In the Presidential election of 1844, there was a third party in the

field. By this time, the anti-slavery sentiment in some of the Northern

States had taken the form of a political organization, which called

itself the “Liberty” party, and was called by the others the party of

the “Abolitionists.” Their candidate for the Presidency was Mr. James G.

Birney, of Ohio, a gentleman who had taken a leading part in organizing

“The American Anti-Slavery Society,” and was at this time its secretary.

He had never held a public office. Texas, which had in 1836 made itself

independent of Mexico, had been for more than nine years a slaveholding

country, with a republican form of government. Between that government

and the United States a secret treaty was negotiated, after Mr. Tyler

became President, for the annexation of Texas to this Union. It had been

submitted to the Senate, and had been rejected, chiefly because Texas

claimed to carry her western boundary to the Rio Grande; and to

incorporate her with the United States and to adopt that claim would, it

was supposed, give Mexico a just cause for war. After the sudden death

of Mr. Upshur,[89] who became Secretary of State when Mr. Webster

retired from President Tyler’s cabinet, Mr. Calhoun, who succeeded him,

took up and carried out a new negotiation, which Mr. Upshur had begun,

for making Texas a part of the United States by the action of Congress.

This project was pending, and more or less suspected, or believed not to

have been relinquished, when the three parties made their nominations

for the Presidency. The Democratic party, by the nomination of Mr. Polk,

and by their avowed declarations, made the annexation of Texas

distinctly one of their party measures. The Whigs, in nominating Mr.

Clay, selected a candidate who was understood to oppose the annexation,

not because Texas was a slaveholding country, but because it might lead

to a war with Mexico. They did not proclaim it as a part of the policy

of their party to prevent the annexation of any more slave territory.

This was one of the principal reasons why Mr. Birney drew many votes

away from Mr. Clay. As Mr. Polk obtained a majority of sixty-five

electoral votes over Mr. Clay, and as six of the States which voted for

him were Northern and non-slaveholding States, including both

Pennsylvania and New York, the Democratic party claimed a right to say

that the country had pronounced for the annexation of Texas, its slavery

notwithstanding. The correspondence between the Government of the United

States and Texas was submitted to Congress by President Tyler, in

December, 1844. Joint resolutions for the annexation of Texas were

finally adopted by Congress on the 1st of March, 1845. They admitted

Texas into the Union, as a State whose constitution recognized slavery,

and they also pledged the faith of the United States to allow of the

future formation of four more States out of Texas, and to admit them

into the Union, either with or without slavery, as their constitutions

might require, if formed below the Missouri compromise line of 36° 30′,

but if formed above that line, slavery was to be excluded. In the

Senate, there were twenty-seven votes for the admission of Texas on

these conditions, and twenty-five votes against it; of the affirmative

votes, thirteen were from free States, and four of these were from New

England. The Missouri compromise line was extended through Texas; the

“Wilmot Proviso,” which aimed to exclude slavery from the whole of this

newly acquired region, came up a year later.

Mr. Buchanan’s course as a Senator, on these resolutions, can easily be

inferred from what has already appeared in regard to his sentiments on

the whole subject of Texan independence, and the relations of that

country to the United States. But the official record shows, with entire

distinctness, that against the constitutional objection which maintained

that new States could not be admitted into the Union unless they had

lawfully arisen within the United States, he held with those who

rejected this restriction, and who maintained that a foreign State could

be made a member of the Union. After the joint resolutions had come

before the Senate from the House of Representatives, the Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations, by a majority report, recommended their

rejection. Mr. Buchanan, who was a member of that committee, did not

make a minority report, but on the 27th of February (1845), he said:

He did not rise to debate the question. He had heard some of his

respected friends on this side of the Senate, in whose sincerity he had

the most entire confidence, observe that if these resolutions should

pass the Senate, the Constitution would receive a mortal stab. If Mr. B.

thought so, great as was the acquisition we were about to make, he

should be the last man in existence to acquire the richest benefit the

world could hold out to our grasp at such a price.

Mr. B. said he might have assumed the privilege of reply which belonged

to him from the position he occupied on the Committee on Foreign

Relations; but he waived it. Not because the arguments on the other side

had not been exceedingly ingenious and plausible, and urged with great

ability; but because all the reasoning in the world could not abolish

the plain language of the Constitution, which declared that “new States

might be admitted by Congress into the Union.” But what new States? The

convention had answered that question in letters of light, by rejecting

the proposed limitation of this grant, which would have confined it to

States lawfully arising within the United States. The clause was

introduced with this limitation, and, after full discussion, it ended in

the shape it now held, without limitation or restriction of any kind.

This was a historical fact. It could not be denied. Planting himself

upon that fact, and having heard no argument which shook the

position—believing, as he most conscientiously did believe, that the

Constitution would not be violated in the least by the adoption of the

pending resolutions, he here entered his solemn protest against the

solemn protests which had been made on the other side, and which went

almost the length of implying that he, and the advocates of these

resolutions, were knowingly and of design violating the Constitution and

their oaths, to secure a favorite political measure. This was the

greatest public act in which Mr. Buchanan had ever had the honor of

taking an humble part; he should do it cheerfully, gladly, gloriously,

because he believed that his vote would confer blessings innumerable

upon his fellow-men. now, henceforward, and forever.

Mr. Berrien said he would not consent that this debate should close with

the declaration of the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan), that

the convention had not determined the sense of the term “new States.”

Mr. Buchanan rose to explain. What the Senator from Pennsylvania did say

was, that at first the clause granting power to Congress to admit new

States into the Union had been confined to States arising within the

United States; but that after debate and a full discussion, the

Constitution was adopted with the clause in its present clear

unrestricted form, written as in letters of light.

After some further remarks from other Senators, and some attempts to

amend the resolutions, they were passed and engrossed on the same day.

President Tyler, on the 3d of March, announced by special message to the

Senate, that he had approved and signed them.[90]

The electoral college of Pennsylvania, when the votes of that State were

given to Mr. Polk, united in a strong recommendation to him to make Mr.

Buchanan Secretary of State. Mr. Buchanan took no steps to influence the

newly-elected President in regard to this or any other cabinet

appointment. He maintained a dignified reserve in his personal relations

to Mr. Polk, both during and after the election. Certainly there were

very strong reasons of fitness, which should have led Mr. Polk to desire

that Mr. Buchanan would accept the Department of State. His

qualifications for it were far greater than those of any other public

man in the Democratic party; and, if such a consideration could have any

weight, he personally deserved at the hands of Mr. Polk all that a

President could bestow of opportunity to render further service to the

country. In looking back over Mr. Buchanan’s public life, now covering a

period of nearly twenty-five years, one can perceive the intellectual

growth of an American statesman, who had not been taken suddenly from

private pursuits to fill an important public position, but who had been

trained by the regular gradations of office for the affairs of

government. To have a constituency who can appreciate the value of such

a training, and can support a public servant in the devotion of his time

and abilities to the public service, is a great advantage. This

advantage Mr. Buchanan had enjoyed for twenty-five years, and he had

well repaid the devotion of his friends. The people of Pennsylvania had

but once in twenty years swerved from the party in which Mr. Buchanan

was a distinguished leader, and they had now returned to it. His

experience, his aptitude for public life, his solid, though not

brilliant abilities, and the weight of the great State which had kept

him in the Senate, marked him as the fittest person to be at the head of

Mr. Polk’s cabinet. Mr. Polk, however, while conscious of the propriety

of offering this position to Mr. Buchanan, and while he felt the need of

his services, seems to have had a fear lest his administration might be

disturbed by Mr. Buchanan’s ambition to become his successor. He took

the somewhat singular step of asking from Mr. Buchanan a promise that he

would retire from the cabinet, if he should be a candidate for the

Presidency in 1848. There is no good reason for attributing this to

personal jealousy of Buchanan, for Mr. Polk did not expect to become a

candidate for re-election. He was a sagacious man, who took a just view

of his own situation, he knew quite well that he had become President

because the conflicting claims of others had rendered it necessary to

compromise upon an unexpected and far from conspicuous candidate. But he

desired, and wisely desired, to avoid all internal difficulties, by

freeing his administration from complications about the succession.

Every one will commend the spirit of the following letter, and every

one, it should seem, will commend the manner in which it was met by Mr.

Buchanan, who could hardly be expected to say that he would renounce all

idea of becoming a candidate for the Presidency in 1848, since he could

not tell what his public duty might require of him.

[MR. POLK TO MR. BUCHANAN.]

WASHINGTON CITY, February 17, 1845.

SIR:—

The principles and policy which will be observed and maintained during

my administration are embodied in the resolutions adopted by the

Democratic National Convention of delegates, assembled at Baltimore in

Maryland, and in the inaugural address which I propose to deliver to my

fellow-citizens on assuming the duties of President of the United

States, and which is herewith handed to you for your perusal.

In making up my cabinet, I desire to select gentlemen who will agree

with me in opinion, and who will cordially co-operate with me in

carrying out these principles and policy.

In my official action I will take no part between gentlemen of the

Democratic party who may become aspirants or candidates to succeed me in

the Presidential office, and desire that no member of my cabinet shall

do so. Individual preferences it is not expected or desired to limit or

restrain. It is official interference by the dispensation of public

patronage or otherwise that I desire to guard against. Should any member

of my cabinet become a candidate for the Presidency or Vice Presidency

of the United States, it will be expected upon the happening of such an

event, that he will retire from the cabinet.

I disapprove the practice which has sometimes prevailed, of cabinet

officers absenting themselves for long periods of time from the seat of

Government and leaving the management of their department to chief

clerks; or other less responsible persons than themselves. I expect

myself to remain constantly at Washington, unless it may be that no

public duty requires my presence, when I may be occasionally absent, but

then only for a short time. It is by conforming to this rule that the

President and his cabinet can have any assurance that absences will be

prevented, and that the subordinate executive officers connected with

them respectively will faithfully perform their duty.

If sir, you concur with me in these opinions and views, I shall be

pleased to have your assistance in my administration, as a member of my

cabinet, and now tender to you the office of Secretary of State, and

invite you to take charge of that department.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

JAMES K. POLK.

[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. POLK.]

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1845.

MY DEAR SIR:—

I feel greatly honored by your kind invitation to accept the station of

Secretary of State in your cabinet; and I cheerfully and cordially

approve the terms on which this offer has been made, as they have been

presented in your note of yesterday. To prevent, however, any possible

misunderstanding between us hereafter, I desire to make an explanation

in regard to that portion of your letter which requires that any member

of your cabinet shall retire upon becoming a candidate for the

Presidency.

Before I had anticipated that you would do me the honor of inviting me

to a seat in your cabinet, I had publicly presented my views on the

subject of agitating the question of the next Presidency in the

strongest colors. Both patriotism and policy, the success of the party

as well as that of your administration, require that we should have

repose from the strife of making Presidents. I am, therefore, utterly

opposed to the agitation of this question in any shape or form, and

shall exercise any influence which I may possess to prevent it, both in

regard to myself and others. Nay, more, I think the welfare of your

administration requires that in every prudent and appropriate manner

this principle should be maintained by it; and the patronage of the

Government ought to be dispensed, not to favor any individual aspirant,

but solely for the good of the country and the Democratic party.

