Aritomo was from the outset of his career distinguished by his strenuous
advocacy of the principle of army reform which even at that early period
of the history of modern Japan had come to be recognised by her most
ardent patriots as a sheer necessity. The idea of establishing the
paramount influence of his native country in the affairs of the Far
East by endowing it with a numerous and powerful army seems to have
taken possession of his active mind from an early age, and he strove
unceasingly to spread the desire of attaining martial supremacy for the
clan among his fellow-samurai, who were in the habit, like himself, of
devoting much of their leisure to the study of translations of military
works from the Dutch. In Yamagata’s young days practically the only
accessible writings on fortification and the art of war were in this
form, but they were devoured by the Choshiu cadets, who speedily turned
to account the knowledge they thereby acquired. The military forces of
the Daimio of Choshiu were drilled more or less on the Occidental system
after the year 1864, and as a result, on the outbreak of hostilities
between the followers of the Shogun and the great southern clans towards
the close of the Emperor Komei’s reign the northern men found themselves
confronted by troops which had a semblance of skill with the bayonet,
and could shoot with some approach to accuracy. The rifles with which
the men were armed were of a pattern obsolete in Europe, it is true, but
they made the best use they could of these weapons, and the effect on the
Aidzu men and other adherents of the Shogun, whose training with modern
arms had been of shorter duration and less thorough, was from the first
unmistakable. The superiority of Western drill and implements of warfare
having been demonstrated in actual combat on the battlefield, it became
the Choshiu leader’s ambition to establish a national army, fit to defend
the Imperial possessions and to enable Japan some day to take her fitting
place among the great powers of the world. To Yamagata, in the opinion
of his countrymen, more than to any other person, belongs the credit of
having established his country’s military effectiveness and laid the
foundations of her martial success in later years.
[Illustration: MARQUIS YAMAGATA]
Yamagata was born in 1838, in Nagato, or Choshiu (_lit._: the Long
Province), his grade as a samurai being that of the lancers, which was
superior to the _ashigaru_ (or “light of foot”) rank of retainer. His
father had achieved local renown as a poet and philologist, but Aritomo’s
own tastes inclined him towards the study of the arts of war, and he
entered the service of the clan in his boyhood, rising by degrees from
the position of a common soldier to the command of a regiment. The
headquarters of the Choshiu daimio were at Hagi, a town picturesquely
situated on the west coast fifty miles from the Shimonoseki Straits. The
seat of the present prefectural government is at Yamaguchi, an inland
town standing on the highroad which connects the Inland Sea, at Mitajiri,
with the Sea of Japan on the west coast of Niphon. Yamaguchi was itself
a place of much importance in pre-Restoration days, and enjoys some fame
for the excellence of its thermal springs.
Yamagata was very active in the War of the Restoration, leading the
Choshiu forces with distinction in the campaign under Marshal Saigo
against the Shogunate forces at Fushimi and elsewhere, and when the new
Administration was formed in 1868 he was appointed Under Secretary of
the War Department at Tokio. There he at once set to work to reorganise
the new Imperial army, partly made up as it was of the forces which the
feudal barons had themselves maintained and handed over to the Imperial
Government after the cessation of hostilities in Oshiu, North Japan. For
the ability he displayed in the campaign in that region he received
signal marks of the Emperor’s approval, and a few months later he was
despatched on a journey to Europe, in order that he might study more
closely the art of war as there practised. He was a little over a year
absent from Japan, but during the interval he had been present at most of
the important engagements of the Franco-German War, and returned to his
own country in the spring of 1871.
It is interesting at this stage to recall the actual constitution of the
first army on the European model which Japan possessed. It was planned by
the Government of the Shogun in 1861 (the first year of the Bun-kiu era),
and as a first attempt was undoubtedly the nucleus of the tremendous
force that the country is now able to place in the field. The intention
was that it should comprise:—
6 regiments of heavy infantry:
4 battalions of light infantry:
6 battalions of heavy cavalry:
2 battalions of light cavalry:
6 batteries of light field artillery:
6½ batteries of heavy field artillery for protection of
castle gates.
13 additional companies of heavy infantry for protection
of castle gates.
