motives of avarice, since for a small sum of money he might have
procured, through Eumenes, a secure peace, well purchased even with half
of his kingdom; while, if defrauded, he might have exposed him to public
view, as an enemy laden with his pelf, and made the Romans deservedly
his enemies. Through this avaricious spirit the prompt alliance of king
Gentius, with the assistance of a large _army_ of Gauls, who had spread
themselves through Illyria, and offered themselves to him, was lost.
There came ten thousand horsemen, and the same number of footmen, who
themselves kept pace with the horses, and in place of the riders who had
fallen, took on the horses to the fight. They had stipulated that each
horseman should receive in immediate payment, ten golden Philippics,
each footman five, and their commander one thousand. Perseus went from
his camp on the Enipeus with half of his forces to meet them as they
approached; and issued orders through the towns and villages near the
road, to prepare provisions, so that they might have plenty of corn,
wine, and cattle. He brought with him some horses, trappings, and
cloaks, for presents to the chiefs; and a small quantity of gold to be
divided among a few; for the multitude, he supposed, might be amused
with hopes. He advanced as far as the city of Almana, and encamped on
the bank of the river Axius, at which time the army of the Gauls lay
near Desudaba, in Mædica, waiting for the promised hire. Thither he sent
Antigonus, one of his nobles, with directions, that the said army should
remove their camp to Bylazor, a place in Pæonia, and that their chiefs
should come to him in a body. They were at this time seventy-five miles
distant from the river Axius and the king’s camp. Antigonus, in his
message, told them what great plenty of every thing was provided on the
road by the king’s directions, and what presents of apparel, money, and
horses he intended for them on their arrival. They answered, that they
would judge of those things when they saw them; at the same time asking
him, whether, according to their stipulation for immediate payment, he
had brought with him the gold which was to be distributed to each
footman and horseman? When to this no direct answer was given,
Clondicus, their prince, said, “Go back, then, and tell your king, that,
unless they should have received the gold and the hostages, the Gauls
would never move one step farther.” When this message was brought to the
king, he called a council: and, as it was very plain what advice all the
members would give; he, being a better guardian of his money than of his
kingdom, began to descant on the perfidy and savage behaviour of the
Gauls. “The disasters,” he said, “of many states demonstrated, that it
would be dangerous to admit such a multitude into Macedonia, lest they
might feel such allies more troublesome than their Roman enemies. Five
thousand horsemen would be enough for them to employ in the war, and
that number they need not be afraid to receive.”
27. It was sufficiently clear to all that what he feared was the paying
of such a multitude, and nothing else; but as none had the courage to
declare their opinion, when asked, Antigonus was sent again, with a
message, that the king chose to employ only five thousand horsemen, but
that he could not receive the rest of their number. When the barbarians
heard this, they began to murmur, and show a great deal of anger at
being brought so far from home for no purpose; but Clondicus again asked
him, whether he would pay even the five thousand the hire agreed on.
When he perceived that an evasive answer was given to this question
also, the Gauls, dismissing the insidious envoy unhurt, which was what
he himself had scarcely hoped could be his fate, returned home to the
Danube, after utterly wasting such lands of Thrace as lay near their
road. Now had this body of troops, while the king lay quiet on the
Enipeus, been led against the Romans through the passes of Perrhæbia,
into Thessaly, it might not only have stripped that country so bare,
that the Romans could not expect supplies from thence; but might even
have destroyed the cities themselves, while Perseus, by detaining his
enemy at the Enipeus, would have put it out of their power to succour
their allies. The Romans, indeed, would have been obliged to look out
for their own safety, since they could neither stay where they were,
after losing Thessaly, whence their army drew sustenance, nor move
forward, as the camp of the Macedonians _stood in their way. By this
error, Perseus enlivened the hopes of the Romans_, and damped not a
little _those of the Macedonians_,[93] who had depended much on that
project. Through the same avarice, he alienated from him king Gentius.
When he paid, at Pella, three hundred talents to the persons sent by
Gentius, he allowed them to seal up the money. He then ordered ten
talents to be carried to Pantauchus, and these he desired should be
given immediately to the king. He ordered his people, who were carrying
the rest of the money, sealed with the seals of the Illyrians, to convey
it by short journeys, and when they should come to the bounds of
Macedonia, to halt there, and wait for a message from him. Gentius,
having received this small portion of the money, and being incessantly
urged by Pantauchus to provoke the Romans by some hostile act, threw
into custody Marcus Perperna and Lucius Petilius, who happened to come
at that time as ambassadors. Having heard this, Perseus, thinking that
the Illyrian had now laid himself under a necessity of waging war with
the Romans at least, sent to recall those who were conveying the money,
as if for no other object, than that the greatest possible booty might
be reserved for the Romans on his defeat. Herophon, too, returned from
Eumenes, without any one knowing what had been secretly negotiated
between them. The parties themselves had mentioned publicly that the
business of the prisoners had been concluded, and Eumenes, for the sake
of avoiding suspicion, acquainted the consul with it.
28. Upon the return of Herophon from Eumenes, Perseus, disappointed in
his hope, sent Antenor and Callippus, the commanders of his fleet, with
forty barks, to which were added five heavy galleys, to Tenedos, that
they might protect the vessels sailing to Macedonia with corn, and
scattered among the Cyclades. This squadron, setting sail from
Cassandrea, steered, first, to the harbour at the foot of Mount Athos,
and crossing over thence, with mild weather, to Tenedos, found lying in
the harbour a number of Rhodian undecked ships, and their commander
Eudamus; these they did not offer to molest, but, after having spoken
them in a friendly manner, suffered them to pursue their course. Then,
learning that, on the other side of the island, fifty transports of
their own were shut up by a squadron of Eumenes, commanded by Damius,
which lay in the mouth of the harbour, they sailed round with all haste;
and the enemy’s ships retiring, through fear, they sent on the
transports to Macedonia, ten barks having been appointed to accompany
them, which were to return to Tenedos as soon as they had convoyed them
to a place of safety. Accordingly, on the ninth day after, they rejoined
the fleet, then lying at Sigeum. From thence they sailed over to Subota,
an island between Elea and Athos. The next day after the fleet had
reached Subota, it happened that thirty-five vessels, of the kind called
horse-transports, sent by Eumenes to Attalus, and which had sailed from
Elea, with Gallic horsemen and their horses, were steering towards
Phanæ, a promontory of Chios, from whence they might cross over to
Macedonia, A signal having been given to Antenor, from a post of
observation, that these ships were passing along the main, he left
Subota, and met them between Cape Erythræ and Chios, where the strait is
narrowest. The officers of Eumenes believed nothing less probable than
that a Macedonian fleet was cruising in that sea; they imagined that
they were Romans, or that Attalus, or some people sent home by him from
the Roman camp, were on their way to Pergamus. But when, on their nearer
approach, the shape of the vessels was plainly perceived, and when the
briskness of their rowing, and their prows being directed straight
against themselves, proved that enemies were approaching, a panic was
struck into them; for they had no hope of being able to make resistance,
their ships being of an unwieldy kind, and the Gauls scarcely able to
bear a state of quiet when at sea. Some, who were nearest to the shore
of the continent, swam to Erythræ; some, crowding all their sail, ran
the ships aground near Chios; and, leaving their horses behind, made for
the city in disorderly flight. When the barks, however, had landed their
troops nearer to the city, where the access was more convenient, the
Macedonians overtook and put to the sword the flying Gauls, some on the
road, and some who had been shut out before the gate, for the Chians had
shut their gates, not knowing who they were that fled, or who that
pursued. About eight hundred Gauls were killed, and two hundred made
prisoners. Of the horses, some were lost in the sea, by the ships being
wrecked, and others the Macedonians hamstrung on the shore. Antenor
ordered the same ten barks, which he had employed before, to carry
twenty horses of extraordinary beauty, with the prisoners, to
Thessalonica, and to return to the fleet as speedily as possible;
saying, that he would wait for them at Phanæ. The fleet staid about
three days off the city, and then proceeded to Phanæ, and the ten barks
having returned sooner than was expected, they set sail, and crossed the
Ægean Sea to Delos.
