CAESAR’S FIRST INVASION OF BRITAIN
[Sidenote: Caesar obliged to secure his rear before invading Britain.]
Before Caesar could venture to undertake so difficult an enterprise
as the invasion of Britain, it was necessary for him to secure the
country in his rear. His first two campaigns had been directed against
enemies who were as dangerous to Gaul as to Rome. Cavalry levied from
friendly Gallic tribes fought side by side with the Roman legions
against the Helvetii and against Ariovistus: after the defeat of the
Helvetii envoys came from all the tribes of Central and Eastern Gaul to
congratulate the victor; and after the defeat of Ariovistus the legions
took up their quarters for the winter in Gallic territory without
resistance. There was probably not a single tribe in which Caesar had
not opponents: but the prestige of Rome and of his own victories,
the factious spirit and the intertribal jealousies of the Gauls, and
above all the sagacity with which he played off party against party,
and selected the chiefs who, for their own purposes, were able and
willing to serve him, prevented open opposition. Thus, although the
seeds of future troubles were even then germinating, he could safely
use Celtican Gaul as his base of operations when he crossed the Marne
in the following year to encounter the Belgae. The series of victories
which he gained in this campaign intimidated his opponents for the
time and increased his renown, but had little effect upon the remote
maritime tribe of the Morini, on whose coast was the harbour from which
he must sail.
[Sidenote: He contemplated invasion as early as 56 B.C.]
Caesar’s first mention of Britain occurs in the chapter that follows
his narrative of the operations by which he destroyed the invading
hordes of the Usipetes and Tencteri, crossed the Rhine, and chastised
the tribe which had given an asylum to their fugitives:--‘Only a
small part of the summer remained; and in these parts, the whole of
Gaul having a northerly trend, winter sets in early: nevertheless
Caesar made active preparations for an expedition to Britain; for he
knew that in almost all the operations in Gaul our enemies had been
reinforced from that country.’[1279] But even if we had not Strabo’s
explicit statement, it would be unnecessary to argue that Caesar could
not have undertaken so momentous an enterprise upon the spur of the
moment. Strabo says that the Veneti, who in 56 B.C. formed a coalition
of the maritime tribes of North-Western and Northern Gaul against
Caesar, made war upon him because they were determined to prevent him
from invading Britain, the trade with which was in their hands.[1280]
The statement is intrinsically probable, and is supported by facts
for which we have the authority of Caesar himself. The alliance which
the Veneti headed included almost all the maritime tribes between
the Loire and the Rhine; and auxiliaries actually came from Britain
to join them. It is not credible that the Britons would have crossed
the widest part of the Channel, or that the Morini, whose country lay
between the Somme and the Scheldt, and the Menapii, whose seaboard
reached the Rhine, would have supported the remote Veneti, if they had
not had reason to believe that their own interests were imperilled.
Moreover, Caesar tells us that among the ships which he assembled for
the invasion of Britain were galleys which he had used in the naval
action with the Veneti. This action took place off the coast of the
Morbihan, the nearest harbour to which was in the estuary of the
Loire;[1281] and it is needless to argue that the galleys were not
there when Caesar sent for them. If only ‘a small part of the summer’
remained when he began to prepare for the invasion, there was no time
for his messengers to travel from the neighbourhood of Coblenz, where
he had crossed and recrossed the Rhine, to the mouth of the Loire, or
for the galleys to make the voyage of six hundred miles from the Loire
to the north-eastern coast of Gaul. When Caesar’s messengers set out,
the galleys must have been within a short distance of the port from
which he set sail,--probably in the mouth [Sidenote: Campaign against
the Veneti necessary in order to secure command of the Channel.] of
the Seine or of the Somme. The war which he waged against the Veneti
was a necessary prelude to the invasion of Britain. For he could not
safely embark his army unless he had command of the Channel; and at
the time when he planned the invasion the masters of the Channel were
the Veneti. They had a powerful fleet of large vessels, the model of
which had, we may suppose, been originally borrowed from that of the
merchantmen of the Carthaginians, whose commerce in the Atlantic and
in British waters they had inherited. This fleet enabled them to close
the ports not only of their own territory in Western Brittany, but
also of the western seaboard at least of Northern Gaul; and no one was
permitted to use those ports except on condition of paying them toll.
[Sidenote: 57 B.C.]
But Caesar attempted to gain his object without fighting. After his
campaign against the Belgae he sent the 7th legion under Publius
Crassus, the younger son of the wealthy triumvir, to winter in the
valley of the lower Loire; and all the tribes of Brittany submitted
to him and gave him hostages. It was probably about this time that
Crassus made his celebrated voyage to the tin-producing districts
of Cornwall;[1282] and it seems not unreasonable to conjecture that
it was the news of his mission which gave the alarm to the Veneti.
