CAESAR’S SECOND INVASION OF BRITAIN
[Sidenote: 55 B.C.]
Caesar had learned the lessons which failure had taught [Sidenote:
Caesar builds a fleet for a second expedition.] him. In the winter he
was obliged, as usual, to go to Cisalpine Gaul, partly in order to
discharge judicial and administrative business, partly to safeguard his
own political interests in Italy. Before he left Belgium he ordered his
generals to employ the legions in repairing the old ships and building
a new fleet for the second expedition. He drew up minute instructions
for their guidance. Two thousand cavalry horses, besides transport
cattle, were to be conveyed across the Channel; and, as the campaign
would probably be protracted, it would be impossible to leave all
the heavy baggage behind, and imprudent to trust again for supplies
to the resources of the country.[1337] The ships were to be somewhat
shallower than those which were commonly used in the Mediterranean,
in order to facilitate the work of loading and to enable them to be
hauled up on the shore: on the other hand, to make room for troops
and freight, they were to be rather broader in the beam. Their low
freeboard would admit of their being constructed for rowing as well
as sailing;[1338] and Caesar, who had noticed that the waves in the
Channel were comparatively small, thought that it would involve no
danger. But this shallowness, combined with unusual breadth, entailed
a disadvantage which he had perhaps not foreseen: it would cause the
vessels, unless the wind were right aft or on the quarter, to make a
great deal of leeway.[1339] It was of course impossible to build such a
large flotilla in one port. Some of the ships were to be constructed
in the mouth of the Seine: others doubtless in the Portus Itius itself;
others probably in the Canche, the Authie, and the Somme, possibly even
on the Marne, far from the sea-coast.[1340] The legionaries were ill
provided with appliances for ship-building: but they might be trusted
to do their best; and the tackle necessary for rigging and equipping
the fleet was to be imported from Spain. The cost of the expedition
would be very heavy: but Caesar was amassing wealth for himself and his
lieutenants by plundering Gaul; and he certainly hoped to do more in
Britain than recover his expenses.[1341]
News of these preparations must of course have flown swiftly across the
Channel; but it is hardly surprising that the British chieftains did
not take advantage of the time that was given them to mature a scheme
of defence. Cassivellaunus was still intent on self-aggrandisement;
and in the struggle with his neighbours, the Trinovantes, he slew
[Sidenote: Mandubracius flees from Britain and takes refuge with
Caesar.] their king, whose son, Mandubracius, contrived to escape, took
ship for Gaul, and presented himself--the first of a series of British
exiles who invited Roman interference--in Caesar’s camp. The exact date
of his flight cannot be given: it is sufficient to know that he was
with Caesar when the time arrived for the Roman army to embark.
[Sidenote: Caesar winters in Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum.]
Caesar did not start for Italy until the middle of November,[1342] and
after he had fulfilled the civil duties which awaited him in Cisalpine
Gaul he was obliged to travel to the further shore of the Adriatic in
order to punish a tribe which had been making devastating raids upon
Illyricum. In the early spring he was again in Cisalpine Gaul, clearing
off arrears of [Sidenote: His correspondence with Cicero.] work, and
preparing to recross the Alps. Cicero for whom he had an unfeigned
admiration, and whom he was always endeavouring to conciliate, was
now upon the best of terms with him; and his correspondence throws a
ray of light upon the hopes which had been awakened in Italy by the
preparations for a fresh expedition to Britain. Caesar was of course
beset with letters of recommendation written by public men on behalf
of friends who hoped to acquire riches in Gaul or Britain; and Cicero
wrote one, as he alone knew how to write, begging him to do something
for a young lawyer, named Trebatius, who was destined to achieve
distinction as a jurist. Caesar, however pressed with business he might
be, received all such applications, when they came from men whom he
cared to conciliate, with good humour. ‘Just as I was speaking,’ wrote
Cicero, ‘to our friend Balbus at my house, a letter from you was handed
to me, at the end of which you say: “Rufus, whom you recommend to me, I
will make King of Gaul.... Send me some one else to provide for!” ...
I therefore send you Trebatius.’[1343] The confiding lawyer wanted to
make a fortune without having to work for it: but Cicero banteringly
told him to moderate his expectations. ‘I hear,’ he wrote, ‘there is no
gold or silver in Britain. If so, I advise you to capture a war-chariot
and come back in it as soon as you can.’[1344] He ended his letter by
telling Trebatius that if he wished to cultivate Caesar’s friendship,
he must take the trouble to make himself useful. Caesar bestowed upon
him the rank of tribune, exempting him from military duty, for which
he was manifestly unfit; but, after a short experience of camp life,
he made up his mind that the expedition would involve more hardship
than profit, and preferred to remain in Gaul. But Caesar had gained
another adherent who turned out a real soldier. Quintus Cicero, the
orator’s younger brother, had consented to serve on his staff as a
_legatus_, or general of division;[1345] and a few words from a letter
in which this consent is alluded to illustrate the gracious tact which
helped Caesar to gain adherents. ‘Caesar,’ writes Marcus Cicero to
his brother, ‘has written to Balbus that the little bundle of letters
in which mine and Balbus’s were packed was so saturated with rain
when it was delivered to him that he was not even aware that there
was one from me. However, he had made out a few words of Balbus’s,
to which he replied as follows:--“I see you have written something
about [Quintus] Cicero, which I have not deciphered: but as far as
I could guess, it was of a kind that I might wish, but hardly hope
to be true.”’[1346] On the 30th of April Quintus was with [Sidenote:
Cicero’s hopes and fears about the second British expedition.] Caesar
at Blandeno, a small town near Placentia. Marcus knew of course that
Quintus was to accompany the expedition to Britain; and he indulged
the fancy that Caesar’s exploits would furnish him with a theme for a
heroic poem. ‘Only give me Britain,’ he wrote to Quintus, ‘to paint in
colours supplied by you, but with my own brush.’[1347] But he must have
soon received discouraging news; for early in June[1348] he wrote to
Atticus:--‘The result of the British expedition is a source of anxiety.
For it is notorious that the approaches to the island are ramparted by
astonishing masses of cliff; and, besides, it is now known that there
isn’t a pennyweight of silver in the island, nor any hope of loot
except from slaves; and I don’t suppose you expect any of them to be a
scholar or a musician.’[1349]
[Sidenote: Caesar returns to Gaul.]