4 additional battalions of light infantry as bodyguard
for the Shogun.
But though planned this army was never completely organised, because it
was only the hatamoto or other retainers of the Shogun himself who could
be called on to contribute, other retainers (samurai) being already in
the service of their respective feudal lords. The Hatamoto and others
directly controlled by the Shogun had to provide according to their
incomes as under:—
Those having incomes of 500 koku (about £625
at the present day) were required to supply one soldier.
Those in receipt of 1000 koku three soldiers.
Incomes of 3000 koku or more were assessed at ten men.
Those whose incomes were under 500 koku paid a tax in rice or its
equivalent.
The men to be supplied had to be between the ages of 15 and 45, and
served for five years, with liberty to renew their engagement if they so
chose.
Each regiment of heavy infantry—6 in all—was composed of 2 battalions,
each of which contained 10 sections of 40 men. Then the guard for the
Shogun’s castle gates (there were 13 gates in all) was made up of 40 men
at each—520 in all. Thus the total of the heavy infantry force was 5320
men.
The light infantry was to protect artillery and convoys, and consisted
of 4 battalions, each with 8 sections of 32 men in each. The bodyguard
or rifle brigade,—the first to carry modern rifles—numbered 890 men. The
heavy cavalry had swords and carbines, and numbered 888 men. The light
cavalry carried lances, and were only 192 in number.
The artillery had 6-pounder guns, and 12-in. howitzers,—8 guns to a
battery, the men numbering in all 384.
The heavy field artillery (416) men had 12-pounder guns and 15-in.
howitzers, and there was half a battery at each gate,—6½ batteries
altogether. In the coast defences, including the forts at Shinagawa,
Yedo, there were some 2000 artillerymen.
In the staff of the army were 1406 men, many being junior officers,
chosen for training for military duties under the eyes of staff officers.
The total effective force of the Shogunate was thus supposed to be about
13,500 men. In reality it did not muster more than 7700 men and 64
officers when the “standing army” was called on to support the waning
fortunes of the Shogunate in 1867.
At the time that this nucleus of the modern Japanese army was formed
the intrusion, as it was deemed, of foreigners was bitterly resented
by the party of exclusion, which had its centre in the Court of Kioto;
the Shogun, on the other hand, day by day became more convinced of
the futility of such efforts as Japan could make in opposition to the
fulfilment of the treaties. There remained to be considered the probable
attitude of the great feudatories, who were almost independent of the
Shogun though nominally his subordinates, and by whom it was to be
anticipated, in not a few instances, that the occasion would be seized
for divesting themselves of a yoke which had begun to be burdensome.
This factor in the problem was at all events one which no one could with
safety ignore. Affairs were further complicated by the circumstance that
in 1860, when the discussion was at its height, the two strong chieftains
of the south, Mori of Choshiu and Shimadzu of Satsuma, were at variance,
and as a result when Mori advocated the out-and-out adoption of a policy
of expulsion his powerful opponent in the extreme south of Kiushiu
preferred to see an understanding arrived at between the Imperial party
and the adherents of the Bakufu, which was responsible for the signature
of the treaties with foreign powers. At this time the Shogun Iyemochi was
but a youth and politically he was unable to render more than the minimum
of service to his party, but it was hoped that a fusion of interests
might be brought about by a marriage between his Highness and a sister
of the reigning Emperor, which took place in the autumn of 1860. But the
scheme conspicuously failed to bring the rival factions into line, and
instead of presenting a united front against the “barbarians” the clan
enmities and jealousies continued to thrive and in the views entertained
on the subject of the admission of strangers there remained as complete
a divergence as ever. And not only was there this conflict of opinion
prevailing between two well-defined parties in the State but the Shogun’s
side grew to be a house divided against itself, for dissensions arose
within the Mito clan, thereunto the strongest pillar of the Tokugawa
regime, and one of the branches of that family in which the office of
Shogun was hereditary. One half of the Mito clan were for the expulsion
of foreigners, the other half favoured the strict fulfilment of the
Shogun’s bargains. Feeling on these matters at one time ran so high at
Mito that the samurai of the clan fought desperately among themselves,
and it is possible to trace the decline of the Shogunate’s power to
