opportunity for the gathering of
the Ionian fleet?
Did Megabates send the message to Naxos? He had every motive for not
doing so. Why should motive be disregarded in the court of history
when it is regarded as an essential factor in a court of law? The
problem,—the human problem,—is the same in both cases. Again, in a
court of law the credibility of a witness is not regarded by those
expert in the testing of evidence as being dependent solely on the
assertions made by that witness with respect to the case before the
court. Inquiry is made into the origin of his assertions, and into the
possibility of personal prejudice on his part.
Was a man like Herodotus, a Greek to the very backbone, likely to be
free from the bitter, hostile prejudice which the Greek entertained
against a tyrant and all his works?
#PART PLAYED BY ARISTAGORAS.#
The tale of the affair at Naxos was not, maybe, of his own making;
but it was one which he was not likely to subject to severe criticism.
The very idea of tyranny stunk in the nostrils of the free Greek. He
refused to recognize the part played by a Sicilian tyrant in the great
war of liberation. With what feelings must he have regarded those
tyrants of the Asiatic coast who inflicted on their fellow-countrymen
the twofold tyranny of servitude to themselves and to the barbarian? It
would have been a strange thing if Herodotus _had_ been able to obtain
in after times a true, unprejudiced account of the part played by a man
in the position of Aristagoras.
Even prejudice could not, however, deny that he had been the chief
instigator of the Ionian revolt. It contented itself with placing the
worst complexion on his motives. Having failed to enslave the free, he
tried to free the slave.
There is one further question which demands consideration. If this
hypothesis as to the designs of Aristagoras be correct, why did he
not take the first steps in the revolt before the expedition actually
started from the Asian coast?
There are two facts stated in Herodotus which may possibly account for
this delay. Artaphernes had, perhaps, been only too eager in taking
up the proposed design. Aristagoras had asked for one hundred ships;
Artaphernes had given two hundred. This accession of numbers may have
been actually embarrassing to Aristagoras, as rendering the expedition
of such magnitude as to demand the presence of a larger percentage of
the non-Greek element on board the fleet than he had either hoped for
or reckoned upon. The ships and crews seem to have been Greek; ◆H.
v. 32. _ad fin._◆ but it must be concluded from Herodotus’ account
of the gathering of the expedition that a considerable Persian force
was embarked. So long as this force was with the fleet such a measure
as that with which the revolt was opened could hardly have been
adopted with success, and would, indeed, hardly have been attempted.
The conspirators would have to wait until the non-Greek element had
disembarked and gone up country, and then would have to strike quickly
before the fleet was dispersed by official orders.
Another possible reason for this delay is that Aristagoras wished
to defer the outbreak until the close of the campaigning season, when
he would have time to make preparations to meet the coming storm. The
four months’ duration of the fruitless siege of Naxos would be in that
case all in his favour. He had to waste time at Naxos in order to gain
it on the Asiatic coast. A sturdy defence on the part of the Naxians
was the very thing from which he had most to hope.
Did Megabates or Aristagoras send the fatal message?
The tale of “the man with the tattooed head” was evidently a celebrated
tale of the time. There is no reason whatever to suspect the truth of
it. In the plot as given in Herodotus it plays the part of a second
motive. All that Herodotus knows of the message is that it “signified
revolt,” and that Aristagoras imparted it to his fellow-conspirators.
The method of communication implies that the message cannot indeed have
been a long one.
It must, however, be regarded as an extraordinary coincidence that it
should have arrived in the very brief period which must have intervened
between the return from Naxos and the first act of insurrection. It
must, in order to be effective, have suggested some powerful motive for
revolt. It cannot possibly be imagined that Aristagoras wanted Histiæus
back on the coast. The Greek conspirators were very unlikely to desire
the return of the favoured friend of the great king, except on one
assumption, namely, that Histiæus had been in the plot before ever he
made the involuntary journey to Susa.
But whatever the full contents of the message, whatever the reasons
which made it contribute to the determination of the conspirators,
there are, as has been already said, no grounds whatever for doubting
that the message did come. The question is as to the time at which it
came.
Before proceeding with the narrative of the revolt it may be well to
point out clearly the exact status, if it may be so called, of the
hypothesis which has been here suggested as to the circumstances of its
outbreak.
It is an hypothesis, and cannot pretend to be more than that. #MEETING
OF CONSPIRATORS.# The evidence in the version of Herodotus, while it
justifies destructive criticism of the story as told by him, is not
sufficient to afford anything that can be claimed as a _sure_ basis
for constructive history. Herodotus was naturally disposed to accept a
version which brought into relief the haphazard want of method in the
first act of those who were responsible for a design which, however
laudable its aims, was, as seemed to him, carried out from beginning to
end with a strange mixture of pusillanimity and criminal folly.
◆H. v. 36. Cf. v. 36, _ad fin._◆
The meeting of the conspirators took place immediately after the return
from Naxos. The place of meeting was presumably Miletus. It certainly
was not held on board the fleet.
On the question of revolt the conspirators were unanimous, with one
prominent exception. Hecatæus the historian spoke words of serious
warning. He pointed out the magnitude of the resources of the great
king when compared with their own. Failing to dissuade them, he advised
that, as they were bent on revolt, they should secure the command of
the sea. This, he considered, offered the sole chance of success.
For its successful maintenance capital was necessary; and this, he
suggested, might be obtained from the great treasures of the temple of
the Branchidæ, a shrine which had been enriched by the offerings of
Crœsus. This plan was also rejected by the meeting.
