Ministry, a very extensive scheme of army extension and reorganisation
was brought forward, encountering no inconsiderable opposition from
the Radical party in the House of Representatives, and the year ended
with stormy debates in Parliament on questions of military and naval
expenditure. Marshal Yamagata was of course mainly responsible for
the project as far as it related in detail to the enlargement of the
nation’s military resources, but that it had the entire approval and
support of the Crown was clear from the imperial rescript which appeared
in 1893, when matters had reached a deadlock in the Diet owing to the
obstacles placed in the Cabinet’s path by the irreconcilable elements
of the Opposition. In the course of his message to the Diet the Emperor
declared that “the progressive force of various countries of the world
becomes more apparent day by day: at this period if time is squandered in
disputes and ultimately the great objects in view become neglected, so
that the opportunities of promoting the nation’s welfare and extending
its influence are lost, the desire that we cherish in view of meeting
the spirits of our ancestors will be frustrated, and the way to reap
the fair result of constitutional government will be missed. The items
of expenditure referred to in the 67th Article of the Constitution are
already guaranteed by the terms of those articles, and therefore must
not be a matter of dispute now. As to the military defences of the
State, a single day’s neglect may result in a hundred years’ regret. We
shall Ourselves economise in the expenditure of Our household, and We
call on Our officers to do the same....” His Majesty’s efforts brought
about a temporary understanding, and in the meantime affairs in Korea
were assuming so threatening a shape that all the energies of the War
Office were directed into the channel of urgent and complete preparation
for what it was feared could not long be averted, namely, a desperate
struggle with China, whose policy had been growing more and more inimical
to Japan’s interests in the adjacent peninsula.
The culmination was reached when news arrived in Japan that a large
reinforcement of the Chinese army in Korea was on the eve of being
sent from Tientsin, and that foreign vessels had been chartered to
convey the troops across the Yellow Sea to points on the Korean
littoral. The bargain had been that neither Japan nor China was to
increase its strength in the peninsula without giving due notice to
the other interested power, for Korea, under the existing agreement,
was independent, though China still insisted on claiming a rather
shadowy suzerainty. Japan ordered her fleet to intercept the Chinese
vessels, and hostilities began when the _Naniwa Kan_, a cruiser at that
time commanded by the now famous Admiral Togo, fired upon and sank a
British-owned steamer which had been chartered for the express purpose of
carrying Chinese soldiers to the vicinity of the Korean port of Chemulpo.
Admiral Togo’s orders were to prevent a landing, and when he had taken
on board the _Naniwa Kan_ all the foreign officers of the transport, the
Chinese on board refused to surrender, in spite of fair warning, so he
considered that he had no alternative but to put an effectual stop to
the vessel’s career. Already large numbers of Chinese had been thrown
into Korea, and a first collision between the rival forces took place at
Asan, a port to the south of Chemulpo, in the Nam-yang or Empress Gulf.
The decisive battle of the 15th September 1894, at Ping-Yang, north of
Seoul, at which spot Hideyoshi had fought the Chinese at the end of
the sixteenth century, settled the question of the supremacy on Korean
soil, and the Chinese withdrew in haste beyond the river Yalu frontier.
Marshal Yamagata at this stage arrived from Japan to take command in
person of the Japanese army in Manchuria, in the campaign on which it
was now about to enter, and a second army, under the command of Marshal
Oyama, was called out for the invasion of the peninsula known as the
“Regent’s Sword,” at the extremity of which lay Port Arthur, for until
this fortress should be captured the Chinese fleet could not be said to
have been rendered absolutely useless, whilst its possession would give
Japan the control of the Gulf of Pechili and enable her to interrupt
communications with the Chinese ports in those waters.
At the end of 1893 the strength of the Japanese army was as follows:—
Peace Establishment 70,892
First Reserve 92,252
Second Reserve 106,020
Yeso colonists 4,104
-------
273,268
The peace establishment and the First Reserve constitute the First Line
on a war footing, so that the forces which Japan was able under Marshals
Yamagata and Oyama to place in the field were 163,144 in all. Roughly the
peace strength of a Japanese division is 9000, but in time of war its
total rises to about 27,000 men, all told. In the Japan and China war,
under the arrangements which Marshal Yamagata had made, each division
was a complete unit in itself, and, comprised 2 infantry brigades, 1
artillery regiment, 1 engineer battalion, 1 cavalry battalion, 1 train
battalion, a medical corps, and an intendant, accountant, veterinary and
legal staff.