I do not know that I shall ever desire to be a candidate for the

Presidency. Most certainly I never yet strongly felt such an

inclination; and I have been willing, and should at this moment be

willing, to accept a station which would, in my estimation of what is

proper, deprive me of any prospect of reaching that office. Still, I

could not, and would not, accept the high and honorable office to which

you have called me, at the expense of self-ostracism. My friends would

unanimously condemn me were I to pursue this course. I cannot proclaim

to the world that in no contingency shall I be a candidate for the

Presidency in 1848; nor in the meantime can I be held responsible for

the action of occasional county meetings, in my own or other States,

preceding general elections, which, without my previous knowledge or

consent, might present my name in connection with this office. I can

answer for myself that as I have never yet raised a finger or stirred a

step, towards the attainment of this station; so I never shall make any

personal exertions for that purpose without your express permission, so

long as I remain a member of your cabinet. If, however, unexpectedly to

myself, the people should by a State or national convention present me

as their candidate, I cannot declare in advance that I would not accede

to their wishes; but in that event I would retire from your cabinet,

unless you should desire me to remain.

I do not deny that I would be as much pleased to accept the station of

Secretary of State from yourself as from any man living. I entertain a

strong conviction that under the controlling direction of your wisdom,

prudence and firmness, I might be useful to you in conducting the

Department of State, and I know from your established character, so far

as it is given to mortals to know anything, that our social and personal

intercourse would be of the most friendly and agreeable character.

If under these explanations, you are willing to confer upon me the

office of Secretary of State, I shall accept it with gratitude, and

exert my best efforts to do my duty to the country and to yourself.

With sentiments of the highest and most sincere respect, I remain.

Your friend,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

----------------------------

In 1858, there again came about rumors of General Jackson’s hostility to

Mr. Buchanan. The following letter written by a citizen of Nashville to

a friend, gives decisive evidence on General Jackson’s feelings towards

Mr. Buchanan, at the time when the latter became Secretary of State.

[MR. JOHNSON TO GENERAL ANDERSON.]

NASHVILLE, Oct. 6th, 1858.

DEAR SIR:—

I received your letter of the 5th inst., making inquiries of my

recollection as to the feelings entertained by General Jackson towards

Mr. Buchanan at the time of the nomination of Mr. Polk and the

appointment of Mr. Buchanan as Secretary. I do not remember to have met

General Jackson after the election of Mr. Polk, but was upon the most

intimate terms with President Polk, both before and after his election.

General Jackson was the avowed and open friend of Mr. Van Buren, and

when it was ascertained that Mr. Van Buren could not get the nomination,

he expressed himself to many friends favorable to the nomination of Mr.

Buchanan, as the true and proper course of the Democratic party, before

Mr. Polk’s name was known to be before the convention for the

Presidency. This I have heard from so many sources as to entertain no

doubt of the fact. Mr. Polk, it is well known, consulted with him freely

as to the individuals who should compose his cabinet, and the

appointment of Mr. Buchanan as Secretary of State met his decided

approbation, as did all the other individuals composing the cabinet,

excepting the Secretary of the Treasury. He had some misgivings and

apprehensions as to the propriety of the selection, as did many others

of the friends of President Polk.

These are my recollections from the most free and unreserved intercourse

with President Polk, and my recollection now is that I have seen letters

from General Jackson to President Polk confirming substantially the

above statement.

General Jackson was known to have strong feelings—warm towards his

friends, bitter towards his enemies—and in the exciting canvasses for

the Presidency may have used, and even written, harsh expressions about

many prominent friends of his own, founded upon _perversions_ and

_misrepresentations_ of their conduct by those toadies with whom he was

beset, and often deceived by them as to the conduct and expressions of

leading and prominent men in the Democratic party, and by none of them

so often as by —— and ——, who never deserved his confidence or merited

the favors bestowed on them.

The General, however, never hesitated to do justice to any man when the

truth was ascertained as to his conduct.

From the whole of my intercourse with General Jackson and Mr. Polk,

after the second election of General Jackson, I never had reason to

suppose that he ever had any unkind feelings toward Mr. Buchanan. On the

contrary, Mr. Buchanan was considered in the Senate one among his most

active and confidential friends, as President Polk was in the House of

Representatives.

Mr. Polk, or Buchanan, could neither be used nor controlled by such men

as —— and ——, and hence their hostility to them after the second

election of General Jackson, which was manifested in various ways which

I could specify.

I am, very respectfully, your friend,

E. JOHNSON.

-----

Footnote 89:

Mr. Upshur was killed by the explosion on board the Princeton, in

February, 1844. See _ante_, p. 521.

Footnote 90:

Congressional Globe, Vol. 14, pp. 240, 271, 362. The resolutions may

be found at page 332.

-----

CHAPTER XX.

1845–1846.

THE OREGON CONTROVERSY—DANGER OF A WAR WITH ENGLAND—NEGOTIATION FOR A

SETTLEMENT OF THE BOUNDARY—PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE.

Among the subjects involved in the foreign relations of the country,

when Mr. Buchanan became Secretary of State, and which demanded his

immediate attention, one of the most important and critical was the

title to the territory of Oregon, that had long been in dispute between

Great Britain and the United States. The northern boundary of this

region of country, which should have separated British America west of

the Rocky Mountains from the dominion of the United States, had not been

settled by the treaty negotiated at Washington between the two powers in

1842, because Lord Ashburton had no instructions to deal with it. As far

back as the administration of President Monroe, an extension of the 49th

parallel of latitude to the Pacific, as the boundary, was offered by the

United States to England, but it was declined. The British claim was

founded on the assertion that the title of the United States, which was

derived through the Louisiana and Florida treaties, was not exclusive as

to any part of the territory; and since it was for the interest of the

Hudson Bay Company to follow the Columbia River to the ocean, and since

the English asserted an actual and previous occupation as well as the

Americans, it became desirable for England to have a right of joint

occupation established, until the boundary between the two national

possessions should be finally settled. A convention was entered into in

1827, establishing such a joint occupation until notice of its

termination should be given by either of the two powers. This concession

on the part of the United States, made in the interest of peace, left an

open question between the two governments, both claiming the whole

territory. But what was “the whole” of Oregon? On the American side of

the controversy, the region claimed extended to a line that would be

marked by the parallel of 54° 40′ north latitude. This would have

carried the American title on the Pacific coast far above the Strait of

Fuca and Vancouver’s Island, and would have made an irregular boundary,

not coinciding in latitude with the northern boundary of the United

States east of the Rocky Mountains. On the other hand, the claim of

England brought her down to the mouth of the Columbia River, which has

its source nearly at the 50th parallel, and flows in a circuitous course

of about eight hundred miles, first to the south, and then to the west,

until it reaches the Pacific. The joint occupation agreed upon in 1827,

had become inconvenient, and indeed dangerous for both nations. A very

uneasy feeling sprang up in our Western States and among the settlers

who were pushing into this territory, and who looked to the United

States for titles to the land, and for the protection due from the

sovereign power. Popular opinion about our right was not likely to be

founded in intelligent investigation, but it was sure to find its way

into the political action of the Democratic party. The political body

which nominated Mr. Polk as its candidate for the Presidency, proclaimed

our title to be “clear and unquestionable.” Mr. Polk considered himself

as elected under an imperative popular instruction to assert this claim,

and in his inaugural address he put it forth in very strong terms as

extending to the parallel of 54° 40′. This was the attitude of the

matter when Mr. Buchanan became Secretary of State.

Notwithstanding the strong personal convictions of the President and the

Secretary of State of the validity of this claim as it was asserted in

Mr. Polk’s inaugural address, deference for the action of former

administrations and a desire to avoid a rupture with England, led the

President to authorize Mr. Buchanan to offer the 49th parallel as the

boundary. This offer was made to Mr. Pakenham, the British Minister at

Washington, on the 10th of July, 1845. Without referring this offer to

his own government and awaiting instructions, Mr. Pakenham replied on

the 30th of July, that “after this exposition of the views entertained

by the British government respecting the relative value and importance

of the British and American claims, the American Plenipotentiary will

not be surprised to hear that the undersigned does not feel at liberty

to accept the proposal offered by the American Plenipotentiary for the

settlement of the question.” He closed his note by expressing his “trust

that the American Plenipotentiary will be prepared to offer some further

proposal for the settlement of the Oregon question, more consistent with

fairness and equity, and with the reasonable expectations of the British

government.” These were very unfortunate expressions, since they

implied, under the circumstances, that the American Government had begun

the negotiation by asserting a claim that was untenable, and had

followed its assertion with an unfair and inequitable offer. Had this

language of the British plenipotentiary become public at that moment,

the consequences would have been an uncontrollable excitement throughout

this country. Careful, however, to keep open the door for mutual

concessions, Mr. Buchanan, before he answered Mr. Pakenham’s note, wrote

to Mr. McLane, who had succeeded Mr. Everett as United States Minister

in London, an elaborate despatch, tracing the diplomatic history of the

Oregon question, and suggesting, with much skill, the modes in which an

unfortunate result might be avoided. Indefatigably industrious, and

employing no pen but his own, he gave to his official papers a polish,

the marks of which remain on the original drafts, attesting the extreme

care that he bestowed upon them. Mr. McLane was instructed to make known

the contents of this despatch to the British ministry, in case they made

inquiries of him.

The offer of the 49th parallel having been withdrawn, Mr. Buchanan, on

the 30th of August, addressed a note to Mr. Pakenham, in which he

reasserted the American claim to what he regarded as “the whole of

Oregon,” and made an elaborate and exhaustive exposition of its grounds.

There are few papers on the diplomatic records of our Government more

able and searching than this exposition of the American claim to the

territory of Oregon. Thoroughly master of his subject, and fully

convinced of the validity of the claim which he was asserting, Mr.

Buchanan wrote this paper with a dignified force that was not unlikely

to command the assent of impartial persons, when the document should

become public. Writing to Mr. McLane afterwards, he said: “this note of

Mr. Pakenham (July 30th) became the subject of grave deliberation by the

President. Upon a full consideration of the whole question, and after

waiting a month, he deemed it to be a duty which he owed to his country

to withdraw his proposition (of the 49th parallel), which he had

submitted, and to maintain the right of the United States to the whole

of Oregon. This was done by my note to Mr. Pakenham of the 30th of

August last.”

But the note of August 30th could not become public while the

negotiation was pending, or before the meeting of Congress in December.

In the mean time, Mr. Pakenham endeavored to have the American offer of

the 49th parallel restored. “Judging from late conversations with Mr.

Pakenham,” Mr. Buchanan again writes to Mr. McLane, “he is now anxious

that this withdrawal should be withdrawn, and that the negotiation might

proceed as if our offer were still in force. But the President will not

consent to change his position and to recall what has already been done.

He will not renew his former offer, nor submit any new proposition; and

it must remain for the British government to decide what other or

further steps, if any, they may think proper to take in the negotiation.

The President has adopted this determination after two cabinet councils,

and he deems it necessary that this should be communicated to you, in

order that you may clearly understand his purpose.”

The correspondence was submitted by the President to Congress, in

December (1845), and its publication was immediately followed in this

country by a considerable change of feeling in those quarters where the

course of the administration was watched with most jealousy, and where

war was most dreaded. In the House of Representatives, where the war

feeling of the Northwest found expression, some violent speeches were

made. In the Senate there was a moderate tone, but steps were taken

looking to the termination of the joint occupation, and to an inquiry

into the state of the national defences. These movements had an ominous

appearance. In the diplomatic department, however, the negotiation went

on quietly.

