The idea of the raid has been taken from the American War of Secession.
Our new Regulations designate such undertakings as "Streifzüge"
(527),[10] and do not appear to attach overmuch importance to them.
Their use is only advocated if a superfluity of cavalry is at hand.
They should not, it is said, distract the cavalry from their own duties
or from co-operating in the battle (395).[11]
Whether one agrees with this estimation of the value of such
enterprises naturally depends upon the view taken of the co-operation
of cavalry in the battle and the general conception of the conditions
of modern war. It appears to me that the importance of such
undertakings has increased in the same measure as the value of cavalry
on the main battlefield has diminished.
The great size of modern armies renders it, generally speaking,
impossible for them to live on the country. A modern army marching once
through the richest country will nowadays almost completely exhaust its
resources, and yet the supplies carried will scarcely suffice to feed
the columns during a protracted movement. Armies are far more dependent
than formerly on the supplies from the rear--more, indeed, than in
the time of Frederick the Great. In those days, if the bread-wagons
ran short, it was possible to fill up from the country. The armies
were never so great that this became impossible. The cavalry, indeed,
devoted most of its time to foraging, and the soldier frequently bought
his supplies, all except his bread, on the spot.
Nowadays the circumstances are quite changed. It is out of the question
for the horses of the modern army to find the necessary forage in the
country itself. That the men of the great armies of the present day can
supply themselves when rations run out remains to be proved. On paper
it is indeed often possible, taking into consideration the supplies
available in peace; but these calculations cannot hold good for a real
theatre of war where concentration has claimed all available resources.
Of the straits to which a great army may be reduced when supplies
really give out, the campaign of 1812 in Russia is a good example.
There, even during the advance to Moscow, Napoleon's army practically
dissolved owing to lack of supplies. Only some 90,000 men of the mighty
host arrived in Moscow; only these perished during the retreat. How
fearfully the Napoleonic armies suffered and melted away owing to want
of supplies gives cause for reflection. In the armies of millions of
the present day such conditions become still more perilous. Matters
appertaining to ammunition are of equal importance. The modern army
carries enormous masses of artillery with it. All the guns are
designed for a vast expenditure of ammunition, and the _rafale_ from
covered positions and against covered positions will indeed make
this necessary. Modern infantry, too, is armed in a manner that will
entail a prodigious expenditure of cartridges. The replacement of this
expended ammunition is of vital importance. Railways will have to be
laid in rear of the armies to cope with these demands. Long trains
of wagons and automobiles will move to and fro behind them. On every
high-road and in every railway-station magazines will appear, and all
operations must come to a standstill and miscarry as soon as this great
organisation ceases from any cause to carry out its functions.
I hold, therefore, that such circumstances render a disturbance of the
rear communications of an army an important matter. It will often do
the opponent more damage, and contribute more to a favourable decision
of arms than the intervention of a few cavalry divisions in the
decisive battle itself.
The one does not, of course, exclude the possibility of the other.
General Stuart, in the campaign of Gettysburg, rode all round the
hostile army, broke up its communications, drew hostile troops away
from the decisive point, and was yet in his place on the wing of
the army on the day of battle. What this man performed with cavalry
and the inestimable damage he inflicted on his opponent are worth
studying. The fortune of war, which lay in might and in the nature of
things, he could not turn. Nor could he bring the advance of an army
to a standstill, because at that period and under those circumstances
it was possible for the army of the North to live, at least for a
time, upon the country. If we regard his achievement by the light
of modern conditions, we shall certainly not fall into the error of
underestimating the value of such enterprises. If we compare it with
the performances of cavalry upon the battlefield in the latest war, we
will be able to obtain a true impression of the degree of importance of
modern cavalry action.
I am inclined to think that such enterprises will be of altogether
extraordinary significance in a future war; least so, perhaps, during
the earlier battles resulting from the concentration, when it will be
difficult to get round the flanks of the enemy, but more so during
the subsequent course of operations. We have only to imagine what the
decisive consequences must have been if General von Werder, and, later,
General von Manteuffel, had been in a position to continually interrupt
the rear communications of the army of Bourbaki. In all probability
the latter must have capitulated long before it reached the Swiss
frontier, always granting that it was successful in getting so far as
the battlefield of the Lisaine. The whole crisis of this campaign,
which was very nearly ending in the defeat of the Germans, would thus
possibly have been avoided.
There are plenty of examples of this. To indicate only one from the
history of the latest war, I would call to mind the undertaking of the
Russians against the rear communications of the Japanese army.
