THE ADVANCE INTO EASTERN PRUSSIA
The Russians must be somewhat of a disappointment to many experts,
professional and amateur, whose supreme ignorance of the conditions
obtaining in the eastern theatre of the war was only equalled by their
sublime confidence in the ability of a steamroller to push forward,
full steam ahead, over all obstacles and against all opposition. When
towards the middle of August the news came that Russia was ready for
serious business, it was confidently predicted that the end was in
sight. It was only a matter of 180 miles from the Russian frontier
to Berlin, the Germans had only Landwehr and Landsturm forces,
contemptible third-rate fighting material, to defend her territories,
and Austria was too busy shooting her own mutinous soldiers to be a
menace to anybody. Obviously then, said the strategists, it could only
be a matter of days before the tramp of the Russian legions would be
heard perilously close to Berlin, the Kaiser would have to withdraw his
forces from the west to meet the danger in the east, the allies would
overthrow his weakened armies and hurl them back against the oncoming
Russian hordes. Armageddon looked to be in danger of degenerating into
a race to Berlin.
The expected has not happened. In spite of many rumours it may be taken
as certain that the Germans have not to any great extent reduced their
forces in the west. The fierceness of the fighting there is sufficient
proof of this. And instead of being on the very threshold of Berlin,
the main Russian armies are still 400 miles away.
It is Russia’s due that this failure to come up to expectation should
be explained.
It is quite true that from the most westerly point on the frontier of
Russian Poland to Berlin is only a matter of 180 miles. A glance at the
map, however, will show that Poland is more or less a wedge driven into
German territory. The average distance from the frontier to Berlin is
much more than 180 miles. Nevertheless, Russia might have made a dash
on Berlin along the route indicated. There would be every likelihood,
too, of the dash proving successful. The country would be favourable
for a quick advance. The communications are good--well-made roads and
direct railway connection with the Russian base at Warsaw. The River
Oder would be the only natural obstacle, and the fortress of Posen the
only artificial one. And the country being open, it would be easier to
attack than to defend.
But apart from the fact that the capture of Berlin would no more crush
Germany than the occupation of Brussels has crushed Belgium, such an
advance would be doomed to disaster. The invading army might reach
Berlin itself, but sooner or later, it would find itself cut off from
its supplies. It would necessarily have left behind it large forces of
German troops in Eastern Prussia, and equally strong Austrian armies
in Galicia. It could only be a matter of time before Russia would
meet with a greater and more disastrous Sedan. Such a move would be a
terrible blunder of which no general in his senses would be guilty.
It may be objected that the German troops in East Prussia were only
Landwehr reserves and that the _moral_ of the Austrians was so bad that
it would have been possible for Russians to leave sufficient forces to
hold both armies in check. In the first place it has been amply proved,
again and again during the present war that the partially trained
reserves when capably led, and in sufficiently large numbers, can hold
their own with first line troops. In the second place, although the
Slav regiments were mutinous, Austria had quite two million Teutons
and Magyars in her army. These men were unquestionably loyal and quite
capable of giving a good account of themselves.
Before, therefore, they could set off on that 180 mile journey, it was
necessary for the Russians to remove all sources of danger to their
rear. The Germans must be turned out of Eastern Prussia or safely held
in their own territories, and the Austrians swept from Galicia.
The task of capturing Eastern Prussia is one of unusual difficulty.
It is a region which it is very much easier to defend than to
attack. The greater part of it is covered with marshes, lakes and
forests, most difficult country for an army to traverse. The means of
communication are poor, the roads--a most important consideration in
connection with the movement of the heavy artillery necessary for a
successful invasion--are in many instances little better than tracks.
Moreover, it is strongly fortified. Königsberg is a first-class modern
fortress, whilst those on the line of the Vistula at Thorn, Graudenz
and Dantzig are even more powerful. Königsberg and Dantzig, it should
also be noted, have the advantage of being ports as well as fortified
towns. In other words, they could be used for large supplies of men
and material. An invading army, therefore, could not content itself
with merely masking the fortresses unless it was supported by a navy
enjoying the command of the sea. The Russian fleet was practically
a prisoner in the Gulf of Finland. The German navy was in complete
command of the Baltic, and, therefore, to be safe, the invading army
would have to storm the fortresses and gain possession of the ports.
The German War Staff, of course, knew perfectly well how difficult was
Russia’s task of subduing Eastern Prussia. Hence it was not likely that
they were in any way panic stricken over Russia’s advance, at least in
that direction. Before that advance could become dangerous the whole of
Eastern Prussia would have to be in Russian hands and the passage of
the Vistula forced. There was every prospect of Russia being busily
engaged for weeks to come.