They arrested two officers whom he had sent to make a requisition of
corn: the other maritime tribes of Brittany and Normandy threw in
their lot with them; and an embassy was sent to Crassus to demand the
restoration of the hostages. Messengers were promptly dispatched to
inform Caesar, who had gone to Illyricum. He sent orders to Crassus to
have a fleet of war-galleys built in the estuary [Sidenote: 56 B.C.]
of the Loire, to summon oarsmen from the Roman Province of Southern
Gaul, and to impress seamen and pilots. Meanwhile the Veneti were
engaging fresh allies, and reinforcements were hastening from Britain
to join them. The allied fleet was speedily assembled on the coast of
the Morbihan. Caesar hurried back to join his army, and on his arrival
made all the necessary dispositions for preventing the spread of the
insurrectionary movement. Crassus was dispatched southward into the
country of the Aquitani, from whom, it is true, little danger was to
be expected: another general, Titurius Sabinus, was sent northward
into the peninsula of the Cotentin, to prevent the tribes of Northern
Brittany and Western Normandy from joining the Veneti; and Labienus,
Caesar’s most capable lieutenant, marched eastward through the heart of
Gaul to the neighbourhood of Treves, with orders to watch the Belgae
and repel the German tribes, who were believed to be in communication
with the Gauls, in case they attempted to cross the Rhine. Labienus
appears to have had little trouble; but Crassus and Sabinus encountered
and defeated their respective enemies. Caesar himself invaded Venetia,
and entrusted Decimus Brutus with the command of his fleet. During a
great part of the summer Brutus was detained in the mouth of the Loire
by stormy weather; and Caesar spent the time in endeavouring to reduce
the strongholds on the Venetian coast. These operations were fruitless;
but on the first fine day the struggle was brought to an issue. The
decisive battle was fought in Quiberon Bay.[1283] The allied fleet
numbered two hundred and twenty sail, while the Roman galleys were
reinforced by ships lent by friendly tribes who inhabited the maritime
districts south of the Loire. The ships of the Veneti and their allies
were so heavy and so stoutly built that it would have been useless for
the galleys to attempt to ram them; and they stood so high out of the
water that the legionaries were unable to throw missiles with effect.
But the Roman engineers came to the rescue as they had done in the
First Punic War. Long poles had been prepared, armed at one end with
sharp-edged hooks. The galleys swifter and more mobile than the Gallic
ships, which had no oars.[1284] When the fleets approached each
other, two or more galleys ran alongside one of the enemy’s ships; and
the halyards were seized by the hooks. Instantly the rowers pulled
away: the halyards snapped, and yards and sails fell down, leaving the
helpless hulk to be boarded by the legionaries. ‘Thenceforward,’ wrote
Caesar, ‘the fight turned upon valour, in which our soldiers easily
had the advantage.’[1285] When several ships had been captured, the
Veneti abandoned the fight and made haste to escape. But their ships
had hardly been put before the wind when they were becalmed; and the
galleys, running swiftly in and out among them, captured them one after
another, all but a few which contrived to reach land when darkness fell.
[Illustration: SOUTH EASTERN BRITAIN<br /> _See note on page XVI._]
The Veneti surrendered unconditionally. Caesar was determined to teach
the Gauls that ‘the rights of envoys’[1286] must be respected in
future. The Venetian senate were put to death; and all the tribesmen
who failed to escape were sold into slavery.
[Sidenote: Campaign against the Morini.]
It remained only to subdue the Morini, who had never yet acknowledged
the supremacy of Rome. Caesar marched against them: but the season was
too far advanced; and he found it impossible to strike a decisive blow.
The Morini would not risk a battle, and took refuge in their forests.
Caesar allowed himself to be surprised on the outskirts and lost a few
men, though he succeeded in punishing his assailants; and after the
legions had spent some days in cutting down trees, capturing baggage,
and driving off cattle, stormy weather set in, and rain fell so heavily
and continuously that they could no longer live safely in tents,
[Sidenote: Its failure leaves Caesar’s base not quite secure.] and were
forced to abandon the campaign. Owing to this failure, which Caesar
hardly atoned for by ravaging the cultivated lands as he retreated,
the base of operations for the expedition which was to take place in
the following year was still insecure. On the other hand, the maritime
tribes between the Somme and the Pyrenees were effectually subdued;
and Caesar was absolute master of the sea.
[Sidenote: 55 B.C. Caesar determines to sail from the Portus Itius
(Boulogne.)]
When the campaign of the following year against the Germans was over,
Caesar marched westward into the country of the Morini, ‘because,’
as he tells us, ‘the shortest passage to Britain was from their
coast.’[1287] Probably he had already ascertained what was the best
port to sail from; but any competent cavalry officer could have
procured the information in a couple of days. Between the Scheldt
and the Somme there was only one harbour which would satisfy all his
requirements. Calais did not then exist: Sangatte, on the east of Cape
Blancnez, was at best a mere roadstead; and the sandy waste between
Cape Blancnez and Cape Grisnez, from which the village of Wissant
derives its name, though it possessed two tiny creeks formed by
rivulets, offered no shelter for a fleet and no facilities for building
or repairing ships, or for provisioning an army. The Canche, the
Authie, and the Somme, if at that time they were used as harbours, were
too far from Britain. But the estuary of the Liane, on whose right bank
stood Gesoriacum, the village whose site is now covered by Boulogne,
combined every advantage. Caesar, Latinizing its Celtic name--the
port of Icht, or ‘the Channel harbour’--called it the Portus Itius.