If this undertaking had been actually directed against the only railway
at the disposal of the Japanese army, if it had been carried through by
throwing into the scale the whole fighting strength of a really mobile
and efficient cavalry, and if it had thereby succeeded in interrupting
the supplies of the Japanese army for a period, the whole course of the
campaign might have been changed. Victory in this tremendous conflict
hung continually in the balance, and it needed but little more weight
on either side to turn the scale of the fortunes of war.
The importance of such raids in modern war should not therefore, in
my opinion, be underestimated. They are capable rather of exercising
enormous influence on the course of events.
Rules, however, cannot be laid down for their conduct. The Regulations
indicate, shortly, that attention must be paid to the transport of
sufficient ammunition and supplies, and here, indeed, move in the right
direction. It is absolutely indispensable that a cavalry mass destined
to carry out such an enterprise should be independent of what it may
find in the country and be perfectly free of movement.
The supply and ammunition columns, however, which accompany it, must
also be so mobile that they are able to follow the troops closely, even
at a rapid pace, as otherwise they will run the danger of falling into
the hands of the enemy. The whole force designed for the enterprise
must be able to advance rapidly as a concrete whole, and should not be
allowed to take up too much room. Resources found upon the enemy's
lines of communication and magazines captured must be used for the
sustenance of the troops as far as possible. It will then be able
to reserve the supplies carried for critical times or for a further
turning movement. Any of the enemy's supplies which are not used must
be ruthlessly laid waste. His railways and magazines, particularly any
important engineering structures, must be thoroughly destroyed, the
necessary explosives being carried in sufficient quantities.
In contrast to Stuart's raids, however, one must count on meeting not
inconsiderable bodies of the enemy's communication troops, which will
probably be capable of rapid reinforcement. This entails corresponding
preventive measures.
Hostile cavalry sent to secure the safety of the communications will
generally have to be attacked in a determined manner. It may sometimes,
however, be more advantageous to avoid it by rapid marching. For
the rest, the factor of surprise is of decisive importance. Should
the enemy early become aware of the approach, he will generally be
in a position to bring up fresh forces, often by rail, and thereby
imperil the success of the whole undertaking. Under such circumstances
a covered approach, perhaps by night, careful screening, and the
interruption of the enemy's telegraph-lines and transmission service
are matters to which special attention must be paid. It is also a
matter of consideration in the attack on communications and railways to
destroy them at a sufficient distance above and below the objective by
means of detachments deflected for that purpose, so that the enemy may
be prevented from bringing up reinforcements. If the direction of the
attack is fixed upon and assured, and if approach and deployment have
been successfully effected unobserved, the attack must from the first
be carried through with sufficient firepower and energy to allow the
enemy no time for reflection.
It is therefore absolutely necessary that troops engaged in a raid
should be of sufficient fighting strength to be able rapidly to
break down any resistance. The scanty strength of a division of six
regiments is much too small for such an undertaking in modern war.
Stronger divisions must be formed for the purpose, and strengthened
when necessary by cyclist battalions. An enterprise of this kind also
requires thorough preparation, especially by an extensive system of
espionage which will amplify the results of the cavalry reconnaissance.
Before such a raid is undertaken all possible information must be to
hand as to the conditions in the rear of the hostile army. Mobile light
bridging equipment should accompany the expedition, with the necessary
complement of mounted engineers. During the advance the cavalry should
be surrounded by a screen of patrols, not too far distant from it, so
that the enemy will not too early become aware of the expedition, and
yet at the same time far enough to guard against surprise. After a
successful surprise the force should withdraw with the same speed in
order to escape from the enemy's counter-measures. Finally, the chief
safety of such enterprises lies in their daring.
The leader of such a raid should be minutely instructed as to the
advance and intended operations of his own army, so that he may be
able to calculate when and where the decisive collision between the
opposing armies will take place. He must regulate his own movements
accordingly. As long as the two armies are still distant from each
other he can strike the enemy's communications far to the rear,
destroying railways and magazines. The nearer, however, the opponent
approaches to his own army, the more closely must he endeavour to
hang on the rear of the hostile troops and to interrupt the supply of
the immediate necessities, that is to say, to destroy the supply and
ammunition columns of the army corps, and to capture the provision and
baggage wagons of the troops. If circumstances demand, he must be able
to appear upon the battlefield itself on the day of battle.
Keen perception and foresight, rapid decision, and relentless energy
are indispensable qualities to the leader of such a raid. The ability
to mystify and mislead the enemy will greatly facilitate the carrying
out of the enterprise. A considerable measure of cavalry ability
is, at the same time, necessary to ensure proper horse management.
A combination of all these qualities goes to form the great cavalry
leader, before whom, even in modern war, lie great prospects of
distinction, if he but understands how to break loose from the routine
and pedantry of the day.