And it must not be forgotten that the mobilisation was not complete
at the time that the general advance was ordered. Thousands of
troops cannot be gathered from the farthest confines of Siberia and
transported across Asia and half-way across Europe. Only the first
phase was completed. Time was still necessary before Russia could put
her full strength in the field. The army under General Rennenkampf
which invaded Prussia did not comprise the million men with which
it was credited. It is doubtful whether he had half-a-million men
with him. Certainly he had no more during the early stages of the
campaign. Besides invading Prussia, Russia had to invade Galicia,
drive back the forces invading Poland and generally guard a frontier
about seven times as long as that between Germany and France. Another
reason why General Rennenkampf’s army was not so large as it was
popularly supposed to be was the fact that the Grand Duke Nicholas,
the Commander-in-Chief, did not, for reasons that will be subsequently
examined, regard the invasion of Eastern Prussia as of such paramount
importance as the invasion of Galicia.
In dealing with this campaign, therefore, its secondary importance
should not for a moment be forgotten. Both victory and defeat must be
tempered with the knowledge that neither will have the far-reaching
effect hoped for or feared. Of course, that is not to say that the
Russians did not care what happened in Prussia. If it should prove that
the defending German forces were weaker than was believed, if it were
possible to overcome all transport difficulties, if Rennenkampf should
march from victory to victory, driving the Germans back over the line
of the Vistula, so much the better. But such an accomplishment would
be a feat of arms worthy of Napoleon himself. Rennenkampf was known
to be a remarkably clever general and great things were expected of
him--otherwise he would not have been chosen for the most difficult
command--but there was no reason to credit him with superhuman genius.
Popular enthusiasm, however, both in Russia and the West, knowing
nothing of circumstances and conditions, and full of implicit faith in
Russian prowess, immediately jumped to the conclusion that Rennenkampf
was the man who was destined to alter the whole trend of the war. The
campaign, therefore, assumed a rather exaggerated importance which
was not remedied until actual events had their inevitable sobering
influence.
At the beginning of the general advance, the Russians found themselves
firmly established in the neighbourhood of Stalluponen. Before them
lay a strong German army, under General von Hindenburg. The advantage
in numbers was with the Germans, who were in the proportion of roughly
three to two. On the other hand they were composed to a very large
extent of reserves. The smaller Russian army was composed of fully
trained first line troops. The coming operations, therefore, were a
test of the comparative values of numbers and training. Sheer numbers
supported by perfect discipline, such as that which obtains in the
German army, can accomplish much in modern warfare. The advance of the
Germans in the western theatre of war had already proved as much. And
in these days when the personal factor in warfare, at least so far
as the rank and file is concerned, has been practically eliminated,
and the tendency is to rely for victory more and more on artillery
and material superiority rather than on personal qualities, the age,
training and fitness of the troops is of less importance than in the
old days when battles consisted of downright fighting. The finest
troops in the world are helpless when exposed to an efficient artillery
attack. In point of artillery the two armies in Eastern Prussia were
about evenly matched, the superiority, if any, being on the side of the
Germans. Consequently, it will be realised that the Russians were faced
with a difficult task.
The advance, which after the taking of Stalluponen had temporarily
ceased, was resumed with vigour. The region to the north towards Tilsit
was cleared of the enemy. Cavalry patrols scoured the country and
there were innumerable minor engagements. In all of these the Russians
were successful and the Germans were forced to withdraw their outposts
towards the line Stillen, Gumbinnen and Goldap. The only engagement of
any importance occurred some miles to the north of Stalluponen. Here a
strong Russian force fell on a German army corps, which was occupying
a rather advanced position. The fighting continued for practically a
whole day, and in spite of fierce Russian attacks, the Germans held
their ground. Towards the evening, however, their left flank was turned
and soon they were in full retreat towards Gumbinnen. The Russians
captured some hundreds of prisoners besides eight field guns, twelve
cannons and three machine guns.
Inspired by this success the Russians pushed forward. But the
Germans contested every foot of ground. The Russian movement, too,
was considerably hampered by the excellence of the German means of
obtaining information. Their airmen were everywhere in evidence, and
displayed the greatest courage and daring in face of the Russian
aeroplanes, which were mostly of the heavy Sikorski type. The latter,
excellent machines though they are, were outmatched in point of
speed by the German Taube machines, and were therefore unable to
deal effectively with the menace from the air. The country, too, was
infested with spies. Every movement of the Russians was signalled to
the defending forces.