Each infantry brigade had 2 regiments, and each regiment 3
battalions,—(save in the Guards, which had 2 battalions to a regiment)—a
battalion at war strength averaging 800 rifles. The weapon was the
Murata rifle of the 1889 pattern (embodying the improvements effected in
the original type which was the invention of Captain Murata, as he was
then, of the Japanese army, in the early years of the Meiji era,—he is
now General Murata) the rifle being a single-loading breech-loader of 8
millimetres calibre. Each man carried 100 rounds of ammunition, and there
were 80 rounds per man in the battalion transport and ammunition column.
A new magazine rifle—since brought to great perfection—had then just
been issued to the Guards and to the Osaka (4th) division. An artillery
regiment comprised 6 batteries of 6 guns each, and a cavalry battalion
consisted of 2 squadrons of 100 sabres each. The engineer battalion
had 2 field companies of about 200 combatants each, and also furnished
the bridging and telegraph sections. The train battalion supplied the
personnel, ponies, and so forth for all regimental and divisional
transport, a pack pony being able to carry about 250 lbs., but during
the campaign great use was made of hand-carts, each drawn by 3 coolies,
and conveying about 350 lbs. Each division had 3 supply columns and 5
ammunition columns, and in all 8 days’ rations were carried. The medical
corps formed 2 bearer companies and 6 field hospitals. The men of the
First Reserve formed depots for each corps and augmented the units
from peace to war strength, whereas the Second Reserve, on territorial
mobilisation, formed additional units for garrison work, and for the
preservation of the lines of communication for the army in the field.
It is needful to supply these details in order to show how Marshal
Yamagata had taken cognisance, in his scheme, of the requirements of
modern warfare, and that the confidence with which Japan entered on the
contest with China was thoroughly well based. By Yamagata’s efforts the
army of Japan had already been brought to a high standard of efficiency,
and it more than fulfilled the expectations that he had been led to form
of its capabilities in the field. Its discipline was from the first
perfect. Had they been needed, there was a vast reserve of men in Japan
who, given medical fitness, were liable to be called out, if between the
ages of seventeen and forty, for service in the National Army, but up to
that period no demand had ever been made on them, and they had not been
organised into a fighting force.
The Japanese headquarter staff, at the beginning of the war, removed from
Tokio to Hiroshima, in the south-west, and thence directed operations.
The Emperor went likewise to Hiroshima and took up his residence in
the barracks without the ancient castle of the former _daimio_ of Aki
province, as Dai-Gen-Sui, or Supreme Commander-in-chief of Army and Navy.
At his Majesty’s side were Prince Komatsu, Chief of Staff for the army,
with General Kawakami, as his assistant, and Admiral Kabayama, as Chief
of Staff for the Navy.
It was noted by military critics of the campaign that “the conduct of the
war by the Japanese was marked by a very complete decentralisation.” The
commanders of armies or detached forces were given definite objectives
(one at a time), and then allowed a free hand in carrying out their work,
the same system being followed within the armies or their divisions.
The telegraph, of which Japan had learned the value during the Satsuma
Rebellion of 1877, was turned to the best account in the war of
1894-5, for orders were sent by cable from Japan to Fusan, and thence
by telegraph through Korea to Marshal Yamagata, and for the Second
army they were sent by wire to Ping-Yang and thence by steamer to the
Liao-Tung peninsula. After the end of December 1894 the line of telegraph
was built around the coast to the vicinity of Port Arthur, so that
Marshal Oyama was also in direct touch with the imperial headquarters at
Hiroshima.
The approximate strength of the Chinese army when it took its stand at
Kiu-lien-cheng, on the west bank of the Yalu, was 20,000, and there was
a further contingent of 4500 men, who had come south from Tsi-tsi-har,
posted ten miles upstream. The advanced guard of Marshal Yamagata’s army
arrived at Wiju, on the south side of the river, on the 10th October,
and the main body on the 23rd. Just above Kiu-lien-cheng the Yalu is
joined by the Ai-ho, and in the angle formed by the two rivers stands a
prominent hill called Hu-shan, or Tiger Mount. The Chinese held this as
an advanced position in front of their left flank, their main position
extending along the right bank of the Yalu as far south as An-Tung-hsien.