29. While these things were taking place, the Roman ambassadors, Caius
Popilius, Caius Decimius, and Caius Hostinus having sailed from Chalcis
with three quinqueremes, arrived at Delos, and found there forty
Macedonian barks, and five quinqueremes belonging to king Eumenes. The
sacred character of the temple and the island secured all parties from
injury; so that the Roman and Macedonian seamen, and those of Eumenes,
used to meet promiscuously in the temple, a truce being imposed by the
religious feeling which the place inspired. Antenor, the commander of
Perseus’s fleet, having learned, by signals from his watch-posts, that
several transport ships were passing by at sea, went himself in pursuit,
with one half of his barks, (distributing the other half among the
Cyclades,) and sunk or plundered every ship he met with, except such as
were bound for Macedonia. Popilius and the ships of Eumenes assisted as
many as they were able; but, in the night, the Macedonians sailing out,
generally with two or three vessels, passed unseen. About this time,
ambassadors from Macedonia and Illyria came together to Rhodes. Their
influence was the greater, in consequence of their squadron cruising
freely among the Cyclades, and over all the Ægean Sea, and likewise on
account of the junction of Perseus and Gentius, and of the report of the
Gauls approaching with a great force both of horse and foot. Dinon and
Polyaratus, the partisans of Perseus, now took fresh courage, and the
Rhodians not only gave a favourable answer to the ambassadors, but
declared publicly, that “they would put an end to the war by their own
influence; and therefore desired the kings to dispose themselves to
accede to a peace.”
30. It was now the beginning of spring, and the new commanders had
arrived in their provinces; the consul Æmilius in Macedonia, Octavius at
Oreum, where the fleet lay, and Anicius in Illyria, to carry on the war
against Gentius. This prince, who was the son of Pleuratus, king of
Illyria, and his queen Eurydice, had two brothers, one called Plator, by
both parents, the other Caravantius, by the same mother only. The
latter, as descended of ignoble ancestors on his father’s side, was but
little suspected; but, that his reign might be more secure, he had put
to death Plator, and two active men his friends, Ettritus and Epicadus.
It was rumoured, that he was actuated by jealousy towards his brother,
who had engaged himself to Etuta, the daughter of Hononus, prince of the
Dardanians, as if, by that match, engaging that nation in his interest;
and this supposition was rendered the more probable by Gentius marrying
her, after the death of Plator. From this time, when he was delivered
from the fear of his brother, he began to be oppressive to his subjects,
and the natural violence of his temper was inflamed by an immoderate use
of wine. Having been incited, as was mentioned above, to a war with the
Romans, he collected all his forces, amounting to fifteen thousand men,
at Lissus. From thence, detaching his brother with one thousand foot and
fifty horse, to reduce, either by force or terror, the nation of the
Cavians, he marched himself to Bassania, a city five miles distant from
Lissus. The inhabitants were in alliance with Rome. Therefore, having
been first solicited by emissaries sent in advance, they determined
rather to endure a siege than surrender themselves. In Cavia, the people
of the town of Durnium cheerfully opened their gates to Caravantius, on
his arrival; but another town, called Caravantis, refused him
admittance; and whilst he was carelessly ravaging their lands, many of
his straggling soldiers were killed by a muster of the peasants. By this
time Appius Claudius, having joined to the army he had in command some
bodies of auxiliaries, composed of Bulinians, Apollonians, and
Dyrrhachians, had left his winter quarters, and was encamped near the
river Genusus. Having heard of the treaty between Persius and Gentius,
and being highly provoked at the ill-treatment of the outraged
ambassadors, he was resolved to make war upon him. The prætor Anicius,
who was now at Apollonia, being informed of what passed in Illyria,
despatched a letter to Appius, desiring him to wait for him at the
Genusus; and, in three days after, he arrived in the camp. _Having
added_ to the auxiliary troops which he then had, two thousand foot and
two hundred horse of the Parthinians, (the foot commanded by Epicadus,
and the horse by Agalsus,) he prepared to march into Illyria, chiefly
that he might relieve the Bassanians from the siege. But an account
brought him, of the sea-coast being ravaged by a number of the enemy’s
barks, checked his efforts. These were eighty vessels, which, by the
advice of Pantauchus, Gentius had sent to waste the lands of the
Dyrrhachians and Apollonians. _The Roman fleet was then lying near
Apollonia. Anicius hastily repaired thither, soon overtook the Illyrian
plunderers, brought them to an engagement, and, defeating them with very
little trouble, took many of their ships, and compelled the rest to
retire to Illyria. Returning thence to the camp at the Genusus, he
hastened to the relief of Bassania. Gentius did not bear up against the
rumour of the prætor’s coming; but, raising the siege, retired to Scodra
with such precipitate haste, that he did not even take the whole of his
army with him. There was a large body of forces, which, if their courage
had been supported by the presence of their commander, might have given
some check to the Romans; but, as he had withdrawn_,[94] they
surrendered.
31. The cities of that country, one after another, followed the example;
their own inclinations being encouraged by the justice and clemency
which the Roman prætor showed to all. The army then advanced to Scodra,
which was the chief seat of the war, not merely because Gentius had
chosen it for the metropolis of his kingdom, but because it has by far
the strongest fortifications of any in the territory of the Labeatians,
and is of very difficult access. Two rivers enclose it; the Clausula
flowing past the eastern side of the city, and by the western, the
Barbanna, which rises out of the lake Labeatus. These two rivers,
uniting their streams, fall into the river Oriuns, which, running down
from mount Scordus, and being augmented by many other waters, empties
itself into the Adriatic Sea. Mount Scordus is much the highest hill in
all that country; at its foot, towards the east, lies Dardania; towards
the south, Macedonia; and towards the west, Illyria. Notwithstanding
that the town was so strong, from the nature of its situation, and was
garrisoned by the whole force of the Illyrian nation, with the king
himself at their head, yet the Roman prætor, encouraged by the happy
success of his first enterprises, and hoping that the fortune of the
whole undertaking would correspond to its commencement, and thinking
also that a sudden alarm might have a powerful effect, advanced to the
walls with his troops in order of battle. But, if the garrison had kept
their gates shut, and manned the walls and the towers of the gates with
soldiers, they might have repulsed the Romans from the walls with their
efforts frustrated, instead of which they marched out from the gate,
and, on equal ground, commenced a battle with more courage than they
supported it: for, being forced to give way, and crowded together in
their retreat, and above two hundred having fallen in the very entrance
of the gate, the rest were so terrified, that Gentius immediately
despatched Teuticus and Bellus, two of the first men of the nation, to
the prætor, through whom he begged a truce, in order that he might be
able to deliberate on the state of his affairs. He was allowed three
days for the purpose, and, as the Roman camp was about five hundred
paces from the city, he went on board a ship, and sailed up the river
Barbanna, into the lake of Labeatus, as if in search of a retired place
for consultation; but, as afterwards appeared, he was led by a
groundless report, that his brother Caravantius was coming, with many
thousands of soldiers collected in the country, to which he had been
sent. This rumour dying away, on the third day he sailed down the river
in the same ship to Scodra; and, after sending forward messengers, to
request permission to call upon the prætor, and leave being given, came
into the camp. He began his discourse with reproaches against himself,
for the folly of his conduct; then descended to tears and prayers, and,
falling at the prætor’s knees, gave himself up into his power. He was at
first desired to keep up his spirits, and having been even invited to
supper, he went back into the city to his people, and, for that day, was
entertained by the prætor with every mark of respect. On the day
following, he was delivered into custody, to Caius Cassius, a military
tribune, having, though a king, received ten talents, scarcely the hire
of a party of gladiators, and that from a king, to reduce himself to
these circumstances.