this lamentable internecine strife which sapped the strength of the
Tokugawa house and paved the way to its final fall. Another peril to the
Shogunate was created by the antagonism of the Lord Mori of Choshiu. His
uncompromising hostility to the treaties led him into a direct quarrel
with the Bakufu, and he was directed to return to his own province from
Kioto. His abrupt dismissal from Court was calculated to arouse the
keenest antagonism to the Shogunate on the part of his followers, who
carried the news to Hagi, his castle town in the west of Choshiu, and
there was from that time war between the clan and the adherents of the
Tokugawa house. Thus arose the anomaly that while the Choshiu clan had
at that time in its ranks those very men by whose endeavours Japan was
ultimately to be induced to abandon a policy of seclusion and to enter
the comity of nations, their influence was insufficient to prevent,
until a considerably later period, the adoption of an attitude by their
feudal chief which was distinctly reactionary. And the reformers, finding
themselves in a minority, were compelled to wait their time. The Choshiu
men gathered in their strength and marched upon Kioto, resolved to wipe
out the disgrace which they conceived attached to them through the
unavenged insult to their lord, and as at that date the Choshiu troops
were by far the better armed, victory would have rested with them in the
battle which ensued within sound, and, indeed, within rifle shot, of the
Imperial residence, but for the inadequacy of their numbers. Yamagata,
Takasato, and many others who were presently to achieve distinction in
their country’s cause, were engaged in this contest, and were ranged
under the Jo-I banner, though their presence there as supporters of the
principle of expulsion was due to their loyalty to their feudal lord, and
in defence of his rights as opposed to the Shogun, rather than to any
unwillingness that the country should be opened to international trade
and the introduction of Western arts and sciences.
In writing of the pre-Restoration days himself, in 1887, Count Yamagata,
as he was then, described the time of the Tokugawa Shogunate as that
when, all foreign intercourse being limited to China and Holland, people
in Japan knew little of the civilisation of other nations. “Peace,” he
said, “universally reigned. The swords were kept in their sheaths, and
the arrows lay untouched in their quivers. Luxury and effeminacy followed
in the wake of peace. The sudden appearance of the problem of foreign
intercourse in the sixth year of Ka-yei [1853] resulted in the universal
cry for exclusion. The power of the Shogunate was gradually undermined by
this event. It is not to be wondered at that this cry was raised on every
side, for people were kept in ignorance of things outside of their own
country. Their condition was that of the proverbial frog in the well.
I no naka no kawadzu
Dai Kai wo shiradzu.
(The frog in the well
Knows naught of the ocean.)
Things outside were completely shut off from their view. Along with
this perplexity the advocates of the virtual authority of the Throne
assailed the Shogunate. Baron Ii Naosuke was the person who had to face
these great problems. Confident in the wisdom of his policy, he bravely
opposed public opinion, and was hated even by his relations. The result
was that he had to sacrifice his life for his perseverance in the policy
that he followed. Yet this sad event not only saved our country from the
misfortune that befell our neighbour, China, but opened the pathway of
civilisation in our own land. The merit of this is attributable to no one
but Baron Ii Naosuke.” This powerful championship of a nobleman to whom
Japan owes much—further reference to the part which he took in connection
with the foreign treaties and the manner of his death will be found in
this volume in the chapter devoted to Prince Tokugawa Keiki—does justice
to the memory of one whose fate it was to be much maligned during life,
and also to Marshal Yamagata’s goodness of heart, and there must have
been many of the former adherents of the _Tairo_ who read this eulogy of
their murdered chieftain with genuine satisfaction.
It was on Yamagata’s return from France in 1871 that the reform and
expansion of the military system were definitely taken in hand, the
barons of Satsuma, Choshiu, and Tosa presenting their provincial armies
to the Emperor, and it was then that four military centres were formed
for the troops that likewise were drafted into the imperial service
from the military establishments of the other feudal lords. In 1872
conscription became the law of the land. Six divisions of the army were
formed, and regular drill and instruction were provided for. Several
French officers were engaged to give tuition in military subjects.