In front of this main Chinese position the river was broad and deep,
and the country on the opposite bank was flat and open, so Marshal
Yamagata, realising the difficulty of making a direct attack, determined
to capture Hushan first, and then by fording the tributary stream to
turn the Chinese left. The attack was planned to take place at daylight
on the 25th October. The main obstacle to the advance of the Japanese
forces was the principal channel of the Yalu, which at that time of the
year was 11 feet deep and about 200 yards wide. The bridge had to be
constructed by night, the pontoon equipment at that time with the army
was not sufficient, and the water was so ice-cold that the men could
only work in very short reliefs. By dawn however, the principal work had
been done, and, the attack was delivered, the Chinese abandoning their
Hushan positions before 8 A.M., though the main position continued to
give trouble. The Japanese bivouacked on the right bank of the Ai-ho
above Kiu-lien-cheng, and next morning it was found that their foes had
evacuated both that city and An-Tung during the dark hours, and had
fallen back, part in the direction of Feng-hwang-cheng, and part towards
Siu-Yen.
The maxim that history repeats itself was so accurately borne out in the
events of a decade later at Kiu-lien-cheng that the temptation to allude
briefly to them at this point becomes irresistible. In the Russo-Japanese
war of 1904 the Japanese commander General Kuroki had to force the
passage of the Yalu in a precisely similar fashion, the attack being
commenced by the crossing of the twelfth division at dawn on the 30th
of April, and the Russians vainly attempting to hold the heights facing
Hushan against assault. General Sassulitch fell back on the 1st of May,
on Feng-hwang-cheng, which the Japanese occupied five days afterwards.
In 1894 the troops under Marshal Yamagata entered Feng-hwang-cheng on
the 29th October, the fifth day after the commencement of the attack on
Hushan, the Chinese having retreated to the Mo-tien pass, thirty-eight
miles to the north-west. Two columns were sent by different roads towards
Taku-shan, afterwards meeting at Siu-Yen, and General Nodzu executed
a brilliant combined movement against Sai-ma-tsui and defeated the
Chinese at Tsao-ho-kao, on the 30th of November. Meanwhile General Sung,
taking with him Ma Yu-kun as his chief of staff, had gone south by way
of Kai-ping to attack the Japanese Second Army, which was reported to
be marching on Port Arthur. At this time the Chinese opposing Marshal
Yamagata in Manchuria numbered approximately 22,000 men.
After the capture of Port Arthur by the Second Army on the 21st of
November, Marshal Yamagata was directed to proceed to the taking of
Hai-cheng, which the Chinese were then holding in considerable strength,
but his health, which had never been good during his stay in that region,
quite broke down, and he was invalided home, his place in the field being
taken by General Nodzu. At this period the marshal was so feeble that he
could only with difficulty mount his charger, but he held on until the
Emperor’s own physician, who had been sent with him to Manchuria, made
a resolute appeal to him to desist. Very reluctantly Yamagata returned
to Japan, abandoning the hope of winning glory on the field of battle,
almost at the moment when fame seemed to be within his grasp.
The end of the war came in April 1895, and Marshal Yamagata had recovered
sufficiently to be able to resume his place at the War Office, and even
to journey to Europe, to attend the coronation of the Tsar Nicholas II.
at Moscow, as the delegate of the Japanese Emperor. He did not succeed in
getting as far as London, for he was obliged by illness to return direct
to Japan from Russia, after concluding the Treaty of 9th June 1896.
On resuming his duties some months later at Tokio a scheme of expansion
of the military forces was elaborated under his supervision which
promised to confer upon Japan by the year 1902 a military power just
double that which she possessed in the summer of 1895, and providing for
an army of not less than 500,000 men, at an annual cost of 26,000,000
_Yen_ (roughly £2,654,000).
In January 1898 the Emperor decreed the formation of a Supreme
Military Advisory Council, consisting of four members—viz. Marquis
Yamagata, holding the position at that time of Inspector-General of the
Army,—Prince Komatsu, Chief of the Staff,—Marshal Oyama,—and Marquis
Saigo (since deceased). On the failure of the attempt to form a Party
Government, which ended in the resignation of the Cabinet in November
1898, Marquis Yamagata was once more commanded by the Emperor to form
a Ministry, and he became Minister-president with Marquis Saigo as
Home Minister, Count Katsura as Minister for War, Count Matsukata
at the Finance Department, and Baron Aoki at the Foreign Office.
