During the latter part of April the Tenth Army had found its XXIV Corps
heavily engaged in southern Okinawa. It was decided that the III
Amphibious Corps would be assigned the western half of the southern line
on about 7 May. It was further decided that on 1 May the First Marine
Division would be attached to the XXIV Corps and committed in the
vicinity of Machinato Airfield. Its mission was clear out the Jichaku
plateau area and then strike toward Shuri, the core of the Japanese
defensive position. The Sixth Marine Division would then be committed on
the right of the First Division.
All through the last week in April, the Sixth Division patrolled and
garrisoned northern Okinawa. Preparations were made for the move to the
south. The regiments rested, re-equipped themselves and received
replacements. During the month of April the division had traveled over
84 miles, seized 436 square miles of enemy territory, captured 46
prisoners and killed nearly 2,500 of the enemy. In the same period the
division had lost 236 men killed and 1,061 wounded in action.
On 2 May the division began to move southward to assembly areas near
Chibana, east of the original landing beaches. The responsibility for
the defense of northern Okinawa passed from the Sixth Marine Division to
the Twenty Seventh Infantry Division on 4 May.
According to Tenth Army order, the III Amphibious Corps was to assume
responsibility for the western portion of the southern front on 7 May.
The First Marine Division was already committed and was fighting to
secure the high ground north and northeast of the Asa River. The Sixth
Marine Division was ordered to commit one regimental combat team on the
right of the First Division on 8 May. General Shepherd chose the Twenty
Second Marines to be committed first. Its mission was to cross the Asa
and seize the first high ground to the south. From here, the division
could attack to carry out its mission, which was: To seize Naha and the
line of the Kokuba River in its zone of action, to assist the First
Marine Division by fire and maneuver, and to protect the Corps’ right
(west) flank.
[Illustration: Map 5. Final Drive. Motobu Peninsula.]
All during the fighting on Motobu, the men of the Sixth Marine Division
had heard stories of the fighting down south. They knew that the Tenth
Army had uncovered the main Japanese defensive positions; that the enemy
had chosen rough hilly ground across a narrow part of the island. The
enemy was well dug in on a high and broken hill mass which took its name
from its geographical center—Shuri. The line, or series of lines really,
ran from north of Naha through Shuri to Yonabaru on the east coast. They
had heard that the XXIV Corps had run into a virtual stalemate; that
some sixty thousand of the enemy were offering fierce resistance from
concealed positions; that the enemy was using mortars and artillery on
an unprecedented scale; and that the enemy troops in southern Okinawa
were excellent soldiers, well disciplined, and well prepared to fight a
long and costly campaign. Before the second week in May had passed the
men were certain that none of the stories were exaggerated.
In the new zone of action, the Sixth Marine Division launched its first
attack when it sent the Twenty Second Marines across the Asa River in
the early morning hours of 10 May. Patrols had crossed the river on the
previous day and reconnoitered the ground to its immediate south. The
only bridge across the river in this sector had been totally destroyed.
Through the night of 9-10 May, the Sixth Engineer Battalion worked to
construct a footbridge. Although the little bridge was finally completed
in time for the pre-dawn attack, a group of the enemy carrying
demolitions packs succeeded in destroying themselves and a section of
the bridge before many of the Marines got across.
At 0330, 10 May, the First and Third Battalions of the Twenty Second
Marines crossed the Asa; the First waded across upstream on the
regiment’s left, while the Third started to use the footbridge. When it
was destroyed, the battalion was forced to go upstream and wade across.
At first enemy resistance was light, but as the Japanese became aware of
this threat to their left flank, opposition became fierce. Despite heavy
artillery, mortar, and small arms fire, the troops moved on up the first
ridges. By nightfall, and after a day of heavy casualties, a bridgehead
1400 yards wide and about 400 yards deep had been established.
Next morning the reserve battalion of the Twenty Second Marines, the
Second, was committed to cover the left flank of the First which was
fighting to reduce an enemy stronghold on a formidable coral hill
southeast of Asa village. When flanking action failed to secure the
hill, the troops withdrew so that naval gunfire from the USS
Indianapolis could be utilized. In the meantime the engineers labored
under sporadic enemy fire to construct a Bailey Bridge across the Asa,
where the footbridge had been. About noon the structure was completed
and tanks roared across to support the troops. With the added fire power
of the tanks, the First Battalion attacked the hill again, this time
successfully. Over on the right, the Third Battalion fought for three
hours before capturing the precipitous cliff area in its zone of action.