Gallic merchants sailed from it to the ports of Kent: from the time of
Augustus it was the Roman port of embarkation for Britain, and at a
later period the naval station of the Roman Channel Fleet. The estuary,
longer, wider, and deeper than it is now, was protected from every gale
by the bold bluff of land which on the west throws out the promontory
of Alprech, and which then projected northward considerably beyond its
present limit.[1288] Vessels of light draught could enter the harbour
at low tide. Shipyards lined its banks. Roads connected it with the
interior; and timber in abundance could be floated down the river from
the forest of Boulogne. The heights that look down from the east upon
the harbour, about half a mile south of the column which commemorates
the assemblage of Napoleon’s ‘Grand Army’, offered an excellent site
for the encampment of the force that was destined to protect the
communications; and perhaps a detachment may have been posted on the
opposite bank of the river.[1289] If the distance in a straight line
to Britain was a little longer than from the creeks of Wissant, the
passage, owing to the set of the tidal streams and the prevalence
of south-westerly winds, was more convenient. Caesar therefore gave
orders that vessels should be collected from the adjacent coasts, and
assemble, along with the galleys which had been docked after the war
with the Veneti, in the Portus Itius.
[Sidenote: He attempts to obtain information about Britain from Gallic
traders.]
The summer was now far advanced; and Caesar saw his first expedition
must be a mere reconnaissance: but, as he tells us, ‘he thought that
it would be well worth his while merely to visit the island, see what
the people were like, and make himself acquainted with the features of
the country, the harbours, and the landing-places.’[1290] Though on a
clear day he could see beyond the straits those ‘astonishing masses of
cliff’ which haunted the imagination of Cicero,[1291] he was about to
venture into an unknown land. The Italians of that time knew hardly
anything of the island which they vaguely regarded as the end of the
inhabited world, except that it produced tin, some of which found its
way to the markets of the Mediterranean.[1292] Perhaps Cicero and
other cultivated men had read extracts from the journal of Pytheas:
but Pytheas was a discredited writer; and, after all, his description
of the Britons who lived in the time of Alexander the Great would have
been little more useful to Caesar than Bernier’s account of the empire
of Aurangzeb would be to a traveller who intended to spend a winter in
India. Caesar sent for traders from all parts of North-Eastern Gaul,
and questioned them about the island:--How large was it? What tribes
inhabited it? What were their methods of fighting, their manners and
customs? What ports were capable of accommodating a large fleet? He
failed to obtain the information which he required. Many commentators
have insisted that the traders could have told him all that he wanted
to know; and certainly it seems difficult to understand how they could
have professed ignorance of the harbours without manifest contumacy:
but at least as regards the other questions, the reason which Caesar
assigns for their silence is sufficient:--‘even they know nothing of
Britain except the coast and the parts opposite the various regions
of Gaul.’[1293] Moreover, it must be remembered that Caesar asked
them what harbours could shelter a large fleet; and as they were only
acquainted with the harbours of Kent, none of which would fulfil this
requirement, it is quite intelligible that even on this point they
should have been unable to enlighten him. Still, they could have given
valuable information about the Kentish coast; and the passage in which
Strabo accounts for the hostility of the Veneti suggests that they kept
silence from interested motives.[1294] They could not foresee that
Caesar’s expeditions would powerfully stimulate British trade.
[Sidenote: Gaius Volusenus sent to reconnoitre the opposite coast.]
Thrown back upon his own resources, Caesar sent a military tribune,
named Gaius Volusenus, in a galley to reconnoitre the opposite coast.
Volusenus had distinguished himself in a campaign, conducted by one
of Caesar’s generals, against the mountaineers of the upper Rhône: he
possessed, as his later history proved, not merely a keen eye for the
features of a country, but daring of that kind which characterized the
sons of Zeruiah; and how highly Caesar thought of him is evident from
the fact that he was the only military tribune whose name is mentioned
with honour in the _Commentaries_.[1295]
[Sidenote: Envoys from British tribes sent to Caesar to promise
submission.]
All this time trade was going on as usual between Gaul and Britain;
and Gallic merchants had informed their clients in Kent that the
long-expected invasion was about to take place. While Volusenus was
cruising in the Straits of Dover a ship with envoys from various
British tribes on board sailed into the Liane. Presenting themselves in
Caesar’s camp, they announced that their principals were prepared to
submit to the Roman People and to give hostages. Caesar received them
courteously, exhorted them to adhere to their resolve, and dismissed
them. But they were not to return alone. Two years before, during the
campaign against the Belgae, Caesar had gained over Commius, whose
connexion with Britain[1296] he had perhaps already ascertained, and,
in accordance with the policy which he often followed, had established
him as king over the Atrebates. He had doubtless learned much from him
about British politics, and had concluded that, just as in Gaul he had
taken advantage of tribal disputes and had found it politic to support
the Aedui and the Remi against their rivals, so in Britain his best
course would be to side with the Trinovantes against the aggressive
Catuvellauni. He had formed a high opinion of the energy and judgement
of Commius, and believed him [Sidenote: He commissions Commius to
return with them and gain over tribes.] to be thoroughly loyal.
Accordingly he charged him to approach all the British chieftains with
whom he had any influence, engage them on the side of Rome, and give
them notice that he himself would shortly visit the island. Commius
took with him a troop of cavalry, composed of thirty of his retainers.
[Sidenote: Volusenus’s voyage of reconnaissance.]