On one occasion a large force of Cossacks was sent to carry out a
surprise attack on a German force occupying a village to the south of
Stalluponen. As they moved forward, it was noticed that a haystack had
caught alight. A tramp and a pipe were the explanation. The owner was
greatly upset at his loss and made every effort to save his property.
He worked with desperate energy, throwing bucket after bucket of water
on the flames. The only result, however, was that a dense column of
black smoke rose from the stack. The Cossacks pushed on. A couple
of miles from the village they had to pass through wooded country.
Suddenly a storm of lead swept through them. They had been ambushed.
In close formation, and scarcely able to turn, they were mowed down by
the score. When the few survivors returned to their headquarters the
haystack was still smouldering, but the owner had disappeared. It was
found subsequently that the “water” which he had so vigorously thrown
on the flames was a chemical solution which had caused the dense
clouds of smoke, serving to warn the Germans of the coming attack.
The advance, however, continued in spite of all the courage and
cunning displayed by the Germans. The Russian cavalry in particular
distinguished itself by its dash and bravery. The German advance guards
and outposts were overwhelmed by the fury of its attack. Thanks to its
superb, almost reckless, bravery and its bewildering mobility, the way
was cleared for the main army, so that on the 19th it found itself
facing a strong German army defending Gumbinnen.
In the meantime a Russian force had advanced in a north-westerly
direction from Bialestock and had crossed the frontier at Prostken.
Moving rapidly, it captured Lyck after a sharp engagement, and pushed
on towards Lotzen. Here their progress was barred by a German army
corps holding a strong position. Some desperate fighting ensued, but
the Russians forced their way into the town and the Germans retreated
northward along the lakes towards their main army at Gumbinnen.
Obviously the time had now come for a decisive engagement. Any further
retreat on the part of the Germans would entail the abandonment of
Insterburg, a most important railway junction, the possession of which
was the key to the whole of the country lying east of Königsberg
and Allenstein. The Germans, faced by the main Russian army on the
south-east towards Goldap, and with its right flank threatened by the
victorious force marching on from Lotzen, prepared for a determined
resistance.
As early as the 17th the civilian inhabitants had been ordered to leave
the town, at the same time reinforcements were brought up from the
west and north so that the strength of the defending army amounted
to about 200,000 men. On the morning of the 20th, the Russian right
rested on the village of Pilkallen, its left on Goldap. Everything was
in readiness for a determined onslaught. At dawn the battle began with
a terrific artillery duel. Soon the shells of the heavy German guns
were causing havoc in the Russian lines, but after a time the Russian
artillery began to manifest a superiority, and some of the enemy’s guns
were silenced. The Russian infantry then moved forward to the attack,
and some of the most desperate fighting of the war took place.
The Russians were subjected to a merciless fire from machine and
field guns. On all sides men were falling. But they never wavered for
an instant. On and on they pressed until they reached the German
trenches. There the bayonets got to work and soon the defenders were
forced to give ground. But they were by no means defeated. Time after
time they hurled themselves forward in the most desperate counter
attacks, but the Russians succeeded in holding their own.
It was during this period of the engagement that one of the most
significant events--so far as Russia is concerned--of the whole war
occurred. A Russian battalion was in the midst of a veritable inferno.
The Germans were determined to hold an important position at all costs.
The Russians were equally determined to capture it. On both sides
the carnage had been terrible. At last, with a desperate rush, the
Russians succeeded in getting to grips with the Germans. Indescribable
hand-to-hand fighting ensued. In the midst of the mêlée a German
bayoneted the Russian Standard-bearer and seized the flag. Emboldened
by this emblem of victory the Germans renewed their efforts and dashed
to the assistance of their comrade. But before they could reach him a
young Russian had sprung forward, killed him and recaptured the flag.
With a howl of disappointment the Germans attacked him. For a moment
he seemed to be doomed. Germans, were all round him struggling for the
possession of the flag. Then there came a deep-throated roar, a sudden
rush, and the Germans were hurled back. The Russians had captured the
position and saved their flag.
The youth who had held it against such odds was afterwards discovered
severely wounded. He proved to be a young Jewish medical student from
Vilna, named Osnas. He was at once hailed on all sides as a hero, and
on being invalided back to Petrograd the Commander himself gave orders
that every care was to be taken to save the life of “Osnas the hero.”
Subsequently he received the military cross of St. George, the Russian
V.C., from the hands of the Tzar himself.
The significance of the incident does not lie in the bravery of Osnas,
but in the fact that he was a Jew. His action, which has made him a
popular hero throughout the Russian Empire, has done more to improve
the position of the Jews than any event in the whole course of their
history in Russia. It has made the nation realise that a Jew can be a
worthy son of Russia.