Yamagata himself occupied the post of Minister of War, and to the army he
appointed as Commander-in-chief General Saigo Takamori. General Yamada
ranked next, and other appointments to high command were those of Kirino,
the close friend of Saigo in the events of 1877, General Tani, who in
that year defended Kumamoto, and Generals Toriwo, Miura, Nodzu, Asa,
Miyoshi, Nishi, Osawa, etc.: all capable men who in after years greatly
distinguished themselves, some having taken part prominently in the war,
now happily at an end, with Russia.
The first regulations promulgated remain in most of their essential
features but little changed, notwithstanding the lapse of thirty-five
years, and this is testimony in itself to the soundness of the system
for which Marquis Yamagata was mainly responsible. All Japanese subjects
on reaching the age of twenty were to be liable for three years’ active
service in the army or the navy. The officers of the lower grades were to
be chosen by the officers of the corps. Commissions were to be granted
only after a course of instruction and rigid examination. After their
three years’ term conscripts were to form a first reserve, assembling
once a year for drill. On the expiration of two years in the first
reserve they were to be placed in a second reserve, only liable to be
called out in case of a levy _en masse_. The militia was to be formed
of all males between the ages of seventeen and forty, who had been
otherwise exempted from service, and these were to be formed into troops
for district protection whenever a general levy might take place. The
term in the first reserve has been extended far beyond that originally
contemplated, but in practice the service in the first and second
reserves is merely nominal, and in the militia or national army likewise,
as the men are only called out once a year for manœuvres, save in case of
war or emergency. The six provincial divisions, inclusive of the Imperial
Guards, who were maintained at the capital, were stationed in the first
place as under:—
Headquarters Brigade Headquarters Regiment Quarters
Provincial
Division I. Tokio I. Tokio I. Tokio
XV. Takasaki
II. Sakura II. Sakura
III. Tokio
Do. II. Sendai III. Sendai IV. Sendai
XVI. Shibata
IV. Aomori V. Aomori
XVII. Sendai
Do. III. Nagoya V. Nagoya VI. Nagoya
XVIII. Toyohashi
VI. Kanazawa VII. Kanazawa
XIX. Nagoya
Do. IV. Osaka VII. Osaka VIII. Osaka
IX. Otsu
VIII. Himeji X. Himeji
XX. Osaka
Do. V. Hiroshima IX. Hiroshima XI. Hiroshima
XXI. Hiroshima
X. Matsuyama XXII. Matsuyama
XII. Marugame
Do. VI. Kumamoto XI. Kumamoto XIII. Kumamoto
XXIII. Kumamoto
XII. Kokura XIV. Kokura
XXIV. Fukuoka
In addition to the six divisions detailed under the earlier scheme
of military organisation—viz. those having their headquarters at
Tokio, Sendai, Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Kumamoto—divisions were
subsequently established at Asahigawa in the island of Yeso, at Hirosaki
in Northern Hondo, at Kanasawa on the west coast, at Himeji, near Kobé,
close to the Inland Sea, at Kokura, facing Shimonoseki across the
Straits, and at Marugame in the island of Shikoku.
All the divisional headquarters are now served by public or State
railways, and practically the same may be said of the various Brigade
headquarters, numbering twelve more.
The establishment comprised 36 regiments including artillery, 22
battalions, 20 companies, 12 corps (inclusive of colonial troops in Yeso,
and the gendarmerie), 228 General and Field officers, 2267 officers, 484
cadets, 5835 sub-officers, and 54,555 rank and file. Total 63,369.
These were the figures of the standing army at the end of 1893, and at
that time the nominal strength of the reserve rank and file was 193,949
of all arms, made up of 107,222 infantry, 1923 cavalry, 10,182 artillery,
4373 engineers, 2035 commissariat, and 68,214 miscellaneous, including
transport-soldiers, firemen, ambulance attendants, etc.: all these
passing into the “landsturm” or national army on the expiration of their
12 years with the colours or in the reserves.
By the ordinance of July 1894, a divisional regiment consists of 3
battalions or 12 companies, each company comprising 136 officers and men.
