CATALONIA. BATTLE OF VALLS. DEATH OF REDING. BLAKE APPOINTED TO THE
COMMAND. BATTLE OF ALCANIZ. FLIGHT OF THE SPANIARDS AT BELCHITE.
COMMENCEMENT OF THE GUERILLAS.
♦1809. FEBRUARY.♦
Three circumstances had materially contributed to the success of the
Galicians: the aid and confidence which they derived from the British
ships, whereby they were assisted first in recovering Vigo, and
afterwards at the bridge of S. Payo; the rare virtues of Romana, whose
single thought was how to serve his country, and who for that object,
shrinking neither from responsibility nor obloquy, acted always with
promptitude and decision upon his own judgement; and, lastly, the very
condition, or rather destitution of his army: its name and presence
had a powerful effect in rousing and encouraging the people, while the
troops themselves felt and understood their utter inability for any
other mode of warfare than that which their leader was pursuing, and
thus derived strength from the very knowledge of their weakness. In
Catalonia the people were not less brave and patriotic; there was a
stronger British squadron off the coast; and the army was respectable
for numbers, sufficiently equipped, and in a state of discipline not
to be despised. But the Generals in succession were deficient either in
military skill or natural talent, or that vigour of mind without which
all other qualifications in a commander are of no avail.
♦PROCEEDINGS OF THE FRENCH AFTER THE FALL OF ZARAGOZA.♦
Neither in Aragon nor in Catalonia had the French been able to follow
up their success. They had paid dearly for Zaragoza: even the army of
observation had been so harassed during that ever-memorable siege, that
it was necessary to allow them some repose. Having possessed themselves
of Jaca by the treachery of the governor, and of Monzon, which was
evacuated by the garrison because Lazan had taken no effectual
measures for supplying it with provisions; they were repulsed in three
attempts upon Mequinenza. They summoned Lerida, thinking to intimidate
the inhabitants by the fate of the Zaragozans; but that example had
produced an effect which neither Buonaparte nor his Generals were
capable of anticipating; they estimated every thing by success, and
with them to be unfortunate was to be despised and miserable. Marshal
Lasnes was told in answer to his summons, that Zaragoza, unprotected as
it was, had held out ten months against its besiegers, and that Lerida
was a strong place. The Spaniards were also reminded that the Prince of
Condé had been baffled before that fortress. It was expected by some of
the Spanish officers that St. Cyr, in conjunction with the French from
Aragon, would besiege the city without delay; that he would afterwards
attack Tarragona, and then, marching from conquest to conquest, proceed
against Valencia. Others ♦CABAÑES, C. 14.♦ supposed, that for the more
immediate object of securing the communication between France and
Barcelona, his first measure would be to get possession of Hostalrich.
Orders were indeed sent to St. Cyr to undertake with his corps the
♦ST. CYR, 130.♦ sieges of Gerona, Tarragona, and Tortosa, at the same
time; enterprises so much beyond his means, that the order made him
doubt whether it was an error in the ciphers of the dispatch, or an
act of folly in those who dictated instructions which could not have
been obeyed without exposing the army to some great and inevitable
disaster. That General had as little reason to be satisfied with his
situation, as with the cause in which he was employed. Having exhausted
the resources within reach, he was obliged to quit his position at
Martorell, S. Sadurni, Villa Franca, and Vendrell, and draw nearer to
Tarragona, Reus, and Valls. His great object was to bring on another
action, for the purpose of establishing the superiority of the French
arms in the feelings of his own army, as well as of the Spaniards; for
notwithstanding the splendid successes which he had achieved, that
opinion ♦ST. CYR, 118.♦ was daily losing ground while the Catalans
confined themselves to a system of desultory warfare.
♦STATE OF THE CATALAN ARMY.♦
Upon such a system Reding had resolved to act in conformity to the
opinion of all his best officers. Hope, enterprise, and activity, were
thus excited; and the spirit not of the irregular force alone, but of
the troops, was raised, as every day brought tidings of some partial
and animating success. Meantime he exerted himself in endeavouring to
bring the army into a state of discipline, acting when that was in
question with a decision which he wanted at other times. One regiment
he broke for having refused to obey a Swiss officer in action. His
character stood so high with the Catalans, that this vigorous measure
did not injure his popularity; for he had the full support of public
feeling and of the local authorities. The Junta of Tarragona coined
not only the plate of individuals, but that of the churches also,
for the pay of the troops; and for two months the hospitals received
their whole supplies, and the army the whole of their pay, clothing,
and food, from the inhabitants of that faithful city. It was at this
♦CABAÑES, C. 14.♦ time that one of the best and ablest men whom these
calamitous times forced into action, the Baron de Eroles, D. Joaquin
Ybañez, resigned his place in the Superior Junta, and putting on the
Miquelet uniform, took the command of a body of those troops, believing
that he could serve his country more effectually in the field than in
council. Throughout the whole subsequent course of the war no Spaniard
made himself more conspicuous, nor has any one acquired a higher or
more irreproachable name.
♦NEW LEVIES.♦
A conscription of every fifth man throughout the principality was
called for, without distinction of ranks, in obedience to the decree
of the Central Junta; the men were willing to serve, but an error
was committed in embodying them with the regular troops, because the
Catalans disliked that service, and were proud of the name as well as
attached to the privileges of the Miquelets. Some attempt was made
to bring this irregular but most useful force into a better state of
order and uniformity, for which purpose the camp-marshal, D. Josef
Joaquin Marti, was appointed their commander-in-chief; but this proved
altogether abortive. Even the proper returns of the men who were to
be under his command could not be obtained; and though he had ability
as well as zeal to qualify him for the charge, nothing could be done,
when means of every kind were wanting. The province, however, was in
arms. The people, knowing their own physical strength, and impatient
of seeing their country oppressed by a handful of invaders, began
to murmur at the General’s inactivity: he was assailed by anonymous
writings, accusing him of incapacity or treason; and this General was
as sensitive to such attacks as he was sensible of the difficulties
that surrounded ♦CABAÑES, C. 14.♦ him. Brave, honourable, humane, and
well acquainted with the art of war, he wanted the main qualifications
for it when entrusted with command; having neither fortitude to
persevere against vulgar clamour in the cautious system which he was
sensible was best suited to the time, nor promptitude to act with
vigour and decision when he departed from it.