On 12 May the Twenty Second Marines, with all three battalions in the
line, continued to advance despite increasing enemy resistance. Not only
was the regiment receiving fire from its front, but also from the left
flank, where the enemy in his positions on Wana Ridge and the Shuri
heights could observe troop movements and bring fire to bear at an
instant’s notice. As it became apparent that the division’s left was
becoming open, General Shepherd ordered the Third Battalion, Twenty
Ninth Marines into the line to protect the east flank. It was quite
plain that another regiment would have to be committed if the momentum
of advance were to be maintained.
Next day, the Sixth Marine Division continued the attack with the Second
Battalion, Twenty Second Marines and the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth,
in assault. About three hundred yards was all that could be gained due
to heavy enemy resistance. In the late afternoon the other two
battalions of the Twenty Ninth Marines moved up behind the Third, and
prepared to go into the assault on 14 May.
By this time General Shepherd had discovered the following: (1) In
attempting to outflank the Shuri line, the Sixth Marine Division had
uncovered the western anchor of the enemy’s main defensive position; (2)
Three terrain features, heavily fortified and manned, and mutually
supporting formed this anchor; (3) Unprotected but heavily guarded
corridors led into each of these terrain features. (4) There was no
ground offering covered routes of approach, from which these terrain
features could be assaulted; (5) the three terrain features (later
called Horseshoe Ridge, Sugar Loaf Hill, and Half Moon Hill) would be
held by the enemy at all costs; if they were lost, the enemy’s main
position at Shuri would be outflanked; (6) The battle efficiency of the
Twenty Second Marines was seriously impaired; It had lost over 800 men
killed or wounded since crossing the Asa; (7) Naha, the capital city of
Okinawa, lay open in front of the Twenty Second Marines, but it could
not be seized until the Sugar Loaf defensive position, Horseshoe Ridge,
and the Half Moon were reduced and cleared of enemy.
[Illustration: Map 6. Attack of 2nd Bn., 22nd Marines.]
Commanding the surrounding countryside, Sugar Loaf Hill was the apex of
a triangle. All three elements of the triangle were mutually supporting:
Horseshoe Ridge and the Half Moon covered Sugar Loaf; from Sugar Loaf
the enemy could cover the other two with fire; all three terrain
features were, in turn, under observation and fire from Shuri. Troops
attacking any one of the three hills would be subjected immediately to
fire from the other two. There was no room for extended maneuver; on the
right of the division was the sea; on the left the zone of the First
Marine Division, which offered no protection or cover.
Late in the afternoon of 14 May the Second Battalion, Twenty Second,
attempted a tank-infantry assault, and despite heavy 47-mm. fire that
drove the tanks back, succeeded in getting a few men from “G” Company up
on the top of Sugar Loaf. The attack caught the Japanese by surprise,
but only momentarily; during the night, they reorganized to launch an
attack next morning that drove the Second Battalion back from the ground
immediately to the north of Sugar Loaf, and finally spread over into the
zone of the Twenty Ninth Marines. This counterattack, in approximately
battalion strength, started a day of the bitterest fighting yet seen by
the Twenty Second Marines. The desperate character that the fight now
assumed was indicative of the enemy’s resolve to hold the Sugar Loaf
system regardless of the cost. Two battalions of the Twenty Ninth, the
First and Third, encountered the same bitter fighting that was
experienced by the First and Second Battalions, Twenty Second. In the
corridor leading to the Half Moon, the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth,
finally reduced an enemy pocket that had been bypassed but had become so
troublesome as to prevent further advance. To the left, the First
Battalion was fighting in the low ground north of the Half Moon. During
the afternoon of this day, 15 May, the Third Battalion, Twenty Second
Marines, moved up to relieve the Second Battalion which had lost over
400 men in the last three days. Over on the division’s right, the First
Battalion of the Twenty Second drove down the long ridge overlooking the
Asato, but could advance no further due to heavy fire from the Horseshoe
and Sugar Loaf.
All during the night of 15-16 May the enemy used his mortars and
artillery to interdict the front lines, causing light casualties. Early
next morning the Sixth Marine Division, with the Twenty Second and
Twenty Ninth regiments in assault, again attacked to seize the Sugar
Loaf—Half Moon positions. Heavy enemy fire greeted the attack; from near
the town of Takamotoji the enemy commenced to fire, although that area
had been quiet previously. It was apparent that the enemy was moving in
replacements and additional troops to bolster the Sugar Loaf system.
Working its way into position on the left of the regimental front, the
Third Battalion, Twenty Second Marines prepared to assault Sugar Loaf
Hill. Behind tanks, and after an intense artillery barrage, the
battalion advanced rapidly up the pitted north slope of the hill in the
face of extremely heavy fire from enemy mortars, grenades, and automatic
weapons. Several times the battalion reached the top of the hill and
closed with the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting only to be driven back.