On the 23d of December, Mr. Buchanan made the following brief minute of

a cabinet consultation held on that day, at which the President said:

If Mr. Pakenham inquires if a new proposition made by them would be

respectfully considered, I would refer him to the correspondence—your

last note of the 30th August, and say it has been at your option, with a

perfect liberty to propose any proposition you thought proper, and you

had no reason to conclude from what had occurred here that the

Government would not have treated such a proposition with respectful

consideration when made. You have made no new proposition, and the

question, therefore, stands on its present attitude.

December 23, 1845.—I took down the foregoing from the lips of the

President, in the presence of the cabinet.

Four days afterward an interview took place at the State Department, of

which I find the following account in Mr. Buchanan’s hand-writing:

On Saturday afternoon, 27th of December, 1845, Mr. Pakenham called at

the Department of State. After some brief preliminary conversation on

other topics, he informed me that he had received instructions from his

government relative to the Oregon question; without at the time

informing me what they were. He then proceeded to express his desire

that I should recall the withdrawal of our offer to settle the Oregon

question by the 49th parallel of latitude, and suffer the negotiation to

proceed on that basis, expressing the belief that it might then result

in a satisfactory manner. I informed him that he had made one

proposition to Mr. Calhoun, which had been rejected; that I had made a

proposition which had been rejected by him and then withdrawn; that the

whole negotiation had been submitted to Congress with the President’s

message; and after all this, it was too late to expect that the

President would now retrace his steps. That what had been done must be

considered as done.

He then said that if he were now to make a new proposition, he had no

means of knowing whether it would be accepted: if he made a proposition

it might be rejected.

I replied that the whole field was open to him, as it had been in the

beginning; that it was as free to him as it had been to him at first, or

was to me afterwards, to make any proposition he thought proper; that

all I could say was that any proposition he might make would be

respectfully considered by the President; but I said no more.

He then observed that as I was not willing to go further (as I

understood him), he would, under his instructions, present me the offer

of the British government to arbitrate the question. He said it was

drawn up chiefly in the very language of Lord Aberdeen.

I then received the communication from him, and read it over carefully.

As soon as I had completed its perusal, he urged its acceptance

strongly; expressed his great desire for the preservation of peace

between the two countries, and said that it was impossible that war

should grow out of such a question between two great nations. He said he

was not worth much in the world; but would give half what he was worth

to see the question honorably and amicably adjusted between the two

nations.

I stated the strong desire, both on the part of the President and

myself, that the question might be amicably and honorably adjusted. That

we had every disposition that this result might be attained. I observed,

however, that if ever this was accomplished, I thought it must be by

negotiation, and not by arbitration; and especially such an arbitration

as he proposed. That both the President and myself were firmly convinced

of the validity of our title up to 54° 40´; and yet his proposition to

arbitrate assumed the right to a portion of the territory on the part of

Great Britain, and left it to the arbitrator alone to decide in what

manner the territory should be divided between the parties. That this

alone, I thought, would be a sufficient reason for the rejection of his

proposition, even if others did not exist, of which he must be aware

from our previous conversations on the subject; but I would consult the

President, and give him an answer with as little delay as possible. He

intimated rather than expressed a wish that his answer might be

communicated to him in time for the packet (Monday). I told him that a

proper respect for the British government required that the answer

should be well considered; that the cabinet would not meet again before

Tuesday, and I could not encourage him to expect the answer before

Saturday next. He said he had no doubt my answer would be well

considered. He hoped that in it I would not assert a claim to the whole

territory, and Saturday next would be in time.

He then branched off, and said that the proposition was to refer the

question to a state as well as a sovereign; he said that this had been

done on purpose to get clear of the objection to crowned heads. I asked

him to whom he thought it might be referred if not to a sovereign. He

suggested the Republic of Switzerland, or the government of Hamburg or

Bremen. I told him that whilst my own inclinations were strongly against

arbitration; if I were compelled to select an arbitrator, it would be

the Pope. That both nations were heretics, and the Pope would be

impartial. This he appeared at first to take seriously,—he said the Pope

was a temporal sovereign; but I thought he was disinclined to select him

as an arbitrator. He perceived, however, that I was not in earnest, and

suggested that the reference might be made to commissioners from both

countries. I told him I thought it was vain to think of arbitration;

because, even if the President were agreed to it, which I felt pretty

certain he was not, no such treaty could pass the Senate. That the

pursuit of arbitration would only involve the question in new

difficulties. He then suggested the mediation of a third power in the

adjustment of the question. I told him that was an idea which he had

never suggested before, and on which I could say nothing. He observed

that this, together with his suggestion of commissioners, came from

himself and had not been embraced in his instructions. He said that a

mediator who would interfere might share the fate of the man who

interfered between two other men who were fighting, when both fell upon

him and gave him a sound drubbing.

He remarked that the affair might remain just where it was, and the

British government would not disturb it. He did not entertain serious

apprehensions of war.

He then told me that he had met Judge Douglas at Mr. Cox’s party the

other evening, and had a good deal of conversation with him about his

bill.

He objected to a promise of a grant of lands to actual settlers in

Oregon, and to the erection of forts by the Government within it, as

violations of the treaty. I told him I had formed no decided opinion as

to the promise of grants of land; but as to the forts, it was very

clear, in my opinion, that we had a right to erect them. We did not

purpose to erect fortifications capable of enduring a siege in civilized

warfare; but merely stockade forts to protect our emigrants from the

savages. That the Hudson’s Bay Company had erected many such forts, and

we surely had the right under the treaty to do what they had done. He

observed that the settlers might do this themselves as the Company had

done. I replied that they were too poor; that this Company had the

entire government in its hands; and surely we might do what they had

done. I observed that this was ever the way with Great Britain, she was

always fettered by monopolies; and if it were not for the Company they

would at once give us our rights to the whole country up to 54° 40′. He

said that the Hudson’s Bay Company had rights in Oregon which must be

protected; but I understood him to admit that they did interpose an

obstacle in the way of the settlement of the question. He said the

British government would be glad to get clear of the question on almost

any terms; that they did not care if the arbitrator should award the

whole territory to us. They would yield it without a murmur. I said I

had no doubt of this. They never played the part of the fox: but always

of the lion. They would preserve their faith inviolate. He said they

wished for peace; but intimated that this was not our wish. I asked him

why we should desire war. Would not their superiority at sea give them

command of the coasts of Oregon. Yes, he said, that was true, but the

war would not be confined to that region. That he would willingly make a

bargain to fight it out with us there, if we would agree to that.

On the 26th of February (1846), Mr. Buchanan addressed an elaborate

official despatch to Mr. McLane, explaining fully the reasons which had

led the President to decline to make the boundary of Oregon a subject of

arbitration, and suggesting what it would be practicable for the

President to agree upon, if proposed by the British government. Mr.

McLane was authorized to make known to Lord Aberdeen the contents of

this despatch; and between its date and the 1st of June, Sir Robert

Peel’s government determined to send to Washington the project of a

convention which is described in a despatch addressed to Mr. J. Randolph

Clay on the 13th of June, and which is given below. The despatch of

February 26th, to Mr. McLane, was accompanied by a private letter of the

same date. On the 6th of June, another private letter to Mr. McLane

informed him of the President’s purpose to submit Lord Aberdeen’s

project to the Senate, and the despatch of June 13th to Mr. Clay gives

the result.

[MR. BUCHANAN TO HON. LOUIS McLANE.]

WASHINGTON, Feb. 26, 1845.

MY DEAR SIR:—

The brief space left to me before the departure of our messenger to

Boston shall be devoted to writing you a private letter...... By my

despatch you will be made distinctly acquainted with the ground which

the President has determined to maintain on the Oregon question; and I

do not perceive, after what has passed, how he could do more than submit

a British proposition, based on the parallel of 49°, to the Senate. From

all I can learn, there is not the least doubt but that either of the two

propositions specified in my despatch would receive the previous

sanction of a constitutional majority of that body. I say the previous

sanction, for reasons which I have not the time to give you. All that I

apprehend is, that the British government, in their offer, may insist on

the perpetual free navigation of the Columbia. This would indeed be

truly embarrassing; and all your diplomacy should be exerted to prevent

it. The President would not present such a proposition to the Senate,

unless he should greatly change his mind; and if he should, I do not

believe that two-thirds of that body would give it their sanction.

I am convinced that the Oregon question is rapidly reaching that point

when it must, if ever, be peaceably settled. Although what I have said

to you of the present disposition of the Senate is strictly true, it is

uncertain how long this may continue. Public opinion on this subject is

far in advance of Congress. I am convinced that if the question should

remain open until the Congressional elections next fall, this would be

clearly evinced...... In Great Britain they form their judgment of

popular opinion from what they read in the newspapers, chiefly Whig, of

our large commercial cities. This you know to be a mistake. The

commercial interest which, in a great degree controls these papers, has

a direct interest in the preservation of peace, and especially with

Great Britain. The strong and irresistible public opinion throughout the

vast interior of our country, which controls the action of the

Government, is but little, if at all, affected by the considerations

which influence the mercantile community. General Cass and Mr. Allen,

who are both candidates for popular favor, the one immediately and the

other prospectively, will not consent to accept the parallel of 49°. The

two Senators from Indiana, the two from Illinois, and one from Missouri

(not Colonel Benton), occupy the same ground.

Mr. Calhoun, from a variety of circumstances, came to the Senate with a

flush of popularity, which might have rendered him highly useful, both

to himself and to his country; but, already, it is nearly all gone. He

at once took open and bold ground against the notice, and propagated his

opinions with that degree of zeal which belongs to his character. He

succeeded in inducing a small number of Democrats in the House, chiefly

Virginians, to vote against the notice; and such is now the weight of

public opinion in its favor, that it is said he would vote for it

himself, but for the awkward dilemma in which this would place his

friends in the House. The truth is, that the discreet friends of peace

clearly perceive that the question must be settled peaceably within the

year, or war may be the consequence. In some form or other it will pass

the Senate by a large majority; and many anticipate an almost unanimous

vote. I do not believe this. I have always liked Mr. Calhoun very much,

and am truly sorry that he did not adopt a wiser course. He must have

been the great man of our party in the Senate. Colonel Benton’s conduct

and speech on the Oregon question are entitled to warm commendation.

Your son Robert is winning laurels for himself in the Maryland

legislature. He is indeed a fine fellow, and a worthy chip of the old

block.

I have for years been anxious to obtain a seat on the bench of the

Supreme Court. This has been several times within my power; but

circumstances have always prevented me from accepting the offered boon.

I cannot desert the President, at the present moment, against his

protestations. If the Oregon question should not be speedily settled,

the vacancy must be filled; and then farewell to my wishes.

...... Please to remember me in the kindest terms to Mrs. McLane, and

believe me, as ever, to be, sincerely and respectfully,

Your friend,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

[BUCHANAN TO McLANE.]

(Private and Confidential.) WASHINGTON, June 6, 1846.

MY DEAR SIR:—

I have but little time to scribble you a private letter before the

closing of the mail to go by the Great Britain.

The President has determined to submit Lord Aberdeen’s project to the

Senate. He had no alternative, as you know, between this and its

absolute rejection.

The proviso to the first article would seem to render it questionable

whether both parties would have the right to navigate the Strait of

Fuca, as an arm of the sea, north of the parallel of 49°; neither does

it provide that the line shall pass through the Canal de Arro, as stated

in your despatch. This would probably be the fair construction.