The express mention of Hecatæus’ name in connection with two proposals,
of one of which Herodotus must have cordially approved, is noticeable
as an indication of the origin of much of the “prejudice” which is
discoverable in Herodotus’ work. ◆Cf. H. ii. 16; iv. 36; iv. 95, 96;
ii. 123.◆ Either from jealousy or from conviction, he had no very high
opinion of the Ionian historio-geographers, and of the Ionian intellect
generally. ◆H. iv. 36.◆ One of his most depreciatory remarks about them
is in all probability directed against Hecatæus personally.
Yet though he entertained so poor an opinion of one side of Hecatæus’
work, though he was probably jealous of his reputation as a historian,
he does not hesitate to reproduce from his sources emphatic testimony
to the practical wisdom and judgment of the man.
The statement of the absolute rejection of the second proposal of
Hecatæus must be understood in a modified sense. The Ionians did in the
subsequent campaign allot a very prominent part to their fleet. The
meaning of the proposal was that the offensive should be taken on sea;
and, above all, that the sea should be regarded as the real base.
But Aristagoras, as his subsequent language at Sparta makes clear,
was convinced that the Greek hoplite was infinitely more than a match
for any soldiery which Persia could put into the field; and others
apparently shared his opinion. The events of twenty years later proved
the truth of his general judgment on this point. He and his fellow
conspirators may have made a mistake, when they took the offensive on
land, in expecting too much from the land forces which the insurgents
could put into the field. But in great ventures great risks have to be
taken; and the attack on the Persian base made at the beginning of the
year 498, had it been successful, must have brilliantly justified the
plan.
It is easy now, in the light of knowledge after the event, to see
that, if the revolt was to be successful, it must succeed on both
elements:—on sea, because only by means of the fleet could the
concentration of a large land force be brought about: on land, because
only on that element could an effective blow be struck against the
Persian dominion in Western Asia.
Aristagoras’ estimate of the strategic position of the insurgents
was singularly justified by the history of the subsequent warfare of
the century. The sea was, indeed, and must be, the Ionian base. The
strategic weakness of the position of the cities rendered any other
alternative impossible. But ages of fighting were destined to prove
that no mortal blow could be inflicted on Persia by sea alone. The
Ægean might be made a Hellenic lake. The islands on the Asian coast
might be liberated. But so long as Persia maintained her hold upon the
continent, the cities of the mainland must be ultimately at the mercy
of a great land power holding the central position in Western Asia. If
the revolt was to be successful, it was at this central position that
the blow must be struck. Sardes must be the objective of the insurgents.
#FIRST ACT OF REVOLT.#
It was evident that nothing could be done with the fleet until the
tyrants who were in command of its contingents were removed. ◆H. v.
37.◆ A certain Iatragoras was accordingly sent to seize them. He
did so “by a trick,” whose nature is not specified. He seized four
who are mentioned by name, and “many others.” It is a remarkable
fact that not one of the four is Ionian. Two are Æolan, and two are
Helleno-Carian[18] Aristagoras, of his own accord, “nominally” laid
aside the tyranny of Miletus. He then proceeded to depose other tyrants
in Ionia, besides those whom he had caught upon the fleet, and handed
over the whole number to their various cities. The Mytilenians slew
their tyrant Koës; the others were allowed to depart. Inasmuch as
those tyrants had all been acting in the interests of Persia, their
deposition was necessarily the first step in the revolt.
This measure must have been taken later in the autumn of 499, just
at the close of the campaigning season; for Aristagoras could not
otherwise have ventured on the journey to Greece which he immediately
undertook with a view to getting assistance.
It was to Sparta that he first turned for help.
The tale of his visit to Kleomenes, the Spartan king, is told at
considerable length. As told, it contained at least one incident which
was likely to render it famous in Greek story. The version of it which
Herodotus has preserved is of Lacedæmonian origin.[19]
Aristagoras brought with him a map of the world engraved on a bronze
tablet, the work of one of the Ionian geographers,—possibly of the
famous Hecatæus. The strong appeal which he addressed to Kleomenes
as leader of the foremost state in Greece to save the Ionians from
their slavery comes strangely from the mouth of one who has just been
represented as doing all in his power to bring one of the European
islands into that state from which he now begged Kleomenes to save the
Asiatic Greeks. It is still more strange that in this story, whose
origin is manifestly different from that of the affair at Naxos, there
is no mention whatever of any suspicion having been excited by
Aristagoras’ conduct; and no explanation of it was demanded from him.
Coming to the practical question of the possibilities offered by a
campaign in Asia, Aristagoras emphasizes in a very remarkable way the
superiority of the Greek military equipment over that of the Persian.
◆H. v. 49.◆ His proposal does not confine itself to the liberation
of Ionia: he even holds out the prospect of the conquest of the rich
lands of Western Asia. To the men of the time at which Herodotus
wrote, this part of the story must have seemed a striking example of
the wild exaggeration of the Ionian imagination. As an estimate of
possibilities it was, however, far more near the truth than they can
have supposed—nearer, perhaps, than Aristagoras supposed himself. “When
it is in your power,” said he, “to rule all Asia with ease, will you
choose aught else?”
Kleomenes took three days for consideration, and then, at a second
conference, asked Aristagoras how far the king was from the Ionian sea.
When informed that it was a journey of three months up country to Susa,
he broke off negotiations and dismissed Aristagoras at once.
Aristagoras would not accept dismissal, but returned once more, and,
so the story goes, in the presence of the king’s little daughter
Gorgo, tempted him with ever-increasing bribes. The child, with more
than childish wisdom, brought the interview to a conclusion by saying,
“Father, the stranger will corrupt you, unless you go away.”