By this time Caesar and his new lieutenant, having posted across Gaul
at the rate of fifty miles a day or more,[1350] must have reached the
country of the Belgae; and there is no more conclusive proof of the
hold which he had already obtained upon the Gallic tribes than the
fact that he was able to count, as securely as in Italy, upon finding
horses ready for each successive stage. He immediately proceeded to
inspect the various shipyards, near which the troops were encamped,
and was well satisfied with the manner in which his instructions had
been executed. ‘Thanks,’ he wrote, ‘to the extraordinary energy of the
troops, and in spite of the extreme deficiency of resources, about six
hundred vessels of the class specified and twenty-eight ships of war
had been built, and would probably be ready for launching in a few
days.’[1351] Caesar, who knew the stimulating power of discriminative
praise, bestowed hearty commendation upon officers and men, and gave
orders that the ships, as soon as they were ready for sea, should all
assemble in the Portus Itius. For this purpose he detached an adequate
[Sidenote: He is obliged to march to the country of the Treveri.]
number of troops. Meanwhile his presence was urgently required in
the country of the Treveri, a powerful tribe who inhabited parts of
Luxembourg and Rhenish Prussia, and whose name survives in that of
the modern Trèves. A squadron of cavalry furnished by this people had
served on his side in the battle with the Nervii, and had deserted in
a body at a moment when it seemed that he was doomed to defeat. Since
that day the Treveri had refused to send representatives to attend the
councils of Gallic magnates which he periodically convened; and he was
now informed that they were making overtures to the Germans. Unless he
recalled them to obedience, it was more than probable that while he
was absent in Britain, Gauls and Germans would raise a rebellion in
his rear. Accordingly, he marched against the malcontents with four
lightly equipped legions and eight hundred cavalry. Fortunately for him
the Treveri were not unanimous. Two rival leaders, Indutiomarus and
Cingetorix, were struggling for supremacy. Cingetorix at once threw
in his lot with Caesar, and gave him full information of all that was
going on. Indutiomarus began to raise levies, and prepared to resist;
but, finding that most of his fellow chieftains were going over to the
stronger side, he sent envoys to Caesar, and endeavoured to explain
away his conduct. Unwilling to lose time, Caesar feigned to accept
his excuses, and contented himself with taking hostages for his good
behaviour.
[Sidenote: Returning to the Portus Itius, he finds fleet and army
assembled.]
It was near the middle of June when he returned to the camp on the
Liane. More than eight hundred vessels of all sorts were in the
harbour, including numerous small craft, constructed by rich officers
who desired to make the voyage in comfort, by merchants who had
dealings with the troops, or by adventurers who, we may suppose, had
been attracted by stories of the wealth of Britain;[1352] but sixty
of Caesar’s ships had encountered contrary winds, and failed to
arrive.[1353] The entire Roman army, comprising eight legions, perhaps
about thirty-five thousand men, besides slingers, archers, and four
thousand Gallic cavalry, were assembled on the spot. The notables
from all the tribes had also repaired [Sidenote: He resolves to take
Gallic chiefs of doubtful fidelity as hostages to Britain.] thither
in obedience to Caesar’s summons. He was aware that there was much
smouldering discontent among them, and he intended to take all but the
few on whose fidelity he could depend, as hostages across the Channel.
Among these was one whose name, as written by Caesar, was Dumnorix,
and whose coins, bearing the legend DUBNOREIX,[1354] still testify to
the authority which he exercised. He was the most powerful chieftain
of the Aedui, the most powerful Gallic tribe, whose territories,
corresponding with the Nivernais and Western Burgundy, gave access
to all parts of Northern and Western Gaul; who, from the time when
the legions first entered Transalpine Gaul, had borne the honorary
title of ‘Friends and Allies of the Roman People’; and whom it had
been Caesar’s constant policy to treat with special favour. Dumnorix
was the leader of the anti-Roman faction which existed in this as in
almost every other Gallic tribe. He was a man of boundless ambition,
the vehemence of whose character was out of all proportion with his
judgement: he had amassed great wealth, which enabled him to maintain
an army of retainers; and he had great influence not only with the
lower orders in his own country but also with the Gauls of every tribe
who wished to rid themselves of the Roman dominion. For the last four
years his intrigues had caused anxiety to Caesar. He had been secretly
in league with the Helvetian invaders at the time when Caesar marched
to encounter them; and in the early part of the campaign his own
brother, the famous Druid, Diviciacus, as well as the chief magistrate
of his own tribe, had advised Caesar to beware of him. At that time
Caesar had not felt sufficiently secure in his new position to punish
him; he had simply given him a severe reprimand and a stern warning,
but had ever since employed spies to watch his movements. It was now
reported that Dumnorix had announced in the Aeduan tribal council that
Caesar intended to make him king, and that the announcement had been
received with alarm and indignation. There are writers who believe
that Caesar had really offered him the throne in order to purchase
his support: but it is hardly credible that he would have made such
a gross miscalculation; and there is more reason in concluding that
Dumnorix had spread a false report in order to estrange the loyal
Aeduans from Caesar’s side. At all events he was irreconcilable;
[Sidenote: Dumnorix resolves not to go.] and he determined that to
Britain he would not go. He began by imploring Caesar to allow him to
remain behind, pleading that he was not accustomed to the sea, and
dreaded it, and insisting that he was debarred by religious obligations
from leaving the Continent. Finding Caesar obdurate, he approached
his brother chieftains, and adjured them to join him in refusing to
go, assuring them that Caesar only wanted to get them out of Gaul in
order that he might safely put them to death. Caesar did his utmost
to keep him quiet, at the same time informing himself through his
agents of all [Sidenote: The fleet weatherbound.] that he said and
did. Meanwhile the fleet was lying idle in the harbour. All the
preparations were complete: but continuous north-westerly winds made
it impossible to sail; and we may safely presume that the troops, who
might be required to row the transports, were employed in learning to
use their oars. The two Ciceros were in constant correspondence; and
the elder brother was impatiently waiting for the announcement that the
campaign had begun. On the 2nd of July he wrote to Atticus, ‘Judging
from my brother Quintus’s letter, I imagine that by this time he is in
Britain. I am anxiously waiting for news of his movements.’[1355] The
fleet had been weatherbound then for about three weeks; and the chief
of Caesar’s commissariat, who succeeded in feeding forty thousand men
for so long a period in an unfriendly country, must have possessed rare
powers of organization. At length the wind shifted; and infantry and
cavalry began to embark. Suddenly, while every man in the force had
his thoughts concentrated on the work in hand, Caesar received news
that Dumnorix and his Aeduan troopers had gone. Instantly he stopped
the embarkation; and a strong detachment of cavalry was soon riding
in pursuit with orders to bring Dumnorix back, or, if he resisted,
to kill him on the spot: for, as Caesar afterwards said, ‘he thought
that a man who disregarded his authority when he was present would
not behave rationally in his absence.’[1356] [Sidenote: The fate of
Dumnorix.] Adjuring his retainers to be true to him, Dumnorix resisted
desperately; but he was surrounded and slain, passionately crying with
his last breath that he was a free man and a citizen of a free country.