Meanwhile Volusenus had been carrying out Caesar’s instructions. His
galley, manned by trained oarsmen, not only made him comparatively
independent of wind and tide, but, owing to her superior speed,
would enable him to keep clear of any ships which Gauls or Britons
might send against him. We do not know what part of the coast he
reconnoitred first: but it is probable that his coasting voyage did
not extend beyond Lympne, or, at the furthest, Rye on one side and
the North Foreland on the other; for within those limits the port and
the alternative landing-place of which he was in search were to be
found. The port was indeed too small for such a vast armada as would
be required to transport the grand army with which Caesar purposed
eventually to invade Britain, but not for the comparatively small
fleet that had been collected for the preliminary expedition: if
Volusenus had sailed westward in quest of the great harbour which he
could not have found until he had reached the coast of Sussex,[1297]
he would have turned back when he saw the inhospitable forest of the
Weald, or the Fairlight Down; and, moreover, he knew that Caesar
intended to cross the Channel in its narrowest part. While he was still
some miles from the British coast he could see the low but precipitous
chalk cliffs, backed by a commanding range of heights, that hem in
the rock-strewn shore of East Wear Bay: the inlet of Folkestone was
plainly too small to accommodate the Roman fleet; and the first sight
of the hills that guarded the coast from Folkestone to Hythe and of
the wooded uplands that overlooked the tide-washed flat which is now
Romney Marsh,[1298] must have warned him not to advise the great
captain whom he served to land beneath them. It was a maxim of ancient
warfare, never disregarded without urgent necessity, to avoid engaging
an enemy who had the advantage of higher ground; and there was not a
foot of land in the whole extent of coast between Shakespeare’s Cliff
and Lympne which a Roman soldier would not have described as a most
unfavourable position. The hills behind Hythe were, indeed, pierced by
three valleys: but it was evident that they ascended to high, broken,
and wooded ground, where cavalry would be useless, and an invading
army would be encompassed by manifold perils;[1299] and for such
disadvantages the narrow pool harbour which extended opposite Hythe,
between the hills and the long bank of shingle, through a gap in which
it might be entered at high tide,[1300] promised no compensation.
Eastward of Shakespeare’s Cliff Volusenus saw that he must look for
the place of disembarkation. There, sheltered in the valley between
the cliffs, was old Dover harbour, in which we may suppose that
Gallic merchants used to discharge their freight.[1301] But even this
haven would be useless if the landing were to be opposed; and it was
necessary to look for some broad expanse of open beach which would
give easy access to the interior. None such was yet visible. The
galley ran on under the Castle Cliff, round the Foreland and past the
coomb within which lies St. Margaret’s Bay, past the cliffs, still
precipitous but diminishing in height, which end at Kingsdown. About
a hundred yards further on the ground was seen rising again; and the
tribune observed a low rampart of cliff extending and gradually sinking
towards the north till it finally terminated just south of the spot
where Walmer Castle rises amid embowering trees. Stretching northward
for several miles from this spot he saw the open beach for which he had
been looking. Not a sign of high ground was visible. Once the legions
had succeeded in forcing their way on to dry land, they would find
no difficulty in following up their advantage; and the cavalry would
be able to ride down the beaten enemy. The slope upon which Walmer
Church now stands would afford a suitable site for the camp. But it
was of course impossible to see far inland; and, as Volusenus could
not venture to disembark and run the risk of falling into the hands of
the natives, he was unable to find out all that he wished to know. The
nature of the inner country, the comparative density of the population,
the water-supply,--of all these things he remained ignorant. But
Caesar had chosen him because he was the fittest man that he could
find; and we may assume that he did not neglect precautions which any
competent officer would have taken, and that he did not overlook what
no observant man could have failed to perceive. He spent three entire
days in British waters; and his time must have been fully occupied.
We may be sure that he bore in mind that the beach was of shingle;
that he took soundings all along the coast between Walmer and Deal
as close inshore as he could venture to go, and tested the character
of the anchorage; and that he noted the phenomena which twice daily
obtruded themselves upon his attention,--the rise and fall of the tide,
and the movement up and down the Channel of the tidal stream. Perhaps
indeed he went as far north as Sandwich, and concluded that a landing
might still more advantageously be effected between that point and
Sandown, where, even in those days, the beach must have shelved more
gently than at Walmer or Deal.[1302] One other feature, if it then
existed, cannot have escaped his scrutiny,--the Goodwin Sands, perhaps
only half-formed, or the long low bank of London Clay, which, as some
geologists believe, may then have occupied their place.[1303] On the
fourth day following that of his departure he returned to the Portus
Itius, and presented his report to Caesar.
[Sidenote: Kentishmen prepare for resistance.]
The Kentishmen, on their part, knew what they had to expect. The
Roman galley had of course been watched; and though Caesar was coming
professedly to receive them under the protection of Rome, his visit
would portend the loss of their independence. If they chose to resist,
they would not be embarrassed by having a long line of coast to defend.
The movements of the galley indicated where the fleet of which she was
the forerunner would probably arrive; and, moreover, those who lived by
the sea were aware that the invaders could not attempt to land except
at a few points within a strictly limited range. War-chariots would be
helpful in checking them when they attempted to advance through the
surf: accordingly the horses were exercised on the beach until they
became accustomed to enter the waves.
[Sidenote: Certain clans of the Morini spontaneously promise to submit.]