The Cabinet so constituted remained in office until September 1900,
when Marshal Yamagata made way for Marquis Ito, who, as the retiring
Minister-president declared, was far more skilled than himself in matters
concerning China, and Chinese questions were then becoming exceptionally
prominent.
Marquis Yamagata held during 1904 and 1905 the position at headquarters
of Chief of the General Army Staff, and politically he is one of the
Gen-Ro, or Elder Statesmen, to whom Japan looks for counsel and guidance
in the hour of trial. During the recent war with Russia he was ever at
the helm at Tokio, silently arranging and directing everything pertaining
to the conduct of the campaign in Manchuria, while his colleague Marshal
Oyama was active in the field.
Ten years ago Marshal Yamagata realised to his intense mortification not
only that the Government of St Petersburg wished to deprive Japan of the
legitimate fruits of her successes in the war with China, but that Russia
intended to appropriate Manchuria herself. From that time his thoughts
were occupied with the development of his country’s military strength,
that at least she might not again be subject to the indignity which she
had to suffer in 1895. It has already been shown how he gradually and
surely raised the total of Japan’s resources in men and material until
she was in possession of an army that would enable her to challenge with
success the further advance towards her own shores of a power whose
progress southward had ever constituted,—and as Minister Okubo had
declared thirty years before,—a grave peril for Japan.
The disposition of Western observers had always been to accept the
published figures of the standing army as indicative of the Empire’s
military power. Never, perhaps, were figures so altogether deceptive, for
the nominal muster of the regular forces bears but little comparison with
the real strength which the nation is capable of putting forth in time of
war.
Japan’s army is based on conscription, and all male subjects of the
Ten-shi become liable when full seventeen, and remain liable until full
forty years of age. In actual practice they are never called on until
they are twenty, but even then their term of service may extend over
twenty years, only three of which it is compulsory that they shall spend
with the colours. We have in the Japanese system, therefore, a short
service with the colours, but followed by a prolonged liability to be
called out in emergencies and annually for practice, and its effects
in relation to the military power of a nation are conveniently to be
studied in the history of Japan since about the year 1890 when its
possibilities first began to be realised by the people at large. At the
end of his third year the Japanese soldier of the first selection—which
is of men of superior physique—passes into the First Reserve, to which
he is attached for four years and four months. But as there is a
superabundance of men who are physically fully qualified for the Active
army, the conscripts have to draw lots for the three years’ service
with the colours, and when one of them is unlucky enough to be debarred
from the active service—(this is the view which, as is, of course, only
natural, the Japanese youth’s patriotism induces him to take of the fact
that he has drawn a blank)—he is commiserated by his friends, and passes
to the depot, where he will serve seven years and four months, and thus
equal in the duration of his term his more fortunate comrade on whom the
lot fell for active service at the outset. At the expiration of their
term of seven years and four months the men of both classes are passed
into the territorial army for ten years, and thence to the territorial
reserve until they reach the age of forty. Up to a certain point the
same course is followed with those who were at first rejected as being
of inferior physique,—they serve seven years and four months in depot,
but they then pass to the Territorial Reserve direct until they are forty
years old. One-year volunteers are accepted, as in Germany, provided they
are youths of the prescribed educational attainments and undertake to
maintain themselves (and to mount themselves in mounted branches of the
service) during their term. They then pass for six years and four months
into the Active Reserve Army, and next for ten years into the Territorial
Army as usual, completing their term in the Territorial Reserve until
forty. There is a special plan of service in force in the island of
Tsu-shima owing to its strategical position, whereby all the male
population may be mobilised, but with the changed circumstances resultant
on the altered status of Korea it seems possible that Tsushima may
eventually be brought under the operation of the ordinary regulations.
The general effect of the provisions for service was to equip Japan down
to the end of 1904 with an army on a peace footing of 8000 officers and
152,000 men, which was capable of being raised on a war footing to 14,000
officers and 630,000 men, but that was before the law increasing the term
of service in the Territorial Army to ten years, promulgated in September
1904, came into operation. The term had previously been five years only.
The lengthening of the term will have had the result of vastly adding to
the possibilities of the army in numbers on a war footing. The budget
appropriation for this large army was for the fiscal year ending with
March 1906 as nearly as possible £4,000,000.
