legislation. This is found in the case of Carrie Burnham Kilgore, of
Philadelphia. Speaking of her twelve years’ struggle for admission, Miss
Martin, in her article on “Admission of Women to the Bar,” already
cited, says: “In December, 1874, Carrie Burnham (now Kilgore), of
Philadelphia, began the long and tedious warfare that she has been
obliged to wage for admission in Pennsylvania. The Board of Examiners
refused to examine her, because there was ‘no precedent for the
admission of a woman to the bar of this county,’ and the Court refused
to grant a rule on the board requiring them to examine her. Mrs. Kilgore
then tried to have a law passed forbidding exclusion on account of sex,
but the Judiciary Committee of the Senate took the position that the law
as it stood was broad enough, and so it would seem to be. The Act of
1834 declares, ‘The Judges of the several Courts of Record in the
Commonwealth shall respectively have power to admit a competent number
of persons of an honest disposition, and learned in the law, to practice
as attorneys in their respective courts.’ The Senate finally passed the
clause desired, at two or three sessions, but it was never reached in
the House. Finally Mrs. Kilgore gained admission to the Law School of
the University of Pennsylvania in 1881, where she had previously been
denied, and by virtue of her diploma from there, in 1883, was admitted
to the Orphans’ Court of Philadelphia. She was then admitted to one of
the Common Pleas Courts, but denied admission to the other three, though
it is the custom when a person has been admitted to one, to admit to the
rest as a matter of course. As soon after admission to the Common Pleas
Court as the law allows, two years, and in May of this year, 1886, Mrs.
Kilgore applied and was admitted to the Supreme Court of the State, and
by virtue of this admission, all the lower Courts are now compelled to
admit her. Thus, Pennsylvania has accomplished after twelve years, what
Iowa did seventeen years ago without any ado, and with a statute that
might have afforded a reasonable ground for refusal, which the
Pennsylvania statute did not.” Since her admission, Mrs. Kilgore has
been in active general practice. Her husband, an able lawyer, in whose
office she studied and worked, died two years ago, in 1888. He had a
large clientage. After his death, Mrs. Kilgore was requested to take
charge of his cases in all but one instance. She is the attorney for
Harmon Lodge, I.O.O.F., and the Relief Mining and Milling Company.
Several times she has been appointed master and examiner by the courts.
A special correspondent of the _Chicago Daily Tribune_, in its issue of
April 5, 1890, speaking of Mrs. Kilgore’s efforts and successes
concludes with: “She has several interesting children and a delightful
home, neither her struggle for woman’s rights nor her devotion to her
professional concerns having interfered with her domestic duties nor
estranged her from the hearth.”
This reminds us of many interesting cases of motherly care and devotion
on the part of women practitioners, two of which we cannot refrain from
mentioning. One is in regard to Ohio’s first woman lawyer, Annie Cronise
Lutes, of Tiffin, who was admitted to practice before the courts of that
State in April, 1873. Her sister, Florence Cronise, was admitted in
September of the same year. These two sisters, since their admission,
have pursued the steady, straight practice of law without deviation. For
several years they were law partners. In 1880, Mrs. Lutes and her
husband, who had been fellow students in the same office, and were
admitted to the bar at the same time, formed a partnership. (This left
Miss Florence to practice alone, which she has since done with signal
success.) Mr. and Mrs. Lutes were married in 1874. They have three
daughters. The two eldest (aged fourteen and twelve respectively) are
attending the Heidelberg University, at Tiffin, taking the full
classical course, _for which they were prepared under the instruction of
their mother_, never having attended public school. The full force of
this fact will become apparent further on. In 1881 Mr. Lutes became
_totally deaf_. In a letter showing the extent of their law practice,
which was published in the article on “Women Lawyers in the United
States,” already cited, Mr. Lutes says:
“Our practice is general in character, and extends to the courts of this
State and the United States courts for the Northern District of Ohio.
The following facts will enable you to form an estimate as to the nature
and extent of Mrs. Lutes’s practice and experience at the bar. The bar
of this county has forty-five members. The total number of civil cases
on the trial docket of the term just closed was 226; of that number, our
firm was retained in fifty cases, which is probably a fair average of
our share of the business for this county, and our practice also extends
to a considerable extent to the adjoining counties of this district.”