32. The first thing Anicius did, after taking possession of Scodra, was,
to order the ambassadors, Petilius and Perperna, to be sought for and
brought to him; and having restored to them their former dignity, he
immediately despatched Perperna to seize the king’s friends and
relations, who, hastening to Medeo, a city of Labeatia, conducted to the
camp at Scodra, Etleva, the king’s consort; his brother Caravantius;
with his two sons, Scerdiletus and Pleuratus. Anicius, having brought
the Illyrian war to a conclusion within thirty days, sent Perperna to
Rome with the news of his success; and, in a few days after, king
Gentius himself, with his mother, queen, children, and brother, and
other Illyrians of distinction. This one war was announced at Rome as
finished before it was known to have been begun. At the time when these
things took place, Perseus laboured under dreadful apprehensions, on
account of the approach, both of the new consul Æmilius, who, as he
heard, was coming with formidable threats, and also of the prætor
Octavius: nor did he less dread the Roman fleet, and the danger which
threatened the sea-coast. Eumenes and Athenagoras commanded at
Thessalonica, with a small garrison of two thousand targeteers. Thither
he sent Androcles, as governor, and ordered him to keep the troops
encamped close by the naval arsenals. He ordered one thousand horse,
under Antigonus, to Ænia, to guard the sea-coast; directing them,
whenever they should hear of the enemy’s fleet approaching the shore in
any part, instantly to hasten thither, to protect the country people.
Five thousand Macedonians were sent to garrison the mountains Pythium
and Petra, commanded by Histiæus, Theogenes, and Medon. After making
these detachments, he set about fortifying the bank of the river
Enipeus, the channel being dry and fordable; and, in order that all the
men might apply themselves to this work, the women were obliged to bring
provisions from the neighbouring cities into the camp. He ordered the
soldiers to _fetch timber_ from the woods which were not far distant.
_Then a mound was formed and works thrown up strengthened with towers
and with engines, disposed in various parts so that the enemy might not
be able to force a way through without great opposition and danger. Thus
he trusted that he should be secure against every attack of the Romans,
and that, wearied out with inaction and slow delay, and drained by
expenses, a disgust at so difficult a war would seize on the mind of the
enemy. On the other side, the more diligence and caution Paullus saw the
Macedonians use, the more assiduously did he study to devise some means
of frustrating those hopes, which the enemy had not without reason
conceived. But he suffered immediate distress from the scarcity of
water, as the neighbouring river was almost dried up, except that a
little stream, and that impure, flowed in the part contiguous to the
sea._
33. _The consul, when those who were sent to search the neighbourhood
announced that no water could be found_,[95] at last ordered the
water-carriers to attend him to the shore, which was not three hundred
paces distant, and there to dig holes in several places, not far from
each other. The great height of the mountains gave him reason to suppose
that they contained hidden springs of water, the veins of which flowing
through to the sea, mingled with its waves; and the more so, as they
discharged no streams above ground. Scarcely was the surface of the sand
removed, when springs began to boil up, small at first, and muddy, but
in a little time they threw out clear water in great plenty, as if
through the favourable interference of the gods. This circumstance added
greatly to the reputation and influence of the general in the minds of
the soldiers. He then ordered them to get ready their arms; and went
himself, with the tribunes and first centurions, to examine the fords,
in hopes of finding a passage, where the descent would be easy for the
troops, and where the ascending the other bank would be least difficult.
After taking a sufficient view of these matters, he made it his first
care to provide, that, in the movements of the army, every thing should
be done regularly, and without noise, at the first order and beck of the
general. When notice was proclaimed of what was to be done to all at the
same time, every one did not distinctly hear; and as the orders received
were not clear, some making additions for themselves, did more than was
ordered, while others did less; while dissonant shouts were raised in
every quarter, insomuch that the enemy knew sooner than the soldiers
themselves what was intended. He therefore directed, that the military
tribune should communicate, secretly, to the first centurion of the
legion, then he to the next, and that so on, in order that each should
tell the next to him in rank what was requisite to be done, whether the
instructions were to be conveyed from front to rear, or from rear to
front. He likewise, by a new arrangement, forbade the sentinels to carry
their shields when on duty; for as a sentinel did not go to fight, but
to watch, he had no occasion for arms; it was his duty, when he
perceived an enemy approaching, to retire, and to rouse the rest to
arms. They used to stand with their helmets on, and their shields
erected on the ground before them; when tired, they leaned on their
spears; or laying their heads on the edge of their shields, stood dozing
in such a manner, that from the glittering of their arms they could be
seen afar off by the enemy, while themselves could see nothing. He
likewise altered the practice of the advanced guards. Formerly, the
guards were kept on duty through the whole day, all under arms, the
horsemen with their horses bridled; and when this happened in summer,
under a continual scorching sun, both men and horses were so much
exhausted by the heat and the languor contracted in so many hours, that
very often, when attacked by fresh troops, a few could get the better of
a greater number. He therefore ordered, that they should retire from the
morning-watch at noon, and that others should succeed to the duty for
the rest of the day; by which means the enemy could never come fresh
upon them when they were wearied.
34. Æmilius, after publishing, in a general assembly, his orders for
these regulations, added a speech of similar purport to that which he
had made in the city, that “it was the business of the commander alone
to consider what was proper to be done, sometimes singly, sometimes in
conjunction with those whom he should call to council; and that such as
were not called, ought not to pronounce their opinions either in public
or in private. That it was a soldier’s business to attend to these three
things,—his body, that he may keep it in perfect strength and agility;
his arms, in good order; and his provisions ready, in case of a sudden
order; and to understand, that all other matters relating to him are
under the care of the immortal gods and his captain. That in any army,
where the soldiers formed plans, and that the chief was drawn, first one
way, then another, by the rumours of the multitude, nothing was
successful. For his part,” he declared, that “he would take care, as was
the duty of a general, to afford them occasion of acting with success.