While these fierce attacks and counter-attacks were taking place at
the centre and on the Russian left, determined attempts were made
to envelop the right flank resting on Pilkallen. The successful
resistance of this movement was chiefly due to the brilliant work of
the Russian cavalry.
The Germans occupied a strong position towards the north-west, from
which their artillery was able to pour a murderous fire into the
Russian ranks. At length it became obvious that unless the guns were
silenced the Russians would have to retreat. The Horse Guards were
ordered to take the guns. The first squadron charged straight at the
battery. There was an ominous silence. The distance grew less and
less. Then at point blank range the gunners fired. The squadron was
practically annihilated. The second squadron then charged. It seemed as
if it were doomed to a like fate, but at the critical moment the third
squadron took the battery on the flank. In a few minutes every gunner
was either sabred or fleeing for safety.
For fourteen hours the battle raged until darkness caused a cessation
of hostilities. The Russians were, on the whole, satisfied with the
results of the day’s work. They had suffered heavy losses, but the
enemy had suffered more. They had made distinct progress in the centre,
had captured thirty guns and large numbers of prisoners.
The engagement on the 21st opened sensationally. In the early hours
of the morning a strong force of Cossack cavalry moved northwards and
managed to envelop the German left flank. Dawn was the signal for a
combined movement. The Germans found themselves vigorously attacked
in the centre and left. For a time they held their ground, but their
position soon became untenable. There was no holding the Russian
attack. A regiment of Cossacks, finding the ground unsuitable for
cavalry operations, dismounted and hurled themselves forward with all
their reckless ferocity. Gradually the Russians pressed forward until
they were attacking the enemy on three sides. The result was then
inevitable. Von Hindenburg had the choice of flight or of allowing his
army to be surrounded. He decided to retreat. Soon retreat degenerated
into rout, and vast quantities of stores and ammunition, besides
thousands of prisoners fell into the hands of the Russians.
The battle of Gumbinnen was the first decisive engagement of the war.
Its immediate result was to make Russia master of the whole of Prussia
east of the line from Königsberg to Allenstein. There was no position
which afforded von Hindenburg any hope of successful resistance even
if he were able to collect his routed troops. Insterburg, the main
point in the network of German strategic railways, fell into Russian
hands on the evening after the battle and ensured for Rennenkampf
ample supplies. Tilsit was isolated, and its capture was a matter of
convenience. The whole region of the Mauer lakes was at the mercy of
the Russians.
The moral advantages were as great as the material. Von Hindenburg’s
army had been badly beaten, and would never be able to face the
Russians again with the same confidence. Moreover, the rout of the
Germans and the reputation of the pursuing Cossacks caused a panic
throughout the province. From every village and town the inhabitants
began to fly in terror, some towards Danzig, others towards Graudenz in
the hope of reaching Berlin. Soon Danzig was in a state of chaos. Two
hundred and fifty thousand refugees poured in with the most exaggerated
stories of the prowess of the Russians. Commerce was at a stand-still;
the prices of provisions rose daily. Soon there was rioting in the
streets. There was no accommodation for the refugees, most of whom were
penniless, and who were almost as numerous as the ordinary inhabitants
of the town. It was not until the sternest measures had been taken by
the military authorities that the panic subsided and some show of order
was restored.
Meanwhile the Russians were following up their victory with a vigorous
pursuit. Von Hindenburg’s army divided into two, one portion retreating
through Tapiau to Königsberg, the other pressing in a south-westerly
direction towards Allenstein, and the fortresses of Thorn and
Graudenz. The former portion safely reached its destination, which
was invested by the Russians on the 25th. On the same day Tilsit was
formally occupied. Meanwhile the main Russian army, meeting with
practically no resistance, pushed on along the line of the railway,
occupying Angerberg and Korschen. By this time, however, heavy German
reinforcements had come up, and the advance began to be contested with
increasing determination. For three days there was vigorous fighting in
the neighbourhood of Allenstein. Then, after inflicting heavy losses
on the Germans, Rennenkampf entered the town and again forced von
Hindenburg to retreat. The action, however, was not a decisive battle
comparable with Gumbinnen, and the Russian advance became slow. Further
fierce fighting, most of which resulted satisfactorily to the Russians,
took place further to the south around Soldau and Nesdenberg.