♦REDING DETERMINES TO ACT ON THE OFFENSIVE.♦
The Central Junta had sent D. Tomas de Veri, one of its members, as its
representative to Catalonia. A like measure had been adopted in the
tumultuous times of the French Revolution; the circumstances in Spain
were altogether different, and these missions appear neither to have
produced good nor evil. On the present occasion Veri was in favour of
active operations; and that opinion, which had necessarily much weight
with Reding, was strengthened by assurances that an insurrection would
be attempted in Barcelona as soon as any movements on his part should
be made to favour it. The Camp-marshal Marti was called upon to form
the plan of a general attack; his own judgement was decidedly opposed
to it, but Reding had determined upon action in deference to the
popular cry. He did not like to hear it remarked that the troops were
more willing to eat their rations than to march against the enemy; and
he wished also to ascertain in the field whether any reliance might be
placed upon the Somatens, and upon that general enthusiasm which he did
not participate, and in which he had no faith. If he entertained any
hope, it was founded upon the promised effort in Barcelona, ... which
of all hopes had the least foundation; ... for the fortresses having
now been well victualled, the time was gone by when it might have been
of advantage to have got possession of the city. But even after his
resolution to act on the offensive was taken, the movements of the army
were delayed by that ominous mood of mind which draws on ill fortune
more surely than it foresees it. And in strange opposition to what
happened in all other parts of the Peninsula, all Reding’s plans were
perfectly well known to the French, while he obtained no information of
their movements or of their numbers on which he could rely. On ♦STAFF.
BEFREIUNGS KRIEG DER KATALONIER, P. 148.♦ the other hand, by a singular
perversion of principle, the Catalans whom the French had in their pay
made it a point of honour and conscience to communicate full and true
intelligence. The task was not difficult; for Reding, in the certainty
that his intentions were betrayed as soon as they were formed, gave up
all hope of secrecy; and every thing was talked of in public, with a
desperate carelessness, as if it were useless to observe even the rules
of common prudence.
♦THE SPANIARDS DRIVEN FROM IGUALADA.♦
The Spaniards occupied a line from Martorell to Tarragona, through
Bruch, Capelladas, S. Magi, and Col de S. Cristina; the head-quarters,
under Camp-marshal D. Juan Bautista de Castro, being at Igualada: this
line covered the whole south of the principality, and touched upon the
north at Valls, where the levy in mass was to be effected. St. Cyr
waited till the Spaniards had weakened themselves to his desire by
extending their line so far as to render it vulnerable in many points:
then leaving Souham’s division at Vendrell to observe the troops at
Col de S. Cristina and near Tarragona, he, with the divisions of Pino,
Chabot, and Chabran, ♦FEB. 17.♦ attacked the Spaniards on their left at
various points, and, though at one time Chabot’s division was in danger
of being routed, succeeded in driving them back upon Igualada, where,
with an imprudence which experience had not corrected, large magazines
had been assembled. They had neglected to occupy the road from Llacuna
in sufficient strength, though it was the key to all their positions on
the way to Barcelona; by this road they found themselves attacked in
the rear, when falling back already dispirited and in confusion; and
it was only by flight that they escaped in the directions of ♦ST. CYR,
103–106. CABAÑES, C. 14.♦ Cervera, Cardona, and Manresa. Castro was
removed from his command, for the want of skill or of zeal which he had
manifested in these operations. His subsequent conduct confirmed the
worst suspicions that could then have been entertained; for he entered
the Intruder’s service, and holding a military command under him,
became, as far as his power extended, the scourge of his countrymen.
♦FAILURE OF THE FRENCH ATTEMPT AGAINST THE ABBEY OF THE CREUS.♦
It was part of St. Cyr’s plan that Souham, when he was apprised of the
success of these operations, either by the ceasing of the fire, or by
any other means, should beat the detachment at Col de S. Cristina, and
join him at Villarradoña, when it was hoped that the Spaniards might
be driven from all their positions, in utter rout, once more within
the walls of Tarragona. To effect this the French commander proceeded
with Pino’s division against a body of Spaniards under Brigadier D.
Miguel de Iranzo, who occupied ♦FEB. 18.♦ the position of S. Magi.
The distance had appeared trifling upon the map: it proved long and
difficult, the road during great part of the way being so narrow that
the troops, foot as well as horse, could only defile man by man: they
did not reach the position till four in the afternoon; the attack
lasted till night closed, and the Spaniards then, unable to maintain
their ground, retreated under cover of the darkness. Here, however, an
unexpected difficulty impeded the conquerors; they were not acquainted
with the country, nor had they been able, with all their exertions upon
the march, to find any person who could serve them as a guide. From
this perplexity they were relieved by a circumstance which would not
have occurred if St. Cyr had not deserved and obtained a reputation,
most unusual among Buonaparte’s generals in Spain, for observing the
humanities of war. A Spanish officer, who had been wounded and taken
prisoner in this last affair, relying upon the French commander’s
character, entreated that he would let him be carried to Tarragona: St.
Cyr not only granted his request, but finding from him that he was able
to direct those who bore him, added, that as there were no peasants
to be found at S. Magi or in the adjoining parts, he would send him
as far as the Convent of the Creus. By this act of compassion the
French were extricated from the difficulty in which they had placed
themselves. The wounded officer gratefully acknowledged this kindness,
little thinking in what manner he was to serve the enemy. On the ♦FEB.
19.♦ morrow accordingly he was sent forward; two or three persons at
convenient distances behind observed his way, and the French by their
direction followed the unconscious guide. During the whole day they did
not fall in with a single person; but in the evening when they drew
near the monastery, instead of finding there, as they had expected,
good quarters and comfortable stores for the troops, who stood in need
of both after four days’ exertions, they discovered that Iranzo had
fallen back to this very point, and occupied it in strength. The French
immediately saw that the post could not be forced without artillery,
and they had none with them; they made, however, a feint of attacking
it, with the intention of attempting an escalade, if the Spaniards
should betray any want of alacrity in the defence. But the walls of
the enclosure, the windows of the buildings, the roof of the church,
and the tower, were presently manned; and a fire was opened upon them
from two _violentos_, ... pieces of small artillery, so named from the
manner in which they are used; they are fired not less than twelve
times in a minute, and the exertion which this requires is so great,
that the strongest and most expert artillerymen ♦ST. CYR, 107–111.♦
cannot continue it more than a quarter of an hour.
The French had learnt at Zaragoza what it was to attack the Spaniards
where there were walls and buildings to be defended; and St. Cyr was
not a man who would throw away the lives of his soldiers. His men,
instead of the good quarters and better fare which they had promised
themselves, were fain to bivouac upon the heights; and in the morning
when the General had determined to cross the Gaya for the purpose of
getting into a more open country, and effecting his junction with
Souham’s division, they were obliged to defile under a sharp and
well-directed fire of musketry from the Convent. When they reached
Villarrodoña, to their great disappointment Souham was not there; the
dispatches which had been sent to him had been all intercepted, and
a day and half were lost in waiting till he arrived from Vendrell.