The Portus Itius was thronged with shipping, and the preparations for
the expedition were nearly complete; but the base of operations was
still insecure. The Morini had hardly felt the weight of Caesar’s
hand, and might give trouble to the garrison which he intended to
leave for the protection of his communications: but the end of August
was approaching; he was anxious to set sail; and he had no time to
reduce the tribe to submission. Fortune, however, as usual, befriended
him. The various communities of the Morini were accustomed to act
independently. Envoys from some of them appeared in Caesar’s camp, and
excused themselves for having resisted the Romans in the two previous
years. He of course accepted their excuses, and ordered them to give
him a large number of hostages, who were promptly brought to the
camp.
[Illustration: East Kent]
[Sidenote: 55 B.C. Caesar’s expeditionary force.]
And now all was ready. The expeditionary force consisted of two
legions--the 10th, which had gained renown on many fields and was
regarded by Caesar with special favour, and the 7th, which had played
a conspicuous part in the famous battle with the Nervii--besides about
five hundred cavalry, raised from various tribes of Gaul, slingers
from the Balearic Isles, and Numidian and Cretan archers. The entire
army numbered about ten thousand men. A small squadron of galleys and
about eighty transports were assembled in the harbour; and on the 25th
of August[1304] the legionaries embarked on the transports, while the
galleys were assigned to the archers, slingers, and artillerymen.
The catapults which they carried would be worked, in case they were
required, under the protection of movable turrets, which could be
erected, at short notice, on their decks.[1305] Caesar omitted to
mention the class of ‘long ships’ to which they belonged: but his
narrative shows that they were shallow; and it may be doubted whether
any of them had more than one bank of oars.[1306] The transports had of
course been carefully selected, and were all excellent sea-boats: but
they had not been designed for disembarking troops on an enemy’s coast;
and in case it should prove necessary to land on an open beach, the
troops whom they carried would find themselves, on entering the water,
almost out of their depth. They were probably sailed by their native
crews; and the galleys, which were severally placed under the command
of the quaestor, the two generals who commanded the legions, and the
auxiliary officers, were doubtless handled by the seamen and Provincial
oarsmen who had manned them in the preceding year. The fleet included
some small fast-sailing vessels of light draught, which were commonly
used for reconnoitring, and would now be called scouts. Eighteen other
transports were lying in the little harbour of Ambleteuse, between five
and six miles to the north,[1307] having been prevented by contrary
winds from reaching the Liane; and, as the wind was now favourable
for the voyage to Britain, and Caesar could not afford to wait, he
sent his cavalry by road with orders to embark on these vessels and
follow him. As the expedition was to be of such short duration, no
heavy baggage was taken, and only sufficient supplies to last for a
few days. A general named Sulpicius Rufus remained with an adequate
force to guard the camp and the harbour; [Sidenote: Sabinus and Cotta
sent to punish the recalcitrant Morini and the Menapii.] while Titurius
Sabinus, who had commanded a division in the war of the previous year,
and Aurunculeius Cotta, who had served with distinction in the campaign
against the Belgae, were directed to march with the remaining legions
against those clans of the Morini which had not submitted, and their
neighbours, the Menapii.
[Sidenote: Caesar’s voyage.]
It was just five days before the full moon;[1308] and high tide that
evening was about six o’clock. About midnight the moon set, and we may
suppose that, like the ships of William when he sailed to encounter
Harold, each vessel carried a lantern.[1309] Soon afterwards the
signal was given to weigh anchor,[1310] and the ships stood out to
sea and steered against the ebb tide, which, however, was moving at
less than one knot an hour,[1311] for Dover harbour.[1312] As they
passed Ambleteuse, there was no sign that the cavalry transports had
[Sidenote: His cavalry transports fail to put to sea in time.] yet
got under way. About half an hour before sunrise the stream turned
eastward; and by that time Cape Grisnez had been left behind. But at
some period of the voyage the wind must have shifted to an unfavourable
quarter,[1313] for [Sidenote: Aug. 26.] it was not until the fourth
hour of the day, or about nine o’clock in the morning,[1314] that the
galleys approached the Dover cliffs; and at that time the transports,
which were slower sailers and had no oars, were far behind. Above
the white precipices, ranged on the undulating downs behind, Caesar
descried an armed host of the enemy. ‘The formation of the ground,’ he
observed, ‘was peculiar, the sea being so closely walled in by abrupt
heights that it was possible to throw a missile from the ground above
on to the shore.’[1315] To attempt a landing in the harbour or below
the cliffs on either side of it was of course out of the question;
and [Sidenote: He anchors off the Dover cliffs.] Caesar determined
to remain at anchor until the rest of the fleet should arrive. The
reader who is familiar with the _Commentaries_, and can comprehend
their implied meaning, will perceive that the vessels must have been
grouped in the bay somewhere between the Castle Cliff and the South
Foreland, the one on the extreme right being about a mile westward of
the latter.[1316] Caesar summoned his generals and tribunes to come
on board, communicated to them the substance of the report which he
had received from Volusenus, and instructed them how to handle their
ships and troops when the landing-place should be reached, warning them
above all to bear in mind that rapid and irregular movements were of
the essence of seamanship, and to be prepared to obey orders on the
instant. When he was satisfied that all understood what was required of
them, he sent them back to their ships. Between three and four in the
afternoon the infantry transports arrived; and although Caesar does not
expressly say so, it seems reasonable to assume that he communicated
with their officers as well.[1317] Between four and five the stream,
which, for about six hours, had been running down the Channel, turned
towards the east, and, as the wind was now blowing from a favourable
quarter, Caesar gave the signal to weigh anchor.[1318] A few minutes
later galleys, transports, and smaller craft, with all sail set,
[Sidenote: Late in the afternoon he sails on to Walmer--Deal.] were
running in an extended line past the Foreland, while the British
chariots and cavalry, followed by their infantry, were hurrying across
country to intercept them. In about an hour the armada was off the
coast between Walmer and Deal, heading straight for the shore; and,
while the galleys were held ready for emergencies, the transports were
run aground.
