will try it again, however. It is said in one of the admonitions of our
Lord, "Be ye [therefore] perfect even as your Father which is in heaven
is perfect." The Saviour, I suppose, did not expect that any human
creature could be perfect as the Father in heaven; but He said: "As your
Father in heaven is perfect, be ye also perfect." He set that up as a
standard, and he who did most toward reaching that standard attained the
highest degree of moral perfection. So I say in relation to the
principle that all men are created equal, let it be as nearly reached as
we can. If we cannot give freedom to every creature, let us do nothing
that will impose slavery upon any other creature. Let us, then, turn
this government back into the channel in which the framers of the
Constitution originally placed it. Let us stand firmly by each other.
If we do not do so, we are tending in the contrary direction, that our
friend Judge Douglas proposes,--not intentionally,--working in the
traces that tend to make this one universal slave nation. He is one that
runs in that direction, and as such I resist him.
My friends, I have detained you about as long as I desired to do, and I
have only to say, let us discard all this quibbling about this man and
the other man, this race and that race and the other race being
inferior, and therefore they must be placed in an inferior position. Let
us discard all these things, and unite as one people throughout this
land, until we shall once more stand up declaring that all men are
created equal.
My friends, I could not, without launching off upon some new topic,
which would detain you too long, continue to-night. I thank you for this
most extensive audience that you have furnished me to-night. I leave
you, hoping that the lamp of liberty will burn in your bosoms until
there shall no longer be a doubt that all men are created free and
equal.
_From a Speech at Springfield, Illinois. July 17, 1858_
... There is still another disadvantage under which we labour, and to
which I will ask your attention. It arises out of the relative positions
of the two persons who stand before the State as candidates for the
Senate. Senator Douglas is of world-wide renown. All the anxious
politicians of his party, or who have been of his party for years past,
have been looking upon him as certainly, at no distant day, to be the
President of the United States. They have seen, in his round, jolly,
fruitful face, post-offices, land-offices, marshalships, and cabinet
appointments, chargéships and foreign missions, bursting and sprouting
out in wonderful exuberance, ready to be laid hold of by their greedy
hands. And as they have been gazing upon this attractive picture so
long, they cannot, in the little distraction that has taken place in the
party, bring themselves to give up the charming hope. But with greedier
anxiety they rush about him, sustain him, and give him marches,
triumphal entries, and receptions, beyond what, even in the days of his
highest prosperity, they could have brought about in his favour. On the
contrary, nobody has ever expected me to be President. In my poor, lean,
lank face, nobody has ever seen that any cabbages were sprouting out.
These are disadvantages, all taken together, that the Republicans labour
under. We have to fight this battle upon principle, and upon principle
alone. I am in a certain sense made the standard-bearer in behalf of the
Republicans. I was made so merely because there had to be some one so
placed,--I being in no wise preferable to any other one of the
twenty-five, perhaps a hundred, we have in the Republican ranks. Then I
say, I wish it to be distinctly understood and borne in mind, that we
have to fight this battle without many--perhaps without any--of the
external aids which are brought to bear against us. So I hope those with
whom I am surrounded have principle enough to nerve themselves for the
task, and leave nothing undone that can fairly be done to bring about
the right result. As appears by two speeches I have heard him deliver
since his arrival in Illinois, he gave special attention to the speech
of mine delivered on the sixteenth of June. He says that he carefully
read that speech. He told us that at Chicago a week ago last night, and
he repeated it at Bloomington last night.... He says it was evidently
prepared with great care. I freely admit it was prepared with care....
But I was very careful not to put anything in that speech as a matter of
fact, or make any inferences which did not appear to me to be true and
fully warrantable. If I had made any mistake I was willing to be
corrected; if I had drawn any inference in regard to Judge Douglas or
any one else, which was not warranted, I was fully prepared to modify it
as soon as discovered. I planted myself upon the truth and the truth
only, so far as I knew it, or could be brought to know it.
Having made that speech with the most kindly feelings toward Judge
Douglas, as manifested therein, I was gratified when I found that he had
carefully examined it, and had detected no error of fact, nor any
inference against him, nor any misrepresentations, of which he thought
fit to complain.... He seizes upon the doctrines he supposes to be
included in that speech, and declares that upon them will turn the
issues of the campaign. He then quotes, or attempts to quote, from my
speech. I will not say that he wilfully misquotes, but he does fail to
quote accurately. His attempt at quoting is from a passage which I
believe I can quote accurately from memory. I shall make the quotation
now, with some comments upon it, as I have already said, in order that
the Judge shall be left entirely without excuse for misrepresenting me.