Whether the story itself be truth or fiction the fact remains that
Sparta abided by that policy which she had followed for some years
past, and refused to become embroiled with the great empire of the East.
◆H. v. 55.◆
From Sparta Aristagoras went to Athens. His arrival was, in a sense,
opportune. The demand of Artaphernes for the reinstatement of Hippias
had created an intensely bitter feeling of hostility towards the
Persian. Introduced before the public assembly, he used the same
arguments as he had employed at Sparta, and further claimed that the
Milesians were Athenian colonists. “There is nothing that he did not
promise, so urgent was his request, until he persuaded them.”
#AID FROM GREECE.#
Herodotus is at considerable pains to show the depth of the folly, as
he conceived it to be, with which Athens entered upon a fatal venture.
In the end the Athenians voted an aid of twenty ships; not a small
number, when it is remembered that their navy at this time was but
a fraction of what it was twenty years later. ◆H. v. 97.◆ “These
ships were a source of woes to the Greeks and the barbarians,” says
Herodotus. There can be no doubt as to his meaning. He regarded this as
the decisive moment in the relations between Persia and European Greece.
The tale of the revolt is that part of his history in which he allows
his own personal views to be most clearly seen. To him it seemed the
great mistake of the century; that is clear from his story of it; but
it is not so easy to say why he so utterly condemned it, unless he
regarded it as leading to the renewal of those designs on Greece which
Darius had been obliged for ten years past to lay aside.
But that cannot have been all. It is necessary to examine the whole
story as told by him. That alone can afford some clear clue to the
causes which brought about what was undoubtedly a strange perversion of
his judgment.
◆H. v. 98.◆
Aristagoras, he says, returned from Athens to Miletus, “having devised
a plan from which no advantage was fated to come to the Ionians.”
It must have been in the winter of 499 B.C. or early spring of the year
498 that Aristagoras returned.
His first act was to send a message to those Pæonians whom Darius had
removed from the Strymon to Asia, telling them that they were free to
return, as all Ionia had revolted from the king. Unless his object
in so doing were to create an impression in the Persian sphere of
influence in Europe, it is impossible to attribute a motive to any
otherwise apparently causeless act. Herodotus looks upon it as simply
designed to give annoyance to Darius, an end which, it may be presumed,
Aristagoras had sufficiently attained by raising the standard of
revolt. It is quite possible that he sought to carry out the policy
attributed to his father-in-law, Histiæus, some ten years before, and
to enlist the aid of the Thracians in a struggle with the Persian
power in Western Asia. If this was the intent, the design did not meet
with success. The Thracians did not take any active part in the revolt,
though they took advantage of the events on the Asian side to throw off
whatever allegiance they had hitherto owed to the king.
In the spring of 498 the twenty Athenian ships, accompanied by five
triremes from Eretria, arrived on the Asiatic coast. The Eubœan
city had apparently sent her aid unasked, influenced by those trade
relations of which so little is heard from the two great historians of
the fifth century, but which must have played so decisive a part in the
shaping of events. The academic atmosphere of the Athens of the latter
part of the century excluded such ♠banausic details from a cultured
narrative of events.
♠ “banaustic” replaced with “banausic”
Hitherto the offensive operations of the insurgents had been confined
to the deposition of the tyrants of the Greek cities.
Herodotus is absolutely silent as to the measures which Artaphernes
took in consequence of this bloodless act of war. He can hardly have
entertained any illusions as to its significance; yet, if Herodotus’
account is to be taken as a complete narrative of events, the Ionians
took the offensive in the spring of 498, some months at least after
this act of unmistakable hostility, without meeting at first with any
opposition.
◆H. v. 99.◆
After the arrival of the ships from European Greece Aristagoras sent
an expedition against Sardes. He did not accompany it himself, but
placed his brother Charopinos and another Milesian in command. The
expedition went by sea to Ephesus, and, leaving the ships at Koresos
in the Ephesian territory, went up country under the guidance of the
Ephesians.[20]
Following first the river Kaÿster, they afterwards crossed Mount
Tmolos, and took Sardes, except the Acropolis, without opposition. That
was saved by Artaphernes “with no inconsiderable force.”
#ATTACK ON SARDES.#
The town was composed of houses either thatched with reeds or wholly
constructed of them. One of these was kindled by a Greek soldier,
either by accident or design, and the whole place was burnt to the
ground. A statement is then made which seems inconsistent with the
assertion that the town had been taken without opposition, to the
effect that, in consequence of the conflagration, the Lydians and
Persians were compelled to defend themselves in the market-place, and
that the Ionians, by reason of their numbers, found it advisable to
retreat under cover of night to their ships.
The most remarkable feature of this story, as it stands in Herodotus,
is its lack of consequence. Cause and effect are as little apparent
in it as in the narrative of a dream. Artaphernes, after months of
warning, is caught unprepared. Sardes is taken without opposition; yet,
when the conflagration takes place, a host, not merely of Lydians, but
of Persians also, springs from its very ashes, and in such formidable
numbers that the Ionians are obliged to withdraw under cover of night.
If Greek history is to bear the guise of history, this story requires
examination. No useful end can be served by accepting as fact that
which is incapable of rational interpretation. Human motive springs
from human thought; and if thought has its formal laws, it is
reasonable to suppose that there is a formality in motive also.
It happens that in the present instance there exists evidence which
puts a complexion on these events very different to that which is given
by Herodotus.