On their part, they were to make no inquiries whatever as to what was
about to take place; but, when the signal was given, to discharge the
duty of a soldier.” After these precepts, he dismissed the assembly,
while the veterans themselves acknowledged, that on that day, for the
first time, they had, like recruits, been taught the business of a
soldier. Nor did they, by such expressions only, demonstrate with what
perfect conviction they had listened to the consul’s discourse; but the
practical effect of it was immediate. In the whole camp, not one person
was to be seen idle; some were sharpening their weapons; others scouring
their helmets and cheek-pieces, their shields and breastplates; some
fitted their armour to their bodies and tested the agility of their
limbs under it; some brandished their spears, others flourished their
swords, and tried the points; so that it could be easily perceived that
their intention was, whenever they should come to battle, to finish the
war at once, either by a splendid victory or a memorable death. On the
other side, when Perseus saw that, in consequence of the arrival of the
consul, and of the opening of the spring, all was motion and bustle
among the Romans, as in a new war; and that the camp had been removed
from Phila and pitched on the opposite bank, and that the Roman general
employed himself busily, sometimes in going round and examining all his
works, doubtless looking out for a place to pass the river; _and
sometimes in preparing every thing requisite for attack or defence of a
camp, with the closest attention, and omitted nothing which could be
attempted or achieved by a great general, whether against the enemy or
for increasing the efficiency of his own men; he (Perseus) also exerted
himself no less diligently on his part to rouse the courage of his
soldiers, and add more and more strength to his defences, as if he were
approaching the crisis of the whole business, and never considered all
matters to be adequately provided for, or the bank sufficiently
fortified and secured. Nevertheless, amidst this most vehement ardour on
both sides, their camps were for some time in a state of tranquillity.
Nor was it ever recorded that such powerful armies, with their camps
pitched so near together, had ever lain so quiet._
35. _In the mean time, a report announced that king Gentius had been
defeated, in Illyria, by the prætor Anicius; and that himself, his
family, and his whole kingdom, were in the hands of the Romans_; which
event greatly raised the spirits of the Romans, and struck no small
degree of terror into the Macedonians and their king. At first, Perseus
endeavoured to suppress the intelligence, and sent messengers to
Pantauchus, who was on his way from that country, forbidding him to come
near the camp; but some of his people had already seen certain boys,
carried away among the Illyrian hostages; and it is certain that the
more pains there are used to conceal any circumstances, the more readily
they are divulged, through the gossiping disposition of the attendants
of kings. About this time, ambassadors came to the camp from Rhodes,
with the same message which had excited so much resentment in the Roman
senate. They were now heard by the council in the camp with much greater
indignation than at Rome; some _even advised_ that they should be
instantly driven out of the camp without any reply; but the consul said,
that he would give them an answer in fifteen days. Meanwhile, to show
how far the influence of the Rhodians as mediators extended, he began to
consult on the plan of carrying forward the war. Some, particularly the
older officers, advised to force their way across the Enipeus, and
through the enemy’s works. “When they should advance in close order and
make an assault, the Macedonians,” they said, “would never be able to
withstand them. They had been, last year, beaten out of many fortresses
much higher and better fortified, which they had occupied with much
stronger garrisons.” Others recommended, that Octavius, with the fleet,
should sail to Thessalonica; and, by committing depredations on the
sea-coast, to divide the king’s forces; so that when, on the appearance
of another enemy behind him, he should turn about to protect the
interior part of the kingdom, he would be forced to leave a passage over
the Enipeus open in some place or other. The consul himself was of
opinion, that the nature of the bank, and the works erected on it,
presented insuperable difficulties; and, besides its being every where
furnished with engines, he had been informed, that the enemy were
remarkable for using missile weapons with uncommon skill, and with a
very certain aim. The consul’s full conviction leaned quite another way;
as soon, therefore, as the council broke up, he sent for Schœnus and
Menophilus, Perrhæbian merchants, whom he knew to be men of probity and
good sense, and examined them in private about the nature of the passes
leading into Perrhæbia. They told him, that the places themselves were
not difficult; but that they were occupied by parties of the king’s
troops; from which he conceived hopes of being able to beat off those
parties, by making a sudden attack with a strong force in the night,
when they were off their guard. For he considered that “javelins, and
arrows, and other missile weapons, were useless in the dark, when one
cannot see at distance what to aim at; but that, when combatants closed
together in a throng, the business must depend on the sword, in which
the Roman soldier was superior.” He resolved to employ those two men as
guides; and, sending for the prætor Octavius, explained to him what he
intended, ordering him to sail directly with the fleet to Heracleum, and
to have in readiness, there, ten days’ provisions for one thousand men.
He then sent Publius Scipio Nasica, and Quintus Fabius Maximus, his own
son, with five thousand chosen men, to Heracleum, as if they were to
embark in the fleet, to ravage the coast of the interior parts of
Macedonia, as had been proposed in the council. He told them, in
private, that there were provisions prepared for them on board, so that
they should have no delay. He then ordered the guides to divide the road
in such a manner that they might attack Pythium at the fourth watch on
the third day. He himself, on the day following, in order to withdraw
the king from the observation of other matters, attacked his advanced
guards as soon as it was light in the middle of the channel of the
river, where the fight was maintained by the light infantry on both
sides, for the bottom was so uneven, that heavy arms could not be used.
The slope of each bank was three hundred paces long, and the breadth of
the channel, which was of various depths, somewhat more than a mile. In
this middle space the fight was carried on, while the king on one side,
and the consul with his legions on the other, stood spectators on the
ramparts of their camps. At a distance, the king’s troops had the
advantage in fighting with missile weapons; but in close fight the Roman
soldier was more steady, and was better defended, either with a target
or a Ligurian buckler. About noon, the consul ordered the signal of
retreat to be given, and thus the battle ended for that day, after
considerable numbers had fallen on both sides. Next morning at sun-rise,
the fight was renewed with greater fury, as their passions had been
irritated by the former contest; but the Romans were wounded, not only
by those with whom they were immediately engaged, but much more by the
multitudes that stood posted in the towers, with missiles of every sort,
particularly stones; so that whenever they advanced towards the enemy’s
bank, the weapons thrown from the engines reached even the hindmost of
their men. The consul, having lost far more men on that day, somewhat
later called off his men. On the third day he declined fighting, and
moved down to the lowest side of the camp, as if intending to attempt a
passage through an intrenchment which stretched down to the sea.
Perseus, _who did not extend his cares beyond_ the objects that lay
before his eyes, _bent all his thoughts and exertions to stop the
progress of the enemy in the quarter where he lay, careful of nought
beside. In the mean time, Publius Nasica, with the detachment assigned
to him, having departed towards the sea to Heracleum, when he arrived
there, waited for nightfall, ordering his soldiers to refresh
themselves. He then explained to the principal of his officers the real
directions of the consul, and when first the darkness spread itself,
bending his course to the mountain, he led his troops in silence to
Pythium, as he had been commanded. When they had arrived at the very
summit, which rises to a height of more than ten stadia, some repose was
given to the wearied soldiers. This height, as has been already stated,
Medon, Histiæus, and Theogenes, who were sent by Perseus, were occupying
with five thousand Macedonians, but so great was the negligence of the
king’s generals, that no one perceived that the Romans were approaching.
If we are to believe Polybius, Nasica, having attacked them while
asleep, easily dislodged them from the height. Nasica himself however,
narrates the affair very differently in a letter to one of the kings. He
says, that the mountain was of steep ascent, but so unguarded that he
could have taken possession of the pass with no trouble, had not a
deserter from those Cretans, whom he was taking with him, fled to
Perseus, and informed him what was being done. That the king himself
remained in his camp, but sent two thousand Macedonians and ten thousand
auxiliaries, with Medon as their leader, to take possession of the pass.