Mr. Lutes’s infirmity necessarily imposes extra duties on his faithful
partner, which the following extract from the _Chicago Daily Tribune_,
of April 5, 1890, graphically pictures: “Mr. Lutes is totally deaf, but
his wife sits by him in court and repeats word for word what is said,
and although her lips make no audible sound, every word said by judge,
jury, or opposing counsel is understood. Without her assistance he would
be perfectly helpless, so far as his law practice is concerned. The two
work together on every case that is brought to them, and it is seldom a
person sees one without the other. Their practice is lucrative and
extensive.”
The other case is that of Clara S. Foltz. Her married life was
unfortunate. She had the family to support. This she did by undertaking
dressmaking and millinery, and then conducting classes in voice culture
and keeping boarders. An attorney who “admired her keen reasoning powers
and her incisive logic,” one day said: “Mrs. Foltz, you are such a good
mother that I believe you would make an able lawyer. Here is a copy of
Kent’s Commentaries. I wish you would take it home and read it.” She did
so as she nursed her babies—five of them now. Shortly afterward she
began the study of law in an office. Subsequently she secured a divorce
and the custody of her children. In September, 1878, she was admitted to
practice and removed to San Francisco for a course in the Hastings Law
College. She made application for admission as a student in the college
and the dean permitted her to attend the lecture for three days, while
the directors were deciding what to do about it. They refused her
application on the ground that it was “not wise or expedient, or for the
best interest of the college, to admit any female as a student therein.”
Mrs. Foltz informed the dean that she meant to attend the
lectures—peaceably if she could, but forcibly if she must. She promptly
commenced action for a mandate to compel the directors to admit her. She
won. The directors appealed the case to the State Supreme Court. Mrs.
Foltz appeared and argued her side of the case, making the point that
the Law College was a branch of the University, and that woman’s right
to enter the latter was unquestioned. The Court agreed with her, and
held that “An applicant for admission as a student to the Hastings Law
College cannot lawfully be rejected on the sole ground that she is a
female.” (Foltz _v._ Hoge, _et al._, Cal. Supreme Court Rep., vol. liv.
p. 28.) She entered the college and remained there eighteen months,
attending three classes daily to overtake her class. Finally overstudy,
lack of means, and the care of her children, prostrated her. It was a
severe disappointment not to be able to complete the prescribed three
years’ course and win her degree. She will yet gain it. Mrs. Foltz thus
tells the story of her first case:
“I firmly believe in the Infinite. The day the Supreme Court admitted
me—it was on Thursday—I traveled from San Jose to San Francisco. An old
gentleman who knew of my struggles and ambitions was on the train. He
explained in an apologetic way that he thought perhaps I would be
willing to assist him in finding a land claim that he had pre-empted,
and which another settler contested. My would-be client had all the
necessary proofs and witnesses ready, and the case was to come up at ten
o’clock the following day. I had never been in a land office. I was
ignorant of the methods of procedure, but I could soon learn. I accepted
the case.
“That day was a crisis in my life. To pay the ten dollar fee of the
Supreme Court I pawned this breastpin—dear old pin! Next morning, before
I was up, a knock came to my door as the clock struck seven. My client
was there. I dressed myself and carried on a conversation through the
door. What would I charge for my services, he asked. I did not know, but
ventured a guess at the correct figure. I would undertake the case for
$25. He hesitated a little, and said that after witnesses fees and other
expenses were paid he would have but $15 left, and that if I had a mind
to take that sum it would be all right. I accepted eagerly, for I needed
the money. Next I invited the witnesses in and questioned them. We
parted to meet at the land office, but I went down in advance to see the
Surveyor-General. I hold that the truth is always the best, so I told
him that I had a case at ten o’clock, but knew nothing about land-office
matters, and that I wanted to learn the law. He was very kind and
furnished me with a pamphlet of instructions. Then I ventured to request
that the case might go over to 1 P. M. He found that it could. I was
immensely relieved and hastened off with my precious pamphlet. Client
and witnesses were on the stairs. I informed them of the change in time
and turned back. Didn’t I get that pamphlet by heart though! And I won
my first case, redeemed my cherished pin, and paid my board bill.”
