I now reiterate these sentiments; and, in doing so, I only press upon

the public attention the most conclusive evidence of which the case is

susceptible, that the property, peace, and security of no section are to

be in any wise endangered by the now incoming administration. I add,

too, that all the protection which, consistently with the Constitution

and the laws, can be given, will be cheerfully given to all the States

when lawfully demanded, for whatever cause--as cheerfully to one section

as to another.

There is much controversy about the delivering up of fugitives from

service or labour. The clause I now read is as plainly written in the

Constitution as any other of its provisions:--

"No person held to service or labour in one State, under the laws

thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or

regulation therein be discharged from such service or labour, but

shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or

labour may be due."

It is scarcely questioned that this provision was intended by those who

made it for the reclaiming of what we call fugitive slaves; and the

intention of the lawgiver is the law. All members of Congress swear

their support to the whole Constitution--to this provision as much as to

any other. To the proposition, then, that slaves whose cases come within

the terms of this clause "shall be delivered up," their oaths are

unanimous. Now, if they would make the effort in good temper, could they

not with nearly equal unanimity frame and pass a law by means of which

to keep good that unanimous oath?

There is some difference of opinion whether this clause should be

enforced by national or by State authority; but surely that difference

is not a very material one. If the slave is to be surrendered, it can be

of but little consequence to him or to others by which authority it is

done. And should any one in any case be content that his oath shall go

unkept on a merely unsubstantial controversy as to how it shall be

kept?

Again, in any law upon this subject, ought not all the safeguards of

liberty known in civilized and humane jurisprudence to be introduced, so

that a free man be not, in any case, surrendered as a slave? And might

it not be well at the same time to provide by law for the enforcement of

that clause in the Constitution which guarantees that "the citizen of

each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of

citizens in the several States"?

I take the official oath to-day with no mental reservations, and with no

purpose to construe the Constitution or laws by any hypercritical rules.

And while I do not choose now to specify particular acts of Congress as

proper to be enforced, I do suggest that it will be much safer for all,

both in official and private stations, to conform to and abide by all

those acts which stand unrepealed, than to violate any of them, trusting

to find impunity in having them held to be unconstitutional.

It is seventy-two years since the first inauguration of a President

under our National Constitution. During that period fifteen different

and greatly distinguished citizens have, in succession, administered the

executive branch of the government They have conducted it through many

perils, and generally with great success. Yet, with all this scope of

precedent, I now enter upon the same task for the brief constitutional

term of four years under great and peculiar difficulty. A disruption of

the Federal Union, heretofore only menaced, is now formidably attempted.

I hold that, in contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution,

the Union of these States is perpetual. Perpetuity is implied, if not

expressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments. It is

safe to assert that no government proper ever had a provision in its

organic law for its own termination. Continue to execute all the express

provisions of our National Constitution, and the Union will endure for

ever--it being impossible to destroy it except by some action not

provided for in the instrument itself.

Again, if the United States be not a government proper, but an

association of States in the nature of contract merely, can it, as a

contract, be peaceably unmade by less than all the parties who made it?

One party to a contract may violate it--break it, so to speak; but does

it not require all to lawfully rescind it?

Descending from these general principles, we find the proposition that

in legal contemplation the Union is perpetual confirmed by the history

of the Union itself. The Union is much older than the Constitution. It

was formed, in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was

matured and continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It was

further matured, and the faith of all the then thirteen States expressly

plighted and engaged that it should be perpetual, by the Articles of

Confederation in 1778. And, finally, in 1787 one of the declared objects

for ordaining and establishing the Constitution was "to form a more

perfect Union."

But if the destruction of the Union by one or by a part only of the

States be lawfully possible, the Union is less perfect than before the

Constitution, having lost the vital element of perpetuity.

It follows from these views that no State upon its own mere motion can

lawfully get out of the Union; that resolves and ordinances to that

effect are legally void; and that acts of violence, within any State or

States, against the authority of the United States, are insurrectionary

or revolutionary, according to circumstances.