◆Plut. de Herod. Malignitate, 24.◆
Plutarch has preserved a tradition that at the time at which the
expedition against Sardes took place the Persians were engaged in the
siege of Miletus, and that one object of the expedition was to force
the Persians to raise the siege. The bitter animus of the treatise in
which this assertion is made makes it impossible to accept statements
in it without consideration. In the present instance, however, the
statement is so manifestly in accord with the situation at the time
that it is impossible to reject it as untrue.
Miletus had been, through Aristagoras, the author of the revolt.
Artaphernes had had a whole winter’s warning. It is inconceivable that
he should have allowed months to elapse without taking measures to
crush the rising before it became formidable; and this end could best
be attained by an attack on that centre at which the conflagration
had had its origin, and from which it was, if left unchecked, but
too likely to spread far and wide. Artaphernes was no child playing
at empire, but a practised administrator, who had governed a great
outlying province for nearly ten years of a critical period of its
history.
There can be little question that the bold design of a direct attack
on Sardes completely upset his plans. It forced him not merely to
raise the siege of Miletus, but also to hurry with all speed to save
the Persian capital in the west, which must, from its very position,
be his base of operations in the coming struggle. An examination of
the map will show that the loss of Sardes would have necessitated the
withdrawal of that base far to the east. It is doubtful indeed whether
another could have been found west of Halys. The attack was a brilliant
venture on the part of the Greeks. It was a brilliant idea on the part
of the one man to whom it can be attributed,—Aristagoras.
Aristagoras has come down in history with the ill reputation of one
who dared to lead brave men to their death, but dared not die with
them. This feature of his life’s story has tended to obscure the true
picture of the man. The added selfishness of motive is not calculated
to present him in a more favourable light.
Such is the general impression created by the picture which Herodotus
draws of him.
Yet the details do not altogether bear out the impression which is
created by the picture as a whole.
It is doubtless the case that he acted from selfish motives. It may
be that his highest aim was to become the first man among the Greeks
of the Asiatic coast; but he must at least be credited with a spirit
that ventured much to gain more. He miscalculated the means to the end
he sought. But was the miscalculation more discreditable to him than
to those European Greeks on whose aid he had calculated? They had, no
doubt, their excuse; but he had his.
#THE LYDIANS AND THE REVOLT.#
Even in the hostile pages of Herodotus there is clear evidence that the
measures he took with the means at his disposal showed high ability,
if not genius. He all but checkmated the Persians at Sardes; and the
period during which the revolt was formidable was coincident with the
time at which he played the foremost part in it.
The incidental light which Herodotus’ narrative throws on the events
at Sardes is, in some respects, of more historical importance than his
direct story of events.
The attitude of the Lydians towards the revolt is clearly marked from
the very first. This people, for some reason which it is not possible
to conjecture with anything approaching certainty, not merely stood
apart and remained neutral, but actually fought on the Persian side,
in Sardes at any rate. ◆H. v. 102.◆ This deed of active hostility may
have been exceptional, and both it and the absence on the part of the
Lydians of all sympathy with the revolt may be due to the destruction
of their chief city, and especially of their national sanctuary of
the goddess Kybebe, which perished in the conflagration. This, so
Herodotus says, served as an excuse for the subsequent destruction of
the Greek temples; but if it also served to alienate the sympathies of
the Lydians from the struggle for freedom, it can only be regarded as a
disaster of the first magnitude to the cause of the Asiatic Greeks.[21]
◆H. v. 102.◆
The Greek occupation of the town of Sardes does not seem to have been
a matter of a few days. Not merely had the news of its seizure time
to spread to the region west of Halys, but the Persian commanders[22]
in that wide stretch of country had time to assemble a large levy
for the rescue of the capital; and though when they arrived there
the Greeks had departed, their departure had been so recent that the
relieving force actually overtook and fought an action with them before
they reached their ships.
The spreading of the news and the gathering of this force must have
been at least an affair of some weeks; and the summer of 498 must have
been at its height ere the Greek retreat began.
It was near Ephesus that the Persian reinforcements overtook the
Greeks. In the battle which followed the Ionians were, so Herodotus
says, badly defeated, and a great many prominent men were slain,
while the survivors dispersed to their various cities. Evalkides, the
Eretrian general, was one of those who perished; and the record of his
death has all the appearance of truth. There are several very serious
reasons, however, for believing that the result of the battle has been
greatly exaggerated.
After the battle the Athenian contingent sailed off home. This was
probably in the autumn of 498. It is the last event recorded by
Herodotus which can be attributed with certainty to that year.
It is possible that the Athenians had a valid excuse for this apparent
desertion, in that they had just become engaged in a war with Ægina;
but the date of the outbreak of that war is quite uncertain, and
the real cause of withdrawal may have been that the Athenians took
too pessimistic a view of the prospects of the revolt.[23] The
non-participation of the Lydians was calculated to set them thinking.
If the latter of these alternatives were the case, it is conceivable
that the tale of the results of the battle of Ephesus is of Athenian
origin, put forward in part justification of the withdrawal.
Herodotus[24] evidently attributed it to the results of the battle
of Ephesus, and this may be taken to indicate, at any rate, that the
Athenians thought badly of the prospects of the revolt. #BYZANTION
AND CARIA JOIN THE REVOLT.# Aristagoras sent message after message
during the winter of 498–97, imploring them to return; but they
refused to come back.