♦REDING TAKES THE FIELD, AND COLLECTS HIS SCATTERED TROOPS.♦ Reding
meantime, as soon as he heard that his line had been broken, concluded
that nothing now was to be done but to collect as many of the troops as
he could, and withdraw them again under the protection of Tarragona;
and feeling that this service was of too much importance to be
entrusted to any one in whom he had not the most entire confidence,
he set out himself on the morning in which St. Cyr marched from
his unsuccessful attempt upon the Convent. He took with him only a
battalion of Swiss, 300 horse, and six pieces of flying artillery; and
as he marched from Pla saw the enemy on his right, where they were
employed in sacking and burning Villarrodoña and La Puebla. Reding was
not aware that the French Commander-in-chief was with this body of the
invaders, nor did St. Cyr know that the Spanish General was passing
within sight with such a handful of troops. His force, however, was
soon increased with the detachment which had retired from Col de S.
Cristina, and with the 1200 men under Iranzo, whom he now recalled. He
then proceeded to S. Coloma de Queralt, and there effected his junction
with Castro, with the detachment stationed at that place, and with the
force which Castro had collected after his defeat. But here he was
alarmed by learning that the enemy had entered Valls.
♦HE IS ADVISED TO RETREAT.♦
St. Cyr on his part was not without some anxiety concerning Reding’s
intention. The movement which that General had made from his right
upon his centre, led him to apprehend a purpose of re-establishing the
line of communication with his left beyond the Noya, in which case the
French detachment at Igualada would be in danger. That thought had
passed across Reding’s mind. He had supposed that the object of the
French, by occupying Valls, was to cut off his retreat to Tarragona,
and intercept his communications with that fortress; and his first
impulse was to move upon Igualada, and then upon Montbuy, to cut
off the enemy at both places. But it was his fate never to decide
resolutely and act with promptitude: a council of war was held; the
Deputy Veri was for retreating, with the view of covering the plain
of Tarragona. Accordingly they set out from S. Coloma, with the intent
of leaving Valls on the right. That day they reached Montblanch. A
party of French appeared in their rear, reconnoitred them, and then
turned by the Col de Cabra toward Pla and Valls. As it was thus made
certain that the enemy was observing them, a second council was held
on the following morning, at which Marti was present, who had been
summoned from Tarragona, where he had been left with the command. The
force which Reding had with him consisted at this time of 10,000 men,
who were in a better state than any body of troops which the Spaniards
had yet brought into the field in that quarter. The question was
asked, Where the French were posted, and in what numbers? The General
could only answer that they were supposed to be in Valls, and that
he estimated them at from 5000 to 6000, without artillery. Marti’s
opinion was, that as the object was to save the army and protect the
plain of Tarragona, where Reus and the other towns would otherwise
be at the mercy of the enemy, it was not advisable to risk an action
with a foe whom they knew to be superior in cavalry, and who, they
had reason to conclude, had other troops near enough at hand to be
brought together and overpower them if a battle should be ventured. He
advised, therefore, that a few light troops and Miquelets should make
a demonstration by the Col de Lilla against Valls in the morning, and
make their way afterwards as they could, either to join the corps on
the Llobregat, or to Lerida; ♦CABAÑES, C. 15.♦ that their guns should
be sent to that fortress, and that the troops should defile during the
night by Prades and a mountain path impracticable for artillery to
Constanti, where the whole army might be collected safely in a position
that would cover the plain.
General Doyle, who, after the most anxious endeavours to effect
something for the relief of Zaragoza, had joined the Catalan army
that day on its march, was for hope and enterprise. The troops were
in good condition and in good heart, and the opportunity favourable,
when they were within reach of a force inferior in number. Reding,
perplexed by these jarring opinions, and never venturing to decide at
once upon his own responsibility, took a middle course. He thought it
derogatory to steal as it were away through a mountain path like a
guerilla chief; and moreover Marti was one of the persons on whom his
suspicions had fixed. The course on which he determined had neither the
prospect of advantage, nor the certainty of safety. It was to retreat
with his artillery and baggage by the Col de Riba and the banks of the
Francoli; to begin the march that evening; not to seek the enemy, but
not to refuse battle if a favourable opportunity should be offered.
Marti represented that to take this line was not only seeking the
enemy, but putting it in their power to bring on an action upon ground
advantageous to themselves. But Reding certainly had not come to this
determination in the view of bringing on a battle, without incurring
the responsibility of such a measure. He suffered some provision carts
to be cut off by a reconnoitring party almost under his eyes, without
permitting his troops to resent the insult; ... they were tired, he
said, and he would not weaken the main body by sending ♦CABAÑES, C.
15.♦ out any detachments. Nor could Doyle prevail upon him to make his
retreat by day. It was commenced at seven in the evening, in good order
and with all possible silence.
♦BATTLE OF VALLS.♦
St. Cyr, who was at this time with Pino’s division at Pla, had ordered
Souham never to lose sight of Reding’s movements. That General occupied
Valls; he had entered it on a market day, and supplied his hungry
troops with the corn brought thither from Aragon and the plain of
Urgel, as if there had been no enemy to fear! His advanced guard was
to the north of that town, having its left upon the Francoli; his
right was in the direction of Pla, and he had a post at Picamoxons,
the point at which Reding must debouche upon the plain of Valls, if he
went either by the valley of Montblanch or the Col de Lilla. At this
point Souham’s orders were to give him battle; though some apprehension
was entertained that he might pass by the Col de Cabra, with the view
of cutting off the French from Barcelona. No such thought had ever
entered Reding’s mind[20]. The narrowness of the passes and the badness
of the road made the night march slower than had been calculated; at
five in the morning, however, the vanguard under Castro and half the
centre had passed Valls, leaving the enemy’s camp-fires on the left.
They were proceeding ♦FEB. 25.♦ silently and in the best order, and
no advanced post of the enemy had yet been discovered, when, as the
General was passing a little bridge, a volley of musketry opened upon
him within pistol shot. This unexpected attack occasioned a momentary
disorder: measures, however, were immediately taken to prevent the
enemy from cutting off that half of the army which had not yet come
up; the troops took their station with alacrity and precision; the
artillery on both sides began to play: the French descended from the
heights of Valls in several columns; they were met by the Spaniards,
and attacked so vigorously, that notwithstanding the advantage of the
ground, they were driven back.
All the information which Reding had previously obtained concerning the
enemy agreed in affirming that they had no artillery. It was therefore
not without surprise that he had found two batteries open upon him.
They had been silenced, however; the Spaniards had behaved even to his
wish, and a manifest advantage had been gained. But when the French had
been driven to the heights, reinforcements arrived which enabled them
to make a stand, and Reding perceived by their smoke-signals and their
rockets, that they were communicating with a fresh body of troops. It
was now noon; his own men had been marching all night, and having been
several hours in action, they began to feel exhausted. He therefore
concentrated them, sent off the whole of the baggage, and determined to
continue his retreat, as soon as they should have taken food or rest.