It may be useful to insert here for the sake of comparison the cost of
some other armies to their respective countries:—
Russia £38,330,000
Germany 31,674,000
Great Britain 28,600,000
France 27,000,000
Austro-Hungary 13,150,000
Italy 11,160,000
In Japan the service is universal and compulsory, with exemption only
for physical disability. At a rough estimate 410,000 youths reach the
prescribed age annually, but less than one-third of this number are
selected for the maintenance of the standing army, as men of superior
physique, a term which palpably is elastic enough to admit of the choice
of precisely the number required from the vast assemblage of youths
presenting themselves every year for enrolment.
To judge of Japan’s strength, then, by her standing army would be a huge
mistake, or even to wholly estimate it from the figures given as that
of her army on a war footing, as was proved by the last campaign, for
there were vast numbers of men who had completed their twelve (now 17)
years and four months’ service in the active army, the first reserve,
and territorial army, who were still liable until they became full
forty. Moreover, the territorial army and its reserves are composed
of men who are as a rule in good marching condition, for they are in
the majority of cases engaged in normal times in agriculture or other
industries, and physically equal to any tasks they may be called on to
undertake. Conscription has made of Japan the great military power that
she may, with strict justice, claim to be, but owing to the light in
which military service is there regarded it is never a burden on the
population. On the contrary, the system is really a voluntary one, since
it is every youth’s hope and ambition to be among those first chosen to
enter the ranks of the active army and a source of grief to him when he
is drafted into the depot corps.
It was, then, not simply with a nation possessing a powerful army but
with veritably a nation in arms that Russia had to contend when the war
was begun in February 1904, and no more definite, straightforward history
of that mighty contest has been given to the world than the brief account
of its origin, progress, and conclusion which, according to a journal
published in the Far East, fell from Marshal Yamagata’s own lips not long
ago. Referring to the events of the spring of 1904, he said:—
“Russian aggression in the Far East became so notorious, and
took on such serious dimensions after Russia obtained the
lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan that it was felt that a
conflict of the interests of Japan and Russia was imminent.
I considered most carefully measures to counteract this
aggression, and took counsel with all my colleagues and
friends. We came to the decision to forestall Russia in Korea,
as the historical and geographical relations of Korea with
our Empire demanded that we should have the peninsula in our
power, rather than it should fall into that of Russia. To
attain this object we decided to construct the Seoul-Fusan
railway, and did not neglect to elaborate any other necessary
measures, as circumstances required, to oppose Russia. In the
meantime Russia steadily augmented her naval strength in the
Far East, and by about March 1903 her naval force here was
almost equal to our own. Russia failed to fulfil her promise
to evacuate Manchuria, and by steadily reinforcing her army
and navy her designs came to be generally acknowledged. The
Japanese Government, therefore, decided to protest against
these designs, and entered upon negotiations in July 1903, with
a view to arriving at an arrangement diplomatically. These
negotiations proved very difficult, and towards the end of
November the situation became desperate. By this time we were
determined that Korea should under no circumstances be left
in the hands of Russia. Frankly I may say that we were not
confident of defeating Russia, for she was considered to be one
of the greatest powers of the world. We had some hope, however,
in our navy. The naval forces of the two countries were almost
equally balanced, but fortunately our navy had had experience
in fighting in the past ten years, while Russia had had none.
As to the strength of the army, there was great disparity, the
Russians having 4,000,000 men and Japan only 500,000. There was
certainly a limit in the strength of the army that could be
sent by Russia’s one line of railway, but the Russian equipment
in arms was in no way inferior, even if it was not superior, to
that of our army, and the education of the officers was almost
equal. We had, therefore, no advantage over the Russian army,
with the exception, as we thought, of the skill of our troops
in fighting in such hilly country as Korea and Manchuria.
Thus we had very little prospect of success in land fighting,
it having been altogether impossible to assure ourselves of
success in the way that the lay mind is apt to think. It was a
critical and anxious time when hostilities were commenced, but
the army was determined, we knew, to fight to a man in defence
of the Empire. On the campaign being opened, however, we were
able to obtain a success far beyond that which we had hoped
for. This was to be ascribed to the virtue of the Emperor and
to the valour of the officers and men, and the army and navy
are to be congratulated thereon.
From about the time of the great victory at Mukden a suggestion
was made in Europe and America that for the sake of humanity
peace should be restored, and shortly after the defeat of the
Russian fleet in the battle of the Sea of Japan, President
Roosevelt, acting from humanitarian motives, advised the two
belligerents to make peace, with the result already known.