It seems certain that the Athenians greatly miscalculated the
possibilities of the moment; yet it may be doubted whether the actual
facts were not such as to justify their decision. Save for the
assistance given by their own small contingent and by the five ships
from Eretria, the Ionians had gone through the first season of the
war single-handed. The revolt had merely excited opposition in Lydia;
and its remarkable extension in the next year could hardly have been
foreseen. Even the Greek cities of the coast were not unanimous in
supporting it. Herodotus, himself a Dorian of Asia, is so significantly
silent as to any part which the Dorian cities played in it, that it
must be concluded that they played no part at all.
The winter of 498–97 was passed by the Ionians in preparation for the
continuance of the struggle. The withdrawal of the Athenians was not a
great loss to the actual fighting power of the insurgents. It seems,
moreover, to have had but little moral effect upon them, and none
whatever upon their relations and friends in Asia.
The Ionian fleet opened the year’s campaign by sailing to Byzantion,
and bringing about the revolt of the whole region of the Propontis.[25]
From the Propontis the fleet returned to Caria, which also joined the
insurgents. The Carian district of Kaunos had apparently been invited
to join at the time of the burning of Sardes, but had deferred doing so
until the arrival of the fleet.
The action of the fleet, and the sudden spread of the revolt at this
time, tend to throw light on certain obscurities in the history of the
campaign of the previous year.
Inasmuch as the Ionian fleet must, in spite of Aristagoras’ refusal
to recognize the fact, have formed the real base of the insurgent
operations, it is inconceivable that the Persians should have
omitted to bring up the Phœnician fleet to cope with it. This would
be the first measure which would suggest itself to them. Yet at the
beginning of the second campaigning season, at least a year and a
half after the first act of revolt had placed the Ionian fleet in the
power of the insurgents, that fleet is free to leave the Ægean coast
undefended, and to go to the Propontis to stir the Hellespontine region
into activity! Where was the Phœnician fleet meanwhile? The artifice of
Aristagoras in bringing about the mobilization of the Ionian fleet had
indeed given the Asiatic Greeks a long start in naval operations; but
at least eighteen months had elapsed since he had shown his hand.
Had the revolt of Cyprus already taken place, and had the Phœnician
fleet been obliged to make the reduction of that island its first
objective? There are at least three reasons which render this
assumption unlikely:—
◆H. v 104, _ad init._◆
(1) Herodotus is certainly under the impression that the Cypriote
revolt took place about the same time as that of Caria.[26]
(2) Cyprus was so important to the revolt that, had the Phœnician fleet
been in a position to threaten it at this time, the Ionians could
hardly have ventured on an expedition to the Hellespontine region.
(3) The revolt in Cyprus had been in progress for many months before
the Ionian fleet went thither.
◆Plut. de Herod. Malign. 24.◆
It seems probable that Plutarch has preserved the record of an
important incident in the history of this time, which Herodotus had
either forgotten, or of which he had never heard. He refers to a
victory gained by the Ionian fleet off the Pamphylian coast. This would
account for the non-appearance of the Phœnician fleet in the Ægean in
the campaign of 498.
#REVOLT OF CYPRUS.#
It may be conjectured that the victory took place early in that
year—that is, in the spring or early summer,—and that it was won over
a fleet which was coming up to assist Artaphernes in the siege of
Miletus. It would account also for the spirit shown by the Ionians in
the bold venture of the attack on Sardes.
◆H. v. 103.◆
The rapid spread of the revolt in 497 makes it almost impossible to
accept Herodotus’ version of the battle at Ephesus. If he is to be
believed, the reverse there sustained more than compensated for any
success won at Sardes. If that be so, the impetus given to the revolt
by the burning of Sardes becomes inexplicable. It must be concluded
that Ephesus was not the disaster which Herodotus represents it to have
been.
The news of the revolt of the Ionians had thrown the Cypriote Greeks
into a state of ferment. The island had been for many ages past divided
between the Greek and Phœnician interests. The Greek section of the
population seems to have hitherto adopted an attitude of passive or
secretly active resistance to the Persian, while the Phœnician formed
the Medic party. Persian and Phœnician interests in the island were
mutual. The Persian communications were dependent on the Phœnician
fleet, while the Phœnicians could only hold their ground against the
preponderating numbers of the Greeks by means of Persian support.
Salamis and Amathus (Hamath) were respectively the foremost towns of
the Greek and Phœnician regions.
◆H. v. 104.◆
The leader of the movement in the island was Onesilos, the younger
brother of Gorgos, the Greek king of Salamis. “He had frequently before
this time advised his brother Gorgos to revolt from the king; but now,
when he heard that even the Ionians had revolted, he was very urgent
in his endeavours to induce him to do so.” Failing to persuade Gorgos,
he seized the city during his temporary absence, and Gorgos fled to
the Persians. The revolt spread to all the towns of the island except
Amathus. Onesilos proceeded accordingly to besiege this place.
It is very difficult to assign a certain date to these events. One
thing may, however, be confidently assumed, namely, that when Onesilos
made his urgent representations to his brother, and, still more, when
the revolt broke out, the Phœnician fleet was for the time being _hors
de combat_. The absolutely indeterminate element in the matter
is the length of time which intervened between the first urgent
representation of Onesilos and the deposition of Gorgos. Certain facts
stated in the subsequent story of the campaign render it probable that
Onesilos’ representations were made after the battle off the Pamphylian
coast, if not after the burning of Sardes, and that they must therefore
be attributed to the autumn of 498; while the first step in revolt, the
deposition of Gorgos, took place in the following winter, and the siege
of Amathus began in the spring of 497.
The customs or necessities of campaigning in the fifth century rendered
the winter the natural time for planning insurrection, and the summer
the time for carrying it out.