The Russians, after a remarkably quick advance through very difficult
country, had now come within hail of the line of the Vistula. The line
was protected by three first-class fortresses covered by at least four
army corps in addition to the armies which had been driven back by the
Russians. It was the critical moment of the campaign. With their heavy
numerical superiority and strongly fortified position, the Germans
would be sure to make a more determined resistance, and in greater
force than any which the Russians had yet had to meet. In attacking
the line Rennenkampf would be handicapped by a lack of heavy siege
artillery, and by the numerical inferiority of his forces. On the other
hand his troops comprised some of the finest fighting material in the
world, they were flushed with victory and could be relied upon to make
a tremendous effort to win the greatest triumph of all. If they could
drive the Germans over the Vistula and bring up sufficiently large
forces to invest Thorn, Graudenz and Danzig, the northern route to
Berlin would be open to them as far as the Oder. The beginning of the
end would indeed have arrived.
The Russians accordingly pushed forward. But they did not advance much
further on the road to the Vistula. An immense German army, heavily
supported by artillery, including numbers of the heavy siege guns which
had already proved themselves to be the Kaiser’s most potent weapons,
awaited the Russians in a strong position in the neighbourhood of
Osterode, midway between Allenstein and Graudenz.
Von Hindenburg now proved himself to be a leader of remarkable skill
and resource and he performed as brilliant a feat of generalship as
the war has yet produced. Only a year before he had taken part in
the manœuvres in East Prussia, and was acquainted with every inch of
the ground. It was even stated that he had already solved the exact
military problem with which he was now faced, and in the same locality.
In addition he enjoyed the advantage of outnumbering the Russians by at
least two to one.
These factors practically decided the battle. The district around
Allenstein and Osterode is of the worst possible description for an
invading force. It is a mass of lakes, swamps and forests, and an
intimate knowledge of the locality is essential for the success of any
military operations there. There are almost insuperable difficulties in
the way of transport alone.
Utilising his advantages to the full, von Hindenburg lured the Russians
towards Tannenberg to the south-east of Osterode. The Russians,
realising that a successful offensive was their only chance, blundered
forward. They pressed on until they found themselves in a position
where their flanks rested on more or less solid ground, but their
centre was backed by a vast swamp. Then von Hindenburg struck his blow.
An immense force was hurled against the Russian right. A desperate
encounter followed, but sheer weight of numbers gave victory to the
Germans. The Russians were forced back on to the swamps. A similar
attack on the Russian left was equally successful.
What followed was not a battle; it was one of the most hideous
slaughters history has known. The Russians were unable to manœuvre on
the swampy ground; the Germans, on the other hand, were in possession
of the solid higher ground and free to move at will. From three sides
they poured a murderous fire into the helpless Russians, forcing them
deeper and deeper into the swamps. Guns sank in the mud, horses were
unable to move, men stood up to their waists in the deadly slime. The
carnage continued until nightfall, when Rennenkampf managed to escape
with a remnant of his army, leaving Generals Samsonov, Martos and
Pestitsch among the thousands of slain.
Thus von Hindenburg won the battle of Osterode and obtained ample
revenge for his defeat at Gumbinnen.
The battle caused a complete reversal of the campaign. The route to
Berlin via the north was not only barred, but the Russian advance was
turned into a retreat. Hopelessly outnumbered, Rennenkampf was forced
back on Allenstein. Every foot of the way was contested, but bit by
bit he had to give up the results of his victorious move forward.
Allenstein and Intersburg were in turn evacuated before the merciless
pressure of the advancing Germans. The troops investing Königsberg
were recalled. It was not until the frontiers were almost reached and
strong reinforcements came up from Kovno and Grodno that the German
advance was checked and finally held.
In spite of official attempts at secrecy, the news soon spread that the
invasion of Germany upon which Russia’s Allies had placed such high
hopes had ended in what appeared to be complete failure. Berlin was
as far off as ever, and the Germans were at the very gates of Paris.
Something had gone seriously wrong with the steam roller on which so
much had depended!
The strategists were wrong in the blame they heaped on Rennenkampf’s
head because of his failure. As a matter of fact, his chief fault was
that he had played his part too well. He had never been expected to
push forward so far as Osterode. His “advance” was intended simply
to attract German attention and to prevent Germany from sending
reinforcements to the Austrian army. In attaining this object he
succeeded admirably. After the battle of Gumbinnen the Germans poured
regiment after regiment of Landwehr and Landsturm troops into Eastern
Prussia, which otherwise would have gone to the aid of the Austrians.
Rennenkampf’s unexpected success took him too far forward. His advance
was so rapid that it was difficult to bring up reinforcements. Osterode
and its heavy losses was the penalty he paid for success.
The only really unfortunate result of his efforts was that he attracted
such strong forces into Prussia that the Russians will have great
difficulty in dislodging them. They are, however, strong enough to keep
them confined to their own territories, and so have little to fear from
that direction.
Besides, there are other ways to Berlin.