That with these a most fierce engagement took place on the top of the
hill, and, among other things, that he himself was thrust at with a
sword by a Thracian soldier, whom he transfixed by driving his spear
through his breast. That at length the Macedonians, being conquered,
gave way, and that their leader himself, throwing away his arms, sought
safety in a disgraceful flight. The Romans pursuing the fugitives had an
easy descent, without any danger, to the plain. In this stale of things
Perseus was in perplexity as to what was necessary to be done, as he
feared lest, now that a way through the pass had been opened, he should
be hemmed in by the Romans. It was absolutely necessary that he should
either retire to Pydna, and await the enemy there, so as to fight with
less danger under the walls of a fortified city; or that, dispersing his
forces through the cities of Macedonia, conveying the corn and cattle
into more fortified places, and devastating the fields, he, should leave
the bare soil to the enemy. The mind of the king fluctuated irresolute
between these two propositions: his friends, thinking that that which
was the most honourable would also be the safer, advised him to try the
fortune of a battle, alleging both that he was superior in the number of
his soldiers, and that he ought surely to trust to that valour which,
while it was natural to their minds, would be inflamed by the most
powerful and sacred incitements to a valiant opposition which could act
upon men;—their altars, their hearths, and their religious institutions,
amidst which and for which they had to fight; their parents and their
wives, and, lastly, their king himself observing them, and exposing
himself to a share of the danger. Influenced by these suggestions, the
king prepared himself for a battle, and when he had retired to Pydna, at
once pitched his camp, drew up his army, and assigned to each of his
leaders his position and duty, as if about to fight immediately after
the march. The locality was of this hind; the plain was suited for the
ranging of the phalanx, which requires an open and even space, not,
however, such as that it could be easily moved forward; then there were
continuous hills which afforded to the light-armed troops the means of
retreating at one time, and at another of wheeling round. Two streams,
the one of which the inhabitants called Œson, the other Leucus, though
they flowed with but a scanty supply of water, yet seemed likely to
occasion some trouble to the Romans. Æmilius, having united his forces
with Nasica, set out directly against the enemy, but at the sight of
their army, which was most effective both as to the number and the
strength of the soldiers, and admirably drawn up and ranged for battle,
he stopped, struck with awe, and revolving many considerations within
himself._
36. _The season of the year_[96] was a little after the summer
solstice; the time of the day was approaching towards noon; and his
march had been performed amidst great quantities of dust, and the
increasing heat of the sun. Lassitude and thirst were already felt, and
both would certainly be aggravated by mid-day coming on. He resolved,
therefore, not to expose his men in that condition to an enemy, fresh
and in full vigour; but so great was the ardour for battle in the minds
of both parties, that the general had occasion for as much art to elude
the wishes of his own men, as those of the enemy. He urged the military
tribunes to hasten the forming of the troops, went himself round the
ranks, and with exhortations inflamed their courage for the fight. At
first, they called to him for the signal briskly; but afterwards, as the
beat increased, their looks became less lively, and their voices
fainter, while many stood resting on their shields, or leaning on their
javelins. He then, at length, openly ordered the foremost ranks to
measure out the front of a camp, and store the baggage; on seeing which,
some undisguisedly rejoiced that he had not compelled them to fight when
they were wearied with marching and with the scorching heat. Immediately
about the general were the lieutenants-general, and the commanders of
the foreign troops; among others Attalus, who, when they thought that
the consul intended to fight, (for even to them he did not disclose his
intention of delaying,) had all approved the measure. On this sudden
alteration of his plan, while the rest were silent, Nasica alone of them
all ventured to advise the consul, not to let slip from his hands an
enemy, who, by shunning a battle, had baffled former commanders. “There
was reason to fear,” he said, “that if he should march off in the night,
he would have to be pursued with extreme toil and danger, into the heart
of Macedonia; and the troops must be led about, as under former
generals, wandering through the glens and forests of the Macedonian
mountains. He therefore earnestly recommended to attack the enemy while
he had him in an open plain, and not to lose the opportunity of
obtaining a victory, which now presented itself.” The consul, not in the
least offended at the frank advice of so illustrious a youth, answered:
“Nasica, I once thought as you do now; hereafter you will come to think
as I do. By the many chances of war, I have learned when it is proper to
fight, when to abstain from fighting. It would not be right in me, at
present, standing at the head of the troops to explain to you the causes
that render it better to rest to-day. Ask my reasons some other time. At
present you will acquiesce in the judgment of an old commander.” The
youth was silent, concluding that the consul certainly saw some
objections to fighting, which did not appear to him.
37. Paullus, as soon as he saw the camp marked out, and the baggage laid
up, drew off, first, the veterans from the rear line, then the
first-rank men, while the spearmen stood in the front, lest the enemy
might make any attempt; and lastly, the spearmen, beginning at the right
wing, and leading them away, gradually, by single companies. Thus were
the infantry drawn off without tumult; and, in the mean time, the
cavalry and light infantry faced the enemy; nor were the cavalry
recalled from their station, until the rampart and trench were finished.
The king, though he was disposed to have given battle that day, was yet
satisfied; since his men knew, that, the delay was owing to the enemy:
and he led back his troops to their station. When the camp had been
thoroughly fortified, Caius Sulpicius Gallus, a military tribune of the
second legion, who had been prætor the year before, with the consul’s
permission collected the soldiers in assembly, and gave them notice,
lest they should any of them consider the matter as a prodigy, that, “on
the following night, the moon would be eclipsed, from the second hour to
the fourth.” He mentioned that, “as this happened in the course of
nature, at stated times, it could be known, and foretold. As, therefore,
they did not wonder at the regular rising and setting of the sun and
moon, or at the moon’s sometimes shining with a full orb, and sometimes
in its wane, showing only small horns, so neither ought they to construe
as a portent, its being obscured when covered with the shadow of the
earth.” When on the night preceding the day before the nones of
September, at the hour mentioned, the eclipse took place, the Roman
soldiers thought the wisdom of Gallus almost divine; but the Macedonians
were shocked, as at a dismal prodigy, foreboding the fall of their
kingdom and the ruin of their nation; nor did their soothsayers explain
it otherwise. There was shouting and yelling in the camp of the
Macedonians, until the moon emerged forth into its full light. Both
armies had been so eager for an engagement, that, next day, both the
king and the consul were censured by many of their respective men for
having separated without a battle. The king could readily excuse
himself, not only as the enemy had led back his troops into camp, openly
declining a battle; but, also, as he had posted his men on ground of
such a nature, that the phalanx (which even a small inequality of
surface renders useless) could not advance on it. The consul, besides
appearing to have neglected an opportunity of fighting, and to have
given the enemy room to go off in the night, if he were so inclined, was
thought to waste time at the present, under pretence of offering
sacrifice, though the signal had been displayed, at the first light, for
going out to the field. At last, about the third hour, the sacrifices
being duly performed, he summoned a council, and there, too, he was
deemed by several to spin out, in talking and unseasonable consultation,
the time that ought to be employed in action; after the conversation,
however, the consul addressed to them the following speech.