Finally, with losses steadily mounting, the battalion was forced to
withdraw.
Hope was held for a while on this day that the Twenty Ninth Marines
might seize Half Moon Hill. Closely supported by tanks, troops moved
forward slowly and reached the edge of the ridge by late afternoon.
Before they could organize defensive positions, or dig in, the enemy
poured so much fire in from Shuri, Sugar Loaf, and the reverse slopes of
the Half Moon, that the troops had to withdraw under the cover of smoke.
Casualties were extremely heavy.
This day, 16 May, was perhaps the bitterest day of the entire Okinawa
Campaign for the Sixth Marine Division. With all the strength at their
command, two regiments had attacked without apparent success. A week of
steady fighting had reduced the offensive capabilities of the Twenty
Second Marines so General Shepherd now shifted the burden of attack to
the Twenty Ninth, leaving the Twenty Second to hold where it was.
Before the Twenty Ninth Marines began the attack of 17 May, the enemy in
the Sugar Loaf area was subjected to a terrific bombardment which
included 16-inch shells from the main batteries of battleships, 8-inch
howitzer shells, and 1000-pound aerial bombs. With tanks in close
support and immediately behind a heavy and continuing artillery barrage,
the First and Third Battalions, Twenty Ninth Marines edged their way to
the northern edge of Half Moon Hill. Finally the Third Battalion seized
a slim foothold on the north-western edge of the hill but intense enemy
fire made the position untenable and the troops were forced to withdraw.
Meanwhile “E” Company of the Second Battalion was attempting a flanking
attack around the east side of Sugar Loaf Hill. Despite heavy enemy
mortar barrages and grenade fire, the company drove to the top of the
hill three times; each time the enemy counterattacked and drove the men
off. Finally at 1830 in the last vestige of light, the company mustered
strength enough to assault the hill again. This time when it reached the
top it beat off an enemy counterattack, but had so few men left, and so
many wounded to be evacuated, that it had to pull back to better ground
for the night.
At dusk, but while there was still enough light to be seen, the enemy
attempted to reinforce Sugar Loaf and began to move his troops in the
open. Almost immediately twelve battalions of our artillery took the
enemy troops under time-on-target fire and inflicted such heavy losses
that the reinforcement threat was broken up. While the Half Moon and
Sugar Loaf still remained in enemy hands, the division had made gains
that were not yet perceptible. There was no way of knowing as yet the
extent of the enemy’s losses. So far, he had been able to move in enough
reinforcements to counter our attacks, but his losses had reached the
point where he could no longer readily replace them. Meanwhile, the
Twenty Ninth Marines had got into position for the final attack, which
was to be launched next day.
[Illustration: Map 7. 29-Th Marines Secure Sugar Loaf.]
At 0830, 18 May, the First and Third Battalions, Twenty Ninth again
assaulted the enemy on the Half Moon. After a foothold was established
the fighting resolved itself into a slugging match, and this enabled the
Second Battalion to make its move. It first attempted to encircle Sugar
Loaf with tanks but enemy mines, 47-mm. fire, and artillery fire
disabled six tanks and drove the rest back.
[Illustration: Map 8. Attack of 4-Th Marines.]
Next, the Second Battalion launched a combined tank-infantry assault on
Sugar Loaf, working the tanks, closely supported by troops, around each
flank of the hill simultaneously. One tank accompanied by troops, edged
its way around the west side of the hill and commenced firing into the
enemy’s reverse slope defenses. Then, as the enemy moved to repel this
threat, another tank worked its way around the east side of the hill and
emptied its machine guns into the backs of the defenders of Sugar Loaf.
In the ensuing pandemonium troops swarmed all over the hill and, after
an hour of heavy fighting, the hill was firmly held by Marines. “F”
Company was sent to seize the Horseshoe and reduce the mortar positions
there that were firing on Sugar Loaf. The company moved rapidly across
the intervening ground, climbed up on the Horseshoe, and engaged the
enemy in a hand grenade battle. During the night the enemy
counterattacked and drove “F” Company back to Sugar Loaf but could not
regain the lost hill. Over on the left of the zone of action of the
Twenty Ninth Marines, the First and Third Battalions held their
positions at the base of the Half Moon, despite heavy enemy fire. For
the action during the period 14-19 May, the Twenty Ninth Marines, and
attached units, were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.