[Sidenote: Caesar sets sail, leaving Labienus in charge of Gaul.]
It was about the 6th of July, probably the day after this episode, when
the embarkation took place.[1357] Commius, still friendly to Rome, was
to accompany the expedition, as well as Mandubracius, the Trinovantian
prince who had placed himself under Caesar’s protection. The slaughter
of Dumnorix, following the temporary submission of Indutiomarus, had
relieved Caesar from imminent danger: but he knew that to keep a hold
on the half-subdued and restless peoples whom he was leaving behind
would require all the ability of his ablest lieutenant; and there
are indications in his narrative that he hoped, if all went well,
to winter in Britain, and thus to find time not merely to deter the
Britons from combining with the Gauls, but to conquer the south-eastern
part of the country.[1358] Labienus therefore remained in charge of
the camp and port with three legions and two thousand cavalry. He was
to keep the expeditionary force supplied with corn, ascertain all
that was passing in Gaul, and act on his own discretion according to
circumstances. Among the divisional commanders that accompanied Caesar
was Gaius Trebonius, an intimate friend of Marcus Cicero,[1359] who,
two years before, had proposed, in the interests of the triumvirate,
the law by which the province of Syria was assigned to Crassus, and
the two provinces of Spain to Pompey. Late in the afternoon all was
ready for the start, the flotilla lying moored in the harbour with five
legions and two thousand cavalry on board. The ebb stream was running
slowly down the coast. Towards sunset the hawsers were cast off,[1360]
and the ships steered north by west before a light south-westerly wind.
The moon was invisible,[1361] but at that time of the year there is
no real night in these latitudes; and perhaps, as in the preceding
year, each vessel hoisted a lantern when the twilight waned. About
ten o’clock the stream began to run up the Channel, and for a time
the vessels made good progress. By midnight the leading division was
not far off the South Foreland, and somewhere near what is now the
southern end of the Goodwin Sands; but it is probable that in steering,
sufficient allowance had not been made for the current, and that the
shallow flat-bottomed vessels had already drifted to leeward away from
their true course. And now the wind, which had been gradually dying
down, almost entirely dropped, only retaining [Sidenote: The fleet
drifts north-eastward out of its course.] just sufficient force to
give steerage way. Borne along by a rapid flood, the armada drifted
into the North Sea; and about a quarter past three, when day broke,
Caesar descried the white cliffs of Kingsdown and the South Foreland
receding on the port quarter. Right opposite, but hardly discernible,
was the low coast on which he had landed in the previous year. We
may assume that when he saw where he was drifting he anchored for a
time. Presently the stream ceased to run up the Channel, and, after
a few minutes’ slack water, the ebb set in.[1362] The Romans had a
system of naval signalling,[1363] and either by this means or by oral
instructions conveyed from vessel to vessel, the order was given to go
about and run down Channel with the stream. The soldiers on board the
transports got out their oars. For some time their work was easy; but
when, not far from the spot where the South Sand Head Light Vessel is
now moored, the ships’ heads were turned in the direction of Sandwich,
they encountered a cross current setting towards the south-west.[1364]
Although the transports were heavily laden, they toiled with an energy
which earned Caesar’s warm admiration, and actually [Sidenote: The
landing-place, between Sandown Castle and Sandwich, reached by rowing.]
succeeded in keeping up with the galleys. About noon the whole fleet
had reached the landing-place; but no enemy was to be seen, and in
the course of the day a galley was speeding back across the Channel
with one of Caesar’s couriers on board, who carried, besides other
dispatches, a letter in which Quintus Cicero informed his brother that
all was well.[1365]
[Sidenote: Leaving the fleet at anchor in charge of a brigade, Caesar
marches against the Britons,]
While the troops and baggage were being disembarked, Caesar chose a
site for his camp, perhaps on the slight eminence near the village
of Worth. Some prisoners were soon brought in by the cavalry and
questioned. They stated that their countrymen had assembled in large
numbers to oppose the landing, but that, on observing the huge size of
the the armada, they had abandoned the shore and retreated to higher
ground inland. Caesar determined to march against them that very night,
and accordingly accepted the risk of not hauling his ships up on shore,
an operation which would have consumed valuable time. He had not
forgotten the disaster of the previous year; but, as the shore where he
now left the ships at anchor was not only perfectly open but sloped
very gently seaward, he felt little anxiety for their safety.[1366]
He mentioned this fact in his memoirs[1367] with an emphasis which
suggests that he wished to deprecate professional criticism. Moreover,
the storm which had wrought such havoc before had occurred on the night
of a full moon: the moon was now new; and it may be doubted whether
Caesar had studied the writings of the Greek astronomers, or consulted
the pilots, from whom he would have learned that the tides at new and
at full moon are virtually identical. Ten cohorts selected from the
various legions, or about four thousand men, and three hundred cavalry
were left, under the command of an officer named Quintus Atrius, to
protect the fleet. Soon after midnight Caesar set out against the
enemy. We may presume that he had sent a troop of cavalry in the
afternoon to reconnoitre; but he must have trusted to his prisoners for
information as to the whereabouts of the British force. It was posted
on high ground overlooking Durovernum, the village which stood upon the
site of Canterbury, and which the Romans afterwards linked by a system
of roads with their settlements at London, Reculver, Richborough,