38. “Publius Nasica, a youth of uncommon merit, was the only one of
those who were for fighting yesterday, that disclosed his sentiments to
me; and even he was afterwards silent, so that he seems to have come
over to my opinion. Some others have thought proper, rather to carp at
their general in his absence, than to offer advice in his presence. Now,
I shall, without the least reluctance, make known to you, Publius
Nasica, and to any who, with less openness, entertained the same opinion
with you, my reasons for deferring an engagement. For, so far am I from
being sorry for yesterday’s inaction, that I am convinced that by that
course I preserved the army. And if any of you think that I hold this
opinion groundlessly, let him come forward, if he pleases, and take with
me a review of how many things were favourable to the enemy and adverse
to us. In the first place, how far they surpass us in numbers, I am sure
not one of you was at any time ignorant; and yesterday, I am convinced
that you must have observed it, when you saw their line drawn out. Of
our small force, a fourth part had been left to guard the baggage; and
you know that they are not the worst of the soldiers who are left in
custody of the baggage. But suppose we were all here, can we believe it
a matter of little moment, that, with the blessing of the gods, we shall
this day, if judged proper, or tomorrow at farthest, march to battle out
of this our own camp, where we have lodged last night? Is there no
difference whether you order a soldier to take arms in his own tent,
when he has not suffered any fatigue on that day, either from a long
march or laborious work; after he has enjoyed his natural rest, and is
fresh; so as to lead him into the field vigorous both in body and mind;
or whether, when he is wearied by such a march, or fatigued with
carrying a load; while he is wet with sweat, and while his throat is
parched with thirst, and his mouth and eyes filled with dust, you oppose
him, under a scorching noon-day sun, to an enemy who has had full
repose, and who brings into the battle his strength unimpaired by any
previous circumstance? Is there, in the name of the gods, any one so
dastardly, that, if matched in this manner, he would not overcome the
bravest man? We must consider, that the enemy had, quite at their
leisure, formed their line of battle; had recruited their spirits, and
were standing in regular order; whereas we must have formed our line in
hurry and confusion, and have engaged before it was completed.
39. “We should then confessedly have an irregular and disorderly line,
but should we have had a camp fortified, a watering-place provided, and
the passage to it secured by troops, and all the country round
reconnoitred; or should we have been without any one spot of our own,
except the naked field on which we fought? Your fathers considered a
fortified camp as a harbour of safety in all the emergencies of an army;
out of which they were to march to battle, and in which, after being
tossed in the storm of the fight, they had a safe retreat. For that
reason, besides enclosing it with works, they strengthened it further
with a numerous guard; for any general who lost his camp, though he
should have been victorious in the field, yet was deemed vanquished. A
camp is a residence for the victorious, a refuge for the conquered. How
many armies, to whom the fortune of the fight has been adverse, when
driven within their ramparts, have, at their own time, and sometimes the
next moment, sallied out and defeated their victors! This military
settlement is another native country to every soldier: the rampart is as
the wall of his city, and his own tent his habitation and his home.
Should we have fought while in that unsettled state, and without
quarters prepared, to which, even if victorious, we might retire? In
opposition to these considerations of the difficulties and impediments
to the fighting at that time, one argument is urged: What if the enemy
had marched off in the course of last night? What immense fatigue, it is
observed, must have been undergone in pursuing him to the remotest parts
of Macedonia! But, for my part, I take it as a certainty, that if he had
had any intention of retreating, he would neither have waited, nor drawn
out his troops to battle. For, how much more easily could he have gone
off while we were at a great distance, than now, when we are close
behind him! Nor could he escape observation in departing either by day
or by night. What could be more desirable to us, who were obliged to
attack their camp, defended as it was by a very high bank of a river,
and enclosed likewise with a rampart and a number of towers, than that
they should quit their fortifications, and, marching off with haste,
give us an opportunity of attacking their rear in an open plain? These
were the reasons for deferring a battle from yesterday to this day. For
I am myself also inclined to fight; and for that reason, as the way to
come at the enemy over the river Enipeus was stopped, I have opened a
new way, by dislodging the enemy’s guards from another pass. Nor will I
rest until I shall have brought the war to a conclusion.”
40. Silence ensued after this address; for some were convinced by his
arguments, and the rest were fearful of giving offence needlessly in a
matter which, from whatever cause overlooked, could not now be regained.
Even on that day, neither the king nor the consul was desirous of
engaging; not the king, because he was not going, as on the day before,
to attack men who were fatigued after their march, were hurried in
forming their line, and not completely marshalled; nor the consul,
because, in his new camp, no collection was yet made of wood or forage,
to bring which from the adjacent country a great number of his men had
gone forth from the camp. Still fortune, whose power prevails over all
human schemes, brought about a battle. Nearer to the enemy’s camp was a
river, not very large, from which both parties supplied themselves with
water; and that this might be done with safety, guards were stationed on
each bank. On the Roman side were two cohorts, a Marrucinian and a
Pelignian, with two troops of Samnite horse, commanded by a
lieutenant-general, Marcus Sergius Silus; and in the front of the camp
there was posted another guard, under Caius Cluvius, lieutenant-general,
composed of three cohorts, a Firmian, a Vestinian, and a Cremonian;
besides two troops of horse, a Placentine and an Æsernian. While there
was quiet at the river, neither party making an attack; about the ninth
hour, a horse, breaking loose from those who had the care of him, ran
off towards the farther bank, and three Roman soldiers followed him
through the water, which was about as high as their knees. At the same
time two Thracians endeavoured to bring the horse from the middle of the
channel to their own bank; but one of these having been slain, and the
horse having been recovered, they retired to their post. On the enemy’s
bank there was a body of eight hundred Thracians, of whom a few, at
first enraged at their countryman being killed before their eyes,
crossed the river in pursuit of his slayers; in a little time some more,
and at last all of them, and engaged with the guard which defended the
bank on the Roman side. Some authors say, that by the command of
Paullus, the horse was driven without a bridle to the enemy’s side, and
men sent to bring him back, in order that the enemy might first provoke
the conflict. For when favourable auspices were not obtained by the
first twenty victims, at length the haruspices declared, “that the
entrails of the twenty-first portended victory to the Romans, provided
they acted only upon the defensive, without striking the first blow.”