The article relating to the possessions of British occupants south of

49° is vague and indefinite; and in order to prevent disputes between

the two governments hereafter, as to the extent of these possessions, it

would seem to be a prudent precaution to provide some means of

ascertaining the rights of these occupants respectively. There is no

reciprocal provision in the treaty for American settlers north of 49°.

There may be none there; but yet such a provision would give the

convention a fairer appearance.

The right of the Hudson’s Bay Company to the navigation of the Columbia

presents the important difficulty. It is considered doubtful by the

President and several members of the cabinet whether under the terms of

the projet this right would not expire upon the termination of the

existing charter of that company in 1859.

The President’s message will reiterate the opinions expressed in his

annual message in favor of our title to 54° 40´; but in consideration of

and in deference to the contrary opinions expressed by the Senate, his

constitutional advisers, he submits the projet to them for their

previous advice. He may probably suggest some modifications.

What the Senate may do in the premises is uncertain. There undoubtedly

is in that body a constitutional majority in favor of settling the

question on the parallel of 49° to the Straits of Fuca. The question of

the perpetual navigation of the Columbia is and ought to be the point of

difficulty. Should the Senate modify this article so as to limit the

right to the termination of the existing charter of the Hudson’s Bay

Company, I can scarcely suppose that the modification would be rejected

by the British government.

I sincerely hope that you may not think of leaving London until the

question shall be finally settled; and I am happy to learn from Robert

that your continuance in London will not be prejudicial to your private

interest at home.

With my kindest respects to Mrs. McLane, I remain sincerely and

respectfully your friend,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

[MR. BUCHANAN TO JOHN RANDOLPH CLAY, ESQ.]

No. 2. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,}

WASHINGTON, }

SIR:—

The Oregon question may now be considered as settled. On the 6th instant

Mr. Pakenham presented to me the project of a convention for its

adjustment: and the President, after mature deliberation, determined, in

pursuance of several precedents adopted in the early history of our

Government, to submit it to the Senate for their previous advice. This

was done by a confidential message on the 10th instant, of which I

transmit you a copy.

On the 12th instant the Senate adopted a resolution by a vote of 37 to

12, of which the following is a copy:

“Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring) that the

President of the United States be, and he is hereby, advised to accept

the proposal of the British government accompanying his message to the

Senate, dated 10th June, 1846, for a convention to settle boundaries,

etc., between the United States and Great Britain, west of the Rocky or

Stony Mountains.”

The convention will be signed by the plenipotentiaries on Monday next:

and in the course of the next week will doubtless be ratified by and

with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The terms are, an extension of the 49th parallel of latitude to the

middle of the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver’s

Island, thence along the middle of this channel and the Strait of Fuca,

so as to surrender the whole of that island to Great Britain.

The navigation of the Columbia is conceded, not to British subjects

generally, but to the Hudson’s Bay Company and those trading with it. To

this concession there is no express limitation of time; but it was

believed by the Senate, that under the true construction of the projet

this grant will expire on the 30th May, 1859, the date of the

termination of the existing license to that Company, to trade with the

Indians, etc., on the North-west Coast of America.

I need not enumerate the other less important particulars.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

While in December 1845 many political friends and opponents in all parts

of the country were reading with approbation the correspondence on the

Oregon question, so far as it had been published, an approbation which

appears from a great multitude of private letters addressed to Mr.

Buchanan, he thus wrote confidentially to Mr. McLane:

“I should this day [December 13th] have been on the bench of the Supreme

Court, had it not been for the critical state of our foreign relations.

I very much desired the position, because it would have enabled me to

spend the remainder of my days in peace. I have now been on the stormy

deep nearly a quarter of a century. Besides, I sincerely wished, if

possible, to prevent my name being even mentioned in connection with the

next Presidency.”

The vacancy on the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States was

occasioned by the death of Mr. Justice Baldwin. According to an

invariable custom the appointment should be made from the Pennsylvania

circuit. There were persons who desired, not without a mixture of

motives, that Mr. Buchanan might receive it; for his transfer to the

bench would, it was assumed, bring into the Department of State a

gentleman whose friends were exceedingly anxious to have him in that

position. Others wished Buchanan to be out of the cabinet, without much

reference to the question of who was to be his successor. There came

about a kind of intrigue, to produce a public belief that he was to be

appointed a judge, in order that it might be considered as a foregone

conclusion and appear to be called for by the general voice. Some of Mr.

Buchanan’s friends, of both political parties, believing that he had

eminent qualifications for the judicial office, urged him to accept the

offer, if it should be made to him; others, who had just as strong

convictions that he would be a great acquisition to the bench, were not

willing to have him retire from political life, and were earnestly

opposed to his leaving the Department of State at that time. The great

body of the discreet friends of the administration took the same view.

The matter was kept open for a long time, and meanwhile Mr. Buchanan,

uncertain of his own future, had to go on and manage the foreign

relations of the country, in which, besides the Oregon question, the

state of things consequent upon the proposed annexation of Texas and the

other difficulties with Mexico, of which I shall treat hereafter, became

extremely perplexing. That he would have preferred the safe retirement

of the bench to anything that political office could give him, and that

he would have renounced all further connection with politics if he had

received this appointment, cannot be doubted. Having had occasion thus

far to estimate the qualities of his mind and character, I may here

express the opinion, that he would have been a highly useful and

distinguished judge. If this change in the course of his life had taken

place, he would never have become President of the United States, and

his biography, if written, would have been only that of a man who had

been very eminent in political life to the age of forty-six, and had

then passed the remainder of his days in the tranquillity of a judicial

career, giving more or less proof of the versatility of his powers. He

believed that it would be a gain of happiness to escape from the stormy

conflicts of the political sphere. But public men can rarely do more

than “rough-hew their ends;” to entirely “shape” them is not given to

mortals. The following interesting letters from his friend King give, by

reflex, all that can now be known concerning his feelings in regard to

this disappointment:[91]

[HON. WM. R. KING TO MR. BUCHANAN.]

PARIS, January 25, 1846.

DEAR BUCHANAN:—

Your friendly letter gave me both pleasure and pain. Pleasure, in the

renewed assurance of your friendship; and pain, to perceive that the

course of the President towards you has not been entirely characterized

by that delicacy and confidence which is certainly due to your position,

and to the important services you have rendered to him and the country.

Let me entreat you, however, to act with great deliberation and

prudence. Do not suffer yourself to be operated upon by professing, or

even by real friends, to act hastily. I am not of the opinion that any

slight was intended by the President. He no doubt gave the true reason

for having nominated Judge —— without consulting you, as he knew you

were opposed to his selection.[92] It is not, I think, of sufficient

importance to produce a quarrel; and the President must be too well

aware of the strength you give to his administration to desire your

withdrawal. Your doing so at this most important juncture would be to

give the staff into the hands of your enemies; who would desire nothing

better to prostrate you with. Your able correspondence with Pakenham has

justly turned the eyes of the country towards you as a talented and safe

helmsman to guide the ship of State. This your enemies know and feel. Do

not, I again entreat you, by your own act, aid them to defeat your

future prospects. Probably I have dwelt more on this matter than it

merits; if so, I feel assured you will attribute it to the true motive,

my anxiety to see you elevated to a station you are so well qualified to

fill, with honor to yourself and advantage to the country....

[KING TO BUCHANAN.]

PARIS, February 28, 1846.

MY DEAR FRIEND:—

I read your kind letter attentively, and then committed it to the

flames, as you requested. The refusal of the President to place you on

the Bench of the Supreme Court, after you had manifested a willingness

to accept of the situation, surprises me greatly. I had supposed,

independent of a desire to gratify you, to whom he owes so much, he

would have seized with avidity on the opportunity thus afforded him to

get freed from the importunities of persons of doubtful qualification,

none of whom could venture to complain of your being preferred to him. I

have turned it over and over in my mind, to see if I could discover any

motive for his refusal other than that assigned by himself, viz., that

you were too important to his administration in the post you now occupy

to enable him to dispense with your services. If this was in truth his

sole reason, he should have frankly and unreservedly placed before you

the difficulties and embarrassments your abandonment of the State

Department would involve him in; how necessary you were to enable him to

carry on the Government successfully, and at the same time have

expressed his willingness to meet your wishes if persisted in. If such

had been his course, I know you too well to doubt for a moment but that

you would have relinquished the judgeship, and continued your invaluable

services as a member of the administration. This, however, you must

still do; you owe it to the country; you owe it to yourself. You can

form no idea of the reputation you have acquired, even in Europe, by the

able and masterly manner in which you have presented our claim to

Oregon, never before perfectly understood, either in Europe or America.

You certainly occupy at this moment, in public estimation, a more

enviable position than any other distinguished man of our country, and

your prospects for the future are brighter than those of any one I know.

Do not, I beg you, mar those prospects by abandoning your place at this

critical period of our foreign relations. Finish the work you have so

ably begun. Settle the Oregon question by an equitable compromise, and

whatever a few hot heads or selfish aspirants may say, your reputation

will rest upon a foundation broad and strong, the approval of a virtuous

and intelligent people at home, and the wise and good of every land. You

know I am no flatterer. I speak in all sincerity, and say nothing but

what is strictly true.

[KING TO BUCHANAN.]

PARIS, March 28th, 1846.

DEAR BUCHANAN:—

The last steamer brought me your very acceptable letter of the 26th

February. The publication of my correspondence with M. Guizot has been

well received by all parties in Paris, and has put at rest forever all

speculation as to the correctness of my despatch. Even M. Guizot himself

manifests a greater degree of cordiality than formerly, and made it a

point to attend a ball I gave on the 22d February, although he is not in

the habit of going to parties. I knew the course I pursued would, so far

from committing me with any one here, produce a salutary result; and it

was not taken in passion, or because I am “thin skinned.” My position

was never better than at this time with all in power here, from the king

down to the lowest official. Present me kindly to my friend, Mr. Trist,

and tender him my thanks for the interest he has manifested for me. The

postponement of the election of Senator for Alabama will, as you say,

enable me to enter the field with a fair prospect of success, and I am

free to declare that I should be truly gratified to be reinstated in the

Senate. It is possible, however, that the Governor may be operated upon

by those on the spot, who aspire to the situation, and dread my return,

to call the legislature together this spring, and before I can possibly

be present. This my friends Bagby and others should prevent. A called

session would involve unnecessary expense, without an adequate

advantage, or, in fact, any advantage whatever, so far as the public is

concerned. My arrangements are such that I cannot, with convenience,

return to the United States before the last of July. I am anxious,

however, to conform to the wishes of the President in the appointment of

my successor, and will either hasten or retard my surrender of my place,

as to him may seem best. Should he prefer to delay the appointment of my

successor until after the adjournment of Congress, I could return on

leave of absence, as he once kindly permitted me to do, and leave my

Secretary, Mr. Martin, as chargé des affaires. He is, as you know, well

qualified to discharge the duties, and on his account I should be

pleased to give to him the advantages of the position. You will confer

with the President and let me know what course will be most acceptable

to him, and I will then make my request accordingly. If a vacancy occurs

at Turin by the resignation of Wickliff, could you not lend a helping

hand to Dr. Martin? The place will not, I presume, be sought for by any

of the prominent politicians, and Martin’s information and experience

peculiarly fits him to be useful. He is, withal, very poor; and even if

my successor consented to retain him here, his condition would be

greatly altered for the worse, as with me he lives without expense.