Dover, and Stutfall near West Hythe. The general direction of Caesar’s
march is indicated by the road which runs across the gently undulating
and somewhat featureless country between Sandwich and Canterbury. He
had advanced about eleven miles when, in the early morning, he descried
the enemy’s cavalry and charioteers descending from high ground towards
the left bank of the Stour. The spot where he encountered them must
have been somewhere between Sturry on the east of Canterbury, and
Thanington on the west; and military experts who know the country
will probably conclude that it was near the latter.[1368] The enemy
had doubtless attempted to occupy the whole range of low hills which
closes the valley of the Stour between these two points, prepared to
oppose the legions wherever they might attempt to cross. It would seem,
however, that their resistance was comparatively feeble, perhaps
because they were surprised, and, having needlessly strung out their
forces, were unable to concentrate in time. Caesar [Sidenote: forces
the passage of the Stour near Canterbury,] may have sent a detachment
to turn their position: anyhow they were driven from the banks after a
combat which he recorded in a single sentence. Retreating to the higher
ground, they took up their position in a stronghold situated in the
midst of woods,--probably the earthwork, about a mile and a half west
of Canterbury, through which runs the Pilgrims’ Way, and within which,
as we have seen, have been discovered iron implements and weapons
of pre-Roman age.[1369] The legions, pressing after them, found the
entrances blocked by _abatis_; and when they attempted to force their
way in, the Britons, issuing from the woods in small groups, assailed
them with showers of missiles. It would appear from Caesar’s narrative
that the rampart, or at least a part of it, extended along the edge of
the wood. The 7th legion was selected for the assault. Advancing in a
dense column, with shields close-locked over their heads, they shot
earth or fascines into the ditch so as to form a causeway flush with
the top of the rampart; and it may be conjectured that the work was
performed by men who advanced between the files under the protection of
their comrades’ uplifted shields.[1370] [Sidenote: and storms a fort,
to which they had retreated.] In this way the entrenchment, which,
like all the British forts that Caesar saw, was weaker than the great
strongholds of Western Britain, was speedily captured with small loss;
and the Britons were expelled from the woods. The legionaries followed
up their success, but Caesar soon stopped the pursuit. He was afraid to
run the risk of letting his troops get entangled in a wooded country,
of the intricacies of which he was ignorant; and, as it was late in the
afternoon, he was obliged to utilize the remaining hours of daylight
for the construction of his camp.
[Sidenote: Next morning he sends three columns in pursuit,]
Early next morning he dispatched his cavalry in three columns, each
supported by a strong body of infantry, to hunt down the fugitives.
The pursuers had advanced a considerable distance from the camp, the
rearguard being still in sight,[1371] when some troopers rode up to
Caesar with a note from Atrius. A storm had arisen on the previous
night: the ships had parted from their anchors, collided with one
another, and almost all been dashed ashore and damaged. [Sidenote:
but is forced to recall them by news that many of his ships had been
wrecked.] Caesar sent gallopers to recall the pursuing columns, and
order them to march back to the coast, defending themselves, if
necessary, against a counter-attack, and started in person for the
scene of the wreck.[1372] When he arrived, he found that Atrius’s
report was accurate: about forty ships were totally destroyed; but,
after inspecting the rest, he saw that it would be possible to repair
them. In the course of the day the legions arrived. The men who had
enlisted as skilled craftsmen were segregated and set to work; and
galleys were sent to Labienus with a letter in which he was ordered
to dispatch gangs of shipwrights from his three legions, and to
employ the rest of the men in building new [Sidenote: He beaches the
ships, constructs a naval camp, and repairs damage.] vessels. Caesar
reluctantly concluded that the only way of preventing another disaster
was to have all the ships hauled up on land out of reach of the highest
spring tides. They were doubtless moved in the usual way, by capstans
over greased logs, which the Romans called _phalangae_;[1373] and then,
in order to secure them against attack, an earthwork was thrown up
round them, and connected with the existing camp. The amount of labour
which these operations entailed was enormous: but there were some
twenty thousand willing workers; and by employing them in relays all
day and all night, Caesar was able to complete the task in about ten
days. The repairs of course required a longer time.
[Sidenote: Results of the disaster.]
This second shipwreck was a calamity of which the mere loss in ships
formed the smallest part. It changed the course of the campaign. Why
had not Caesar restrained his eagerness to close with the enemy, and
employed every available man in beaching the vessels which he had
constructed with that very aim? Granted that it might not have been
possible to complete even the mere work of dragging them all out of
reach of the waves before the storm began, he would still have done
right in not presuming upon the favour of fortune. Nobody knew better
how necessary it is, especially in making war upon a half-civilized
enemy, to complete all preparations, even at the cost of delay, before
opening the campaign, so as to lose not a moment in following up an
initial success, and to give fugitives no time to recover from their
demoralization. Less than two days after he set foot in Britain he had
dealt the enemy a succession of heavy blows, and the game was in his
hands,--when all that he had done was undone by his own carelessness.
Britons saw Romans in full retreat, and concluded that they were not
invincible.
[Sidenote: Caesar again marches towards Canterbury. Cassivellaunus
elected commander-in-chief of the Britons.]