This chronology of the prelude to the revolt in Cyprus is not merely in
accord with calculations which may be made from Herodotus’ statements,
but is also in agreement with his general assumption that the outbreak
concurred with the similar outbreaks in the Hellespontine region and in
Caria.
After mentioning the beginning of the siege of Amathus, Herodotus
transfers the scene of his narrative to Susa, where he describes
the reception by Darius of the news of the burning of Sardes by the
Athenians and Ionians. The details of the story cannot be cited as
serious history, but it contains the record of what are undeniably
historical events. As is so often the case with famous stories, the
historical matter has become involved in a mass of graphic detail which
cannot be supposed to rest on anything but the slenderest foundation of
fact.
There are two features of Herodotus’ version which, though not, it may
be, historical, are of both interest and importance to the student of
Herodotus’ history; they are (1) the prominence given to the Athenian
participation in the opening campaign of the revolt; (2) an incidental
reference to the Ionians.
#DARIUS HEARS OF THE REVOLT.#
◆H. v. 105.◆
“When the news was brought to King Darius that Sardes had been
captured and burnt by the Athenians and Ionians, and that Aristagoras
the Milesian had been leader of the coalition, so that he had devised
those things, he is said in the first instance, on hearing this,
to have recked nothing of the Ionians, knowing well that they
would not come off unpunished for their revolt, but to have asked
who the Athenians were; and afterwards, when he had been informed
on this point, he is said to have asked for his bow, and to have
taken an arrow, and, placing it in the bow, to have shot it towards
heaven, exclaiming in so doing: ‘Zeus, grant that I be avenged on the
Athenians.’ Having thus said, he ordered one of his attendants that
whenever his dinner was laid before him, he should say three times,
‘Master, forget not the Athenians.’”
The tale then passes on to a reported conversation with Histiæus.
The historical fact underlying this story amounts in all probability to
no more than that Darius was both exasperated and alarmed at this first
instance of an active interference of the European Greeks in his West
Asian dominions. It was, indeed, the realization of a trouble which he
seems to have foreseen.
The references to the Athenians and Ionians, though they cannot be
regarded as historical, are undoubtedly made with intent to give a
certain colouring to the history of the time. It is therefore important
to try and form some judgment as to their significance. Whatever their
origin, there can be no doubt that they give _that colouring to events
which Herodotus himself believed to be the true one_.
His judgment as to the part played by Athens in the great events of the
first twenty years of the century is a very striking one, and bears the
impress of genuine conviction.
Of the attitude of that state in the great war of 480–479 he has
nothing but good to say; but he is evidently convinced that Athens,
and Athens alone, was really responsible for that war having taken
place at all. This judgment of his must have been a purely personal
one, formed upon his reading of the events of the period of which he
wrote the history. It can be seen now that he was not wholly mistaken.
His mistake consisted in assuming that what was only a contributory
cause was the whole efficient cause of what occurred subsequent to the
revolt. His attitude towards the Ionians cannot, on the other
hand, be attributed to purely personal judgment. His sources for
the history of the revolt, which had their origin largely, it may
be, in those Dorian cities of Asia which had not taken part in it,
were evidently of a nature to prejudice his mind against the Ionian
Greek.[27]
The second part of the story which relates to Histiæus is probably
a piece of Greek invention, describing what might well be supposed
to have happened at Susa in consequence of the part which his near
relative Aristagoras had played in the revolt. It served also to bring
into relief the duplicity of this Ionian tyrant towards a master and a
friend who trusted him but too implicitly.
But in the case of this story, as in the case of other similar
stories in Herodotus, it is necessary to bear in mind that, though
the story itself may be fiction, it is extremely likely to contain
historical matter in the shape of chance disclosures of the views
which its framers or their contemporaries held as to the events of
the time. There is in this very story a remark which indicates that
some contemporary opinion was not disposed to regard the revolt as
the hurried creation of Aristagoras. “The Ionians seem,” Histiæus is
represented to have said, “after losing sight of me, to have done what
they long desired to do.”
Whatever persuasion Histiæus used, he succeeded in inducing Darius to
let him go down to the coast.
It would be vain to attempt to deduce from the juxtaposition of these
two imaginative tales any conclusion as to the time at which Histiæus
started from Susa.
◆Cf. H. vi. 1.◆
The only real indication of the date of his return is given in a
subsequent chapter, where it is clearly implied that it was subsequent
to the departure of Aristagoras from Miletus, if not to his death at
Myrkinos.
◆Cf. H. v. 108.◆
From Susa the story shifts back to Cyprus. #STRATEGIC VALUE OF CYPRUS.#
The siege of Amathus is still proceeding, and Onesilos has just
received word of the coming of a Phœnician fleet with a large Persian
force aboard of it, under the command of Artybios. He accordingly
despatched messengers to Ionia to ask for help. Herodotus emphasizes
the promptness with which the Ionian fleet was despatched to aid the
Cypriotes.
It is plain that both sides recognized the crucial importance of the
part which Cyprus had to play in the great struggle. The peculiar
configuration of the neighbouring continent, which brings the only
really practicable military line of communication between Asia Minor
and the Euphrates valley into immediate contact with the shore of the
Levant at that corner of the sea which is commanded by Cyprus, renders
this island a strategical position of inestimable value either to a
power assailing Asia Minor from the east, or to one defending it from
the west. The Cypriote Greeks, backed by the Ionian fleet, would have
been in a position to threaten at its weakest point the Persian line of
communication with the Western satrapies. From it as a base also, the
Ionian fleet might have made it impossible for the Phœnicians to sail
to the Ægean. Cyprus was then, as it is now, the key of the Levant.