The position which he had chosen was a good one, behind the bridge of
Goy, on the right bank of the Francoli, and covered by that river. But
time for rest was not allowed them. Pino’s division had now come up,
and St. Cyr himself had arrived. That General, who was desirous of
gaining such a victory as should give the French the utmost confidence
in what was called their moral superiority, forbade his artillery to
fire; though the opportunity for firing with advantage was such, that
the commandant feigned not to understand the order, and when after a
third discharge it was repeated to him in the most formal manner,
expressed the unwillingness with which he obeyed. That of the Spaniards
was well served; and when, having crossed the river and ascended the
height, the French proceeded with the bayonet to the attack, they
advanced under a fire of musketry which could not have been more
regular at a review. The ♦ST. CYR, 125.♦ right wing of the Spaniards
was threatened, but the main attack was made upon the left, and this
the enemy succeeded in breaking between four and five in the evening,
about an hour after the action had been renewed. The Spaniards then
began to retreat in good order for the next half hour, ... but then
as usual fear and insubordination prevailed as soon as hope was lost.
Reding himself, when it was no longer possible to perform the part of a
general, was distinguished for his personal bravery. A body of French
dragoons surrounded him and some of his staff: two of his aide-de-camps
were killed, and he himself received five sabre wounds from a French
Colonel, with whom he was personally engaged. The cavalry rendered
little service in covering the retreat; but the infantry of the right
and centre, and part of the left, retired ♦CABAÑES, C. 15. ST. CYR,
117, 126.♦ through the vineyards, where the horse could not pursue
them. The other part of the broken wing took to the mountains, and made
their way to Tortosa.
♦THE FRENCH RECEIVED AT REUS.♦
The French estimated their own loss in this action at about a thousand
men, that of the Spaniards at four; ... the Spaniards supposed it to
be about two thousand on either side. In fact the evening was so far
advanced, that they suffered comparatively little in their flight.
Reding reached Tarragona that night; ... that city was only three
leagues from the scene of action, and thither the greater part of the
dispersed troops found their way before morning, some corps in good
order, others in small parties. Some made for Reus, and from thence
to Cambrils and Col de Balaguer. The artillery and baggage fell into
the enemy’s hands. On the following day Souham entered Reus, a rich
commercial city, second only in size and importance to Barcelona.
The inhabitants had not, as had every where till now been done,
forsaken it; on the contrary the municipality went out to receive the
conquerors, and agreed to raise a contribution for the use of the army.
Their wealth may explain a conduct which, in the then state of public
feeling, surprised the French[21] themselves. This supply came at a
time when the paymaster had not a single _sous_ in the chest. Resources
of every kind were also found here, and here were some thousand of sick
or wounded Spaniards in the hospital, whom St. Cyr sent to ♦ARRANGEMENT
CONCERNING THE WOUNDED.♦ Tarragona. This measure led to a negotiation
with Reding, by which it was agreed that in future whatever patients
might be found in the hospitals should not be regarded as prisoners,
♦ST. CYR, 127–8.♦ but allowed to remain where they were, and to rejoin
their respective armies upon their recovery.
♦ALARM AT TORTOSA.♦
The enemy now occupied Villaseca and the port of Salon, and thus cut
off Tarragona from all communication by land with the rest of Spain.
They profited by their success with their wonted alacrity; and yet
they might have improved it farther, and gained a far more important
advantage than the victory itself, had they been aware of the alarm
which prevailed at Tortosa, and of the condition in which that fortress
had been left. The Governor and the Junta sent for General Doyle,
who, as far as personal influence and example could go, possessed in
an extraordinary degree the talent of exciting activity and creating
confidence. He found the fortifications in such a state that they could
not have resisted a coup-de-main; and the city so ill provided, that
if the works could have resisted an enemy, it must presently have been
reduced by famine. Provisions were now collected by requisition from
the neighbourhood, receipts being given for the amount (for the public
money had been constantly ordered to Tarragona), and the citizens
were called out to work upon the ramparts; so that the place was put
in a state for resisting any sudden attack. There were but two roads
by which artillery could be brought against it: one was defended by
the fort at Col de Balaguer; but from that post the troops at this
important crisis were deserting for want of provisions. By General
Doyle’s exertions it was immediately stored, and the other road,
through Falcat, which, there had been no attempt to guard, was occupied
according to his directions by 600 Somatenes. This was a position which
could well be maintained by a small force, and this timely occupation
prevented the advance of a French detachment which had been ordered
thither. The Tortosans were soon encouraged by the arrival of the
Marques de Lazan, who brought his army there when they might better
have kept the field. The want of cordiality between ♦LAZAN SEPARATES
HIS ARMY FROM REDING’S COMMAND.♦ this General and Reding had been
sufficiently manifested to be known even by the enemy; and Lazan now
formally announced, that having previously been appointed second in the
Aragonese army by the Cortes of that kingdom, he had upon the loss of
his brother succeeded to the command in chief; and considering himself
as independent of the commander in Catalonia, should thenceforth look
upon the protection of Aragon as his proper business: but he would do
whatever he could consistently with this object, for covering Catalonia
on that side. Reding represented this to the war-minister as an act by
which Lazan crippled the Catalan army, and exposed his own troops to
certain destruction, without the possibility of effecting any service;
and instructions were accordingly dispatched from Seville that he
should obey Reding’s orders. The same spirit of provincialism was
prevailing in Valencia; a corps of 6000 men ♦1809. MAY.♦ from that
kingdom was stationed at Morela, with orders to remain there, though
neither this place not that part of the country were threatened, but
because that position covers Valencia on the side of Aragon. There
was neither unity in counsel nor in command; ... each of these three
provinces had its own army, acting upon its own views, and of course
all acting without effect.
♦MORTALITY IN TARRAGONA.♦
And yet St. Cyr had mistaken the character of the Spaniards when he
supposed that the battle of Valls would convince them of their moral
inferiority to the conquerors. Far from it; it had even raised the
spirit of the Catalans; and the Central Junta spake of it in their
proclamations as one of those defeats in which ill fortune brought
with it no dishonour, but rather hope and confidence. It proved to the
Spanish army far more disastrous in its consequences than in itself;
they were crowded into Tarragona, and the French commander, by sending
thither several thousand sick and wounded from the hospitals at Reus,
increased or perhaps occasioned an infectious disease which broke
out among them, and was aggravated by the uncleanliness arising from
want of linen, the neglect of those precautions, and the destitution
of all those means without which armies cannot be kept in health. We
reconcile ourselves to the slaughter of a battle or a siege, because
such destruction is the business of war, and the men engaged in it
take their chance bravely for the evils which they are inflicting upon
others; ... ♦1809. MARCH.♦ but there is somewhat at which the heart
revolts in making a league with pestilence or famine, however much the
system of war may require and justify it. St. Cyr knew that disease was
doing his work in Tarragona; officers as well as men were dying in such
numbers, that if he could have kept them thus shut up within the seat
of the contagion, more would perish in a month than he could have hoped
to destroy in four pitched battles. He determined therefore ♦ST. CYR,
133.♦ to remain in the plain of Tarragona as long as his army could be
supplied with a quarter of a ration.