Serve him if you can; at any rate, save us from that miserable toady ——.

I altogether approve of the President’s refusal to submit the Oregon

question to arbitration, as proposed by the British government. The

objections enumerated by you are all sufficient, but, in addition, it

could not escape your observation that, by the terms of submission,

whether referred to a crowned head or to private individuals, the result

would, in all probability, have been to deprive us of all the country

north of the Columbia, simply upon the ground that actual possession

should not be disturbed. Information on which I can rely convinces me

that Lord Aberdeen, when he directed the offer to be made, did not

expect it to be accepted. His object was, first, to induce the European

governments to believe that they were anxious to settle the question

upon just terms, and, secondly, to gain time, as they calculated on Sir

Robert Peel’s measure inducing the American people to force their

Government to give way on the Oregon question that they may receive the

advantages it holds out to them.[93] I know the calculation is

altogether erroneous, and that, as you say, the people are ahead of the

Government on the question. Still, such is the impression made in

England by Pakenham’s despatches, the speeches of some of our prominent

men, and the tone of our opposition press generally. I have my doubts

whether Pakenham is as yet instructed to make a proposition for a

compromise, but it will be made; and will, I think, be such as we should

not hesitate to accept, unless the perpetual navigation of the Columbia

is insisted upon. This I would not grant without an equivalent in the

navigation of the St. Lawrence; but there seems to be a propriety in

allowing the use of the river for a term of years, not to exceed ten, to

enable the Northwest Fur Company gradually to withdraw an interest which

has grown up under the treaty of joint occupancy. The President will

certainly act with prudence by submitting the proposition, whatever it

may be (unless altogether inadmissible), to the Senate, for the advice

in advance of that body. Cass, Allen and Company will find that no

political capital can be made by arraying themselves against an

arrangement which makes the 49th parallel the boundary, but yielding the

whole of Vancouver’s Island, and the use for a few years of the Columbia

River. The good sense of the whole country will approve of such a

settlement. I am not at all surprised to hear that Calhoun is anxious to

free himself from the odium of voting against the notice, regardless of

the dilemma in which he has involved his devoted adherents in the House.

If the Senate amends the House resolutions, my life upon it, they will

receive Calhoun’s vote; and all chivalry will exclaim: Behold the great

statesman, whose wise and prudent course has alone saved the nation from

the horrors of war. The speech of Colonel Benton was excellent, and

proves him to be a statesman indeed. Still, I do not, I am sorry to say,

approve of his opposition to an increase of our navy. If we hope to

command the respect of the powers of Europe, we must put ourselves in a

position not only to repel all aggression, but, if needs be, to act on

the offensive. They are all jealous of our rapid growth and prosperity,

and would, if they dared, unite to retard or destroy it. We should

hasten to repair our forts, build some new ones, and add to our little

navy ten or twelve war steamers.

Such preparation, although it involves expense, would in all probability

save us millions, as it would effectually put down all attempts to wrest

the Island of Cuba from Spain, or to establish a monarchy in Mexico. I

highly approve of the views taken by Bancroft; he promises to make an

able and efficient Secretary of the Navy, and I hope he will retain his

place and give up, if he has thought of it, all idea of a foreign

mission. —— —— is here on his return home; he is no doubt an amiable

man, but weak beyond description. Such a representative at such a court

was calculated to do us a positive injury; we require to have there one

of our ablest men. Berlin is of much less importance; in truth, to keep

a minister there is scarcely worth the expense. Donalson is a good

appointment; I wish it had been for St. Petersburg. I am fully aware

that diplomatic situations are in great demand, and that the President

is worried with applications from second and even third-rate men for the

most important stations. I trust, however, that no commonplace men may

be sent to London, Paris or St. Petersburg. My residence abroad has

convinced me that the respect in which our country is held very much

depends on the character and standing of its representative; and I

greatly doubt the policy of making removals when the incumbent possesses

talent and information, and from a long residence has acquired

facilities for obtaining useful information which a new man, whatever

his ability, it may be will require years to obtain. This I know runs

counter to your theory of rotation in office; which may be correct as

respects office at home, but should not, I think, apply to those held

abroad. I once gave you my opinion of Wheaton. I see no reason to change

that opinion. He is peculiarly well qualified to represent his country

with advantage. Could he not be sent to St. Petersburg? He has grown old

in diplomacy without growing rich, and at his period of life will find

it exceedingly difficult to engage in any pursuit, other than that he

has so long followed, with a prospect of securing to his family a decent

support. I should feel truly gratified if you would bring him to the

attention of the President. I am much gratified to learn that harmony

prevails in the Cabinet; a break up would do much mischief. Retain your

place regardless of all minor annoyances. The country requires your

services to bring to a successful termination the important and delicate

question of Oregon. You have the confidence of all parties; and I

heartily believe that in the present state of things the President could

not find a man capable of supplying your place. Stay where you are,

settle the Oregon question, and great shall be your reward. Tender my

respects to my friends Sturgeon and General Cameron, also to Walker,

Mason and Benton.

Your friend sincerely,

WILLIAM R. KING.

P.S.—Present me most respectfully to the President and his accomplished

lady.

W. R. K.

[KING TO BUCHANAN.]

PARIS, April 30, 1846.

DEAR BUCHANAN:—

I thank you for your long and friendly letter. Engrossed as your time

must be by cares of State, official duties and social intercourse, I

feel flattered in having engaged so much of your attention. On the 16th

of this month Paris was thrown into a state of great excitement by an

attempt made to assassinate the king at Fontainebleau, where he had been

spending a few days with his family. Two shots were actually fired into

the _char à banc_ (an open carriage), in which he was returning from a

hunting party, in company with the queen, Madame Adelaide, and several

other members of the royal family. Fortunately, no one received the

slightest injury. The ladies were terribly frightened, but the king

showed his usual coolness and disregard of danger. The wretched assassin

was instantly seized by the attendants. He turned out to be a former

employé of the government, who, having lost his place, had brooded over

the injustice he conceived had been done him until he determined to kill

the king to revenge himself. Lecomt, for that is the name of the

miserable man, has been subjected to several examinations, but nothing

has transpired to connect him in any manner with any of the political

parties of the country. Although the _Journal des Debats_, the

semi-official paper, whatever disclosures Mr. Guizot may make, has, and

as I think, most imprudently, contended that it was political. Be that

as it may, it has certainly called forth the better feelings of the

French generally in favor of their wise, prudent and pacific old

monarch, which will add strength to his government and give permanency

to his dynasty. I hastened on his return to Paris to tender him my

congratulations on his extraordinary and most providential escape; for

Lecomt is said to be one of the best shots in France. The old man bears

a charmed life. Would it not be well for the President to address him

with his own hand a letter of congratulation at his fortunate escape

from the hands of the base assassin? It would, I know, be well received,

and in the present state of our relations with England, we should treat

France with marked courtesy. Trifles in themselves are of great

importance here. I am somewhat surprised at Lord Aberdeen’s course on

the Oregon question, especially as he has openly expressed a desire to

settle it on amicable terms. That arbitration would be rejected, he must

have known when he instructed Pakenham to make the proposition; and it

strikes me that the motive for making it was to gain time, pass their

free trade measures, and avail themselves of the effects it would have

in the United States, to obtain more favorable terms than had been

offered by us—or should negotiation fail and war ensue, they would be

able to prejudice the European governments against us by showing that

they had tendered arbitration, which was rejected. I must think,

however, that as soon as the resolutions, to give the notice to put an

end to the existing treaty, shall have passed the Senate, a proposition

for a compromise will be made; but whether it will be such as ought to

be accepted by us, is more than doubtful. My information leads me to

believe it will not be. Still it will open the door for negotiation, and

however extravagant, should not be promptly rejected, but with proposed

modifications. If Pakenham has common sense, he must long before this

have well understood that a proposition to fix the line at 49° to the

Straits; the whole of Vancouver’s Island; part of Puget Sound; the

navigation of the Columbia; with indemnity to the North West Fur

Company, would never be acceded to by us, be the consequences what they

may. Should such an extravagant offer be made, be assured Mr. P. will

have a wide margin given him for modifications; and in the end he will

settle down on Vancouver’s Island and the navigation of the Columbia for

a term of years. You already know my opinions on this subject, and

further I would not go, war or no war. Be not surprised, if the

conducting of this negotiation falls into the hands of the Whigs, unless

speedily settled. I do not think many months will pass over before Lord

John Russell will be at the head of affairs in England, and Lord

Palmerston in the Foreign Office. Now, I am not of the number who

believe that the return of the Whigs to power will throw additional

obstacles in the way of the adjustment of our difficulties, and I trust,

should the change take place, we shall have no alarm speeches from those

Senators who recently expressed such heart-felt pleasure that Lord John

had failed to form a ministry. When shall we learn prudence in our

national councils? You are, I am sorry to see, dissatisfied with your

position; and I am no less wearied with mine. Most sincerely do I wish

that we had both remained in the Senate. You, however, have much to

reconcile you to the change; having acquired increased reputation by

your able correspondence with Pakenham; nor must you on any account

abandon your post, until that affair is finally settled. The war spirit

of Cass, Allen, etc., must not deter the President from making, if

practicable, a fair compromise. In such a course he will be sustained by

the good sense of the country. When I wrote you to consult the President

relative to my return home, it was simply because I was desirous to

subject him to no inconvenience in the selection of my successor. The

state of my private affairs renders it imperative that I should be at

home in September. I can remain here until the first of that month, but

not longer; and I wish you so to inform the President. Any mode he

chooses to adopt to enable me to execute my purposes, will be perfectly

satisfactory, and my object in writing thus early, is to know what

course will be adopted, that I may make my arrangements accordingly. I

shall not fail to procure a breast-pin, or ring, or something of the

kind, and present it Mrs. Walsh in your name. It should have been done

before this, but I have been suffering from lumbago, which has confined

me to the house. I am now, however, nearly well. Poor McLane has for

many weeks been suffering severely from some affection...... He is still

in the hands of his physician, but much better. He stands deservedly

high in England, with both Whig and Tory. Lord Landsdown, who will be

the president of the council, if the Whigs get into power, was in Paris

a few days past, and spoke to me of McLane in the most exalted terms.

Catlin has, I understand, applied to Congress, to purchase his Indian

gallery. It should not be lost to our country, as it will be if Congress

refuses the purchase, for he has offers from England, which he is only

prevented from accepting by his anxious desire that his own country

should possess it. It is richly worth what he asks for it, and you would

be doing a service to a most estimable man if you would take the trouble

to enlist some of your friends in favor of the purchase. As Grund gives

up the consulate at Antwerp, why not appoint Vesey? He is honest and

capable, and withal a good and true American in all his principles. Mrs.

Ellis thanks you for your kind remembrance of her. Present my kindest

regards to the Bentons, Bagbys, Pleasontons and Beans.

Your friend sincerely,

WILLIAM R. KING.

P. S.—Say to my friend, Col. Benton, that exalted as was my opinion of

his statesmanlike qualities, his courage on the Oregon question has

raised him still higher in my estimation. Richly does he deserve his

well earned popularity. But for my stiff fingers, which almost disable

me from holding my pen, I would write to him and express more fully the

respect and regard I entertain for him. I wish you would call his

attention to Catlin’s proposition to dispose of his gallery of Indian

portraits and curiosities. I do not think it should be lost to our

country.