In order to exploit the recently won gains General Shepherd ordered the
Fourth Marines fresh after a two weeks’ rest, to relieve the Twenty
Ninth on 19 May. On the right of the division’s front, the Twenty Second
Marines remained in position, but were in no condition to continue the
attack. After relieving the Twenty Ninth Marines, the Fourth prepared to
attack next day to seize the upper reaches of the Asato River. The night
of 19 May saw the enemy making full use of his mortars and artillery but
casualties were light. Next morning the Fourth Marines attacked
Horseshoe Ridge and managed to seize a part of it. While the fighting
raged, the enemy on the Shuri Hill mass turned his weapons and hit the
flank of the Fourth with heavy fire. At 2130, following a terrific
90-mm. mortar barrage, the enemy commenced to counterattack with Sugar
Loaf as the objective. Centering on the Third Battalion, Fourth Marines,
the counterattack continued until midnight. During this time naval star
shells kept the critical area illuminated and six battalions of
artillery fired to break up the counterattack. Before the enemy was
driven back, it was necessary to commit part of the regimental reserve.
In this unsuccessful counterattack, the enemy lost nearly 300 killed
while the Fourth Marines only lost 1 man killed and 19 wounded.
On 21 May the Fourth Marines made slight gains in the interior of
Horseshoe Ridge but the foothold on the Half Moon could not be expanded.
Until Shuri fell it would be virtually impossible to take the Half Moon
in its entirety. It was futile to attack on the left. Now the emphasis
was shifted to the regiment’s right and on the morning of 22 May the
front lines advanced slowly to the Asato.
Employing a holding attack on the extreme left of the division front,
General Shepherd was ready to exploit his gains. After a thorough
reconnaissance of the ground just across the Asato, the Fourth Marines
moved two battalions across the river during the afternoon of 23 May and
ran into determined enemy resistance. The position of the Fourth
Marines, while not precarious, was extremely difficult. Two attempts to
bridge the Asato had failed; all food, water and ammunition had to be
carried across by hand. The past three days had brought unusually heavy
rains and the entire division zone of action was a sea of mud. Wading
through mud ankle deep, stretcher bearers had a hard time getting the
wounded back to evacuation points north of the rear. Few vehicles could
negotiate the morass of mud that characterized the area. These rains
were to continue until the last of May.
[Illustration: Map 9. Attack of Fourth Marines. Asato River Area.]
On 25 May the Fourth Marines resumed the attack and seized most of the
north-south ridge line west of Machishi. About a company of the enemy
counterattacked during the night and spent its force in the sector of
the Third Battalion. While the Fourth Marines were moving into the
eastern outskirts of Naha, the Division Reconnaissance Company crossed
the Asato near its mouth and penetrated the urban portion of Naha west
of the north-south canal. Enemy resistance was very light; only a few
snipers harassed the company. Next day, with the heavy rain still
falling, the Fourth Marines confined its efforts to vigorous patrolling.
The reconnaissance company moved 300 yards further into Naha.
Unmistakable signs on 26 May pointed toward a Japanese withdrawal from
the Shuri position. In order to determine the extent of the withdrawal
to the front of the Sixth Marine Division, all units commenced
patrolling. Part of the Second Battalion, Twenty Second Marines, crossed
the Asato and passed through the Reconnaissance Company while pushing
farther into Naha. The city was almost a total wreck. Only a few
buildings around the outskirts remained standing and these were badly
damaged. During the day the Fourth Marines sent patrols over 300 yards
forward of the lines and found only light opposition.
Again General Shepherd reoriented his attack; he ordered the Twenty
Second Marines to complete the capture of Naha and be prepared to
advance through the hills that overlook the Kokuba River from the north.
At the same time, he ordered the Twenty Ninth Marines to relieve the
Fourth, and to be prepared to continue the attack to the southeast
toward the Shichina hills. On 28 May the Twenty Ninth Marines commenced
to relieve the Fourth Marines; at the same time, the Twenty Second
Marines completed the capture of urban Naha, the part that lies to the
west of the north-south canal.
Initially, the Twenty Ninth Marines were to carry out a holding attack
while supporting the Twenty Second Marines by fire. On 29 May, with the
Twenty Ninth Marines holding on its left, the Twenty Second Marines
crossed the north-south canal and commenced to fight through the low
hills that lead to Shichina, and parallel the Kokuba River. The attack
moved rapidly at first on the right but the enemy rear guard, stationed
in the hills to the front of the two regiments, began to resist more
fiercely, and it wasn’t until 1 June that the two regiments were able to
clean out the enemy in the Shichina area; now the division could look
down from its position above the Kokuba and see the Naha-Yonabaru
cross-island highway. Across the river, troops could see destroyed
materiel abandoned by the enemy in his hasty withdrawal to the south.
The Twenty Second Marines rested now for the first time since crossing
the Asa River on 10 May. For this period the regiment, and its attached
units, was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. In the drive from the
Asa to the Kokuba casualties had been heavy.