I do so now, as I hope, for the last time. I do this in great caution,
in order that if he repeats his misrepresentation, it shall be plain to
all that he does so wilfully. If, after all, he still persists, I shall
be compelled to reconstruct the course I have marked out for myself, and
draw upon such humble resources as I have for a new course, better
suited to the real exigencies of the case. I set out in this campaign
with the intention of conducting it strictly as a gentleman, in
substance at least, if not in the outside polish. The latter I shall
never be, but that which constitutes the inside of a gentleman I hope I
understand, and am not less inclined to practise than others. It was my
purpose and expectation that this canvass would be conducted upon
principle, and with fairness on both sides, and it shall not be my fault
if this purpose and expectation shall be given up.
He charges, in substance, that I invite a war of sections; that I
propose all local institutions of the different States shall become
consolidated and uniform. What is there in the language of that speech
which expresses such purpose or bears such construction? I have again
and again said that I would not enter into any one of the States to
disturb the institution of slavery. Judge Douglas said at Bloomington
that I used language most able and ingenious for concealing what I
really meant; and that while I had protested against entering into the
slave States, I nevertheless did mean to go on the banks of the Ohio and
throw missiles into Kentucky, to disturb them in their domestic
institutions.
... I have said that I do not understand the Declaration to mean that
all men were created equal in all respects. The negroes are not our
equals in colour; but I suppose it does mean to declare that all men are
equal in some respects; they are equal in their right to "life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness." Certainly the negro is not our equal in
colour, perhaps not in many other respects. Still, in the right to put
into his mouth the bread that his own hands have earned, he is the equal
of every other man, white or black. In pointing out that more has been
given you, you cannot be justified in taking away the little which has
been given him. All I ask for the negro is, that if you do not like him,
let him alone. If God gave him but little, that little let him enjoy.
... One more point on this Springfield speech, which Judge Douglas says
he has read so carefully. I expressed my belief in the existence of a
conspiracy to perpetuate and nationalize slavery. I did not profess to
know it, nor do I now. I showed the part Judge Douglas had played in the
string of facts, constituting to my mind the proof of that conspiracy. I
showed the parts played by others.
I charged that the people had been deceived into carrying the last
presidential election, by the impression that the people of the
Territories might exclude slavery if they chose, when it was known in
advance by the conspirators that the court was to decide that neither
Congress nor the people could so exclude slavery. These charges are more
distinctly made than anything else in the speech.
Judge Douglas has carefully read and re-read that speech. He has not, so
far as I know, contradicted those charges. In the two speeches which I
heard he certainly did not. On his own tacit admission I renew that
charge. I charge him with having been a party to that conspiracy and to
that deception, for the sole purpose of nationalizing slavery.
_From Lincoln's Reply to Douglas in the First Joint Debate at Ottawa,
Illinois. August 21, 1858_
When a man bears himself somewhat misrepresented, it provokes him--at
least, I find it so with myself; but when misrepresentation becomes very
gross and palpable, it is more apt to amuse him.... [After stating the
charge of an arrangement between himself and Judge Trumbull.]
Now, all I have to say upon that subject is, that I think no man--not
even Judge Douglas--can prove it, because it is not true. I have no
doubt he is "conscientious" in saying it. As to those resolutions that
he took such a length of time to read, as being the platform of the
Republican party in 1854, I say I never had anything to do with them,
and I think Trumbull never had. Judge Douglas cannot show that either of
us ever had anything to do with them....
Now, about this story that Judge Douglas tells of Trumbull bargaining to
sell out the old Democratic party, and Lincoln agreeing to sell out the
old Whig party, I have the means of knowing about that; Judge Douglas
cannot have; and I know there is no substance to it whatever....
A man cannot prove a negative, but he has a right to claim that when a
man makes an affirmative charge, he must offer some proof to show the
truth of what he says. I certainly cannot introduce testimony to show
the negative about things, but I have a right to claim that if a man
says he knows a thing, then he must show how he knows it. I always have
a right to claim this; and it is not satisfactory to me that he may be
"conscientious" on the subject.