Of its value as a strategic position the Greek was, moreover, fully
aware. The alacrity with which the Ionians accepted the invitation
in the present instance was equalled by the eagerness with which,
twenty years later, the Greeks on the fleet under Pausanias sought
to seize it, even when the liberation of the Ægean coast was as yet
in its initial stage. They knew that its possession would inevitably
facilitate their task nearer home. Had not Kimon died so inopportunely,
Athens might have realized the dream of its permanent acquisition.
But it was not merely its strategic position that rendered it so
attractive in the eyes of the trading cities of Ionia. From a
commercial point of view it would have supplied an ideal base for
trade with the wealthy East, and would have placed the Greek trader
in possession of a sea route of his own, instead of, on the one hand,
a sea route on which he had to face the fierce Phœnician competition,
and, on the other, a land route through Asia Minor, inconvenient alike
from the expense of traffic along it, and from its passing through many
alien peoples.
When it is considered that the Ionian fleet had already in this
campaigning season brought about the revolt both of the Hellespontine
region and of Caria, it cannot be supposed that the expedition to
Cyprus was undertaken earlier than the late summer of this year 497.
Apart from the time spent in the actual operations at these two
comparatively distant points, the ships of those days were not able to
keep the sea for any prolonged period without a refit.
◆H. v. 108.◆
The Ionian fleet seems to have arrived at Cyprus at about the same time
as the Persian expedition. The Phœnician fleet transhipped the Persian
army from the Cilician coast to the north shore of the island, whence
it marched overland towards Salamis. The fleet then rounded the islands
called “the Keys,”[28] and so sailed towards the same destination.
Herodotus describes an interview between the Cypriote tyrants and the
Greek commanders, in which the former offer to embark their men on
board the fleet and let the Ionians fight on land. The latter, however,
replied that the Common Council of the Ionians had sent them to fight
on board the fleet, and on board the fleet they intended to fight.
Of the battle by sea which ensued, Herodotus says but little, save
that the Ionians fought well and beat the Phœnicians; and that, of the
Ionians, the Samians fought best.
Whatever the measure of success attained, it was more than compensated
for by the loss of the battle on land. There was grievous treachery
in the Cypriote army. Stesenor, tyrant of Kourion, with a large band,
deserted during the battle; and part, at least, of the Salaminian
contingent followed his example. Onesilos and one of the Greek tyrants
perished in the battle.
The Ionian fleet seems to have remained some time longer upon the
coast, until, at any rate, the Persians began the siege of the various
Greek cities. Then, finding itself powerless to effect anything, it
sailed away home. #CHRONOLOGICAL DISCREPANCY.# One of the towns, Soli,
held out for five months, but with its capture the revolt of
Cyprus came to an end; and “thus,” says Herodotus “the Cyprians, after
a year of freedom, were enslaved anew.”
Five months of siege would protract the revolt far into the winter of
497–96. It is noteworthy that the chronological details deducible from
the account of the revolt in Cyprus are in reasonable agreement with
the general statements as to its duration. This chapter of the history
of the revolt as a whole is, indeed, conspicuous as being the only one
in which chronological data can be said to be existent.
From the end of the revolt in Cyprus in the winter of 497–96 until the
siege of Miletus in 494, the course of recorded events does not admit
of any certain chronological arrangement, and, apart from this, the
record is manifestly of a most fragmentary character.
It is now necessary to carry back the story to the Ægean coast. Earlier
in the year the Ionian fleet had brought about the revolt of Caria and
the district of the Propontis. These events can be attributed with some
assurance to the spring and early summer of 497. But the chronology of
the measures taken by the Persians to reduce these revolted regions to
submission is so hopelessly involved that it is impossible to accept
it.[29]
◆H. v. 116, _ff_.◆
The greatness of the chronological discrepancy will be best appreciated
when it is pointed out that Herodotus in one chapter ascribes the
reduction of the revolt on the Hellespont and in Caria to a period
which, ◆H. v. 103.◆ if the data of a previous chapter be correct,
must have been from four to six months before the outbreak of the
insurrection in those regions. Of the two series of chronological data
the earlier one is by far the more trustworthy. It is connected with
the outbreak of the revolt by a continuous chain of events whose
dates can be fixed with reasonable probability. The later chronological
series is not merely in disaccord with the previous one, but, if
adhered to, renders the whole story of the revolt incomprehensible. The
reader wanders amid a maze of circumstances without cause and without
effect.
The main incidents attendant on the suppression of the revolt on
the continent of Asia Minor seem, in so far as they are told, to
be correctly told by Herodotus, in all save their chronological
setting. The modern world has, at any rate, no other evidence on the
subject. On the question of fact the position must be accepted. On
the question of chronology, Herodotus must be corrected by his own
chronological statements, and by the strong presumptive evidence of
his own statements of fact. The direct evidence makes it quite clear
that the measures undertaken by the Persians for the suppression of
the widespread revolt were not undertaken at the time to which he
attributes them. His statements of fact render it possible to form some
conclusion as to when they were undertaken.
It is not possible to assign an earlier date than the summer of 497 to
the despatch of the Ionian fleet to Cyprus. Herodotus himself says that
the General Council of the Ionians were prompt in their decision to
send it. It may reasonably be concluded that the circumstances of the
insurrection on Asia Minor were at the time in a favourable condition.
The lack of hesitation would be otherwise incomprehensible, inasmuch as
the combination of the cities against attack was, from the vary nature
of things, dependent upon the fleet.