A Bodyguard regiment has only 8 companies. The cavalry battalion is of
3 companies, each of 159 officers and men. A Field artillery regiment
includes 693 officers and men in a division, or 465 if of the Bodyguard.
In time past only the “Samurai” of Japan were entitled to bear arms, and
as the sum-total of these “Samurai” families was comparatively small, it
was evidently impossible in 1871 to create a large army of this class
alone. Thus it became needful as a first step to throw open the ranks
of Japan’s new military organisation to “heimin” as well as to the
“ancient warrior caste,” if what was in reality the knighthood of the
realm may properly be so designated. The “heimin” were complimented by
such a direct recognition of their ability to wield weapons of war, and
flocked to the standards; the nucleus of a huge fighting machine was
speedily formed, and the necessary steps were taken to provide tuition
for its officers and competent instruction for the rank and file. At
first the intention was to take France as the model, as it had already
been determined to copy Britain in all matters naval. But France having
come somewhat badly out of the war of 1870 it was in the end decided to
base the system chiefly on that of Germany. The Household Troops were at
first an exception to this rule and held more or less for a time to the
French system.
Yamagata’s ambition did not extend very far at first, for the army was
to consist of only 20,000 men, all told. But it was intended that these
should be well drilled, with additions to their ranks later on, and in
gaining proficiency in military exercises they served to leaven the
whole mass of the male population, and imbue it with a notion of the
high standard of efficiency which defenders of the realm were expected
to attain. Not until after the war with China, however, which will be
referred to in detail in its proper place, was the Japanese army really
formidable in point of numbers. But under the plan for which Marshal
Yamagata was directly responsible, there grew up an enormous reserve, far
in excess of anything for which the rest of the world was prepared to
give Japan credit. Parenthetically, it may be mentioned that even down
to the end of 1904 the tremendous strength which Japan is able to put
forth had not, save in a very limited circle, been in the faintest degree
appreciated, and least of all, perhaps, in Russia.
At the time of the outbreak of war in the island of Kiushiu in 1877
General Yamagata was at headquarters in Tokio, and it may well be
comprehended that there was some anxiety in his mind concerning the
behaviour of the new army when confronted by the redoubtable swordsmen
of the great southern clan. The heimin of whom the imperial army was
largely composed were comparatively unaccustomed to the use of weapons
of warfare, and it remained to be seen how they would comport themselves
in the face of a peculiarly strong and agile foe. The Satsuma onslaught
was famed for its irresistible vigour and determination. It was at least
open to question if the men who had only recently begun to handle the
bayonet would with it be a match for swordsmen whose tactics were to
come to close quarters on every occasion and to some extent despised
musketry as an art unworthy of their knightly training. But the outcome
of the struggle justified the sanguine anticipations which the military
authorities at Tokio had formed regarding the value of the new force, and
increased confidence was felt in its future development. It was not the
first trial that it had undergone in actual warfare, for some regiments
had been through a rather severe campaign,—not in respect of the fighting
that they had to do, but in regard to the climate and the character of
the country—in the island of Formosa three years before the contest with
Satsuma occurred, yet the civil war in Kiushiu was a test of a far more
rigorous nature, and one on which the fate of the Government’s scheme of
reform in no small degree depended. Suffice it to say that the confidence
Yamagata had placed in his military system was amply warranted by events,
and as references are to be found elsewhere to the incidents of the
campaign it would be superfluous to enter into detail concerning them
here.
By 1883 the available strength of the imperial army had risen to some
105,110 men, of all arms, not counting non-combatants, and at the end
of the year 1888 there were 150,000 drilled men, with 120 guns, and a
cavalry force of 500 sabres, ready for service at short notice, and a
serviceable army of 25,000 troops could have been sent away to Korea
or China at any time, on three days’ notice being given to the War
Department.
In December 1889 Marshal Yamagata, as he had now become,—having
previously held the office of Nai-mu-kio or Home Minister, in the
Cabinet, was called upon, owing to the resignation of Count Okuma, to
form a Ministry, and he continued to fill the post of Minister-President
of State until April 1891, when he gave way to Count Matsukata, who had
held under him the portfolio of Finance.