W. R. K.

[KING TO BUCHANAN.]

PARIS, July 15th, 1845.

DEAR BUCHANAN:—

I have this moment received your letter of the 23d June, brought out by

the Great Western. I have at once availed myself of your suggestion, and

asked officially for my recall. I hope to embark for the United States

on the 15th of September, or, at farthest, by the first of October. I am

most anxious to see you, and, as far as I have any influence, to prevail

on you to abandon all idea of the judgeship, and to continue in your

present position, where you have rendered such important services to our

country, and justly elevated yourself in the estimation of all whose

good opinion is worth having.

As for ——, envy and vanity are his controlling passions, his praise or

his censure are alike worthless, and you should treat them with

contempt. You speak of three sections of the Democratic party in the

Senate, headed by Cass, Benton and Calhoun. Cass may have a small party

composed almost exclusively of the old followers of Benton; but I am at

a loss to understand who they are who now constitute the late Colonel’s

party. It seems to me, able general as I admit he is, that all his men

have deserted, and unless he can enlist recruits from the Whig ranks, he

must be his own standard-bearer. Calhoun’s followers are beginning to

look over the left shoulder, and even his fidus Achates, D. H. Lewis,

will very soon turn his back on him. Calhoun is politically dead. The

Oregon question and the Mexican war have already proved fatal to many

distinguished leaders, Democrat and Whig, so that you will find the

field open for the Presidency, unless you place yourself on the shelf by

accepting of the judgeship. I am much pleased to learn that the best

possible relations exist between you and the President. Use your

influence to prevent him from selecting improper persons to fill the

missions to London, Paris and St. Petersburg. They are most important

positions, and should be filled by the first men of our country, and not

by mere seekers of office, or by those who erroneously suppose that they

can enrich themselves by the outfit and salary. I speak from my own

experience when I say that no American minister can live even

respectably in Paris for less than fifteen thousand dollars a year.

Congress should look to this, and give such compensation as will enable

the country to avail itself of the services of the best qualified, who

are but too often destitute of private fortune. Mrs. Ellis still

continues to be your warm advocate for the Presidency. She requests me

to present her best respects. Mr. Martin is much pleased with diplomacy,

but has great apprehension lest he should not find his position as

Secretary altogether as desirable with my successor; and he is looking

forward with hope to an appointment as chargé des affaires, either at

Turin, or some other place. Could you not aid him? He is, as you know,

exceedingly poor, and not very provident, and an increase of salary

would be important to him. Present my best respects to my friends, the

Pleasontons, Taylors, and old associates in the Senate.

Faithfully your friend,

WILLIAM R. KING.

[KING TO BUCHANAN.]

LIVERPOOL, Oct. 1, 1847.

DEAR BUCHANAN:—

On the 15th of September, I presented my letters of recall, and took

leave of his Majesty, the King of the French. He was pleased to express

great regret at parting with me, and a hope that nothing had occurred

during my residence at his court which had given me dissatisfaction. I

assured him such was not the case, and that I should ever cherish

towards him and his amiable family the kindest feelings for the uniform

courtesy and cordiality he and they had manifested towards me. He

abounded in professions of friendship for myself personally, and for my

country; but Louis Philippe is full of duplicity, and professions cost

him but little. I left Paris on the 16th, and hastened to Liverpool to

embark on board the splendid iron steamer, the Great Britain. On the 22d

we took our departure. The day was fine, the wind fair, and we proceeded

on our voyage at the rate of twelve miles an hour. The passengers, 180

persons, were all in high spirits, and flattered themselves with a short

and agreeable voyage. Most lamentably were our hopes blasted. In an evil

hour the captain determined to take the dangerous northern passage. Why,

it would be difficult to tell, as the wind was equally fair for the

southern. Night came on dark and gloomy. The breeze freshened, almost

approaching to a gale; still he kept on his way at the same rapid rate,

although he now acknowledges that he had mistaken his reckoning and was,

in fact, ignorant of his situation. A little before eleven the ship

struck on the ledge of rocks which surround Dundee Bay, north of

Ireland. The shock was indeed terrific, and the ladies, many of whom had

retired for the night, rushed from their rooms, frantic with alarm.

Among them was Mrs. Ellis. Believing that the ship must go to pieces in

a few minutes, I frankly told her her danger. To my astonishment, she

became calm and composed, and during the whole trying scene displayed

extraordinary composure. To our extraordinary speed we probably, under

Providence, owe our escape from a watery grave. The good ship cleared

the reefs and imbedded herself in the sand, where as the tide was

receding, she sunk deeper and deeper, maintaining an upright position.

Our hope now was that her great strength would enable her to resist the

waves, which thundered against her side and dashed over her lofty decks,

until the dawn of day; for should she break up in the darkness of the

night, on a rocky shore, with a heavy sea, all were convinced that few,

if any, could be saved. Long indeed appeared that terrible night, but

day at length dawned, and the tide being out, we found we were but a

short distance from the dry land. The boats were lowered. I placed Mrs.

Ellis in the first that left the ship, and saw her make the shore in

safety. My nephew and myself followed as soon as all the ladies were

landed, and joined her in a miserable cabin where she had taken refuge

from the rain. No lives were lost. I procured a conveyance for Down

Patrick, where we rested for the night. The next day we arrived at

Belfast and took the steamer for Liverpool. Being unable to procure a

passage in any of the steamships which leave in this month, I shall sail

to-morrow in the packet ship New York, with the prospect of a passage of

at least thirty days, but I trust it will be a safe one.

Your friend sincerely,

WILLIAM R. KING.

[HON. RICHARD RUSH TO MR. BUCHANAN.]

SYDENHAM, NEAR PHILADELPHIA, December 16, 1845.

MY DEAR SIR:—

...... I have this morning been turning once more to your note of the

30th of August on the Oregon question, in answer to the British

minister’s of the 29th of July. I had, to be sure, read it on its first

appearance with the greatest attention; and it would be unjust to

withhold longer from you my poor tribute to its value. Its demonstration

of our title is so full, as to leave nothing further to be said; so

clear that our whole country can now fortunately understand it; and it

is in a spirit so fair, and in a tone of patriotism so high and just,

that every American has solid ground to feel proud of it. I rejoice that

the country has found so powerful an exponent of her rights as is

recorded in this most able state paper; and, as one of her sons formerly

striving to defend those rights abroad, gladly award to you both my

tribute and my share of the public thanks, for this comprehensive, final

and triumphant vindication of them which your pen has accomplished.

Perhaps, in propriety and prudence, I ought here to stop. I know how

rash it generally is, in those not behind the curtain, to be venturing

opinions before those who are; yet while writing I cannot avoid adding

my belief, founded upon as much only as is known to the public, that war

is at hand. I rest on the courageous spirit of Britain, which we must

not undervalue, as it is the root of our own: and from a belief in the

stability of her resources—more than is entertained by all of our

friends. These are no reasons why we should fear her, but only for being

on the look out; and we shall all, when the extremity comes, owe you, my

dear sir, a heavy debt for making our right so manifest in the eyes of

this great nation. But Britain, I believe, has a firm conviction (such

are the different eyes with which nations look) that she has rights in

that country; and, by my estimate, she will not, as things stand, yield

them north of the Columbia, but appeal to the sword, and very

soon—unless an arbitration, or a mediation should arrest the appeal.

I pray you to excuse these presumptuous forebodings, in which I truly

hope I may be wrong, but in the faith of which I am at present deeply

imbued; and to believe me to be, with the most unfeigned and friendly

respect,

Yours most faithfully,

RICHARD RUSH.

[RUSH TO BUCHANAN.]

SYDENHAM, near PHILADELPHIA, August 26, 1846.

MY DEAR SIR:—

I hardly know how to thank you sufficiently for your obliging favor of

the 22d instant and the documents you have so kindly sent me respecting

the Oregon negotiation. All have arrived safely, as well those by Mr.

Sword as the separate one from you by mail; and now I have in hand

everything I could wish.

My attention was specially directed to the protocol of the 24th of

September, 1844, recording the break-up between Mr. Calhoun and Mr.

Pakenham, and I can understand the hopeless prospect it seemed to leave

to the new administration. When I used to brood over that protocol last

winter, and recall what passed in Mr. Gallatin’s negotiation in ’26 and

in mine of ’24, and weighed the long inflexibility with which England

had adhered to the Columbia as her basis; and remembered also, as I

freshly could and did, the solemnity—I have no doubt sincerity too at

that time—with which Huskisson used to tell me that he and their whole

cabinet thought _even that line_ a great concession to us, I did not see

how war was to be avoided after the President’s bold and brilliant

message when Congress opened. One of the Paris papers, the

_Constitutionnel_, speaking of the settlement of the dispute, said that

the English journals pretended that England had given to the United

States a lesson of wisdom and moderation; but they might add, said the

same paper, that “the Government of the United States, on its part, has

given to all powers in relation with England a lesson of firmness.” This

is the truth. I again own, that I did not think England would have

yielded as much as she has; and although it appears from Mr. McLane’s

communications that terms something better might have been finally

obtained, but for the Senate, history will be justified in pronouncing

the President’s course under the complications of the occasion (Mexico

and everything else) wise and advantageous for the country, and one to

draw a just fame to himself and the administration. England had got very

near to her fighting point, and the settlement marks a great epoch in

our annals—one not unlike, under some parallels that might be drawn, the

war of 1812 in its acceleration of our national character.

The last article in the last _Edinburgh Review_, headed “Colonial

Protection,” is an argument for us touching the West India trade with

England, its principle covering full reciprocity as to our _shipping_ as

well as traffic, though the Reviewers do not utter the former word; and

now that the Whigs are in, it may be hoped that they will think so, and

that Sir Robert Peel will co-operate with them, as on the sugar

question. Sir Robert having done so much already, might now set about

pushing Lord John Russell into farther liberality! What a curious

spectacle this would present in the British parliament; yet things more

remarkable have been happening there lately, and much more so than if

they were at length to admit our tobacco almost duty free.

I am gratefully sensible to the friendly invitation you give me to your

hospitable roof while going on with the investigation I spoke of, though

am now through your kindness supplied with sufficient materials. Whether

I shall venture upon another volume or not, I am quite undetermined.

Sometimes I feel half inclined; then again the other scale kicks the

beam. The latter is the case whenever I think of Hannah More’s comment

upon Pope, who when quoting the line from him which says the greatest

art in writing is “_to blot_,” says there is a greater—“the art _to

stop_.”

If I live as long as my mother, who was out here this week at 86, in

good health, I shall have time to make up my mind. Excuse this flight,

as well as so long a letter, and pray believe in the friendly and

perfect respect and esteem with which I am, my dear sir,

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD RUSH.

Mr. McLane, at his own request, was recalled from London after the

settlement of the Oregon question, and Mr. Bancroft, who had been

Secretary of the Navy, in October, 1846, became Mr. McLane’s successor.

The following private letters may fitly close the present chapter:

[MR. BUCHANAN TO HON. GEO. BANCROFT.]

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1846.

MY DEAR SIR:—

I cannot suffer you to depart from the country without saying from the

heart, God bless you! May your mission be prosperous, and Mrs. Bancroft

and yourself happy! I sorely regret that we have lost your services in

the Navy Department, and still more that we have lost your society; and

this I do, without any disparagement to your successor, whom I highly

esteem. My feelings, both in regard to Mrs. Bancroft and yourself, are

warmly entertained by Mrs. Polk, with whom I have recently held a

conversation on the subject.