♦ST. CYR REMOVES TO THE PLAIN OF VICQ.♦
But the Spaniards were not idle. The Somatenes were once more in force
and in activity; and the left of the Catalan army, which had not been
engaged in the defeat, harassed the enemy on their right and in the
rear. When Reding had formed his unfortunate plan of operation, 10,000
Miquelets and Somatenes, under Wimpffen, had been sent beyond the
Llobregat to take advantage of any insurrection that might be attempted
in Barcelona. These irregular troops, when they had no longer to
depend upon the combinations of the Commander-in-chief, but were left
to themselves to carry on their own kind of warfare in their own way,
began again to acquire that superiority which such warfare assured
them; Chabran’s division, harassed by repeated assaults, fell back
successively from Igualada upon Llacuna, S. Quinto, and Villa Franca;
and the Spaniards in that quarter, full of hope as ever, resumed the
blockade of Barcelona. For a time they cut off St. Cyr’s communication
with that city, and their position excited no trifling uneasiness in
Duhesme and Lechi, who well knew the disposition of the inhabitants.
But the English squadron, the sight of which always afforded hope to
the Barcelonans, was compelled by a heavy gale to stand out to sea: and
Chabran’s division, recovering the ground and the reputation which it
had lost, once more broke up the irregular blockade. St. Cyr meantime
maintained his position as long as it was possible to feed his army
there; he then determined upon moving it into the little plain of Vicq,
where he expected to find corn, and to remain till the harvest should
be ripe in the environs of Gerona, where he foresaw that in the course
of the siege his army must be established. The battle of Valls had not
given that army the confidence which their General was so desirous they
should possess; there was in fact an impression upon them which they
had never felt in any other service; they knew that they were not the
objects of mere military hostility, in which there is neither enmity
nor ill will between man and man, but that they had the hatred and the
curses of the whole country. Their removal now they looked upon as a
retreat, and they knew what were the dangers of a retrograde movement
in Catalonia. St. Cyr better understood how little able Reding was to
take advantage of such a movement at that time; and for the purpose of
showing his men that he could defy the Spaniards, while at the same
time he was careful not to wound the feelings of a General whom he
respected, he sent an officer to Tarragona with a flag of truce, and
a letter stating that, as circumstances rendered it necessary for him
to draw nearer the French frontier, he should depart from Valls the
following day at noon, and if General Reding would send a detachment
thither at that time, the hospital which had been formed in that town,
and which it was of such consequence for him to preserve, considering
the number of his sick, should be consigned to him as it stood. It
was well furnished from ♦ST. CYR, 134, 145–7.♦ the houses which the
inhabitants of Valls had abandoned on the entrance of the enemy. The
French commander left only a very few wounded men, who were not in a
state to bear removal; because he doubted whether Reding would be able
to make the Spaniards observe the agreement which had been concluded
upon that subject. As far, however, as opportunity was given, it was
properly performed.
This done, after having remained something more than three weeks in
the plain of Tarragona, the French retreated toward the Llobregat.
Chabot’s division occupied at this time Montblanch, for the double
purpose of rendering it more difficult for Reding to communicate with
Wimpffen, and of preventing the latter from holding any communication
with Lerida. A brisk firing in a quarter where no alarm was looked
for, occasioned this General to send out a reconnoissance. It was in
time to save a detachment of 600 horse and foot, with two pieces of
cannon, which Marshal Mortier had sent from Fraga to communicate with
St. Cyr’s army, and bring him back intelligence of the state of things
from Catalonia. A smaller party would have had no chance of succeeding
in this service; and if this had been four-and-twenty hours later, it
would have been cut off. They were fortunate enough to find a division
of their countrymen here, but only half their object was accomplished;
for though the army delayed its ♦ST. CYR, 138.♦ movements two days
in the hope of facilitating their return, and escorted them to some
distance, the attempt was found to be so hopeless, that they were fain
to continue with St. Cyr.
♦VICQ DESERTED BY ITS INHABITANTS.♦
The troops in Tarragona were not in a condition to harass the French
on their retreat; but the retreat was most important to them. They
obtained room to distribute their sick, and the progress of the
contagion was stopped as soon as its main cause was thus removed. Some
affairs took place beyond the Llobregat with Wimpffen’s division, which
dispersed, as it became irregular troops to do, when they were not
acting at advantage. When the enemy reached Vicq, they found that that
city had not been infected by the ill example of Reus; the Bishop,
five or six old men, and the sick who were unable to remove, were the
only inhabitants of that populous city who remained. The others, with
a spirit worthy of their country and their cause, upon the unexpected
approach of the invaders abandoned all that they could not carry with
them in their instant removal, and went to seek shelter where they
could; many of them actually lived among the mountains during the whole
three months that the French continued there, though at the time of
their flight the weather was severe, and the snow daily falling. ♦ST.
CYR, 156.♦ There had been no time to destroy the provisions, much less
to remove them; if St. Cyr had not succeeded in effectually concealing
his intention of quartering the troops there, this would have been
done, and his army could then have derived no advantage from their
change of position. As it was, they found corn enough to last till the
harvest, lard for a month, and wine for a fortnight: but the change of
diet, air, and climate (for they had moved into a higher region), and
the want of wine as soon as the stock was exhausted, produced disease
among the soldiers; and it was well for them that neither Reding nor
his army was in a state to resume offensive operations; so that they
were enabled to rest.
♦ARREST OF THE PERSONS IN OFFICE AT BARCELONA FOR REFUSING THE OATH.♦
St. Cyr himself remained some three weeks in Barcelona. From the
depôts of the Spaniards, which, in the course of this successful
campaign had fallen into his hands, he had supplied the garrison of
that city with grain, pulse, and salt for three months’ consumption:
but there was not enough ammunition for a fortnight’s siege. Of
being formally besieged indeed there was not now even the remotest
danger; but from within there was sufficient cause for inquietude.
The honourable feeling of nationality, for which the Catalans are
eminently distinguished, was in no part of the principality stronger
than in its capital. At this very time Barcelona had two _tercios_
of Miquelets in the field, raised among its inhabitants, and paid
and clothed by them. The individuals of those regiments, having no
uniform by which they could be recognised, used to enter the city
fearlessly whenever it suited them, for the purpose of visiting their
friends, raising recruits, and receiving money or clothing: nor was
it in Duhesme’s power, with all the vigilance, and it may be added,
all the villany of his police, to detect a single person in this
practice; so unanimous were the Barcelonans in their detestation of
the intrusive government, and so well was the secret kept. That police
was continually reporting to Duhesme and Lechi, and these again to
the Commander-in-chief, the existence of conspiracies which they had
discovered; but the members of the police were men of such character,
that St. Cyr suspected these schemes to be suggested by their agents,
if they were not mere fabrications, brought forward for the most
nefarious motives. Now, however, that he was on the spot, he allowed
Duhesme ♦1809. APRIL.♦ to exact an oath of allegiance to the Intruder
from all the public functionaries, and from the Spanish soldiers who
had been disarmed after ♦ST. CYR, 142–4.♦ the treacherous seizure of
the place. Sunday was the day chosen for this act of oppression. They
were summoned to the house of the Royal Audience, which was surrounded
with horse and foot, and 3000 troops were drawn up on the esplanade
and the sea-wall; the display and the actual force being necessary to
keep down the indignation of a generous and most injured people. Every
member of the Audience refused thus to disgrace himself and betray his
country; only one of the _Relatores_ took the oath, and only three of
the numerous persons employed in the inferior departments. The French
were not more successful in tempting the military. Persuasions and
promises availed as little as the threat of immediate imprisonment. The
Contador Asaguerre told Duhesme, that if all Spain were to acknowledge
Joseph, he would expatriate himself. The French executed their threat.