... Anything that argues me into his idea of perfect social and
political equality with the negro is but a specious and fantastic
arrangement of words, by which a man can prove a horse-chestnut to be a
chestnut horse. I will say here, while upon this subject, that I have no
purpose, either directly or indirectly, to interfere with the
institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have
no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so. I have no
purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and
the black races. There is a physical difference between the two, which,
in my judgment, will probably for ever forbid their living together upon
the footing of perfect equality; and inasmuch as it becomes a necessity
that there must be a difference, I, as well as Judge Douglas, am in
favour of the race to which I belong having the superior position. I
have never said anything to the contrary; but I hold, that,
notwithstanding all this, there is no reason in the world why the negro
is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration
of Independence,--the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. I hold that he is as much entitled to these as the white man.
I agree with Judge Douglas, he is not my equal in many respects,
certainly not in colour, perhaps not in moral or intellectual endowment.
But in the right to eat the bread, without the leave of anybody, which
his own hand earns, he is my equal, and the equal of Judge Douglas, and
the equal of any living man.
... As I have not used up so much of my time as I had supposed, I will
dwell a little longer upon one or two of these minor topics upon which
the Judge has spoken. He has read from my speech at Springfield, in
which I say that "a house divided against itself cannot stand." Does the
Judge say it can stand? I don't know whether he does or not. The Judge
does not seem to be attending to me just now, but I would like to know
if it is his opinion that a house divided against itself can stand? If
he does, then there is a question of veracity, not between him and me,
but between the Judge and an authority of a somewhat higher character.
Now, my friends, I ask your attention to this matter for the purpose of
saying something seriously, I know that the Judge may readily enough
agree with me that the maxim which was put forth by the Saviour is true,
but he may allege that I misapply it; and the Judge has a right to urge
that in my application I do misapply it, and then I have a right to show
that I do not misapply it. When he undertakes to say that because I
think this nation, so far as the question of slavery is concerned, will
all become one thing or all the other, I am in favour of bringing about
a dead uniformity in the various States, in all their institutions, he
argues erroneously. The great variety of local institutions in the
States, springing from differences in the soil, differences in the face
of the country, and in the climate, are bonds of union. They do not make
"a house divided against itself," but they make a house united. If they
produce in one section of the country what is called for by the wants of
another section, and this other section can supply the wants of the
first, they are not matters of discord, but bonds of union, true bonds
of union. But can this question of slavery be considered as among these
varieties in the institutions of the country? I leave it for you to say,
whether in the history of our government, this institution of slavery
has not always failed to be a bond of union, and, on the contrary, been
an apple of discord and an element of division in the house. I ask you
to consider whether so long as the moral constitution of men's minds
shall continue to be the same, after this generation and assemblage
shall sink into the grave, and another race shall arise with the same
moral and intellectual development we have--whether, if that institution
is standing in the same irritating position in which it now is, it will
not continue an element of division?
If so, then I have a right to say that, in regard to this question, the
Union is a house divided against itself; and when the Judge reminds me
that I have often said to him that the institution of slavery has
existed for eighty years in some States, and yet it does not exist in
some others, I agree to the fact, and I account for it by looking at
the position in which our fathers originally placed it,--restricting it
from the new Territories where it had not gone, and legislating to cut
off its source by the abrogation of the slave-trade, thus putting the
seal of legislation against its spread. The public mind did rest in the
belief that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. But lately, I
think,--and in this I charge nothing on the Judge's motives,--lately, I
think that he and those acting with him have placed that institution on
a new basis, which looks to the perpetuity and nationalization of
slavery. And while it is placed on this new basis, I say, and I have
said, that I believe we shall not have peace upon the question, until
the opponents of slavery arrest the further spread of it, and place it
where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course
of ultimate extinction; or, on the other hand, that its advocates will
push it forward until it shall become alike lawful in all the States,
old as well as new, North as well as South. Now, I believe if we could
arrest the spread, and place it where Washington and Jefferson and
Madison placed it, it would be in the course of ultimate extinction, and
the public mind would, as for eighty years past, believe that it was in
the course of ultimate extinction. The crisis would be past, and the
institution might be let alone for a hundred years--if it should live so
long--in the States where it exists, yet it would be going out of
existence in the way best for both the black and the white races. [A
voice: "Then do you repudiate popular sovereignty?"] Well, then, let us
talk about popular sovereignty. What is popular sovereignty? Is it the
right of the people to have slavery or not to have it, as they see fit,
in the Territories? I will state--and I have an able man to watch me--my
understanding is that popular sovereignty, as now applied to the
question of slavery, does allow the people of a Territory to have
slavery if they want to, but does not allow them not to have it if they
do not want it. I do not mean that if this vast concourse of people were
in a Territory of the United States, any one of them would be obliged
to have a slave if he did not want one; but I do say that, as I
understand the Dred Scott decision, if any one man wants slaves, all the
rest have no way of keeping that one man from holding them.