By the time when the naval camp was finished the season was far
advanced. It was near the end of the third week in July when Caesar
was able to renew his campaign. The Britons had made good use of
their respite. The tribes had suspended their feuds: Cassivellaunus
had been called upon by a general assembly of notables[1374] to
undertake the chief command with full powers; and a large force,
composed of contingents from all, or almost all, the cantons of the
south-eastern district, had marched to join the men of East Kent. We
may doubt whether the Trinovantes had not held aloof; but if they had
been forced to join the league, they were half-hearted. It is certain
that, before Caesar had been long in the island, they sent envoys,
promising submission and begging him to send Mandubracius back to them
as their ruler and to protect him against Cassivellaunus. He allowed
Mandubracius to depart, only stipulating that the Trinovantes should
give him forty hostages and provide grain for his army; and readers
who can interpret the _Commentaries_ will conclude that the embassy
was dispatched before he had advanced far into the interior, and
doubtless as soon as he had proved his superiority. He left the same
force as before--ten cohorts and three hundred cavalry--to protect
the camp, and marched once more in the direction of Canterbury. As
he was approaching the valley of the Stour, the enemy’s cavalry and
charioteers commenced a fierce running fight with his Gallic cavalry;
but they were beaten back at all points and driven to take refuge on
the [Sidenote: The Romans harassed by British charioteers.] wooded
heights near the river. The Gallic cavalry, however, over-eager to
pursue, and getting entangled in ground which was unknown to them,
suffered considerable loss; and soon afterwards, while the legionaries,
careless of danger, were engaged in entrenching their camp, the enemy
suddenly swooped down upon the cohort on guard and began to overpower
it. Caesar had not yet learned due respect for his enemy; otherwise he
would have kept a much more powerful force, as he had done on a similar
occasion in Gaul, to protect the working-parties. He sent two cohorts,
however, to support the struggling guard and cut off the retreat of the
assailants. These reinforcements were separated from one another by
a narrow interval: the men who composed them, and who had not served
in the preceding year, were unnerved by the novel tactics of the
charioteers; and the enemy boldly rushed through the interval, and got
back to the main body unhurt. Several additional cohorts, accompanied
by cavalry, were sent to retrieve the situation. The combat was clearly
visible from the camp; and Caesar saw that his troops, who had so often
routed their continental enemies, were at a serious disadvantage. The
Britons fought not in close order but in small groups, separated by
wide intervals; and when these were tired, their places were taken
by reserves. Whenever a group was hard pressed by the legionaries,
the men who composed it ran away: the Romans, weighted by their heavy
armour, were ineffective in pursuit; and, besides, accustomed as they
were to fight in compact masses, they and their officers naturally
failed to adapt themselves to new conditions. Again, when the Gallic
cavalry charged the charioteers, the latter drove rapidly away; and,
as soon as they had withdrawn their assailants from the support of the
legions, the warriors leaped to the ground, and, supported by their
own cavalry, fought as infantry, with the odds in their favour.[1375]
A tribune named Quintus Laberius Durus was killed; but at length the
reinforcements which Caesar sent up succeeded in beating back the
Britons, or at all events deterring them for the moment from renewing
their attack.
All this time Caesar was doubtless fighting to gain the line of the
road or trackway by which he would have to march westward into the
interior of Britain and assail the dominions of Cassivellaunus. But
it was of course out of the question to begin his march until he had
inflicted a crushing defeat upon the allies; and, as he saw now, their
game was to avoid a general action. On the following day, however, a
chance presented itself. In the morning the enemy, who had taken up a
position on the heights at some distance from the Roman camp, moved
down, as before, in scattered groups, and began to assail the cavalry
outposts, but with somewhat diminished vigour. The outposts fell back;
and presently the whole of the cavalry were sent out, along with three
of the legions, under Gaius Trebonius, on a foraging expedition. Part
of the force proceeded to cut grass, while the rest remained drawn
up in support. Suddenly the enemy rushed down from all points on the
foragers, and, made reckless by success, ‘did not even hesitate,’ as
Caesar wrote, ‘to attack the ordered ranks of the legions.’[1376]
[Sidenote: Trebonius routs the Britons.] The Romans charged them
fiercely, and took ample revenge for the previous day. The Britons
were driven from the field, hotly pursued by Trebonius and his men,
until the Gallic cavalry, relying upon the support of the legions,
which still followed as closely as they could, hunted them in headlong
rout, cutting them down in numbers, and never giving them a chance of
rallying. Not even the charioteers could get a moment’s respite, or
dared to dismount and turn [Sidenote: The British infantry disperse.]
upon their pursuers. This defeat was decisive. The tribal levies of
foot at once dispersed to their homes; and ‘from that time’, wrote
Caesar, ‘the enemy never encountered us in a general action.’[1377]
[Sidenote: War-chariots _versus_ Roman troops.]
Cassivellaunus had learned a lesson which his kinsmen on the other
side of the Channel were already taking to heart. His undisciplined
foot were evidently powerless to contend against the legions on a
fair field, and, except behind works, in a strong position, or in
attacking small bodies which had been carelessly isolated, they were
of little use. The Celtic infantry of the more warlike tribes were not
indeed to be despised. The Helvetii with their allies made a stubborn
fight against Caesar: the Parisian confederation under the veteran
Camulogenus tested the mettle of Labienus; and the issue of the battle
with the Nervii remained long doubtful. But in all these combats the
Celts had a great numerical advantage; and in all they were beaten
to the verge of annihilation. Cassivellaunus saw that his object was
not to be attained by regular warfare. Moreover, it is certain that,
during a prolonged campaign, he would have been unable to feed a large
army. But he still had four thousand charioteers with the cavalry
who supported them;[1378] and on them he determined to rely. The
success with which he had already used them makes us wonder why the
Continental Celts had abandoned the arm which their insular kinsmen
wielded with such effect. Less than a century before Caesar crossed the
Alps chariots had been generally employed in Eastern and in Central
Gaul.[1379] Chariots have been found in scores in the great sepulchres
of the Iron Age which have been opened in Burgundy and Champagne,
while in the British barrows their remains are extremely rare.[1380]
It is evident to every reader of the _Commentaries_ that Caesar was at
his wits’ end to know how to adapt his organization to this strange
form of resistance; and it is equally evident that on his own side
of the Channel he never encountered it at all. The most satisfactory
explanation is to be found in a passage of the _Commentaries_ from
which we learn that the Gauls spent large sums in buying well-bred
horses.[1381] Evidently they discarded chariots for cavalry when they
began to import from Southern Europe horses which were powerful enough
to carry big men and charge with effect.[1382] The German cavalry,
it is true, had only small underbred cattle; but they were virtually
mounted infantry.[1383] The British may have been well or ill mounted;
but for the most part British horses were no bigger than ponies,[1384]
able to draw a light car but not to gallop fast with heavy riders.
Still, whoever calls to mind how in the last Samnite War the Gallic
chariots routed the Roman cavalry,[1385] will perhaps doubt whether
the Gauls did well to abandon chariots altogether in favour of mounted
troops.
Nevertheless the reader who trusts to his first impressions of
Caesar’s narrative is prone to exaggerate the successes of the British
charioteers. Their object was to break up the formation of their
opponents; and this they could only do when carelessness gave them
an opening. The punishment which they inflicted upon the 7th legion
was invited by the almost incredible negligence of its commander: the
check which Caesar himself suffered in the following year befell an
outpost of inadequate strength. In irregular warfare chariots could
cause serious trouble; but the difficulty which Caesar found in dealing
with them was partly due to the fact that his army, like all Roman
armies, was weak in cavalry,--and in cavalry of the right kind. If he
could have taken to Britain one of those German squadrons with their
attendant light infantry which so effectively supported him in the war
with Vercingetorix, he would have had less trouble in his encounters
with the British charioteers.