It is not a mere assumption to say that the circumstances must have
been favourable. The formidable character of the rising had been
well-nigh quadrupled by the accession of the Hellespont, Caria, and
Cyprus to the insurrection in the earlier half of the year 497. The
forces which Artaphernes had at his disposal were sufficient to save
the citadel of Sardes in 498, and to inflict some sort of reverse on
the retreating Ionians at Ephesus; but were they sufficient to cope
with the infinitely more dangerous situation in the early months of the
following year?
#PERSIAN REINFORCEMENTS.#
The Persian Empire appears in history as a great military power because
it only appears in extant records when engaged in warfare with the
Greek. But it was not a military monarchy in any real sense of the
word. It did not, relatively to the size of the empire, keep a large
standing army on foot. It met military necessities by the calling
forth of levies, the gathering of which must have demanded time. The
Persian king, like the Roman emperor of later days, did not entrust the
governors of distant provinces with the disposal of large bodies of
troops, unless circumstances rendered such a step absolutely necessary.
The reverse suffered by the Greeks at Ephesus cannot have been serious;
but it had clearly demonstrated the fact that, on land, Artaphernes
was able to hold his own against the insurrection, so long as it was
confined to Ionia. At sea the circumstances were not so promising. The
defeat off Pamphylia had placed the Phœnician fleet _hors de combat_
for the time being, and it is not difficult to imagine that at least
a year would have to pass before the cities of the Syrian coast could
turn out a fleet sufficiently powerful to cope with that of the Ionian
Greeks. This second fleet would be that one which was defeated off
Cyprus in 497. But in the course of that year the whole balance of
military power on land had been completely changed by the spread of the
revolt to Hellespont and Caria. This would necessitate the despatch of
reinforcements from Susa to the Western satrapies, reinforcements which
would, doubtless, have reached Sardes by the latter part of the summer
of 497, had not the state of affairs in Cyprus rendered it necessary to
divert them, as well as the new Phœnician fleet, to the suppression of
the revolt in that island. That was an affair of some months; and these
reinforcements cannot have reached Sardes until early in the year 496.
There is, and there must be, a certain arbitrariness in any scheme for
the rearrangement of the confused chronology of those years. All that
can be urged in favour of the one here set forth is that it is of a
piece with Herodotus’ own chronology of the opening year of the revolt,
and is in accord with the facts, other than chronological, stated
by him.[30]
The arrival of these troops at Sardes in the late winter or early
spring of 496 made it possible for the Persian generals to devise a
scheme for the simultaneous suppression of the revolt in Hellespont and
Cana. The events of 498 had shown that the Ionians were not formidable
on land unless the Persians were taken by surprise.
◆H. v. 116.◆
The three chief commanders were Daurises, Hymeës, and Otanes, the last
of whom had been the successor of Megabazos, nigh ten years before, in
the command in Thrace.
◆H. v. 117.◆
Daurises began operations in the district of the Hellespont, and took
Dardanos, Abydos, Perkote, Lampsakos and Paisos. These places he
is reported to have taken with incredible rapidity.[31] From these
successes he was called away, so Herodotus says, by the revolt of
Caria. Why Caria should have revolted at a time when the structure of
revolt in the Hellespont was falling like a house of cards, and why,
above all, the Common Council of the Ionians, after bringing about
the revolt of both the Hellespont and Caria by means of its fleet,
should have unhesitatingly despatched the fleet to Cyprus at a time
when a large part of the one district had been resubjugated, and the
other was on the point of being attacked, Herodotus does not explain.
The chronological combination of events in these chapters is intended
to heighten the impression of the hopelessness of the revolt which
has been conveyed by the story of the disaster at Ephesus, and with
that intent these events are brought into close juxtaposition with
it. #CAMPAIGN IN CARIA.# When it is remembered that the defection of
Thrace and Macedonia must have been closely linked with that of the
Hellespontine region, it is impossible to suppose that the revolt in
these parts was of so feeble a nature that it could be suppressed
within what, if Herodotus’ second chronological series is to be
accepted, cannot have amounted to more than a few weeks from its
outbreak—so feeble, too, that a large number of the most prominent
cities were captured with the utmost ease.
The campaign of Daurises in the Hellespont seems to have taken place
in the spring of 496. It seems, moreover, to have been successful. The
European shore was, indeed, left alone for the time being, but the
revolt on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont must have been practically
stamped out.
◆H. v. 117.◆
Herodotus represents Daurises as having been called away to Caria
before his work in the Hellespontine region was done. It may be that he
was called away from the north; but, even on Herodotus’ own evidence,
he had done his work thoroughly on the Asiatic side of the Propontis.
The reconquest of Caria was a much more difficult matter. The Carians
were not mere amateurs in the art of war, but numbered among them
men who had seen fighting in many lands, the soldiers of fortune of
their time. The race was infected with that strange fever which has at
different periods driven members of some of the world’s most virile
peoples to seek a livelihood in quarrels not their own.
Herodotus makes no attempt to place the striking events of this war in
Caria in a chronological setting. Three great battles take place, of
which the first two are great Persian victories, while the last is a
tremendous disaster to their arms. There is no means of judging of the
interval between the victories and the disaster; though, from the way
in which the narrative is told, it might be supposed that the Carians
recovered almost instantaneously from two serious and successive
defeats.
On the general question of the campaign it may be said that it seems
to have been part of a great design planned at Sardes in the winter of
497–96, to be carried out so soon as reinforcements came up from the
east.