The two most important objects of your mission will be to have the

duties on tobacco diminished, and to obtain a relaxation of the present

arrangement regulating our trade with the British West Indies and

American provinces. Free trade is now the order of the day, and I am not

without hope that these objects may be accomplished. I have omitted to

instruct you on the former subject on your own suggestion. I desire that

you should enjoy all the credit of the movement. I think a despatch

embracing all the statistical and other information on the subject, with

your own views, might do both the country and yourself much good.[94] In

regard to the latter subject, I have not had sufficient time to give it

a thorough investigation.

There is still much sickness in Washington, though not of a dangerous

character. The centre of the city, F Street and the avenue, is

comparatively healthy. Both Marcy and Mason have had intermittents,—they

were, however, at the cabinet to-day. Miss Annie[95] appears to be

entirely well, and is again as gay as a lark. Miss Clem.[96] is still

very weak, and has not yet left her chamber, unless she has done so

to-day.

With my kindest regards for Mrs. Bancroft, I remain, as ever, sincerely

and respectfully,

Your friend,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

[BANCROFT TO BUCHANAN.]

October 8, 1846.

MY DEAR MR. BUCHANAN:—

My heart sunk within me as I read your letter containing new evidences

of your friendship and regard; because it made me feel more sensibly how

much I lose in parting from immediate co-operation with you. Your hint

about tobacco I shall adopt, and will make it my special business to

collect all the details. On the other subject also, which is of less

immediate necessity, I propose to enter upon its consideration fully,

first, however, submitting to you the paper which I may prepare. You

must always deal with me frankly, giving me advice as freely as you

would to a younger brother. You may be sure of my acting with caution;

and I shall always aim to carry out your views in the manner that I

think will be most satisfactory to you. I shall hope to hear from you

very often privately, as well as officially.

Your parcels came yesterday safely to me, about an hour after I wrote to

you.

Mrs. Bancroft joins me in expression of the most cordial regard.

Ever most truly yours,

GEORGE BANCROFT.

[BANCROFT TO BUCHANAN.]

LONDON, November 3, 1846.

MY DEAR MR. BUCHANAN:—

I must add a line to you if it be but to remind you personally of me.

To-night I shall see a good deal of Lord Palmerston. The tone in England

is, towards us, one of respect. Public opinion is in favor of letting us

alone, and people are beginning to say that it would be a blessing to

the world if the United States would assume the tutelage of Mexico. This

country is neither in the disposition, nor in the ability, to interrupt

its friendly relations with us. The good understanding between the

British cabinet and the French is quite broken up, and they use in the

newspapers and in private very harsh language towards each other. But by

the next steamer I shall know more.

The paper at Springfield, Mass., which I named to you for the

publication of the laws was the “_Hampden Post_,” the old Democratic

newspaper with which I fought many a hard battle against the worst sort

of malignant Whigs.

“Give my love to Mr. Buchanan,” says Mrs. Bancroft. So give my love to

Clementina and Annie, say I, and wish them all happiness and abundant

health. I wish them good husbands and you a good wife.

Ever faithfully yours,

G. BANCROFT.

[FROM MR. CALHOUN.]

FORT HILL, August 30, 1845.

MY DEAR SIR:—

I enclose a letter to ——, the minister appointed by the Dominican

Republic to our Government, which I will thank you to have forwarded to

his address.

He informs me that Mr. Hogan’s report will shortly be made. I hope if it

should be favorable, the administration will not fail to recognize the

independence of the republic, as soon as it can be done according to

what has been usual in such cases. St. Domingo is, perhaps, the most

fertile and best of all the West India Islands. It was lost to

civilization and commerce through the insane movements of France during

her revolution. Should the Dominican Republic sustain itself, it opens a

prospect of restoring the island again to the domains of commerce and

civilization. It may one day or another be one of the great marts for

our products. It can sustain a population of many millions. It belongs

to us to take the lead in its recognition.

I have good reason to believe that our recognition would be acceptable

to both France and Spain......

I regret to learn that the prospect is so discouraging in reference to

the settlement of the Oregon question by the parties. I regard it as

very important that it should be settled. If it should not be, there is

great danger of its leading to a rupture between the two countries,

which would be equally disastrous to both. It is beyond the power of man

to trace the consequences of a war between us and England on the subject

of Oregon. All that is certain is, that she can take it and hold it

against us, as long as she has the supremacy on the ocean, and retains

her Eastern dominions. The rest is left in mystery.

As to my going again into the Senate, I do not contemplate to return

ever again to public life. I am entirely content with the portion of the

public honors which have fallen to my share, and expect to spend the

rest of my days in retirement, in my quiet retreat near the foot of the

mountains. I find ample and agreeable occupation both of mind and body.

With great respect, yours truly,

J. C. CALHOUN.

NOTE ON THE OREGON QUESTION.

Mr. Justin McCarthy, in his “History of our own Times,” passes very

lightly over the Oregon controversy, leaving his readers to infer that

the only element of danger was the popularity which any President would

have gained by forcing England into a war. Nearly the whole of his

“history” of this question is condensed into the following sentences:

“The joint occupancy was renewed for an indefinite time; but in 1843 the

President of the United States somewhat peremptorily called for a final

settlement of the boundary. The question was eagerly taken up by

excitable politicians in the American House of Representatives. For more

than two years the Oregon question became a party cry in America. With a

large proportion of the American public, including, of course, nearly

all citizens of Irish birth or extraction, any President would have been

popular beyond measure who had forced a war on England. Calmer and wiser

counsels prevailed, however, on both sides. Lord Aberdeen, our foreign

secretary, was especially moderate and conciliatory. He offered a

compromise which was at last accepted.”

A true understanding of any past controversy between England and the

United States is of importance in the future, not only that justice may

be done to individual statesmen, but that the methods by which war has

been averted and mutual respect and good feeling have been preserved,

may have a salutary influence in all time to come. This is the chief

value of the history of such international controversies. The truth is,

that in this Oregon matter there were undoubtedly popular tendencies in

this country, which, if they had been yielded to, might have enabled any

President to force a war upon England, if he had been disposed to have

one. But it is not true that there was anything precipitate or

peremptory in the call for a final settlement of the boundary, or that

the American Government was disposed at any time to go further in

compliance with the popular demand than it was bound to go, by a proper

regard for the rights of the country and the interests of the settlers

in the national domain, who looked to it for protection. Moreover there

was at one time quite as great a probability that a war on this question

of Oregon would find backers in England, as there was that it would be

popular in America. There were interests and passions in both countries

that had strong tendencies to provoke a war: and the war would have

occurred at a time when, to repeat the words of Mr. Webster, it “would

have kindled flames that would have burned over the whole globe.”

When the President’s message of December, 1845, communicating to

Congress the correspondence down to that period reached England, the

British press became excessively violent and even abusive. Worse things

could not have been said of any government or people than were said of

the American nation and their rulers; and it is just as true,

historically, that a war would have been popular in England, as it was

that it would have been popular in America. In the House of Commons

there were by no means wanting strong proofs of an unnecessary

excitement.

In estimating the causes which produced the real peril of a war, it

would not be just to overlook the loose, not to say careless, manner, in

which the negotiation was at first conducted by and through the British

minister in Washington. His rejection of Mr. Buchanan’s offer of the

49th parallel, without a reference to his own government, made in terms

that were not well considered—that were in fact scarcely respectful—put

it out of the power of the President to do anything but to reassert the

American claim, and to leave the British government to renew the

negotiation by other steps, or to take the consequences of a termination

of the joint occupancy. It is not to be questioned that Lord Aberdeen’s

subsequent course became moderate and conciliatory. But in the earlier

stages of this business, Sir Robert Peel’s ministry had on hand a most

serious domestic question. To borrow the pithy words of Mr. McCarthy

himself, used in reference to that question: “Peel came into office in

1841 to maintain the corn laws, and in 1843 he repealed them.” It was in

fact with Peel one long struggle between his former connections and the

new opinions forced upon him by the circumstances in which he was

placed; and although, in dealing with the relations between England and

this country, in the earlier part of his ministry, there were manifested

great care, prudence, and conciliation, it is quite certain that in the

later controversy about Oregon, which had not been settled by the treaty

of 1842, the British foreign office did not act at first with the same

attentive circumspection, and was not represented at Washington with

anything like the same ability and wisdom, as it was in the time of Lord

Ashburton’s special mission. And how was it that public opinion and

official persons in England were brought to a sense of the peril in

which both nations stood in 1845–6? So far as salutary influences could

be exerted on this side of the Atlantic and be felt in either country,

great merit is due to two of our statesmen, Mr. Buchanan and Mr.

Webster; the one having the duty of conducting the negotiation to a

peaceful issue; the other the duty of watching it, and of using all his

influence at home and abroad to produce caution, moderation, and a just

sense of the responsibility that would rest upon those in either country

who should unnecessarily lead the two nations into a war.

To Mr. Buchanan the praise is due, that he conducted the negotiation

throughout with skill and firmness, with entire good temper, and without

any wish to gain for the President or himself the cheap popularity that

might have followed their propitiation of the war spirit among their

countrymen. Mr. Webster’s admonitions, uttered with his accustomed

solemnity, both on the popular platform and in the Senate, were

addressed alike to both governments and both nations; but they were

chiefly designed to affect opinion and feeling in England, and this

design was, in a considerable degree, accomplished.

-----

Footnote 91:

William R. King of Alabama. He was a Senator in Congress from that

State for a period of nearly twenty-five years, from 1819 to 1844. He

resigned his seat in the Senate and accepted the mission to France, to

which he was appointed in April, 1844, by President Tyler. He was an

accomplished statesman of broad and liberal views. A strong friendship

had existed between him and Mr. Buchanan, from the time when the

latter entered the Senate. Mr. King was at first under the impression

that Mr. Buchanan had declined the judgeship, and on the 1st of

January he wrote to express his gratification that the matter had

taken this turn. But in fact the appointment was never offered.

Footnote 92:

This does not refer to Mr. Justice Grier, who became the successor of

Judge Baldwin.

Footnote 93:

This refers to the measure for free trade in corn.

Footnote 94:

Mr. Bancroft informs me that he subsequently advised Mr. Buchanan not

to open a negotiation for a reduction of the British taxes on tobacco,

knowing that it would be a useless effort to endeavor to persuade

England to change that part of her financial system.

Footnote 95:

The niece of Mrs. Madison.

Footnote 96:

Miss Clementina Pleasonton.

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CHAPTER XXI.

1845–1848.

ORIGIN OF THE WAR WITH MEXICO—EFFORTS OF MR. POLK’S ADMINISTRATION TO

PREVENT IT.

The administration of President Polk inherited the Texas question from

the preceding administration of President Tyler. The mode in which it

was finally proposed to bring the republic of Texas into the American

Union has been already described. When Mr. Polk became President of the

United States, Texas had been for nine years practically an independent

power, with a form of government modelled on that of the United States,

with the exception of the fact that Texas consisted of a single State.