However, whether by the design of the leader or by accident, the battle
was certainly brought about from this commencement, and, in a short
time, was so augmented by party after party on both sides flying to
carry succour to their comrades, that the commanders were compelled to
come down to a general decision of the contest; for Æmilius, on hearing
the tumult, came forth from his tent, and when it seemed neither easy
nor safe to recall or stop the impetuosity of those who were rushing to
arms, he thought it best to avail himself of the ardour of the soldiers,
and to turn an accident into an opportunity. He therefore led out his
forces from the camp, and riding among their ranks exhorted them to
enter upon the contest they had so greatly desired with corresponding
ardour. At the same time Nasica, having been sent forward to reconnoitre
what was the position of affairs amongst those who were engaged in the
commencing conflict, announced that Perseus was approaching with his
army in battle-array. First marched the Thracians, men of fierce
countenance and tall of stature, and protected on their left side by
bucklers which shone with remarkable brightness. A black cloak covered
both shoulders, and on their right they brandished from time to time a
sword of enormous weight. Next to the Thracians stood the hired
auxiliaries, their armour and costume differing according to their
respective nations; and among these were some Pæonians. Next came a band
of the Macedonians themselves, which they called the phalanx of the
Leucaspides. A few selected for their strength and valour were more
conspicuous, shining in gilded armour and scarlet cloaks: this was the
middle of the army. These were succeeded by those whom they called
Chalcaspides, from their brazen and glittering bucklers. This phalanx
was placed next to the other on the right wing. Besides these two
phalanxes, which constituted the chief strength of the Macedonian army,
the targeteers, who were also Macedonians, and carried pikes like those
of the phalanx, but in other respects more lightly armed, were
distributed on the wings advanced, and projecting beyond the rest of the
line. The plain was illuminated with the brightness of their arms, the
neighbouring hills echoed with their shouts, as they mutually cheered
each other on. Such was the swiftness and boldness of all these forces
as they came out to the fight, that those who were first slain fell at
two hundred and fifty paces from the Roman camp. Meanwhile Æmilius
advanced, and when he saw not only the other Macedonians, but those who
constituted the phalanx, some with their bucklers, and some with their
targets removed from their shoulders, and with their pikes inclined in
one direction receiving the attack of the Romans, admiring the firmness
of the serried ranks, and the bristling rampart of outstretched pikes,
he was smitten at once with astonishment and terror, as if he had never
seen so fearful a spectacle, and was afterwards in the habit of
frequently referring to it, and making this statement respecting
himself. Carefully concealing however at the time the agitation of his
troubled mind, he with serene countenance and careless aspect, and with
his head and body undefended, drew up his line. The Pelignians were now
fighting against the targeteers, who were ranged opposite to them, and
when, after long and laborious efforts, they were unable to break
through that compact array, Salius, who was commanding the Pelignians,
seized a standard and threw it among the enemy. On this a prodigious
conflict was excited, whilst on the one side the Pelignians strove with
all their might to recover the standard, the Macedonians on the other to
retain possession of it. The former strove either to cut through the
long spears of the Macedonians, or to repel them with the bosses of
their bucklers, or in some instances to turn them aside even with their
naked hands, while the latter drove them firmly grasped with both hands
with such force against the enemy, who rushed on with rash and heedless
fury, that, penetrating shields and bucklers, they overthrew the men
transfixed in like manner. The first ranks of the Pelignians having been
thus defeated, those who stood behind them were also cut down, and the
rest retreated towards the mountain which the inhabitants call Mount
Olocrus, though not yet in open flight. On this the grief of Æmilius
burst forth, so that he even rent his robe with mortification, for in
other places as well he saw that his men were hanging back and
approaching with timidity that hedge of steel, as it were, with which
the Macedonian line bristled in every part. But that skilful general
observed that this conjunction of the foe was not every where close, but
that here and there it opened with little interstices, either on account
of the unevenness of the ground, or on account of the very length of its
front, which was immensely extended, while those who attempted to occupy
higher ground were necessarily, though unwillingly, separated from those
who occupied lower positions, or those who were slower from those who
were faster, and those who advanced from those who held back, and
lastly, those who pressed upon the enemy from those who were repulsed.
In order, therefore, entirely to break the ranks of the enemy, and to
distribute the irresistible attack of the entire phalanx into a number
of separate conflicts, he commanded his men, that wherever they should
see the line of the enemy present openings, they should individually
rush to those spots, and insinuating themselves like a wedge into such
spaces, however narrow their extent, they should fight with impetuosity.
This order having been issued and spread through the whole army, he led
on in person one of the legions to the battle.
41. The troops were impressed by the high dignity of his office, the
personal renown of the man, and, above all, by his age: for, though
more than sixty years old, he discharged the duties of youth, taking on
himself the principal share both of the labour and danger. His legion
filled up the space between the targeteers and the phalanxes, and thus
disunited the enemy’s line. Behind him were the targeteers, and his
front faced the shielded phalanx of Chalcaspides. Lucius Albinus, a man
of consular rank, was ordered to lead on the second legion against the
phalanx of the Leucaspides, which formed the centre of the enemy’s line.
On the right wing, where the fight began, at the river, he brought
forward the elephants, with the cohorts of allied cavalry; and from this
quarter the retreat of the Macedonians first began. For as new
contrivances generally make an important figure in the words of men, but
on being put in practice ofttimes prove vain and ineffectual, so on that
occasion the elephants in the line of battle were a mere name, without
the least use. Their attack was followed by the Latin allies, who forced
the enemy’s left wing to give way. In the centre, the second legion
charged and dispersed the phalanx; nor was there any more evident cause
of the victory, than there being many distinct fights, which first
disordered that body, when it wavered, and at last quite broke it. Its
force, while it is compact and bristling with extended spears, is
irresistible; but if, by attacking them separately, you force them to
turn about their spears, which, on account of their length and weight,
are unwieldy, they are mingled in a confused mass; and, if any disorder
arises on the flank or rear, they fall into irretrievable disorder.
Thus, now, they were obliged to oppose the Romans in small parties, and
with their own line broken into numerous divisions; and the Romans, when
any opening was made, worked themselves into their ranks. But had they
advanced with their entire line, straight against the phalanx when in
its regular order, just as happened to the Pelignians, who, in the
beginning of the battle, incautiously engaged the targeteers; they would
have impaled themselves on the spears, and would have been unable to
withstand such a firm body.
42. But though a massacre was made of the infantry on all sides, except
those who threw away their arms and fled, the cavalry quitted the field
with scarcely any loss. The king himself was the first in flight. With
the sacred squadrons of horse he took the road to Pella, and was quickly
followed by Cotys and the Odrysian cavalry. The other wings of the
Macedonians, likewise, went off with full ranks: because, as the line of
infantry stood in the way, the slaughter of them detained the
conquerors, and made them careless of pursuing the cavalry. For a long
time, the men of the phalanx were cut off, in front, on the flanks, and
on the rear; at last, such as could avoid the enemy’s hands, fled
unarmed towards the sea; some even ran into the water, and, stretching
out their hands to those on board the fleet, humbly begged their lives.
And when they saw boats coming from all the ships, supposing that they
were coming to take them in rather than to slay them, advanced farther
into the water, so that some of them even swam. But, when they were cut
to pieces as enemies by the boats, such as were able regained the land
by swimming back, where they met with a more dreadful death; for the
elephants, which their riders had driven down to the shore, trod them
under foot, and crushed them in pieces. It was generally acknowledged,
that the Macedonians never lost so great a number of men in any battle
with the Romans; for their killed amounted to twenty thousand; six
thousand, who made their escape from the field to Pydna, fell alive into
the hands of the Romans, and five thousand were taken straggling through
the country. Of the victorious army there fell not more than one
hundred, the greater part of whom were Pelignians; but a much greater
number were wounded. If the battle had been begun earlier, so that the
conquerors might have had daylight enough for a pursuit, all their
troops must have been utterly destroyed. As it happened, the approach of
night both screened the fugitives, and made the Romans unwilling to
follow them through an unknown country.
43. Perseus fled as far as the Pierian wood, with a military appearance,
being attended by a numerous body of horse, together with his royal
retinue; but when he came into the thicket, where there were numerous
paths in different directions, and when darkness came on, he turned out
of the main path with a very few, in whom he placed the greatest
confidence. The horsemen, abandoned by their leader, dispersed, in
different directions, to their respective homes; some of whom made their
way to Pella, quicker than Perseus himself, because they went by the
straight and open road. The king was hindered by his fears and the many
difficulties of the way, till near midnight. Perseus was met at the
palace by Euctus, governor of Pella, and the royal pages; but of all his
friends who had escaped from the battle by various chances, and had
reached Pella, not one would come near him, though they were repeatedly
sent for. Only three persons accompanied him in his flight; Evander a
Cretan, Neo a Bœotian, and Archidamus an Ætolian. With these he
continued his retreat, at the fourth watch; for he began to fear, lest
those who had refused to obey his summons, might, presently, attempt
something more audacious. He had an escort of about five hundred
Cretans. He took the road to Amphipolis; leaving Pella in the night, and
hastening to get over the river Axius before daylight, as he thought
that it, from the difficulty of passing it, would put an end to the
further pursuit of the Romans.