[Sidenote: The landing vigorously resisted.]
Caesar now saw crowding upon him the troubles that were due to his
lack of preparation. All along the beach a multitude of painted
warriors,[1319] with long moustaches and hair streaming over their
shoulders, were drawn up ready for action. The transports were
immovable in water so deep that the men, crowding in the bows, shrank
from plunging in; and when some of them overcame their hesitation, they
found themselves staggering and slipping, over-weighted by their armour
and encumbered by the shields on their left arms and the javelins which
they grasped in their right hands; while the Britons, standing securely
on the beach, and the charioteers, driving their trained horses into
the sea, harassed them with missiles to which they could not reply.
Old soldiers as they were, they felt unnerved by difficulties which
they had never encountered before. Caesar promptly sent the galleys to
the rescue. Driven through the water at their utmost speed, they were
ranged on the right flank of the enemy, who, alarmed by the long low
rakish hulls, the like of which they had never seen, and distracted by
the measured stroke of the oars, suddenly found themselves assailed by
slingers and archers, and enfiladed by strange artillery. Unable to use
their shields unless they changed front, they ceased to press their
attack, stood still, and presently began to give ground. But few of the
legionaries had yet ventured to enter the water; and the rest still
hesitated to take advantage of the respite. Then the standard-bearer of
the 10th legion, calling upon the gods for aid, turned to his comrades,
and cried, ‘Leap down, men, unless you wish to abandon the eagle to
the enemy. I, at all events, shall have done my duty to my country
and my general.’ Springing overboard, he advanced alone, holding the
eagle above his head. The men plucked up courage, and, calling upon
one another not to bring the legion to shame, leaped all together from
the bows. Encouraged by their example, the men in the nearest vessels
followed, and the fight became general.
But the advantage was still with the defenders. The galleys could not
be everywhere at once. The Romans, though they could not get firm
foothold, tried hard to keep their ranks and follow their respective
standard-bearers; but they soon lost all formation. As men entered the
sea from one ship or another, they attached themselves in bewilderment
to any standard they came across; and the enemy on the shore, whenever
they saw a few legionaries dropping one by one into the water, drove
their horses in, and surrounded and attacked them before they could
join their comrades; while others planted themselves on the exposed
flank of a disordered unsupported group,[1320] and showered missiles
into their midst. Jarring with the shouts of the disciplined soldiers,
resounded the harsh Celtic yell,[1321] the clangour of the Celtic
trumpet,[1322] and invocations uttered in strange language to strange
gods.[1323] Caesar now manned his scouts and the boats belonging to the
galleys, and sent them in different directions to assist all who were
overmatched. Gradually the foremost bodies of legionaries fought their
way on to the beach: the rest followed quickly [Sidenote: Caesar’s
victory indecisive owing to want of cavalry.] in support; and now,
closing their ranks and drawing their swords, they charged the enemy
with exultant cries, and put them to flight. Want of cavalry, however,
made it impossible to complete the victory.
[Sidenote: The Romans encamp.]
It was now near sunset. The site which Volusenus had noted for the camp
was close to the sea; and while fatigue-parties were sent out to cut
wood and the outposts took up their appointed places, the rest of the
troops fell to work with pick and shovel along the lines which had been
marked out for them. The galleys were hauled up on the beach; but the
transports were necessarily left at anchor. Until the cavalry should
arrive it would not be prudent to venture into the interior; and we
may suppose that a galley was sent back to the port of Ambleteuse, to
inform their captains about the landing-place for which they were to
steer.
[Sidenote: British chiefs sue for peace.]
It would seem that the resistance which the Britons had opposed to
the disembarkation was purely local, and that no defensive league had
been organized. The men of East Kent were disheartened by failure, and
on the next day sent envoys to sue for peace. Some days before, when
Commius had just landed and was formally communicating Caesar’s mandate
to the chiefs, he had been arrested and imprisoned. The envoys, who
brought him with them, begged Caesar to pardon this outrage, for which,
they said, the ignorant rabble were responsible. He replied that their
countrymen had made an unprovoked attack upon his army although they
had spontaneously sent an embassy to Gaul to proffer submission; but he
promised to accept their excuses on condition of their giving hostages.
Part of the required number were handed over there and then, the envoys
promising that the rest, who would have to be fetched from considerable
distances, should be brought within a few days. The Britons who had
fought at Walmer were ordered by their leaders to return home; and
within the next few days tribal chiefs arrived from various districts,
and formally surrendered.
[Sidenote: The cavalry transports dispersed by a gale.]