When I made my speech at Springfield, of which the Judge complains, and
from which he quotes, I really was not thinking of the things which he
ascribes to me at all. I had no thought in the world that I was doing
anything to bring about a war between the free and slave States. I had
no thought in the world that I was doing anything to bring about a
political and social equality of the black and white races. It never
occurred to me that I was doing anything or favouring anything to reduce
to a dead uniformity all the local institutions of the various States.
But I must say, in all fairness to him, if he thinks I am doing
something which leads to these bad results, it is none the better that I
did not mean it. It is just as fatal to the country, if I have any
influence in producing it, whether I intend it or not. But can it be
true that placing this institution upon the original basis--the basis
upon which our fathers placed it--can have any tendency to set the
Northern and the Southern States at war with one another, or that it can
have any tendency to make the people of Vermont raise sugar-cane,
because they raise it in Louisiana, or that it can compel the people of
Illinois to cut pine logs on the Grand Prairie, where they will not
grow, because they cut pine logs in Maine, where they do grow? The Judge
says this is a new principle started in regard to this question. Does
the Judge claim that he is working on the plan of the founders of the
government? I think he says in some of his speeches--indeed, I have one
here now--that he saw evidence of a policy to allow slavery to be south
of a certain line, while north of it it should be excluded, and he saw
an indisposition on the part of the country to stand upon that policy,
and, therefore, he set about studying the subject upon original
principles, and upon original principles he got up the Nebraska bill! I
am fighting it upon these "original principles"--fighting it in the
Jeffersonian, Washingtonian, Madisonian fashion....
If I have brought forward anything not a fact, if he (Judge Douglas)
will point it out, it will not even ruffle me to take it back. But if he
will not point out anything erroneous in the evidence, is it not rather
for him to show by a comparison of the evidence that I have reasoned
falsely, than to call the "kind, amiable, intelligent gentleman" a liar?
I want to ask your attention to a portion of the Nebraska bill which
Judge Douglas has quoted: "It being the true intent and meaning of this
act, not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to
exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to
form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject
only to the Constitution of the United States." Thereupon Judge Douglas
and others began to argue in favour of "popular sovereignty,"--the right
of the people to have slaves if they wanted them, and to exclude slavery
if they did not want them. "But," said, in substance, a senator from
Ohio (Mr. Chase, I believe), "we more than suspect that you do not mean
to allow the people to exclude slavery if they wish to; and if you do
mean it, accept an amendment which I propose, expressly authorizing the
people to exclude slavery." I believe I have the amendment here before
me, which was offered, and under which the people of the Territory,
through their proper representatives, might, if they saw fit, prohibit
the existence of slavery therein.
And now I state it as a fact, to be taken back if there is any mistake
about it, that Judge Douglas and those acting with him voted that
amendment down. I now think that those who voted it down had a real
reason for doing so. They know what that reason was. It looks to us,
since we have seen the Dred Scott decision pronounced, holding that
"under the Constitution" the people cannot exclude slavery--I say it
looks to outsiders, poor, simple, "amiable, intelligent gentlemen," as
though the niche was left as a place to put that Dred Scott decision
in, a niche that would have been spoiled by adopting the amendment. And
now I say again, if this was not the reason, it will avail the Judge
much more to calmly and good-humouredly point out to these people what
that other reason was for voting the amendment down, than swelling
himself up to vociferate that he may be provoked to call somebody a
liar.
Again, there is in that same quotation from the Nebraska bill this
clause: "it being the true intent and meaning of this bill not to
legislate slavery into any Territory or State." I have always been
puzzled to know what business the word "State" had in that connection.
Judge Douglas knows--he put it there. He knows what he put it there for.
We outsiders cannot say what he put it there for. The law they were
passing was not about States, and was not making provision for States.
What was it placed there for? After seeing the Dred Scott decision,
which holds that the people cannot exclude slavery from a Territory, if
another Dred Scott decision shall come, holding that they cannot exclude
it from a State, we shall discover that when the word was originally put
there, it was in view of something that was to come in due time; we
shall see that it was the other half of something. I now say again, if
there was any different reason for putting it there, Judge Douglas, in a
good-humoured way, without calling anybody a liar, can tell what the
reason was....