Nine-and-twenty of these honourable Spaniards were sent prisoners,
some to Monjuic, others to the citadel. The people, undeterred by
their strong escort, followed them as in procession, cheering them as
they went, and promising that their families should be well provided
♦PRISONERS SENT TO FRANCE.♦ for during their imprisonment. Many
others were put under arrest in their own houses, and the whole of
the military were, by St. Cyr’s orders, marched with the prisoners of
war, under convoy of Lechi’s division, as far as the Fluvia, where
Reille received and sent them into France: and by Lechi’s return the
commander-in-chief ♦ST. CYR, 151, 158.♦ received the first intelligence
from that country which had reached him since he crossed the Fluvia
himself, ... five months before. His last remaining anxiety was for the
provisionment of Barcelona; and that was removed soon afterward by the
arrival of a squadron from Toulon, which had the rare good fortune to
reach its destined port and return in safety. ♦BARCELONA RELIEVED BY
SEA.♦ The place was thus amply supplied with military stores as well as
provisions, and the siege of Gerona then became the only object of the
French.
♦REDING DIES OF HIS WOUNDS.♦
The dispatch in which Reding informed the Central Junta of his defeat
at Valls, was marked equally by his habitual despondency and his
magnanimity as to every thing which regarded himself. He rendered the
fullest justice both to the policy and humanity of St. Cyr’s conduct
as opposed to that of Duhesme and Lechi, and expressed an apprehension
that it had produced some effect upon the public mind. Some ground
for this had been afforded by what had happened at Igualada and at
Reus; but the evil extended no farther. He had no reliance upon the
Somatenes, he said, nor upon the enthusiasm which they displayed;
order was wanting among them, and where order ended confusion began.
He complained that he could obtain no intelligence of the enemy’s
numbers, whereas they were well informed of every thing that related
to his army; and he gave as a reason for having taken the field, the
opinions of those whom he had consulted, and the popular cry. He made
no mention of his own wounds; and when the government published such
parts of his dispatch as were intended for publication, they noticed,
as it became them, his silence upon this point. The wounds, though
many, were not thought dangerous, and they appeared for a time to be
going on well; but the symptoms changed, and in the course of a month
they proved mortal. He fell in a foreign land, and in the service of a
foreign state; but the cause in which Theodore Reding fell was the same
for which his brother Aloys had fought amid their native mountains; and
it was the cause of his own countrymen as well as of the Spaniards;
the cause of all good men every where. The motives for which ordinary
wars have been undertaken are so mean and transitory, and come so
little to the heart of man, that after a few years have elapsed all
interest concerning them is exhausted; and even nationality does not
prevent us from feeling, that they, whose lives have been expended in
such contests, have died rather in the exercise of their profession
than of their duty. But the struggle of Spain against Buonaparte
is of the same eternal and unfading interest as the wars of Greece
against Xerxes: at whatever distance of time its records shall be
perused, they will excite in every generous mind the same indignant
and ennobling sympathy. Not, therefore, in an ungrateful service did
Reding lay down his life, for with those records his name will be
perpetuated: Switzerland will remember him with pride, as one of the
most honourable, though not most fortunate of her sons, and Spain with
respectful gratitude, as a soldier not unworthy of her service in its
best day, and true to it in its worst.
♦PEASANTS OF THE VALLÉS.♦
Right as this General was in his opinion, that the co-operation of
an irregular force was not to be relied on in a plan of regular
operations, he estimated the effects of a popular resistance below
its real importance, nor did he fairly appreciate the Catalan spirit.
A fine example of it was shown immediately after his death by the
peasants in the Vallés. Their country lies in the line between Vicq and
Barcelona, and the peasants taking arms to impede the communication
occupied the heights near the Church of Canovellas, about a mile from
Granollers, which is the capital of that district. The district is so
strong, that the invaders were desirous of opening the communication by
persuasion rather than by force; and therefore communicated to these
insurgents in due form, that the French commanders ordered their troops
to make war upon soldiers only, not upon peasants; that if they would
lay down their arms, and retire every man to his house, no injury
should be done them; but otherwise there was a division of the enemy
in their front, and another was coming in their rear. A written answer
was returned, in the name of the peasants of the Vallés. “They held it
a great honour,” they said, “to form a part, though but a small one, of
the Spanish nation; and they had seen what their requital had been for
receiving and entertaining the French troops, when their government had
commanded them so to do; their peaceful habitations had been invaded,
their property plundered, their houses burnt, their women violated,
their brethren murdered in cold blood, and above all, the religion of
their fathers outraged and profaned. Nothing remained for them but to
repel force by force; and as they could not by themselves defend their
open villages, they had taken to the mountains as to a strong hold:
from thence they would defend their valleys, and oppose to the enemy
the most obstinate resistance, as long as the government enjoined them
to consider as enemies the subjects of Napoleon. The Spanish general
in Catalonia was the person whose instructions they were to obey. For
themselves, emulating as they did the courage and constancy of all
Spain, they would never depart from those principles which the whole
nation maintained. General St. Cyr and his companions might have the
dreadful glory of seeing nothing but ruins in all that country; ...
they might pass in triumph over the bodies of those whom they had
sacrificed; but neither they nor their masters should ever say that
the people of the Vallés had submitted their necks to a yoke which the
whole nation had justly rejected.” The Spaniards are a nation upon whom
deeper impression would be made by a circumstance of this kind than by
the defeat of one of their armies; and the success with which these
peasants harassed the French, and cut off some of their artillery and
baggage, raised the spirits of the Catalans more than the battle of
Valls had depressed them.