I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the

Union is unbroken; and to the extent of my ability I shall take care, as

the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the

Union be faithfully executed in all the States. Doing this I deem to be

only a simple duty on my part; and I shall perform it so far as

practicable, unless my rightful masters, the American people, shall

withhold the requisite means, or in some authoritative manner direct the

contrary. I trust this will not be regarded as a menace, but only as the

declared purpose of the Union that it will constitutionally defend and

maintain itself.

In doing this there needs to be no bloodshed or violence; and there

shall be none, unless it be forced upon the national authority. The

power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the

property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the

duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects,

there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people

anywhere. Where hostility to the United States, in any interior

locality, shall be so great and universal as to prevent competent

resident citizens from holding the Federal offices, there will be no

attempt to force obnoxious strangers among the people for that object.

While the strict legal right may exist in the government to enforce the

exercise of these offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating,

and so nearly impracticable withal, that I deem it better to forego for

the time the uses of such offices.

The mails, unless repelled, will continue to be furnished in all parts

of the Union. So far as possible, the people everywhere shall have that

sense of perfect security which is most favourable to calm thought and

reflection. The course here indicated will be followed unless current

events and experience shall show a modification or change to be proper,

and in every case and exigency my best discretion will be exercised

according to circumstances actually existing, and with a view and a hope

of a peaceful solution of the national troubles and the restoration of

fraternal sympathies and affections.

That there are persons in one section or another who seek to destroy the

Union at all events, and are glad of any pretext to do it, I will

neither affirm nor deny; but if there be such, I need address no word to

them. To those, however, who really love the Union may I not speak?

Before entering upon so grave a matter as the destruction of our

national fabric, with all its benefits, its memories, and its hopes,

would it not be wise to ascertain precisely why we do it? Will you

hazard so desperate a step while there is any possibility that any

portion of the ills you fly from have no real existence? Will you,

while the certain ills you fly to are greater than all the real ones you

fly from--will you risk the commission of so fearful a mistake?

All profess to be content in the Union if all constitutional rights can

be maintained. Is it true, then, that any right, plainly written in the

Constitution, has been denied? I think not. Happily the human mind is so

constituted that no party can reach to the audacity of doing this.

Think, if you can, of a single instance in which a plainly written

provision of the Constitution has ever been denied. If by the mere force

of numbers a majority should deprive a minority of any clearly written

constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view, justify

revolution--certainly would if such a right were a vital one. But such

is not our case. All the vital rights of minorities and of individuals

are so plainly assured to them by affirmations and negations, guaranties

and prohibitions, in the Constitution, that controversies never arise

concerning them. But no organic law can ever be framed with a provision

specifically applicable to every question which may occur in practical

administration. No foresight can anticipate, nor any document of

reasonable length contain, express provisions for all possible

questions. Shall fugitives from labour be surrendered by national or by

State authority? The Constitution does not expressly say. _May_ Congress

prohibit slavery in the Territories? The Constitution does not expressly

say. _Must_ Congress protect slavery in the Territories? The

Constitution does not expressly say.

From questions of this class spring all our constitutional

controversies, and we divide upon them into majorities and minorities.

If the minority will not acquiesce, the majority must, or the government

must cease. There is no other alternative; for continuing the government

is acquiescence on one side or the other.

If a minority in such case will secede rather than acquiesce, they make

a precedent which in turn will divide and ruin them; for a minority of

their own will secede from them whenever a majority refuses to be

controlled by such minority. For instance, why may not any portion of a

new confederacy a year or two hence arbitrarily secede again, precisely

as portions of the present Union now claim to secede from it? All who

cherish disunion sentiments are now being educated to the exact temper

of doing this.

Is there such perfect identity of interests among the States to compose

a new Union, as to produce harmony only, and prevent renewed secession?

Plainly, the central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy. A

majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and

always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and

sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people. Whoever rejects

it does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or to despotism. Unanimity is

impossible; the rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is

wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy

or despotism in some form is all that is left.