On the morning of the 30th of August the long-looked-for cavalry
transports were descried in the offing. They had sailed from Ambleteuse
with a light breeze; but as they were approaching the British coast a
sudden gale prevented them from keeping on their course. ‘Some,’ wrote
Caesar, ‘were carried back to the point from which they had started,
while the others were swept down in great peril to the lower and more
westerly part of the island. They anchored notwithstanding; but, as
they were becoming waterlogged, they were forced to stand out to sea
in the face of night, and make for the Continent.’[1324] The brief
sentences tell a tale which cannot be mistaken. The ships which were
swept down past the Foreland and the Dover cliffs scudded before the
north-easterly gale;[1325] and, although they were evidently in no
danger of being driven ashore, they were in great peril because only
the most watchful steering could prevent them from broaching to: if a
heavy sea struck the stern, it might swing the vessel round, and in a
moment she would be overset and founder. The ships which were carried
back to the point from which they had started were of course handled
differently. A sailing-vessel, caught by a gale, must either run before
the wind or lie to. With these vessels the latter course was adopted.
Carrying only just enough sail to keep them steady, they were laid to
on the port tack; and once they had drifted past Cape Grisnez into
comparatively sheltered water, they were able to stand in for the shore
and make the port of Ambleteuse.[1326] Not one of the eighteen vessels,
not a single man among their crews, was lost; and this fact, which
Caesar was careful to record, bears witness to the skilful seamanship
of the Gauls.
[Sidenote: Caesar’s fleet partially wrecked.]
But on the shores of East Kent the gale was still raging; and the moon
that shone out that night through the fleeting clouds was at the full.
Caesar’s officers and, it would seem, Caesar himself were ignorant of
the connexion between tide and moon; but if he had ever had leisure to
study the writings of Pytheas or of Posidonius,[1327] he would have
known what he might expect. His Gallic pilots indeed could certainly
have enlightened him; and there will always remain a doubt whether he
did not know more than he chose to admit. It was high water about an
hour before midnight; and the seas that came rushing over the shingle
before the north-east wind rose as high as a spring tide. The galleys
which had been hauled up, as Caesar supposed, above high-water mark,
were swept by the waves; the transports were driven ashore. Soldiers
and crews could only look helplessly on. Several vessels were totally
wrecked; and the rest lost their anchors, cables, and other tackle. No
provision had been made against the chance of such a disaster; and the
tools and materials that were needed for repairs were on the other side
of the Channel. The whole army was seized with panic. Men asked one
another how they were to subsist when they had no grain, and how they
were to get back to Gaul when there were no ships to carry them.
[Sidenote: The British chiefs prepare to renew hostilities.]
The British chiefs who were still in the camp saw their opportunity.
The coincidence of the shipwreck with the full moon was a good
omen.[1328] They knew that Caesar had no supplies; and although they
did not know exactly the strength of his force, they saw that his camp
was very small, and concluded that his troops were correspondingly
few. Besides, his want of cavalry would place him at a disadvantage.
Accordingly, they determined to recall their tribesmen, to prevent
the Romans from getting supplies, and to harass them by an irregular
warfare, in the hope that they would be able to starve them out,
or at any rate prevent them from re-embarking until wintry weather
should have set in. One by one they moved away from the camp without
attracting observation.
[Sidenote: Caesar labours to retrieve the disaster.]
Meanwhile Caesar was doing his best to retrieve the disaster; and,
although the chiefs managed to keep their plans secret, he suspected
that they meant mischief. Moreover, the hostages who were still due did
not arrive. The crops were ripe; and troops were detailed every day to
get corn. A galley was sent back to Gaul to fetch everything that was
required for repairing the ships. Twelve of them were so badly damaged
that it was impossible to patch them up even for one voyage; but their
timbers and bronze were utilized for the repair of the rest. All the
legionaries who had any knowledge of carpentry or metal-working were
employed as shipwrights, and worked with such good will that within a
few days the fleet had been made tolerably seaworthy.
[Sidenote: The 7th legion surprised and attacked while cutting corn.]
All this time natives were daily passing in and out of the camp; and
no one in the Roman army suspected that trouble was brewing. At a
considerable distance from Walmer there was a wood, close to which was
a field of standing corn. Everywhere else the crops had been already
cut; and to this spot the 7th legion was dispatched. The officer
who commanded it neglected to send out scouts; and the troops laid
aside their arms, and went to work securely with their reaping hooks.
It is true that the only cavalry were Commius’s thirty retainers;
but they might have done good service. It would seem that even the
ordinary precaution of keeping some of the cohorts under arms was
neglected.[1329] Suddenly the enemy’s chariots and cavalry emerged
from the wood, and swept down upon the unarmed and scattered reapers.
The chariots careered at full gallop all over the field, the warriors
who stood beside the drivers hurling javelins[1330] or slinging stones
at the legionaries as they were running to seize their arms, and
intimidating them, as Caesar said, ‘by the mere terror inspired by
their horses and the clatter of the wheels:’ presently the drivers
passed into the intervals between the troops of their supporting
cavalry; horsemen and charioteers charged together;[1331] and while the
warriors leaped from their chariots and fought as infantry, the drivers
moved off to a safe distance, ready to receive them in case they were
hard pressed. Meanwhile two cohorts were on guard as usual outside
the gates of the camp;[1332] and some of their number reported to
Caesar that an unusual amount of dust was rising in the direction in
which the 7th had gone. His suspicions were aroused; and, ordering the
two cohorts[1333] to accompany him, two others to take their places,
and the remaining cohorts of the 10th legion to leave their work,
arm, and follow him immediately, he marched towards the corn-field.
He had advanced some little distance before he came in sight of the
legionaries, who were evidently unable to hold their own. Huddled
together in a small space, with ranks disordered, they were surrounded
by cavalry and charioteers, missiles flying into them from every side.