♦BLAKE APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND.♦
Upon Reding’s death the command devolved upon the Marques de Coupigny,
till Blake was nominated as his successor, and with more extensive
powers, being appointed Commander-in-chief in Catalonia, Valencia, and
Aragon. This General, after leaving Romana, had been sent to serve
under Reding, and was in Tortosa at the time of Reding’s decease, where
Lazan, obeying without hesitation the Central Junta’s instructions,
resigned to him the charge of his division, and continued with it, to
serve under him. The Aragonese had not been disheartened by the loss
of their capital; they had regarded the former siege with a happier,
but not with a prouder feeling, for of all examples, that of dignified
suffering makes the deepest impression upon a generous and high-minded
nation. The ♦MOVEMENTS OF THE ARAGONESE.♦ lordship of Molina de
Aragon was surrounded with points which were occupied by the enemy.
Nevertheless, the people, cut off as they were from support, took
arms, trusting in themselves and the strength of their country: for
want of better weapons some of them used slings, as the Somatenes also
had done with good effect; and they made wooden artillery, so light,
that a single man could carry one of these pieces up the heights, and
yet strong enough to bear from fifteen to twenty rounds. The French
endeavoured to surprise them with a detachment of 1800 men, for the
purpose of opening the communication with Madrid, which they had cut
off; but part of this body was itself surprised in Iruecha, and put to
flight with some loss. The Molinese were about to pursue their success
against another party in Alcolea, when they learned that General
Suchet, who had now the command in Aragon, had passed the Puerto de
Daroca, and was entering the lordship on its open side, with some 4000
foot and 600 horse. In the course of two hours the cavalry would reach
Molina. The Junta gave instant orders for removing the ammunition, the
town was deserted by all its inhabitants, and the men in arms retired
with the Junta to the mountains five leagues distant. The efforts of
the French to arrest the Junta or any of its members were in vain;
the proclamations which they issued to intimidate or to delude the
people were of no effect; and after remaining five days in Molina, they
returned with no other advantage from this expedition than that of
carrying away all the flocks and herds they could find.
♦1809. MAY.
MONZON RECOVERED BY THE SPANIARDS.♦
There was no part of Spain in which the French had imagined themselves
to be so secure as in Aragon, after the fall of Zaragoza. During that
siege the army of Aragon had proved completely inefficient, and the
Catalans were too hardly pressed themselves to make any efforts in
behalf of their neighbours. In reliance upon this, some troops had
been withdrawn to march into Germany; and that larger detachment
under Mortier had been called off towards the Douro, which was to
co-operate with Marshal Soult. Advantage was taken of this when Blake’s
appointment to the command had raised the spirits of the soldiers and
of the people, ... both being alike ready to impute their ill success
to any cause except the true one, and to expect better fortune with
every new commander. Blake brought with him a good name, for though
always unfortunate, the Spaniards had never suffered any disgrace under
his guidance; and the Roman government never demeaned itself with more
generosity toward an unsuccessful general than the Central Junta. The
first effect of the impulse which his arrival communicated was on the
side of Lerida. As soon as Mortier had withdrawn from the neighbourhood
of that city, the garrison, in conformity to Blake’s instructions, was
on the alert. A French detachment occupied Barbastro and the places
near, with other points on the right of the Cinca; on the left of that
river they were in possession of Monzon; and from thence, as from a
strong hold, they tyrannized over the country, levying contributions
without mercy. The town of Albalda having refused to answer one of
these oppressive demands, a detachment of 1400 was sent to make
what was called an example of that place for its disobedience. The
governor of Lerida, D. Josef Casimiro de Lavalle, who was apprised
of this movement, stationed 700 of his garrison at Tamarite, under
Colonels Perena and Baget, with some Aragonese and Catalan Somatenes,
who succeeded in routing the enemy; the greater part retreated to
Barbastro, and in consequence of this movement and defeat, about 200
only remained in Monzon. The inhabitants rose against them, though they
had only seven muskets; knives and bludgeons supplied the place of
other weapons; they recovered the Castle, and drove the invaders out.
♦CAPTURE OF A FRENCH DETACHMENT.♦
Monzon, though in these days a place of little strength, was
nevertheless a fortress of importance in that country, and in a war
where every advantage, however trifling, raised the spirits of a people
whom no disasters, however severe, ♦MAY 16.♦ could depress. The French
therefore being determined to retake it, and punish the people, came in
considerable force, horse and foot, down the right bank of the Cinca
to Pomar, where they crossed by the ford and the ferry. Perena, who
had hastened to Monzon upon its recapture, was there to receive them
with his battalion and with a _tercio_ of Miquelets; and they were
repulsed in their attack. They obtained reinforcements, and repeated
it on the morrow, and forced their way into the streets; but Baget with
his detachment came in all speed from Fonz, and arrived opportunely
enough to assist in driving them out a second time, with considerable
loss. They called to their assistance the 2000 men that were left in
Barbastro, but meantime the Cinca had risen so as to be no longer
fordable; and while they were thus cut off from succour, the Spaniards
at Monzon were in communication with Lerida. Perceiving now their
danger, they made for Albalete, hoping to cross at Fraga by the bridge;
their intention had been foreseen, and a detachment from the garrison
of Lerida, weak as it was, was dispatched to secure that point. Thus
anticipated in that direction, and being now not more than 1000 men,
with about forty horse, they fled toward Fonz and Estadilla, to cross
the river in the mountains, above its junction with the Eseva. They
were closely pursued by Perena and Baget; their commander was drowned
in attempting the passage, eight companies were made prisoners, the
whole detachment which had crossed the Cinca was thus cut off, and the
French in consequence withdrew from Barbastro.
♦BLAKE MOVES UPON ALCAÑIZ.♦
The prisoners were marched to Tarragona, where the Catalans, after so
many reverses, were in no slight degree elated by seeing them. More
however from humanity than from a motive of ostentation, proposals for
exchanging them were immediately made to St. Cyr, and accepted by him.
The French suffered another check, less mortifying indeed and less
important, but one which impeded their movements, in the destruction
of their flying bridge upon the Ebro. This, which was large enough to
carry some hundreds at a time, they had removed from the river where
it approaches Caspe, to the part near Alborge, where it was surprised
and burnt by a detachment from Mequinenza. Blake meantime was not less
successful in his own operations. Part of his troops were stationed at
Morelia, to oppose the French division which occupied Alcañiz and its
district, and to cover that part of Catalonia and Valencia which there
borders upon Aragon: others formed a cordon along the Algas, to guard
the difficult country by which they might have threatened Tortosa, or
interrupted the communication between that place and Mequinenza. With
the approbation of the Junta Blake formed a plan for driving the enemy
from this part of the country; for which purpose it was necessary to
collect these troops, and strengthen them with a small detachment from
the garrison of Tortosa. The French division was that which Junot had
commanded at the siege of Zaragoza, and was now under General Laval;
it consisted of from 6000 to 7000 men and 500 horse, having lost
about half its number during the siege. Laval’s head-quarters were at
Alcañiz, where the greater part of the division was stationed; but he
was at this time in the field with 2000 or 3000 men, for the purpose
of driving away the Spaniards, who were observing him too closely, and
continually harassing his posts.