[Sidenote: Caesar marches for the country of Cassivellaunus,]
Caesar now marched for the country of Cassivellaunus, who, as he
divined, intended thenceforth to wage a guerrilla warfare. The troops
must have carried in their wallets rations for several days, drawn
from the magazine in the naval camp; for they could not count upon
getting supplies from the farms till they reached the territory of
the Trinovantes; and we may be sure that Caesar, venturing into an
unexplored country and against so troublesome an enemy, dispensed
as far as possible with transport. What route he followed is an
interesting but perhaps insoluble question. He dismisses the story
of the march, which must have occupied nearly a week, in a single
sentence, which contains no clue. We know only that he started from
the neighbourhood of Canterbury, and that he crossed the Thames at or
not far from Brentford.[1386] It is, however, morally certain that he
marched either by the trackway on the line of which the Romans of a
later period made the great road called Watling Street, which crosses
the Medway between Rochester and Strood, or along the southern slope of
the chalk escarpment, and across the Medway at Aylesford or Halling.
All the antiquities of Roman or pre-Roman age that have been discovered
in Kent, west of the maritime tract which is bounded by a line drawn
from Reculver through Canterbury and Lympne to Romney, have come from
sites clustering alongside these routes.[1387] That Caesar makes no
mention of the Medway has no significance. He must have crossed it
somewhere; and it is certain that he crossed many rivers to which he
never alluded unless the passage had some tactical or strategical
importance. His narrative shows that his object was to inflict the
greatest damage possible upon the enemy’s homesteads and farms; and we
may reasonably suppose that he followed the route, leading through a
fertile and populous country, which his successors selected, diverged
from it somewhere near Rochester, and thence advanced by way of
Bromley. But the matter is of no great consequence. Caesar demands
from his readers not only attention and intelligence, but also expert
knowledge; but from those who possess these qualifications he rarely
withholds necessary information: when he baffles their curiosity, his
silence does not prevent them from understanding what is essential.
[Sidenote: whose chariots harass his cavalry.]
During a great part of the march Cassivellaunus dogged the Roman
column. Caesars object was to strike terror; and despoil the
inhabitants of their chief source of wealth,--their flocks and herds.
But Cassivellaunus soon taught him a lesson of caution. He succeeded
in ascertaining what route the Romans intended to pursue, and sent
messengers to warn the inhabitants to drive their cattle into the
woods and to fly for refuge thither themselves. Knowing every inch of
the country, and having the advantage of superior mobility, he would
conceal his force in some wooded spot, and when he saw the Roman
horsemen diverge from the column and ride forth to plunder, swoop down
upon them and inflict heavy loss. Caesar was compelled to keep his
cavalry, who were terrorized by these unforeseen attacks, in constant
touch with the infantry; while the legions, whose powers of endurance
were taxed to the uttermost, moved off the road from time to time, and
burned and ravaged whatever they could reach.[1388]
[Sidenote: Caesar crosses the Thames.]
Caesar had ascertained that the Thames, in that part of its course
which formed the southern boundary of the territory of Cassivellaunus,
was only fordable at one spot; and since the time of Camden it has
generally been supposed that this was close to Halliford,--the only
place, it is said, between Hurleyford, about two miles west of Great
Marlow, and the sea, whose name preserves the memory of an ancient
ford.[1389] Evidence, however, has lately been adduced which makes it
more probable that Caesar was describing Brentford; for, though the
name may only have denoted a ford over the Brent, in this part only
of the lower Thames have piles been discovered in dredging operations
which could reasonably be identified with the obstacles that threatened
the passage of the Roman army.[1390] When the column descended into
the valley, Caesar found that Cassivellaunus had anticipated him. The
further bank was fenced by a row of sharp stakes, behind which were
massed Cassivellaunus’s tribesmen; and Caesar learned from prisoners
and deserters that similar stakes, concealed by the water, were planted
in the bed of the river. He sent his cavalry behind cover to swim the
stream close by; and at the right moment the column of infantry plunged
into the water, and advanced to the attack. Caesar had calculated that
the British levies would be distracted by the onset of the cavalry
upon their flanks and rear; but the infantry were determined to have
the credit for themselves. We may suppose that, while they were
removing the stakes, the slingers and archers harassed the enemy.[1391]
‘The infantry,’ wrote Caesar, ‘advanced with such swiftness and dash,
though they had only their heads above water, that the enemy, unable
to withstand the combined onset of cavalry and infantry, abandoned the
bank and fled.’[1392]
[Sidenote: Cassivellaunus orders the kings of Kent to attack the naval
camp.]
But Cassivellaunus did not despair. Before Caesar crossed the Thames,
he had sent mounted messengers to order the four petty kings of Kent to
raise all their tribesmen instantly and make a sudden attack upon the
naval camp.[1393]
Meanwhile Caesar was moving eastward into the country of the
Trinovantes. Cassivellaunus haunted his line of march as before, and
pursued the same harassing tactics; but the legionaries succeeded in
doing considerable damage. [Sidenote: Caesar enters the country of
the Trinovantes, who furnish hostages and grain.] When, however, they
crossed the frontier of the Trinovantes, Caesar was careful to restrain
them from committing any act of violence. The Trinovantes punctually
handed over the hostages and delivered the grain which Caesar had
required from them; and several other tribes which had joined the
defensive league, seeing that they had been rewarded for their
[Sidenote: Five of the confederate tribes submit.] submission, sent
envoys to announce their surrender. These tribes were the Cenimagni,
the Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci, and the Cassi. The last
three do not reappear in history: they were evidently dependent tribes,
and nothing is known about their geographical position except that they
lived somewhere in the basin of the Thames, on the west or possibly on
the north of the Trinovantian territory in Essex.[1394] The territory
of the Segontiaci, judging by coins, may have been conterminous with,
and was probably north of that of the Atrebates,[1395] who occupied
parts of Hampshire and Berkshire.[1396] The Cenimagni may have been
the people who dwelt in Suffolk and Norfolk,[1397] and who, under
the name of Eceni or Iceni, rose in revolt under Boadicea, a century
later, against the Romans. The envoys told Caesar that the stronghold
of Cassivellaunus was not far off, and that a large number of the
inhabitants with their flocks and herds had taken refuge in it.