The emigration which had flowed into it from the south-western region of

the United States had made it a slaveholding country. From the time when

its independence was acknowledged by the American Government, the

question whether it should remain a separate nation, or be absorbed into

the American Union, became a very serious one. The leading men who had

gone thither, had made the revolution which claimed to have expelled,

and had practically expelled, the Mexican power; and together with the

great bulk of the inhabitants, they looked upon the United States as

their mother country. There were great difficulties attending either of

the two courses that remained open for the American Government. On the

one hand, if Texas should be left as a separate nationality, to continue

her war with Mexico, which still lingered after the battle of San

Jacinto, that war was quite certain to end in efforts of the Texans to

invade and conquer Mexico. This would have been resisted by England, and

with her aid Mexico would in turn have invaded Texas. The power of

England once introduced into Mexico, she would in all probability have

shared the fate of India. On the other hand, the introduction of Texas

into the American Union was proposed at a time when the “Abolitionists”

of the North had long been pressing forward the immediate and

unconditional abolition of slavery everywhere, by what they regarded as

“moral means,” without any consideration for the feelings or

apprehensions of the Southern people. To make a large addition to the

area of slavery by the annexation of Texas, a slaveholding State, was

regarded in the South as a necessary means of strengthening the

political power of that section against the control of the General

Government, which, it was feared, might eventually be obtained by a

sectional combination of the Northern States on questions relating to

the whole subject of slavery. It was a hazardous mode of meeting the

dangers arising from the Northern anti-slavery agitation, because it

placed the people of the South in the attitude of seeking a

preponderance of political power upon a sectional issue, at a time when

the people of the North were not seeking to obtain such a sectional

preponderance, and when there was only an apprehension that they might

do so. But at the time when President Polk succeeded to the management

of this delicate matter, it was believed by him and by many of his most

considerate Southern supporters, that the repose of both North and South

could be, and required to be, secured by an arrangement with the

executive government of Texas, before her admission into the Union,

fixing the northern boundary of slavery at the Missouri compromise line

of 36° 30´ north latitude, by extending that line westward. North of

that line and west of Missouri, it was believed that negro labor could

not be valuable, and that the negro could not encounter the climate.

These were the views entertained by Mr. Buchanan when he accepted the

position of Secretary of State; and he had reason to know that they were

the views of Mr. Polk before his election. To Mr. Buchanan the Missouri

compromise line recommended itself as a practicable mode of giving

effect to the principle of equality among the States in regard to the

common territories of the United States.

The precise attitude of the Texas negotiation, and the relations of the

United States with Mexico, at the time when Mr. Buchanan took charge of

the State Department, must now be stated, together with some reference

to the previous history of the project of annexation. The first formal

overture of annexation came from the government of Texas, in the time of

President Van Buren, after the independence of Texas had been recognized

by the United States. Mr. Van Buren declined the proposal, because he

considered it inexpedient to open the constitutional questions involved,

and because of our friendly relations with Mexico under existing

treaties of amity and commerce. The secret treaty of annexation

negotiated by Mr. Upshur under President Tyler was rejected by the

Senate. Mr. Calhoun’s plan for bringing Texas into the Union as a State,

through the action of Congress, was arranged by him with the government

of Texas, after he became Secretary of State in March, 1844, and in the

following December this plan and the correspondence with the executive

government of Texas were submitted to Congress by President Tyler at the

opening of the session. The motive was fully disclosed. It was plainly

made known that the American executive believed that the British

government was about to interpose to cause the people of Texas to

abolish slavery in their country. This it was considered would leave the

Southwestern States of this Union on what Mr. Calhoun described as the

“exposed frontier” of a free state, into which their slaves would be

induced to escape, and from which the foreign and the American

abolitionists would be able to operate upon slavery in the domains of

those States.[97]

The objections urged against this measure, when the resolutions for

accomplishing it were finally adopted, three days before Mr. Polk became

President, were the great extent of territory which it would add to our

dominions, the increase of slavery and slave representation, and its

tendency to produce a war with Mexico. It could not be said, however,

that under the circumstances Mexico would have a clearly just cause for

war if the annexation should be accomplished, whatever she might have

had at an earlier period. Texas was now actually independent of Mexico.

The United States had not only recognized her independence, but had made

treaties and carried on commerce with her, in entire disregard of the

claim of Mexico to the sovereignty of this revolted province. And Mexico

had during all this period made no attempt at reconquest. She had

practically acquiesced in the recognition of Texan independence by the

United States and other powers; and therefore it could not be said,

after such a lapse of time, that a new and just cause for war would

arise if Texas should be annexed to the American Union.[98] There was

undoubtedly much danger that Mexico would not regard the annexation in

this light; and, therefore, what the new Secretary of State had to do

was to conduct the whole matter, under the resolutions of Congress, so

as to preserve peace, if possible.

His first official duty was to answer a protest addressed to the

Government of the United States by General Almonte, the Mexican minister

at Washington. Mr. Buchanan’s answer was regarded by Mr. Webster as

“mild and conciliatory.” It was, in substance, that Mexico had no right

to complain of such a transaction between independent states; that the

Government of the United States would respect all the just rights of

Mexico, and hoped to bring all pending questions with her to a fair and

friendly settlement; but that the annexation of Texas must now be

considered as a thing done. Still, a period of sixty or seventy days

must elapse before it could be known how the government of Texas had

taken the passage of the joint resolutions. At that time, there were

instalments of money due from Mexico to the United States, under an

existing treaty, to meet claims of citizens of the United States to a

large amount. These Mexico might choose to withhold; perhaps she might

decree non-intercourse with the United States; but that she would go to

war was not regarded as probable by the best informed persons at

Washington. In the meantime, Mr. Buchanan had not only to manage the

relations between the United States and Mexico, under circumstances of

great delicacy, with firmness, as well as conciliation, but also to keep

a watchful eye upon the course of England and France in reference to

this measure. It must be remembered that Mr. Buchanan had succeeded, as

Secretary of State, to the management of the Oregon question with

England, as well as to the completion of the arrangements for annexing

Texas to the United States. He was informed, both privately and

officially, by the ministers of the United States at London and Paris,

of the danger of an intervention by England and France in the affairs of

Mexico; and soon after he became Secretary of State, he had some reason

to apprehend that the settlement of the Oregon difficulty might be

delayed for the purpose of keeping open the unsettled questions in

regard to the final disposal of Texas. Mexico was at this time about to

undergo one of its many revolutions, and it might become difficult to

find an executive government with which to establish diplomatic

relations. In this posture of affairs, an interference by either France

or England, or both, might render it impracticable to carry out the

annexation of Texas to the United States, and might lead to very serious

complications. Writing from London on the 3d of March, at the moment

when the resolutions providing for the annexation of Texas had just

passed, but before they could have become known in London, Mr. McLane

said, in a private letter to Mr. Buchanan:

“Allow me to add a word in regard to Mexico. I stated in an early

despatch that the policy here would be to keep open our difficulties

there, to await the issue of the Oregon question; and of that I have

very little doubt. But why not disappoint such calculation? Even if our

affairs with Great Britain are to end in a rupture, that result, with

proper precaution, may be postponed until the expiration of the year’s

notice. Then why not act promptly and decisively in regard to Mexico?

...... Every day is leading to machinations in Europe to interfere with

the settlement of the Mexican government.”

On the 25th of March (1845,) Mr. Buchanan sent the following official

despatch to Mr. King, the Minister of the United States at Paris:

[BUCHANAN TO KING.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, } WASHINGTON, March 25, 1845.}

SIR:—

Your Despatch, No. 11, under date of the 27th ultimo, has been received

and submitted to the President. In commencing his administration, he had

confidently hoped, that the government of France was animated by the

same kind spirit towards the United States which inspires the Government

and people of this country in all their conduct towards their ancient

Revolutionary ally. This agreeable impression was made upon his mind by

the emphatic declaration of his Majesty to yourself on the 4th July

last, when speaking on the subject of the annexation of Texas to our

Union, “that in any event no steps would be taken by his government, in

the slightest degree hostile or which would give to the United States

just cause of complaint.” The President was also gratified with the

subsequent assurance of M. Guizot, given to yourself, that France had

not acted and would not act in concert with Great Britain for the

purpose of preventing annexation, but that in any course she might

pursue she would proceed independently of that power. You may then judge

of the surprise and regret of the President, when he discovered from

your last despatch, that the governments of France and Great Britain

were now acting in concert and endeavoring by a joint effort to dissuade

the government and people of Texas from giving their consent to

annexation. Nay, more, that so intimate has been their alliance to

accomplish this purpose, that even “the instructions of the French

government to its representative in Texas had been communicated to Lord

Aberdeen.”

The people of Texas are sovereign and independent. Under Providence they

hold their destiny in their own hands. Justice to them requires that

they should have been left free to decide the question of annexation for

themselves without foreign interference and without being biassed by

foreign influence. Not a doubt exists but that the people of the two

Republics are anxious to form a re-union. Indeed, the enthusiastic

unanimity which has been displayed by the citizens of Texas in favor of

annexation is unexampled in the history of nations. Little reason then

had we to anticipate that whilst the two Republics were proceeding to

adjust the terms for accomplishing this re-union that France in concert

with Great Britain, and under the lead of that power, should interpose

her efforts and influence to paralyze and obstruct the free action of

the people of Texas, and thus place herself in an unfriendly attitude

towards the United States.

The President leaves it to your sound discretion to decide whether you

ought not to embrace a favorable opportunity to communicate, formally or

informally, to the government of France, the painful disappointment

which he has experienced from a review of these circumstances.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

At the time when this despatch was written, the British and French

agents in Texas, in conjunction with certain of the principal officials

of that country, were making efforts to produce dissatisfaction with the

terms of annexation proposed by the American Government. The people of

Texas were by a very large proportion in favor of the annexation. The

terms offered by the United States could be made the means of preventing

it. Writing privately to Mr. Buchanan, on the 25th of April, Mr. King

said:

...... There is scarcely any sacrifice which England would not make to

prevent Texas from coming into our possession. France is acting in

concert with her, so far as influence goes, but will stop there. She

will make no pecuniary sacrifices. I have weighed well the contents of

your last despatch, and as you give me full discretion in the matter, I

have come to the conclusion that in the present threatening state of our

relations with England, no good purpose could be effected by convicting

M. Guizot of the gross duplicity of which he has been guilty; and

especially as it is to be hoped that the question of annexation has

before this been definitely settled. The notice taken of the President’s

inaugural on the Oregon question in both Houses of Parliament has roused

up a war spirit in that country which pervades all classes, and caused

the detention of the steamer which should have left on the 4th, to take

out despatches to Mr. Pakenham. As the excitement was then at its

height, it was supposed that their instructions contained an ultimatum

which was to yield nothing beyond the Canning proposition. Should this

be the determination of that government, negotiation must cease, for to

such terms we can never accede. I am induced, however, to believe, from

conversations I have held with Mr. Ellis, now in Paris, who is connected

with the ministry, being a brother-in-law of Lord Ripon, and himself a

privy councillor, that Mr. Pakenham’s instructions will be of a

conciliatory character; and that they have great hopes of being able to

settle the matter upon fair and liberal terms. But of this you are

probably much better informed than he is. I am still of the opinion that

we should not hesitate to divide the Territory [Oregon] by fixing our

northern boundary at latitude 49°. To settle the question, I would yield

something more and take the southern shore of the Strait of Fuca, and

thus give to England the whole of Vancouver’s Island. Such a variation

of the proposition, which was rejected by Mr. Canning, would afford Sir

Robert Peel ground to stand on, and might facilitate an arrangement. I

fully understand the difficult position you occupy as regards this

question, looking to the generally received opinion that our title to

the whole of the Territory is unquestionable.