Laura De Force Gordon, who was also denied admission to the Hastings Law
College, and aided Mrs. Foltz in her mandamus case, successfully
defended a Spaniard charged with murder, within two months after her
admission to the bar in 1879. “Among her most noted criminal cases was
that of The People _v._ Sproule, which was indeed in some respects the
most remarkable trial in the whole range of criminal jurisprudence in
California. The defendant had shot and killed a young man named Andrews,
by mistake for one Espey, the seducer of Sproule’s wife. It was a
fearful tragedy, and the excitement was so great that the jail had to be
guarded for a week to prevent the lynching of the prisoner. Mrs. Gordon
undertook his defense, against the advice of the most distinguished
lawyers in the State, and obtained a verdict of “Not guilty” amid the
most deafening cheers of men and hysterical cries of women, half-weeping
jurymen joining in the general clamor of rejoicing.” (“Women Lawyers in
the United States,” in _The Green Bag_, January, 1890.)
In speaking of her practice, Mrs. Lockwood says: “My first was a divorce
case and I won it, but the man refused to pay the alimony. The judge
told me there was no law to make him pay it. I told him there was, and I
showed him I could issue a _ne exeat_. I issued the writ, and the man
was clapped into prison until he agreed to pay the alimony. Years
afterward a similar case came up and the men who were the lawyers asked
if there was no way to compel a man to stay in the District until he
paid the alimony. The clerk said: ‘Belva Lockwood is the only one who
has ever issued a _ne exeat_ in the District; you had better consult
her.’ Many a time I have been saved by a little wit. Once my client, a
woman, got upon the witness stand, in spite of all I could do, and
acknowledged she had committed the crime of which she was accused. It
was for shooting a constable, and that woman described the whole thing,
talking until I was glued to my seat with fright. When she stopped and I
had to get up I didn’t know what I was going to say, but I began,
‘Gentlemen of the jury, the laws must be enforced. My client has
committed the double offense of resisting an officer of the law and
shooting a man. The District is under the common law. That law says a
woman must obey her husband. Her husband told her to load a gun and
shoot the first officer that tried to force his way into the house. She
obeyed him. Gentlemen, I claim that that husband loaded the gun and shot
the officer, and as the judge will not postpone this case until I can
have the husband brought from the West, where he is, I claim you are not
trying the right prisoner. You would not have a woman resist her
husband?’ The jury brought in the verdict of ‘Not guilty,’ and the
judge, a crusty gentleman, said, when the next case was brought up: ‘I
will call a new jury for this case, as the old one has just done a hard
day’s work.’”
Col. C. K. Pier, his wife, and three daughters, of Madison, Wisconsin,
are widely known as “the Pier family of lawyers.” The Colonel is a
lawyer of long standing. Mrs. Pier and their eldest daughter graduated
from the Law Department of the University of Wisconsin in 1887. All
three practice together. The two younger sisters, Carrie and Harriet,
have nearly finished the course in the law school from which their
mother and sister graduated. Miss Kate, in her twenty-first year,
appeared before the Supreme Court and won her case, the first to be
argued by a woman in the supreme tribunal of the State. A newspaper,
commenting on the fact, says: “Her opponent was J. J. Sutton, a veteran
practitioner. The gray-haired patriarchs of the profession smoothed the
wrinkles out of their waistcoats and straightened their neckties, and
then wiped the specks off their spectacles. The audience was one before
which any young man might readily have been excused for getting rattled.
There were present Gen. E. E. Bryant, dean of the law faculty,
ex-Secretary of the Interior William F. Vilas, and a host of visiting
legal lights. Even the dignified judges were compelled to affect an
extra degree of austerity to conceal their interest in the young
attorney. But Miss Pier showed no sign of embarrassment. Her argument
was direct and to the point, and, moreover, relieved of the
superfluities that frequently characterize the verbose utterances of
more experienced attorneys of the male sex. She stated her case
unhesitatingly, and frequently turned to and cited authorities, showing
an acquaintance with the law and a degree of self-possession which
indicated that she was truly in love with her profession. She showed she
possessed the true mettle for success, and two weeks later, when the
judges rendered their decision, she had the pleasure of winning her
first case. Since then both she and her mother have frequently argued
cases before the Court.”