Possibly it was Verulamium, near St. Albans,[1398] which was in later
times the capital of the son and successor of Cassivellaunus, though
Caesar seems to imply that there was no permanent settlement within
the fortress: at any rate it was not far west of the river Lea, which
formed the boundary of the Trinovantes. When Caesar arrived, he found
that the stronghold was protected by woods and marshes, and fortified
with a rampart and trench: but the legions, advancing on two sides,
speedily carried the place by assault: many of the Britons, as they
were endeavouring to escape, were caught and killed; and all their
cattle were taken.
[Sidenote: Attack on the naval camp repulsed.]
Meanwhile the counter-attack which Cassivellaunus had ordered had
been delivered. The extent of the naval camp, enclosing as it did
several hundred vessels, might appear disproportionate to the slender
force to which Caesar had entrusted its defence; but he had made no
miscalculation. Probably the entrenchment was protected at intervals
by towers like those which he used to strengthen his lines at Alesia,
and from which artillery could play upon the flanks of the assailants.
A chieftain named Lugotorix was chosen to lead the assault; but the
garrison made a sortie, beat off the Britons with considerable loss,
and captured their commander.
[Sidenote: Caesar’s hurried journey to the coast and its significance.]
It was perhaps just after this event that Caesar, accompanied by a
flying column, made a journey to the coast, of which he omits all
mention in the _Commentaries_. His silence, which can hardly have been
unintentional, certainly suggests that the news of the attack--perhaps
the information that it was about to be delivered--caused him serious
anxiety. On the 5th of August (the 1st of September of the unreformed
calendar) he wrote a letter from the naval camp to Marcus Cicero. A
service of dispatch vessels had been organized, which plied from time
to time between the Kentish coast and the Portus Itius. Caesar had
found time to write at least once before; and the younger Cicero had
sent a long series of letters to his brother, whose allusions to them
reveal something of the inner history of the campaign. In the first
week of August he replied to the one which had described the safe
arrival of the armada:--‘How I rejoiced at your letter from Britain.
I was nervous about the sea and the coast of that island. I don’t
underrate what you have still to do; but there is more ground for
hope than fear.’[1399] On the 1st of September he dispatched a long
letter, written in instalments, in which he acknowledged the receipt
of four successive letters:--‘I gather from yours,’ he said, ‘that we
have no occasion either for fear or exultation.’[1400] The letter to
which he here alludes--the first of the series--was written before the
16th of July, that is to say, while the construction of the naval camp
was still going on. Caesar’s first letter was written in a spirit so
friendly that it gave him the keenest pleasure, mingled with pain; for
he knew that Caesar could not long remain in ignorance of the death of
his daughter, Julia, the wife of Pompey. Towards the end of the letter
of September 1 he says, ‘Caesar wrote me a letter on the 5th of August,
which reached me on the 31st, satisfactory enough as regards affairs
in Britain, in which, to prevent my wondering at not getting one
from you, he tells me that you were not with him when he reached the
coast.’[1401] Caesar did not, it would seem, write again until the 29th
of August, after which about a fortnight elapsed before he quitted the
island; and it is hardly credible that he should have spent more than
five weeks inactive at the sea. The only conclusion is that he had some
urgent motive for leaving the main body of his army and undertaking
a journey of seventy miles, and that this journey was connected with
the attack upon the camp. Perhaps he desired to see for himself that
the defences were secure against any future attempt, to reinforce the
garrison, and to ascertain what progress had been made in the repair of
the fleet.[1402]
[Sidenote: Cassivellaunus sues for peace.]
But Cassivellaunus had by this time begun to lose heart. His country
had been harried without mercy; his people had been dragged off by
hundreds to be sold as slaves; and--what he valued most of all--his
cattle had been taken away from him. Discredited by reverses, he had
not been able to hold his ill-assorted confederates together; their
defection left him powerless to retrieve his fortunes; and his last
great stroke had failed. He therefore sent envoys to the Roman camp to
propose surrender, and requested Commius to negotiate for him.[1403]
Caesar, on his part, was glad to be able to leave the island with a
semblance of success. He had originally intended to winter in Britain
and renew the war in the following spring. But Labienus had just
warned him that the outlook in Gaul was threatening: the season for
campaigning was nearly at an end; and he was aware that Cassivellaunus
could still maintain a guerrilla warfare. He was obliged therefore to
content himself with demanding hostages, fixing a sum which the tribes
that had belonged to the league were to pay annually as tribute to
Rome, and admonishing Cassivellaunus to leave the Trinovantes and their
king unmolested.
[Sidenote: Caesar and his army return to Gaul.]
The hostages were handed over without delay; and Caesar, with his
army and his train of captives, marched back to the coast. He found
all the ships which it had been possible to repair ready for sea: but
the number of those which had been condemned was not inconsiderable;
and, as the prisoners were very numerous, he determined to effect the
transport in two successive trips. With the first convoy went one of
his couriers, bearing letters from him and Quintus to the elder Cicero.
Their purport is preserved in one of Cicero’s letters to Atticus:--‘On
the 26th of September I received letters from my brother Quintus and
from Caesar, dated from the nearest coasts of Britain on the 29th of
August. They had settled affairs in Britain, received hostages, and
imposed tribute, though they had got no booty, and were on the point
of bringing the army back.’[1404] Caesar expected that when the empty
transports returned, they would be accompanied by sixty ships, which
had just been launched by Labienus; but only a few either of the old or
the new vessels arrived, the rest having been driven back by contrary
winds. Day after day Caesar waited for them with increasing anxiety;
for the equinoctial gales might soon be expected. At length he made up
his mind that he could wait no longer. The few available vessels were
inconveniently crowded: but the sea was perfectly smooth, and, leaving
the Kentish coast between [Sidenote: About Sept. 15.] nine and ten
at night, the fleet rowed into the harbour at break of day. In spite
of all the perils to which they had been exposed in their numerous
voyages, not a man had been lost at sea, not a ship had foundered in
either year.
While Caesar was still in Britain he had begun to collect materials
for a description of the island and of the manners [Sidenote:
Caesar’s description of Britain.] and customs of its inhabitants.