Caesar was just in time. When the enemy saw reinforcements approaching
they suspended their attack, and the 7th recovered from their panic.
But if the enemy had no mind to renew the combat, Caesar did not feel
able, without cavalry and with only two legions, one of which had just
been so roughly handled, to strike an effective blow. ‘The moment,’ he
afterwards explained, ‘was not favourable for challenging the enemy
and forcing on a battle.’[1334] Accordingly he contented himself with
maintaining his ground, and, after a short interval, withdrew both
legions into camp.
[Sidenote: Military operations suspended owing to bad weather.]
The tribesmen who had not yet rejoined their chiefs were on the way:
but during the next few days stormy weather prevented the Romans from
going out of camp and the enemy from attacking them. Such was Caesar’s
statement; and it is not difficult to fathom his meaning. He would
not attack a mobile enemy whom it was difficult to bring to action,
but preferred to wait until they should attack him on his own ground,
before his impregnable camp: on the other hand, the ground was so miry
that for the time their chariots could not act. The Kentish chiefs,
however, were not idle. Messengers scoured the country, assured all
who still remained passive that the Roman army was contemptible, and
urged them to seize the opportunity of plundering their camp and
securing their own independence for ever. A large body of horse and
foot speedily assembled, and advanced towards the coast. If they had
been commanded by one skilful leader, and had adhered to the simple
plan of harassing the Romans when they were endeavouring to embark,
they might have achieved something. But they were a mere aggregate of
tribal levies under tribal chiefs; and greed and impatience worked
their ruin. The one thought that troubled Caesar was that their speed
would enable them to escape the consequences of defeat. They [Sidenote:
The Britons, attempting to rush Caesar’s camp, are defeated with heavy
loss.] made a wild attack upon the camp, and the legions, which were
drawn up outside, of course scattered them. Commius’s horse were of
some slight service in the pursuit; and the legionaries, who exerted
themselves to the utmost, killed many of the fugitives, and burned all
the buildings which they had time to reach.
[Sidenote: Caesar compelled by the approach of the equinox to return to
Gaul.]
This success came just in time to enable Caesar to leave Britain with
some show of credit. His departure could not be postponed. It was
about the middle of September: the dreaded equinox was near; and, with
his unsound ships, he would need a fine night for the voyage. He must
therefore have been relieved when, on the very day of their defeat,
the chiefs sent envoys to sue for peace. He ordered them to find twice
as many hostages as he had demanded before; and, as he could not wait
for them, the chiefs were to send them in their own or the merchants’
vessels to Gaul. Before he embarked he may have personally reconnoitred
the coast north of Walmer: anyhow he decided that, when he returned in
the following year, his best landing-place would be the sandy flats
between Sandown and Sandwich, where, as we have seen, the seaward
slope was gentler than [Sidenote: Causes of his partial failure.]
that of the Walmer shingle.[1335] But otherwise the objects for which
he had undertaken the expedition had not been attained. The time for
preparation had been too short. Owing to the excessive draught of
the transports, the disembarkation had entailed unnecessary loss: by
neglecting to bring over supplies Caesar had exposed the 7th legion
to the risk of a defeat which would have been calamitous; while the
unfortunate absence of the cavalry had made it impossible to obtain
any information about the nature of the country, and had weakened
the effect of the final victory. The troops were embarked without
opposition, and, taking advantage of a fair breeze, Caesar set sail
just after midnight. The [Sidenote: Two transports fail to make the
Portus Itius: the troops whom they carried attacked by the Morini.]
fleet reached the opposite coast safely; but two of the transports,
which perhaps were in worse condition than the rest, kept a little too
far out to sea, and, failing to make the mouth of the Liane, drifted
a few miles further down the coast and reached land somewhere north
of the mouth of Canche. The soldiers who had disembarked from them,
numbering about three hundred, were marching northward to join their
comrades when they were intercepted and attacked by a band of the
Morini, who belonged to one of the clans which had submitted a few
weeks before. As the Romans were considerably outnumbered, they were
obliged to form in a square; and, hearing the shouts of the combatants,
large numbers flocked to join in the attack. The three hundred defended
themselves with vigour; and four hours later, when Caesar’s cavalry
came to the rescue, they were still unbeaten. The assailants speedily
dispersed; [Sidenote: Punishment of the Morini and Menapii.] but next
day Labienus marched against them with the two legions which had just
returned from Britain, and almost all were taken prisoners. Titurius
and Cotta, with the other legions, had been punishing the Menapii.
Finding that they had taken refuge in their forests, they mercilessly
ravaged the open country, cutting the corn and burning the hamlets.
Thus, when the legions went into winter-quarters in the country of
the Belgae, Caesar might feel that in the ensuing summer his base of
operations would be secure. ‘Thither,’ he wrote dryly, ‘two British
tribes and no more sent hostages: the rest neglected to do so.’[1336]
[Sidenote: 55 B.C.]
When Caesar’s dispatches reached the Senate, they ordered [Sidenote:
Thanksgiving service at Rome for Caesar’s success.] a thanksgiving
service of twenty days to be held in honour his exploits. No one who is
versed in Roman literature and gifted with historical imagination will
regard the decree as ironical. For Caesar’s countrymen may well have
felt that he had opened the way for the conquest of a new world.