I do not forget the position, assumed by some, that constitutional

questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court; nor do I deny that

such decisions must be binding, in any case, upon the parties to a suit,

as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very high

respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments

of the government. And while it is obviously possible that such decision

may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect following it,

being limited to that particular case, with the chance that it may be

overruled and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be

borne than could the evils of a different practice. At the same time,

the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government,

upon vital questions affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably

fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in

ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will

have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically

resigned their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal. Nor

is there in this view any assault upon the court or the judges. It is a

duty from which they may not shrink to decide cases properly brought

before them, and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to turn their

decisions to political purposes.

One section of our country believes slavery is right, and ought to be

extended, while the other believes it is wrong, and ought not to be

extended. This is the only substantial dispute. The fugitive-slave

clause of the Constitution, and the law for the suppression of the

foreign slave-trade, are each as well enforced, perhaps, as any law can

ever be in a community where the moral sense of the people imperfectly

supports the law itself. The great body of the people abide by the dry

legal obligation in both cases, and a few break over in each. This, I

think, cannot be perfectly cured; and it would be worse in both cases

after the separation of the sections than before. The foreign

slave-trade, now imperfectly suppressed, would be ultimately revived,

without restriction, in one section, while fugitive slaves, now only

partially surrendered, would not be surrendered at all by the other.

Physically speaking, we cannot separate. We cannot remove our respective

sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them. A

husband and wife may be divorced, and go out of the presence and beyond

the reach of each other; but the different parts of our country cannot

do this. They cannot but remain face to face, and intercourse, either

amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then,

to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory after

separation than before? Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can

make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens than

laws can among friends? Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always;

and when, after much loss on both sides, and no gain on either, you

cease fighting, the identical old questions as to terms of intercourse

are again upon you.

This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit

it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing government, they can

exercise their constitutional right of amending it, or their

revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it. I cannot be ignorant

of the fact that many worthy and patriotic citizens are desirous of

having the National Constitution amended. While I make no recommendation

of amendments, I fully recognize the rightful authority of the people

over the whole subject, to be exercised in either of the modes

prescribed in the instrument itself; and I should, under existing

circumstances, favour rather than oppose a fair opportunity being

afforded the people to act upon it. I will venture to add that to me the

convention mode seems preferable, in that it allows amendments to

originate with the people themselves, instead of only permitting them to

take or reject propositions originated by others not especially chosen

for the purpose, and which might not be precisely such as they would

wish to either accept or refuse. I understand a proposed amendment to

the Constitution--which amendment, however, I have not seen--has passed

Congress, to the effect that the Federal Government shall never

interfere with the domestic institutions of the States, including that

of persons held to service. To avoid misconstruction of what I have

said, I depart from my purpose not to speak of particular amendments so

far as to say that, holding such a provision to now be implied

constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and

irrevocable.

The chief magistrate derives all his authority from the people, and they

have conferred none upon him to fix terms for the separation of the

States. The people themselves can do this also if they choose; but the

Executive, as such, has nothing to do with it. His duty is to administer

the present government, as it came to his hands, and to transmit it,

unimpaired by him, to his successor.

Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of

the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world? In our

present differences, is either party without faith of being in the

right? If the Almighty Ruler of Nations, with his eternal truth and

justice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South, that

truth and that justice will surely prevail by the judgment of this great

tribunal of the American people.

By the frame of the government under which we live, this same people

have wisely given their public servants but little power for mischief;

and have, with equal wisdom, provided for the return of that little to

their own hands at very short intervals. While the people retain their

virtue and vigilance, no administration, by any extreme of wickedness or

folly, can very seriously injure the government in the short space of

four years.

My countrymen, one and all, think calmly and well upon this whole

subject. Nothing valuable can be lost by taking time. If there be an

object to hurry any of you in hot haste to a step which you would never

take deliberately, that object will be frustrated by taking time; but no

good object can be frustrated by it. Such of you as are now dissatisfied

still have the old Constitution unimpaired, and, on the sensitive point,

the laws of your own framing under it; while the new administration will

have no immediate power, if it would, to change either. If it were

admitted that you who are dissatisfied hold the right side in the

dispute, there still is no single good reason for precipitate action.