Partly, indeed, it may have been based upon the account of the Greek
historian, Timaeus, who had himself derived material from the journal
of Pytheas;[1405] but certain sentences embodied the results of his
own observation. What specially struck him as he marched through the
country was the density of the population and the superiority in
material civilization of the people of Kent. ‘The population,’ he
wrote, ‘is immense: homesteads, closely resembling those of the Gauls,
are met with at every turn; and cattle are very numerous.’[1406] His
curiosity was excited by the statement, which he had seen in one of his
Greek authorities, and the origin of which we have already endeavoured
to trace,[1407] that in some of the islands off the mainland there
was continuous night for a month about the winter solstice. ‘Our
inquiries,’ he tells us, ‘could elicit no information on the subject;
but by accurate measurements with a water-clock we ascertained that the
nights were shorter than on the Continent.’[1408] It would be useless
to guess from what authority he derived the puzzling statement that
groups of ten or twelve men had wives in common, brothers sharing with
one another and fathers with their sons;[1409] in other words, that one
of the British customs was polyandry. Thoughtless commentators have
condemned the passage as simply untrue: it has been explained as the
outcome of a misunderstanding; and an eminent scholar, with a theory
that needed every support, has insisted that it was merely a blundering
description of the primitive institution of matriarchy, which he
believed to have survived among the Picts of a later time.[1410] We
can only be sure that neither matriarchy nor polyandry existed among
the dominant Celts; but it is permissible to suppose that certain
primitive communities in remote districts had some usage which gave
colour to Caesar’s statement. But perhaps the most remarkable feature
in his description was the approximate accuracy of his estimate of the
size of the island. He was told that its circumference was two thousand
miles; and this information was certainly not derived either directly
or indirectly from Pytheas, whose estimate, if Strabo has reported
it correctly, was monstrously exaggerated.[1411] On the other hand,
Caesar, although, like Pytheas, he placed Ireland in its true position,
imagined, in common with other geographers who derided Pytheas’s
teaching, that the Gallic coast, from the Rhine to the Pyrenees, was
roughly parallel with Southern Britain.[1412]
[Sidenote: Review of Caesar’s invasions of Britain.]
The story of these invasions is not without interest for students
of military history. In Britain Caesar was confronted by tactical
problems of an entirely strange kind; and he did not dissemble the
difficulty which he had experienced in attempting to solve them. The
Roman soldiers had been trained to encounter an enemy who fought in
close order; if ever, in the stress of unforeseen circumstances,
such as those which beset the foragers of the 7th legion, they found
themselves cut off from the standards which they were accustomed to
rally round, they felt that they were but the units of a mob.[1413] It
was not perhaps that they lacked the intelligence which enabled the
German soldier in 1870 to adapt himself to new conditions. The coolness
with which, in the fearful combat with the Nervii, each legionary shook
off the effects of his surprise, and, disentangling himself from the
press, ‘fell in by the standard he first caught sight of,’[1414] and
fought as steadily as under his own centurion, shows that in Caesar’s
soldiers no moral, as no physical, military qualification was wanting.
But encompassed by those rushing chariots, assailed by those nimble
groups of skirmishers who would not come to sword’s point with them,
they found themselves helpless. And when they advanced with ranks
closed--for the enemy never succeeded in breaking their formation--the
charioteers could easily keep out of the way and concentrate the whole
weight of their attack upon the cavalry, which they had lured away
from their support. Cassivellaunus handled his levies with commendable
skill; and if he did not deserve from Caesar the admiration that
makes itself felt in the terse chapters which mirror the tremendous
personality of Vercingetorix, he was a leader of no ordinary capacity,
raised to his high place by merit alone. For the mistake which gave
Trebonius the opportunity of dealing him that staggering blow near the
banks of the Stour--the rush of his tribesmen, intoxicated by success,
upon the ranks of the legions--not his lack of judgement but their
lack of discipline was responsible. And if, instead of disbanding his
infantry and following Caesar’s march with his chariots, he had then
had the hardihood to let Caesar go his way, and, leaving his cattle,
his homesteads, and his granaries to their fate, had hurled his entire
force, combined with the levies of the Kentish kings, against the
little garrison which held the naval camp, it might have gone hardly
with Caesar. For, like the weak cohorts with which Galba strove to hold
his camp in the Valais against a host of mountaineers, the garrison
would have been compelled to defend themselves without respite against
assailants whose numbers enabled them to fight and rest by turns; and
if, like Galba’s men, they had attempted to disperse their enemies
by a sortie, they would have been attacked in flank and rear by the
charioteers and cavalry. Perhaps, indeed, Cassivellaunus saw what to
do, but was not sufficiently master of his countrymen to do it. He
who can keep in hand an aggregate of levies, shattered by defeat in
a regular combat which they should never have fought, must needs be
a king of men. Caesar understood the weaknesses of half-civilized
tribes, and knew what risks he might fairly run. Just as Vercingetorix
was compelled by his tribesmen to let go his hold upon the country of
the Bituriges, where he barred Caesar’s advance, and to leave the way
open to him by returning to succour their farms, so Cassivellaunus, we
may be sure, would not have been able to withstand the clamours that
would have bidden him go to the rescue of the threatened dominions
of the Catuvellauni and their allies, even if, by sacrificing them,
he could have cut the invaders’ communications, and detained him a
prisoner in Britain. One may be allowed perhaps to speculate whether
Caesar, if he had himself had much experience of British tactics in
his first expedition, would have been able, without sacrificing the
advantage of discipline, to train his troops in the intervening winter
to adapt their formation to the methods of attack which they had to
expect; or whether it would have been possible for him then, as it
was two years later, to enlist the invaluable aid of German cavalry:
but in his second campaign he speedily corrected the mistakes which
his sanguine temperament had led him to make; and in his mode of
conducting the war he conformed so closely to the maxims which the
foremost British soldier of our time, himself an enthusiastic admirer
of the _Commentaries_, has laid down for generals who have to command
against uncivilized enemies,[1415] that one might almost suppose those
maxims to have been derived from a study of the campaign. By marching
in the night to seek out his enemy after his disembarkation, he gained
the advantage which is the reward of a secretly-planned, sudden, and
swift movement against an undisciplined foe. Instantly following up his
success, he taught the fugitives that the strongholds which kept their
own countrymen at bay were of little avail against Roman soldiers. As
soon as he was free to advance into the interior, he demoralized his
enemies by rapidity of movement and incessant energy; and by ruthlessly
destroying their crops, seizing the stores upon which they depended for
subsistence, and driving off the cattle, which were their most valued
possession, he succeeded, within a few weeks, in bringing the campaign,
which fortune would not permit him to continue, to a successful
conclusion.