Almeda E. Hitchcock, of Hilo, Hawaii Islands, graduated from the Law
Department of the Michigan University in 1888, and was admitted to the
Michigan bar. Her father is one of the circuit judges of that far away
island. On her return home she was admitted to the Hawaiian bar on
presentation of her license from the Michigan Court, the first instance
of a woman’s receiving license to practice law in that kingdom. The same
day she was appointed notary public and became her father’s law partner.
Marilla M. Ricker, while a resident of the District of Columbia, was
appointed Commissioner and Examiner in Chancery by the Supreme Court of
the District, and several cases were heard before her. Other women
lawyers, in various parts of the country, have been appointed examiners
in chancery and examiners of applicants for admission to the bar. Mary
E. Haddock, LL.B., in June, 1878, was appointed by the Supreme Court of
Iowa to examine students of the State University for graduation and
admission to the bar. She was reappointed for two successive years. Ada
Lee, of Port Huron, Michigan, the year following her admission in 1883,
was elected to the office of Circuit Court Commissioner, having been
nominated, without solicitation on her part, by the Republican,
Democratic, and Greenback parties of St. Clair county. “She performed
the duties of this office, and held it until the expiration of her term,
despite the fact that thirteen suits were begun to oust her, during
which time two hundred and seventeen cases were tried before her.” Mrs.
J. M. Kellogg acted as Assistant Attorney-General during the time her
husband was Attorney-General of Kansas. They are law partners.
Phoebe W. Couzins, LL.B., was chief deputy United States Marshal for the
Eastern District of Missouri during the time her father was the Marshal.
At the death of her father she was named his successor, which position
she held until removed by the incoming Democratic administration.
Catherine G. Waugh, A.M., LL.B., was for a year or two Professor of
Commercial Law in the Rockford (Ill.) Commercial College. Mrs. Foltz
delivered a legal address before the students of Union College of Law in
1886. Mary A. Greene, LL.B. recently delivered a course of lectures
before the students of Lasell Seminary on “Business Law for Women.”
Several able articles have been written for law journals by women
lawyers of this country. Of books, M. B. R. Shay, is author of
“Students’ Guide to Common Law Pleading” (published in 1881.) Of this
work, Hon. R. M. Benjamin, dean of Law Faculty, and Hon. A. G. Kerr,
professor of Pleading of Law Department of the Illinois Wesleyan
University, say, as published in Callaghan & Company’s annual catalogue
of law books:
“We have examined with considerable care Shay’s Questions on Common Law
Pleading, and can cheerfully recommend them to students as admirably
adapted to guide them to a thorough knowledge of the principles of
pleading as laid down by those masters of the system, Stephen, Gould,
and Chitty.”
Lelia Robinson Sawtelle is author of “Law Made Easy” (published in
1886). Of this work, Hon. Charles T. Russell, professor in Boston
University Law School, says: “For the end proposed, the information and
instruction of the popular mind in the elements of law, civil and
criminal, I know of no work which surpasses it. It is comprehensive and
judicious in scope, accurate in statement, terse, vigorous, simple, and
clear in style. My gratification in this work is none the less that its
author is the first lady Bachelor of Laws graduated from our Boston
University Law School, and that she has thus early and fully vindicated
her right to the highest honors of the school accorded her at her
graduation.” Mrs. Sawtelle has since written a manual entitled “The Law
of Husband and Wife,” which likewise has been well received. She is now
at work upon another to be called “Wills and Inheritances.”
We have already spoken of Myra Bradwell as the editor of the _Chicago
Legal News_. Catharine V. Waite, LL.B., edits the _Chicago Law Times_,
which she founded in 1886. Bessie Bradwell Helmer, LL.B., compiled,
unassisted, ten volumes of Bradwell’s Appellate Court Reports. Cora A.
Benneson, LL.B., was law editor for the West Publishing Company of St.
Paul, Minnesota, in 1886.