Intelligence, patriotism, Christianity, and a firm reliance on Him who

has never yet forsaken this favoured land, are still competent to adjust

in the best way all our present difficulty.

In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is

the momentous issue of civil war. The government will not assail you.

You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. You

have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the government, while I

shall have the most solemn one to "preserve, protect, and defend it."

I am loath to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be

enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds

of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every

battle-field and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all

over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union when again

touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.

_Address at Utica, New York. February 18, 1861_

Ladies and Gentlemen, I have no speech to make to you, and no time to

speak in. I appear before you that I may see you, and that you may see

me; and I am willing to admit, that, so far as the ladies are concerned,

I have the best of the bargain, though I wish it to be understood that I

do not make the same acknowledgment concerning the men.

_From his First Message to Congress, at the Special Session. July 4,

1861_

... It is thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter

was in no sense a matter of self-defence on the part of the assailants.

They well knew that the garrison in the fort could by no possibility

commit aggression upon them. They knew--they were expressly

notified--that the giving of bread to the few brave and hungry men of

the garrison was all which would on that occasion be attempted, unless

themselves, by resisting so much, should provoke more. They knew that

this government desired to keep the garrison in the fort, not to assail

them, but merely to maintain visible possession, and thus to preserve

the Union from actual and immediate dissolution,--trusting, as

hereinbefore stated, to time, discussion, and the ballot-box, for final

adjustment; and they assailed and reduced the fort for precisely the

reverse object,--to drive out the visible authority of the Federal

Union, and thus force it to immediate dissolution....

That this was their object the Executive well understood; and having

said to them in the inaugural address, "You can have no conflict without

being yourselves the aggressors," he took pains not only to keep this

declaration good, but also to keep the case so free from the power of

ingenious sophistry that the world should not be able to misunderstand

it....

By the affair at Fort Sumter, with its surrounding circumstances, that

point was reached. Then and thereby the assailants of the government

began the conflict of arms, without a gun in sight, or in expectancy to

return their fire, save only the few in the fort sent to that harbour

years before for their own protection, and still ready to give that

protection in whatever was lawful. In this act, discarding all else,

they have forced upon the country the distinct issue, "immediate

dissolution or blood."

And this issue embraces more than the fate of these United States. It

presents to the whole family of man the question whether a

constitutional republic or democracy--a government of the people by the

same people--can or cannot maintain its territorial integrity against

its own domestic foes. It presents the question whether discontented

individuals, too few in numbers to control administration according to

organic law in any case, can always, upon the pretences made in this

case or any other pretences, or arbitrarily without any pretence, break

up their government, and thus practically put an end to free government

upon the earth. It forces us to ask: "Is there, in all republics, this

inherent and fatal weakness?" "Must a government, of necessity, be too

strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its

own existence?"

So viewing the issue, no choice was left but to call out the war power

of the government, and so to resist force employed for its destruction

by force for its preservation.

The call was made, and the response of the country was most gratifying,

surpassing in unanimity and spirit the most sanguine expectation.

... The people of Virginia have thus allowed this giant insurrection to

make its nest within her borders,--and this government has no choice

left but to deal with it where it finds it. And it has the less regret,

as the loyal citizens have in due form claimed its protection. Those

loyal citizens this government is bound to recognize and protect, as

being Virginia.

In the border States, so called,--in fact, the Middle States,--there are

those who favour a policy which they call "armed neutrality;" that is,

an arming of those States to prevent the Union forces passing one way,

or the disunion the other, over their soil. This would be disunion

completed. Figuratively speaking, it would be the building of an

impassable wall along the line of separation,--and yet not quite an

impassable one, for under the guise of neutrality, it would tie the

hands of Union men, and freely pass supplies from among them to the

insurrectionists, which it could not do as an open enemy. At a stroke,

it would take all the trouble off the hands of secession, except only

what proceeds from the external blockade. It would do for the

disunionists that which of all things they most desire,--feed them well

and give them disunion without a struggle of their own. It recognizes no

fidelity to the Constitution, no obligation to maintain the Union; and

while very many who have favoured it are doubtless loyal citizens, it

is, nevertheless, very injurious in effect.

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