44. The consul, when he returned victorious to his camp, to mar his
entire joy, was much distressed by concern for his younger son. This was
Publius Scipio, who afterwards acquired the title of Africanus by the
destruction of Carthage. He was, by birth, the son of the consul
Paullus, and by adoption, the grandson of the elder Africanus. He was
then only in the seventeenth year of his age, which circumstance
heightened his father’s anxiety; for, pursuing the enemy with eagerness,
he had been carried away by the crowd to a distant part. But when he
returned late in the evening, the consul, having received his son in
safety, felt unmixed joy for the very important victory. When the news
of the battle reached Amphipolis, the matrons ran together to the temple
of Diana, whom they style Tauropolos, to implore her aid. Diodorus, who
was governor of the city, fearing lest the Thracians, of whom there were
two thousand in garrison, might, during the confusion, plunder the city,
contrived to receive in the middle of the forum a letter through a
person whom he had deceitfully suborned to personate a courier. The
contents of it were, that “the Romans had put in their fleet at Emathia,
and were ravaging the territory round; and that the governors of Emathia
besought him to send a reinforcement to oppose the ravagers.” After
reading this, he desired the Thracians to march to the relief of the
coast of Emathia, telling them, as an encouragement, that the Romans
being dispersed through the country, they might easily kill many of
them, and gain a large booty. At the same time he threw discredit on
the report of the defeat, alleging that, if it were true, many would
have come thither direct from the retreat. Having, on this pretence,
sent the Thracians out of the town, he no sooner saw them pass the river
Strynion, than he shut the gates.
45. On the third day after the battle, Perseus arrived at Amphipolis,
and sent thence to Paullus suppliant ambassadors, with the wand of
peace. In the mean time, Hippias Medon, and Pantauchus, the principal
friends of the king, went themselves to the consul, and surrendered to
the Romans the city of Berœa, to which they had fled after the battle;
and several other cities, struck with fear, prepared to do the same. The
consul despatched to Rome, with letters and the news of his victory, his
son Quintus Fabius, Lucius Lentulus, and Quintus Metellus. He gave to
his infantry the spoils of the enemy who were slain, and to his cavalry
the plunder of the circumjacent country, provided, however, that they
did not stay out of the camp longer than two nights. He himself then
removed nearer the sea towards Pydna. Berœa, Thessalonica, and Pella,
and indeed almost every city in Macedonia, successively surrendered
within two days. The inhabitants of Pydna, which was the nearest, had
not yet sent any ambassadors; the confused multitude, made up of many
different nations, with the numbers who had been driven into one place
in their flight from the battle, embarrassed the counsels and unanimity
of the inhabitants; the gates, too, were not only shut, but closed up
with walls. Milo and Pantauchus were sent to confer, under the wall,
with Solon, who commanded in the place. By his means the crowd of
military people were sent away, and the town was surrendered and given
up to the soldiers to be plundered. Perseus, after making a single
effort to procure the assistance of the Basaltians, to whom he had sent
ambassadors in vain, came forth into a general assembly, bringing with
him his son Philip, in order to encourage the Amphipolitans themselves,
and to raise the spirits of those horse and foot soldiers who had either
constantly accompanied him, or had happened to fly to the same place.
But, though he made several attempts to speak, he was always stopped by
his tears; so that, finding himself unable to proceed, he told Evander,
the Cretan, what he wished to have laid before the people, and came down
from the tribunal. Although the multitude, on observing the aspect of
the king, and his pitiable weeping, had themselves sighed and wept with
him, yet they refused to listen to the discourse of Evander; and some,
from the middle of the assembly, had the assurance to interrupt him,
exclaiming, “Depart to some other place, that the few of us who are left
alive may not be destroyed on your account.” Their daring opposition
stopped Evander’s mouth. The king retired to his palace; and, causing
his treasures to be put on board some barks which lay in the Strymon,
went down himself to the river. The Thracians would not venture to trust
themselves on board, but went off to their own homes, as did the rest of
the soldiers. The Cretans only followed in hope of the money: but, as
any distribution of it among them would probably raise more discontent
than gratitude, fifty talents[97] were laid for them on the bank, to be
scrambled for. After this scramble they went on board, yet in such hurry
and disorder, that they sunk one of the barks, which was swamped by
numbers in the mouth of the river. They arrived that day at Galepsus,
and the next at Samothrace, to which they were bound. Thither it is said
that as many as two thousand talents[98] were conveyed.
46. Paullus sent officers to hold the government of the several cities
which had surrendered; lest, at a time when peace was but newly
restored, the conquered might suffer any ill treatment. He detained with
himself the ambassadors of Perseus; and, being uninformed of the flight
of the king, detached Publius Nasica, with a small party of horse and
foot, to Amphipolis, both that he might lay waste the country of
Sintice, and be ready to obstruct every effort of the king. In the mean
time, Melibœa was taken and sacked by Cneius Octavius. At Æginium, to
which Cneius Anicius, a lieutenant-general, had been despatched, two
hundred men were lost by a sally made from the town; the Æginians not
being aware that the war was at an end. The consul, quitting Pydna,
arrived with his whole army, on the second day, at Pella; and, pitching
his camp at the distance of a mile from it, remained in that station for
several days, reconnoitring on all sides the situation of the city; and
he perceived that it was chosen to be the capital of the kingdom, not
without good reason. It stands on a hill which faces the south-west, and
is surrounded by morasses, formed by stagnant waters from the adjacent
lakes, so deep as to be impassable either in winter or summer. In the
part of the morass nearest to the city the citadel rises up like an
island, being built on a mound of earth formed with immense labour, so
as to be capable of supporting the wall, and secure against any injury
from the water of the surrounding marsh. At a distance it seems to join
the city rampart, but is divided from it by a river, and united by a
bridge; so that if externally invaded it has no access from any part,
and if the king chooses to confine any person within it, there is no way
for an escape except by that bridge, which can be guarded with great
ease. This was the depository of the royal treasure; but, at that time,
there was nothing found there but the three hundred talents which had
been sent to king Gentius, and afterwards brought back. While they were
stationed at Pella, audience was given to a great number of embassies,
which came with congratulations, especially out of Thessaly. Then,
receiving intelligence that Perseus had passed over to Samothrace, the
consul departed from Pella, and after four days’ march, arrived at
Amphipolis. Here the whole multitude poured out of the town to meet him;
a plain demonstration that the people considered themselves not as
_bereft of a good and just king, but as delivered from a haughty tyrant.
Paullus having entered the city while engaged in religious services, and
performing a solemn sacrifice, the altar was suddenly kindled by
lightning, while all considered the event to signify that the offerings
of the consul were most acceptable to the gods, since they were
consecrated by fire from heaven. The consul, after a short delay at
Amphipolis, proceeded at once in pursuit of Perseus, and also that he
might carry his victorious arms round to all the nations which had been
under his sway, made for the province of Odomantice, a region beyond the
river Strymon, and encamped at Siræ_.