The first association of women lawyers is called “The Equity Club.” This
was organized in October, 1886, by women students and graduates of the
Law Department of Michigan University, having for its object “the
interchange of encouragement and friendly counsel between women law
students and practitioners.” It is international in scope. Each member
is required to contribute a yearly letter, “giving an account of
individual experiences, thoughts on topics of general interest, and
helpful suggestions,” for publication and distribution among members of
the association.
Another association of women lawyers, organized in 1888, is the “Woman’s
International Bar Association,” having for its object:
1. To open law schools to women.
2. To remove all disabilities to admission of women to the bar, and to
secure their eligibility to the bench.
3. To disseminate knowledge concerning women’s legal status.
4. To secure better legal conditions for women.
Women lawyers are welcomed as members of bar associations established by
their brothers in the profession. Many have availed themselves of this
privilege.
For various reasons quite a number of women admitted have not, so far,
identified themselves with law practice. Others have allowed themselves
to be drawn into temperance and other reform movements; but the greater
portion at once settled down to follow their chosen pursuit with no
deviation, and are ripening into able, experienced lawyers, and winning
their fair share of clientage. Some confine themselves mainly to an
office practice, seldom or never appearing in public; others prefer
court practice. Those who enter the forum are cordially countenanced by
brother lawyers and acceptably received before court and jury. As a rule
they are treated with the utmost courtesy by the bench, the bar, and
other court officers.
Woman’s influence in the court room as counsel is promotive of good in
more than one respect. Invectives against opposing counsel, so freely
made use of in some courts, are seldom indulged in when woman stands as
the opponent. And in social impurity cases, language, in her presence,
becomes more chaste, and the moral tone thereby elevated perceptibly.
But there should be one more innovation brought into general vogue, that
of the mixed jury system. When we shall have women both as lawyers and
jurors to assist in the trial of cases, then, and not until then, will
woman’s influence for good in the administration of justice be fully
felt. In Wyoming and Washington the mixed jury system has been tried and
found perfectly practicable.
There has not been time enough yet for a woman to develop into an
Erskine or Burke, an O’Connor or Curran, a Webster or Choate. But few
men have done so, if history correctly records. Woman has made a fair
beginning, and is determined to push on and upward, keeping pace with
her brother along the way until, with him, she shall have finally
reached the highest pinnacle of legal fame.
X.
WOMAN IN THE STATE.
BY
MARY A. LIVERMORE.
No one who has studied the history of the world, even superficially,
will dispute the statement that over the female half of the human family
there has steadily brooded a cloud of hindrance and repression, of
disability and servitude. The long past has denied to women the
possession of souls, and they have been relegated to the ignorance and
injustice to which men have always doomed those regarded as their
inferiors. Until within a few years, comparatively speaking, the world
has been under the dominion of brute force, and might has made right.
Every one has been welcome to whatever he has had the brawn and muscle
to win and to hold, and all have yielded to the rule of physical force,
as to-day we respect the decisions of the courts. All through these ages
the history of woman has been disastrous. Her physical weakness, and not
alone her mental inferiority, has made her the subject of man. Toiling
patiently for him, asking little for herself and every thing for him,
cheerfully sharing with him all perils and hardships, the unappreciated
mother of his children, she has been bought and sold, petted or
tortured, according to the whim of her brutal owner, the victim
everywhere of pillage, lust, and war. And this statement includes all
races and peoples of the earth from the date of their historic
existence.
Among the Hindoos, woman was the slave of man; bought, sold, lent,
gambled away, and taken for debt, with the very power of life or death
held over her by some irresponsible husband, father, or other man. She
was forbidden to speak the language of man, and was condemned to use the
patois of slaves. Under the old Roman law, the husband was the sole
tribunal of the wife. He controlled her property, earnings, and
religion: she was allowed no rights in her own children; and she could
invoke no law against him. The Greek law regarded woman as a child, and
held her in everlasting tutelage from the cradle to her gray-haired old
age. Aristotle, and they of his school, called her a “monster,” an
“accidental production.” The Hebrews pronounced her an afterthought of
the Deity, and the mother of all evil. Throughout the entire Orient, her
condition has been one of such compulsory servitude, that the phrase
“Oriental degradation of woman,” remains to-day the synonym of the
deepest debasement woman has ever known.