D. Pedro Roca was to conduct the troops from Morella to the place
appointed for their junction, Lazan those from the Algas. Both had
orders to avoid any action with the enemy till the junction should have
been effected. But it so happened that Laval took up his quarters in
the village of Beceyte on the day when Lazan had to arrive there, and
the Spanish general rightly concluded that his instructions were not
intended to prevent him from seizing any decided advantage which might
present itself. He stationed ♦MAY 16.♦ some light troops in points
that commanded the defiles through which the French must pass, and
killed or wounded about an hundred of the enemy, with the loss of only
five or six men on his own part. On the following day the junction was
effected at Monroyo, great difficulty having been overcome in bringing
the artillery through such a country. Having reached the Ermita at
Fornoles, the vanguard ♦MAY 18.♦ under D. Pedro Texada was sent forward
to interpose between Alcañiz and Val de Algorfa, which was the usual
position of the enemy’s van. Two columns, under D. Martin Gonzalez
da Menchaca and D. Joseph Cucalo, had preceded them to occupy the
villages of Castelseras and Torrecilla. The remainder of Blake’s little
army, consisting of three columns of infantry, the cavalry, and the
artillery, began their march by night along the only road from Morella
to Alcañiz, from which place they were five or six hours distant.
♦THE FRENCH WITHDRAW.♦
Upon reaching Val de Algorfa, it was seen that the enemy were protected
by the walls of the inclosures, and by a chapel, where they had formed
a parapet. They were some 500 or 600 in number, and being dislodged
from thence by the artillery, retreated toward Alcañiz; but when they
had advanced about half a league, they came upon Texada’s detachment,
and being thus between two fires, dispersed with as much alacrity as
a body of Spaniards could have done. By this time Menchaca and Cucalo
were approaching the city from the left, and the French, who were
sallying forth against Texada, seeing themselves threatened on that
side also, began to retreat hastily in the direction of Samper. There,
and at La Puebla and Hijar, they collected their troops, withdrawing
them from Caspe and Calanda. The people of Alcañiz, priests, women,
young and old, went out to meet their deliverers, carrying refreshments
for the soldiers, and blessing them with prayers and tears. Blake
himself was affected at the sight, and said, that if the tyrant of the
world, as he called Buonaparte, could have seen the emotions of that
multitude, and heard their shouts for their King, their country, and
their religion, he would perhaps have begun to doubt the possibility of
raising for his brother in Spain a party, not of persons attached to
his cause, but even of those who would be resigned to his usurpation.
♦SUCHET COMES AGAINST HIM.♦
Upon the approach of a Spanish detachment the enemy withdrew from
Samper to the Puebla de Hijar, and being there reinforced from
Zaragoza, ♦MAY 21.♦ advanced towards Alcañiz, to revenge themselves
for their late reverses. They were now 10,000 foot, with 800 horse
and twelve pieces of artillery. Suchet commanded in person. Blake
was informed of their approach, and drew up his army to meet them on
the plain of Alcañiz, before that city. The plain is surrounded with
heights. About two musket shot from the city is a range of hills,
accessible for cavalry, and on all sides sloping gently to the plain.
The road to Zaragoza crosses there. Here he stationed the main body of
his forces, their wings being supported by two batteries, which, with
others in the centre, completely flanked the whole line. The weak side
of this position was on the right, where the plain was lowest, and
there were trees enough to afford cover to the enemy; but the heights
terminated here, and upon their loftiest part, where a chapel commanded
the road from Caspe, he stationed 2000 men, under Camp-marshal D. Juan
Carlos Areizaga. The vanguard, under Texada, was placed on an eminence
in front of the position; some light troops, among the olive-yards
on the left, to prevent the French from turning them on that side;
and the cavalry, under D. Miguel Ibarrola, in front of all, upon the
Zaragoza road.
♦MAY 23. DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH BEFORE ALCAÑIZ.♦
At six in the morning the enemy appeared: the advanced parties retired
before them, and the cavalry and the vanguard fell back before superior
numbers, as they had been instructed; the infantry to the chapel on
the right, the horse, with two pieces of flying artillery, to the
protection of their batteries. The chapel, as Blake had anticipated,
was the main point of attack; the enemy presented themselves in
front of this post and on the right, and occupied all the immediate
heights. After a brisk fire on both sides, a column of about a thousand
grenadiers attempted to take this position with the bayonet: they were
broken presently, and the light troops of the Spaniards in their turn
attacked the French on the heights, who kept their ground. In the hope
of relieving this post, which he saw would be again attempted in force,
Blake directed Menchaca to make an attack upon the enemy’s centre; but
the French were strong enough to attend to this and renew their efforts
against Areizaga. The second effort, however, was not more successful
than the first. The Spanish cavalry had been ordered from the Zaragoza
to the Caspe road, to assist in supporting this point: and as they came
out from the trees, a discharge from the French infantry wounded their
commander Ibarrola; they were attacked with a superior troop of horse,
and fell back to the position. The enemy, now abandoning their first
plan of winning the chapel, turned upon Menchaca, who found himself
suddenly assailed by very superior numbers; he fell back in good order
to the position, but one light battalion found it necessary to retire
upon Areizaga’s post. Encouraged by this, the French made a desperate
attack upon the centre of the Spanish line: it was saved by the
artillery: they approached almost to the cannon’s mouth, but were mown
down by a fire of grape; and those who turned one of the batteries fell
by the fire of the troops. Defeated in this attempt also, they withdrew
to the heights on which they had first been seen, and after an action
of seven hours, both armies remained looking at each other. The rich
plain of Alcañiz was between them; and Blake said in his dispatch that
the sight of it might have warmed the heart of the coldest Spaniard,
and animated him to defend the beautiful country which God had given
him. It would have been rash in him to have attacked the enemy when
they had the advantage of the ground; to have thus decidedly repulsed
them was no inconsiderable advantage in the state of his army, some
corps of which had never before been in action. The French retreated
under cover of the night, and took up a strong position behind the
Huerba near Zaragoza. They left 500 dead on the field, and their total
loss was estimated at[22] 2000; that of the Spaniards did not amount to
400.
Among the officers whom Blake particularly commended for their conduct
Lazan was one, who was at his side during the whole day; Loigorri, the
commandant of the artillery, was also deservedly noticed, and Areizaga,
upon whom the brunt of the action had fallen; to the two latter he
frankly declared that the victory was owing. He returned thanks to his
army; and noticing that a few wretched men had fled from the field,
said their names should be struck off the roll, that the Spanish army
might no longer be disgraced by them. The Central Junta, in consequence
of this success, nominated him Captain General of Aragon, Catalonia,
Valencia, and Murcia, as well as General-in-chief of the united army
of those provinces, and conferred upon him the Encomienda of the Peso
Real in Valencia. The officers whom he recommended were promoted also,
Areizaga to the rank of Lieutenant-General.
♦ANNIVERSARY AT VALENCIA.♦